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PETITIONER: DIWAN BROS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA, BOMBAY AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT07/05/1976

BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA BHAGWATI, P.N. GUPTA, A.C.

CITATION:  1976 AIR 1503            1976 SCR  664  1976 SCC  (3) 800

ACT:      Court Fees Act, Schedule II, Art. 11.      Displaced  Persons   (Debts  Adjustment)   Act,   1951- Tribnal’s decision-If a decree within the meaning of s. 2(2) C.P.C.      Court Fees Act. Schedule II, Art. 11-Schedule 1 Art. 1- Applicability of.

HEADNOTE:      Schedule II,  Article 11 of the Court Fees prescribes a sum of  Rs. 2/- as court fees in the case of a memorandum of appeal presented to a High Court when the appeal is not from a decree or order having the force of a decree.      The Tribunal  appointed  under  the  Displaced  Persons (Debts Adjustment)  Act 1951 dismissed the petition filed by the appellant claiming certain sums from the respondents. In appeal to  the High  Court from the decision of the Tribunal did not  amount to a decree within the meaning of s. 2(2) of the Code  of Civil  Procedure. The  taxing  Judge,  to  whom question of  payment of court fees was referred, came to the conclusion that  the appellant  should pay  ad valorem court fees under Schedule I, Article 1 of the Court Fees Act.      On the  question whether  the decision  of the Tribunal was a decree within the meaning of s. 2(2) C.P.C.      Allowing the appeal to this Court, ^      HELD: The  memorandum of  appeal in  the  instant  case falls within  the ambit  of Schedule  II, Article  11 of the Court Fees  Act and  the view  of the  taxing Judge  that ad valorem court  fees were  payable under Schedule I Article 1 was legally erroneous. [683C]      (1) (a)  In the  definition of "decree" contained in s. 2(2)  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  three  essential conditions are  necessary: (i) that the adjudication must be given in  suit; (ii)  that the suit must start with a plaint and culminate  in a  decree; and (iii) that the adjudication must be  formal and  final and  must be  given by a civil or revenue court. [677E-F]      Under the  1951 Act,  special Tribunal  was created  to enquire into  the claims  of displaced debtors or creditors. It cannot be called a court in any sense of the term because

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the legislature  had made  a  clear  distinction  between  a Tribunal and  a courts. Secondly, since proceedings before a Tribunal statute   with an application and not with a plaint the  other  important  ingredient  of  a  decree  is  wholly wanting. Thirdly  the claim  before the  Tribunal  had  been described as a preceding rather than a suit. Therefore, none of the  requirements of  a decree  is to  be  found  in  the decision given  by the  Tribunal even though the legislature may have  described the  decision given by the Tribunal even though the  legislature may have described the decision as a decree. A  mere description  of the decision of the Tribunal as a  decree does not make it a decree within the meaning of the Court Fees Act. [677G-H]      (b) The  term "decree" used in Schedule II, Article 11, is referable  to a  decree as defined in s. 2(2) of the Code of Civil  Procedure. As  the decision of the Tribunal in the instant case does not fulfil the requirements of a decree, 665 it is  not a  decree within  the  meaning  of  Schedule  II, Article 11 of the Court Fees Act. [678D]      Mannan Lal  v. Mst.  Chhotaka Bibi [1970] 1 S.C.C. 769; Ram Prasad v. Tirloki Nath, AIR [1938] All. 50; Dawood Karim Ashrafi v.  City Improvement  Board.  AIR  [1954]  Hyd.  81; Antala Gope v. Sarbo Gopain, AIR [1962] Pat. 489; Mrs. Panzy Fernadas v. Mrs. M. F. Cusoros & others AIR [1963] All. 153; Dundoppa v.S  G. Motor  Transport Company.  AIR [1966] Mys,. 150; Irshad  Husain v. Bakshish Hussain AIR [1946] Oudh 254; Harrish Chandra  Chatteree vg.  Bhaoba Tarini Debi, 8 C.W.N. 321; Taxing  Officer, High  Court Appellate side v. Jamnadas Dharamdas ILR  [1956] Bom.  211; Barras  v.  Aberdeen  Steam Trawling and  Fishing Company [1933] A.C. 402 411; Parmanand Lokumal and others v. Khudabadi Bhaibund Co-operative Credit Bank Ltd.  and others,  AIR  [1958]  Raj.  146;  The  Punjab National Bank  Ltd. v.  The American  Insurance Company Ltd. ILR [1958]  8 Raj.  216 and  S. Sohan Singh v. Liverpool and London and  Globe Insurance  Co. Ltd.  AIR [1956]  Pb.  153, referred to.      Parmanand Lokumal  and others v. Khudabadi Bhaibund Co- opertive Credit  Bank Ltd.  and others, AIR [1958] Cal. 675; Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Firm Isardas Kaluram AIR [1957] Raj. 146;  Kishandas v. Parasram AIR [1955] Raj. 81 and Sita Ram v. Mool Chand, AIR [1954] All. 672,. not approved.      (c) Where  a legislature  uses an  expression bearing a well-known legal  connotation it  must be  presumed to  have used the  said expression  in the sense in which it has been so understood.  Therefore, when  the Court Fees Act uses the word "decree" which had a well-known legal significance, the legislature must  be presumed  to have  use this term in the sense in  which it  is which  it is  understood in the Civil Procedure Code.[678F; 679B]      Barras v.  Aberdeen Steam  Trawling and Fishing Company [1933] A.C. 402, 411. referred to.      There is  no force  in the contention of the respondent that under  s. 5  of the  Court Fees Act the decision of the taxing Judge  was final  and could  not be  re-opened in any court  and   as  such   no  appeal  under  Article  136  was maintainable. Even  though the order of the taxing Judge may be final  under s.  5, the power of this Court under Article 136 will over-ride any stamp of finality given by a statute. The finality  under s.  5 cannot  derogate  from  the  power conferred by the Constitution on the Supreme Court. [683E]      S. Rm  Ar. S.  Sp. Satheppa  Chettiar v. S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ar.  Rm.   Ramanathan  Chettiar  [1958]  S.C.R.  1021,  held inapplicable.

