REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.987 OF 2002

Dhanapal    .. Appellant

Versus

State by Public Prosecutor, Madras  .. Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dalveer Bhandari, J.

1. This  appeal  has  been  filed  under  Section  2(a)  of  the  

Supreme  Court  (Enlargement  of  Criminal  Appellate  

Jurisdiction) Act, 1970 against the judgment and order dated  

11.6.2002 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras  

in Criminal Appeal No. 217 of 1993.

2. Brief facts which are necessary to dispose of this appeal  

are recapitulated as under:

The appellant herein along with the other accused were  

acquitted by the Sessions Judge, Thanjavur in Sessions Case  

No. 36 of 1989 of offences punishable under sections 307 and  

302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short  

‘IPC’).

3. The High Court in the impugned judgment set aside the  

acquittal  recorded  by  the  Sessions  Judge  and  allowed  the  

appeal filed by the State.  The High Court held accused nos.1,  

2  and 4 guilty  for  an offence punishable  under  section 302  

read  with  section  34  IPC  and  imposed  sentence  of  life  

imprisonment  and  held  accused  no.3  guilty  for  the  offence  

punishable under section 307 IPC and imposed sentence of five  

years.  It may be pertinent to mention that accused respondent  

Nos.2 to 4 died during the pendency of appeal before the High  

Court. The only surviving appellant herein (who was accused  

no.1  before  the  High  Court)  has  filed  the  present  appeal  

against the impugned judgment and order of the High Court.

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4. The motive for the occurrence as per the prosecution is  

that  P.W.1’s  sister  was  living  with  the  appellant  and  

subsequently  died six  months prior  to the occurrence.   The  

other women folk of the house abused the appellant and his  

relatives.   The  appellant  told  the  same to  Sebastiraj  P.W.1.  

P.W.1 consoled him stating that they were abusing him only  

because of frustration and everything would be alright after a  

lapse of time.

5. The  appellant  and  other  accused  and  the  deceased  

belonged to the Burma colony, Thanjavur.   Sebastiraj  P.W.1  

and Karunanidhi P.W.2 were friends of deceased Jambu.  On  

8.5.1988  at  about  12.00  noon  when  P.W.2  was  talking  to  

Jambu near the railway gate, Sebastiraj P.W.1 invited Jambu  

to  go  to  Sebastiar  temple.   Jambu  requested  Karunanidhi  

P.W.2 to accompany him.  All of them went to the temple and  

came out at 2.00 p.m. after worshipping and taking food from  

the temple.  Outside the gate, they saw the appellant Dhanapal  

and other accused.  Dhanapal shouted, Sebastiraj has come,  

cut  (kill)  him.   The crowd before the temple dispersed and  

people started running.  Accused no.3 Loganathan threw an  

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aruval on Sebastiraj P.W.1 After receiving the injury, Sebastiraj  

P.W.1 managed to  run.   Then accused no.2 Sekar  gave cut  

injury  to Jambu on his  head and back.   Dhanapal  stabbed  

Jambu on his chest.  Accused no.4 Somu stabbed Jambu on  

his  back.   Thereafter,  all  the  accused  ran  away  with  their  

weapons.  The deceased was attacked near the house of one  

Subramania Thevar by the side of a light post in 19th Street,  

Burma Colony.  Selvaraj P.W.3 at about 2.00 pm on 8.5.1988  

saw the deceased lying dead at the scene of crime.

6. Sebastiraj P.W.1 who ran away after receiving injury at  

the  hands  of  accused  no.3  went  to  Thanjavur  South  Police  

Station and gave Ex.P2 report at about 4.00 p.m. on 8.5.1988  

and the same was received by P.W.4 the then Sub Inspector of  

Police who registered a case in Cr. No.311/88 for the offences  

punishable  under  sections  302  and  307  IPC  and  prepared  

Ex.P3 printed First Information Report and sent the same to  

the Court.

7. Inspector of Police P.W.10 took up investigation, went to  

the scene of crime at about 6.30 p.m. and on account of lack of  

sufficient  light,  he  did  not  hold  the  inquest,  but  went  and  

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searched  for  the  accused  after  posting  two  constables  to  

protect the body of the deceased.  He also stayed there and on  

9.5.1988 at about 6.00 a.m., in the presence of panchayatdars,  

he started inquest and completed by 8.00 a.m. and prepared  

Ex.P.16 inquest report.  He examined P.Ws. 1 to 3 and others.  

