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PETITIONER: DHARTIPAKAR MADAN LAL AGARWAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAJIV GANDHI

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/05/1987

BENCH: SINGH, K.N. (J) BENCH: SINGH, K.N. (J) VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)

CITATION:  1987 AIR 1577            1987 SCR  (3) 369  1987 SCC  Supl.   93     JT 1987 (2)   402  1987 SCALE  (1)1086  CITATOR INFO :  F          1987 SC1926  (4,5)  RF         1991 SC2007  (5)

ACT:     Representation  of the People Act, 1950: ss. 77,  80  to 87,  100 and 123--Election petition--Allegations of  corrupt practice--Not to be vague or general--scrutiny by Court in a Strict  manner--Jurisdiction of Court to strike  out  plead- ings--Empowered  at  any  stage of  proceeding  even  before filing of written statement--Time limit for  enquiry-Desira- bility for suitable Parliamentary legislation.     Code of Civil Procedure: O.VI R. 16, O.VII R. 11, Strik- ing    out    of    pleadings----Rejection    of    election petition--Jurisdiction of the Court.

HEADNOTE:     The election of the respondent, who was returned to  the Lok  Sabha in a bye election in 1981, was challenged by  the appellant  under s. 80 of the Representation of  the  People Act, 1951, on a number of grounds, including the allegations of corrupt practice of undue influence, hiring and procuring of vehicles for carrying voters and obtaining the assistance of  Government servants and incurring expenses at the  elec- tion in excess of the permissible limit. Upon a  preliminary objection raised by the respondent the High Court struck off the pleadings as vague, general, unnecessary, frivolous  and vexatious within the meaning of Order VI Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure and rejected the petition under Order VII Rule 11 read with s. 87 of the Act on the ground that it did not disclose any cause of action.     In  the  appeal under s. 116-A of the  Act  against  the order of the High Court, it was contended for the  appellant that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain prelim- inary  objections  under Order VI Rule 16 or to  reject  the election petition under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code before the respondent had filed his written statement to the  peti- tion, which deprived him of the opportunity of amending  the petition  by supplying material facts and particulars,  that allegations contained in various paragraphs of the  petition constituted  corrupt  practices  which  disclosed  cause  of action within the meaning of s. 100 of the Act and the  High

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Court  committed  error  in holding that  the  petition  was detective,  on  the  premise that it did  not  disclose  any triable  issue,  and that the  election  petition  disclosed primary facts regarding corrupt practice and 370 if there was absence of any particulars or details the  High Court  should have afforded opportunity to the appellant  to amend the petition.     The  respondent  was subsequently returned  to  the  Lok Sabha in the general election held in 1984 and the  validity of  that election has been upheld in Azhar Hussain v.  Rajiv Gandhi,  AIR  1986  SC 1253 and  Bhagwati  Prasad  v.  Rajiv Gandhi,  [1986]  4 SCC 78- The relief of setting  aside  the impugned  election had thus become infructuous by  lapse  of time  as the subsequent election could not be set  aside  on the  grounds  raised in the petition. But since s.  98  read with  s. 99 of the Act mandates investigation of charges  of corrupt practice, if any, raised against the returned candi- date, and as proof thereof entails incurring of  disqualifi- cation  from contesting subsequent election for a period  of six years, the Court heard the appeal at length.     On  the questions: Whether the High Court had  jurisdic- tion  to strike out pleadings under Order VI Rule 16 of  the Code  of Civil Procedure and to reject an election  petition under  Order  VII Rule 11 of that Code  at  the  preliminary stage,  even though no written statement had been  filed  by the respondent, whether in the instant case in  entertaining the preliminary objections and rejecting the election  peti- tion the High Court deprived the appellant of an opportunity to  amend the petition and to make good the deficiencies  by supplying  necessary particulars and details of the  corrupt practices  alleged in the petition, and whether the  various paragraphs of the said election petition disclosed any cause of action. Dismissing the appeal,     HELD:  1.1 Right to contest election or to question  the election by means of an election petition is neither  common law  nor fundamental right, instead it is a statutory  right regulated by the statutory provisions of the  Representation of  the People Act, 1951, which is a complete and self  con- tained  Code. Outside the statutory provisions, there is  no right  to dispute an election. The provisions of  the  Civil Procedure  Code are applicable to the extent as  permissible by s. 87 of the Act. [387H-388B]     1.2. The scheme of the Act shows that an election can be questioned  under  the statute as provided by s. 80  on  the grounds as contained in s. 100. The pleadings are  regulated by s. 83, which lays down a mandatory provision in providing that an election petition shall contain a COncise  statement of material facts and set forth full particulars of 371 corrupt practices with exactitude. [388C]     1.3  Since  allegations of corrupt practice are  in  the nature  of criminal charges, it is necessary that  each  and every  corrupt  practice must be  clearly  and  specifically pleaded  and  it should be complete in itself  so  that  the returned candidate may know the case he has to meet. If  the allegations  are  vague and general and the  particulars  of corrupt  practice are not stated in the pleadings the  trial of the election petition cannot proceed for want of cause of action. [388DE]     N.P.  Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, [1952]  SCR  218; Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh, AIR 1954 SC 210 and Jyoti  Basu v. Debi Ghosal, [1982] 3 SCR 318, referred to.     2.1  A combined reading of ss. 81, 83, 86 and 87 of  the

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Act makes it apparent that an election petition is liable to be  dismissed in limine at the initial stage if it does  not disclose any cause of action. Cause of action in questioning the  validity of election must relate to the grounds  speci- fied  in s. 100 of the Act. If the allegations contained  in the petition do not set out grounds of challenge as  contem- plated  by s. 100 and if the allegations do not  conform  to the requirement of ss. 81 and 83 the pleadings are liable to be  struck off under Order VI Rule 16 of the Code  of  Civil Procedure.  If  after striking out defective  pleadings  the Court  finds that no cause of action remains to be tried  it would  be duty bound to reject the petition under Order  VII Rule 11 of the Code. [382H, 386A-C]     Azhar  Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, AIR 1986 SC 1253;  Bhag- watii  Prasad v. Rajiv Gandhi, [1986] 4 SCC 78; Udhav  Singh v. Madhay Rao Scindia, [1976] 2 SCR 246 and Charan Lal  Sahu JUDGMENT: to.     2.2  In the instant case, the appellant failed to  plead complete details of corrupt practices which could constitute a  cause of action as contemplated by s. 100 of the Act.  He also failed to give the material facts and other details  of the  alleged corrupt practices. The High  Court,  therefore, rightly exercised its power in rejecting the election  peti- tion under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. [401G, 403G-H]     3.  I Order VI Rule 16 of the Civil Procedure Code  per- mits striking out of pleadings which are unnecessary,  scan- dalous, frivolous, or vexatious or which may tend to  preju- dice,  embarrass or delay a fair trial at any stage  of  the proceedings.  It  does not admit of any exception  that  the respondent must file written statement before the 372 preliminary objections could be entertained. If,  therefore, a preliminary objection is raised before commencement of the trial, the court is duty bound to consider the same. It need not  wait  for the filing of the written  statement  by  the defendant  and point out defects. Instead it can proceed  to hear the preliminary objection and strike out the pleadings. [387BC, 386D, 383AB, CD]     3.2. The High Court, therefore, had jurisdiction in  the instant  case  to strike out pleadings  at  the  preliminary stage even though no written statement had been filed by the respondent. [382CD]     K.  Kamaraja  Nadar v. Kunju Thevar & Ors.,  [1959]  SCR 583,  referred  to. Union of India v.  Surjit  Singh  Atwal, [1979]  2  SCR 1002, distinguished. Vidya Charan  Shukla  v. G.P. Tiwari & Ors., AIR 1963 MP 356 overruled.     4.1  The  Court  did not deprive the  appellant  of  the opportunity  to  amend  the petition and to  make  good  the deficiencies  by  supplying the  necessary  particulars  and details of the corrupt practices alleged in the petition. He was free to file amendment application, but at no stage  did he express any desire to make any amendment application  nor he  made  any  application to that effect  before  the  High Court. It was open to him to have made that application  but he himself did not make any such application. [387DE]     4.2  The  High Court was under no  legal  obligation  to direct the appellant to amend pleadings or to suo moto grant time  for  the same. Moreover, the  allegations  of  corrupt practice as required by Section 83 were not complete and did not furnish any cause of action. [387E]     5.1  The  petition  was drafted in a  highly  vague  and general manner. Various paragraphs of the petition presented disjointed  averments and it is difficult to make out as  to what actually the petitioner intended to plead. [401H]

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   5.2  The  allegations  contained in paragraphs  1  to  7 contain  narration  of facts as to when  the  election  took place  and  the petitioner’s desire to file  his  nomination paper and the obstruction raised by the authorities and  the allegation  that the police were shadowing the appellant  do not make out any ground under s. 100 of the Act. [388H]     5.3 The allegation in para 8 that food was given to  the workers of the respondent at some places assuming to be true does not make out a 373 case  of corrupt practice or any other ground  of  challenge under s. 100 of the Act. A corrupt practice as  contemplated by s. 123(6) contemplates incurring or authorising  expendi- ture  beyond the prescribed limit. The  impugned  allegation does  not contain any averment that the respondent  incurred or  authorised  expenditure  beyond  the  prescribed  limit. [389B-D]     5.4 Paras 9 to 19 merely show that a number of  vehicles were  plying with party flags of the respondent in the  con- stituency on different dates which by itself do not  consti- tute any corrupt practice. The basic ingredients to make out a  ground for challenging the election under s. 100  of  the Act  in these paras were totally lacking.  They,  therefore, disclosed no cause of action. [389E-G]     5.5  The allegations in paras 20 and 21 that the  mother of  the returned candidate, who was the Prime Minister,  had toured  the constituency alongwith him and in  her  speeches had appealed to the voters to vote for him do not constitute undue influence or any other corrupt practice. It is  always open  to  a  candidate or his supporters to  appeal  to  the electors to vote for a particular candidate for the develop- ment  and progress of the area. This would be  a  legitimate appeal, [389H-390A]     5.6  The allegations in paras 22 to 26 of  the  petition relate to the relationship of the appellant with his  agent. These  do not make out any ground under s. 100 of  the  Act. [390BC]     5.7 The statement in para 27 that the appellant as  we11 as his election agent were being followed by police does not refer  to any violation of law or rule or commission of  any electoral  offence by the returned candidate or his  workers with his consent. [390C]     5.8 The allegation in para 28 that on the polling day  a lady  went to the polling booth alongwith a voter  where  he affixed stamp on ballot paper and returned with her does not amount to any corrupt practice with consent of the  returned candidate  unless it could be shown that it  materially  af- fected the result of the election. [390D]     5.9  The allegation in para 29 that on the  polling  day drinking  water and batashas were being distributed  to  the voters  at  the polling station does not show  that  it  was being  done  with the consent of the respondent or  that  he spent  money over it or that the said action influenced  the voters  or  that it materially affected the  result  of  the election. In the absence of such allegations it disclosed no cause of action. [390F] 374     5.10  The allegations in paras 31 to 35 that workers  of the  respondent helped voters to cast their votes in  favour of  the  respondent, do not amount to any  corrupt  practice unless  there  was  further allegation  that  it  materially affected the result of the election. [390G]     5.11  The  averments  made in paras 37  and  38  contain narration  of  facts which have no bearing  on  any  corrupt practice. [391A]

