13 December 1996
Supreme Court


Case number: C.A. No.-002020-002024 / 1986
Diary number: 69424 / 1986






DATE OF JUDGMENT:       13/12/1996




JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T      S.B. Majmudar. J.      These five  appeals arise  on certificates  of  fitness granted by  the High  Court of  Andhra Pradesh  at Hyderabad under Article  100(1) of  the Constitution  of  India.  They bring in  challenge on  behalf of  the Institution of Andhra Pradesh Lokayukta/Upa-Lokayukta  and  the  State  of  Andhra Pradesh respectively, a common judgment rendered by the said High  Court  in  five  writ  petitions  moved  by  the  writ petitioners who are contesting respondents in these appeals. A common  question of  jurisdiction  of  the  Lokayukta/Upa- Lokayukta functioning  under the  Andhra  Pradesh  Lokayukta Act,  1983   (hereinafter  referred  to  as  ‘the  Act’)  to entertain complaints  regarding the  impugned actions of the writ petitioners falls for consideration in these appeals.      For appreciating  the aforesaid question the background facts leading  to these  proceedings deserve  to  be  noted. Civil Appeal  No.2020 of  1986 moved  by Lokayukta  and Upa- Lokayukta, Andhra  Pradesh arises  out of  the decision of a Division Bench  of the  High Court in Writ Petition No.16716 of 1984.  The original writ petitioner who is the contesting respondent in  this appeal  was at  the relevant  time Chief Executive Officer  of Andhra Pradesh State Cooperative Union Limited duty  registered under  the provisions of the Andhra pradesh Cooperative  Societies Act,  1964. A  complaint  was filed against  his functioning as Chief Executive Officer by one A.  Pratap Reddy.  It  was  received  by  the  Lokayukta functioning under  the Act on 6th March 1984. The contesting writ petitioner’s objection before the Lokayukta that he had no jurisdiction  to entertain  the complaint was rejected by order dated  17th November  1984. The said order was brought in challenge  by the  respondent-writ petitioner  before the High Court  in the aforesaid writ petition, A Division Bench of the  High Court  took the  view that the Lokayukta had no jurisdiction to  entertain the  said complaint.  Accordingly the writ  petition was  allowed and  proceedings before  the Lokayukta were quashed giving rise to the present appeal.      Civil Appeal  No.2021 of  1986 is moved by the State of Andhra Pradesh  being aggrieved by similar decision rendered by the  very same  Division Bench  of the High Court in Writ



Petition No.1883  of 1995.  That writ  petition was moved by the contesting  respondent who  was  Divisional  Manager  of Andhra Pradesh  State Road Transport Corporation constituted by the  State of  Andhra Pradesh  under the  Road  Transport Corporation Act,  1950  (hereinafter  refereed  to  as  ‘the Corporations Act’)  which is  a Central  Act. The  said writ petitioner challenged  the proceedings  before the Lokayukta resulting from  a complaint  filed against  his  working  as such. He  raised an  identical contention that the Lokayukta had no  jurisdiction to  entertain such  a complaint against him end  to pass  any orders  thereon. This  contention  was accepted by  the Division  Bench  by  the  aforesaid  common judgment and  that is  how the State of Andhra Pradesh being aggrieved by  the  said  decision  of  the  High  Court  has prosecuted this appeal.      In Civil  Appeal No.2022  of 1988  the State  of Andhra Pradesh has  brought  in  challenge  the  very  same  common decision of  the Andhra  Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No.4502 of  1985 moved  by  the  original  writ  petitioner- contesting respondent  herein who  was at  the relevant time working as  a doctor in the dispensary run by Andhra Pradesh State Road  Transport Corporation.  It was  contended by the writ  petitioner  that  proceedings  initiated  against  him before  the  Lokayukta  could  not  be  entertained  by  the Lokayukta having  no jurisdiction  to proceed  with  such  a complaint  against  him.  The  Division  Bench  upheld  that contention of  the respondent-writ petitioner. That has been the subject-matter of challenge in this appeal by the State.      Civil Appeal No.2023 of 1988 is also moved by the State of Andhra  Pradesh being  aggrieved by the decision rendered by the same Division Bench in Writ Petition No.10217 of 1985 whereunder the  writ  petition  of  the  second  petitioner, namely, G.  Prakash was  allowed, Said  writ petitioner no.2 was  a   clerk  in  Andhra  Pradesh  State  Wool  Industrial Cooperative Society Limited, Hyderabad. The said society was registered under  the Andhra  Pradesh Cooperative  Societies Act, 1994,  The said  writ petitioner was working in the pay scale of  Rs.600-900 at the relevant time when complaint was filed against  him regarding  his alleged  action before the Lokayukta. Writ  petitioner contended  that Lokayukta had no jurisdiction to  entertain the  complaint against him and to pass any  order thereon.  This contention  appealed  to  the Division Bench  of the High Court and the proceedings before the Lokayukta  were quashed.  The State  of  Andhra  Pradesh feeling aggrieved  by the said order has filed the aforesaid appeal.      The last  Civil Appeal No.2024 of 1988 in also moved by the State  of Andhra  Pradesh being  aggrieved by  the order passed by  the same Division Bench in Writ petition No.12166 of 1985  moved by  one 8,  Prakash  who  is  the  contesting respondent herein.  He was  the Business  Manager of  Andhra pradesh State  Handloom  Weaver  Cooperative  Society  Ltd., Hyderabad, A  complaint was  filed against  him  before  the Lokayukta  for   his  working   as   such.   Respondent-writ petitioner  contended   before  the   High  Court  that  the Lokayukta  had   no  jurisdiction   to  entertain  the  said complaint and  to proceed  with the  same against  him. This contention of  his was accepted by the Division Bench of the High Court  by the aforesaid common order. That has resulted in the present appeal by the State of Andhra Pradesh.      That the aforesaid common controversy in the present cases requires  to be  resolved in the light of the relevant provisions of  the Act.  The Act, as its Preamble shows, was enacted to  make provision for the appointment and functions of  Lokayukta   and  Upa-Lokayukta   for  investigation   of



