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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  2175 of 2007

PETITIONER: Dharappa Sangappa Nandyal

RESPONDENT: Bijapur Co-operative Milk Producers Societies Union Ltd

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 26/04/2007

BENCH: G P Mathur & R V Raveendran

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

CIVIL APPEAL NO 2175 OF 2007 (Arising out of SLP [C] No.3796/2006)

RAVEENDRAN, J.

       Leave granted.

       This appeal is filed against the judgment dated 15.6.2005 passed by  the High Court of Karnataka in Writ Appeal No.2131/2005.

2.      The appellant claims that he was employed as a daily-wage labourer  in the Rural Dairy Centre, Bijapur, on 13.5.1977. He further alleges that he  worked continuously and uninterruptedly till his services were illegally  terminated with effect from 1.3.1980. The appellant did not challenge his  termination.  3.      Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ( ’ID Act’ for short)  was amended in Karnataka by the Industrial Disputes (Karnataka  Amendment) Act, 1987 [Karnataka Act No.5 of 1988] inserting the  following as sub-section (4A) with effect from 7.4.1988 :

"(4A) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 9-C and in this  section, in the case of a dispute falling within the scope of section 2-A, the  individual workman concerned may, within six months from the date of  communication to him of the order of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment  or termination or the date of commencement of the Industrial Disputes  (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 1987, whichever is later, apply, in the  prescribed manner, to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute and  the Labour Court shall dispose of such application in the same manner as a  dispute referred under sub-section (1)."     

Taking advantage of the new provision, on 4.10.1988, the appellant made an  application to the Labour Court, Hubli (KID No.1055/88 subsequently  transferred and renumbered as KID No. 497/1995 on the file of the Labour  Court, Bijapur) seeking a declaration that his termination from service on  1.3.1980 was null and void and a direction for reinstatement with full back- wages, continuity of service and other consequential reliefs. The appellant  contended that his termination amounted to illegal retrenchment, as the  respondent failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 25- F of ID Act even though he had worked continuously for more than 240  days in a year.  

4.      The respondent (Karnataka Milk Federation, Unit : Bijapur) filed an  objection statement contending that it came into existence and took over the  Rural Dairy  Centre, Bijapur, long after the alleged termination of appellant

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by Rural Dairy  Centre,  Bijapur. The respondent denied the claim of the  appellant that he was a daily wage worker between 13.5.1977 and 1.3.1980  and that his services were termination in violation of section 25F of the ID  Act.  

5.      The appellant gave evidence and produced a certificate dated  19.2.1978 allegedly issued by the Dairy  Supervisor, Rural Dairy Centre,  Bijapur, certifying that he had worked as a casual labourer from 13.5.1977 to  19.2.1978.  None was examined on behalf of the respondent to deny the said  certificate.  On consideration of the material, the Labour Court accepted the  said service certificate, but did not accept his further self-serving statement  that he worked up to 1.3.1980 as such claim was not supported by any  document. The Labour Court made an award dated 15.10.1996 directing  reinstatement, holding that Appellant had worked for more than 240 days in  the year preceding termination (13.5.1977 to 19.2.1978), and the termination  of his service, without complying with section 25F of ID Act, amounted to  illegal retrenchment. However, as there was an inordinate delay of 10 years  in filing the claim statement, the Labour Court awarded only 50% back- wages in addition to continuity of service and consequential benefits. The  respondent challenged the said award in W.P. No.7227/1997.  

6.      During the pendency of the said writ petition, a Division Bench of  Karnataka High Court held in Veerashiva Co-operative Bank Ltd. vs.  Presiding Officer, Labour Court [2001 (3) Kar.L.J. 519] that the procedure  for adjudication and the remedy provided under the Karnataka Co-operative  Societies Act, 1959 (’KCS Act’ for short) being comprehensive, the  jurisdiction of Labour Courts under ID Act to deal with such disputes was  barred. The decision in Veerashiva Co-operative Bank was approved and  reiterated by a Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Karnataka Sugar  Workers Federation v. State of Karnataka [2003 (4) Kar.L.J. 353].  

7.      Following the decision of the Full Bench, a Single Judge of the High  Court, allowed the Respondent-employer’s writ petition, by order dated  1.2.2005, holding that ID Act was inapplicable to a dispute raised by an  employee of a co-operative society. He therefore set aside the award of the  Labour Court, reserving liberty to the appellant to work out his remedy in  accordance with law. The said order of the learned Single Judge was  challenged by the appellant in a writ appeal. A Division Bench of the High  Court, by its judgment dated 15.6.2005, dismissed the writ appeal, holding  that an employee of a co-operative society having a claim against the  employer has to raise a dispute under Section 70 of the KCS Act. The  Division Bench purported to follow the decision of the Full Bench in  Karnataka Sugar Workers Federation. The said decision of the Division  Bench is challenged in this appeal by special leave.