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JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1370 of 1968.      Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and  order dated the 6th March, 1967 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in First Appeal No. Nil of 1965.      J. P. Goyal and S. M. Jain, for the Appellants.      G.L.  Sanghi,  D.  N.  Misra  and  O.  C.  Mathur,  for Respondent No. 1.      G. N. Dixit and O. P. Rna, for the State of U.P.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      FAZAL ALI,  J.-This  is  an  appeal  by  special  leave against the  judgment of  the Single  Judge of the Allahabad High Court deciding 666 a court  fee matter  in connection  with the  memorandum  of appeal filed  by the  appellants before  the Allahabad  High Court against  a decree  passed by  the  Tribunal  appointed under the  Displaced Persons  (Debts Adjustment)  Act, 1951- hereinafter referred  to as  ’the Act’.  The appellants  had filed an  application under  s. 13  of the  Act  before  the Tribunal alleging that it was a partnership firm and claimed that an  amount of  Rs.  3,50,000/-  by  way  of  refund  of security deposits  and a  sum of  Rs. 55,000/- as commission was due  from the  respondents. The application was tried by the Tribunal  and the  claim preferred by the appellants was ultimately dismissed by the Tribunal by its decree dated May 19, 1965.  Additional Civil  Judge of Badaun was assigned as the Tribunal  under the  aforesaid Act.  The appellants then filed an  appeal before  the Allahabad  High  Court  with  a nominal court  fee of  Rs. 5/- but the Stamp Reporter of the High Court  was of  the opinion  that the  appellants should have paid ad valorem court fees on the total claim preferred by  the  appellants  before  the  Tribunal  which  had  been disallowed. The  matter was  taken up by the Taxing Officer, who, in  view of  the substantial  importance of  the  point raised, made  a reference  to the  Taxing Judge for deciding the court  fee payable  on the  memorandum of  appeal in the instant case.  The plea  of the  appellants was  that as the decision of  the Tribunal  did not  amount to  a  decree  as contemplated by s. 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, ad valorem  court fees  were not  payable and the appellants were entitled  to pay  court fees  as prescribed  in Sch. 11 Art. 11  of the  Court Fees’  Act. The  stand taken  by  the revenue was that as the present appeal was against a decree, the case of the appellants squarely fell within the ambit of s. 4  of the  Court Fees’ Act and therefore ad valorem court fees were  payable under  Sch. I  Art. 1  of the Court Fees’ Act. The  matter was  taken up  by the Taxing Judge who went into the  question  of  law  raised  before  him  and  after considering some  authorities,  particularly  those  of  the Allahabad High  Court, agreed  with the  Stamp Reporter  and came to  the conclusion  that the  appellants should  pay ad valorem court  fees under  Sch. I  Art. 1 of the Court Fees’ Act. The Taxing Judge accordingly by his order dated October 11, 1965  directed the  appellants to make up the deficiency in the  payment of the court fees. It was against this order that the  appellants filed  a petition  for special leave to this Court which having been granted the appeal has now been placed before us for hearing.      This appeal  involves a  short but substantial question of law  as to the interpretation, scope and ambit of Sch. II Art. 11  of the  Court Fees’  Act as  applicable to  appeals

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preferred against  the  orders  or  decrees  passed  by  the Tribunal constituted  under the  Act. The  point is not free from difficulty and there appears to be a serious divergence of judicial opinion on the question as to whether in appeals like the  present, Sch.  I Art.  1 or Sch. II Art. 11 of the Court Fees’ Act would apply.      Mr. Goyal  learned counsel appearing for the appellants raised two points before us. In the first place he contended that  as  the  proceedings  before  the  Tribunal  were  not proceeding in  a Civil  Court nor  was the Tribunal a Court, therefore, the decision of the Tribunal 667 even though  loosely called  as a  decree is not a decree as contemplated by  s. 2(2)  of the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore the  case of  the appellants  clearly falls within the ambit  of Sch.  II Art. II of the Court Fees Act. It was next contended that as the Tribunal had disallowed the claim of the  appellants by  the order  impugned before  the  High Court the order did not amount to any decree and, therefore, the question  of payment  of ad  valorem court  fees did not arise. In this connection it was also submitted that the Act being a  beneficial statute  was designed to provide a cheap and expeditious  remedy  to  displaced  persons  in  certain circumstances and  therefore the  Parliament never  intended that displaced  persons who had lost all that they possessed in Pakistan  should be  made to  pay ad  valorem court  fees without possessing the capacity to do so.      Mr. Dikshit  appearing for  the respondents  sought  to repel the  arguments of  Mr. Goyal  on two  grounds. In  the first place  it was  submitted that  under the provisions of the Court  Fees Act  the order of the Taxing Judge was final and could  not be  re-opened by  this Court  even in special leave. Secondly,  it was  submitted that  the  Tribunal  was nothing but  a Civil  Court and  the provisions  of the  Act would show that the Tribunal was clothed with all the powers and incidents  of a  Civil Court.  In these circumstances it was contended  that any  decree  which  was  passed  by  the Tribunal must  be presumed  to be  a decree of the Court and was made  appealable  as  such  under  s.  40  of  the  Act. Therefore, it  was said,  Sch. II  Art. 11 had absolutely no application and  the view  taken by  the  Taxing  Judge  was legally correct.      In order  to understand  the contentions  raised by the counsel for  the parties it may be necessary for us to trace the history of the Act and the circumstances in which it was passed. To  begin  with,  following  the  partition  of  the country there  was an  unprecedented rush  of refugees  from Pakistan to India and our country immediately after becoming independent  had   to   face   the   colossal   problem   of rehabilitating the  refugees or  the displaced persons. Most of these persons had left huge assets behind in Pakistan and had come  to this  country  without  a  penny.  Others  were creditors and  were entitled  to get  their debts liquidated from the  assets in  this country  or  from  the  properties possessed  by   the  Banks   in  this  country.  Soon  after independence there  were stray  and  piecemeal  legislations providing for  some facilities  for  displaced  debtors  and creditors but  there was  no uniform  law to  cater to their growing needs  in  view  of  the  situation  faced  by  them following  the   partition  of   our   country.   In   these circumstances, therefore,  the Government  decided to  bring out a  uniform legislation  so as  to be  a complete code in itself providing  for a  cheap and  expeditious  remedy  for displaced  debtors  and  creditors.  The  matter  was  first entrusted to  a Committee  and then  to Bind Basni Prasad, a