He  also  prepared  Ex.P4  Observation  Mahazar  and  drew  a  

rough sketch Ex.P17.   He  seized  material  objects  (for  short  

‘M.O.’)  including  M.O.1  blood  stained  earth;  M.O.2  sample  

earth and M.O.3 shirt of the deceased under Ex.P5 Mahazar.  

At about 3.00 p.m. on that day he went to the house of the  

deceased  and  when  he  was  searching  for  the  accused,  he  

noticed M.Os. 4, 5, 6 and 7 weapons in the backyard of the  

third accused and seized them under Ex.P6 Mahazar.  After  

inquest, he forwarded the body for autopsy.

8. Dr.  Vijayalakshmi  P.W.8  Tutor  in  Forensic  Medicines,  

Government Medical  College, Thanjavur received the body of  

the deceased at about 10 a.m. on 9.5.1988 and commenced  

the postmortem.  She found 21 injuries and according to her  

the cause of death was due to hemorrhage and shock due to  

injuries received.

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9. The  appellant  herein  surrendered  before  the  Judicial  

Magistrate,  Thiruvaiyaru  on  17.5.1988.   The  Investigating  

Officer  P.W.10  after  investigation  gave  the  final  report  

implicating the appellant.

10. After  the  evidence  of  prosecution  was  over,  the  Trial  

Judge questioned the accused under section 313 Cr.P.C. with  

reference  to  the  incriminating  circumstances  appearing  in  

evidence  against  them  and  they  denied  the  offence.   The  

learned  Sessions  Judge,  considering  the  evidence  recorded  

both oral and documentary, chose to acquit the accused.

11. The  High  Court  on  re-appreciation  of  the  evidence  

convicted the appellant and other accused.  According to the  

High  Court,  the  learned  Sessions  Judge  has  not  properly  

marshaled and evaluated the evidence on record.

12. The  relevant  findings  of  the  High  Court  would  be  

discussed in the later part of the judgment to avoid repetition,  

therefore, we do not deem it appropriate to reproduce the same  

at this juncture.

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13. Brief analysis of the important evidence is as under:

(i) P.W.1, who is considered to be an eye witness  

and also  lodged the  first  information report,  

has turned hostile.

(ii)     P.W.2 has deposed that accused no.2 Sekar  

instigated  the  other  accused  to  cut  (kill)  

Jambu with an aruval on his head and back.  

Accused no.1 Dhanpal  (appellant)  repeatedly  

stabbed Jambu on his chest.  Accused no. 4  

Somu also stabbed Jambu on his back with  

‘sulukki’.   

14. The  finding  of  the  learned  Sessions  Judge  is  that  the  

evidence  of  P.W.2  has  not  been  corroborated  by  any  other  

acceptable evidence.    The trial court also rejected the evidence  

of  P.W.3,  another eye witness.   According to the trial  court,  

even the medical evidence does not help the prosecution case.  

15. According  to  P.W.2,  the  occurrence  took  place  after  

deceased  and  the  witnesses  came  to  the  temple  and  after  

worshipping and taking food they came out at 2.00 p.m.  The  

stomach  of  the  deceased  must,  therefore,  contain  food  

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particles.   Whereas, according to the doctor,  who conducted  

the autopsy over the dead body of the deceased, found that the  

stomach was empty.  This casts serious doubt on the veracity  

of  the testimony of  P.W.2.   The trial  court  also rejected the  

testimony of another eye witness P.W.3.    

16. P.W.10, Inspector of Police, took up the investigation and  

went to the scene of occurrence at 6.30 p.m. and on account of  

lack of sufficient light, he did not hold the inquest, but went  

and searched for the accused after posting two constables to  

guard the body of the deceased.

17. The  trial  court  was  of  the  opinion  that  the  medical  

evidence also does not support the prosecution case. The trial  

court was of the view that on such quality of evidence it would  

not be safe to record the conviction and acquitted the accused.

18. The High Court, in the impugned judgment, has given an  

entirely  new  dimension  to  the  testimony  of  P.W.2  and  

discarded  the  version  of  the  trial  court  by  observing  that,  

“according to P.W.2, about 12.00 noon, they (deceased and his  

friends) went to the temple and then came out at about 2.00  

p.m. in the meantime, there is no evidence pertaining to the  

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time when they had eaten the food.  Though according to him,  

they came out at 2.00 p.m., he only says that after some time  

when  they  were  standing  outside  there  was  a  noise  and  

accused no. 1 instigated other accused to cut (kill) Sebastiraj  

P.W.1.   The sense of time may vary from person to person  

unless one was able to look at the wrist watch at a given time.”  