Administrative  action   taken  by   or  on  behalf  of  the Government of  Andhra Pradesh  or certain  Local and  Public Authorities in  the State  of Andhra  Pradesh (including any omission and commission in connection with or arising out of such potion)  in certain  cases and  for  matters  connected therewith. The  matters which  could be  investigated by the Lokayukta or  Upa-Lokayukta are  enumerated in  Section 7 of the Act. The relevant provisions thereof road as under:      "7.   Matters    which    may    be      investigated by  Lokayukta or  Ups-      Lokayukta:-(1)   Subject   to   the      provisions   of   this   Act,   the      Lokayukta   may   investigate   any      sation which  is taken  by, or with      the general  or  specific  approval      of, or at behest of:-      (i) a Minister or a Secretary: ; or      (ii) a  Member of  either House  of      the State Legislature or      (iii)  a  Mayor  of  the  Municipal      Corporation constituted by or under      the relevant law for the time being      in force; or      (iv)  any   other  public  servant,      belonging to  such class or section      of  public   servants,  as  may  be      notified by  the Government in this      behalf after  consultation with the      Lokayukta,  in  any  case  where  a      complaint involving  an  allegation      is made  in respect of such action,      or such action can be or could have      been,  in   the  opinion   of   the      Lokayukta,  the   subject   of   an      allegation."      The  contention  of  learned  senior  counsel  for  the appellants is  that the  writ petitioners  concerned who are contesting respondents  in these  appeals are covered by the sweep or Section 7(1)(iv).      In order  to see whether all the contesting respondents could be  covered by the sweep of the aforesaid provision it will be  necessary to  find  out  whether  they  are  public servants within the contemplation of the Act. The definition of ‘public servant’ is given by Section 2(k) of the Act. The relevant provisions of the said definition read as under :      "2(k)  ‘public   servant’  means  a      person falling  under  any  of  the      following descriptions, namely:-      (i) ... ... ...      (ii) ... ... ...      (iii) every  officer referred to in      clause (i);      (iv) (1)  every Chairman of a Zilla      Parishad, and  every President of a      Panchayat Samithis,  constituted by      or   under   the   Andhra   Pradesh      Panchayat   Samithis    and   Zilla      Parishads Act, 1959:      (2) Every  Mayor of  the  Municipal      Corporation constituted by or under      the relevant law for the time being      in force;      (3) ... ... ...      (v) every Chairman or President, by      whatever   name   called   of   the



