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PETITIONER: DISTRICT COUNCIL OF UNITED KHASI & JAINTIA HILLS& ORS.  ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MISS SITIMON SAWIAN ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT25/08/1971

BENCH: DUA, I.D. BENCH: DUA, I.D. SIKRI, S.M. (CJ) MITTER, G.K. VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN

CITATION:  1972 AIR  787            1972 SCR  (1) 398  1971 SCC  (3) 708  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1986 SC1930  (11)

ACT: Constitution of India 1950-Sixth Schedule-Para 3(1)(a)-Power of District Council to make law with respect to  "allotment, occupation or use, or the setting apart of land"-If includes power  to make laws with respect to transfer of  land-United Khasi-Jaintia  Hills District (Transfer of Land) Act,  1953- Section 3-Constitutionality of.

HEADNOTE: By  virtue  of the Sixth Schedule to  the  Constitution  the United  Khasi  Jaintia Hills District has  been  constituted into  an autonomous district with a District Council.   Para 3(1)(a)  of the Schedule authorises the District Council  to make  laws  "with respect to" "the allotment  occupation  or use,  or  the  setting apart, of  land",  for  the  purposes mentioned  therein.  The District Council passed the  United Khasi-Jaintia  Hills District (Transfer of Land)  Act,  1953 section  3  of  which provided that "no  land,  within  -the District shall be sold, mortgaged leased bartered gifted  or otherwise  transferred........  The  preamble  to  the   Act recited  that  it was "necessary to make provisions  in  the Autonomous  District of the United Khasi Jaintia Hills  with respect  to  the transfer, allotment, occupation or  use  of land for any purposes likely to promote the interests of the inhabitants thereof".  On the question whether para  3(1)(a) of the Sixth Schedule confers on the District council  power to make laws with respect to transfer of land, HELD  : The subject of transfer is clearly beyond the  scope of the law-making power conferred on the District Council by the Constitution and therefore, s. 3 of the impugned Act  is void being beyond the jurisdiction of the District Council. The bracketing together of the words "allotment,  occupation or  use,  or  -setting  apart  of  land"  for  the  purposes mentioned  therein  without using words like  "transfer"  or "alienation"  is  clearly  indicative  of  the  Constitution makers’ intention to restrict power of the District  Council only  to make laws with respect to actual use or  occupation

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of  the land allotted or set apart for the  purposes  stated therein.   It  was not intended to extend  to  "transfer  of land".   Nor  can  the words used in  para  3(1)(a)  of  the Schedule be read as implying transfer.  The purpose,  object and scheme of making such provision for the hill areas  also goes  against inclusion of the power of transfer.   And  the addition, in the preamble to the Act, of the word "transfer" to  the words allotment occupation or use of land"  used  in para 3 (1) (a) of the Schedule is indicative of an intent to enlarge the scope of the object and purpose of enacting  the impugned Act beyond the limits of the power conferred by the Constitution. [404 G-H, 405 B, 404 B] It  is  clear from Para 12 of the Sixth Schedule  read  with para  3  (1)  (a) that the  District  Councils,  unlike  the Parliament and the State Legislatures are not intended to be clothed  with plenary power of legislation.  Their power  to make  laws  is expressly limited by the  provisions  of  the Sixth  Schedule  which  has created them  and  they  can  do nothing beyond the 399 limits  which  circumscribe their power. it  is  beyond  the domain  of the courts to enlarge constructively their  power to make laws. [407 A-B] Further, the proviso to para 3(1)(a) merely serves to ensure that no law made by the Regional and District Councils  with respect to allotment, occupation or use or setting apart, of land, as mentioned in that clause, shall have, the effect of preventing   compulsory  acquisition  of  land  for   public purposes, by the Government of Assam in accordance with  the law in force authorising such acquisition.  The proviso does not  in  any way after the operative effect of  clause  (a). [407 C-E]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1546  and 1547 of 1968. Appeals  from the judgment and order dated June 3,  1968  of the  Assam and Nagaland High Court in Civil Rules  Nos.  384 and 408 of 1965. Niren  De,  Attorney-General and D. N.  Mukherjee,  for  the appellants (in both the appeals). A.K.  Sen,  P.  K. Chatterjee and Rathin,  Das,  for  the respondents (in both the appeals). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Dua,  J.  The  short question requiring  decision  in  these appeals on certificate of fitness granted by the’ High Court of Assam and Nagaland under Art. 132(1) of the  Constitution relates to the validity of s. 3 of the United  Khasi-Jaintia Hills  District  (Transfer- of Land) Act (No.  IV  of  1953) (hereinafter called the impugned Act), passed by the  United Khasi-Jaintia Hills District Council (hereinafter called the District Council The High Court struck down this section  as beyond  the competence of the District Council and  also  as offending  Art. 14 of, the Constitution.  The  facts  giving rise  to these appeals are not in dispute.  It is,  however, unnecessary  to  state  them because the  question  of  ’the constitutional  validity of s. 3 of ’the impugned Act  falls for  determination  solely on the interpretation  1  of  the relevant   provisions  of  the  Constitution   without   any reference to the facts. Part  X of the Constitution dealing with the  Scheduled  and Tribal  Areas  consists  of  the  solitary  Art.  244  which provides for the administration of such areas.  According to

