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PETITIONER: AJIT SAVANT MAJAGAVI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF KARNATAKA

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       14/08/1997

BENCH: M. K. MUKHERJEE, S. SAGHIR AHMAD

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT: Present :              Hon’ble Mr. Justice M.K. Mukherjee              Hon’ble Mr. Justice S. Saghir Ahmad Mukul Sharma, Adv. for S.R. Bhat, Adv. for the appellant Ms. Manjula  Kulkarni, Adv.  for M.  Veerappa, Adv.  for the Respondent                       J U D G M E N T The following Judgment of the Court was delivered :                       J U D G M E N T S. Saghir Ahmad, J.      Padmavathi, a  house  wife,  in  this  case,  has  been strangulated to  death, of  all persons, by her husband, the appellant before us. 2.   BATTLE OF SEXES has always been a battle of wits. Today it is  denuded of  its charms. It has degenerated into a WAR involving physical  violence, torture,  mental  cruelty  and murder of the female, including particularly, the WIFE. 3.   Social thinkers,  philosophers, dramatists,  poets  and writer have  eulogised the  female species of the human race and have  always used  beautiful epithets  to  describe  her temperament and  personality and have not deviated from that path even  while speaking  of her  odd behaviour,  at times. Even in  sarcasm, they  have not  crossed the literary limit and have  adhered to  a particular  standard of  nobility of language. Even  when a  member of her own species, Madame De Stael, remarked  "I am  glad that I am not a man; for then I should have  to marry  a woman",  there was  wit in it. When Shakespeare wrote, "Age cannot wither her; nor custom stale; Her infinite  variety", there again was wit. Notwithstanding that  these  writers  have  cried  hoarse  for  respect  for "Woman", notwithstanding   that Schiller said "Honour Women! They entwine  and weave  heavenly rose in our earthly life." and notwithstanding  that Mahabharat  mentioned her  as  the source of  salvation, the crime against "woman" continues to rise  and   has,  today   undoubtedly,  risen   to  alarming proportions. 4.   It is  unfortunate that  in an  age  where  people  are described as  civilised, crime against "Female" is committed even when the child is in the womb as the "female" foetus is often destroyed  to prevent  the birth  of female  child. If

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that child  comes into  existence, she  starts her life as a daughter, then  becomes a  wife and in due course, a Mother. She rocks  the cradle to rear up her infant, bestows all her love on  the child  and as the child grows in age, she gives to the  child all  that she  has in her own personality. She shapes the  destiny and  character of the child. To be cruel to such  a creature  is unthinkable.  To torment  a wife can only be  described as  the most  hated and derisive act of a human being. 5.   In this  appeal, we  have to  deal with the unfortunate story of torture of a wife and her sudden and untimely death at the hands of a person who had promised to the God, before the altar of fire, to be her protector. 6.   The appellant  was married  to a  young woman, by name, Padmavathi @  Janki, in  or about  April,  1984  in  Belgaum Taluk. Her  father was P.W. 8, Paris Savant Kaggodi who was, incidentally,   also    brother   of   appellant’s   mother. Padmavathi, after  bidding a-dieu  to her  father and  other relations, came  to live with the appellant in her new house where her  parent-in-laws also  lived. She became the victim of  mental   torture  and   cruelty  for  a  charge,  which, unfortunately, can  be levied  easily against  any  virtuous woman, that  she was involved in extra marital relationship; in this case with one Gundu Badasad. 7.   On becoming  pregnant,  Padmavathi  came  back  to  her father’s  house   of  performance   of  certain   ceremonies connected with  the pregnancy  and continued  to stay  there till she delivered a mala child. The information of birth of the child  was conveyed to the appellant and his parents but nobody, not  even the  appellant, came  to see Padmavathi or the child  although, in  normal course,  the birth of a male child has  the effect  of bringing  smile even on a frowning face. Like  a lull  before the  storm, this cold-shouldering was  the   precursor  of  the  evils  that  were  to  befall Padmavathi. 