19. The important findings of the High Court are set out as  

under:-

I, Merely because P.W.1 turned hostile, it cannot  

be  said  that  the  accused  who  attempted  to  

commit  the  murder  of  P.W.1  should  be  

acquitted.  

II. There is no specific evidence that the deceased  

took any food.  When the friends have gone to  

the temple and at temple, some Prasatham or  

food  is  provided,  unless  there  is  a  specific  

evidence  that  the  deceased  took  a  particular  

type of food or a particular quantity, it cannot  

be said that the deceased ought to have taken  

food.    

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III. This is not a case where death occurred during  

night  time or  the  dead body was  found long  

after the commission of the crime so that the  

courts  have  to  depend  upon  the  medical  

evidence to fix the time of death.

20. There are conflicting judgments of the trial court and the  

High  Court,  therefore,  we  have  carefully  gone  through  the  

entire evidence  de novo.   The High Court,  in our considered  

view,  could  not  have  shifted  the  burden  of  proof  on  the  

accused.   According  to  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  

Evidence Act, it is for the prosecution to have proved its own  

case.   

21. The  High  Court  was  not  justified  in  weaving  out  a  

different and new prosecution version.  The Court is under the  

bounden duty and obligation to deal with the evidence as it is.  

No improvement or rewriting of evidence is permissible.   In the  

instant case, P.W.1 had turned hostile and P.W.3 also did not  

support the prosecution case.  The testimony of P.W.2 is also  

not wholly reliable.   

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22. On proper evaluation of the trial court judgment, we hold  

that the view taken by the trial court was certainly a possible  

or a plausible view.  It is a well settled legal position that when  

the view which has been taken by the trial court is a possible  

view,  then  the  acquittal  cannot  be  set  aside  by  merely  

substituting its reasons by the High Court.  In our considered  

view, the impugned judgment of the High Court is contrary to  

the settled legal position and deserves to be set aside.

23. The  earliest  case  which  dealt  with  the  controversy  in  

issue at length is of Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor AIR 1934  

Privy  Council  227.   In  this  case,  the  ambit,  scope  and  the  

powers of the appellate court in dealing with an appeal against  

acquittal  have been comprehensively dealt  with by the Privy  

Council.  Lord Russell writing the judgment has observed as  

under: (at p. 230):

“..the High Court should and will always give  proper weight and consideration to such matters  as  (1)  the  views  of  the  trial  Judge  as  to  the  credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of  innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption  certainly  not  weakened  by  the  fact  that  he  has  been  acquitted  at  his  trial,  (3)  the  right  of  the  accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the  slowness  of  an  appellate  court  in  disturbing  a  finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the  advantage of seeing the witnesses..”

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 The  law  succinctly  crystallized  in  this  case  has  been  

consistently followed in subsequent judgments by this Court.   

24. This Court in the case of  Surajpal Singh & Others  v.  

State,  AIR 1952 SC 52, has spelt out the powers of the High  

Court.  This Court has also reminded the High Courts to follow  

well  established  norms  while  dealing  with  appeals  from  

acquittal by the trial court.  The Court observed as under:

“It is well established that in an appeal under  S. 417 Criminal P.C., the High Court has full power  to  review  the  evidence  upon  which  the  order  of  acquittal was founded, but it is equally well-settled  that the presumption of innocence of the accused  was further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial  court, and the findings of the trial court which had  the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing  their  evidence  can  be  reversed  only  for  very  substantial and compelling reasons.”

25. This  Court  reiterated  the  principles  and  observed  that  

presumption of innocence of accused is reinforced by an order  

of the acquittal.  The appellate court could have interfered only  

for very substantial and compelling reasons.

26. In  Tulsiram Kanu  v.  The State,  AIR 1954 SC 1,  this  

Court explicated that the appellate court would be justified in  

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reversing  the  acquittal  only  when  very  substantial  question  

and compelling reasons are present.  In this case, the Court  

used  a  different  phrase  to  describe  the  approach  of  an  

appellate  court  against  an  order  of  acquittal.   There,  the  

Sessions  Court  expressed  that  there  was  clearly  reasonable  

doubt in respect of the guilt of the accused on the evidence put  

before  it.  Kania,  C.J.,  observed  that  it  required  good  and  

sufficiently cogent reasons to overcome such reasonable doubt  

before the appellate court came to a different conclusion.  