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sub-Art.  (2)  of this Article the provisions of  the  Sixth Schedule of the Constitution apply to the administration  of the  tribal  areas in Assam.  By virtue of Para 1  (1)  read with  Para  20  and Part A of the  Table  appended  to  this Schedule  the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills District  has  been constituted into an autonomous District and under Para 2 ( 1 )  of  the Schedule there has to be a District  Council  for each autonomous District with not less than three-fourths of its  members to be elected on the basis of  adult  suffrage. Para 3 (1 ) (a) 400 of  the  Schedule with which we are  directly  concerned  in these appeals reads as under :-               3.Powers of the District Councils and Regional               Councils to make laws.-               (1)The  Regional  Council  for  an  autonomous               region  in  respect of all areas  within  such               region   and  the  District  Council  for   an               autonomous  district in respect of  all  areas               within  the  district except those  which  are               under  the authority of Regional Councils,  if               any,  within the district shall have power  to               make laws with respect to-               (a)   the allotment, occupation or use, or the               setting  apart, of land, other than  any  land               which  is a reserved forest, for the  purposes               of  agriculture or grazing or for  residential               or other non-agricultural purposes or for  any                             other purposes likely to promote, the interests               of the inhabitants of any village or town:               Provided  that  nothing  in  such  laws  shall               prevent  the  compulsory  acquisition  of  any               land,  whether  occupied  or  unoccupied,  for               public purposes by the Government of Assam  in               accordance with the law for the time being  in               force authorising such acquisition;" As  its preamble shows the impugned Act was enacted  because it  was  considered  "necessary to make  provisions  in  the autonomous  district of the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills  with respect to the transfer, allotment occupation or use of land for  any  purposes likely to promote the  interests  of  the inhabitants thereof".  Section 3 thereof provides as follows :               "No  land within the District shall  be  sold,               mortgaged,   leased,   bartered,   gifted   or               otherwise  transferred  by tribal  to  a  non-               tribal  or  by a non-tribal  to  another  non-               tribal,  except with the previous sanction  of               the District Council :               Provided that no sanction will be necessary in               the case of lease of a building on rent               Provided further-               (a)   That  sanction shall not be accorded  to               the sale from a tribal to a non-tribal if  the               intended  transferee either already holds  one               piece  Of house property or land in  Shilling,               within 5 miles from the Deputy  Commissioner’s               Court  401               either is his name or in the name or names. of               other  members of his family or  falls  within               the  category  (in the opinion  of  the  Chief               Executive Member) of the class of profiteering               landlords;