    governing   body   to   which   the      Management is  entrusted and  every      director, if any in respect of-      (1) ... ... ...      (2) any  Corporation (not  being  a      local authority)  established by or      under   State    Act   and    owned      controlled by the Government;      (3) ... ... ...      (4) ... ... ...      (5)   any    co-operative   society      registered   or    deemed   to   be      registered under the Andhra Pradesh      Co-operative  Societies  Act,  1964      whose Area of operation extends tot      he  whole   of  the  Estate  or  is      confined to  a part  of  the  State      extending to  an Area not less than      a district;"      So far as the term ‘officer’ is concerned it is defined by Section 2(i) as under :      "2. (i)  ‘officer’ means  a  person      appointed to  a public  service  or      post in connection with the affairs      of the State of Andhra Pradesh, but      does not include a person holding a      post carrying  a minimum  scale  of      pay  of  rupees  one  thousand  one      hundred and fifty and below;"      Section 2(a)  defines  ‘action’  as      under :      "2. (a) ‘action’ means action taken      by  a   public   servant   in   the      discharge of  his functions as such      public servant, by way of decision,      recommendation or finding or in any      other  manner,   and  includes  any      omission    and    commission    in      connection with  or arising  out of      such   action;    and   all   other      expressions connecting action shall      be construed accordingly;"      A conjoint  reading of the aforesaid provisions clearly indicates that  the Lokayukta  or Upa-Lokayukta, as the case may be,  may investigate  any action of a public servant who falls within  the scope  and  ambit  of  the  definition  of ‘public servant’ as found in Section 2(k).      In the  first instence it was contended before the High Court  on   behalf  of   the  appellants   that  these  writ petitioners were  public servants as defined by Section 2(k) (iii) as  they were  officers. In support of this contention reliance was  placed on the definition of the word ‘officer’ as found  in Section  2(i). Now  a mere  look  at  the  said provision shows  that before  a person  can be  said to be a public servant  because he  is an  officer it  must be shown that he  was appointed  to  a  public  service  or  post  in connection with  the affairs of the State of Andhra Pradesh. The concerned writ petitioners were either working in Andhra Pradesh State  Road Transport Corporation or in Co-operative Societies registered  under the  Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act,  1964. They  could not  be said to be persons appointed to a public service or post in connection with the affairs of  State of  Andhra Pradesh  and they were not full fledged government  servants we  would be  entitled to enjoy the protection  of Article all of the Constitution of India.



Therefore, the  attempt on  the part  of the  appellants  to attract the  jurisdiction of  the Lokayukta against the writ petitioners concerned on this ground was rightly found to be unsustainable by the High Court.      Learned senior  counsel then  invited our  attention to other relevant  parts of  the definition of the term ‘public servant’ as found in Section 2(k). So far as the respondent- writ petitioners  in Civil  Appeal Nos.2020 of 1988; 2023 of 1986 and  2024 of  1988 were concerned it was submitted that they would  be covered by the definition of ‘public servant’ as found  in Section  2(k)(v)(5) of  the Act  as  they  were working in Cooperative Societies registered under the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative  Societies  Act,  1984  whose  area  of operation extended  to the  whole of the State. It is not in dispute between  the parties that respondent in Civil Appeal No.2022 of  1986 at  the relevant  time was working as Chief Executive Officer  of Andhra Pradesh Cooperative Union Ltd., Hyderabad. The said Union was an apex Union registered under the Andhra  Pradesh Cooperative  Societies Act, 1964 and its area of  operation extended  to the  whole of  the State  of Andhra Pradesh.  Similarly in  Civil Appeal  No.2023 of 1986 the original  second writ  petitioner C.  Prakash  was  also working in  a Co-operative  Society, namely,  Andhra Pradesh State Wool  Industrial Co-operative  Society Ltd.  Which was also duly  registered under  the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act,  1984 and whose area of operation extended to the whole  of the  State. In the same manner respondent-writ petitioner in  Civil Appeal  No.2024 of  1986 S. Prakash was working in  a  Co-operative  Society  registered  under  the Andhra Pradesh  Co-operative Societies  Act, 1964 whose area of operation  extended to  the whole  of the  State, Thus on that count  sub-clause (5) of Clause (v) of Section 2(k) got attracted in  the  case  of  the  aforesaid  concerned  writ petitioners in  these appeals.  However this  conclusion  of ours cannot  advance the  case of the appellants any further against  them.   The  reason   is  obvious.  Before  Section 2(k)(v)(5) can  apply the concerned public servant must also be shown  to be working either as a Chairman or President by whatever name called who should be at the helm of affairs of the Governing  Body of  the Society  concerned to  which its Management is  entrusted, So  far as the respondent in Civil Appeal No.2020  of 1986 is concerned he was no doubt working as Chief Executive Officer of the Andhra Pradesh Cooperative Union Limited.  Our attention was invited by learned counsel for respondent  in the  said appeal  to the  bye-laws of the said Union  which were  applicable at the relevant time when the dispute  arose. The  formation of the Managing Committee of the Union was to be made as per by-law 25 and as per bye- law 26  the elected members of the Managing Committee had to elect, amongst  others, the  following officers, namely, the President, two  Vice-Presidents, General  Secretary and  two Joint Secretaries.  Under bye-law  28 the Managing Committee had power  to appoint - (i) a Chief Executive Officer and an Assistant Chief  Executive Officer  and to fix their pay and allowances  and   (ii)  a   paid  Editor.   These  bye-laws, therefore, make  it clear  that a Chief Executive Officer is the creature  of the  Managing Committee and is not a member thereof, Obviously  the President  of the Managing Committee as elected  under bye-law  26 and  who will  head  the  said Managing Committee  is a  person different  from  the  Chief Executive Officer.  It is  no doubt  true that anyone who is the Chairman  or President  of the  Governing  Body  of  the concerned Society  by whatever  name  called,  to  whom  the management of  the society  is entrusted would be covered by the sweep of Section 2(k)(v). But so far as respondent-Chief