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   5.12 The allegations in paras 39 to 49 that neither  the appellant nor his election agent had appointed any  counting agents  but  a number of persons had acted as  his  counting agents in an unauthorised manner and that complaints made by him  were not considered by the Returning Officer,  even  if assumed to be true do not make out any case of commission of corrupt practice. [391B]     The  High Court, was, therefore, justified  in  striking out all these paragraphs.     6.1 In order to constitute a corrupt practice as contem- plated by ss. 77 and 123(6) it is necessary to plead  requi- site  facts  showing authorisation or undertaking  of  reim- bursement  by  the candidate or his election agent.  A  mere vague  and  general  statement that the  candidate  and  his workers  with his consent spent money in election in  excess of  the permissible ceiling would not be sufficient to  con- stitute corrupt practice. [392G-393A]     Rananjaya  Singh  v. Baijnath Singh, [1955] 1  SCR  671; Smt.  Indira  Gandhi  v. RaI Narain, [1976] 2  SCR  347  and Kunwar  Lal Gupta v.A.N Chawla, [1975] 2 SCR  259,  referred to.     6.2 Any voluntary expense incurred by a political party, well  wishers, sympathisers or association of  persons  does not fail within the mischief of s. 123(6), instead only that expenditure  which is incurred by the candidate  himself  or authorised  by  him  is material for the  purpose  ors.  77. [392B]     Dr.  P.  Nalla Thampy Terah v. Union of  India  &  Ors., [1985] Supp. SCC 189, referred to.     6.3  The allegations contained in various  sub-paras  of para 50 merely allege that a number of vehicles were  plying with the flags of the party to which the returned  candidate belonged and food was served in connection with the election meetings, distribution of badges and 375 leaflets. There is no allegation that the returned candidate incurred  or  authorised incurring of  expenditure  for  the aforesaid purposes. Unless the allegations are specific that the candidate or his election agent authorised the  expenses before  the money was actually spent and that the  candidate or  his election agent reimbursed or undertook to  reimburse the same the necessary ingredient of corrupt practice  would not  be complete and it would provide no cause of action  to plead  corrupt  practice. The High Court  was  justified  in striking out the same. [393G-394A]     7.1 If some developmental activity was carried on in the constituency  and  if it was completed during  the  election period  it  could not amount to any gift or promise  to  the voters. [394G]     7.2  The allegation in para 53(1)(A) does  not  disclose any  material fact or particular regarding the alleged  cor- rupt  practice  of making gift which may amount  to  bribery within  the meaning of s. 123(1)(A). It merely  states  that Amethi railway station was being constructed and during  the election its work was speeded up which persuaded the  voters to  cast  their votes in favour of the  returned  candidate. There  is no allegation that ,he returned candidate  or  his workers with his consent made any gift, offer or promise  to any  elector to vote or refrain from voting at an  election. [394EF]     8.1  A candidate, his workers and supporters have  every right under the law to canvass for the success of a particu- lar  candidate saying that if elected he would work for  the development of the constituency. Such a promise does not  in any way interfere with the free exercise of electoral  right

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of the electors. [395E]     8.2  The allegations in paras 53(1)(B) and (C) that  the returned candidate, his mother and their workers with  their consent  made  promise  through  newspapers,  pamphlets  and speeches  that voters should cast their votes in  favour  of the  respondent for the sake of progress and development  of the  constituency, merely amounts to a representation  being made by the party leader and the returned candidate and  his workers. Such a statement of promise is a legitimate one and it does not fail within the definition of bribery and  undue influence under s. 123(1)(A) or s. 123(2). [395B, D]     8.3 Declaration of public policy or a promise of  public action or promise to develop the constituency in general  do not interfere with free exercise of electoral rights as  the same do not constitute bribery or undue influence. [396B] 376     Shiv Kirpal Singh v.V.V. Giri, [1971] 2 SCR 197 and H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj singh, [1969] 3 SCR 813, referred to.     9.1  Hiring or procuring of a vehicle by a candidate  or his  agent  or by any other person with his consent  is  the first essential ingredient of the corrupt practice under  s. 123(5),  the  second such ingredient is that the  hiring  or procuring  of  the  vehicle must be for  conveyance  of  the voters  to and from the polling station, and the third  that conveyance  of electors is free from any charge. If  any  of the  three ingredients is not pleaded to make out a case  of corrupt  practice  under  s. 123(5) the  charge  must  fail. [397E, 399C]     9.2  The allegations contained in para 30  and  53(1)(D) conspicuously  do not contain any pleading regarding  hiring and  procuring of the vehicles by the returned candidate  or any  of his workers with his consent for conveyance  of  the voters to and from polling station free of cost. No particu- lars of any kind have been’ specified. The paras, therefore, do  not make out any charge of corrupt practice  as  contem- plated  by  s. 123(5) and the High Court  was  justified  in striking out the same. [399G-400A]     Joshbhai Chunnibhai Patel v. Anwar Beg A. Mirza,  [1969] 2 SCR 97; Ch. Razik Ram v. Ch. J.S. Chouhan & Ors., AIR 1975 SC  667; Balwant Singh v. Lakshmi Narain, [1960] 3  SCR  91; Dadasaheb Dattatraya Pawar & Ors. v. Pandurang Raoji  Jagtap & Ors., [1978] 2 SCR 524; Dharmesh Prasad Verma v.  Faiyazal Azam, [1985] 1 SCR 11; Rajendra Singh Yadav v. Chandra Sen & Ors.,  AIR 1979 SC 882 and Balwan Singh v. Prakash  Chand  & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 1187, referred to.     10.1 In order to constitute a corrupt practice under  s. 123(7), it is essential to clothe the petition with a  cause of  action which would call for an answer from the  returned candidate  and it should, therefore, plead mode  of  assist- ance, measure of assistance and all facts pertaining to  the assistance. The pleading should further indicate the kind or form  of assistance obtained and in what manner the  assist- ance was obtained or procured or attempted to be procured by the  candidate. for promoting the prospect of his  election. The petitioner must state with exactness the time of assist- ance,  the  manner of assistance and the persons  from  whom assistance  was  obtained  or  procured  by  the  candidate. [400DE]     10.2  The  allegations in sub-paras 1, 2 and 3  of  para 53(1)(E)  that  though the appellant had not  appointed  any counting agent but still 377 certain persons acted as his counting agents and the return- ing officer did not hold any inquiry into his complaint,  in

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sub-para 4 that there was fear psychosis and it looked as if the police and other government officials wanted to help the returned candidate, in sub-para 5 of certain persons helping the  voters to cast their votes on the polling day and  that some  persons cast votes 100 to 200 times and  their  signa- tures  were not obtained do not make out any charge of  cor- rupt practice within the provisions of s. 123(7). [400FG]     11.  The  allegations in para 53(2) that  the  presiding officers did not perform their duties in accordance with law inasmuch as they failed in their duty to remove the  posters and  other  propaganda material from the polling  booth  and that  the  election  symbol of the  returned  candidate  was displayed  within 100 metres of the polling booth in  viola- tion  of  the rules do not make out any  charge  of  corrupt practice.  If  at  all,  it  could  be  a  ground  under  s. 100(1)(d)(iv)  for setting aside election on the  ground  of its  being materially affected but no such plea was  raised. [401EF]     12.  The allegation in para 52 that the returned  candi- date had polled cent per cent votes in his favour in certain villages  of  the constituency do not make out  any  corrupt practice or any ground of challenge under s. 100 and it  was rightly struck off by the High Court. [394B]     13.  Order  VI Rule 17 of the Code  of  Civil  Procedure permits  amendment of an election petition but the  same  is subject to the provisions of the Act. Section 81  prescribes a  period of 45 days from the date of the election for  pre- senting  election petition calling in question the  election of  the returned candidate. After the expiry of that  period no  election petition is maintainable and the High Court  or this  Court  has  no jurisdiction to extend  the  period  of limitation. An order of amendment permitting a new ground to be raised beyond the time specified in s. 81 would amount to contravention of these provisions and is beyond the ambit of s.  87 of the Act. A new ground cannot, thus, be  raised  or inserted  in an election petition by way of amendment  after the expiry of the period of limitation. [402CD]     In the instant case, the election petition was presented to  the Registrar of the High Court on the last day  of  the limitation.  The  amendments claimed by him are not  in  the nature of supplying particulars instead those seek to  raise new  grounds  of challenge. Various paras  of  the  election petition which are sought to be amended do not disclose 378 any  cause  of action. Therefore, it is not  permissible  to allow  amendment after expiry of the period  of  limitation. [402A, E]     14.1  Court  should  not undertake to  decide  an  issue unless  it is a living issue between the parties, for if  an issue is purely academic in that its decision one way or the other  would have no impact on the position of the  parties, it would be waste of public time to engage itself in  decid- ing it. [380D]     Sun  Life Assurance Company of Canada v. Jervis,  [1944] AC 111, referred to.     14.2  Election is the essence of democratic  system  and purity of elections must be maintained to ensure fair  elec- tion.  Election  petition  is a necessary  process  to  hold inquiry  into  corrupt practice to maintain  the  purity  of election.  But there should be some time limit  for  holding this inquiry. [381E]     14.3  Parliament  should consider  the  desirability  of amending  the election law to prescribe time limit  for  in- quiry into the allegations of corrupt practice or to  devise means  to  ensure that valuable time of this  Court  is  not