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retired Judge  of the Allahabad High Court, who after taking evidence  of   a  large  number  of  displaced  persons  and examining the nature of the claims, submitted a report which formed the  basis of the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment Act. Introducing  the Bill which preceded the Act, Mr. A. P. Jain, the  then Minister of State for Rehabilitation, made a long speech in 668 Parliament dwelling  on the various aspects of the Bill. The Minister particularly highighted the fact that the condition of the  displaced persons  was pitable as they had left huge assets behind  in Pakistan.  In this connection the Minister observed thus:           "The condition  of the displaced persons therefore      today is  that while their assets have been left behind      in Pakistan  and they  have brought the titles of their      property, at least in some cases.           In the  provisions contained in this Bill, we have      tried to  strike a balance between the reduced capacity      of the  debtor to  meet his obligations and at the same      time we have taken sufficient care to see that a debtor      who is in a position to pay may not deny payment to his      creditor.           In this  Bill, we  have introduced  what might  be      called a somewhat revolutionary principle, namely, that      no debtor  will be  called upon  to pay  more than  his      paying capacity. I shall later on define what the words      ’paying capacity’  mean, but  here it  may be enough to      mention that  paying capacity  of  a  debtor  has  been      defined in  a  rather  liberal  manner  after  allowing      fairly large  assets  which  will  not  be  capable  of      attachment.           Clause 13 deals with claims by displaced creditors      against persons  who are not displaced debtors. That is      not comparatively  so important  because it  only gives      relief in respect of court fees. We felt that under the      depressed   economic   condition   of   the   displaced      creditors, it  is necessary that we must give them some      relief against the huge amount of money which they have      to pay as court fees etc.           I submit  that these  are all  very necessary  and      humane  considerations  which  take  into  account  the      actual paying capacity of the debtor.           We have  maintained the  existing procedure in the      Courts but  we have  simplified it  because a prolonged      procedure and the complexities of the civil courts mean      a lot  of money.  We have  provided only  one appeal in      clause 40."      A perusal  of the  above observations will give a clear insight into  the various  objects of  the Act  and the main purposes which the legislation sought to achieve. It will be noticed that  the Minister  laid particular  stress  on  the paying capacity  of the  debtors which  he called  a  humane consideration and  also described  the necessity  of  giving relief to  the displaced  persons against the huge amount of money which  they may  have to  pay as  court fees.  Thus it would appear  that the  intention of Parliament was to bring out a  legislation which  would  provide  for  a  cheep  and expeditious remedy  to the displaced persons and entrust the work to a Tribunal which may 669 be able  to decide the claims quickly instead of leaving the displaced debtors  or creditors  to follow  the dilatory and cumbersome process  of the civil courts. In order to shorten the litigation  the Minister  expressly stated that only one

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appeal had  been provided  in s.  40 of the Act, to the High Court. These  matters will  have a very important bearing on the interpretation  of the  provisions of the Court Fees Act as applicable  to the decrees passed by a Tribunal under the Act. Even  apart  from  these  considerations,  it  is  well settled that in case of a fiscal statute the provisions must be strictly interpreted giving every benefit of doubt to the subject and  lightening as  far as  possible the  burden  of court fees on the litigant. Thus where an adjudication given by a  Tribunal could fall within two provisions of the Court Fees Act,  one of which was onerous for the litigant and the other more  liberal, the  Court would  apply that  provision which was  beneficial to the litigant. In A. V. Fernandez v. State of  Kerala, while  interpreting the  provisions  of  a fiscal statute,  viz., the  Travancore-Cochin General  Sales Tax Act, this Court observed as follows:           "It is  no doubt  true that  in construing  fiscal      statutes and  in determining the liability of a subject      to tax one must have regard to the strict letter of the      law and  not merely to the spirit of the statute or the      substance of the law. If the Reve nue satisfs the Court      that the  case falls  strictly within the provisions of      the law,  the subject  can be  taxed. If,  on the other      hand, the  case is  not covered within the four corners      of the  provisions of the taxing statute, no tax can be      imposed by  inference or  by analogy  or by  trying  to      probe into  the intentions  of the  legislature and  by      considering what was the substance of the matter."      Similarly in  State of  Maharashtra v.  Mishri Lal Tara Chand Lodha  and others,  while  interpreting  some  of  the provisions of the Bombay Court Fees Act, Raghubar Dayal, J., speaking for the Court observed as follow:           "The Act  is a  taxing statute  and its provisions      therefore have  to be  construed strictly, in favour of      the subject-litigant."      These observations manifestly show that the Courts have to interpret  the provisions of a fiscal statute strictly so as to  give benefit of doubt to the litigant. The principles deducible from  the decisions  referred to  above  are  well established and admit of no doubt. We, therefore, propose to decide the  question raised  before us  in the  light of the principles enunciated above, but before doing that it may be necessary to give a brief survey of the scheme and structure of the  Act in  order to find out the real nature, scope and ambit of the statute. 670 To begin  with, it  may be necessary to extract the relevant portion of  the statement  of  objets  and  reasons  of  the statute:           "The Bill  is designed  mainly to  give relief  to      displaced debtors in respect of liabilities incurred by      them prior  to their  displacement from  West  Pakistan      though remission of court fees has also been allowed to      displaced creditors.  A certain  amount of  relief  was      afforded to them by Acts XLVII of 1948 and XXV of 1949,      but this was found to be inadequate.           A thorough  examination of  the  various  problems      involved had  to be  made  with  a  view  to  affording      displaced persons  adequate  and,  at  the  same  time,      reasonable relief  in the matter of their indebtedness,      consistently with the needs of their rehabilitation.           A decree  under the  law will  thus consist of two      parts,  the   first  part   being  equivalent   to  and      recoverable from  the ’paying  capacity’ of the debtor,      and the  second part being equivalent to the balance of

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    the total  amount  decreed  and  recoverable  from  the      compensation, if  and when  received by the debtor. The      first  part   of  the   decree  will,  as  a  rule,  be      recoverable in instalments.           In respect  of the  second part  of the decree, it      has been  accepted that  the amount  payable should  be      scaled down  in the  proportion in  which the displaced      debtor is  able to  obtain recompense in respect of his      immovable property  left behind in West Pakistan. Where      no recompense is received, there will be no recovery of      the second part of the decree." Section 4  of the Act provides for constitution of Tribunals to exercise  jurisdiction under  the Act  and  empowers  the State Government  to designate  any civil  court or class of civil courts  as the  Tribunal or  Tribunals  and  may  also define the  areas in  which  such  Tribunal  shall  exercise jurisdiction. It  may be  pertinent to  note here  that  the statute deliberately  does not  entrust the functions of the Act to  the civil  court per  se but  to a  Tribunal  to  be selected from  amongst civil  courts. Section  5 of  the Act provides for  an application  to be  given  by  a  displaced debtor  for   adjustment  of   his  debts   and  gives   the requirements of  that application.  Section 6 authorises the Tribunal to  reject the  application under  s. 5, if it does not fulfil the requirements of s. 5 and further gives it the power  to  grant  time  to  comply  with  the  requirements. Sections 7  and 8 of the Act provide for issue of notices to the respondents  and give  right to  the respondents to file their objections. Section 9 provides for an inquiry into the application made under s. 5. The statute designedly uses the word "proceeding"  in s.  9 rather than a suit which clearly shows that  the Legislature  was aware  of  the  distinction between a "proceeding" and a "suit". Sub-section (2) of s. 9 authorises the  Tribunal to decide the dispute and pass such decree  in  relation  thereto  as  it  thinks  fit.  It  is, therefore, clear  that the  decree which the Tribunal passes is not  a decree of the Civil Court but a decree passed by a Tribunal in  a proceeding  under s.  5 and  section 9 of the Act. Section 10 deals with claims by the creditors against 671 displaced debtors  and s.  11 regulates  the procedure  of a petition filed  by the  creditor. Sub-section  (2) of  s. 11 further authorises  the Tribunal  to determine the claim and pass a  decree in  relation thereto. Section 12 provides for objection by creditor to schedule of assets and s. 13 refers to claims by displaced creditors against persons who are not displaced debtors.  Section 14  prescribes the procedure for displaced creditor’s  petition filed  under s. 13 of the Act and authorises  the Tribunal  to pass  a decree as it thinks fit. Sub-section  (3) of  s. 14  authorities the Tribunal to pass a  decree if no cause is shown or if no dispute exists. A perusal  of sub-ss.  (2) & (3) of s. 14 clearly shows that the statute  contemplates a  decree  which  may  be  one  of rejection of the claim put forward by the displaced creditor or one  which amounts  to allowing the claim. Thus, in other words, whether  claim is  disallowed or  allowed, the  order passed by  the Tribunal  would be a decree in both cases. We have purposely  mentioned this fact because some of the High Courts have  taken the  view that where the Tribunal rejects the claim  of a  displaced creditor  or debtor either on the ground that  the petitioner  is not  a displaced  debtor  or creditor but  not on  merits, such  an adjudication does not amount to  a decree.  This distinction  sought to be made by some of the courts does not appear to be consistent with the scheme and  language of  the statute.  Section 15 of the Act