8.   Four months after the delivery, the appellant suddenly, on a  Saturday, came to the house of his father-in-law (P.W. 8) and  sought his permission to take his wife and the child to a temple at Stanvanidhi which was a sacred and holy place for the  Jains. The  next morning,  that is,  on Sunday, the appellant, his  wife and  the child  were seen  off  by  his sister-in-law at  the  Bus  Station  where  they  boarded  a Karnataka State  Road Transport  Corporation Bus and came to Halaga village where on Monday, at 1.00 A.M., the appellant, with his  wife and child came to the house of a person named Gopal Bhimappa  Inchal. The  appellant told  Gopal  Bhimappa Inchal that  on their return from the temple, they could not get the  "Bus" and,  therefore, they  had come to this house for the night halt. As promised, the appellant with his wife and the  child left  the house in the early morning and came to "Ashoka  Lodge" in  Belgaum where  he checked in Room No. 113 at 9.30 A.M. on 09.09.85. That was the most unfortunate, as also,  the last  day in Padmavathi’s life. At about 12.00 Noon, the appellant came to the reception counter of "Ashoka Lodge" and  informed the people there that his wife has died of  heart-attack   and  that  he  was  going  to  bring  his relations. he left the "Lodge", with child in his lap, never to come  back. Her gave the child to a lady called Gangavva, in village Halaga who, later, sent the child to Padmavathi’s father. 9.   The police  was informed  of the  matter in  due course which visited  the "Lodge" and held the inquest. The body of Padmavathi  was  sent  for  post  mortem  examination  which revealed that  Padmavathi had  died not  because of  cardiac arrest, but on account of asphyxia. Her death was homicidal.

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10.  The police  arrested,  challenged  and  prosecuted  the appellant, who was found "not guilty" by the trial court but the High Court, on appeal by the State, reversed the verdict and convicted the appellant u/s 302 IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Now, the matter is before us. 11.  Learned counsel  for the  appellant has  contended that the High Court should not have interferred with the judgment passed by  the trial  Court unless  it was  of the  positive opinion that the judgment was perverse and that it had to be reversed   for "substantial  and compelling  reasons". It is contended that  since substantive and compelling reason have not been indicated, the judgment of the High Court is liable to be  set aside  and that  of the  trial  court  is  to  be restored. It is also contended that even if all circumstance appearing   against    the   appellant    are   taken   into consideration, the  cumulative effect  of those circumstance does not  lead  to  the  irresistible  conclusion  that  the appellant was guilty. 12.  Section 378  of the  Code of  Criminal  Procedure  1973 which corresponds  to Section  417 of  the old Code provides for appeal in case of acquittal. 13.  There was  quite a  controversy among  the  Court  with considerable divergence  of judicial opinion as to the scope of appeal  against an  order of  acquittal. This controversy remained unabated  till some  guideline was indicated by the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup & Ors. v. King Emperor, L.R. 61 Indian Appeals 398 = AIR 1934 P.C. 227(2). This decision was considered in  Sanwat Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, (1961) 3 SCR 120,  in which  the legal position was explained by this Court as under :-      (1) The  evidence  upon  which  the      order of  acquittal was  passed  by      the  trial   court  can   reviewed,      reappreciated  and  reappraised  by      the Appellate Court.      (2) The  principle laid down by the      Privy Council in Sheo Swarup & ors.      v. King  Emperor, L.R..  61  Indian      Appeals   398    (supra);   provide      correct    guidelines    for    the      Appellate Court  while disposing of      the appeal  against  the  order  of      acquittal.      (3)  The   words  "substantial  and      compelling  reasons",   "good   and      sufficiently  cogent   reasons"  or      "strong reasons" used by this court      in its  various  judgments  do  not      have the effect of curtailing power      of the  High Court  to  reconsider,      review  or  scrutinise  the  entire      evidence on record so as to come to      its own conclusions in deciding the      appeal   against    an   order   of      acquittal. 14.  As a  matter of  fact, the  power of the High Court are not different  from its powers in an ordinary appeal against conviction. The  additional burden  which is  placed on  the High Court  is that  it has  to consider each of the grounds which has  prompted the  trial court  to pass  the order  of acquittal and  to record  its own  reasons for  not agreeing with the trial court. 15.  In State  of Uttar  Pradesh vs. Samman Das, AIR 1972 SC 677 - (1972) 3 SCR 58, this Court again reiterated the above principles and  pointed out that there were certain cardinal