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consumed  in  election matters which by afflux of  time  are reduced to mere academic interest. [381D]     15. A large number of independent candidates contest the election  for  the mere sake of contesting, with a  view  to make  out  grounds for challenging the election.  They  poll only  paltry number of votes. Parliament should devise  ways and  means to meet the onslaught of such independent  candi- dates who are not quite serious about their business. [402G, 403B, G]

&     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.  430  of 1982.     From  the  Judgment and Order dated  12.10.1981  of  the Allahabad High Court in E.P. No. 1 of 1981. Appeallent in person     Dr.  Y.S. Chitale, N. Nettar, G.S. Narayan Rao and  R.B. Datar for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SINGH, J. This appeal under Section 116-A of the Representa- 379 tion of the People Act 1951 is directed against the order of the High Court of Alahabad (Lucknow Bench) dated  12.10.1981 rejecting  the  election  petition filed  by  the  appellant questioning the election of the respondent as member of  the Lok Sabha.     A bye election was held on June 14, 1981 to fill up  the vacancy  to  the  Lok Sabha caused by the  death  of  Sanjay Gandhi in the 25th Amethi Constituency in District Sultanpur in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The appellant, the respondent and 13 other candidates contested the election. On 15th June 1981 Rajiv Gandhi was declared elected having polled  258884 votes while the appellant polled 2728 votes only. The appel- lant  filed  an election petition under Section  80  of  the Representation of the People Act 1951 (hereinafter  referred to  as the Act) questioning the validity of the election  of the respondent on a number of grounds, including the allega- tions  of  corrupt practice of undue influence,  hiring  and procuring of vehicles for carrying voters and obtaining  the assistance of Government servants and incurring expenses  at the  election in excess of the permissible limit.  The  High Court issued notice to the respondent who appeared before it and  made an application under Order VI Rule 16 of the  Code of Civil Procedure for striking out the pleadings  contained therein as the same were vague, general, unnecessary, frivo- lous  and  vexatious  which did not disclose  any  cause  of action. Respondent further prayed that the election petition be  rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil  Procedure Code read with Section 87 of the Act.     A learned Single Judge of the High Court before whom the preliminary  objections  were raised caused service  of  the copy of the objections on the appellant who was appearing in person  and  granted time to him to submit  his  reply.  The appellant, however, did not submit any reply to the prelimi- nary objections and in spite of date being fixed for hearing arguments in his presence he did not appear before the Court on  the  date fixed for arguments. The learned  Judge  after hearing  the arguments advanced on behalf of the  respondent passed  an order on 12th October 1981 holding that the  var- ious paragraphs contained in the petition were vague and the same did not contain sufficient averments to constitute  any corrupt practice and the various paragraphs of the  petition were unnecessary, frivolous and vexatious within the meaning

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of  Order  VI Rule 16 of the Code of  Civil  Procedure.  The learned  Judge struck off paragraphs 2 to 53, 55 to  57  and rejected  the  petition under Order VII Rule  11  read  with Section 87 of the Act on the ground that the election  peti- tion did not disclose any cause of action. The appellant has preferred this appeal against the said order. 380     The election under challenge relates to 198 1, its  term expired in 1984 on the dissolution of the Lok Sabha,  there- after  another general election was held in  December,  1984 and  the respondent was again elected from 25th Amethi  Con- stituency  to  the Lok Sabha. The validity of  the  election held  in 1984 was questioned by means of two separate  elec- tion  petitions and both the petitions have been  dismissed. The  validity  of respondent’s election has been  upheld  in Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, AIR 1986 SC 1253 and Bhagwati Prasad v. Rajiv Gandhi, [1986] 4 SCC 78. Since the  impugned election  relates  to the Lok Sabha which was  dissolved  in 1984  the respondent’s election cannot be set aside  in  the present  proceedings even if the election petition is  ulti- mately  allowed on trial as the respondent is  a  continuing member  of  the Lok Sabha not on the basis of  the  impugned election  held  in 1981 but on the basis of  his  subsequent election in 1984. Even if we allow the appeal and remit  the case  to the High Court the respondent’s election cannot  be set aside after trial of the election petition as the relief for setting aside the election has been rendered infructuous by  lapse of time. In this view grounds raised in the  peti- tion  for setting aside the election of the respondent  have been rendered academic. Court should not undertake to decide an issue unless it is a living issue between the parties. If an issue is purely academic in that its decision one way  or the  other would have no impact on the position of the  par- ties,  it would be waste of public time to engage itself  in deciding it. Lord Viscount Simon in his speech in the  House of Lords in Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada v.  Jervis, [1944]  AC 111 observed; "1 do not think that it would be  a proper exercise of the Authority which this House  possesses to hear appeals if it occupies time in this case in deciding an academic question, the answer to which cannot affect  the respondent  in  any way. It is an essential  quality  of  an appeal fit to be disposed of by this House that there should exist  between  the parties a matter in  actual  controversy which  the  House undertakes to decide as a  living  issue." These observations are relevant in exercising the  appellate jurisdiction of this Court.     The  main controversy raised in the present  appeal  re- garding  setting  aside  of the  respondent’s  election  has become  stale  and academic, but precious time of  the  apex Court  was consumed in hearing the appeal at Length  on  ac- count  of  the present state of law. Section  98  read  with Section  99 indicates that once the machinery of the Act  is moved  by means of an election petition, charges of  corrupt practice, if any, raised against the returned candidate must be  investigated.  On conclusion of the trial if  the  Court finds that a returned candidate or any of his election agent is guilty of commission of corrupt practice he or his 381 election  agent,  as  the case may be, would  be  guilty  of electoral offence incurring disqualification from contesting any  subsequent election for a period of six years. In  this state  of legal position we had to devote considerable  time to  the present proceedings as the appellant  insisted  that even  though  six years period has  elapsed  and  subsequent election has been ’held nonetheless if the allegations  made

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by  him make out a case of corrupt practice the  proceedings should be remanded to the High Court for trial and if  after the trial the Court finds him guilty of corrupt practice the respondent should be disqualified. If we were to remand  the proceedings to the High Court for trial for holding  inquiry into  the allegations of corrupt practice, the trial  itself may  take couple of years, we doubt if any genuine and  bona fide  evidence could be produced by the parties  before  the Court,  in fact, during the course of hearing the  appellant himself  stated before us more than once, that it would  now be very difficult for him to produce evidence to  substanti- ate  the allegations of corrupt practice but nonetheless  he insisted  for the appeal being heard on merits.  Though  the matter  is  stale  and academic yet  having  regard  to  the present state of law, we had to hear the appeal at length.     Before  we consider the submissions on merit,  we  would like to say that Parliament should consider the desirability of amending the law to prescribe time limit for inquiry into the  allegations of corrupt practice or to devise  means  to ensure  that valuable time of this Court is not consumed  in election matters which by efflux of time are reduced to mere academic  interest.  Election is the essence  of  democratic system and purity of elections must be maintained to  ensure fair  election. Election petition is a necessary process  to hold inquiry into corrupt practice to maintain the purity of election.  But there should be some time limit  for  holding this  inquiry.  Is it in public interest to  keep  sword  of Damocles  hanging on the head of the returned candidate  for an indefinite period of time as a result of which he  cannot perform  his public duties and discharge his obligations  to his  constituents? We do not mean to say that  the  returned candidate  should be permitted to delay proceedings  and  to plead later on the plea of limitation. Ways and means should be  found to strike a balance in ascertaining the purity  of election and at the same time in preventing waste of  public time and money and keeping the sword of Damocles hanging  on the  head of returned candidate for an indefinite period  of time.     The  appellant  appeared in person and argued  the  ease vehemently for a number of days. He made three  submissions: (i) The High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain prelimi- nary objections under 382 Order  VI Rule 16 or to reject the election  petition  under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure before  the respondent had filed his written statement to the  petition. In  rejecting the petition under Order VII Rule 11 the  High Court  deprived  the appellant opportunity of  amending  the petition  by supplying material facts and particulars.  (ii) Allegations contained in various paragraphs of the  election petition constituted corrupt practice which disclosed  cause of action within the meaning of Section 100 of the Act.  The High Court committed error in holding that the petition  was defective  on the premise that it did not disclose any  tri- able  issue. (iii) The election petition  disclosed  primary facts regarding corrupt practice and if there was absence of any  particulars or details the High Court should  have  af- forded opportunity to the appellant to amend the petition.     The first question which falls for our determination  is whether the High Court had jurisdiction to strike out plead- ings  under Order VI Rule 16 of the Code of Civil  Procedure and to reject the election petition under Order VII Rule  11 of the Code at the preliminary stage even though no  written statement  had  been  filed by the  respondent.  Section  80 provides that no election is to be called in question except