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deals with  the consequences  of  application  by  displaced debtor. The next relevant provision is s. 18 which regulates the procedure  for claims  against insurance  companies, and sub-s. (2)  of this  section provides  for a  decree  to  be passed by  a Tribunal.  Section 23 provides for a simplified procedure in  certain cases  where the  claim is  below  Rs. 5,000/- in  which case  the Tribunal  is empowered to record only a  memorandum of the substance of the deposition of the witnesses so  as to  given a  short  and  summary  decision. Section 27  refers to  the contents  of the decree and s. 28 provides for  the forum  and the  Court in  which the decree passed by  the Tribunal is to be executed. Section 32 of the Act provides  the procedure  for scaling  down of debts by a displaced debtor.  Section  36  provides  for  extension  of period of  limitation.  Section  40  is  the  provision  for appeals against any decree or final order of the Tribunal or against any  order passed  in the course of execution. These are the  relevant provisions  of the  Act in  so far  as the facts of the present case are concerned. A close examination and a detailed analysis of the various provisions of the Act would clearly  reveal that  the Act  is a beneficial statute meant for  advancing the  cause of the displaced debtors and creditors by conferring substantial benefits on them if they are able to prove their claims. In these circumstances it is clear to  us that  the Legislature could never have intended that the  claimants should  have to  pay  heavy  court  fees either in  getting, their claims adjudicated by the Tribunal or even  in  filing  appeals  against  the  decrees  of  the Tribunals. That  the displaced  persons had  been given such concessions and  facilities has  been held  by this Court in Shri Ram  Narain v.  The Simla  Banking & Industrial Company Ltd. where this Court observed as follows:           "Now, the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act      is one  of the  statutory measures meant for relief and      rehabil- 672      tation  of   displaced  persons.  It  is  meant  for  a      temporary  situation  brought  about  by  unprecedented      circumstances. It  is possible, therefore, to urge that      the provisions  of such  a measure are to be treated as      being particularly  special in  their nature  and  that      they also serve an important national purpose. It is by      and large a measure for the rehabilitation of displaced      debtors. x  x x     There is no provision therein which      compels  either  a  displaced  debtor  or  a  displaced      creditor to go to the Tribunal he is satisfied with the      reliefs which  an ordinary  civil court can give him in      the normal  course. It  is only  if he desires to avail      himself of  any of the special facilities which the Act      gives to  a displaced debtor or to a displaced creditor      and makes  an application in that behalf under sections      3, or  5(2), or  13, that  the Tribunal’s  jurisdiction      comes into operation. x x x           It is  also desirable  to notice  that so far as a      claim of  a displaced  creditor against a non-displaced      debtor is concerned the main facilities that seem to be      available are  (1) the  claim can be pursued within one      year after the commencement of the Act (presumably even      though it  may have been time barred), (2) a decree can      be obtained  on a mere application, i.e. without having      to incur  the necessary  expenses by  way of  court-fee      which would  be payable  if he  had to file a suit, (3)      the creditor  has the  facility of  getting  his  claim      adjudicated upon  by a  Tribunal which has jurisdiction      over the  place where  he resides,  i.e., a  place more

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    convenient to  him than  if he had to file a suit under      the ordinary  law in which case he would have to file a      suit at  the place  where the defendant resides or part      of the  cause of action arises. There may also be a few      other minor facilities."      As pointed  out above,  the claim  of the appellants in the present  case before us was dismissed by the Tribunal on merits and the stand taken by the Revenue which found favour with the  Taxing Judge  of  the  High  Court  was  that  the appellants should  pay ad  valorem court-fees as their claim was rejected on merits.      Counsel for  the  appellants  has  submitted  that  the present appeal  would be governed clearly by Sch. II Art. 11 of the Court Fees Act, This Article reads thus:           "11. Memorandum  of appeal  when the appeal is not      from a decree or an order having the force of a decree,      and is presented.           (a)  x    x    x           (b)  to a  High Court  or Chief  Commissioner,  or                other Chief  Controlling Executive or Revenue                Authority.                                                  Two rupees" In  order  to  attract  application  of  this  article,  the following conditions must be fulfilled: 673      (i)  that the  document sought  to be stamped must be a           memorandum of appeal;      (ii) that  the appeal  should be  presented to the High           Court; and      (iii)that the  appeal should not be from a decree or an           order having the force of a decree. The third  condition of the article is couched in a negative form  thus  implying  that  this  provision  would  have  no application to  appeals against  decrees. The  question that falls for determination is as to whether or not the decision given by  the Tribunal  under the  Act could be said to be a decree within  the meaning  of Sch.  II Art. 11 of the Court Fees Act.      It was  submitted by learned counsel for the appellants that the  Court Fees  Act and  the Code  of Civil  Procedure being statutes complementary to each other should be read as one harmonious  whole. We  think that the contention is well founded and  must prevail.  The term "decree" as used in the Court Fees  Act is  a term  of art  and it must be deemed to have been  used in  the same sense as understood by the Code of Civil  Procedure. It  may be  pertinent to note here that neither the  Court Fees Act nor the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act has defined the term "decree". Nevertheless" as far  back as  1859, by Act No. VIII of 1859 passed by the Governor-General in  Council the  concept of  a  decree  was clearly indicated,  although no  definition of  a decree was given in that Act. By ss. 183 to 190 the manner in which the judgments were  to be  given and  the  decrees  were  to  be prepared as  also the  contents of  the  same  were  clearly mentioned. Section  189 which  expressly dealt  with decrees ran thus:           "The decree  shall bear date, the day on which the      judgment was passed. It shall contain the number of the      suit, the  names and  descriptions of  the parties, and      particulars of  the claim, as stated in the Register of      the suit,  and shall specify clearly the relief granted      or other determination of the suit. It shall also state      the amount  of costs  incurred in  the suit and by what      parties and  in what  proportions they  are to be paid,      and shall  be signed by the Judge, and sealed with seal