Executive  Officer  in  Civil  Appeal  No.2020  of  1986  is concerned he  cannot be  said to  be either  the Chairman or President or  his equivalent  having any  other nomenclature who was  at the helm of affairs of the Managing Committee or the Governing  Body of  the said  Society. Consequently  the contesting respondent  in this  Civil Appeal was outside the sweep of Section 2(k)(v)(6) of the Act.      So far  as  the  respondent-writ  petitioner  in  Civil Appeal No.2023  of 1988  is concerned  he was  a mere clerk. Hence he would not be covered by Section 2(k)(v)(6). Learned senior  counsel   for  the  appellants  in  this  connection submitted that  even though  he may  not be  covered by  the aforesaid provision  he would  still remain a public servant being an  officer as defined by Section 2(k) (iii) read with Section  2(i).  It  is  not  possible  to  agree  with  this contention for  two obvious reasons. Firstly before the said respondent could  be said  to  be  an  officer  of  the  Co- operative Society  it should  be shown that he was appointed to public  service or post in connection with the affairs of the State of Andhra Pradesh. He was not so appointed. He was appointed to  a post  in connection  with the affairs of the Co-operative Society  which  was  an  independent  corporate body. The  second reason  is that  even assuming that he was working on  a post  in connection  with the  affairs of  the State of Andhra Pradesh he was not holding a post carrying a minimum scale  of  pay  of  Rs.600-900.  Therefore,  he  was excluded from  the sweep  of the  definition of  officer  as found in  clause 2(i). For both three reasons, therefore, he could not  be said  to be  an officer.  Neither Section 2(k) (iii) nor  Section 2(k)  (v) applied  in his  page. He  was, therefore,  outside  the  sweep  of  definition  of  ‘public servant’. Consequently, his action could not be investigated by the  Lokayukta  on  the  combined  operation  of  Section 7(i)(iv) and  Section 2(a),  2(i) and  2(k) of  the  Act  as rightly held by the High Court.      So far  as the  contesting respondent  in Civil  Appeal No.2024 of  1986 is  concerned he  was a Business Manager of the Co-operative Society whose area of operation extended to whole of the State of Andhra pradesh, Therefore, second part of Section 2(k)(v)(5) applied in his case. However, the main part of  Section 2(k)(v)(5)  did not apply as he was neither the Chairman  nor the President of the Governing Body of the Committee of  Managing Committee  of the  said Society  much less  its   head  being   Chairman  or   President  thereof. Consequently as  he was a Business Manager of Andhra Pradesh State Handloom  Weavers’ Cooperative  Society, Hyderabad, he was outside the sweep of Section 2(k)(v). No other provision of the Act could be pressed in service by the learned senior counsel for  the appellant for roping him in for the purpose of subjecting  him to  the jurisdiction  of  the  Lokayukta. Therefore, the  decision rendered  by the  High Court in the case of  the  aforesaid  three  writ  petitioners  in  these appeals cannot be found fault with from any angle.      Now remains  the consideration  of the applicability of the Act  in the case of remaining two contesting respondents in Civil  Appeal No.2021 of 1988 and 2022 of 1988. So far as these two  respondents are  concerned learned senior counsel for the  appellants submitted  that Section 2(k)(v)(2) would apply provided  the concerned  public servant is attached to any Corporation  established by  or under  the State Act and owned and  controlled by  the Government.  It was  submitted before the  High Court  by these  writ petitioners that they were  working   in  Andhra   Pradesh  State  Road  Transport Corporation which was not established by the State of Andhra Pradesh under  any State  Act but under Central Act, namely,



