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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  5162 of 2006

PETITIONER: DHARAMPAL ARORA

RESPONDENT: PUNJAB STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD & ANR

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 22/11/2006

BENCH: Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN& TARUN CHATTERJEE

JUDGMENT:

J U D G M E N T (@ SLP(C) No.21904 OF 2004)

Dr. AR. Lakshmanan, J.         Leave granted.         This appeal is directed against the final order of the High  Court of Punjab and Haryana dated 13.2.2004 passed in  Regular Second Appeal No.2332 of 1987.  The appellant  was working as an Assistant Revenue Accountant with the  Punjab State Electricity Board.  He was suspended vide  order dated 26.8.1974.  He was charge-sheeted vide Memo  dated 24.9.1974.  Thereupon, he was reinstated in service  vide order dated 25.8.1975.  The appellant was due to  cross the efficiency bar w.e.f. 4.10.1974 but he was allowed  to cross efficiency bar w.e.f. 1.4.1976 vide order dated  10.10.1980 passed by the respondent-Board.   The period  from 4.9.1974 to 30.9.1975 was treated as a non-duty  period.  An inquiry was held and an order was passed on  16.3.1984 whereby one annual grade increment of the  appellant was stopped with future effect.  The appellant  filed a Civil Suit in the court of Senior Sub Judge, Patiala  on 28.4.1984.  The suit was filed for declaration and other  incidental reliefs.  The learned Trial Judge by judgment  dated 12.3.1985 dismissed the suit filed by the appellant- plaintiff.  Against the judgment and decree of the Trial  Court, the appellant filed the first appeal before the  Additional District Judge.  Before the Additional District  Judge, the appellant had specifically argued that the claim  of the appellant was that he was deemed to have crossed  the efficiency bar w.e.f. 4.10.1974 and that he was entitled  to full pay and allowances for the suspension period from  4.9.1974 to 30.9.1975.  A further submission was made  that the order dated 16.3.1984 was illegal because not only  that the order was not speaking order but also that no  show cause notice was served upon the appellant by the  punishing authority after the report of the Inquiry Officer  was submitted and further that the copy of the report of the  Inquiry Officer was also not supplied to the appellant.   The  Additional District Judge categorically gave a finding that:- "So  far as the copy of the inquiry report  and the show cause notice is concerned,  admittedly no copy of the report of the  Inquiry Officer was supplied to the plaintiff  after the inquiry report was submitted by  the Inquiry Officer nor any show cause  notice was given to the plaintiff by the

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Punishing Authority prior to passing the  impugned order dated 16.3.1984."

       Despite the said finding, the First Appellate Court held  that it was not essential for the Punishing Authority to  supply the copy of the report of the Inquiry Officer to the  appellant-plaintiff or to give him show cause notice prior to  the passing of the impugned order.  The Court also held the  view that the report of the inquiry is to be furnished to the  employees and show cause notice required to be given only  in the case of major punishment.  According to the First  Appellate Court, since only minor punishment was  imposed, there was no need of furnishing the copy of the  inquiry report or to give a show cause notice to him before  imposing the punishment against the appellant.  In the  result, the first appeal was dismissed by the Additional  District Judge.  Against the order of the Additional District  Judge, the appellant filed Regular Second Appeal before  the High Court, which was dismissed by the High Court in  limine at the admission stage.  Against the order of the High  Court, the appellant filed special leave petition no.2288/88,  in which leave was granted by this Court and the special  leave petition was registered as Civil Appeal no.2549/88.    This Court, while disposing the appeal, passed the following  order:         "The  appeal is directed against the order  dated 28th November, 1987 of the Punjab and  Haryana High Court summarily dismissing the  Second Appeal of the appellate herein.         In view of our decision in Kulwant Singh  Gill vs. State of Punjab (1991(Suppl)(1) SCC  5043), an order withholding increments with  permanent effect is a major punishment.  In  these circumstances it appears to us that the  order of summary dismissal was not justified and  the case ought to have been disposed of on  merits after giving reasons as the learned District  Judge, in his judgment, which was  unsuccessfully challenged before the High Court,  took the view that the punishment in question,  which was of stopping increments with  permanent effect, was a minor punishment and  that view is incorrect.         In view of our decision referred to above,  we set aside the impugned order and remand the  case to the High Court for disposal according to  law after giving reasons.  We have not   considered the rest of the contentions of the  parties and these may be urged before the High  Court.         The appeal is disposed of with no order as  to costs."

       After the remand, the matter came up for consideration  before the High Court for final hearing.  The High Court  formulated following two substantial questions of law: "(a)    Firstly, that stoppage of annual grade  increment with future effect is a major  punishment and as such proper procedure  prescribed under Regulation 8 of 1971  Regulations ought to have been followed and  since there was violation of the said  Regulation, order dated 16.3.1984 imposing  penalty is illegal and unsustainable.  The  counsel relied upon a judgment in Kulwant

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Singh Gill versus The State of Punjab  (Judgment   Today  1990 (4)  SC  70  ) for      a proposition that stoppage of annual grade  increment with cumulative effect is a major  punishment. (b)     Secondly, it was submitted by the  learned counsel for the appellant that order  dated 10.10.1980 (Exhibit P-10) vide which  the appellant had been allowed to cross  Efficiency Bar with effect from 1.4.1976  instead of 4.10.1974 is legally unsustainable  and the appellant was entitled to cross the  Efficiency Bar with effect from 4.10.1974."