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    the Court." Thus when the Court Fees Act was passed in the year 1870 and used the  term "decree" it must be intended to have used the word "decree" so as to bear the same connotation as the word "decree" as  explained in s. 189 of Act VIII of 1859. In the Code of  Civil Procedure Act XIV of 1882 "decree" appears to have been  defined for the first time and the definition may be extracted as follows.           "’decree’  means   the  formal  expression  of  an      adjudication upon  any right claimed, or defence set up      in Civil Court when such adjudication so far as regards      the Court  expressing it,  decides the suit or, appeal.      An order  rejecting a  plaint, or directing accounts to      be taken, or determining any question 674      mentioned or  referred  to  in  section  244,  but  not      specified in section 588, is within this definition: an      order specified  in section  588  is  not  within  this      definition:" The Code  of Civil  Procedure of  1908 also  gave a full and complete definition of "decree" in s. 2(2) which runs thus:           "’decree’  means   the  formal  expression  of  an      adjudication  which,   so  far  as  regards  the  Court      expressing it,  conclusively determines  the rights  of      the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in      controversy in  the suit  and may be either preliminary      or final.  It shall  be deemed to include the rejection      of a  plaint and  the  determination  of  any  question      within  section  47  or  section  144,  but  shall  not      include-           (a)  any adjudication from which an appeal lies as                an appeal from an order, or           (b)  any order of dismissal for default."      It would  be seen  that an order rejecting a plaint was clearly mentioned  as falling  under the  term "decree".  In view of  this clear  definition of  the  order  rejecting  a plaint, it  became necessary  to make a corresponding change in Sch.  II Art.  11 of  the Court  Fees Act and by Act V of 1908 the words "from an order rejecting a plaint or" used in Sch. II  Art. 11  before 1908 were expressly omitted for the simple reason  that an  order rejecting a plaint having been incorporated in  the definition  of a  "decree" it  was  not necessary to  retain it  in the  Court Fees Act. This is the most  important   intrinsic  evidence   to  show   that  the Legislature in  enacting the  Court Fees  Act used  the term "decree" in  the same sense as it was used in s. 2(2) of the Code of  Civil Procedure,  1908 or  in  the  code  obtaining before that day. This also shows that the Court Fees Act and the Code  of Civil  Procedure are more or less complementary to each  other. This  matter was  the  subject-matter  of  a decision of  this Court in Mannan Lal v. Mst. Chhotaka Bibi, where this Court observed as follows:           "In our view in considering the question as to the      maintainability of  an appeal  when the  court-fee paid      was insufficient  to start  with but  the deficiency is      made good  later on,  the provisions  of the Court Fees      Act and  the Code  of  Civil  Procedure  have  to  read      together to  form a  harmonious  whole  and  no  effort      should be  made to give precedence to provisions in one      over those  of the  other unless the express words of a      statute clearly override those of the other. Apart from      the decisions  bearing on  the point,  there can in our      opinion, be  no doubt  that Section 4 of the Court Fees      Act is  not the  last word on the subject and the court      must consider  the provisions  of both  the Act and the

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    Code to  harmonise the two sets of provisions which can      only be  done by  reading Section  149 as  a proviso to      Section 4  of  the  Court  Fees  Act  by  allowing  the      deficiency to  be made  good within  a period  of  time      fixed by it." 675      There are  a number  of other  decisions  of  the  High Courts which have also taken the view that the word "decree" appearing in  Sch. II  Art. 11  has to  be read  in the same sense as  used in the Code of Civil Procedure. In Ram Prasad v. Tirloki Nath a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court observed as follows           "The word  ’decree’ has  not been  defined in  the      Courtfees Act  or in the General Clauses Act; and it is      safe to  assume that  the word  has been  used  in  the      Court-fees Act  in the sense in which it is used in the      Civil P.C.,  under which all the decrees are passed and      which defines  it as  meaning "the formal expression of      adjudication  which,   so  far  as  regards  the  Court      expressing it,  conclusively determines  the rights  of      the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in      controversy in the suit......"      A Full  Bench of  the Hyderabad  High Court  in  Dawood Karim Ashrafi  v. City  Improvement  Board  made  a  similar observation where the Court observed as follows:           "To have  the force  of a  decree, an  order  must      possess all  the characteristics  of a  decree. It  was      further held  that  the  word  "decree"  has  not  been      defined in the Court-fees Act or in the General Clauses      Act, and  it was  safe to assume that the word has been      used in  the Court-fees Act in the sense in which it is      used in the Civil Procedure Code." A Division Bench of the Patna High Court also in Antala Gope v. Sarbo  Gopain, while  interpreting the word ’decree’ used in the  Hindu Marriage  Act, appears  to have taken the same view and observed as follows:           "The Act  provides  under  section  21  that  "all      proceedings under  this Act  shall be regulated, as far      as may be, by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908";           that is to say, the procedure to be adopted by the      Court, in dealing with such proceedings will be akin to      that provided  for the trial of suits in a Civil Court.      But that  does not  make the  proceeding a  suit or the      application a plaint.           x      x     x     x      x     x      x       x           Therefore, in  our view, article 11 of Schedule II      of the Court Fees Act will be applicable to all appeals      coming under  section 28  of the  Hindu  Marriage  Act,      1955." The later Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Mrs. Panzy  Fernandas v. Mrs. M. F. Cusoros & others appears to have endorsed its previous view and observed as follows: 676           "The same  result would,  however, follow  from  a      perusal of  the various provisions of the Code of Civil      Procedure of 1859, as it stood in the year 1870.           The above  provision of  law, therefore, indicates      that under  the Code of Civil Procedure, 1859, a decree      could only  be passed  in a  proceeding which  could be      termed a suit.           Section 26  specified the  particulars that are to      be given in the plaint. Section 27 laid down the manner      in which  the plaint was to be subscribed and verified.      Thus the  scheme of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1859      as disclosed  by the  aforementioned  provisions,  also