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by  an  election petition presented in accordance  with  the provisions  of  Part VI of the Act before  the  High  Court. Section  81 provides that an election petition may  be  pre- sented  on one or more of the grounds specified  in  Section 100 by an elector or by a candidate questioning the election of  a returned candidate. Section 83 provides that an  elec- tion petition shall contain a concise statement of  material facts on which the petitioner relies and he shall set  forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that he may  allege including full statement of the names of the parties alleged to  have  committed such corrupt practice and the  date  and place  of the commission of each such practice.  Section  86 confers  power  on  the High Court to  dismiss  an  election petition  which does not comply with the provisions of  Sec- tions  81 and 82 or Section 117. Section 87 deals  with  the procedure to be followed in the trial of the election  peti- tion and it lays down that subject to the provisions of  the Act  and of any rules made thereunder, every election  peti- tion shall be tried by the High Court as nearly as may be in accordance  with  the procedure applicable to the  trial  of suits under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Since  provi- sions  of  Civil  Procedure Code apply to the  trial  of  an election  petition, Order VI Rule 16 and Order VII  Rule  11 are  applicable to the proceedings relating to the trial  of an  election petition subject to the provisions of the  Act. On  a combined reading of Sections 81, 83, 86 and 87 of  the Act,  it  is apparent that those paragraphs  of  a  petition which do not disclose any cause of   383 action  are liable to be struck off under Order VI Rule  16, as the Court is empowered at any stage of the proceedings to strike out or delete pleading which is unnecessary, scandal- ous, frivolous or vexatious or which may tend to  prejudice, embarrass  or delay the fair trial of the petition or  suit. It  is  the duty of the Court to examine the plaint  and  it need not wait till the defendant files written statement and points  out the defects. If the court on examination of  the plaint  or  the  election petition finds that  it  does  not disclose any cause of action it would be justified in strik- ing out the pleadings. Order VI Rule 16 itself empowers  the Court  to strike out pleadings at any stage of the  proceed- ings  which  may even be before the filing  of  the  written statement by the respondent or commencement of the trial. If the  Court is satisfied that the election petition does  not make out any cause of action and that the trial would preju- dice,  embarrass and delay the proceedings, the  court  need not wait for the filing of the written statement instead  it can  proceed to hear the preliminary objections  and  strike out  the pleadings. If after striking out the pleadings  the court finds that no triable issues remain to be  considered, it has power to reject the election petition under Order VII Rule 11.     In  K. Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar and  Ors.,  [1959] SCR  583 the Election Tribunal and the High Court  both  re- fused  to  consider  preliminary objections  raised  by  the returned  candidate at the initial stage on the ground  that the  same would be considered at the trial of  the  election petition.  This Court set aside the order and directed  that the preliminary objection should be entertained and a  deci- sion reached thereupon before further proceedings were taken in  the  election petition. Bhagwati, J.  speaking  for  the Court observed thus:               "We  are  of opinion that  both  the  Election               Tribunal and the High Court were wrong in  the               view  they took. If the preliminary  objection

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             was  not  entertained and a  decision  reached               thereupon,  further proceedings taken  in  the               Election  Petition would mean a  full  fledged               trial involving examination of a large  number               of  witnesses on behalf of the 2nd  respondent               in  support  of the  numerous  allegations  of               corrupt  practices  attributed by him  to  the               appellant, his agents or others working on his               behalf;  examination  of  a  large  number  of               witnesses  by  or on behalf of  the  appellant               controverting  the  allegations  made  against               him;  examination of witnesses in  support  of               the  recrimination submitted by the  appellant               against the 2nd respondent; and large               384               number of visits by the appellant from distant               places like Delhi and Bombay to Ranchi result-               ing  in  not only heavy expenses and  loss  of               time  and diversion of the appellant from  his               public duty in the various fields of  activity               including those in the House of the People: It               would mean unnecessary harassment and expenses               for  the  appellant which could  certainly  be               avoided if the preliminary objection urged  by               him  was decided at the initial stage  by  the               Election Tribunal."     In  Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia, [1976] 2 SCR  246 this Court held that failure to plead even a single material fact  leads to an incomplete cause of action and  incomplete allegations  of  such a charge are liable to be  struck  off under  Order  VI Rule 16, Code of Civil  Procedure.  If  the petition  is based solely on those allegations which  suffer from  lack of material facts, the petition is liable  to  be summarily rejected for want of a cause of action. In  Charan Lal Sahu & Ors., v. Giani Zail Singh & Anr., [1984] 2 SCR  6 an election petition challenging the election of Giani  Zail Singh, President was rejected summarily at the initial stage by a Constitution Bench of this Court on the ground that the pleadings  contained in the election petition even  assuming to be true and correct did not disclose any cause of  action for  setting aside the election of the  returned  candidate. The precise question as raised by the appellant was  consid- ered  at  length  by this Court in Azhar  Hussain  v.  Rajiv Gandhi and this Court held that the High Court while dealing with the election petition has power to strike out pleadings under  Order VI Rule 16 and to reject the election  petition under  Order VII Rule 11 if the petition does  not  disclose essential facts to clothe it with complete cause of  action. Failure to plead even a single material fact would amount to disobedience of the mandate of Section 83(1)(a) and election petition  could  therefore be and must be  dismissed  if  it suffers  from any such vice. The Court repelled the  submis- sion that the power to reject an election petition summarily under the Code of Civil Procedure should not be exercised at the threshold. The Court observed as under:               "In  substance the argument is that the  Court               must  proceed with the trial, record the  evi-               dence,  and only after the trial of the  elec-               tion  petition  is concluded that  the  powers               under the Code of Civil Procedure for  dealing               appropriately  with  the  defective   petition               which does not disclose cause of action should               be  exercised.  With respect  to  the  learned               counsel, it is an argument which it is  diffi-               cult to compre-

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             385               hend. The whole purpose of conferment of  such               powers is to ensure that a litigation which is               meaningless and bound to prove abortive should               not  be  permitted to occupy the time  of  the               court and exercise the mind of the respondent.               The sword of Damocles need not be kept hanging               over  his head unnecessarily without point  of               purpose. Even in an ordinary civil  litigation               the  court  readily  exercises  the  power  to               reject  a plaint if it does not  disclose  any               cause  of action. Or the power to  direct  the               concerned  party  to strike  out  unnecessary,               scandalous,  frivolous or vexatious  parts  of               the  pleadings.  Or such pleadings  which  are               likely  to  cause embarrassment or  delay  the               fair trial of the action or which is otherwise               an  abuse  of  the process of  law.  An  order               directing a party to strike out a part of  the               pleading  would result in the  termination  of               the  case arising in the context of  the  said               pleadings.  The  courts  in  exercise  of  the               powers  under the Code of Civil Procedure  can               also treat any point going to the root of  the               matter such as one pertaining to  jurisdiction               or maintainability as a preliminary point  and               can  dismiss  a  suit  without  proceeding  to               record  evidence and hear elaborate  arguments               in the context of such evidence, if the  court               is  satisfied that the action would  terminate               in view of the merits of the preliminary point               of objection. The contention that even if  the               election  petition is liable to  be  dismissed               ultimately  it  should be  so  dismissed  only               after  recording  evidence  is  a   thoroughly               misconceived   and  untenable  argument.   The               powers  in this behalf are meant to  be  exer-               cised to serve the purpose for which the  same               have been conferred on the competent court  so               that  the  litigation comes to an end  at  the               earliest  and  the  concerned  litigants   are               relieved  of the psychological burden  of  the               litigation  so as to be free to  follow  their               ordinary pursuits and discharge their  duties.               And  so that they can adjust their affairs  on               the footing that the litigation will not  make               demands  on their time or resources  will  not               impede their future work, and they are free to               undertake  and fulfil other commitments.  Such               being  the position in regard to matters  per-               taining to ordinary civil litigation, there is               greater  reason for taking the same in  regard               to matters pertaining the elections."     In  Bhagwati Prasad Dixit ’Ghorawala’ v.  Rajiv  Gandhi, this  Court  again reiterated that in an  election  petition pleadings have to be precise, 386 specific  and unambiguous and if the election petition  does not  disclose  a cause of action it should  be  rejected  in limine.  These authorities have settled the  legal  position that  an  election  petition is liable to  be  dismissed  in limine  at  the initial stage if it does  not  disclose  any cause of action. Cause of action in questioning the validity of election must relate to the grounds specified in  Section 100 of the Act. If the allegations contained in the petition

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do  not  set  out grounds of challenge  as  contemplated  by Section 100 of the Act and if the allegations do not conform to  the  requirement of Sections 81 and 83 of the  Act,  the pleadings  are  liable  to be struck off  and  the  election petition is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11. A pleading if vague and general is embarrassing. If the  alle- gations contained in the election petition even assuming  to be  true  and correct do not make out any  case  of  corrupt practice  or  any ground under Section 100 of the  Act,  the pleading  would be unnecessary, frivolous and vexatious.  It is always open to strike out the same. If after striking out defective pleadings the Court finds that no cause of  action remains  to  be tried it would be duty bound to  reject  the petition under Order VII Rule II of the Code of Civil Proce- dure.  If a preliminary objection is raised before the  com- mencement of the trial, the court is duty bound to  consider the  same it need not postpone the consideration for  subse- quent stage of the trial.     The  appellant placed reliance on the decision  of  this Court in Union of India v. Surjit Singh Atwal, [1979] 2  SCR 1002  in  support of his submission that unless  a  plea  is raised by the respondent in the written statement it is  not open  to the Court to strike out pleadings contained in  the election  petition. In Surjit Singh Atwal’s  case  plaintiff had  filed  a suit for recovery of certain amount  of  money which  he claimed to be due to him from the Union  of  India under a contract. The Union of India filed a written  state- ment  five years after the filing of the suit  wherein  they raised no plea that the contract between the parties was hit by  failure to comply with the provisions of Section  175(3) of  the  Government of India Act, 1935. More  than  a  dozen years  after  the institution of the suit  and  eight  years after  the filing of the written statement,  an  application for  amendment of the written statement was filed on  behalf of  the Union of India raising a plea that the contract  was hit by the failure to comply with the provisions of  Section 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935. The trial court dismissed the suit in view of the additional plea raised  in the written statement, but the High Court decreed the  suit. On appeal by the Union of India this Court upheld the  order of  the High Court, and in that connection it observed  that the illegality of the contract should have been specifically pleaded as required by Order VI Rule 8 and Order VIII Rule 2 of 387 the  Code of Civil Procedure. The decision has no  relevance to  the  question under consideration.  The  appellant  then placed  reliance  on  a Division Bench  decision  of  Madhya Pradesh High Court in Vidya Charan Shukla v. G.P. Tiwari and Ors.,  AIR 1963 MP 356.In that case a Division Bench of  the High Court held that the preliminary objections relating  to non-maintainability  of an election petition should  not  be allowed  to be raised by mere applications without filing  a complete written statement. We do not find any justification to  uphold this view. As discussed earlier Order VI Rule  16 of Civil Procedure Code permits striking of pleadings at any stage  of  proceedings. It does not admit of  any  exception that  the respondent must file written statement before  the preliminary objections could be entertained. In view of this Court’s decisions as discussed earlier the view taken by the Madhya  Pradesh High Court in Vidya Charan Shukla’s case  is no longer a good law.     The  appellant’s  grievance  that  in  entertaining  the preliminary  objections and rejecting the election  petition under  Order VII Rule 11 the High Court deprived the  appel-