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             (b)   That  reason shall be recorded  for  any               refusal  of transfer from a tribal to  a  non-               tribal  or from a non-tribal to  another  non-               tribal." The  narrow  question posed in the  present  controversy  is whether para 3 (1 ) (a) of the Sixth Schedule confers on the District Council power to make laws with respect to transfer of  land; in other words whether the subject of transfer  of land is covered by the expression "allotment, occupation  or use or the setting apart of land." The  High  Court has held that Para 3 (1) (a) of  the  Sixth Schedule does not empower the District Council to  legislate with  respect to transfer of land.  According to that  Court the  expression  "the allotment, occupation or use,  or  the setting  apart of land. . . " does not take within its  fold "transfer of land". The learned Attorney-General has questioned the  correctness of  this  view and has submitted that bearing  in  mind  the legislative history of the Sixth Schedule which reflects the real  object and purpose of inserting in the Constitution  a separate provision for the administration of tribal areas in the  State of Assam, the expression in question as  used  in cl.  (a) of para 3 (1 ) must be given a wider meaning so  as to include ’transfer of land’.  The learned Attorney-General has  in  support of this submission drawn our  attention  to Art.  46  of the Constitution which embodies as one  of  the directive principles of State policy, requiring the State to promote  with  special  care the  educational  and  economic interests  of  the weaker sections of the  people,  and,  in particular,  of  the  Scheduled  Castes  and  the  Scheduled Tribes,  and to protect them from social injustice  and  all forms of exploitation.  Reference has also been made by  him to  certain portions of the report of the  Sub-Committee  on North-East  Frontier  (Assam)  Tribal  and  Excluded   Areas submitted  in  July,  1947  to  the  Advisory  Committee  on "fundamental  rights, minorities, tribal areas etc." of  the Constituent  Assembly, entrusted with the task  of-  framing the Constitution of India.  The Advisory Committee  accepted the recommendations to which reference has been made by  the learned Attorney General.  In that report, emphasis was laid on  the  anxiety  of the Hill people  of  the  North-Eastern Frontier   areas  about  their  land  and  fear   of   their exploitation  by  the  people from  the  more  advanced  and crowded  areas  in the plains.  The atmosphere of  fear  and suspicion   prevailing  in  the  hill  areas   even   though considered  by  some to be unjustified, was  felt  to.-be  a reality,  and in order to allay those suspicions  and  fears the necessity of making 402 requisite provisions by way of constitutional safeguards was emphasised.   According to the report there was an  emphatic unanimity of opinion among the hill people that there should be control of immigration of outsiders and of allocation  of land to them, such control being already vested in the  hill people  themselves.  In the areas where no right to  private property  or proprietary right of the hereditary  chief  was recognised, the land, including the forests, was regarded as the property of the clan.  It was accordingly recommended in the report, to quote its own words:               ".....   that the Hill Districts  should  have               powers  of legislation over occupation or  use               of  land other than land  comprising  reserved               forest  under the Assam Forest  Regulation  of               1891  or  other  law  applicable.   The   only               limitation  we  would place upon  this  is  to