8.      The Appellant contends that amended Section 70 of the KCS Act took  away the jurisdiction of Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals functioning  under the ID Act, only when the amendments to the said section as per Act 2  of 2000 came into effect on 20.6.2000, and it did not nullify an award made  by the Labour Court prior to that date, that is on 15.10.1996. It was also  contended that the respondent not having raised any objection about want of  jurisdiction before the Labour Court, could not subsequently be permitted to  raise the plea of want of jurisdiction before the High Court. The Respondent  on the other hand, supported the decision of the High Court and contended  that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction having regard to section 70 of the  KCS Act. The respondent also contended that the award of the Labour Court  was otherwise also unsustainable as the claim itself was hopelessly barred by  limitation, delay and laches. Therefore, the following two questions arise for  our consideration :  

(i)     Whether the jurisdiction of Labour Court under the ID Act, was  barred by section 70 of the KCS Act with reference to co- operative societies and if so, from when.  

(ii)    Even if Labour Court had jurisdiction, whether the appellant

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was entitled to file an application under Section 10(4A) of ID  Act in respect of a cause of action which occurred in 1978.  

Re : Question (i) :           9.      It is necessary to refer to the metamorphosis of section 70 of the KCS  Act, before considering this question. The said section originally stood as  follows :  "70. Disputes which may be referred to Registrar for decision. \026 (1)  Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force,  if any dispute touching the constitution, management, or the business of a  co-operative society arises. \026

(a) and (b) x x x x x (omitted as not relevant)

[c] between the society or its committee and any past committee,  any officer, agent or employee, or any past officer, past agent or  past employee or the nominee, heirs, or legal representatives of any  deceased officer, deceased agent, or deceased employee of the  society, or

(d) x x x (omitted as not relevant)

such dispute shall be referred to the Registrar for decision and no Court   shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceeding in respect  of such dispute.   (2)     For the purposes of sub-section (1), the following shall be deemed  to be disputes touching the constitution, management or the business of a  co-operative society, namely. \026

(a)     a claim by the society for any debt or demand due to it  from a member or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of a  deceased member, whether such debt or demand be admitted or  not;

(b)     a claim a surety against the principal debtor where the  society has recovered from the surety any amount in respect of any  debt or demand due to it from the principle debtor, as a result of  the default of the principal debtor whether such debt or demand is  admitted or not;

(c)     any dispute arising in connection with the election of a  President, Vice-President, Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary,  Treasurer or Member of Committee of the society.  

(3)     x x x (omitted as not relevant).          Section 70 was amended by Karnataka Co-operative Societies (Amendment)  Act, 1976 (Karnataka Act 19 of 1976). The Amendment Act received the  assent of the Governor on 7.3.1976. It was brought into effect from  20.1.1976. The Amendment Act added the following as clauses (d) and (e)  in sub-section (2) of section 70 :  

(d)     any dispute between a co-operative society and its  employees or past employees or heirs or legal representatives of a  deceased employee, including a dispute regarding the terms of  employment, working conditions and disciplinary action taken by a  co-operative society;

(e)     a claim by a co-operative society for any deficiency caused  in the assets of the co-operative society by a member, past  member, deceased member or deceased officer, past agent or  deceased agent or by any servant, past servant or deceased servant  or by its committee, past or present whether such loss be admitted  or not."    

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Section 70 was again amended by Karnataka Co-operative Societies (Second  Amendment) Act, 1997 (Karnataka Act No.2/2000) in the following manner:  (i)     In sub-section (1), for the words "no court", the words "no  civil or Labour or Revenue court or Industrial Tribunal" were  substituted.  

(ii)    At the end of clause (d) of sub-section (2), the words  "notwithstanding anything contrary contained in the Industrial  Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act 14 of 1947)" were inserted.  

The said Amendment Act (Act 2 of 2000) received the assent of the  President on 18.3.2000 and was brought into force on 20.6.2000. After the  said amendments in 1996 and 2000, Section 70 of KCS Act (relevant  portion) reads thus: "Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in  force, if any dispute touching the constitution, management, or the  business of a Co-operative Society arises - \005 between the Society or its  committee and \005 any officer, agent or employee, or any past officer, past  agent or past employee \005 of the Society, _.. such dispute shall be referred  to the Registrar for decision and no Civil or Labour or Revenue Court or  Industrial Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other  proceeding in respect of such dispute.