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rules which  had always  to kept  in view  in appeal against acquittal. It was pointed out that there is a presumption of innocence in  favour of  the accused  especially when he has been acquitted by the trial court. It was further to be kept in view  that if  two views  of the matter are possible. the view which  favours the  accused  has  to  be  adopted.  The Appellate Court  has also  to keep in view the fact that the trial judge has the advantage of looking at the demeanour of witnesses and  that the  accused is  still entitled  to  the benefit of  doubt. The  doubt should  be such  as a rational thinking    person    will    reasonably,    honestly    and conscientiously entertain and not the doubt of an irrational mind. (See also : Sohrab vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1973) 1 SCR  472 =  (1972) 3  SCC 751  = AIR  1972 SC  2020; Ediga Sanjnna vs.  State of  Andhra Pradesh,  (1976)  2  SCC  210; Satbir Singh  & Anr. vs. State of Punjab, (1977) 3 SCR 195 = (1977) 2 SCC 263; Chandrakanta Devnath vs. State of Tripura, (1986) 1  SCC 549  = 1986 Cr.L.J. 809; G.B. Patel & Anr. vs. State of  Maharashtra, AIR  1979 SC  135; Awadesh & Anr. vs. State of  Madhya Pradesh,  (1988) 3  SCR 513  = (1988) 2 SCC 557; Anokh  Singh vs.  State of  Punjab, (1992) 1 (Supp) SCC 426; Gajanan  Amrut Gaykwad & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra, (1995) 3 (Supp) SCC 607; Ram Kumar vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1995 SC 280; Betal Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1996) 4 SCC 203). 16.  This Court  has thus  explicitly and  clearly laid down the principle which would govern and regulate the hearing of appeal by  the High  Court against  an  order  of  acquittal passed by  the trial  court. These  principles have been set out in innumerable cases and may be reiterated as under :-      (1) In  an appeal  against an order      of  acquittal,   the   High   Court      possesses  all   the  powers,   and      nothing less  than the  powers,  it      possesses while  hearing an  appeal      against an order of conviction.      (2) The High Court has the power to      reconsider   the    whole    issue,      reappraise the evidence and come to      its own  conclusion and  finding in      place of  the findings  recorded by      the  trial   court,  if   the  said      findings are  against the weight of      the evidence on record, or in other      words, perverse.      (3) Before  reversing the  findings      of acquittal, the High Court has to      consider each  ground on  which the      order of acquittal was based and to      record  its   own  reason  for  not      accepting  those  grounds  and  not      subscribing to  the view  expressed      by the trial court that the accused      is entitled to acquittal.      (4) In  reversing  the  finding  of      acquittal, the  High Court  has  to      keep in  view  the  fact  that  the      presumption of  innocence is  still      available in  favour of the accused      and the  same stands  fortified and      strengthened  by   the   order   of      acquittal passed  in his  favour by      the trial court.      (5) If  the High  Court, on a fresh      scrutiny  and  reappraisal  of  the