       After hearing the arguments of the counsel appearing for  the respective parties, the High Court observed on question  of law no.1 as under: "It  needs to be noticed that sub rules (iv), (v)  of Rule 5 and Rules 8 and 9 of 1970 Rules  are in pari materia with provisions contained  in 1971 Regulations.  The judgment of the  Division Bench in Sarwan Singh  vs. State of  Punjab& Ors. (ILR 1985 (2) P & H 193) was  overruled by the Supreme Court in Kulwant  Singh Gill’s case (supra).  Learned counsel for  the respondent-Board also could not submit  gainful argument to successfully refute the  contention of the counsel for the appellant.   The findings of the courts below on issue  no.1 are thus reversed and it is held that  stoppage of annual grade increment with  cumulative effect is a major punishment and  the same, in the present case, having been  inflicted without holding a regular inquiry in  terms of Regulation 8 of 1971 Regulations  cannot legally be sustained.  The suit of the  plaintiff-appellant is decreed to this extent."

       So far as the second question of law is concerned, the High  Court held that the appellant has not filed the suit seeking  declaration to the effect that order dated 10.10.1980 is null  and void and, therefore, the said relief cannot be granted to  him unless the order dated 10.10.1980 is set aside.  Since  the said order was not assailed by the appellant-plaintiff  and the suit having been filed on 4.5.1984 i.e. after more  than three years of the passing of the order Exhibit P-1, the  High Court held that that the suit was clearly time barred.   The High Court has further observed that even if viewed  from any angle, the appellant-plaintiff could not be granted  any relief in this behalf, and rejected the contention of the  appellant on this point.  Resultantly, the Second Appeal  was partly allowed and the judgment and decree passed by  the courts below were set aside to the extent indicated  above and the suit of the appellant stood decreed for  declaration to the effect that the order no.222/CAO dated  16.3.1984 stopping his one annual grade increment with  future effect was declared to be illegal and void.   

       Aggrieved against the judgment passed by the High Court,  the plaintiff preferred the above Civil Appeal in this Court.   We heard Mr. R.K. Kapoor, learned counsel for the  appellant and Mr. H.M. Singh, learned counsel for the  respondents.  Both the learned counsel drew our attention  to the findings rendered by the courts below and also the  documents.  We have also carefully perused the judgment

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passed by the High Court.  As already noticed above, the  High Court on issue no.1 has categorically held that the  stoppage of annual grade increment with cumulative effect  is a major punishment and the same in the present case  having inflicted without holding a regular inquiry in terms  of Regulation 8 of 1971 Regulations, the said departmental  proceedings cannot be legally sustained.  By holding so, the  High Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff to the said  extent.         When a particular inquiry is held against the appellant  with respect to a given set of allegations and the final order  of punishment is imposed by order dated 16.03.1984 and  when the said final order dated 16.03.1984 was set aside,  the appellant was entitled for all the consequential  benefits.  In the instant case, the appellant had specifically  challenged the final order of punishment dated 16.03.1984  and also the action of the respondent-authorities in  denying the claim of crossing the Efficiency Bar w.e.f.  4.10.1974 instead of 1.04.1976 and the said action was  specifically challenged then merely because the order of  the said action dated 10.10.1980 was not mentioned or  challenged does not mean that the appellant could be  denied the relief of crossing the Efficiency Bar w.e.f.  4.10.1974.  In our view, the appellant could not be refused  the substantial relief merely on technicalities when the  specific claim and relief was claimed in the suit though the  date of the order was not mentioned.  Therefore, the claim  of the appellant could not be said to be time-barred  particularly when the order denying the benefit of crossing  the Efficiency Bar w.e.f. 4.10.1974 was passed by  considering the suspension period as non-duty period.                   It would be relevant to reproduce here the order dated  10.10.1980 whereby the appellant was denied the benefit  of crossing the Efficiency Bar w.e.f. 04.10.1974 and was  allowed to cross the Efficiency Bar only w.e.f. 01.04.1976.  "Punjab State Electricity Board  

Office Order No.419/EA-3187       Dated  10/10/80

Sh. Dharam Paul Arora Assistant Revenue  Accountant (now posted against the post of Head  Office Assistant) in the pay scale of Rs. 160-10- 250/15-400 is hereby allowed to cross Efficiency  Bar with effect from 1.4.76 raising his pay from  Rs.250/- P.M. to 265/- P.M. instead of 4.10.74 by  considering his suspension period as ’non-duty  period’ with effect from 4.9.74 to 30.9.75 and his  record being unsatisfactory.  

2.      This issues with the approval of Chief  Accounts Officer, PSEB, Patiala.           

                                               Sd/-                         Sr. Accounts Officer/Estt  A/c,                         For Chief Accounts Officer,  PSEB,                          Patiala."         From the above, it is clear that it was continuation of the  same charges that the appellant was denied the benefit of  crossing the Efficiency Bar from the date he was entitled to.   It would be relevant to mention here that the appellant was

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served with the charge sheet by department on 24.09.1974  and it was the same charge sheet which ultimately led to  the infliction of the final penalty against the appellant by  order dated 16.03.1984.          Therefore, once the final order goes, all the orders from the  date of charge sheet upto the date of the passing of the  final order become a nullity and redundant.  

       Since the final order dated 16.3.1984 itself was set aside  by the High Court, we need not go into any other question  raised in this appeal or considered by the High Court,  which in our opinion is wholly unnecessary in the facts and  circumstances of the case.   

       We, therefore, hold that the appellant will be entitled to all  the monetary benefits for the period from 4.10.1974 to  30.9.1975 along with crossing of efficiency bar w.e.f.  4.10.1974 instead of 1.4.1976.  The Civil Appeal stands  allowed to the extent indicated above.  No costs.