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PETITIONER: DILBAGH RAI JARRY

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT05/11/1973

BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH KHANNA, HANS RAJ KRISHNAIYER, V.R.

CITATION:  1974 AIR  130            1974 SCR  (2) 178  1974 SCC  (3) 554  CITATOR INFO :  E&R        1974 SC1084  (6)  RF         1986 SC2045  (67)  R          1990 SC1080  (13,14,15,17)

ACT: Payment   of  Wages  Act,  1936-S.   15(2)-Limitation   when commences-  The date on which deduction from wages was  made or  the  date on which, the payment of wages was due  to  be made. Running allowance whether part of wages.

HEADNOTE: The appellant, a Railway Guard, was convicted and  sentenced for  an offence under s. 509, I.P.C. The High  Court  uphold his   conviction.   On  appeal  this  Court  set   aside.the conviction  and acquitted him.  In the meanwhile the  appel- lant,  was  dismissed  from service with  effect  from  31st March, 1956.  The appellant impugned the order of  dismissal in  the High Court which held that his dismissal was  wholly void   and   ineffective.   Thereupon  the   appellant   was reinstated  and  was informed that the matter  of  his  back wages  for the period between the date of his dismissal  and the  date  of  reinstatement would  be  decided  later.   By another letter he was informed that this period was  treated as  leave due.  He was paid Rs. 81.51 as his wages  for  the entire period ending on March 7, 1959. The  appellant  made an application under s.  15(2)  of  the Payment  of Wages Act, 1936 claiming Rs. 9,016.60  plus  ten times  the  said amount as compensation.   In  addition,  he first  claimed  ’traveling allowance’ but  later  sought  to amend  the application by replacing ’traveling allowance  by ’running  allowance  This  was rejected  by  the  Prescribed Authority.   The Authority allowed a part of the  claim  but the appellant preferred an appeal to the Appellate Authority under the Act.  The Appellate Authority held that the  claim was barred by time as limitation had commenced from the date of  dismissal  from  service  and  not  from  the  date   of reinstatement  Or the date on which it was decided to  treat the period of dismissal as leave due. On the question (i) whether the. claim application filed  by the  appellant  tinder  s- 15(2) was  time-barred  and  (ii)

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whether he was entitled to running allowance. Allowing the appeal, HELD  :  (i)  the  first proviso to sub-ss.  (2)  of  s.  15 indicates  two alternative starting points  for  limitation, namely, (i) the date on which deduction from wages was  made or  (ii) the date on which the payment of the wages was  due to be made. [183-A] From a reading of s. 15 it is clear that the legislature has deliberately  used, first. in sub-s. (2) and then in  sub-s. (3).  the expressions "deduction of wages" c and  "delay  in payment of wages’ as two distinct concepts.  Terminus a  quo (i)  in  the proviso expressly relates to the  deduction  of wages,  while  (ii) is referable to the delayed  wages.   If both these terminii were always relatable to the same  Point of  time,  then  there  would be  nor  point  in  mentioning terminus a quo (i)  and  the legislature could  have  simply said that limitation for a claim under s.    15(2)     would always start from the date on which the wages "fall due"  or "accrue"  as  has  been  done  under  Article  102  of   the Limitation  Act which applies only to suits for recovery  of wages.   The very fact that two distinct starting points  of limitation  referable  to two distinct  concepts  have  been stated  in  the  proviso. shows  that  the  legislature  had visualised  that the date of deduction of wages and the  due date of delayed wages. may not always coincide.  Conjunction "or" which in the context means "either" and the phrase  "as the 179 case  may  be"  at  the end of  the  proviso  are  clinching indicate   of  this  interpretation.   They  are  not   mere surpluses  and  must  be  given  their  full  effect.    The legislature  is  not supposed to indulge in  tautology;  and when it uses analogous words or phrases in the  alternative, each  may  be  presumed to convey a  separate  and  distinct meaning.  the  choice  of either of which  may  involve  the rejection  of the other.  To hold that the  two  expressions "wages  deducted"  and "wages delayed" though  used  in  the alternative. carry the same meaning, and in the proviso  are always referable to one and the same point of time, would be contrary to this primary canon of interpretation. (183B-E] Ordinarily  where an employee was dismissed on one date  and reinstated   on   another,  the  deduction  of   wages   may synchronize  with the act of reinstatement.  In the  instant case  the  deduction  did  not take place  on  the  date  of reinstatement  because the order of reinstatement  expressly stated that decision with regard to his wages for the period would  be  taken  later.   Therefore  the  deduction   would coincide  with  the decision deducting the  wages.   Such  a decision  was  taken on February, 18,  1959  and  limitation under  the  first part of the proviso  commenced  from  that date. [183G-H] Jai  Chand  Sawhney v. Union of India [1963] 3  S.C.R.  642; Divisional Superintendent.  Northern Railway v. Pushkar Dutt Sharma (1967] 14, F.L.R. 204; held inapplicable. (ii) Running  allowance was counted towards average  pay  in those  cases only where the leave did not exceed one  month. Travelling  allowance or running allowance was  eligible  if the  officer had travelled or run, not otherwise.  it  could not be said that running allowance was due to the  appellant as  part of his wages for the entire period of his  inactive service. [185H; 186A] Per  Krishra Iyer J. (Concurring) In this country the  State is  the  largest  litigant today and  the  huge  expenditure involved  makes a big draft on the public exchequer, In  the context  of  expanding  dimensions  of  State  activity  and