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lant’s  opportunity to amend the petition and to  make  good the deficiencies by supplying the necessary particulars  and details of the corrupt practice alleged in the petition,  is devoid of any merit. Firstly, the appellant was free to file amendment  application,  but at no stage  he  expressed  any desire  to  make any amendment application nor he  made  any application  to  that effect before the High Court.  It  was open  to the appellant to have made that application but  he himself  did not make any such application. The  High  Court was  under  no legal obligation to direct the  appellant  to amend  pleadings  or to suo moto grant time  for  the  same. Secondly, the allegations of corrupt practice as required by Section  83 were not complete and the same did  not  furnish any cause of action, any amendment made after the expiry  of the period of limitation could not be permitted which  would amount  to raising a new ground of challenge. The  question, however,  does not arise as the appellant did not  file  any amendment application. During the course of hearing of  this appeal  before  us the appellant has made  applications  for amendment  of  the  election petition which  we  shall  deal later.     Before  we consider various paragraphs of  the  election petition  to  determine the correctness of  the  High  Court order  we think it necessary to bear in mind the  nature  of the right to elect, the right to be elected and the right to dispute  election  and the trial of the  election  petition. Right  to  contest election or to question the  election  by means  of  an election petition is neither  common  law  nor fundamental right 388 instead  it is a statutory right regulated by the  statutory provisions  of the Representation of the People Act, 195  1. There  is no fundamental or common law right in  these  mat- ters.  This is well-settled by catena of decisions  of  this Court in N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, [1952] 1  SCR 2 18; Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh, AIR 1954 SC 210 and Joyti Basu v. Debi Ghosal, [1982] 3 SCR 318. These decisions  have settled the legal position that outside the statutory provi- sions  there is no right to dispute an election. The  Repre- sentation of the People Act is a complete and self contained code  within  which  any rights claimed in  relation  to  an election  or an election dispute must be found.  The  provi- sions  of  the Civil Procedure Code are  applicable  to  the extent  as permissible by Section 87 of the Act. The  scheme of  the Act as noticed earlier would show that  an  election can  be questioned under the statute as provided by  Section 80  on the grounds as contained in Section 100 of  the  Act. Section 83 lays down a mandatory provision in providing that an  election petition shall contain a concise  statement  of material  facts  and set forth full particulars  of  corrupt practice.  The pleadings are regulated by Section 83 and  it makes  it obligatory on the election petitioner to give  the requisite  facts,  details and particulars of  each  corrupt practice with exactitude. If the election petition fails  to make out a ground under Section 100 of the Act it must  fail at the threshold. Allegations of corrupt practice are in the nature  of  criminal  charges, it is  necessary  that  there should  be no vagueness in the allegations so that  the  re- turned  candidate may know the case he has to meet.  If  the allegations  are  vague and general and the  particulars  of corrupt practice are not stated in the pleadings, the  trial of the election petition cannot proceed for want of cause of action. The emphasis of law is to avoid a fishing and roving inquiry. It is therefore necessary for the Court to  scruti- nise the pleadings relating to corrupt practice in a  strict

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manner.     Now  we  would consider the various  paragraphs  of  the election petition to determine as to whether the allegations contained  therein disclosed any cause of action. The  elec- tion,petition runs into 58 paragraphs containing allegations of various corrupt practices known to the law. The averments contained  in the various paragraphs are in disjointed  form and  in  order to ascertain true intention of  the  election petitioner,  one has to read several paragraphs and  connect the  same with the other to ascertain the correct import  of the  allegations. The allegations contained in paragraphs  1 to 7 contain narration of facts as to when the election took place  and  the petitioner’s desire to file  his  nomination paper by wearing only a "langot" and the obstruction  raised by the authorities and the allegation that the police were 389 shadowing the appellant and two of them always kept  company to  him. These paragraphs do not make out any  ground  under Section  100 of the Act. In paragraph 8, the  appellant  al- leged  that  on 5th, 6th and 10th June he saw  a  number  of jeeps  plying  in the Parliamentary constituency  of  Amethi bearing  flags  of Congress (I) which were  being  used  for electioneering  purposes  in support of  Rajiv  Gandhi.  The allegations  further state that the appellant  noticed  that food  was being given to the workers of Rajiv Gandhi at  the kothi of Sanjay Singh at Amethi. Assuming the allegations to be true, these do not make out any case of corrupt  practice or  any other ground of challenge under Section 100  of  the Act. During the course of arguments the appellant urged that the allegations contained in paragraph 8 indicate that Rajiv Gandhi had been using a large number of vehicles and feeding workers  and thereby he had been incurring  expenses  beyond the permissible limit. This inference is not permissible  as each and every corrupt practice must be clearly and specifi- cally  pleaded and it should be complete in itself. No  cor- rupt practice can be inferred from reading one sentence here and the other sentence there. A corrupt practice as  contem- plated by Section 123(6) contemplates incurring or authoris- ing expenditure beyond the prescribed limit. The allegations contained  in paragraph 8 do not contain any  averment  that the respondent incurred or authorised expenditure beyond the prescribed limit. Neither any details of incurring  expenses or authorising have been stated therein. Paragraph 9 of  the petition stated that on 5th June 1981 the appellant had seen a  number  of cars mentioned therein carrying  Congress  (I) flags.  Similarly, allegations contained in  paragraphs  10, 11,  12,  13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 stated that  on  the dates mentioned in those paragraphs the election  petitioner namely the appellant has seen a number of vehicles plying in the constituency carrying Congress (I) flags. These  allega- tions merely show that a number of vehicles were plying with Congress  (I) flags in the constituency which by  itself  do not  constitute  any corrupt practice. It appears  that  the appellant  intended  that the returned candidate  had  spent money  over the plying of vehicles and thereby  he  exceeded the limit prescribed by Section 123(6) read with Section  77 of  the Act. In the absence of requisite allegations in  the aforesaid  paragraphs  the basic ingredients to make  out  a ground for challenging the election under Section 100 of the Act  was  totally lacking. These paragraphs  therefore  dis- closed no cause of action.     In  paragraphs 20 and 21 the appellant stated that  Smt. Indira  Gandhi  toured the constituency along with  the  re- spondent  and in her speeches she appealed to the voters  to vote  for  Rajiv  Gandhi. We fail to  appreciate  how  these

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allegations constitute any corrupt practice. It 390 is always open to a candidate or his supporter to appeal  to the  electors  to vote for a particular  candidate  for  the development and progress of the area. This would be a legit- imate appeal and in any view, it could not constitute  undue influence  or  any  other corrupt  practice.  The  appellant further  stated that the Station Officer of Amethi took  him in  a jeep to Munshi Ganj crossing on the pretext that  Smt. Indira Gandhi had given time to see the appellant but  later on the Station Officer left him there. These allegations are wholly irrelevant.     Allegations  contained in paragraphs 22 to 26 relate  to the relationship between the appellant and one Ram Pal Singh whom he had appointed his election agent. These  allegations refer  to  matters which do not make out  any  ground  under Section 100 of the Act. In paragraph 27 the appellant stated that  he as well as his election agent both were being  fol- lowed  by police but it does not refer to any  violation  of law  or rule or commission of any electoral offence  by  the returned  candidate  or  his workers with  his  consent.  In paragraph 28 the appellant alleged that on the polling day a lady went to the polling booth along with a person, and  the accompanying  person affixed stamp on the ballot  paper  and returned with her. Even if that be so, we fail to understand as  to how those facts would amount to any corrupt  practice with  consent of the returned candidate. Even assuming  that this constitutes violation of provisions of the Act and  the Rules framed thereunder, there is no pleading that it  mate- rially  affected  the result of the election.  In  fact  the difference of votes between the petitioner and the  returned candidate was of such great magnitude that there could be no question of election being materially affected on the  basis of  the  aforesaid incident. In paragraph 29  the  appellant stated that on the polling day drinking water and ’batashas’ were being distributed to the voters at the polling  station in  Amethi. There is no allegation that the water and  bata- shas were being distributed with the consent of Rajiv Gandhi or  that  he  spent money over it or that  the  said  action influenced  the  voters or that it materially  affected  the result  of the election. In the absence of any such  allega- tions paragraph 29 disclosed no cause of action.     Allegations  contained in paragraphs 31 to 35 relate  to alleged irregularities committed on the polling day. Accord- ing  to these allegations, workers of the respondent  helped voters  to cast their vote in favour of the respondent.  The averments  contained  therein do not amount to  any  corrupt practice,  instead  if at all these  allegations  relate  to irregularities and illegalities alleged to have been commit- ted  on the polling day which would at best be  relevant  if there was further allega- 391 tion that it materially affected the result of the election. Since  respondent’s  term has already expired,  and  as  his election  cannot  be  set aside, these  allegations  do  not survive and it is not necessary to consider them in  detail. Similarly  averments  contained in paragraphs  3738  contain narration  of  facts which have no bearing  on  any  corrupt practice.  Allegations  contained  in paragraphs  39  to  49 relate  to the appointment of counting agents. In  substance the  appellant has alleged that neither he nor his  election agent  had  appointed any counting agents but  a  number  of persons  had acted as the appellant’s counting agents in  an unauthorised  manner  and complaints made by  him  were  not considered  and the Returning Officer failed to perform  his