27. The same principle has been followed in Atley v. State of  

U.P.  AIR 1955 SC 807 (at  pp.  809-10 para 5),  wherein the  

Court said:

“It has been laid down by this Court that it is  open to the  High Court  on an appeal  against  an  order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and  to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in  view the well established rule that the presumption  of  innocence of  the accused is  not weakened but  strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed  by  the  trial  court  which  had  the  advantage  of  observing  the  demeanour  of  witnesses  whose  evidence have been recorded in its presence.

It is also well settled that the court of appeal  has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in  an appeal  against an order of acquittal  as in the  case of  an appeal  against an order of  conviction,  

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subject  to  the  riders  that  the  presumption  of  innocence with which the accused person starts in  the trial court continues even up to the appellate  stage  and that  the  appellate  court  should attach  due weight to the opinion of the trial court which  recorded the order of acquittal.”

28. In  Balbir Singh  v.  State of Punjab  AIR 1957 SC 216,  

this  Court  again  had  an  occasion  to  examine  the  same  

proposition of law.  The Court (at page 222) observed as under:

“It  is  now well  settled that though the High  Court has full  power to review the evidence upon  which an order of acquittal is founded, it is equally  well  settled that the presumption of  innocence of  the  accused  person  is  further  reinforced  by  his  acquittal  by  the  trial  Court  and the views of  the  trial  Judge  as  to  the  credibility  of  the  witnesses  must  be  given  proper  weight  and  consideration;  and  the  slowness  of  an  appellate  Court  in  disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge  who  had  the  advantage  of  seeing  the  witnesses  must  also  be  kept  in  mind,  and  there  must  be  substantial  and  compelling  reasons  for  the  appellate Court  to come to a conclusion different  from that of the trial Judge.”  

29. A Constitution Bench of this Court in  M.G. Agarwal  v.  

State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 200, observed as under:  

“There is no doubt that the power conferred  by clause (a) which deals with an appeal against an  order of acquittal is as wide as the power conferred  by clause (b) which deals with an appeal against an  order of conviction, and so, it is obvious that the  High  Court's  powers  in  dealing  with  criminal  

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appeals  are  equally  wide  whether  the  appeal  in  question  is  one  against  acquittal  or  against  conviction. That is one aspect of the question. The  other  aspect  of  the  question  centres  round  the  approach which the High Court adopts in dealing  with appeals against orders of acquittal. In dealing  with such appeals, the High Court naturally bears  in mind the presumption of innocence in favour of  an accused person and cannot lose sight of the fact  that the said presumption is strengthened by the  order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial  Court and so, the fact that the accused person is  entitled for the benefit  of  a reasonable doubt will  always be present in the mind of the High Court  when it  deals  with the merits of  the case.  As an  appellate Court the High Court is generally slow in  disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial  Court, particularly when the said finding is based  on  an  appreciation  of  oral  evidence  because  the  trial  Court  has  the  advantage  of  watching  the  demeanour  of  the  witnesses  who  have  given  evidence.  Thus,  though  the  powers  of  the  High  Court in dealing with an appeal  against acquittal  are as wide as those which it has in dealing with an  appeal  against  conviction,  in  dealing  with  the  former class of appeals, its approach is governed by  the  overriding  consideration  flowing  from  the  presumption of innocence...  

The  test  suggested  by  the  expression  "substantial and compelling reasons" should not be  construed  as  a  formula  which  has  to  be  rigidly  applied in every case, and so, it  is not necessary  that before reversing a judgment of acquittal,  the  High  Court  must  necessarily  characterize  the  findings recorded therein as perverse.

The question which the Supreme Court has to  ask itself, in appeals against conviction by the High  Court in such a case, is whether on the material  produced by the prosecution, the High Court was  

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justified  in  reaching  the  conclusion  that  the  prosecution case against the appellants had been  proved  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  and that  the  contrary  view  taken  by  the  trial  Court  was  erroneous.   In  answering  this  question,  the  Supreme  Court  would,  no  doubt,  consider  the  salient and broad features of the evidence in order  to appreciate the grievance made by the appellants  against the conclusions of the High Court.”

