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PETITIONER: HUNGERFORD INVESTMENT TRUST LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: INCOME TAX. OFFICERS & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       17/02/1998

BENCH: SUJATA V. MANOHAR, D.P. WADHWA

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                THE 17TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 1998 Present:               Hon’ble Mrs. Justice Sujata V.Manohar               Hon’ble Mr. Justice  D.P. Wadhwa Mr. Shanti  Bhushan, Sr,  Advocate and mr. Prashant Bhushan, Advocate with him for the appellant. Mr. K.N.  Shukla, Sr. Advocate and Mr. B.K. Prasad, Advocate with him for the respondents.                       J U D G M E N T      The following Judgment of the Court was delivered: Mrs. Sujata V. Manohar. J.      The appellant,  M/s. Hungerford  Investment Trust  Ltd. was, at  all material  times, a  non-resident company having its registered  office at  Singapore. The  appellant company owned 100%  share in  M/s. Turner  Morrison and Company Ltd. which was  a comp[any  incorporated in  India.  The  present appeals are concerned with assessment years 1949-50, 1950-51 and 1951-52.      An order under Section 23A of the Income-tax Act, 1922, before its  amendment in  1955 was  passed by the Income-tax Officer in the case of M/s. Turner Morrison and Company Ltd. as a  result of  which  the  undistributed  portion  of  the assessable income  of M/s.  Turner Morrison and Company Ltd. was deemed  to have  been distributed as dividends among its shareholders for assessment years 1949-50, 1950-51 and 1951- 52. The  dividend deemed  to have  been so  received by  the appellant-company as  shareholder for  the assessment  years 1949-50, 1950-51  and 1951-52  was sough  to be subjected to income-tax by the Income-tax Officer under Section 34 of the Income-tax Act,  1922. In  the past  an assessment  had been made on  M/s. Turner Morrison and Company Ltd. was deemed to have been  distributed as  dividends among  its shareholders for assessment  years  1949-50,  1950-51  and  1951-52.  The dividend deemed  to have  been so received by the appellant- company as  shareholder for  the assessment  years  1949-50, 1950-51 and 1951-52 was sought to be subjected to income-tax by the Income-tax Officer under Section 34 of the Income-tax Act, 1922.  In the  past an assessment had been made on M/s. Turner  Morrison   and  Company   Ltd.  as  agents  for  the appellant-company on  a total  income which  was returned as

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nil. In  vies of  the above  order under  Section  23A,  the Income-tax Officer  sought approval  of the  Commissioner of Income-tax under  Section 34 to tax the appellant-company as an assessee  in respect of assessment years 1949-50, 1950-51 and 1951-52.      After obtaining approval of the Commissioner of Income- tax under Section 34, the Income-tax Officer issued a notice for the  assessment year 1949-50 to M/s. Turner Morrison and Company  Ltd.   as  agents   of  the   appellant-company  on 24.3.1954. A return was filed pursuant to the notice by M/s. Tuner Morrison  and Company Ltd. as agents of the appellant- company for  the assessment years 1949-50. The status of the company in  the return was described as non-resident and the income was  the dividend deemed to be received under Section 23A by  the appellant-company  from M/s. Turner Morrison and Company Ltd.  On 29.10.1954  the Income-Tax  Officer made an assessment and issued a demand notice on M/s. Tuner Morrison and Company  Ltd. as  agents of  the appellant  non-resident company.      For the  assessment  years  1950-51  and  1951-52,  the Income-tax  Officer,   after  obtaining  approval  from  the Commissioner of  Income-tax to  issue a notice under Section 34 on  the appellant-company as the assessee, issued notices dated 11.2.1955  on  the  appellant-company.  On  16.2.1955, returns were  filed by  the appellant-company. The residence was shown as at Singapore. The returns were accompanied by a covering letter  from M/s.  Turner Morrison and Company Ltd. As agents  o behalf  of the appellant-company. On 25.2.1955, the Income-Tax  Officer made  an  assessment  and  issued  a demand for  assessment years  1950-51 and  1951-52  on  M/s. Turner Morrison and Company Ltd. as agents of the appellant- company.      Thereupon  M/S.   