For the purposes of sub-section (1), the following shall be deemed to be  disputes touching the constitution, management or the business of a Co- operative Society, namely \005\005. (d) any dispute between a Co-operative  Society and its employees or past employees or heirs or legal  representatives of a deceased employee, including a dispute regarding the  terms of employment, working conditions, and disciplinary action taken  by a Co-operative Society notwithstanding anything contrary contained in  the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947(Central Act 14 of 1947)."      

10.     "Co-operative societies" fall under Entry 32 of the State List.  "Industrial and labour disputes" fall under Entry 22 of the Concurrent List.  Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is an "existing law" with respect to a matter  enumerated in the Concurrent List, namely, industrial and labour disputes. A  dispute between a co-operative society and its employees in regard to terms  of employment, working conditions and disciplinary action, is an industrial  and labour dispute squarely covered by an existing law (ID Act), if the  employees are ’workmen’ as defined in the ID Act. Clause (1) of Article 254  provides that if any provision of a law made by a State Legislature is  repugnant to any provision of an existing law with respect to one of the  matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of  clause (2), the existing law shall prevail, and the law made by the  Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void.  Clause (2) of Article 254, however, provides that where a law made by the  Legislature of a State with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the  Concurrent List, contains any provision repugnant to an existing law with  respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of such State  shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has  received his assent, prevail in that State. The question of repugnancy can  arise only with reference to a legislation made by Parliament falling under  the Concurrent List or an existing law with reference to one of the matters  enumerated in the Concurrent List. If a law made by the State Legislature  covered by an Entry in the State List incidentally touches any of the entries  in the Concurrent List, Article 254 is not attracted. But where a law covered  by an entry in the State List (or an amendment to a law covered by an entry  in the State List) made by the State Legislature contains a provision, which  directly and substantially relates to a matter enumerated in the Concurrent  List and is repugnant to any provision of an existing law with respect to that  matter in the Concurrent List then such repugnant provision of the State law  will be void. Such a provision of law made by the State Legislature touching  upon a matter covered by the Concurrent List, will not be void if it can co-

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exist and operate without repugnancy with the provisions of the existing law.  What is stated above with reference to an existing law, is also the position  with reference to a law made by the Parliament. Repugnancy is said to arise  when : (i) there is clear and direct inconsistency between the Central and the  State Act; (ii) such inconsistency is irreconciliable, or  brings the State Act  in direct collision with the Central Act or brings about a situation where  obeying one would lead to disobeying the other. If the State Legislature,  while making or amending a law relating to co-operative societies, makes a  provision relating to labour disputes falling under the Concurrent List, then  Article 254 will be attracted if there is any repugnancy between such  provision of the State Act (MCS Act) with the existing law (ID Act). We  will have to examine the issue in this case keeping the above legal position  in mind.             

11.     The effect of the amendments to Section 70 of KCS Act, by Act 2 of  2000 is that  if any dispute (including any dispute relating to the terms of  employment, working conditions and disciplinary action), arose between a  co-operative society and its employees or past employees or heirs/legal  representatives of a deceased employee, on and from 20.6.2000, such  dispute had to be referred to the Registrar for decision and no Civil Court or  Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal would have jurisdiction to entertain any  suit or proceeding in respect of such dispute.  

12.     Even prior to 20.6.2000, having regard to the amendment to Section  70 of KCS Act by Act 19 of 1976 with effect from 20.1.1976, any dispute  between a co-operative society and its employees or past employees or  heirs/legal representatives of a deceased employee including a dispute  regarding the terms of employment, working conditions and disciplinary  action taken by a co-operative society, was deemed to be a dispute touching  the constitution, management, or business of a co-operative society which  had to be referred to the Registrar for adjudication. But prior to 20.6.2000,  there was no express exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court and  Industrial Tribunal. As a result, if an employee of a Co-operative Society  answered the definition of ’workman’ and the dispute between the co- operative society and its employee fell within the definition of an ’industrial  dispute’, then the employee had the choice of two alternative forums \026 either  to raise a dispute before the Registrar under Section 70 of the KCS Act or  seek a reference to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal under Section  10(1)(c) of the ID Act (or approach the Labour Court by an application  under Section 10(4A) of ID Act).