30. In Khedu Mohton & Others v. State of Bihar, (1970) 2  

SCC 450, this Court gave the appellate court broad guidelines  

as to when it could properly disturb an acquittal.  The Court  

observed as under:

“3. It is true that the powers of the High Court in  considering  the  evidence  on  record  in  appeals  under Section 417, Cr. P.C. are as extensive as its  powers  in  appeals  against  convictions  but  that  court  at  the  same time should bear  in  mind the  presumption  of-innocence  of  accused  persons  which  presumption  is  not  weakened  by  their  acquittal.  It  must also bear in mind the fact that  the  appellate  judge  had  found  them  not  guilty.  Unless  the  conclusions  reached  by  him  are  palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the  law or that his decision is likely to result in grave  injustice,  the  High  Court  should  be  reluctant  to  interfere  with  his  conclusions.  If  two  reasonable  conclusions  can  be  reached  on  the  basis  of  the  evidence on record then the view in support of the  acquittal  of the accused should be preferred. The  fact  that  the  High  Court  is  inclined  to  take  a  different  view  of  the  evidence  on  record  is  not  sufficient to interfere with the order of acquittal.”

(emphasis supplied)

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31. In  Bishan  Singh  &  Others  v.  The  State  of  Punjab  

(1974)  3  SCC  288,  Justice  Khanna  speaking  for  the  Court  

provided the legal position:

“22. It is well settled that the High Court in appeal  under Section 417 of  the CrPC has full  power to  review at large the evidence on which the order of  acquittal was founded and to reach the conclusion  that  upon  the  evidence  the  order  of  acquittal  should be reversed. No limitation should be placed  upon  that  power  unless  is  be  found  expressly  stated be in the Code, but in exercising the power  conferred  by  the  Code  and  before  reaching  its  conclusion upon fact  the  High Court  should give  proper weight and consideration to such matters as  (1) the views of the trial judge as to the credibility of  the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in  favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not  weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at  his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit  of  any doubt;  & (4)  the slowness  of  an appellate  court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a  judge  who  had  the  advantage  of  seeing  the  witnesses.”

32. In  K. Gopal Reddy  v.  State of A.P.  (1979) 1 SCC 355,  

the Court observed thus:

“9. …..It stems out of the fundamental principle of  our  criminal  jurisprudence  that  the  accused  is  entitled to the benefit  of  any reasonable doubt.  If  two reasonably probable and evenly balanced views  of the evidence are possible, one must necessarily  concede the existence of a reasonable doubt. But,  fanciful and remote possibilities must be left out of  account. To entitle an accused person to the benefit  

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of a doubt arising from the possibility of a duality of  views,  the possible  view in favour of  the accused  must  be  as  nearly  reasonably  probable  as  that  against him. If the preponderance of probability is  all one way, a bare possibility of another view will  not entitle the accused to claim the benefit of any  doubt. It is, therefore, essential that any view of the  evidence  in  favour  of  the  accused  must  be  reasonable even as any doubt, the benefit of which  an accused person may claim, must be reasonable.  "A reasonable doubt", it has been remarked, "does  not mean some light, airy, insubstantial doubt that  may  flit  through  the  minds  of  any  of  us  about  almost anything at some time or other, it does not  mean  a  doubt  begotten  by  sympathy  out  of  reluctance  to  convict;  it  means  a  real  doubt,  a  doubt  founded  upon reasons.  [Salmond  J.  in  his  charge to the jury in R. v. Fantle reported in 1959  Criminal Law Review 584.]"             

{emphasis supplied}

33. In  Tota Singh & Another  v.  State of Punjab  (1987) 2  

SCC  529,  the  Court  reiterated  the  same  principle  in  the  

following words:

“This  Court  has  repeatedly  pointed  out  that  the mere fact that the appellate court is inclined on  a  re-appreciation  of  the  evidence  to  reach  a  conclusion  which  is  at  variance  with  the  one  recorded  in  the  order  of  acquittal  passed  by  the  court below will not constitute a valid and sufficient  ground  for  setting  aside  the  acquittal.  The  jurisdiction of the appellate court in dealing with an  appeal  against  an  order  of  acquittal  is  circumscribed by the limitation that no interference  is to be made with the order of acquittal unless the  approach  made  by  the  lower  court  to  the  consideration of the evidence in the case is vitiated  by  some  manifest  illegality  or  the  conclusion  

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recorded by the court below is such which could  not  have  been  possibly  arrived  at  by  any  court  acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore,  liable  to be characterised as perverse.  Where two  views are possible on an appraisal of the evidence  adduced in the case and the court below has taken  a view which is a plausible one, the appellate court  cannot legally interfere with an order of  acquittal  even if it is of the opinion that the view taken by the  court below on its consideration of the evidence is  erroneous.”