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duty.  These allegations even if assumed to be true  do  not make out any case of commission of corrupt practice.     Allegations contained in paragraphs 50, 51 and 53 (1)(F) of the election petition purport to state that Rajiv  Gandhi and his workers with his consent spent money on the election in  excess of the ceiling limit and major portion  of  which was not shown by him in his election expenses return. It was alleged  that  in all Rs.3,15,500 had been  spent  by  Rajiv Gandhi  in his election but he did not include the  same  in his return. Details of the expenditure are mentioned in  the sub-paragraphs  (a) to (g) of paragraph 50. In  these  para- graphs the appellant alleged that Rajiv Gandhi used at least 100  jeeps for thirty days and his workers with his  consent used  40 jeeps and spent money on propaganda  badges,  leaf- lets,  making  arrangements for holding  meetings  for  Smt. Indira  Gandhi throughout the Amethi constituency and  money was spent in providing food to 100 workers of Rajiv  Gandhi, in  all  the  returned candidate and his  workers  with  his consent  spent  a sum of Rs.3,15,500 but the  same  was  not accounted  for in the election return. The allegations  con- tained  in these paragraphs relate to the  corrupt  practice under  Section 123(6) of the Act read with Section 77.  Sec- tion  123(6) provides that incurring or authorising  of  ex- penditure in contravention of Section 77 is a corrupt  prac- tice.  Section  77  lays down that every  candidate  at  the election  shall keep a correct and separate account  of  all expenditure  in  connection with the  election  incurred  or authorised by him or by his election agent between the  date of  nomination  and the date of declaration of  result.  The account  shall  contain such particulars  as  prescribed  by Rules. Sub-section (3) lays down that expenditure shall  not exceed  such  amount as may be prescribed. Rule  90  of  the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 prescribed that the expenses shall not exceed a sum of Rs. 1 lakh for Lok Sabha  election in  the  State of Uttar Pradesh. Section 77  and  the  Rules therefore  prescribed a ceiling limit for election  expenses and if any candidate incurs or 392 authorises expenses in excess of the ceiling limit, he would be  guilty of corrupt practice under Section 123(6)  of  the Act. The allegations contained in various paragraphs of para 50 merely allege that a number of vehicles were plying  with Congress  (I) flags and food was served in  connection  with the election meetings, distribution of badges and  leaflets. There is, however, no allegation that Rajiv Gandhi  incurred or  authorised  incurring of expenditure for  the  aforesaid purposes.  Any  voluntary expense incurred  by  a  political party, well-wishers, sympathisers or association of  persons does  not fall within the mischief of Section 123(6) of  the Act, instead only that expenditure which is incurred by  the candidate  himself or authorised by him is material for  the purpose of Section 77. In Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh, [1955]  1 SCR 671 this Court pointed out that expenses  must be  incurred or authorised by the candidate or his  election agent.  In that case the Manager, the Assistant Manager,  20 Ziladars and their peons were alleged to have worked for the election of the returned candidate. This Court held that the employment of extra persons and the incurring or authorising of  extra expenditure was not by the candidate or his  elec- tion  agent.  It was further pointed out  that  persons  who volunteer  to work cannot be said to be employed or paid  by the  candidate or his election agent. In Smt. Indira  Gandhi v. Raj Narain, [1976] 2 SCR 347 Ray, C.J. observed "Authori- sation means acceptance of the responsibility. Authorisation must precede the expenditure. Authorisation means reimburse-

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ment  by the candidate or election agent of the  person  who has  been  authorised by the candidate or  by  the  election agent  of the candidate to spend or incur. In order to  con- stitute authorisation the effect must be that the  authority must carry with it the right of reimbursement.     Section  77 requires a candidate to keep a separate  and correct  account of all expenditure "in connection with  the election  incurred or authorised by him or by  his  election agent"  between the date of his nomination and the  date  of declaration of the result of the election. The candidate  is required to maintain account of only that expenditure  which he  or  his election agent may have  authorised  before  the expenditure  was actually incurred, which would  imply  that the  candidate or his election agent undertook to  reimburse the  expenses which may have been authorised by him  or  his election  agent  to be spent at the election.  In  order  to constitute a corrupt practice as contemplated by Sections 77 and 123(6) it is necessary to plead requisite facts  showing authorisation, or undertaking of reimbursement by the candi- date or his election agent. A mere vague and general  state- ment  that  the candidate and his workers with  his  consent spent money in election in 393 excess of the permissible ceiling would not be sufficient to constitute corrupt practice.     In  Kunwar  Lal Gupta v. A.N. Chawla, [1975] 2  SCR  259 this  Court held that what Section 77(1) prescribed was  not only  the  incurring but also the authorising  of  excessive expenditure  and that such authorisation may be  implied  or express. The Court held that when a political party sponsor- ing  a candidate incurs expenditure in connection  with  his election  as  distinguished from expenditure  on  a  general party  propaganda, and the candidate knowingly takes  advan- tage  of it or participates in the programme or activity  or consents to it or acquiescence to it, it would be reasonable to infer that he impliedly authorised the political party to incur such expenditure and he could not escape the rigour of the ceiling by saying that he had not incurred the  expendi- ture and the political party had done so. The result of  the judgment  was  that the expenditure  incurred  by  political party  in connection with the general party  propaganda  was deemed  to have been incurred by the candidate himself.  The Parliament  amended Section 77 by the Representation of  the People  (Amendment) Act, 1974 by adding two explanations  to the  Section. Explanation 1 lays down that  any  expenditure incurred or authorised in connection with the election of  a candidate by a political party or by any association or body of persons or by any individual other than the candidate  or his  election agent, shall not be deemed to be  incurred  or authorised  by  the  candidate or his  election  agent.  The validity  of the Amending Act was upheld by  a  Constitution Bench of this Court in Dr. P. Nalla Thampy Terah v. Union of India  & Ors., [1985] Supp. SCC 189. After the amendment  of Section 77(1) any expenditure at the election by a political party,  sympathisers or friends cannot be held to have  been incurred by the candidate or his election agent unless it is shown that the money which they spent belonged to the candi- date  or his election agent or that he reimbursed the  same. it is thus evident that unless the allegations are  specific that  the  candidate or his election  agent  authorised  the expenses  before the money was actually spent and  that  the candidate  or his election agent reimbursed or undertook  to reimburse  the  same  the necessary  ingredient  of  corrupt practice would not be complete and it would provide no cause of  action  to plead corrupt practice. In the  instant  case

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paragraph  50  and its various sub-paragraphs  contain  mere assertion  of facts relating to expenditure but there is  no allegation  that the expenditure was incurred or  authorised by Rajiv Gandhi or that he undertook to reimburse the  same. The  appellant made an attempt to jumble up various  allega- tions  regarding  incurring of expenditure by  the  returned candidate and his workers. The allegations 394 contained therein do not make out any case of corrupt  prac- tice  and the High Court was justified in striking  out  the same.     Allegations contained in paragraph 52 disclose that  the appellant had come to know that the villages in the constit- uency  of Amethi, Rajiv Gandhi polled cent percent votes  in his  favour.  This statement does not make out  any  corrupt practice or any ground of challenge under Section 100 of the Act, it was rightly struk off by the High Court.     Paragraph 53 of the election petition stated that  Rajiv Gandhi  committed corrupt practice as set out  in  sub-para- graphs (A) to (F). These paragraphs are under the heading of "Grounds".  It appears the appellant intended  to  challenge the  election of the returned candidate on the grounds  men- tioned  in  various sub-paragraphs of paragraph  53,  it  is therefore necessary to consider the allegations contained in each  of the sub-paragraphs to ascertain as to  whether  any corrupt  practice was pleaded which could disclose cause  of action  to maintain the petition. Paragraph 53(1)(a)  stated that Rajiv Gandhi "tried to make gift" to the voters in  the following  manner to make them vote in his favour  which  is illegal under Section 123(1)(A) of the Representation of the People  Act. After making this general statement the  appel- lant stated that on 15th June 1981 prior to the  declaration of  election and also during the election period workers  of Rajiv  Gandhi with his consent speeded up  the  construction work  of Amethi Railway Station, and this was done  only  to persuade  the voters to cast their vote in his favour.  This was  a gift to the voters of the constituency. Besides  that certain  other  works were also done which fall  within  the definition  of gift to the voters of the  constituency.  The petition  does not disclose any material fact or  particular regarding the alleged corrupt practice of making gift  which may  amount  to  bribery  within  the  meaning  of   Section 123(1)(A)  of the Act. The allegations merely disclose  that Amethi Railway Station was being constructed and during  the election its work was speeded up which persuaded the  voters to  cast  their vote in favour of  the  returned  candidate. There is no allegation that Rajiv Gandhi or his workers with his  consent made any gift, offer or promise to any  elector to  vote  or  refrain from voting at an  election.  If  some developmental  activity was carried on in  the  constituency and if it was completed during the election period it  could not amount to any gift or promise to the voters.     It  would be noticed that the allegations  contained  in sub-paragraph 53(1)(A) open with the qualification "Respond- ent No. I (Rajiv Gandhi) tried to make gift to the  voters," which means that attempt was 395 made to make gift to the voters and not that it was actually done.  It indicates that the appellant who made the  allega- tions  was  himself not sure that any corrupt  practice  had been  committed. Sub-paragraphs (A) and (C) of paragraph  53 (I)  of the election petition alleged that Rajiv Gandhi  and Smt.  Indira  Gandhi and their workers with the  consent  of Rajiv  Gandhi  and Smt. Indira Gandhi made  promise  through newspapers,  pamphlets and speeches that voters should  cast