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    evidence  and   other  material  on      record,  is  of  the  opinion  that      there is  another view which can be      reasonably  taken,  then  the  view      which favours the accused should be      adopted.      (6) The High Court has also to keep      in mind  that the  trial court  had      the advantage  of  looking  at  the      demeanour    of    witnesses    and      observing  their   conduct  in  the      Court especially  in  the  witness-      box.      (7) The High Court has also to keep      in mind  that even  at that  stage,      the accused was entitled to benefit      of doubt.  The doubt should be such      as  a   reasonable   person   would      honestly    and     conscientiously      entertain as  to the  guilt of  the      accused. 17.  It is in the light of these principle that it has to be seen whether  the High  Court,  in  the  instant  case,  was justified in reversing the order of acquittal. 18.  Before taking up this task, it may be stated that for a crime to  be proved, it is not necessary that the crime must be  seen   to  have   been  committed   and  must   in   all circumstances,  be  proved  by  direct  ocular  evidence  by examining before  the Court  those persons  who had seen its commission. The  offence can  be  proved  by  circumstantial evidence also.  The principle fact or "factum probandum" may be proved  indirectly by  means of  certain inferences drawn from "factum  probans", that  is, the  evidentiary facts. To put it differently, circumstantial evidence is not direct to the point in issue but consists of evidence of various other facts which are so closely associated with the fact in issue that taken together, they form a chain of circumstances from which the  existence  of  the  principal  fact  can  legally inferred or presumed. 19.  It has  been consistently  laid down by this Court that were a  case rests  squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of  guilt can  be  justified  only  when  all  the incriminating  facts  and  circumstances  are  found  to  be incompatible with  the innocence of the accused of the guilt of any  other person.  (See  :  Hukam  Singh  vs.  State  of Rajasthan, AIR  1977 SC  1063; Eradu  and other vs. State of Hyderabad, AIR  1956 SC  316;  Earabhadrappa  vs.  State  of Karnataka, AIR  1983 SC  446; State of U.P. vs. Sukhbasi and others. AIR  1985 SC  1224; Balwinder  Singh  vs.  State  of Punjab, AIR 1987 SC 350; Ashok Kumar Chatterjee vs. State of Madhya Pradesh. AIR 1989 SC 1890). 20.  The circumstance  from which  an inference  as  to  the guilt of  the accused is  drawn have  to  be  proved  beyond reasonable  doubt  and  have  to  be  shown  to  be  closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances.  In Bhagat Ram vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1954 SC  621, it  was laid  down that where the case depends upon the conclusions drawn from circumstance, the cumulative effect of  the circumstance  must be  such a to negative the innocence of  the accused and bring the offences home beyond any reasonable doubt. 21.  In Padala  Veera Reddy  vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, 1991  SCC (Crl.)  407 =  AIR 1990 SC 79, it was laid down that  when a  case rests  upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests :-

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    (1) the  circumstance from which an      inference of  guilt is sought to be      drawn, must  be cogently and firmly      established;      (2) those  circumstances should  be      of a  definite tendency  unerringly      pointing  towards   guilt  of   the      accused;      (3)   the    circumstance,    taken      cumulatively, should  form a  chain      so complete that there is no escape      from the conclusion that within all      human  probability  the  crime  was      committed by  the accused  and none      else; and      (4) the  circumstantial evidence in      order to sustain conviction must be      complete    and     incapable    of      explanation of any other hypothesis      than  that  of  the  guilt  of  the      accused and  such  evidence  should      not only  be  consistent  with  the      guilt of  the accused but should be      inconsistent with his innocence. 22.  (See also  : State  of Uttar  Pradesh vs.  Ashok  Kumar Srivastava, (1992)  2 SCC  86 = 1992 Cr.LJ 1104) in which it was pointed  out that great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial evidence  and if  the evidence  relied on  is reasonably capable  of two  inference, the  one in favour of the accused must be accept. It was also pointed out that the circumstances relied  upon must  be found to have been fully established and  the cumulative  effect of  all the facts so established must  be consistent  only with the hypothesis of guilt. 23.  What is  important  is  that  the  possibility  of  the conclusions being  consistent  with  the  innocence  of  the accused must be ruled out altogether. 