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PETITIONER: BALWANT SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       23/03/1999

BENCH: N.S.Hegde, D.P.Wadhwa,

JUDGMENT:

     Santosh Hegde, J.

     These appeals are against the judgment and order dated 19.4.1983  passed  by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana  in Civil  Writ  Petition  Nos.2621  and   2622  of  1976.   The appellant  who  was  the petitioner before the  High  Court, filed the aforesaid writ petitions challenging an order made by   the  second  respondent   herein  appointing  the   3rd respondent  as  an  arbitrator under the provisions  of  the Punjab Cooperative Societies Act, 1961 (for short the Act) which  petitions  came to be dismissed by the Full Bench  of the  High Court, following an earlier Full Bench judgment of the  same  High Court which is since reported as Mam Raj  v. State of Haryana & Ors.  (AIR 1982 P & H 211).

     In  these  appeals, it is contended by  the  appellant that  the provisions of Section 55(1)(b) of the Act are  not applicable  with  regard to any dispute arising  between  an employee  of  a Cooperative Society and another  Cooperative Society  and  the dispute in the instant case being  between Shahbad  Farm  Cooperative Marketing cum Processing  Society Ltd.   (for  short the Shahbad Society) and an employee  of Nalvi  Cooperative  Agricultural Service Society (for  short the  Nalvi  Society),  such dispute could  not  have  been referred to an arbitrator under the provisions of the Act.

     In support of his contention, the appellant has sought to  place  reliance  on a judgment of this Court  in  Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd.  v.  M/s.  Dalichand Jugraj Jain  &  Ors.  (1969 1 SCR 887).  In our opinion, the  ratio laid  down  in  the said judgment is not applicable  to  the facts  of  this  case.   The dispute in  that  case  was  in relation  to a property leased by a member of the Society to the  Society  and  the question was whether such  a  dispute comes  under the purview of the arbitration clause  provided for  in  the  Act.  There, it was held by  this  Court  that though  the  person who leased the property to the  Society, was  a member of the Society, the nature of the dispute  was such  that it did not pertain to the management and business of  the  Cooperative  Society.   In the  instant  case,  the appellant  though  was  employed by the Nalvi Society  as  a salesman was, in fact, a member of the Shahbad Society.  The dispute  in  question  was  with   reference  to  an  amount collected  by the appellant which was payable to the Shahbad

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Society.   Therefore,  the claim of the Shahbad  Society  is certainly  the one pertaining to the management and business of  the  Shahbad  Society.  Therefore, in our  opinion,  the dispute  squarely falls within Section 55 of the Act.  It is unfortunate that the appellant in his special leave petition did  not  disclose  this fact that he was a  member  of  the Shahbad  Society.  On the contrary, he had only  highlighted the  fact that he was an employee of the Nalvi Society  and, as  such,  the dispute between him and the  Shahbad  Society could  not  come  under Section 55 of the Act.  It  is  only after  a counter was filed on behalf of the Shahbad  Society that  it  has  come on record that the appellant is  also  a member  of the Shahbad Society.  To this extent it should be said  that  the  appellant  was not fair to  this  Court  in presenting  his  case.  It has also come on record that  the arbitrator has already passed an award against the appellant and it is only by virtue of the interim order passed by this Court  that that award is not yet executed.  At any rate, we having  come to the conclusion that in view of the fact that the  appellant  is a member of the Shahbad Society and as  a member  any  amount due from him to the Society, would  come within  the  purview  of  the   dispute  touching  upon  the management and business of the Society.  We find no merit in these appeals and the same are dismissed with costs.