Turner  Morrison   and  Company  Ltd. challenged the  assessment orders  so  made  for  the  three assessment   years    before   the    Appellate    Assistant Commissioner. The  Appellant Assistant  Commissioner, by his order dated 29.11.1980, held that the Income-tax Officer had validly initiated  proceedings for  assessment years 1950-51 and 1951-52  on the appellant-company. However, he failed to make an  assessment on  the appellant-company  directly  and made an  assessment on  M/s. Tuner Morrison and Company Ltd. as agents  of the appellant. He held that such an assessment on  the  agent  of  a  non-resident  company  was  bared  by limitation in  the present  case under the second proviso to Section 34(1)  of the  Income-tax Act, 1922. He directed the Income-Tax  Officer  to  make  a  fresh  assessment  on  the appellant-company on  the basis of the valid returns already furnished by the appellant-company. In respect of assessment year 1949-50, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that the notice  had been issued within the period of limitation. However, the  proceedings should have been taken against the appellant-company  directly.  He,  therefore,  directed  the Income-tax  Officer  to  make  a  fresh  assessment  on  the appellant-company from the stage of notice.      Accordingly, on  26th of  October, 1961,  three notices were issued  on  the  appellant-company  by  the  Income-tax Office for the three assessment years. The appellant-company challenged these  notice by  filling a  writ petition before the Calcutta  High Court  being writ Petition No. 1/1962.  A learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court by his order dated 31.1.1972  dismissed the  writ petition,  holding that the assessment  proceedings  against  the  appellant-company were validly  commenced by  notices  dated  26.10.1361.  The appeal of  the appellant-company  before a Division Bench of the Calcutta  High Court  was also dismissed by its judgment

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and order  dated 13.8.1982.  Hence, the present appeals have been filed before us.      The  appellant-company   contends  that  the  Appellate Assistant  Commissioner   had  no   jurisdiction   to   give directions under  Section 31  to the  Income-Tax Officer  to make the  assessments on  the appellant-company.  Therefore, the notices  which have  been issued  against the appellant- company on  26.10.1961 are  beyond the  period prescribed by Section 34  of the  Income-tax Act,  1922. According  to the appellant-company,  since   the  direction   given  by   the Appellate Assistant  Commissioner is  not covered by Section 31, the  second  provision  to  Section  34(3)  lifting  the embargo of limitation in such cases is not attracted.      The Appellate Assistant Commissioner by his order dated 29.11.1960 gave the following directions:      "In view  of  the  various  reasons      discussed above  the assessment for      1949-50 made  by the  I.T.O. on the      Resident   Company    M/s.   Turner      Morrison and Company Ltd. as agents      of the  Non-Resident  Company  M/s.      Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd. in      order  to   the  tax   the   deemed      dividend under  Section 23A  is set      aside and the I.T.O. is directed to      make a  direct  assessment  on  the      Non-Resident   Company    .....and,      therefore, the  I.T.O. is direct to      make the  assessment direct  on the      Non-resident  Company  to  tax  the      deemed dividend  under Section 23A.      In connection  with the  assessment      for 1950-51 and  1951-52....... the      notices  under   Section  34   were      validly issued  taking the assessee      as  Non-resident  Company  directly      and the returns of income were also      submitted showing  the assessee  as      Non-resident      Company      and,      therefore, the  proceedings are set      aside from  the stage  of issue  of      notice under  Section 23(2) and the      I.T.O.  is  directed  to  make  the      assessment  on   the   Non-Resident      Company    after    giving    fresh      opportunity to  the assessee  under      Section 23(2)."      Pursuant to these directions the Income-tax Officer has issued two notices dated 26.10.1961 in respect of assessment years 1950-51  and 1951-52  on the  appellant-company  under Section 23(2)  of the  Income-tax Act,  1922. The Income-Tax Officer has  also issued  a notice  dated 26.10.1961  on the appellant-company under Section 34 of the Income-tax Act for the assessment year 1949-50.      Under Section  34(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, if the Income-tax  Officer has reason to believe that by reason of the  omission or  failure on  the part  of an assessee to make a return of his income under Section 22 for any year or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment  for that  year, income chargeable to income- tax has  escaped assessment  for that  years,  or  has  been under-assessed etc,  as  set  out  therein,  the  Income-tax Officer can  serve on  the assessee  a notice and proceed to assess or  re-assess such  income. Similarly,  under Section 34(1)(b), notwithstanding  that there has ben no omission or