24.  Let us now delve into the merits. 25.  In  order  to  prove  its  case,  the  prosecution  has examined many  witnesses to  establish the  link between the appellant and  the crime.  Paris  Savant  Kaggodi  (P.W.  8) stated that  his daughter  Padmavathi  was  married  to  the appellant who  was being ill-treated at the house of her in- laws principally  because the  appellant entertained a doubt that she  was having  extra marital  relationship with Gundu Badasad. When  Padmavathi became  pregnant, she came to live with her  parents and  at the house of her parents, she gave birth to a child. 26.  The learned  Session Judge and the High Court have both found that this part of the statement of Padmavathi’s father has not  been challenged  and, therefore, it was established that Padmavathi  was not  treated fairly at the house of her in-law and  the appellant carried doubt in his mind that she was involved  in post-marital sex with Gundu Badasad. It was also established that she gave birth to a child at the house of her father. 27.  The appellant,  however, denied  the prosecution  story that he came to the house of his father-in-law and took away his wife  and child. The trial court, namely, the IInd Addl. Sessions Judge,  Belgaum has  found that the prosecution had failed to establish that the appellant had come to the house of his  father-in-law and requested him to take his wife and child to  a temple  or that, thereafter, he took his wife to the "Ashoka  Lodge" at  Belgaum where  she was  throttled to death  by  the  appellant.  The  High  Court,  however,  has

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reversed this  finding and  come to  the conclusion that the death of  Padmavathi, in  Room No. 113 of "Ashoka Lodge", at the hands of the appellant, was established by the fact that her dead  body, which  was identified by Mallasarja (P.W. 1) of Gandigawad  village who was working at Belgaum, was found in that  room. She  had not  died a  natural death  but  was strangulated to  death which  was established  by the  post- mortem examination  conducted by  the Doctor (P.W. 12). Ajit (P.W.  2)   who  was   the  room-boy   of   "Ashoka   Lodge" categorically stated  that the  appellant with  his wife and the child had come to the "Lodge" and occupied Room No. 113. He also  stated that  the appellant  later left  the "Lodge" with his  child on  the pretext  that his  wife had died and that he was going to call his relations. 28.  It  is   contended  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the appellant that  since P.Ws.  9, 14, 17 and 18 as also P.W. 3 had turned  hostile and  had not  supported the  prosecution case, their statements are liable to be excluded and if this is done, the result will be that the link in the prosecution story would stand broken and the appellant could not be held guilty on  the basis  of broken circumstantial evidence. The Addl. Sessions  Judge had  fallen  into  the  web  of  this, apparently, forceful argument but the High Court, and in our opinion, rightly,  accepted the  remaining evidence and held that in  spite of  hostility of the aforesaid witnesses, the prosecution story was fully established. 29.  We would  like to  add a  few words  of our  own on the effect of exclusion of statements of those witnesses who had turned hostile. 30.  Gangavva (P.W.  3), with whom the child was left by the appellant on  his return  from "Lodge", was the witnesss who was treated  as hostile.  Even if her statement is excluded, the main  part of  the prosecution  story that the appellant had come  with Padmavathi  to "Ashoka  Lodge" where they had occupied Room  No. 113  is not  affected. Their  presence in "Ashoka Lodge"  is testified  by Ajit (P.W. 2), the room-boy of "Ashoka  Lodge". Padmavathi  was, therefore, last seen in the company of the appellant. The appellant left the "Lodge" on the pretext  that his  wife had  died and he was going to call his relations. But he did no return. His conduct of not returning back to Room No. 113 eloquently indicates that he, in order to avoid arrest, did not return to "Lodge". He left the dead  body of  Padmavathi lying  in Room  No. 113  to be found out  there by the hotel and police people. An innocent person would not have behaved in that fashion. His innocence would have  been reflected  in his conduct of coming back to the "Lodge". 31.  