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their vote in favour of Rajiv Gandhi for the development  of Amethi because his victory will ensure progress and develop- ment.  Further Rajiv Gandhi and Smt. Indira Gandhi  and  the workers  of Rajiv Gandhi in all their speeches and  particu- larly  Smt.  Indira Gandhi in her speech of  11.6.1981  said that for the development of Amethi Constituency they  should vote  for Rajiv Gandhi. On account of these speeches  voters could  not  cast their vote impartially, instead  they  cast their vote in favour of Rajiv Gandhi. Since Rajiv Gandhi and Smt.  Indira  Gandhi  both attended  the  meetings  together voters  got  the impression that as Smt. Indira  Gandhi  was Prime  Minister  and her son Rajiv Gandhi was  a  candidate, there  was bound to be development of Amethi area  if  Rajiv Gandhi  was  elected.  These allegations  merely  amount  to representation  being  made by Smt. Indira  Gandhi  and  the returned candidate and his workers that if Rajiv Gandhi  was elected  the constituency would be developed. Such a  state- ment  of  promise is a legitimate one and it does  not  fail within  the definition of bribery or undue  influence  under Section  123(1)(A) or 123 (2) of the Act. A  candidate,  his workers  and  supporters have every right under the  law  to canvass  for  the success of a particular  candidate  saying that  if  elected he would work for the development  of  the constituency.  Such a promise does not in any way  interfere with  the free exercise of electoral right of the  electors. Smt.  Indira  Gandhi  who was the leader of  the  party  was entitled  to ask the electors to vote for Rajiv  Gandhi  and the fact that she was the Prime Minister made no  difference to her to make an appeal of that nature. There is no allega- tion  that  there  was any element of  bargaining  or  undue influence  in making appeal to the voters for casting  their vote  in  favour of Rajiv Gandhi. Section  123(2)(b)  itself provides  that a declaration of public policy, or a  promise of  public  action  or the mere exercise of  a  legal  right without  intent to interfere with the electoral right  shall not be deemed to be interference with the exercise of  elec- toral right.     In  Shiv Kirpal Singh v. V.V. Gin, [1971] 2 SCR 1971,  a Constitution  Bench of this Court held that  the  expression "free  exercise of the electoral right" does not  mean  that voter  is  not to be influenced. This expression has  to  be read in the context of an election in a democratic 396 society  and the candidates and their supporters must  natu- rally  be allowed to canvass support by all  legitimate  and legal  means. This exercise of the right by a  candidate  or his  supporters  to canvass support does  not  interfere  or attempt to interfere with the free exercise of the electoral right. What does amount to interference with the exercise of an  electoral right is "tyranny over the mind".  Declaration of public policy or a promise of public action or promise to develop  the constituency in general do not  interfere  with free exercise of electoral rights as the same do not consti- tute  bribery  or undue influence. In H.V.  Karnath  v.  Ch. Nitiraj Singh, [1969] 3 SCR 813 the State Government  during the  election period issued an Ordinance granting  exemption to  certain agriculturists from payment of land revenue  and during  the election the Chief Minister announced  increased dearness  allowance  to Government employees.  Referring  to these facts the election petitioner therein alleged that the same amounted to corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A) of this  Act. This Court repelled the contention and held  that the Ordinance did not amount to a gift, offer or promise  of any  gratification within the meaning of Section  123(1)(A). Similarly,  increase  in  dearness allowance  could  not  be

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regarded  as a gift, offer or promise of  any  gratification within  the meaning of Section 123(1)(A). A general  promise made  by  the Prime Minister or Minister to  redress  public grievance or to provide for public amenities for  developing the  constituency  if elected, does not  amount  to  corrupt practice.  In  paragraph  53(1)(B) and  (C)  material  facts relating  to alleged "gift and promise and undue  influence" have  not  been stated in the petition and for  that  reason also paragraphs 53(1)(B) and (C) were righlty struck off.     Paragraph  53(1)(D) stated "the workers of Rajiv  Gandhi with his consent on 14th June 1981 at about 2 p.m. tried  to bring  voters  in truck for casting votes and  dropped  them back at their houses. The appellant noted the number of such truck  which is mentioned in the paragraph. This  truck  had brought about 20-22 voters to the Junior High School Polling Centre  of  Amethi constituency and took them  back  without charging fare from them. The truck was used by Rajiv  Gandhi and  this amounted to corrupt practice. This paragraph  con- tains  substantially  the same allegations as  contained  in paragraph  30  of the petition, it purports to  convey  that Rajiv  Gandhi  and with his consent his  workers  "tried  to bring voters". In substance the allegation amounts to saying that  Rajiv  Gandhi and his workers made  attempt  to  carry voters in a truck. He further alleged that they carried  the voters. It appears that the appellant intended to lay charge of  corrupt  practice  against Rajiv  Gandhi  under  Section 123(5) of the Act for hiring or procuring of a 397 truck for the use of same for free conveyance of electors to and from the polling station. The necessary particulars with regard to corrupt practice as contemplated by Section 123(5) are however, totally lacking. The petition does not  contain any material facts with regard to hiring or procuring of the vehicle.  Further  there  is no allegation as  to  when  the vehicle was hired or procured, by whom, and at what place or that the said vehicle in furtherance of hiring or  procuring was used for free conveyance of electors to and from polling station.  The  allegations made in paragraphs  30  and  sub- paragraph  (D)  of  paragraph 53(1) merely  show  that  some voters were brought to the polling station Amethi in a truck without  charging any fare from them and the truck was  used by the workers of Rajiv Gandhi. Does this make out a corrupt practice  under  Section  123(5)? Section  123(5)  reads  as under:               "The  hiring or procuring, whether on  payment               or  otherwise, of any vehicle or vessel  by  a               candidate or his agent or by any other  person               (with the consent of a candidate or his  elec-               tion  agent)  (or the use of such  vehicle  or               vessel for the free conveyance) of any elector               (other than the candidate himself, the members               of  his  family or his agent) to or  from  any               polling station provided under Section 25 or a               place  fixed under sub-section (1) of  Section               29 for the poll  .....  " It would be noticed that hiring or procuring of a vehicle by a  candidate  or his agent or by any other person  with  his consent  is  the first essential ingredient of  the  corrupt practice, the second essential ingredient is that the hiring or  procuring of the vehicle must be for conveyance  of  the voters to and from the polling station and the third  neces- sary ingredient is that conveyance of electors is free  from any  charge.  All the three ingredients must be  pleaded  to make out a case of corrupt practice under Section 123(5). If any  of the three ingredients is not pleaded there would  be

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no  pleading  of corrupt practice.  In  Joshbhai  Chunnibhai Patel v. Anwar Beg A. Mirza, [1969] 2 SCR 97.  Hidayatullah, C.J.  speaking for the Court analysed this Section  and  ob- served: "it will therefore, appear that the Section requires three things, (i) hiring or procuring of a vehicle; (ii)  by a candidate or his agent etc, and (iii) for the free convey- ance of an elector. It will be noticed that the Section also speaks  of the use but it speaks of the use of such  vehicle which connects the two parts, namely, hiring or procuring of vehicle and its use. The requirement of the law therefore is that in addition to proving the hiring or procuring and  the carriage of electors to and from any polling station, should also  be proved that the electors used the vehicle  free  of cost to themselves." In Ch. Razik Ram v. Ch. J.S. 398 Chouhan  &  Ors., AIR 1975 SC 667 the Court  considered  the decision  of this Court in Balwan Singh v.  Lakshmi  Narain, [2960] 3 SCR 91 and the effect of 1966 amendment and  there- upon it held as under:               "On  analysis, clause 5 of Section  12*  fails               into two parts. The requirements of the  first               part are: (i) the hiring or procuring  whether               on  payment  or otherwise, of any  vehicle  or               vessel for the free conveyance of voters, (ii)               such  hiring or procuring must be by a  candi-               date  or  his election agent or by  any  other               person  with the consent of a candidate or  of               his election agent. The second part  envisages               the  "use  of such vehicle or vessel  for  the               free conveyance of any elector (other than the               candidate himself, the members of his  family,               or his election agent) to or from any  polling               station."  The two parts are connected by  the               conjunction  "or"  which  is  capable  of  two               constructions.  In one sense it is a  particle               coordinating  the two parts of the clause  and               creating  an alternative between them. In  the               other  sense  which is akin to  the  sense  of               "and"  it can be construed as  conjoining  and               combining  the first part of the  clause  with               the second. The latter construction appears to               comport better with the aim and object of  the               amendment  of 1966. In this connection, it  is               noteworthy  that  even before  the  amendment,               this  Court  in Shri Balwan Singh  v.  Lakshmi               Narain, [1960] 3 SCR 91 held that in consider-               ing  whether a corrupt practice  described  in               Section  123(5)  is  committed,  conveying  of               electors cannot be dissociated from the hiring               of a vehicle.               Even  if  the  word "or" is  understood  as  a               coordinating conjunction introducing  alterna-               tives,  then  also a petitioner  in  order  to               succeed  on the ground of a  corrupt  practice               under  the  second part of  the  clause,  must               prove in addition to the use of the vehicle               or  vessel  for  the free  conveyance  of  any               elector  to or from any polling  station,  the               hiring or procuring of that vehicle or vessel.               This  is  so because the word  "such"  in  the               phrase  introduced  by  the  1966   amendment,               expressly imports these elements of the  first               into the second part of the clause." Same  view was taken by this Court in  Dadasaheb  Dattatraya Pawar & Ors. v. Pandurang Raoji Jagtap & Ors., [1978] 2  SCR

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524  and the Court emphasised that it was necessary  for  an election petitioner to 399 prove (i) that any vehicle or vessel was hired or  procured, whether  on payment or otherwise, by the returned  candidate or  by  his election agent or by any other person  with  the consent of the candidate or of his election agent; (ii) that it  was used for the conveyance of the electors to  or  from any polling station, and (iii) that such conveyance was free of cost to the electors. Failure to substantiate any one  of these ingredients leads to the collapse of the whole charge. Standard  of proof required to establish a corrupt  practice is  strict,  as imputation of corrupt  practices  is  quasi- criminal  and the charge of corrupt practice  under  Section 123(5) has to be scrutinised in a strict manner. In Dharmesh Prasad  Verma v. FaiyazaI Azam, [1985] 1 SCR 11  this  Court again  reaffirmed  the aforesaid view. There  is  thus  good authority  for holding that if any of the three  ingredients as noted earlier is not pleaded the charge of corrupt  prac- tice must fail. In the absence of any of the three  ingredi- ents  being  pleaded it would not be open  to  the  election petitioner  to  adduce  evidence to sustain  the  charge  of corrupt practice as was held by this Court in Rajendra Singh Yadav v. Chandra Sen & Ors., AIR 1979 SC 882.     The appellant placed strong reliance on the decision  of this Court in Balwan Singh v. Lakshmi Narain. This case  was decided prior to the amendment of Section 123(5) but even in that  case  this Court observed that  the  corrupt  practice under  Section  123(5) being the hiring or  procuring  of  a vehicle  for the conveyance of the electors, full  statement of  the  hiring or procuring must be given by  the  election petitioner. Balwan Singh’s case was considered and discussed in  Ch. Razik Ram v. Ch. J.S. Chouhan & Ors.  The  appellant then  placed reliance on the observations of this  Court  in Balwan  Singh v. Prakash Chand & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 1187.  We have persued the decision but we do not find any support for the  appellant’s contention that the pleadings contained  in paragraphs  30  and 53(1)(D) are  sufficient  to  constitute charge of corrupt practice. In Balwan Singh v. Prakash Chand &  Ors., this Court interpreted the word "procure"  to  mean "to  obtain,  as by request, loan, effort, labour,  or  pur- chase, get, gain, come into possession of". Thus the  hiring of a vehicle must be to procure the same for the purpose  of conveyance  of the voters free of cost. The hiring and  pro- curing  the vehicle is a necessary ingredient which must  be pleaded  before  the charge can be  tried.  The  allegations contained in paragraphs 30 and 53(1)(D) conspicuously do  no contain  any pleading regarding hiring and procuring of  the vehicles  by  Rajiv  Gandhi or any of his  worker  with  his consent  for  conveyance of the voters to and  from  polling station  free of cost. No particulars of any kind have  been specified  in the paragraphs under consideration. The  para- graphs as 400 they stand do not make out any charge of corrupt practice as contemplated by Section 123(5) of the Act and the High Court was therefore justified in striking out the same.     In  paragraph  53(1) (E) of the  election  petition  the appellant  stated "that as per Section 123(7) of the  Repre- sentation of the People Act, Rajiv Gandhi’s workers with his consent  took  help from the Government  officers  and  high police  officers  and people of Government  departments  for securing votes of the electors. These officials flouted  all rules and laws particulars of which are as under."  Thereaf- ter particulars of the help taken from the Government  offi-