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failure as  mentioned in  Clause (a)  on  the  part  of  the assessee, if  the Income-tax  Officer has, in consequence of information in his possession, reason to believe that income chargeable to  income-tax has  escaped  assessment  for  any year, or  has  been  under-assessed  he  can  serve  on  the assessee a  notice and  proceed to  assess or re-assess such income as  specified in  that section. The period prescribed at the  material time  for issuing notice was eight years in the cases  falling under Section 34(1((a) and four years for cases falling  under Section 34(1)(b). The second proviso to Section 34(1),  at the  material  time,  provided  that  the expiry of two years from the relevant assessment year if the person on whom the assessment or re-assessment is to be made in pursuance  of the  notice is  a person  deemed to  be the agent of a non-resident person under Section 43.      The second  proviso to  Section 34(3),  however, at the material time provided as follows:      "Provided further that nothing      contained in  this Section limiting      the time  within which  any  action      may  be   taken   or   any   order,      assessment or  reassessment may  be      made, shall apply to a reassessment      made under  Section  27  or  to  an      assessment or  reassessment made on      the  assessee   or  any  person  in      consequence of or to give effect to      any finding  or direction contained      in  an   order  under  Section  31,      Section 33,  Section  33A,  Section      33B, Section 66 or Section 66A."            [Underlining ours]      This is  how the  second proviso to Section 34(3) stood after its  amendment in  1953 by  the Income-tax (Amendment) Act of  1953 with  effect  from  1st  of  April,  1952.  The appellant-company  contends   that  this   proviso  has   no application in  the present case because the direction given by the  Appellate Assistant Commissioner under Section 31 is a  direction   to  assess   a  stranger  to  the  assessment proceedings against  M/s. Turner  Morrison and  Company Ltd. and hence it is not covered by the second proviso to Section 34(3).      Since the  impugned notices  are dated  26.10.1961, and pertain to  assessment years 1949-50 to 1951-52, it is clear that but  for this  proviso, the notices would be beyond the period prescribed  under Section  34 of  the Income-tax Act, 1922. The  second proviso  to Section 34(3) lifts the bar of limitation when,  inter alia,  an assessment or reassessment is made on an assessee or any person in consequence of or to give effect  to any  finding or  direction contained  in  an order under Section 31.      In the present case the original assessment orders were made on  M/s. Turner  Morrison and Company Ltd. as agents of the appellant-company.  The order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner giving  directions  to  assess  the  appellant- company was  passed in  the appeals  of M/s. Turner Morrison and Company  Ltd. against  the orders  of assessment for the said three  assessment years.  Can the  appellant-company on whom the  notices have been issued pursuant to the Appellant Assistant Commissioner’s  order and directions f 29.11.1960, come within the scope of phrase "the assessee or any person" in respect  of whom any direction can be given under Section 31?      The scope  of this  second proviso to Section 34(3) was examined by  a Constitution  Bench of this Court in the case

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of S.C. Prashar & Anr. v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas & Ors. [(1963) 49 ITR  1]. This Court, examining the second proviso to sub- section (3)  of Section  34 which  came into effect from 1st April, 1952,  said that  it patently  introduced an  unequal treatment in  respect of  some out  of  the  same  class  of persons. Those  whose liability to pay tax was discovered by one method  would be  proceeded against  at any  time and no limitation would  apply in  their case  and in  the case  of others the  limitation  laid  down  by  sub-section  (1)  of Section 34 would apply. Referring to the distinction made by the High  Court in  that case on a somewhat narrower ground, this Court  observed that so far as assesses were concerned, there might  be a  rational ground  of  distinction  because appeal proceedings  etc might  take  a  long  time  and  the assessee being  a party  to the appeal could not complain of such delay.  Therefore, an  assessee did not occupy the same position as  strangers. This Court, therefore, held that the proviso, in so far as it affected strangers, must be held to be ultra vires as violating Article 14 of the Constitution.      The same  Bench delivered  another judgment on the same day in  the Commissioner  of Income-tax,  Bihar &  Orissa v. Sardar Lakhmir Singh [(1963) 49 ITR 70] in which it affirmed its finding  in S.C.  Prashar’s case (supra). In the case of S.C. Prashar  (supra), the  assessee before the Tribunal was VAsantsen Dwarkadas as representing his deceased father. The Tribunal in  appeal held  that the income in question should be  deleted  from  Dwarkadas’s  income.  