13.     In Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. v. Additional Industrial Tribunal,  A.P. (AIR 1970 SC 245), this Court considered Section 61 of the Andhra  Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1964, which dealt with disputes which  could be referred to the Registrar. The said section was in pari materia with  Section 70 of KCS Act, as it originally stood, before the amendments under  Act 19 of 1976 and Act 2 of 2000.  This  Court held that where a State Co- operative Societies Act had received the assent of the President, if any  provision of such State Act was repugnant to any provision of the ID Act,  the provisions of the State Act will prevail over the provisions of the ID Act.  This Court accepted the general proposition that the jurisdiction of the  Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court under the Industrial Disputes Act will be  barred if the disputes can be competently decided by the Registrar under  section 61 of the Andhra Pradesh Act, in view of the fact that the Andhra  Pradesh Act had received the assent of the President. This Court then  proceeded to examine whether disputes relating to service conditions of  workmen could be referred to the Registrar for decision under Section 61 of  the State Act and held that the disputes could only be decided by an  Industrial Tribunal dealing with an industrial dispute. This Court held that  the Registrar under the Co-operative Societies Act, could not grant the relief  in respect of such disputes because of the limitations placed on his powers  under the Act itself, and having regard to  the expression "touching the  business of the society" in Section 61 which did not include a dispute in  regard to conditions of service of workmen.

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14.     Though the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 was reserved  for the assent of the President and received his assent on 11.8.1959, the  Amendment Act 19 of 1976 which added clause (d) to sub-section (2) of   Section 70, (whereby a dispute between a Co-operative Society and its  present or past employee/s in regard to any disciplinary action or working  conditions was deemed to be a dispute touching the constitution,  management, or the business of a co-operative society), was neither reserved  for, nor received the assent of the President. In the absence of the assent of  the President, clause (d) of Section 70(2) could not be called in aid to  contend that section 70(1)(c) of the KCS Act would prevail over the  provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Consequently, even after the 1976  amendment to the KCS Act, the Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals  functioning under the ID Act continued to have jurisdiction in regard to  disputes between a Society and its workmen if the co-operative society  answered the definition of an ’industry’ and the dispute was an ’industrial  dispute’. But when sub-section (1) of section 70 of KCS Act was further  amended by Act 2 of 2000 by specifically excluding the jurisdiction of  Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals with the simultaneous addition of the  words "notwithstanding anything contrary contained in the Industrial  Disputes Act, 1947" in clause (d) of Section 70(2) of KCS Act, the said  Amendment Act (Act 2 of 2000) was reserved for the assent of the President  and received such assent on 18.3.2000. The amended provisions were given  effect from 20.6.2000. Therefore, only with effect from 20.6.2000, the  jurisdiction of Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals were excluded in  regard to disputes between a co-operative Society and its employees (or past  employees) relating to terms of employment, service conditions or  disciplinary action. It follows therefore that in the year 1996, the Labour  Court had the jurisdiction to make an award in regard to such a dispute. The  High Court could not have interfered with it on the ground that Section 70 of  the KCS Act was a bar to the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to decide the  dispute.

15.     The 1976 Amendment to the KCS Act did not bring about any  inconsistency with the provisions of the ID Act nor did it purport to prevail  over the provisions of the ID Act. Its effect was merely to provide an  additional or alternative forum for adjudication of the disputes between co- operative societies and its employees, relating to employment, working  conditions and disciplinary action. The 1976 Amendment Act, therefore,  was valid, even in the absence of the assent of the President. On the other  hand, the 2000 Amendment specifically excluded the jurisdiction of  Industrial Tribunals and Labour Courts under the ID Act, and intended to  prevail over the provisions of the ID Act in regard to adjudication of  disputes. The said Amendment required the assent of the President and was,  in fact, reserved for the assent of the President and obtained his assent. If the  1976 Amendment was to be read as excluding the jurisdiction of the  Industrial Tribunals and Labour Courts, then it was necessary to read the  provisions of Section 70, as amended by the 1976 Act, as prevailing over the  provisions of the ID Act. In which event, it would have required the  President’s assent, and in the absence of such assent, the Amendment to the  extent it purported to prevail over the Central enactment, would have been  void. Therefore, the only way to read the 1976 Amendment is to read it in a  literal and normal manner, that is, as not excluding the jurisdiction of the  Industrial Tribunals and Labour Courts but as merely conferring a  concurrent jurisdiction on the Registrar under Section 70 of the KCS Act.   