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    points to  the  conclusion  that  a  decree  marks  the      culmination of  a proceeding  which is  described as  a      suit,  and  which,  according  to  the  said  Code,  is      initiated by means of a plaint. Proceedings for letters      of administration  under the Indian Succession Act (Act      XXXIX of  1925) are not commenced by the institution of      a plaint. On the other hand, as section 278 of the said      Act shows,  they are commenced by an "application" or a      petition.           For the  above reasons  we are of opinion that the      decision of  a Court  in  proceedings  for  letters  of      administration cannot be described as a decree.           If excitability  was to  be the invariable quality      of all  decrees, one  would expect that the Legislature      would incorporate  this feature in the provisions which      define the  nature, scope  and contents  of  a  decree.      Further, if  the Legislature  wanted that  Schedule  II      Article 11  should apply  only to  executable orders it      could very  easily  have  added  the  word  "executable      before "order"." In the  above case the order passed in a proceeding before a Probate Court was held not to be a decree.      In Dundappa  v.S. G.  Motor Transport  Company the High Court of Mysore observed as follows:           "In order to understand the expression "having the      force of  a decree"  occurring in  this article  of the      Court Fees  Act, it  would be useful to derive guidance      from the  definition of a "decree" contained in section      2(2) of  the Code  of Civil Procedure, according to the      provisions of which, a decree is a formal expression of      an adjudication  conclusively determining the rights of      the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in      controversy before the Court."      In Irshad  Husain v. Bakhshish Husain the same view was taken by  the Oudh  High Court  where the  Court observed as follows:           "The expression  "decree" is not defined either in      the Court-Fees  Act or  in the  General Clauses Act. It      may, 677      therefore, be  safely assumed  that this  expression as      used in   Sch.  2, Art.  11, Court-Fees  Act, bears the      meaning given to it by s. 2(2) Civil P.C. Nor can it be      disputed that  there is  a vital  difference between  a      "decree" and  "order" in matters relating to appeals."      In Harrish  Chandra Chatterji  v. Bhoba Tarini Debi the Calcutta High  Court also  appears to  have taken  the  same view, where the Court observed as follows:           "I do not think this was the "formal expression of      an adjudication"  so as  to make  the  order  a  decree      within the  meaning of  sec. 2  of the  Code  of  Civil      Procedure. The  fee payable,  therefore,  will  be  one      leviable under  Art. 11  of the  second schedule of the      Court-fees Act."      The Bombay  High Court  in Taxing  officer, High Court, Appellate side v. Jamnadas Dharamdas  which was a case under the Displaced  Persons (Debts  Adjustment) Act,  has clearly held that  the term  "decree" used in Sch. II Art. 11 of the Court Fees  Act must  be held to Lave the same meaning as in s. 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure.      Thus on  a consideration  of the  authorities mentioned above the propositions may be summarised as follows:      Firstly,  that  under  the  definition  of  a  "decree" contained in  s. 2(2)  of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, three essential conditions are necessary:

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         (i)  that the  adjudication must  be  given  in  a                suit;           (ii) that the  suit must  start with  a plaint and                culminate in a decree; and           (iii)that the  adjudication  must  be  formal  and                final and must be given by a civil or revenue                court. In the proceedings under the Act we have already pointed out that as  the Legislature  has created  a special tribunal to inquire into the  claims displaced debtors or creditors, the Tribunal cannot  be called  a Court in any sense of the term because the Legislature has made a clear distinction between a Tribunal  and a Court. Secondly, as the proceedings before the Tribunal start with an application and not with a plaint the  other  important  ingredient  of  a  decree  is  wholly wanting. Thirdly,  the Legislature  has itself made a clear- cut distinction  between a  suit and  a proceeding  and  has described the  claim before  the Tribunal  as  a  proceeding rather than  as a  suit. In  these circumstances, therefore, none of  the requirements of a degree are to be found in the decision given  by the  Tribunal even though the Legislature may  have   described  the  decision  as  a  decree  A  mere description of the decision of the Tribunal as a decree does not make it a decree within the meaning of 678 The Court  Fees Act.  The term "decree" appears to have been used by  the Legislature  to  convey  a  sense  of  finality regarding the  decision of  the Tribunal  more  particularly since the  adjudication of the claim, but for the Act, would have been  by a  Civil Court  and then  it would have been a "decree".      Secondly, as  pointed out,  the object of the Act is to benefit displaced  persons by  providing them  a  cheap  and expeditious remedy.  The argument  of  Mr.  Sanghi  for  the respondent., the  he Legislature wanted the claimants to pay heavy court-fees if they lost before the Tribunal is totally inconsistent with  the aim  and object  of the  Act. If  the displaced claimants  were given  the  right  to  have  their claims determined  on a  nominal court-fee  and if  only one right  of   appeal  was   provided  it   surpa,  ses   one’s comprehension why the Legislature should have. intended that even if  wrong orders  were  passed  by  the  Tribunal,  the claimants should have to pay heavy court-fees if they wanted to file an appeal to the High Court. If the intention of the Legislature was  to provide  a  cheap  and  not  expeditious remedy to the claimants, then the remedy would be incomplete if it  was given  only at  the original stage and not at the appellate stage.      Having regard  to these  circumstances we are satisfied that the  term  "decree"  used  in  Sch.  II,  Art.  11,  is referable to a decree as defined in  s. 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure  and as  the decision of the Tribunal in the instant case  does not fulfil the requirements of a "decree" as mentioned above, the said decision is not a decree within the meaning  of Sch.  II, Art. 11 of the Court Fees Act and, therefore, the  memorandum of appeal filed by the appellants squarely falls  within the  ambit of  Sch. II Art. 11 of the Court Fees Act and ad valorem court-fees under Sch. I Art. 1 are not leviale.      Apart from  the above  considerations, it  is  a  well- settled principle   interpretation of statute, hat where the Legislature uses  an expression  bearin a  well-known  legal contation  it  must  be  premised  to  have  used  the  said expression in  the sense in which it has been so understood. Craies on "Statute Law" observes as follows:

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         "There is  a well-known principle of construction,      that where  the legislature uses in an Act a legal term      which has  received judicial interpretation, it must be      assumed that  the term is used in the sense in which it      has  been  judicially  interpreted  unless  a  contrary      intention appears."      In Barras  v. Aberdeen  Steam    Trawling  and  Fishing Company Lord Buckmaster pointed out as follows:           "It has long been a well-establilshed principle to      be applied   in the consideration of Acts of Parliament      that where  a word  of doubtful  meaning has received a      clear judicial  inter pretation, the subsequent statute      which incorporates  the same word or the samerphrase in      a similar context must be construed so that the word or      phrase is  interpreted according   the meaning that has      previously been ascribed to it." 679 Craies  further  points  out  that  the  rule  as  to  world judicially interpreted applies also to words with well-known legal meanings,  even though  they have not been the subject of judicial  interpretation. Thus  applying these principles in the instant case it would appear that when the Court Fees Act uses  the word  "decree" which  had a  well-known  legal significance  or  meaning,  then  the  Legislature  must  be presumed to have used this term in the sense in which it has been understood,  namely, as  defined in  the Code  of Civil Procedure even  if there  has  been  no  express    judicial interpretation on this point.      There are  a number  of decisions  which have taken the view that  Sch. II Art. 11 governs appeals against decisions of the  Tribunal. The  matter  was  fully  considered  in  a decision of  the Bombay  High Court  in Jamnaudas Dharamdas’ case (supra) where Shah, J., observed as follos:           "But the  expression "decree" has not been defined      in the  Court-fees Act. The expression "decree" as used      in  the   Court-fees  Act.,ppears   to  have  the  same      connotation as that expression has in the Code of Civil      Procedure. The  Court fees  Act is  intended  to  be  a      complementary piece of legisiation to the Code of Civil      Procedure dealing with payment of court-fees in matters      which are  tried by the civil Courts. If the expression      "decree" has  the same  connotation as  that expression      has in  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  it  would  be      difficult to  regard an adjudication made by a Tribunal      appointed   under    the   Displaced   Persons   (Debts      Adjustment) Act  as a  decree within the meaning of the      Court-fees Act,  even though  it is so called under the      Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act. In order that      an adjudication  should amount  to a  decree under  the      Code of Civil Procedure, it must be a formal expression      of an  adjudication conclusively determining the rights      of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters      in controversy  in the  suit.  The  proceedings  to  be      initiated by  displaced persons for adjustment of their      debts or  by displaced  creditors or displaces, debtors      are  by   applications.  Such  applications  cannot  be      regarded as plaints in civil suits and are not required      by law  to bear  ad valorem court-fee under schedule 1,      cl. 1  of the  Court-fees Act.  It  is  true  that  the      provisions of  the Code  of Civil  Procedure  are  made      applicable to  the proceedings  which are  commenced by      applications. But  the proceedings under the Act cannot      be called  suits. Again the Tribunal in dealing with an      application under  s. 6 of the Displaced Persons (Debts      Adjustment) Act  is not merely deciding a claim made by

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    a debtor,  but  is  dealing  with  an  application  for      adjustment  of   his  debts.  x  x  x  x  Even  if  the      Legislature has  chosen to call such an award a decree,      it cannot amount to a decree within the meaning of sub-      s. (2)  of s.  of the Code of Civil Procedure and in my      judgment the  award cannot  be  regarded  as  a  decree      within the meaning of Schedule II cl. 11, of the Court-      fees Act." 680 We find  ourselves in  complete agreement with the aforesaid observations made by Shah, J.      In Parmanand  Lokumal and  other v.  Khudabadi Bhaibund Cooperative Credit Bank Ltd. and Others, while construing an almost identical  question, the Calcutta High Court observed as follows:           "It is  to afford  relief to displaced persons and      that purpose  may well  be frustrated,  if, in cases of      preliminary dismissals  of the applications the appeals      are to  be filed  with  ad  valorem  court-fee  on  the      disputed amount,  even assuming  that it  is capable of      ascertainment at  the particular stage. Beaning that in      mind and  having regard  to the scheme and structure of      the Act  and the nature of the impugned decree, namely,      of dismissal  on the preliminary finding of the failure      of the  appellants to  prove the necessary status, and,      the propriety  of that  finding being the sole question      for  consideration   in  the  appeal,  so  far  as  the      appellant are  concerned, we do not think that it would      be improper  to hold that the subject matter in dispute      in the  appeal is that question of status which plainly      is incapable of money value. The appeal thus would come      under Schedule  II, Art.  17, of  the  Court-fees  Act,      provided, of  course, the  memorandum of appeal is in a      ’suit’ as  contemplated in the opening paragraph of the      Article.           x          x           x           Even if  the  subject-matter  in  dispute  in  the      appeal be  held to be the relief of reliefs, claimed by      the  appellants  in  their  original  application,  the      decree, impugned being one of dismissal of the same, we      do not think that any other view on the question of its      valuation should be taken." The Calcutta  High Court  appears to have made a distinction between a  decree passed  by a Tribunal dismissing the claim of a  petitioner on  a preliminary  ground that the claimant was not  able to prove his status and therefore had no locus standi to  file the  claim and  a case  where the  claim was dismissed or decreed on merits. According to the High Court, in the former case a decision given by the Tribunal would be only an  order, whereas  in the  latter case  it would  be a decree. We,  however, do  not agree  with this  part of  the observation because  as pointed  out by us the statute makes no distinction  at all  between the decision of the Tribunal which rejects  the claim either on a preliminary point or on merits and  one which  allows the claim. Both these kinds of decisions have been termed as decree passed by the Tribunal. In these  circumstances, therefore, there does not appear to be any  warrant for the distinction which seems to have been drawn by  the High  Court  between  a  decree  passed  by  a Tribunal on  a preliminary  point or  that passed on merits. Even otherwise,  according to the general scheme of the Code of Civil  Procedure  whether  the  suit  culminates  in  the rejection of  the claim  of the  plaintiff, and  thereby  in dismissal of  the suit  or in acceptance of the claim of the plaintiff, where  the suit is decreed the final adjudication

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given by  the Court is a decree whether it is one dismissing the claim or one allowing it. 681 The distinction  between a  decree which is one of dismissal of the  suit or  a decree  which amounts to an acceptance of the claim  of the  plaint is  too artificial  to  merit  any consideration. While,  therefore, we  do not agree with some of the  observations of  the Calcutta  High Court,  we fully agree with the other part of observations where the Calcutta High Court  has held  that ad  valorem  court-fees  are  not payable.      Similarly, in Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Firm Isardas Kaluram, a Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court observed           x x x x x x           "We are therefore of opinion that the order passed      in  this   case,  though   it  finally  determined  the      application of the appellant, was not a decree, because      it  did  not  a  determine  the  claim  which,  in  the      circumstances in  which that  word has  been used in s.      11(2) must relate to the existence or the amount of the      debt due to the creditor.           The creditor,  therefore, if  he has  a  right  of      appeal, has  to pay  court-fee under  Sch. II.  Art. 11      which mentions  appeals which  are not preferred from a      decree or  an order  D. having  the force  of a decree.      Here  the  order,  though  it  finally  determined  the      application under  s. 10,  was not a decree; nor did it      have the  force of  a decree  for it is not strictly in      accordance with the terms of s. 11(2).           x x x x x x           We feel  that this  Act is an ameliorative measure      for the  benefit of  displaced persons.  It  should  be      strictly interpreted,  and only  those orders should be      considered decrees,  which  come  strictly  within  the      terms of s. 9, 11(2) and 14(2).           Where however  the order  does not  come  strictly      within the  terms of those provisions, it should not be      tracted as  a decree,  but only as an order determining      the application." Here also  a distinction  was sought  to be  drawn between a dismissal of the application on the ground that the claimant was not  a displaced person and a decision which decreed the claim on  merits. Barring  this disinction  made by the High Court, which we do not approve, we are in agreement with the other observations  made by  the Full Bench which are to the effect that  the order  passed by  the Tribunal  not being a decree clearly  falls within  the ambit of Sch. II, Art. 11, of the Court Fees Act.      In a  later decision  of the  same High  Court  in  The Punjab National  Bank Ltd. v. The American Insurance Company Ltd. the Court observed as follows: 682           "On an  analysis of  section 18(2),  it cannot  be      said that  the order under appeal passed by the learned      Civil Judge  is a decree or order having the force of a      decree. The appellant was, therefore, not liable to pay      ad valorem court-fee as required under Schedule I, Art.      1, of  the Court  Fees Act.  .  .  .  The  tribunal  is      competent to  pass a  decree only  after  submitting  a      report  to   the  Insurance   Claims  Board  and  after      receiving their  proposal. If  this is not done and the      application is rejected on the ground that the loss did      not  take  place  in  the  circumstances  specified  in      section 18(1) that order cannot be said to be a decree.      The reasoning  of the  Full Bench  case with  regard to