Apart from  the appellant’s conduct in not returning to "Ashoka Lodge",  aft having  left the "Lodge" at 12.00 Noon, another conduct  of the appellant is significantly eloquent. When he  reported at "Ashoka Lodge", he was sporting a beard and had  also unkempt  hairs on  his head. In the evening of the day  of incident,  he got  his head and the beard shaved which is  proved by  the barber  (P.W. 5),  examined in  the case. This  was done  obviously to  the conceal his identity but police  was vigilant  and the  appellant was apprehended without difficulty. 32.  The appellant’s  further conduct  in  taking  away  the child with  him at 12.00 Noon is also significant. The child was hardly four months old and was a breast-suckling infant. Had Padmavathi  been alive,  the appellant;  would have left the child  with her.  His taking  away the  child  with  him coupled with  his statement  made to  the room-boy  that his wife had  died of  heart-attack, establishes that Padmavathi was already dead. Since she was strangulated to death, there

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was non  else except  the appellant  to have done it. It was positively that  act of  the appellant.  He took the extreme step on account of suspected infidelity of his wife which he had been harbouring since his marriage. 33.  The other  hostile witnesses  are Jaipal  (P.W. 14) who had seen  the appellant  and his  wife Padmavathi with their child in  a Karnataka  State Road Transport Corporation Bus, P.W. 9  before whom  extra judicial  confession was  alleged made the  appellant, P.Ws.  17 and 18 who were the witnesses for the  Panchanamas apart  from P.W.  15 who  was also  the witness of  Panchanama but  he did  not turn hostile. If the statements of  these witnesses are excluded, the prosecution case is  still not  affected on merits inasmuch as the story that the  appellant had  gone to the house of his father-in- law  and  taken  away  his  wife  and  child  and  that  the ultimately  stayed   in  "Ashoka  Lodge"  at  Belgaum  where Padmavathi was  found dead  is  not  affected.  Whether  the appellant with his wife and the child had gone to the temple or had  stayed with a friend in the night, cannot be said to be essential  links in  the chain  of events  leading to the conclusion that  the appellant  had committed the crime. The appellant was  last seen  with Padmavathi in Room No. 113 of "Ashoka Lodge"  where he  had stayed  on the fateful day and had left  the "Lodge  with his  child on the pretext that he was going  to call  his relations  as Padmavathi had died of heart-attack. As pointed out earlier, Padmavathi had died of strangulation.  The   appellant’s  presence   in  the   Room immediately before  the death  of Padmavathi and his conduct in not  coming back  to the "Lodge" are circumstances strong enough to establish his guilt. 34.  Some dispute  appears to  have been  raised before  the High Court  as also  before us that the hotel records should not be relied upon to indicate that the appellant had stayed in "Ashoka Lodge". 35.  Ajit  (P.W.   2),  room-boy  of  the  "Lodge",  in  his statement on oath, has given out that the appellant had come with his  wife and child to the "Ashoka Lodge" and had taken one Room  on the  ground-floor for  his stay.  The necessary entry (Ex.P1(a))  was made  by the Manager of the "Lodge" in the  "Register  of  Lodgers".  The  appellant  had  put  his signature on  the Register which is Ex.P1(b). The appellant, his wife  and the  child had  been taken  by the room-boy to Room No.  113 where he also supplied an extra bed. The hotel Manager, though  mentioned as a witness in the charge-sheet, was not  examined as  he had already left the service of the "Lodge". These  facts stand  proved by  the statement of the room-boy and  the High  Court has already recorded a finding that the appellant had stayed in Room No. 113 of the "Ashoka Lodge". 36.  The original  records were also placed before us and we have perused  those records.  Since learned  counsel for the appellant contended that the appellant had not stayed in the "Ashoka Lodge", we looked into the "Register of Lodgers". It contains the  relevant entry  against which signature of the appellant also  appears. His  signature also  appears on the "Vakalatnama" filed  by him  in this appeal. In the presence of the  learned counsel  for the  parties, we  compared  the signature of  the appellant  on the  "Vakalatnama" with  the signature in  the "Register  of Lodgers". A mere look at the signatures was  enough to  indicate the similarity which was so apparent  that  it  required  no  expert  evidence.  This comparison was done by us having regard to the provisions of Section 73 of the Evidence Act which provides as under:-      S.73.  Comparison   of   signature,      writing   or   seal   with   others