16.     This aspect has been completely overlooked by the Division Bench of  the Karnataka High Court in Veerashaiva Co-operative Bank. It misled itself  to an erroneous assumption that two decisions of this Court in R.C. Tiwari v.  Madhya Pradesh State Co-operative Marketing Federation Ltd. (1997 (5)  SCC 125) and Sagarmal v. District Sahkari Kendriya Bank Ltd., Mandsaur  and another [1997 (9) SCC 354] laid down the proposition that once a  specific procedure and effective remedy is provided under a Co-operative  Societies Act, it ipso facto excluded the settlement of disputes under section  10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. On that assumption, the High Court held  that Section 70 of the KCS Act, excluded the jurisdiction of Labour Courts/

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Industrial Tribunals in regard to references under Section 10 of the ID Act  stood excluded. The High Court held so in view of clause (d) of sub-section  (2) of Section 70 which provided that any dispute between a co-operative  society and its employees (past or present) in regard to terms of  employment, working conditions and disciplinary action will be deemed to  be a dispute to be decided by the Registrar under sub-section (1) of Section  70, overlooking the fact that Amendment Act 19 of 1976 by which clause  (d) was inserted in Section 70(2), had not received the assent of the  President and therefore the jurisdiction of the Registrar under Section 70(1)  of the KCS Act as expanded by section 70(2)(d), could not prevail over the  provisions of the ID Act. If the amendment to section 70(2) by Act 19 of  1976 should be read or construed as having the effect of enabling section  70(1) of KCS Act to prevail over the provisions of ID Act, then the said  amendment Act (Act 19 of 1976) would have required the assent of the  President under Article 254(2). But there was no such assent.  

17.     As the Division Bench had relied on two decisions of this Court in  R.C. Tiwari (supra) and Sagarmal (supra), it is necessary to refer to them.  But before doing so, we have to note that many a time, a principle laid down  by this Court with reference to the provisions of a particular State Act is  mechanically followed to interpret cognate enactments of other States,  without first ascertaining whether the provisions of the two enactments are  identical or similar. This frequently happens with reference to the laws  relating to rent and accommodation control,  co-operative societies and land  revenue. Before applying the principles enunciated with reference to another  enactment, care should be taken to find out whether the provisions of the Act  to which such principles are sought to be applied, are similar to the  provisions of the Act with reference to which the principles were evolved.  Failure to do so has led to a wrong interpretation of section 70 of the KCS  Act, in Veerashiva Co-operative Bank and Karnataka Sugar Workers  Federation.  

18.     R.C. Tiwari (supra) related to Madhya Pradesh, where ID Act itself  was inapplicable (except to the extent indicated in M.P. Industrial Relations  Act, 1960).  In that case, an employee of a co-operative society who had  been dismissed from service for mis-conduct, raised a dispute under the  Madhya Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. The concerned Deputy  Registrar held that the dismissal was proper and rejected the reference.  Thereafter the employee sought a reference under section 10(1) of the ID  Act. The Labour Court held that the domestic inquiry was vitiated and set  aside the order of dismissal. The said order was challenged by the employer- Society before the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The High Court held that in  view of the provisions of Section 55 of the Madhya Pradesh Co-operative  Societies Act, 1960, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction and therefore the  reference to the Labour Court was bad. It also held that the findings recorded  by the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies against the employee in the  award made under Section 55 of the Madhya Pradesh Co-operative Societies  Act, would operate as res judicata. This Court upheld the said decision of the  High Court and dismissed the special leave petition. The decision was  rendered with reference the special provisions of the M.P. Co-operative  Societies Act, 1960 and the M.P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960. Having  regard to Section 110 of the M.P. Industrial Relations Act, the provisions of  the Central Act - Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (except Chapters V-A, V-B  and V-C relating to lay off and retrenchment, special provisions relating to  lay off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments and unfair labour  practices), did not apply to any industry to which the said M.P. Industrial  Relations Act applied. ID Act did not apply in the State of Madhya Pradesh  for adjudication of disputes between the employer and employees, not  because of any bar in the MP Co-operative Societies Act, but because of the  State having made a law relating to industrial disputes, namely the M.P.  Industrial Relations Act, 1960 which had received the assent of the  President.  The M.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, vide section 55,  specifically provided that where a dispute including a dispute relating to  terms of employment, working conditions and disciplinary action by a  Society arises between a Society and its employees, the Registrar or any

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officer appointed by him shall decide the dispute and his decision shall be  binding on the Society and its employees; and Section 93 of the M.P. Co- operative Societies Act provided that nothing contained in the M.P.  Industrial Relations Act, 1960 shall apply to a Society registered under that  Act (M.P. Co-operative Societies Act). It is in those circumstances that in  R.C. Tiwari, this Court held that the I.D. Act did not apply to a dispute  between a Society and its employees in regard to any disciplinary action. In  that case, the question of any repugnancy between a State Act (Madhya  Pradesh State Co-operative Societies Act) and the Central Act (the Industrial  Disputes Act, 1947) did not arise. The State of Karnataka does not have a  State Act governing industrial disputes as in Madhya Pradesh and therefore,  the question of Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act excluding the  applicability of a State law relating to industrial disputes did not arise. The  decision in R.C.Tiwari was not, therefore, relevant or applicable. The  Division Bench of Karnataka High Court committed an error in following  the decision in R.C. Tiwari to hold that the jurisdiction of Labour Court  under the ID Act was barred, in view of section 70 as amended by the  Amendment Act 19 of 1976, even prior to the amendment of Section 70(1)  and (2) by Act 2 of 2000.