the Corporations  Act,  even  though  that  Corporation  was established by  the State  of Andhra  Pradesh and was mainly owned and wholly controlled by the State Government. Learned senior counsel  for the  appellants  joined  issue  on  this aspect and  submitted for our consideration that on a proper construction of  the aforesaid provision it can be seen that Section 2(k)(v)(2)  consists of  two types of corporations - (i) any  corporation established by and owned and controlled by  the   State  Government;   and  (ii)   any   corporation established under  any State  Act.  She  submitted,  placing reliance on  various  provisions  of  the  Corporations  Act especially Sections  3, 5, 8, 17, 25, 31, 34 and 37 thereof, that Andhra  Pradesh State  Road Transport Corporation which was established  by  the  Andhra  Pradesh  State  under  the aforesaid  Central  Act  was  under  the  comprehensive  and pervasive control  of  the  Andhra  Pradesh  State  and  the Central Government  had no  such control  over it.  That the entire affairs  of the  Corporation including appointment of officers and the control of its working were in the hands of the State  of Andhra  Pradesh. Therefore,  it could  be said that it  was a corporation established, owned and controlled by the  State.  She  also  contended  that  there  are  many corporations or boards established by the States in exercise of powers conferred on the States by Central Acts like State Financial Corporation  Act, Indian Electricity Act etc., but once they  are established by the States concerned they work under  their   supervision  and   control  and  the  Central Government would  have nothing  to do  with them.  That if a view  is   taken  that   public  servants  working  in  such corporations  are   outside   the   purview   of   Lokayukta functioning under  the Act  isudable purpose  of  appointing such  Lockayuktas   to  apt   as  ombudsman   and  vigilance authorities for  supervising and  controlling their sections and  bringing   them  to  back  would  get  frustrated  and, therefore, a  more beneficial  construction may be placed on the aforesaid  provision with a view to subserve the purpose and legislative  intent underlying  the  enactment  of  this provision which  is for  the benefit of the society at large and any construction which frustrates the legislative intent underlying this  beneficial provision should not be resorted to.      On the  other hand  learned counsel  for the respondent submitted that on the express language of Section 2(k)(v)(2) any corporation  which is  established by or under the State Act would require the establishment of such corporation only in the  light of State Act. That the phrase ‘under the State Act’ cannot  be divorced  or  isolated  from  the  preceding phraseology  employed   by  the  Legislature,  namely,  ‘any Corporation established by or under.’ That the phrase ‘by or under’  has   a  direct   nexus  with  the  State  Act.  For highlighting  this  legislative  intent  our  attention  was invited to  identical phraselogy employed by the Legislature in the  same Section  2(k) in clauses (iii) and (iv) as well as sub-clause (2) of clause (iv).      In our  view the  aforesaid rival contentions canvassed by learned  counsel for the contesting parties regarding the applicability of  Section  2(k)(v)(2)  would  have  required closer scrutiny  by us  but for  the fact that the concerned respondent-writ petitioners  in these  appeals would get out of the  sweep of  Section 2(k)(v)(2) even assuming that they were corporations  covered by  the second  part of  the said provision and  that it was not necessary for the corporation in which  they worked to have been established under a State Act and could be established under a Central Act. Therefore, on the  facts of the present case it is not necessary for us