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responsibility,  it is not unfair to expect finer sense  and sensibility  in its litigation policy, the absence of  which in  the  present  case had led the  Railways  callously  and cantankerously  to resist an action by its own employee.  a small  man, by urging a mere technical plea which  had  been pursued  right  up  to  the  highest  court  and  had   been negatived, It was not right for a welfare State like ours to be Janus-faced and while formulating the humanist project of legal  aid to the poor contest the claims of poor  employees under it pleading limitation and the like, [186-E]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1898 of 1967. Appeal  by Special Leave from the Judgment and  Order  dated the 4th November, 1965 of the Allahabad High Court in  Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 2491 of 1965. Bishan Narain and D. N. Mishra, for the appellant. S. N. Prasad and S. P. Nayar, for respondents Nos. 1 & 2. The Judgment of the Court were delivered by- SARKARIA J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against the  order  dated  November 4, 1965, of the  High  Court  of Judicature  at  Allahabad dismissing  the  appellant’s  writ petition  under Article 226 and 227 of the  Constitution  in limine. The appellant was a Guard ’C’ Grade in Northern Railway.  He was  confirmed in that post in 1952.  On April 3,  1955,  an incident  took place at Railway Station, Kalka, as a  result of  which,  he was prosecuted for an offence under  s.  509, Penal Code.  The Additional 180 District  Magistrate, Ambala convicted and sentenced him  on December 29, 1955 to three months simple imprisonment.   His appeal was dismissed by the Court of Session.  In  Revision, the  High Court of Punjab, on March 5, 1956, maintained  his conviction but reduced the sentence. On  April  2, 1956, the appellant received  a  communication from the Divisional Personnel Officer, Northern Railway that he had been dismissed by the Divisional Superintendent  from service w.e.f. March 31, 1956. In  Appeal  by  special leave, this  Court,  set  aside  the conviction  ,of  the  appellant and  acquitted  him  by  its judgment  dated  March 7, 1957.  Thereafter,  the  appellant filed  a  writ petition in the High Court  of  Punjab  under Article 226 of the Constitution impugning the order The High Court   by   its   judgment,   dated   of   his   dismissal. September   2,   1958,  issued  the,  writ   directing   the respondents  to treat the dismissal of the appellant  wholly void  and  ineffective.   Pursuant  to  that  direction,  on December  26, 1958 the appellant received a letter from  the Divisional Personnel Officer that he had been reinstated  to the post of Guard ’C’ Grade and that the matter of his  back wages for the period between the date of his. dismissal  and the  date  of reinstatement would be decided later  on.   By another  letter  of  February 13,  1959,  the  same  officer informed the appellant that the period from the date, of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement would be  treated as  leave- due.  The appellant, on March 11, 1959, was  paid Rs. 81.51 as his entire wages for the period ending March 7, 1959. On August 13, 1959, the appellant made an application  under S. 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act (Act 4 of 1936)  (here- inafter  referred  to  a$ the  Act)  before  the  prescribed authority claim-in-, a sum of Rs. 9015.60 plus 10 times  of,