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    admitted or  proved.- In  order  to      ascertain  whether   a   signature,      writing or  seal  is  that  of  the      person by  whom it purports to have      been   written    of   made,    any      signature, writing or seal admitted      or proved  to t satisfaction of the      Court to  have been written or made      by that person may be compared with      the one  which  is  to  be  proved,      although that signature, writing or      seal  has   not  been  produced  or      proved for any other purpose.           The  Court   may  direct   any      person present  in Court  to  write      any  words   or  figures   for  the      purpose of  enabling the  Court  to      compare the  words  or  figures  so      written with  any words  or figures      alleged to  have  been  written  by      such person." 37.  This Section  consists of  two parts.  While the  first part  provides   for   comparison   of   signature,   finger impression, writing  etc. allegedly  written or  made  by  a person with  signature or writing etc. admitted or proved to the satisfaction  of the  Court to  have been written by the same person,  the second  part empowers the  Court to direct any person  including an  accused, present in Court, to give his specimen  writing or  finger prints  for the  purpose of enabling the  Court  to  compare  it  with  the  writing  or signature allegedly  made by  that person.  The Section does not specify  by whom  the comparison  shall  made.  However, looking to  the other provision of the Act, it is clear that such comparison  may either  be made by a handwriting expert under Section  45 or by anyone familiar with the handwriting of the person concerned as provided by  Section 47 or by the Court itself. 38.  As a  matter of  extreme caution and judicial sobriety, the  Court   should  not   normally  take  upon  itself  the responsibility of comparing the disputed signature with that of the admitted signature of handwriting and in the event of slightest doubt,  leave the matter to the wisdom of experts. But this  does not  mean that  the Court  has not   power to compare the  disputed signature  with  admitted signature as this power is clearly available under Section 73 of the Act. (See :  State (Delhi  Administration) vs. Pali Ram, AIR 1979 SC 14 = (1979) 2 SCC 158) 39.  We have  already recorded  above that on the comparison of the  signature in  the "Register  of  Lodgers"  with  the appellant’s signature  on the  "Vakalatnama",  we  have  not found any dissimilarity and are convinced that the appellant himself had  signed the  "Register of  Lodgers" in  token of having taken  Room No. 113 in "Ashoka Lodge" on rent wherein he had stayed with his wife and the child. 40.  On an  overall consideration  of the  matter, we are of the opinion  that the  High Court, in reversing the judgment of the trial court, had fully adhered to the principles laid down by  this Court  in various  decisions and  there is  no infirmity in its judgment. 41.  The circumstance,  the conduct  and  behaviour  of  the appellant conclusively  establish his  guilt on no amount of innovative steps by him including sporting a beard and later shaving off the beard and the head could conceal the offence or his  identity. It was rightly remarked by the famous Urdu poet, Amir Meenai in a couplet :-

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    "Qareeb hai yaro jo Roz-i-Mahshar      Chhupey ga kuston ka khoon keonkar      Jo chup Rehegi Zaban-i-Khanjar      Lahoo Pukarega Aastin Ka" 42.  Translated into English, it will mean :-      "On the  day of  Judgment, you will      not be  able to conceal the killing      of innocents.  If  the  sword  will      keep silent,  the blood  stains  on      your  sleeves   will  reveal   your      guilt." 43.  For the  reasons stated  above, we find no merit in the appeal which  is dismissed.  The appellant  is no  bail. His bail bonds  are cancelled.  He shall  be take  into  custody forthwith to serve out the life sentence.