to decide  the question  whether a public servant working in any corporation  established by  the State not under a State Act  but  under  a  Central  Act  but  which  is  owned  and controlled wholly or partially by the State Government would satisfy  the   requirements  of   the   definition   Section 2(k)(v)(2) or  not. We leave that question open for decision in an  appropriate case.  We may  note that learned Advocate General appearing  for  the  State  of  Andhra  Pradesh  had conceded before  the High  Court that  as the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation is established by the State of Andhra  Pradesh not under State Act but under the Central Act, namely,  the Corporations Act, Section 2(k)(v)(2) would not cover  in its  sweep such  a corporation.  Even  leaving aside the  question whether  such a  concession  on  a  pure question of  law could  bind the appellant-State, as we will presently see  this question  is not required to be resolved in the present proceedings.      Even  assuming  that  the  Andhra  Pradesh  State  Road Transport Corporation  in which the concerned respondents in these two appeals were working at the relevant time would be covered by the sweep of the latter part of sub-clause (2) of clause (v)  of Section  2(k),  still  the  question  remains whether any  of them  was a  Chairman or  President  of  the Governing Body  to which  the Management of this Corporation was entrusted.  So far  as the respondent-writ petitioner in Civil Appeal  No.2021 of  1986 is  concerned at the relevant time he  was working  as a  Divisional Manager. A Divisional Manager working in a Division cannot be said to be in charge of the Managing Committee which is the apex Managing body of the State  Road Transport  Corporation. The  Chairmen of the Managing Committee  of the  Corporation would  be very  much above in the hierarchy as compared to the Divisional Manager who has to work even under the General Manager. Consequently the said  respondent-writ petitioner cannot be said to be at the helm  of affairs  of the Managing Committee of the State Road Transport  Corporation. He  would,  therefore,  not  be covered by  the first  part of  Section 2(k)(v)(2)  on  that score. So  far as respondent writ petitioner in Civil Appeal No.2022 of 1986 is concerned his case is on a still stronger footing as  at the  relevant time he was working as a doctor attached to  the dispensary  run by the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport  Corporation. He  had nothing  to do with the Management  of   the   Corporation   from   any   viewpoint. Consequently he  would obviously not be covered by the sweep of Section 2(k)(iv)(2) of the Act. The Division Bench of the High Court  was, therefore,  right in  taking the  view that actions of  all these  respondent-writ petitioners could not be  looked   into  by   the  Lokayukta  under  the  relevant provisions of the Act.      Before parting  with these matters, it may be necessary to note  that the legislative intent behind the enactment is to see  that the public servants covered by the sweep of the Act should  be answerable  for their  actions as such to the Lokayukta who is to be a Judge or a retired Chief Justice of the High Court and in appropriate cases to the Upa-Lokayukta who is  a District  Judge of  Grade-I as  recommended by the Chief Justice  of the  High Court,  so that  these statutory authorities  work   as  real  ombudsmen  for  ensuring  that people’s faith  in the  working of  these public servants is not shaken.  These statutory  authorities are meant to catre to the  need of  public at  large with a view to seeing that public confidence in the working of public bodies remains in tact.  When   such  authorities  consist  of  high  judicial dignitaries it would be abvious that such authorities should be armed  with appropriate powers and sanction so that their



orders and opinions do not become mere paper directions. The decisions of Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayukta, therefore, must be capable of being fully implemented. These authorities should not be  reduced to  mere paper tigers but must be armed with proper teeth  and claws  so that  the efforts put in by them are not  wasted and  their reports  are not  shelved by  the concerned disciplinary  authorities. When we turn to Section 12, sub-section  (3) of the Act, we find that once report is forwarded by the Lokayukta or Upa-lokayukta recommending the imposition of penalty of removal from the office of a public servant, all  that is  provided is  that it should be lawful for the  Government without  any  further  inquiry  to  take action on  the basis  of the  said  recommendation  for  the removal of  such servant  from his office and for making him ineligible for  being elected  to any office etc. Even if it may  be   lawful  for   the  Government   to  act   on  such recommendation, it  is nowhere  provided that the Government will be  bound to  comply with  the  recommendation  of  the Lokayukta or  Upa-lokayukta. The  question may  arise  in  a properly instituted public interest litigation as to whether the provision  of Section  12(2) of  the Act implies a power coupled with  duty which can be enforced by writ of mandamus by the  High Court  or by  writ of any other competent court but apart  from such  litigations and uncertainty underlying the results  thereof, it  would be  more appropriate for the legislature  itself  to  make  a  clear  provision  for  due compliance with  the report  of  Lokayukta  or  Up-lokayukta system does  not  get  eroded  and  these  institutions  can effectively justify their creation under the statute.      As a  result of  the aforesaid  discussion, it  must be held that  all  the  original  writ  petitioner  whose  writ petitions same  to be allowed by the High Court were rightly held to  be outside  the purview  and  jurisdiction  of  the Lokayukta functioning  under  the  Act.  These  appeals  are liable to  fall and  are accordingly dismissed. In the facts and circumstances  of the  case, however,  there will  be no order as to costs in all these appeals.