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the  said amount as compensation from the  respondents.   In addition,  Traveling  Allowance  was  claimed.   Later,   an attempt  was  made  to amend  the  application  and  replace ’Traveling Allowance’ by ’Running Allowance’.  The Authority did  not permit the appellant to do so as- he had failed  to amend in time despite the order of the Court. The  respondents resisted the appellant’s claim  on  various grounds  including  that of limitation.  By an  order  dated August  7,  1963, the Authority directed  respondent  No.  1 (Union of India), in its capacity as employer, to refund the sum  of  Rs.  4863.20,  (plus Rs. 100/-  as  costs)  to  the appellant holding that the same had been illegally  deducted from  his  wages.  The Authority  disallowed  the  remaining claim including that of the Running Allowance.  Against  the order  of  the Authority, two appeals were  carried  to  the Appellate  Authority (Additional District Judge)-One by  the appellant  and the other by the respondents.  The  Appellate Authority-  held  that the appellant’s claim was  barred  by time as limitation had commenced from the date of  dismissal from  service and not from the date of reinstatement or  the date  on  which  it  was decided  to  treat  the  period  of dismissal  as  leave due.  It upheld the  dismissal  of  the appellant’s  claim to the Running Allowance, inter alia  for the reason that he had, despite the order of the 181 Authority,  failed to amend the petition within  the  period indicated in 0.6, R.18 of the Code of Civil Procedure.   The Appellate   Authority   further  found  that   the   Railway Administration   was  competent  to  treat  the  period   of appellant’s inactive service from April 1, 1956 to  February 17,  1959,  as leave due and to deduct his  wages  for  that period   in  accordance  with  rule  2044  of  the   Railway Establishment Code; and in view of s. 7 (2) (h) of the  Act, no  refund  of  the deducted wages  could  be  allowed.   It further held that in the case of Railway Administration, the Divisional  Superintendent  named  as Pay  Master  was  res- ponsible for the payment of wages of the Railway  employees, and  consequently, the direction of the Authority  requiring the  Union  of  India to make payment to  the  claimant  was illegal. In the result, the Appellate Authority allowed  the respondent’s  appeal  and dismissed the  appellant’s  claim. The  appellant’s writ petition impugning this order  of  the Appellate Authority was, as already stated, dismissed by the High Court.  Hence this appeal. The  first question that falls to be considered is,  whether the claim application filed by the appellant under s.  15(2) of the Act was time barred? Mr.  Bishan  Narain,  learned  Counsel  for  the   appellant contends  that  the case falls under the first part  of  the proviso (1) to s. 15(2) which relates to deduction of  wages and  limitation  would start from March 11,  1959  when  the wages  for  the period of the appellant’s  inactive  service were  actually deducted and he was paid Rs. 81.51  only  for the entire period ending March 7, 1959., Even on a  stricter view, according to the learned Counsel, limitation would not start  earlier  than  the  date,  February  13,  1959,  when constructive  deduction  took place and it  was  decided  to treat the period of his inactive service as leave due (which meant  leave  without  pay).  Since  the  appellant’s  claim application had been presented within six months of  either of these dates, it was well within time. Learned  Counsel for the respondents does not  dispute  that this  is  a  case  of deduction  of  wages.   His  argument, however, is that irrespective of whether the case was one of deduction or of non-payment of wages, the starting point  of

