29 November 2007
Supreme Court
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DIDIGAM BIKSHAPATHI Vs STATE OF AP

Bench: DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT,TARUN CHATTERJEE
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001643-001643 / 2007
Diary number: 10684 / 2006
Advocates: K. SHIVRAJ CHOUDHURI Vs D. BHARATHI REDDY


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CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  1643 of 2007

PETITIONER: Didigam Bikshapathi & Anr

RESPONDENT: State of A.P.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 29/11/2007

BENCH: Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT & TARUN CHATTERJEE

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.     1643               OF 2007 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 2205 of 2006)

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1.      Leave granted.

2.      Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a  learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court,  dismissing the petition filed by the appellants under Section  482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ’the  Code’).  Prayer was to quash the proceedings in SC No.498 of  2001 on the file of VII Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge,  Hyderabad, initiated against them for commission of offence  punishable under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860  (in short ’IPC’).

3.      Accusations which led to the institution of the  proceedings are essentially are as follows:

       Budida Krishnamurthy (hereinafter referred to as the  ’deceased’) had close friendship with the appellant (A1). About  four years back he appointed deceased and others as field  officers in his finance firm namely; Uma Hire Purchase and  Finance.  While so, the appellant no.1 joined as a partner in  Kanaka Mahalaxmi Real Estate Ventures run by Mekala Ravi  and Mekala Venu.  The deceased and two other field officers  namely; Budida Laxmaiah (L.W.7) and Thandra Mallaiah  (L.W.8) sold about 15 plots in that group to Kommaipalli  villagers and collected various amounts from them and  handed over the same to the appellant no.1. As he did not pay  the money to the Kanaka Mahalaxmi Real Estate Ventures, the  other partners did not register the plots in favour of the  persons, who paid the money to the deceased. Since the  deceased demanded for registration of the plots in favour of  the prospective purchasers, he (appellant no.1) escaped with  his family from Jangaon and was staying at his in-laws house.   The deceased went there and demanded registration of the  plots, but the appellants abused him in filthy language and  the accused neither registered the plots nor returned the  amount.  Due to the mental harassment and unable to bear  the pressure from the purchasers of the plots, the deceased  committed suicide by falling under an un-known train in the  night of 17.4.2001 leaving a suicide note narrating the reasons

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for his committing suicide.                     

4.      Before the High Court the stand was that the ingredients  necessary to constitute offence under Section 306 IPC are  absent.  There is no element of abetment.  The High Court did  not accept the contention taking note of the statement made in  the suicide note.  The High Court felt that this was not a fit  case where the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code is to  be exercised.

5.      In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant  submitted that there was no question of abetment.  Merely  because the person committed suicide having been insulted  and humiliated due to the comments or utterances made by  the accused, that does not constitute an offence punishable  under Section 306 IPC. Therefore, the High Court ought to  have quashed the proceedings. Strong reliance was placed on  a decision of this Court in Netai Dutta v. State of West Bengal  (2005 AIR SCW 1326).  Further it was submitted that there  was only a vague reference to appellant no.2 wife of appellant  no.1, and on that score, the appeal deserves to be allowed so  far as she is concerned.

6.      In response, learned counsel for the respondent  submitted that the suicide note clearly refers to various acts of  the appellants due to which the unfortunate step of  committing suicide was taken by the victim and in any event it  is not a fit case where jurisdiction under Section 482 is to be  exercised.   

7.      Section 482 does not confer any new powers on the High  Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court  possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three  circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be  exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code  (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to  otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor  desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern  the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment  dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may  possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart  from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper  discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law.  That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section  which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the  High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in  the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their  constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right  and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on  the principle "quando lex aliauid alicui concedit, concedere  videtur et id sine guo res ipsae esse non potest" (when the law  gives a person anything it gives him that without which it  cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the  court does not function as a court of appeal or revision.  Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be  exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when  such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in  the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do  real and substantial justice for the administration of which  alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for  advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse  that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power  to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court,  to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent  promotion of justice, fn exercise of the powers court would be

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justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that  initiation/continuance of it amounts to ’abuse of the process  of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise  serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the  report, the court may examine the question of fact. When a  report is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into  the materials to assess what the report has alleged and  whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are  accepted in toto. 8.      In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 this  Court summarized some categories of cases where inherent  power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings. (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal  bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want  of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the first information  report or complaint taken at its face value and  accepted in their entirety do not constitute the  offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but  there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence  adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the  charge. 9.      In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear  in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal  evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly  inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where  there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not  support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under  Section 482 of the Code the High Court would not ordinarily  embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is  reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it  accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the  trial Judge. Judicial process should not be an instrument of  oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be  circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should  take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration  before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the  hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass  any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an  instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a  prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The scope of  exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code. and the  categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its  power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse  of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of  justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of  Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) 335). A note of caution  was, however, added that the power should be exercised  sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases. The illustrative  categories indicated by this Court are as follows: "(1) Where the allegations made in the first  information report or the complaint, even if they are  taken at their face value and accepted in their  entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or  make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information  report and other materials, if any, accompanying  the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,  justifying an investigation by police officers under  Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of  a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155 (2) of  the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in  the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in

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support of the same do not disclose the commission  of any offence and make out a case against the  accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not  constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a  non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted  by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate  as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or  "complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable  on the basis of which no prudent person can ever  reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient  ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in  any of the provisions of the Code. or the Act  concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is  instituted) to the institution and continuance of the  proceedings and/or where there is a specific  provision in the Code. or Act concerned, providing  efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved  party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly  attended with mala fide and/or where the  proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior  motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and  with a view to spite him due to private and personal  grudge." 10.     As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court  under Section 482 of the Code. are very wide and the very  plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise.  Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of  this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power  should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The  High Court being the highest court of a State should normally  refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the  entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the  evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court  and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of  magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective  without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule  can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court  will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the  proceeding at any stage.( See State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar  Sahoo (2005) 13 SCC 540 and Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar  AIR 2006 SC 1937)

11.     The suicide note clearly refers to the background in  which the victim took the extreme step of taking away his own  life by committing suicide.  It is not a case where there is no  reference to any act by the accused.  In  Netai Dutta’s case  (supra) para 6 it was observed as follows:

"6. In the suicide note, except referring to  the name of the appellant at two places, there  is no reference of any act or incidence whereby  the appellant herein is alleged to have  committed any willful act or omission or  intentionally aided or instigated the deceased  Pranab Kumar Nag in committing the act of  suicide. There is no case that the appellant  has played any part or any role in any  conspiracy, which ultimately instigated or  resulted in the commission of suicide by  deceased Pranab Kumar Nag."

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12.     In the instant case the suicide note clearly refers to the  acts of the accused-appellant and the roles played by them.   Therefore, the High Court rightly rejected the prayer of  exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code. We make it  clear that any observation made by the High Court and by us  while dismissing of the present appeal shall be construed to be  determinative factor in the trial.