If  the  Income-tax Officer can  include the  same in  the income of the firm of Purshottam Laxmidas (of which Dwarkadas was a partner) he is at liberty  to do  so. He  can then  apportion the income of Purshottam Laxmidas amongst the partners thereof as provided in Section  23(50  of  the  Act.  Thereupon  the  Income-tax Officer served  a notice  under Section  34 on  the firm  of Purshottam Laxmidas.  This  Court  held  that  the  firm  of Purshottam  Laxmidas   was  not  before  the  Tribunal  and, therefore, the firm was no batter than a stranger who was in some way associated with the assessee. Therefore, the second proviso to  Section 3493)  would have  no application to the firm and the notice under Section 34 which was issued on the firm of Purshottam Laxmidas was barred by limitation.      In the second case of Sardar Lakhmir Singh (supra), the assessee and his father had filed separate returns of income in their  individual capacity.  But the  Income-tax  Officer amalgamated their  income and  assessed the  total income as the income  of the  Hindu Undivided  Family. He did not make any protective assessment with regard to the separate income shown in the return of the assessee. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner set aside the assessment of the Hindu Undivided Family.  Thereafter,   the  Income-tax   Officer   made   an assessment on  the assessee  in individual  capacity on  the basis of  the original return filed by him. This was held to be barred by limitation.      In the subsequent case, however, of Income-tax Officer, A-Ward, Sitapur  v. Murlidhar  Bhagwan Das  [52 ITR  335], a Constitution Bench  of this Court considered the ratio  laid down in  S.C. Prashar’s  case (supra).  This Court  observed (p.346) that  the expression  "any  person"  in  the  second proviso to  Section 34(3) in its widest connotation may take in any  person, whether  connected or not with the assessee, whose income  for any  year has escaped assessment; but this construction cannot  be accepted. For the said expression is necessarily circumscribed by the scope of the subject-matter of the  appeal or  revision, as  the case may be. That is to say, that  person must  be one  who would  be liable  to  be assessed for  the whole  or a  part of  the income that went

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into the  assessment of  the year  under appeal or revision. "If so  Construed, we  must turn  to Section 31 to ascertain who is that person other than the appealing assessee who can be liable  to  be  assessed  for  the  income  of  the  said assessment year.  A combined  reading of  Section 30(1)  and Section 31(3)  of the  Act indicated the cases where persons other than  the appealing  assessee  might  be  affected  by orders passed by the Appellate Commissioner. Modification or setting aside  of assessment  made on  a firm,  joint  Hindu family, association  of persons,  for a  particular year may affect the  assessment for  the said  year on  a partner  or partners of  the  firm,  member  or  members  of  the  Hindu undivided family  or the  individual, as the case may be. In such cases  though the  latter are  not eo nomine parties to the appeal, their assessments depend upon the assessments on the former.  The said instances are only illustrative. It is not necessary  to  pursue  the  matter  further.  We  would, therefore, hold  that the  expression "any  person"  in  the setting in  which it  appears must  be confined  to a person intimately  connected   in  the  aforesaid  sense  with  the assessments of the year under appeal."      Therefore, if  the  person  against  whom  notices  are issued under Section 34 pursuant to a direction given by the Appellate Assistant  Commissioner under  Section  31,  is  a person intimately  connected with the original assessee, the period of  limitation will  not apply  to  a  notice  issued against him  under Section  34. He  would be  covered by the phrase "assessee  or any  other  person"  under  the  second proviso to Section 34(3).      The principle  laid down in the above case of Murlidhar Bhagwan Das (supra) was applied by this Court in the case of Commissioner of  Income-tax, Patiala  V. Ambala  Flour Mills [(1970) 78 ITR 256]. In that case an individual Debi Prasad, had submitted  the returns  in various  capacities  and  had appealed against  the order of assessment. The income earned by the  assessee  was  assessed  to  tax  as  income  of  an association of  persons of  which, on  the findings  of  the Income-tax  Officer,  Debi  Prasad,  the  Tribunal  did  not exercise  its   power  qua  a  stranger  to  the  assessment proceedings. Therefore,  this Court  held that the period of limitation would  not be  applied. The  Appellate  Assistant Commissioner was competent to set aside the assessment of an association of  persons and to direct the Income-tax Officer to assess the members individually.      