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limitation  would  be the same viz., the date on  which  the wages  fell  due  or  accrued.  The  argument  is  that  the concepts  of  ’deducted wages’ and .’delayed wages’  are  so integrated with each other that the events relatable to them always  synchronise furnishing the same cause of action  and the  same start of limitation.  It is pointed out  that  the wages  of a Railway employee fall due every month; wages  of one month being payable by the 10th of the succeeding month. Since  the dismissal of the Appellant was declared void  and non-est  by the Punjab High Court-it is urged-his  right  to claim wages continued to accrue every month even during  the period  of  Ills dismissal.  In the view propounded  by  the learned Counsel, limitation for making the application under s.  1  5 (2) started from January 3, 1956, the date  of  the dismissal and the application made by the appellant 182 more  than three years thereafter, was clearly  time-barred. Reference  has  been made to this Court’s  decision  in  Jai Chand Sawhney v. Union of India(1). We  shall  presently see that while the contentions  of  the learned Counsel for the respondents cannot, those  canvassed by the learned Counsel for the appellant must prevail. .               The  material part of s. 15 of the  Act  reads                             "15(1)               15(2) Where contrary to the provisions of this               Act any deduction has been made from the wages               of an employed person or any payment of  wages               has been delayed, such person himself, or  any               legal  practitioner  or  any  official  of   a               registered  trade union authorised in  writing               to  act on his behalf, or any Inspector  under               this Act, or any other person acting with  the               permission  of the authority  appointed  under               sub-section  (1) may apply to  such  authority               for a direction under sub-section (3)               Provided that every such application shall  be               presented within (twelve months) from the date               on which the deduction from the wages was made               or  from the date on which the payment of  the               wages was due to be made, as the case may be:               Provided  further that any application may  be               admitted  after  the  said  period  of  twelve               months   when  die  applicant  satisfies   the               authority  that he had  sufficient cause  for               not making the application within such period.               15(3)  When any application under  sub-section               (2)  is entertained, the authority shall  hear               the applicant and the employer or other person               responsible  for  the payment of  wages  under               section  3,  or give them  an  opportunity  of               being heard, and, after such further  inquiry’               (if  any)  as may be necessary,  may,  without               prejudice  to any other penalty to which  such               employer or other person is liable under  this               Act, direct the refund to the employed  person               of the amount deducted, or the payment of  the               delayed  wages, together with the  payment  of               such  compensation as the authority may  think               fit,  not  exceeding  ten  times  the   amount               deducted in the former case and not  exceeding               twenty-five rupees in the latter, and even  if               the  amount deducted or the delayed wages  are               paid  before the disposal of  the  application               direct  the payment of such  compensation,  as               the  authority, may think fit,  not  exceeding