(emphasis supplied)

34. In  Sambasivan & Others  v.  State of Kerala  (1998) 5  

SCC 412, the Court observed thus:  

“7. The principles with regard to the scope of the  powers of the appellate court in an appeal against  acquittal,  are  well  settled.  The  powers  of  the  appellate court in an appeal against acquittal are  no less than in an appeal against conviction. But  where on the basis of evidence on record two views  are reasonably possible the appellate court cannot  substitute its view in the place of that of the trial  court.  It  is  only  when  the  approach  of  the  trial  court  in  acquitting  an  accused  is  found  to  be  clearly erroneous in its consideration of evidence on  record and in deducing conclusions therefrom that  the appellate court can interfere with the order of  acquittal.”

35. In Bhagwan Singh & Others v.  State of M.P. (2002) 4  

SCC 85, the Court repeated one of the fundamental principles  

of criminal jurisprudence that if two views are possible on the  

evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the  

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accused  and  the  other  to  his  innocence,  the  view  which  is  

favourable  to  the  accused  should  be  adopted.   The  Court  

observed as under:-

“7. ..The golden thread which runs through the  web of administration of justice in criminal case is  that  if  two  views  are  possible  on  the  evidence  adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the  accused and the other to his innocence, the view  which  is  favourable  to  the  accused  should  be  adopted. Such is not a jurisdiction limitation on the  appellate  court  but  a  Judge  made  guidelines  for  circumspection.  The  paramount  consideration  of  the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is  avoided….”  

36. In Harijana Thirupala & Others v. Public Prosecutor,  

High Court of A.P., Hyderabad (2002) 6 SCC 470, this Court  

again had an occasion to deal with the settled principles of law  

restated by several decisions of this Court.  Despite a number  

of  judgments,  High Courts  continue to  fail  to  keep them in  

mind before reaching a conclusion.  The Court observed thus:

“10. The principles to be kept in mind in our  system  of  administration  of  criminal  justice  are  stated  and  restated  in  several  decisions  of  this  Court.  Yet,  sometimes  High  Courts  fail  to  keep  them in mind before reaching a conclusion as to  the  guilt  or  otherwise  of  the  accused  in  a  given  case. The case on hand is one such case. Hence it  is  felt  necessary to remind about  the  well-settled  principles  again.  It  is  desirable  and  useful  to  remind  and  keep  in  mind  these  principles  in  deciding a case.

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11. In our administration of criminal  justice  an accused is presumed to be innocent unless such  a  presumption is  rebutted by  the  prosecution by  producing the evidence to show him to be guilty of  the offence with which he is charged. Further if two  views are possible on the evidence produced in the  case, one indicating to the guilt of the accused and  the other to his innocence, the view favourable to  the accused is to be accepted. In cases where the  court  entertains  reasonable  doubt  regarding  the  guilt  of  the  accused  the  benefit  of  such  doubt  should go in favour of  the  accused.  At  the  same  time, the court must not reject the evidence of the  prosecution  taking  it  as  false,  untrustworthy  or  unreliable  on fanciful  grounds or on the basis  of  conjectures  and  surmises.  The  case  of  the  prosecution  must  be  judged  as  a  whole  having  regard  to  the  totality  of  the  evidence.  In  appreciating the evidence the approach of the court  must  be  integrated  not  truncated  or  isolated.  In  other words, the impact of the evidence in totality  on  the  prosecution  case  or  innocence  of  the  accused has to be kept in mind in coming to the  conclusion  as  to  the  guilt  or  otherwise  of  the  accused. In reaching a conclusion about the guilt of  the accused, the court has to appreciate,  analyse  and  assess  the  evidence  placed  before  it  by  the  yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic value and the  animus  of  witnesses.  It  must  be  added  that  ultimately  and  finally  the  decision  in  every  case  depends upon the facts of each case.