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             provide  that the, local councils  should  not               require  payment for the occupation of  vacant               land by the Provincial, Government for  public               purposes or prevent the acquisition of private               land,  also required for public  purposes,  on               payment of compensation." According to the submission of the learned Attorney  General para  3 (1) (a) of the Sixth Schedule must be held  to  have been  intended to carry out the above recommendation of  the aforementioned sub-committee duly. accepted by the  Advisory Committee concerned. Support for the construction of cl. (a) of para 3(1) of  the Sixth Schedule as suggested by the learned Attorney  General has  been sought from the decision of the Federal  Court  in Bhola  Prasad  v.  The King-Emperor(1)  and  from  a  recent decision  of this Court in Indu Bhusan Bose v. Rama  Sundari Devi  &  anr(2). In Bhola Prasad’s case(1) it  was  observed that the expression "with respect to" contained in s. 100(3) of  the  Government  of India Act, 1935, which  gives  to  a Provisional Legislature power to make laws for the  Province or any part thereof should be given a wide construction.  On this analogy the learned Attorney-General has contended that the expression "with respect to" contained in para 3(1) also deserves to be construed widely so as to include within  the expression  "the allotment, occupation or use"  employed  by the  Constitution  in cl. (a) ’transfer  of  lands".In  Indu Bhusan  Bose’s case (2) this Court construed  the  word  " regulation"   in   the  expression"  regulation   of   house accommodation’  in  Entry  No. 3, List  I,  in  the  Seventh Schedule  of the Constitution of India to be wide enough  to include  within  it  all aspects as to who is  to  make  the constructions, under what conditions the (1) [1942] F.C.R. 17.     (2) [1970] 1 S.C.R. 443.  403 constructions   can  be  altered,  who  is  to  occupy   the accommodation  and for how long, on what terms it is  to  be occupied, when and under what circumstances the occupant  is to  cease  to  occupy  it,  and  the  manner  in  which  the accommodation  is to be utilised.  On the analogy  of  these two  decisions,  the learned Attorney General has  tried  to persuade  us  to hold that the  expression  "the  allotment, occupation  or  use" occurring in para 3 (1 )  (a)  must  be deemed  to have been intended to be used in a wide sense  so as to include transfer of land. The proviso to cl. (a) of para 3 (1) of the Sixth  Schedule, according  to  the learned Attorney-General, should  not  be construed  as  indicative  of  the  narrower   construction, namely,  that the expression "the allotment,  occupation  or use" as used in that clause did not cover transfer of  land. According  to  his contention the proviso  merely  places  a restricted  limitation on the power of the District  Council to  make laws by providing that no law made by  the  Council shall prevent acquisition of land for public purpose by  the Government  of  Assam in accordance with law.  It  has  been argued  that  the meaning and scope of a proviso  is  to  be determined according     to  the legislative  intent,  there being no fixed rule of universal   application governing its function, and that in the present case  the      legislative intent  does not go beyond the limitation suggested  by  the learned  Attorney-General.   He has  cited  Commissioner  of Commercial  Taxes & ors. v. R. S. Jhaver & ors.(1) in  which it  was explained that the question whether a proviso  in  a given case is, by way of an exception or a condition to  the substantive   provision  or  whether  it  is  in  itself   a substantive  provision, must be determined on the  substance

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of the proviso and not its form. On  behalf of the respondents Shri A. K. Sen has  drawn  our attention  to certain passages from "Notes on Khasi Law"  by Keith  Cantlie of the Indian Civil Service, who  was  Deputy Commissioner  of  the  Khasi and  Jaintia  Hills  (1930-34). Those  passages  which are found in Ch.  XIII  dealing  with "Land Tenures in the States" contributed by Mr. David Roy of Assam  Civil Service, do not, in our view, usefully  add  to the information contained in the report of the Sub-Committee to which the learned Attorney-General has already drawn  our attention. We have given full consideration to the arguments  addressed by  the learned Attorney-General, but we feel that the  High Court  was right in placing the construction it did  on  the scope  and  effect  of cl. (a) of para 3 (1)  of  the  Sixth Schedule. (1)  [1968] 1 S.C.R. 148. 404 On the plain reading of para 3 (1) (a) of the Sixth Schedule and  of the preamble and S. 3 of the impugned Act the  first prima  facie  difficulty which one faces  in  accepting  the appellant’s  argument  is created by the  departure  by  the District Council from the language used in para 3 (1) (a) of the  Schedule in the language used in the preamble and S.  3 of  the impugned Act.  The addition in the preamble  of  the word "transfer" to the, words "allotment, occupation or  use of  land. . . . " used in para 3 (1) (a) of the Schedule  is indicative  of an intent to enlarge the scope of the  object and  purpose of enacting the impugned Act beyond the  limits of the power conferred by the Constitution.  And then in  s. 3  of the impugned Act we find that a  completely  different phraseology has been employed for prohibiting various  kinds of  transfers in express terms.  This leaves no doubt  about the great importance attached by the District Council to the addition  of  the word "transfer" in the  preamble  to,  the expression   actually  used  in  the  Sixth   Schedule   for conferring  legislative power on the District  Council.   No convincing  explanation has been offered for this  departure from the language used in the Constitution from which  alone the  District Council draws its power to make laws.  If,  as is  forcefully  contended on behalf of  the  appellant,  the words  used  in  para 3 (1) (a) of the  Sixth  Schedule  are comprehensive enough to include within their sweep "transfer of  land" then it is not understood where was the  necessity of  adding the word "transfer" in the preamble and  using  a wholly  different phraseology in s. 3 of the  impugned  Act. The  law maker, it may be pointed out. may well be  presumed ordinarily  not  to  waste  words by  adding  them  as  mere surplusage. We  now proceed to deal with the arguments relating  to  the meaning  of the controversial words used in para 3 (1 )  (a) of  the  Schedule.  The word "allot" according  to  standard dictionaries means, distribute by lot, or in such a way that the  recipients  have  no choice,- to assign  as  a  lot  or apportion  to; and the word "allotment" means,  apportioning the  action  of  allotting; share  allotted  to  one;  small portion  of  land  let  out  for  cultivation.   The   words "occupation" and "use" by themselves do not convey the  idea of transfer of title.  Similarly the "setting apart of land" for  the  purposes mentioned in cl. (a) cannot  be  read  as implying transfer of title.  The bracketing together of  the words  "allotment,  occupation or use, or setting  apart  of land" for the purposes mentioned therein without using words like "transfer" or "alienation" is clearly indicative of the Constitution  makers’  intention to restrict  power  of  the