In the  case of  Estate of  Late  Rangalal  Jajodia  v. Commissioner of  Income-tax, Madras [79 ITR 505], the return had been  filed by  one Rangalal Jajodia who died before the assessment order  was made.  The assessment order showed the name of  the assessee  as the  estate of  late Shri Rangalal Jajodia by  legal heirs  and representatives  -- these being the son,  the (second)  wife and  her children.  No  notice, however, was  served on  the wife.  Therefore, in  appeal, a necessary direction was given that notice should be given to her  and  after  hearing  her  assessment  should  be  made. Interpreting the  second proviso to Section 34(3) this Court said that  she was  no a stranger to the assessment, she was not merely intimately connected with the assessment. She was in fact  an  assessee.  Therefore,  the  second  proviso  to Section 34(3) would apply.      In the  case of  Commissioner of  Income-tax,  U.P.  v. Mohd. Shakoor Mohd.Bashir [89 ITR 57], one Zahur Bux who was the sole  owner of  the business  gifted his business to his two sons  Mohd. Shakoor  and Mohd.  Bashir. Zahur  Bux  died thereafter. The  two sons  submitted their returns of income in respect of the business. The Income-tax Officer, however,

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rejected their returns and proceeded to assess all the heirs of Zahur  Bux as  an association  of persons. In appeal, the Appellate Assistant  Commissioner held  that  the  assessee, namely, the  association of  persons consisting  of all  the heirs of  Zahur Bux was not liable to be taxed in respect of the business.  He held  that the business had been gifted to two sons,  Mohd. Shakoor  and Mohd  Bashir. He set aside the order of  the Income-tax  Officer but directed him to assess the  income  from  various  sources  in  the  hands  of  the respective  persons  to  whom  they  arose.  The  Income-tax Officer thereafter  issued notices to the two brothers. This Court held that the directions which were given by Appellate Assistant Commissioner  did not  fall within  the  scope  of second  proviso   to  Section   34(30  and,  therefore,  the subsequent notices  which  were  issued  by  the  Income-tax Officer were  barred by limitation. The brothers to whom the business was gifted were strangers to assessment proceedings against the  association of  persons consisting  of heirs of Zahur Bux.      In the  present case  we have  to consider  whether the appellant-company  is   a   stranger   to   the   assessment proceedings against M/s. Turner Morrison and Company Ltd. as laid down in the case of S.C. PRASHAR (supra) or whether the appellant-company can  be said  to be  intimately  connected with the  assessee M/s.  Turner Morrison and Company Ltd. as laid down in the case of Muralidhar Bhagwandas (supra).      The notices  for the assessment years 1950-51 and 1951- 52 were  sent  to  the  appellant-company  itself.  For  the assessment year  1949-50, the  notice had  been sent to M/s. Turner Morrison and Company Ltd. as agents of the appellant- company. Under  Section 42  of  the  Income-tax  Act,  1922, income arising  whether directly  or indirectly  through  or from any  business in  the taxable territories or through or from  any   asset  or   source  of  income  in  the  taxable territories, shall  be  deemed  to  be  income  accruing  or arising within the taxable territories; and where the person entitled to  the income  is  not  resident  in  the  taxable territories, shall be chargeable to income-tax either in his name or  in the  name of  his agent  and in the latter case, such agent  shall be  deemed to  be for  all the purposes of this Act  the assessee  in respect  of such income. Thus, in view of Section 42, in the present case, there was an option to tax either the appellant-company or its agent M/s. Turner Morrison  and  Company  Ltd.  Therefore,  when  the  initial notices under Section 34 were sent by the Income-tax Officer in 1954 and 1955, what was sought to be taxed was the income arising  in   taxable  territories   of   the   non-resident appellant-company. For  the  assessment  years  1950-51  and 1951-52, the  notice was addressed to the appellant company. But even in respect of the assessment year 1949-50, what was sought to  be taxed  was the  appellant’s income  or  deemed income arising  in India.  For the  assessment years 1950-51 and 1951-52,  the returns  were  also  filed  by  appellant- company as an assessee. The status of the assessee was shown as non-resident.  It was  on the basis of these returns that the Income-tax  Officer proceeded to make an assessment. For the assessment  years 1950-51  and 1951-52, however, he made an assessment  in the  name  of  M/s.  Turner  Morrison  and Company Ltd.  as agents  of the  appellant-company. For  the assessment year  1949-50 the return was filed by M/s. Turner Morrison and  Company  Ltd.  as  agents  of  the  appellant- company. The  status of the assessee was shown in the return as non-resident  and the  income which  was shown was deemed dividend accruing to the appellant-company as provided under Section 23A. For the assessment year 1949-50, the assessment