19.     The decision of this Court in Sagarmal (supra) also related to Madhya  Pradesh. In that case, the appellant was an employee of a Co-operative Bank  and he was removed from service after a disciplinary inquiry. The employee  challenged his removal by seeking a reference to the Labour Court under  section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.  A reference was made and  the Labour Court granted him relief of reinstatement with back-wages. The  employer Bank challenged the award in a writ petition and the High Court  quashed the award on the ground that it was a nullity, having been made in  an incompetent reference. While affirming the decision of the High Court,  this Court held that the provisions of the ID Act, did not apply to the  respondent co-operative bank, and the only question was about the  availability of remedy either under the Madhya Pradesh Co-operative  Societies Act, 1960 or under the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act,  1960. This Court observed that if such a question had arisen, section 93 of  the Madhya Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act would have come into  effect, but no occasion arose for consideration of such question inasmuch as  the employee did not resort to the remedy either under the Madhya Pradesh  Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 or under the Madhya Pradesh Industrial  Relations Act, 1960, but chose the remedy of a reference under Section 10 of  the ID Act, which was inapplicable in the State of Madhya Pradesh. This  Court reiterated that as the only question before the High Court was the  competence of a reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act,  1947, and not the availability of the remedy under the Madhya Pradesh Co- operative Societies Act, 1960 or the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations  Act, 1960, the view taken by the High Court that the reference under Section  10 of the ID Act was incompetent, and the award made therein a nullity, did  not suffer from any infirmity. In short, Section 10 of the ID Act was held  inapplicable not because the Madhya Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act,  1960 prevailed over the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 but  because in Madhya Pradesh, the provisions of the ID Act, 1947 (except  certain specified provisions relating to lay off etc.) did not apply in view of  the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960.   Therefore, the decision in Sagarmal was also of no assistance.  Therefore the  decision in Veerashiva Co-operative Bank was erroneous.   20.     The Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Karnataka Sugar  Workers Federation, decided two issues. Firstly, it upheld the constitutional  validity of amendment of Section 70 of the KCS Act, by Act 2 of 2000. That  question does not arise for our consideration and the decision thereon does  not require to be disturbed. Secondly, it upholds and reiterates the decision  in Veerashaiva Co-operative Bank (supra).  To that extent, it is not good  law.  

21.     In Management of Hukkeri v. S.R. Vastrad [ILR 2005 Karnataka  3882], a learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court held that even

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before the amendment of Section 70 by Act 2 of 2000, the legal  position  was that Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals under ID Act did not have  jurisdiction in regard to disputes between society and its employees because  of insertion of clause (d) in Section 70(2) of KCS Act introduced with effect  from 20.1.1976, relying on Veerashiva Co-operative Bank and Karnataka  Sugar Workers Federation. The said decision also, therefore, stands  overruled.  

22.     The resultant position can be summarized thus : a)      Even though clause (d) was added in Section 70(2) with effect from  20.1.1976, section 70(1) did not exclude or take away the jurisdiction of the  Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals under the I.D. Act to decide an  industrial dispute between a Society and its employees. Consequently, even  after insertion of clause (d) in Section 70(2) with effect from 20.1.1976, the  Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals under the I.D. Act, continued to have  jurisdiction to decide disputes between societies and their employees.

(b)     The jurisdiction of Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals to decide  the disputes between co-operative societies and their employees was taken  away only when sub-section (1) and sub-section (2)(d) of section 70 were  amended by Act 2 of 2000 and the amendment received the assent of the  President on 18.3.2000 and was brought into effect on 20.6.2000.

(c)     The jurisdiction to decide any dispute of the nature mentioned in  section 70(2)(d) of the KCS Act, if it answered the definition of industrial  dispute, vested thus :   (i)     exclusively with Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals  till 20.1.1976;

(ii)    concurrently with Labour Courts/Industrial Tribunals  under ID Act and with Registrar under section 70 of the KCS  Act between 20.1.1976 and 20.6.2000; and  

(iii)   exclusively with the Registrar under section 70 of the  KCS Act with effect from 20.6.2000.  