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cers  are detailed in sub-paragraphs (I) to (8).  A  corrupt practice  as  contemplated by  Section  123(7)  contemplates obtaining or procuring by a candidate or his election agent, assistance  from  the Government servants belonging  to  the classes specified in sub-section (7) of Section 123 for  the furtherance of the prospect of the candidate’s election.  In order to constitute a corrupt practice under Section 123(7), it  is  essential  to clothe the petition with  a  cause  of action  which  would call for an answer  from  the  returned candidate and it should therefore plead mode of  assistance, measure  of assistance and all facts pertaining to  the  as- sistance.  The pleading should further indicate the kind  or form  of assistance obtained and in what manner the  assist- ance was obtained or procured or attempted to be procured by the  candidate for promoting the prospect for his  election. The  election petitioner must state with exactness the  time of assistance, the manner of assistance and the persons from whom assistance was obtained or procured by the candidate as held by this Court in Hardware Lal v. Kanwal Singh, [1972] 2 SCR  743  and  Azhar Hussain v.  Rajiv  Gandhi.  Allegations contained in subparagraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the paragraph 53(1) (E)  raise  a grievance that though the  appellant  had  not appointed any counting agent but still certain persons acted as  his  counting agents and the Returning Officer  did  not hold any inquiry into his complaint. Sub-paragraph 4  states that  in the Amethi Constituency, there was  fear  psychosis and  "it looked as if the police and other Government  offi- cials  wanted to help Rajiv Gandhi". Sub-paragraphs 5  to  8 refer to certain illegalities and irregularities alleged  to have been committed by certain persons on the polling day in helping  voters to cast their votes and it  further  alleged that  some  persons cast votes 100 to 200  times  and  their signatures were not obtained. These allegations do not  make out any charge of corrupt practice within the provisions  of Section 123 (7) of the Act; As regards paragraph 53(1)(G) it purports  to allege a corrupt practice under Section  123(6) of  the  Act  on the ground that Rajiv  Gandhi  spent  Rs.3, 15,500  in excess of the amount permitted under the law.  We have 401 already discussed this matter earlier.               Paragraph 53(2) of the petition is as under:               "That  Presiding Officer is duty  bound  under               Sections 27, 28 and 139 of the  Representation               of  the People Act to ensure that the  polling               is fair, but it has not been so in this  case.               According to the rules, the Presiding  Officer               should have not removed the posters and  other               propaganda  material from the  polling  booth.               But  the  hand symbol was being  displayed  by               every Presiding Officer, and other persons and               the  agents of the candidates and  voters.               By reason of this, the voters were  influenced               and Rajiv Gandhi got very many votes. The hand               symbol influenced the voters to a great extent               because Rajiv Gandhi’s workers were trying  to               display  the hand symbol in the polling  booth               as  well as within 100 meters of  the  polling               booth.  The hand symbol was visible  to  every               voter  everywhere. This influenced the  voters               very  much  and they cast votes in  favour  of               Rajiv Gandhi."     The  aforesaid allegations do not amount to any  corrupt practice as contemplated by Section 123 of the Act. At  best these  allegations  raise  a grievance  that  the  Presiding

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Officers did not perform their duties in accordance with law in as much as they failed in their duty to remove the  post- ers and other propaganda material from the polling booth and the  hand which was the election symbol of Rajiv Gandhi  and the  same  was displayed within 100 meters  of  the  polling booth in violation of the rules. The allegations do not make out  any charge of corrupt practice. If at all  the  allega- tions  could be a ground under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of  the Act  for setting aside election on the ground of  its  being materially affected but no such plea was raised.  Paragraphs 54 to 58 do not deal with any corrupt practice.     The  above scanning of the election petition would  show that  the  appellant  failed to plead  complete  details  of corrupt practice which could constitute a cause of action as contemplated by Section 100 of the Act and he further failed to give the material facts and other details of the  alleged corrupt  practices.  The  allegations  relating  to  corrupt practice,  even if assumed to be true as stated in the  var- ious  paragraphs of the election petition do not  constitute any  corrupt practice. The petition was drafted in a  highly vague and general manner. Various paragraphs of the petition presented disjointed averments and it is 402 difficult  to  make out as to what actually  the  petitioner intended  to  plead.  At the conclusion of  hearing  of  the appeal  before us appellant made applications  for  amending the election petition, to remove the defects pointed out  by the  High  Court and to render the  allegations  of  corrupt practice  in  accordance with the provisions of  Section  83 read  with Section 123 of the Act. Having given our  anxious consideration  to the amendment applications, we are of  the opinion  that these applications cannot be allowed  at  this stage.  It must be borne in mind that the election  petition was presented to the Registrar of the High Court, at Lucknow Bench  on  the  last day of the  limitation  prescribed  for filing the election petition. The appellant could not  raise any  ground  of challenge after the  expiry  of  limitation. Order  VI Rule 17 no doubt permits amendment of an  election petition  but the same is subject to the provisions  of  the Act. Section 81 prescribes a period of 45 days from the date of the election for presenting election petition calling  in question  the  election of a returned candidate.  After  the expiry  of that period no election petition is  maintainable and  the  High Court or this Court has  no  jurisdiction  to extend  the  period  of limitation. An  order  of  amendment permitting a new ground to be raised beyond the time  speci- fied  in Section 81 would amount to contravention  of  those provisions.  and  is beyond the ambit of Section 87  of  the Act.  It  necessarily  follow that a new  ground  cannot  be raised or inserted in an election petition by way of  amend- ment  after  the  expiry of the period  of  limitation.  The amendments claimed by the-appellant are not in the nature of supplying  particulars  instead  those  seek  to  raise  new grounds  of  challenge. Various paragraphs of  the  election petition which are sought to be amended, do not disclose any cause  of action, therefore it is not permissible  to  allow their  amendment after expiry of the period  of  limitation. Amendment applications are accordingly rejected.     Before we close we would like to express our anxiety  on a  feature  which of late has assumed great  proportion.  In Parliamentary form of democracy political parties play vital role  and  occassionally  they sponsor  candidates  for  the election.  But  under  the existing law it is  open  to  any elector to contest election from any parliamentary constitu- ency in the country and it is not necessary that the  candi-

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date should be sponsored by a political party. It is permis- sible  for an elector to contest election on his own  as  an independent candidate. Some independent individuals  contest election genuinely and some of them have succeeded also  but experience  has  shown that a large  number  of  independent candidates  contest the election for the mere sake  of  con- testing, with a view to make out grounds for challenging the election.  Presence  of a number of  independent  candidates results in confusion, for the millions of the illiterate and ignorant electors who exercise 403 their  electoral right on the basis of ’symbols’ printed  on the ballot papers. The presence of large number of independ- ent  candidates makes the ballot paper of unmanageable  size and ordinary elector is confused in the election booth while exercising  his franchise. This leads to confusion.  In  the instant case out of 14 candidates who contested the election 11 of them including the appellant contested as  independent candidates and they all polled only paltry number of  votes. This shows the genuineness of the candidature of independent candidates. The appellant is a resident of Gwalior in Madhya Pradesh  and  he  is a lawyer by  profession.  He  contested election  as  an independent candidate and on  the  date  of filing  of nomination paper he insisted to file his  nomina- tion  paper by stripping off himself completely and by  put- ting  on only a ’langot’. This caused consternation  in  the office  of  the Re-. turning Officer, and it has  also  been raised  as a ground of attack in the election  petition.  In fact  the appellant has filed certain photographs before  us showing himself in a ’langot’ only. When this appeal came up for hearing before us the appellant insisted that he  should be  allowed  to  argue the case by putting on  a  crown  (an artificial  one) on his head. According to him  without  the crown  he  would not be able to make his  submissions  in  a satisfactory  manner. We refused to grant the permission  to the  great dissatisfaction of the appellant. A court of  law is  a  solemn place where proceedings are held in  a  solemn manner  and  the time of the court especially  in  the  apex court  is precious. time which belongs to the people and  it would  be wholly abnoxious to judicial propriety to allow  a litigant  to  appear in court wearing a crown to  argue  the case.  The  court  cannot be converted into  a  dramatic  or theatrical  stage. We accordingly refused to grant the  per- mission  to  the  appellant to wear his  crown.  During  the arguments the appellant glibly stated that he had  contested the election for the offices of President and Vice-President and  that he would be contesting each and every election  as an  independent candidate with a view to reform the  society and  the election law. This is not uncommon as a  number  of other persons have been contesting elections as  independent candidates for the high office and some of them filed  elec- tion  petition  disputing the election. These  factors  have given  cause for anxiety to us and we hope that the  Parlia- ment  will take these matters into consideration  to  devise ways and means to meet the on-slaught of independent  candi- dates who are not quite serious about their business.     In  view of our discussion, we are of the  opinion  that the High Court rightly exercised its power in rejecting this petition  under  Order  VII Rule 11. The  appeal  fails  and accordingly  dismissed  with  costs  which  we  quantify  at Rs.2,000. P.S.S.                                                Appeal dismissed. 404

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