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             twenty-five rupees :...... The question of limitation turns on an interpretation of the first proviso to sub-s. (2) of S. 15.  This proviso ex facie indicates two 1. [1969] 3 S.C.C. 642. 183 alternative  termini a quo for limitation, namely : (i)  the date  on which deduction from wages was made, or,  (ii)  the date, on which the payment of the wages was due to be made. From  a reading of s. 15, it is clear that  the  legislature has  deliberately  used, first, in sub-s. (2), and  then  in sub-s.  (3) the expressions "deduction of wages" and  "delay in  payment of wages" as two distinct concepts.  Terminus  a quo (i) in the proviso expressly relates to the deduction of wages, while (ii) is referable to the delayed wages. if both these  terminii were always relatable to the same  point  of time, then there would be no point in mentioning terminus  a quo  (i), and the, Legislature could have simply  said  that limitation  for  a claim under s. 15(2) would  always  start from  the date on which the wages "fall due" or "accrue"  as has been done under Art. 102 of the Limitation  Act  which applies only to suits for recovery of wages.  The very  fact that two distinct starting points of limitation referable to two  distinct  concepts, have been stated  in  the  proviso, shows  that the Legislature had visualised that the date  of deduction  of wages and the due date of delayed  wages,  may not always coincide.  Conjunction "or", which in the context means  "either", and the phrase "as the case may be" at  the end   of   the  Proviso  are   clinching-indicia   of   this interpretation.   They are not mere suplusages and  must  be given their full effect.  The Legislature is not supposed to indulge  in tautology; and when it uses analogous  words  or phrases in the alternative, each maybe presumed to convey  a separate and distinct meaning, the choice of either of which may  involve the rejection of the other.  To hold  that  the two  expressions  "wages  deducted",  and  "wages  delayed", though used in the alternative, carry the same meaning,  and in  the  Proviso are always referable to one and  the  same’ point  of time, would be contrary to this primary  canon  of interpretation "Deduction from wages" has not been defined in the Act. Some  illustrations of such deductions are, however,  to  be found  in  ss.  7 and 13. One of them in s.  7  (2)  (b)  is "deductions  for  absence from duty"  which  indicates  that such  deduction can be a total deduction, also. That  is  to say  "deduction  from  wages"  may be  ’the  same  thing  as "deduction  of wages". The deduction in the instant case  is akin to this category covering the entire deficiency for the period of absence, the only difference being that here,  the appellant   absence from duty was involuntary. Such  absence in  official parlance is euphemistically called  "in  active service’, if the employee is later on reinstated.  The  point to be considered further is  when  did  such deduction ofwages take place ? Ordinarily in a case  like the present where the employee was dismissed on one date and reinstated  on  a later date,  the deduction  of  wages  may synchronise  with  the  act of  reinstatement.  But  on  the peculiar and admitted facts of this case, the deduction  did not  take  place on the date of  reinstatement  (26-12-1958) because  the  order of reinstatement expressly  stated  that "decision  with  regard  to his wages to be  paid  for  that period  will   be  taken later on". In  the  case  in  hand, therefore,  the "deduction’ will coincide with the  decision impliedly or expressly deducting the wages. Such a  decision was taken

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184 and put in the course of a communication to the appellant on February  18, 1959 whereby he was informed that  the  period from 3-1-1956 to 17-3-1959, would be treated as ’leave  due’ Which,  it  is  conceded, meant leave  without  pay.   Thus, deduction  from  his  wages for the  entire  period  of  his ’inactive  service’  took place on February  18,  1959.  and limitation  under  the first part of the  Proviso  commenced from  that  date.  The application was made  on  August  13, 1959,  within  six months of that date and was  thus  within time. in Jai Chand Sawhney’s case (supra), the, interpretation  of the   first   Proviso  to  s.  15(2)  never  came   up   for consideration.   Therein, the Court was concerned only  with the construction of the expression "accrue/due" in Art.  102 of   the  Limitation  Act,  1908  which  does   not   govern applications  under  S.  15(2)  of  the  Act.   That   case, therefore,  is of no assistance in determining  the  precise issue before us. It may be observed in passing that the, rule in Sheo  Prasad v. Additional District Judge,(1) relied on by the Additional District  Judge, was not followed by the same High Court  in Ram   Kishore   Sharma   v.   Additional   District    Judge Saharanpur(2),  as is had ceased to be good law in view  _of the  decision  of this Court in  Divisional  Superintendent, Northern Railway v. Pushkar Dutt Sharma(3). In Pushkar Dutt’s case (supra), the application under s.  15 (2)  of the Act was filed within six months of the  date  on which  the  dismissal of the employee was set aside  by  the court  in second appeal.  The employee’s  application  would have  been within time irrespective of whether his case  was treated  as  one  of "wages deducted"  or  "wages  delayed". Therefore, the necessity of examining the comparative  mean- ing and distinction between "deduction from wages" or "delay in  payment of wages due" and the two  alternative  starting points of limitation relatable to these expressions, did not arise in that case. In the light of the above discussion, we reverse the finding of   the  Additional  District  Judge  and  hold  that   the application filed by the appellant under S. 15(2) of the Act having been made within six months of the date of  deduction from his wages, was within time. The  second  ground on which the order  of  the,  Additional District Judge proceeds, is that since the deduction of  the wages  for the period of his inactive service from April  1, 1956 to February 17, 1959, had been made under the order  of a  co mpetent authority passed in accordance with rule  2044 of  the Railway Establishment Code, in view of S. 7 (2)  (h) of  the  Act no order could be made for the  refund  of  the deducted  amount.   Both the learned Counsel before  us  are agreed  that in view of the pronouncement of this  Court  in Devendra  Pratap  Narain ’Rai; Sharma v. State  of  U.P.(4), this  ground is not sustainable.  In Sharma’s case  (supra), this  Court  was construing rule 54 of the  U.P.  Government Fundamental  Rules, the language of which  is  substantially the  same as that of rule 2044 of the Railway  Establishment Code.  It (1)  A.I.R. 1962 All. 144. (2)  [1959] All Law Journal p. 225. (3)  [1967] 14, F.L.R. 204. (4)  [1962] Supp.  S.C.R. 315. 185 was held therein, that r. 54 enables the State Government to fix  the pay of a public servant when  his dismissal is  set aside  in  departmental  appeal.   But  that  rule  has   no