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was made  on M/s. Turner Morrison and Company Ltd. as agents of the  appellant-company. Whether  we look upon M/s. Turner Morrison and  Company Ltd.  as an  independent  assessee  or otherwise, the  assessment was  clearly in  respect  of  the income of the appellant-company deemed to arise by virtue of Section 23A  in India  for that  assessment year. Therefore, the  appellant-company   was  directly  concerned  with  the assessment proceedings  and  the  appeal  arising  in  those assessment  proceedings   before  the   Appellate  Assistant Commissioner. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner directed, for reasons  set out  in his  order,  that  the  assessments should be  made on  the appellant-company  itself and not on its  agent.   This  direction  cannot  be  considered  as  a direction to  assess a  stranger. In  fact as  the  original assessment  proceedings   pertain  to   the  income  of  the appellant-company, in any vies of the matter, the appellant- company must  be considered as intimately connected with the assessment proceedings  in  which  the  Appellate  Assistant Commissioner gave  the impugned  directions. The  appellant- company  is,   therefore,  covered   by  the  expression  on "assessee or  any person"  in the  second proviso to Section 34(3).      In the case of Muralidhar Bhagwandas (supra) this Court gave illustrations  of persons  who might  be considered  as intimately connected  with the  assessee  in  the  light  of Section 30(1)  and Section  31 of  the Income-tax  Act. This Court referred to assessment of a partnership firm which may affect the  income of  individual partners or the assessment of an  association of persons which may affect the income of the individual  or the  assessment of  a joint  Hindu family which may  affect the  assessment of  members of  the  Hindu joint  family.   It,  however,  made  it  clear  that  these instances were only illustrative and not exhaustive.      The  appellant-company,  however,  contends  that  "any person" in the said proviso would cover only such persons as were referred  to by the Court as illustrations in Murlidhar Bhagwandas (supra)  because they  are also  referred  to  in Section 31(4).  We do  not see any merit in this contention. Under Section 31(3), in disposing of an appeal the Appellate Assistant  Commissioner  may,  inter  alia,  set  aside  the assessments and  "direct the  Income-tax Officer  to take  a fresh assessment  after making  such further  inquity as the Income-tax Officer  thinks fit  or the  Appellate  Assistant Commissioner may  direct and  the Income-tax  Officer  shall thereupon  proceed   to  make   such  fresh  assessment  and determine where  necessary the  amount of tax payable on the basis of  such fresh  assessment." Under  sub-section (4) of Section 31, where as the result of an appeal any changes are made in  the assessment  of a firm or association of persons or a  new assessment  of a firm or association of persons is ordered to be made, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may authorities the  Income-tax Officer to amend accordingly any assessment made  on any partner of the firm or any member of the association.  This provision  under Section 31(4) cannot be read  as limiting  the scope of the words "any person" in the second  proviso to  Section 34(3)  as referring  only to those persons  who are  covered by  Section 31,  sub-section (4). The words are wide enough to cover all directions under Section 31  including those  relating to the assessment of a person intimately  connected with  the assessee in the sense as laid  down by  this  Court  in  the  case  of  Muralidhar Bhagwandas (supra).  Whether the person is so connected will depend on  the facts   of each case. The illustrations given in the case of Murlidhar Bhagwandas (supra) do not limit the words "any  person", but  are only  illustrative.  The  only

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reason why  the words  "any person" are read down to exclude total strangers, is to prevent infringement of Article 14 of the Constitution.      The directions in the present case, therefore, given by the  Appellate   Assistant  Commissioner  by  his  order  of 29.11.1960 are directions property given under Section 31 of the Income-tax  Act, 1922  and the notices, therefore, which are issued  on 25.10.1981 by the Income-tax Officer pursuant to the  directions so given, cannot be considered as notices on total strangers barred by limitation. The High Court was, therefore, right in dismissing the writ petition.      The appeals are accordingly dismissed with costs.