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    sec. 11(2)  is applicable  to the present case which is      under sec. 18."      The Punjab  High Court  in S.  Sohan Singh v. Liverpool and London  and Globe  Insurance Co.  Ltd. appears  to  have taken the same view and observed as follows:           "Having regard  to the general purpose of the Act,      which is  almost entirely intended to benefit displaced      persons and  relieve them from the hardships consequent      on their  displacement, I do not think there can be any      doubt  that   the  Act  was  intended  to  benefit  all      displaced persons  who had  property in  West  Pakistan      which suffered  loss or damage and which was covered by      an insurance  policy entered  into before 15-8-1947 and      in force  at the  time when  the  loss  or  damage  was      sustained, whether  this occurred  before or  after the      15th of August.           x x x x x .           My  own  view  is  that  it  was  certainly  never      anybody’s intention  that  displaced  persons,  whether      debtors or  creditors should  have to  pay ’ad valorem’      court-fees on  appeals against  orders dismissing their      applications, and  I am  inclined to  share the view of      Khosla, J.,  that an  order dismissing  an application,      whether under  s. 5  or s.  10 or 13, is merely a final      order which  does not necessitate the drawing up of any      decree-sheet  or   amount  to   a   decree   and   more      particularly so  in the  case where  an application has      been  dismissed,   as  in   the  present   case,  on  a      preliminary point  without going  into  the  merits  at      all." We find ourselves in complete agreement with the observation made by Falshaw, J., in the decision referred to above.      Our  attention  was,  however,  drawn  by  the  learned counsal for  the respondents  to three decisions of the High Court taking  contrary view,  namely, Kishandas v. Parasram; Nabh Raj  Notan Das  v. Sidhu Ram Mool Chand and Sita Ram v. Mool Chand. These decisions have on doubt held that decision of the Tribunal under the 683 Act amounts to a decree and, therefore, does not fall within the ambit  of Sch.  II Art.  11 and  ad valorem court-fee is payable under the Court Fees Act. We are, however, unable to agree with  the view  taken by  these Courts.  In the  first place, these decisions have not taken into consideration the nature of  the  proceeding  under  the  Act  and  the  clear distinction made  by the  Act itself  between a  suit and  a proceeding. These  decisions have  also not  considered  the various aspects  which we  have discussed  above relating to the essential  conditions of  a  decree  and  finally  these decisions have  also overlooked  the main purpose and object of the  Act and seem to have also ignored the rule of strict interpretation of  a  fiscal  statute.  For  these  reasons, therefore, that  the  court-fee  of  Rs.  5/-  paid  by  the appellants on  the cannot  be held  to be good law and must, therefore, be over-ruled.      On a  consideration of the facts, circumstances and the law on  the subject  we are  clearly of  the view  that  the memorandum of  appeal in  the instant  case falls within the ambit of  Sch. II, Art. 11, and the view of the Taxing Judge that ad  valorem court-fee was payable under Sch. I, Art. 1, of the  Court Fees  Act  was  legally  erroneous.  We  hold, therefore, that  the  court-fee  of  Rs.  5/-  paid  by  the appellants on the memorandum of appeal was sufficient.      Before concluding  we must  notice an argument advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents. It was submitted

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that under  s. 5  of the  Court Fees  Act a  decision of the Taxing Judge as designated by the Chief Justice is final and cannot be  reopened in  any Court.  It was  submitted by Mr. Dikshit that  in view  of this  provision the appeal to this Court  by  special  leave  was  not  maintainable.  We  are, however, unable  to agree  with this contention. Even though an order  of the Taxing Judge may be final under s. 5 of the Court Fees  Act, the  power of  this Court  under  Art.  136 granted by  the Constitution  will  override  any  stamp  of finality given by a statute or Act passed by Parliament. The finality which  may attach  under s. 5 of the Court Fees Act cannot derogate from the power conferred by the Constitution itself on  the Supreme  Court. Reliance,  however, seems  to have been  placed on  a decision of this Court in S. Rm. Ar. S. Sp.  Satheppa Chettiar  v. S. Rm. Ar. Ramanathan Chattiar and particularly  on the following observations made by this Court:           "In our  opinion, the  decision  of  the  Division      Bench of  the Madras  High Court that the memorandum of      appeal should  be taxed  for the  purposes of Court fee      under s.  7(iv) (b)  of the  Act  is  final  under  the      provisions of s. 5 of this Act. That is why we have not      allowed the  merits of  this order  to be questioned in      the present  appeal. We  must, therefore, deal with the      appellant’s contention on the basis that the court fees      on his  memorandum of  appeal must  be levied  under s.      7(iv) (b) of the Act." These  observations   prima  facia   seem  to   support  the contention of  the respondents  but on  a closer scrutiny of the entire decision it seems 684 to us  that this  Court was not at all called upon to decide the question  of the effect of s. 5 of the Court Fees Act as overriding the  provision of  Art. 136  of the Constitution. The observations relied upon by the respondents are prefaced by the observations of Gajendragadkar, J., who spoke for the Court, where he has clearly mentioned that the Court was not called upon to consider this point, thus:           "We are,  however, not called upon to consider the      point as to whether s. 7 (v) would apply to the present      suit or  whether the  present suit  would fall under s.      7(iv) (b)." Further more,  it appears  that as  the appellant before the Supreme Court  was satisfied  with the  observations made by the Court,  he did  not press for a decision on the question of  court-fees  and  confined  his  arguments  only  to  the question as to whether the court-fees should be levied under s. 7(iv)  (b) of the Court Fees Act. In these circumstances, therefore, the  identical  question  raised  before  us  was neither argued  nor decided in the case referred to above by the respondents.  For these reasons the contention raised by the respondents on this score must be overruled.      The result  is that the appeal is allowed, the order of the Taxing  Judge directing payment of the ad valorem court- fees is set aside and the High Court is directed to hear and dispose of  the appeal  in accordance  with the  law on  the court-fee already  paid by  the  appellants  which,  in  our opinion, is  sufficient. In  the peculiar  circumstances  of this case  and in view of somewhat uncertain position of the state of law, we make no order as to costs. P.B.R.                                       Appeal allowed.