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application to cases in which dismissal is declared  invalid by  a  decree  of civil court and  he  is,  in  consequence, reinstated. Mr.   Bishan  Narain  next  contends  that  the   prescribed Authority had wrongly disallowed the claim of the  appellant to  "Running  Allowance’  which  he  had  mis-described   as "Traveling  Allowance" in his claim application.  The  point pressed  into  argument  is, that  once  the  Authority  had allowed   the  appellant  to  amend  his   application   for converting the claim of "Traveling Allowance" into  "Running Allowance", it had no discretion left thereafter to  prevent him from carrying out the amendment, on the technical ground that the period indicated by Order 6, Rule 18, Code of Civil Procedure, for this purpose, has expired.  The Code of Civil Procedure,  it  is  urged,  does  not  govern  amendment  of applications under s. 15(2) of the Act. The  contention is untenable.  While it is true that Rule  s 17 and 18 of Order 6 of the-Code do not, in terms, apply  to amendment of an application under s. 15(2), the Authority is competent to devise, consistently with the provisions of the Act  and the Rules made thereunder, its own procedure  based on   general   principles  of  justice,  equity   and   good conscience.   One of such principles is that  delay  defeats equity.   The Authority found that the applicant was  guilty of gross negligence.  He took no steps whatever to carry out the amendment for several months after the order  permitting the  amendment,  and thereafter, when the case  was  at  the final stage, he suddenly woke up, as it were, from  slumber, and sought to amend his application.  In the  circumstances, the Authority rightly refused to put a premium on this delay and  laxity  on the part of the appellant.  In the  view  we take on the claim to running allowance we need not pronounce finally  on whether an amendment to the relief once  granted requires to be formally carried out in the petition, as in a pleading in court, less rigidity being permissible in quasi- judicial proceedings. Mr.  Bishan Narain further contends that  Running  Allowance was a part of the pay or substantive wages.  In support  of this  argument he has invited our attention to rule 2003  of the  Railway Establishment Code, clause 2 of  which  defines ’average  pay’.   According to the second  proviso  to  this clause in the case, of staff entitled to running  allowance, average  pay for the purpose of leave salary-shall  include the  average running allowance earned during the  12  months immediately  preceding the month in which a Railway  servant proceeds  on  leave subject to a maximum of 75 per  cent  of average  pay  for  the  said  period,  the  average  running allowance once determined remaining In operation during the- remaining  part of the financial year 1  cases of leave  not exceeding  one  month.  The crucial words, which  have  been underlined.  show  that such Running  Allowance  is  counted towards  ’average pay’ in those cases only where the  leave, does  not exceed one month.  It cannot, therefore,  be  said that  Running Allowance was due to the appellant as part  of his wages for the entire period of his inactive ser- 186 vice.  Traveling allowance or running allowance is  eligible if  the  officer  has traveled or run,  not  otherwise.   We therefore negative this contention. For  the foregoing reasons, we allow this appeal, set  aside the order of the Appellate Authority and restore that of the Prescribed  Authority.  The appellant shall have  his  costs throughout. KRISHNA  IYER,  J.-The judgment just delivered has  my  full concurrence  but I feel impelled to make a few  observations