23.     We therefore hold that the award of the Labour Court was not without  jurisdiction. We, however, make it clear that this decision shall not be  applied to re-open matters decided relying on Veerashiva Co-operative Bank  and Karnataka Sugar Workers Federation, which have attained finality.     

Re : Question (ii)

24.     As we have held that the Labour Court had jurisdiction, the next  question that arises for consideration is the validity of the award. As noticed  above, according to the appellant, the termination was with effect from  1.3.1980. The Labour Court found that the termination was in fact from  19.2.1978. The employee made an application under section 10(4A) of the  I.D. Act on 4.10.1988. But for the insertion of sub-section (4A) in section 10  of the ID Act on 7.4.1988, the appellant’s challenge would not have been  entertained at all as the claim had become stale on account of the same not  being agitated for more than 10 years. The Labour Court, however,  proceeded on the assumption that any claim application filed within six  months from the date when sub-section (4A) was introduced, is to be  considered as in time, irrespective the date of termination or cause of action.  Such assumption is erroneous and would lead to absurd results.  

25.     Section 10(4A), no doubt, applied to termination orders passed prior  to 7-4-1988. But the question is whether recourse to section 10(4A) can be  had in regard to any order of termination irrespective of when it was passed,  and without reference to any time limit. Section 10(4A) enables an  individual workman to challenge a termination order before the Labour

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Court, within "six months from the date of communication" of such order of  termination. Having thus fixed the time within which such application has to  be filed, the legislature added the words "or the date of commencement of  the Industrial Disputes (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 1987, whichever is  later". What is the Legislative intent behind the said addition? Is it intended  to provide a one time revival to all claims, including stale, dead, non- existing claims relating to orders of termination passed years or decades  ago? Or does it extend the time only to those who were entitled to seek the  benefit of Section 10(4A) as on 7-4-1988 on account of communication of  termination orders within six months before that date by giving them a  uniform time limit of six months from 7-4-1988, to approach the Labour  Court?  

26.     The Legislative intent should be ascertained by keeping in view the  position before the amendment, the nature of remedy provided, and the need  therefor. It is also necessary to keep in view the general principles relating to  limitation. Statutes relating to limitation are said to be retrospective in nature  in the sense that that apply to all proceedings brought after they come into  force, even for enforcing causes of action which had accrued prior to the  date when such statute came into force. But they are also prospective in the  sense that they do not have the effect of reviving a right of action which was  already barred on the date of its coming into operation. Therefore, where the  right to file an action had come to an end on expiry of period of limitation  prescribed under a law relating to limitation and thus becomes barred by  limitation, the right is not revived by a later limitation Act, even if it  provides a longer period of limitation. Let us illustrate with reference to an  action for which the period of limitation was one year under the Limitation  Act, 1908 and three years under the new Limitation Act, 1963 which come  into force on 1.1.1964. The Limitation Act, 1963 will apply to all suits filed  after 1.1.1964, though the cause of action might have accrued before that  date. But if cause action had accrued on 1.1.1962, and therefore, the right to  file a suit came to an end on 1.1.1963 under the old Act, a suit cannot  obviously filed on 1.4.1964, on the ground that the suit is within time as per  the new law of limitation. In other words, any law relating to limitation,  though will apply to cause of actions accruing earlier, will apply only if the  cause of action was ’live’ as on the date when the new Act came into force  and not to claims which were ’dead’ or unenforceable when the new law  came into force. This general Rule is however subject to any express  statutory provisions to the contrary.  

27.     This Court while dealing with Section 10(1)(c) and (d) of the ID Act,  has repeatedly held that though the Act does not provide a period of  limitation for raising a dispute under Section 10(1)(c) or (d), if on account of  delay, a dispute has become stale or ceases to exist, the reference should be  rejected. It has also held that lapse of time results in losing the remedy and  the right as well. The delay would be fatal if it has resulted in material  evidence relevant to adjudication being lost or rendered unavailable [vide -  Nedungadi Bank Ltd vs. K. P. Madhavan kutty [2000(2)  SCC 455]; Balbir  Singh vs. Punjab Roadways [2001 (1) SCC 133]; Asst. Executive Engineer  vs Shivalinga [2002 (1) LLJ 457]; and S.M. Nilajkar vs. Telecom DT.  Manager [2003 (4) SCC 27] ]. When belated claims are considered as stale  and non-existing for the purpose of refusing or rejecting a reference under  Section 10(1)(c) or (d), in spite of no period of limitation being prescribed, it  will be illogical to hold that the amendment to the Act inserting section  10(4A) prescribing a time limit of six months, should be interpreted as  reviving all stale and dead claims.  