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District  Council only to make laws with respect  to  actual use or occupation of the land allotted or set apart for  the purposes  stated therein.  It was not intended to extend  to "transfer of land".  Words like "transfer" or "alienation of land", it may be pointed out, have been used in the  Seventh Schedule to  405 the  Constitution  when describing the-power  of  the  State Legislature  to make laws vide Entry 18, List II.  There  is no  cogent .-round why such expression could not be used  in para  3 (1) (a) also, if power to make laws with respect  to transfer  of  land  was  intended to  be  conferred  on  the District  Council.   In our opinion, the plain  language  of this  sub-para  does  not  admit of  any  ambiguity  and  no compelling  reasons have been brought to our notice why  the language  should  be unduly stretched so as to  include  the power of transfer.  The purpose, object and scheme of making such  provision  for the hill areas also  goes  against  the appellant’s contention. It therefore seems to us to be quite clear that the  framers of  the  Constitution  wanted to confine the  power  of  the District  Councils to make laws under para 3 (1) (a) to  the distribution or setting apart, of the land mentioned therein only  for  the purposes of occupation or  use  as  expressly stated  therein, without intending to extend that  power  to the  transfer  of land.  This construction is  not  only  in accord  with  the  real sense  discernible  from  the  plain meaning  of the language used in. this clause, but  it  also serves  more effectively to carry out the manifest  purpose, policy   and  scheme  underlying  the  provisions   of   the Constitution,  namely, protection of the hill people in  the North-Eastern  Hills Districts against exploitation  by  the more  sophisticated  outsiders  from  the  plains  than  the construction which would extend the District Councils’ power of  making laws to the transfer of land.  The report of  the Sub-Committee  referred  to earlier  clearly  supports  this construction.   The  passages from the report to  which  our attention has been drawn do not show that power to make laws for  transfer  of land was recommended to be vested  in  the District  Councils.  On the other hand, the  recommendations contained  in  the report were restricted to  the  power  to control only use and occupation of the land and it was  this limited  power  which was recommended to be  vested  in  the District  Councils.  This would be clear from the  following passage in the report :               "Accepting this then as a fundamental  feature               of   the  administration  of  the  hills,   we               recommend that the Hill Districts should  have               powers  of legislation over occupation or  use               of  land other than land  comprising  reserved               forest  under the Assam Forest  Regulation  of               1891  or  other  law  applicable.   The   only               limitation  we  would place upon  this  is  to               provide  that  the local councils  should  not               require  payment for the occupation of  vacant               land  by the Provincial Government for  public               purposes or prevent the acquisition of private               land,  also required for public  purposes,  on               payment of compensation." 406 The  argument that in construing the  provisions  conferring power  to legislate the words should be interpreted  broadly and  no narrow or pedantic interpretation should  be  placed upon  them is, in our opinion, inapplicable to the  case  in hand.  The power of legislation conferred on bodies like the