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not  on  the  merits  but  on  governmental  disposition  to litigation, the present case being symptomatic of a  serious deficiency.   In  this  country the  State  is  the  largest litigant  to-day and the huge expenditure involved  makes  a big  draft  on  the public exchequer.   In  the  context  of expanding  dimensions of State activity and  responsibility, is  it unfair to expect finer sense and sensibility  in  its litigation  policy,  the absence of which,  in  the  present case,  he  led the Railway callously and  cantankerously  to resist an action by its own employee, a small man, by urging a mere technical plea which has been pursued right up to the summit  court  here and has been negatived in  the  judgment just  pronounced ? Instances of this type are legion  as  is evidenced by the fact that then Law Commission of India in a recent  report(1) on amendments to the Civil Procedure  Code has suggested the deletion of s. 80, finding that  wholesome provision  hardly ever utilised by Government, and has  gone further  to  provide  a  special  procedure  for  government litigation  to highlight the need for an activist policy  of just settlement of claims where the State is a party.  It is not right for a welfare’ State like ours to be  Janus-faced, and  while formulating the humanist project of legal aid  to the  poor,  contest the claims of poor  employees  under  it pleading  limitation  and the like.  That  the  tendency  is chronic  flows from certain observations I had made  in  the Kerala  High Court decision(2) which I may usefully  excerpt here               "The State, under our Constitution, undertakes               economic  activities  in a vast  and  widening               public sector and inevitably gets involved  in               disputes  with  private individuals.   But  it               must  be  remembered  that  the  State  is  no               ordinary  party trying to win a  case  against               one  of its own citizens by hook or by  crook;               for,  the State’s interest is to  meet  honest               claims,  vindicate a substantial  defence  and               never to score a technical point or  overreach               a  weaker party to avoid a just  liability  or               secure  an  unfair advantage,  simply  because               legal  devices  provide such  an  opportunity.               The  State is. a virtuous litigant  and  looks               with  unconcern on immoral forensic  successes               so  that  if on the merits the case  is  weak,               government  shows a willingness to settle  the               dispute  regardless  of  prestige  and   other               lesser motivations which move, private parties                             to fight               (1)   Law  Commission of India, .54th  Report-               Civil Procedure Code.               (2)  P.P. Abu backer v. The Union of  India  :               A.I.R. 1972 Ker. 103 : 107 para 5.                187               in court.  The lay-out on litigation costs and               executive  time by the State and its  agencies               is  so  staggering these days because  of  the               large  amount  of litigation in  which  it  is               involved that a positive and wholesome  policy               of cutting back on the volume of law suits  by               the  twin  methods of not being  tempted  into               forensic   show-downs   where   a   reasonable               adjustment  is feasible and ever  offering  to               extinguish a pending proceeding on just terms,               giving  the legal mentors of  government  some               initiative and authority in this behalf.  I am               not indulging in any judicial homily but  only

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             echoing  the dynamic national policy on  State               litigation  evolved  at a  Conference  of  Law               Ministers  of  India way back in  1957.   This               second  appeal  strikes me as an  instance  of               disregard of that policy." All  these  words from the Bench, hopefully addressed  to  a responsive Government, may, if seasonable reactions  follow, go a long way to avoidance of governmental litigiousness and affirmance  of  the image of the State as  deeply  concerned only  in Justic-Social Justice.  The phyrric victory of  the poor appellant in this case is a sad justification, for  the above observations. P.B.R.               Appeal allowed- 188