28.     The object of Section 10(4A) is to enable workmen to apply directly  to the Labour Court for adjudication of disputes relating to termination,  without going through the laborious process of seeking a reference under  section 10(1) of ID Act. The Legislative intent was not to revive stale or  non-existing claims. Section 10(4A) clearly requires that a workman who  wants to directly approach the Labour Court, should do so within six months  from the date of communication of the order. Then come the words "or the  date of commencement of the Industrial Disputes (Karnataka Amendment)

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Act, 1987, whichever is later". The reason for these words is obvious. In  cases where the cause of action arose prior to 7.4.1988, some additional time  had to be provided to make the provisions effective. Let us take the example  of a workman who had received the termination order on 10-10-1987. If  section 10(4A), which come into effect on 7.4.1988,  had merely stated that  the application had to be filed within six months from the date of  communication, he had to file the application before 10-4-1988, that is  hardly three days from the date when the amendment came into effect. The  Legislature thought that workmen should be given some reasonable time to  know about the new provision and take steps to approach the Labour Court.  Therefore, all workmen who were communicated orders of termination  within six months prior to 7-4-1988 were given the benefit of uniform six  months time from 7-4-1988, irrespective of the date of expiry of six months.  When a new remedy or relief is provided by a statute, such a transitional  provision is made to ensure that persons who are given a special right, do not  lose it for want of adequate time to enforce it, though they have a cause of  action or right as on the date when the new remedy or relief comes into  effect.  

29.     Section 10(4A) does not therefore revive non-existing or stale or dead  claims but only ensures that claims which were live, by applying the six  month rule in Section 10(4A) as on the date when the Section came into  effect, have a minimum of six months time to approach the Labour Court.  That is ensured by adding the words "or the date of commencement of the  Industrial Disputes (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 1987, which is later" to the  words "within six months from, the date of communication to him of the  order of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination." In other words  all those who were communicated orders of termination during a period of  six months prior to 7-4-1988 were deemed to have been communicated such  orders of termination as on 7-4-1988 for the purpose of seeking remedy.  Therefore, the words "within six months from the date of commencement of  the Industrial Disputes (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 1987, whichever is  later" only enables those who had been communicated order of termination  within six months prior to 7-4-1988, to apply under Section 10(4A).

30.     Section 10(4A) provides an alternative procedure to seek redressal in  regard to an order of termination, by making an application directly to the  Labour Court, within six months from the date of communication of the  order of termination, without the intervention or assistance of an employees  union and without having to approach the appropriate Government for  making a reference. Such a provision cannot be interpreted as reviving stale  and dead claims nor as enabling a workman to seek remedy beyond six  months from the date of communication, except to the extent expressly  provided for. The true and proper interpretation of Section 10(4A) is that an  individual workman can apply to the Labour Court for adjudication of the  dispute relating to an order of discharge/dismissal/retrenchment/termination  within six months from the date of communication to him, of such order of  termination. Where such remedy becomes available to a workman as on 7-4- 1988 on account of his having received the communication of termination  order within six months prior to 7-4-1988, then the six months period stands  extended upto 7-10-1988. To summarize : (i)     In regard to termination orders communication on or after 7-4- 1988, the outer limit for making an application under Section  10(4A) is six months from the date of communication of the order.     

(ii)    In regard to termination orders communicated during a period of  six months prior to 7-4-1988, the period of limitation would be up  to 7-10-1988 even though the six months period from the date of  communication may actually expire between 7-4-1988 to 7-10- 1988.

(iii)   In regard to termination orders communicated prior to 7-10-1987,  no claim application under Section 10(4A), could be filed, as there  is no provision for such applications. The remedy under section  10(1) (c) and (d) will continue to be available, subject, however, to

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the rule that stale and dead claims will not be referred.

The intent of Section 10(4A) is to give a right to the aggrieved workman to  challenge the termination order within six months from the date of accrual of  cause of action and not to furnish an one time revival in regard to stale and  non-existing claims. Therefore, a claim application of the petitioner filed on  4.10.1988 in regard to alleged termination on 1.3.1980 (or 19.2.1978 as  found by the Labour Court) was not maintainable under Section 10(4A) of  ID Act and could not have been entertained by the Labour Court.

31.     We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the final order in the  judgment of the High Court setting aside the award, though for different  reasons.  The appellant is not entitled to any relief.  The appeal is, therefore,  dismissed. Parties bear respective costs.