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District  Councils,  which  concerns us,  must  be  confined strictly within the limits prescribed by the plain  language used   and  the  doctrine  of  wide   construction   visions conferring  plenary nature of legislative power on the  Par- liament or State Legislatures in which case the  appellant’s argument may be more appropriately accepted.  We consider it proper  at  this  stage to refer to para  12  of  the  Sixth Schedule which provides : "12.    Application  of  Acts  of  Parliament  and  of   the Legislature  of  the  State  to  autonomous  districts   and autonomous  regions.--(1) Notwithstanding anything  in  this Constitution--               (a)   no  Act of the Legislature of the  State               in respect of any of the matters specified  in               paragraph  3 of this Schedule as matters  with               respect  to  which  a District  Council  or  a               Regional Council may make laws, and no Act  of               the  Legislature of the State  prohibiting  or                             restricting   the   consumption  of any   non               distilled alcoholic liquor shall apply to  any               autonomous   district  or  autonomous   region               unless in either case the District Council for               such district or having jurisdiction over such               region by public notification so directs,  and               the District Council in giving such  direction               with  respect to any Act may direct  that  the               Act shall in its application to such  district               or  region  or any part  thereof  have  effect               subject to such exceptions or modifications as               it thinks fit;               (b)   the    Governor    may,    by     public               notification,   direct   that   any   Act   of               Parliament or of the Legislature of the  State               to which the provisions of clause (a)    of               this  sub-paragraph  do not  apply  shall  not               apply  to any autonomous district or an  auto-               nomous region, or shall apply to such district               or region or any part thereof subject to  such               exceptions or modifications as he. may specify               in the notification. (2)  Any  direction given under sub-paragraph  (1)  of  this paragraph may be given so as to have retrospective effect."  407 It  is clear from this provision, read with para 3  (1)  (a) already,  reproduced, that the District Councils unlike  the Parliament and the State Legislatures are not intended to be clothed  with plenary power of legislation.  Their power  to make  laws  is expressly limited by the  provisions  of  the Sixth  Schedule  which  has created them  and  they  can  do nothing  beyond the limits which circumscribe  their  power. It   is  beyond  the  domain  of  the  courts   to   enlarge constructively their power to make laws. The  proviso to para 3 (1) (a) merely serves to ensure  that no,  law  made by the Regional and  District  Councils  with respect  to, allotment, occupation or use or setting  apart, of land, as mentioned in that clause, shall have the  effect of  preventing  compulsory acquisition of  land  for  public purposes, by the Government of Assam in accordance with  the law in force authorising such acquisition.  This proviso  by no  means enlarges the scope of the power conferred  on  the Regional and District Councils by cl. (a) and indeed it  has not  been  so claimed by the learned  Attorney  General.   A proviso  may  undoubtedly be sometimes  inserted  to,  allay fears considered by some to be unfounded.  But the  question

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must ultimately come back to the point whether or not  power to  make laws conferred by cl. (a) includes the power to  do so, with respect to transfer of land and this must turn upon the  exact  language and its primary  meaning.   The  simple words  used  in  cl.  (a)  are  incapable  of  bearing   the construction  suggested by the learned Attorney-General  and the provision found in the proviso does not in any way alter the operative effect of this clause. The preamble of the impugned Act no doubt does speak of  the necessity  to  make provisions with  respect  to  "transfer, allotment, occupation or use of land for any purpose  likely to promote the interests of the inhabitants thereof" but the subject of transfer is clearly beyond the scope of the  law- making  power  conferred  on the  District  Council  by  the Constitution and to that extent, therefore, the impugned Act which  means  S.  3  thereof  is  void  being.  beyond   the jurisdiction of the District Council. On the view we have taken of the plain meaning of para 3 (1) (a) of the Sixth Schedule it is unnecessary to consider  the other  points  relating to the violation of Art. 14  of  the Constitution.   This Court normally does not  decide  points which are not strictly necessary for disposing of the appeal before it. This appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs. K.B.N.                             Appeal dismissed: 408