12. Doubtless the High Court in appeal either  against  an  order  of  acquittal  or  conviction  as  a  court  of  first  appeal  has full  power to review the  evidence to reach its own independent conclusion.  However,  it  will  not  interfere  with  an  order  of  acquittal lightly or merely because one other view is  possible, because with the passing of an order of  acquittal presumption of innocence in favour of the  accused gets reinforced and strengthened. The High  

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Court would not be justified to interfere with the  order  of  acquittal  merely  because  it  feels  that  sitting as a trial court it would have proceeded to  record  a  conviction;  a  duty  is  cast  on  the  High  Court  while  reversing  an  order  of  acquittal  to  examine and discuss the reasons given by the trial  court  to  acquit  the  accused  and  then  to  dispel  those reasons. If the High Court fails to make such  an exercise the judgment will  suffer  from serious  infirmity.

13. It is unfortunate that by the impugned order,  the High Court has upset the well-reasoned order of  acquittal passed by the trial court. It appears to us  that the High Court while doing so, did not bear in  mind the well-settled principles stated above as to  what should be the approach in reversing an order  of acquittal and under that circumstances it should  be reversed.

(emphasis supplied)

37. In  State of Rajasthan v.  Raja Ram (2003) 8 SCC 180,  

this Court observed as under:

“15. …..  Generally, the order of acquittal shall not  be  interfered  with  because  the  presumption  of  innocence of the accused is further strengthened by  acquittal.  The  golden thread  which  runs  through  the  web  of  administration  of  justice  in  criminal  cases  is  that  if  two  views  are  possible  on  the  evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the  guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence,  the view which is favourable to the accused should  be  adopted.  …  The  principle  to  be  followed  by  appellate court considering the appeal against the  judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there  are  compelling  and substantial  reasons  for  doing  so.  If  the  impugned  judgment  is  clearly  

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unreasonable,  it  is  a  compelling  reason  for  interference.”  

38. In State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran & Another, (2007)  

3 SCC 755, this Court observed as under:

“16. ……  while  exercising  the  powers  in  appeal  against the order of acquittal  the court of appeal  would  not  ordinarily  interfere  with  the  order  of  acquittal unless the approach of the lower court is  vitiated  by  some  manifest  illegality  and  the  conclusion arrived  at  would not  be  arrived at  by  any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision  is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because  two views are possible, the court of appeal would  not take the view which would upset the judgment  delivered by the court below…..”

39. In Chandrappa & Others v. State of Karnataka (2007)  

4 SCC 415, this Court held:

“(1) An appellate  court has full  power to review,  reappreciate  and  reconsider  the  evidence  upon  which the order of acquittal is founded.

(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no  limitation,  restriction  or  condition  on  exercise  of  such power and an appellate court on the evidence  before  it  may reach its  own conclusion,  both  on  questions of fact and of law.   

(3) Various  expressions,  such  as,  “substantial  and  compelling  reasons”,  “good  and  sufficient  grounds”,  “very  strong  circumstances”,  “distorted  conclusions”,  “glaring  mistakes”,  etc.  are  not  intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate  court  in  an  appeal  against  acquittal.  Such  phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes  of  language”  to  emphasise  the  reluctance  of  an  

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appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to  curtail the power of the court to review the evidence  and to come to its own conclusion.

(4) An  appellate  court,  however,  must  bear  in  mind  that  in  case  of  acquittal,  there  is  double  presumption in favour of the accused.  Firstly, the  presumption of innocence is available to him under  the  fundamental  principle  of  criminal  jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed  to  be  innocent  unless  he  is  proved  guilty  by  a  competent  court  of  law.  Secondly,  the  accused  having  secured  his  acquittal,  the  presumption  of  his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and  strengthened by the trial court.       

                                                  (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on  the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate  court  should  not  disturb  the  finding  of  acquittal  recorded by the trial court.”

40. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC  

450,  a  two  Judge  Bench  of  this  Court  of  which  one  of  us  

(Bhandari,  J.)  was a  member had an occasion  to  deal  with  

most of the cases referred in this judgment.  The exercise of  

surveying relevant judgments has again been taken with the  

hope that the Appellate Courts would keep in view the settled  

legal position while dealing with the trial courts’ judgments  of  

acquittals.   

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41. The following principles emerge from the cases above:

1. The  accused  is  presumed  to  be  innocent  until  

proven  guilty.   The  accused  possessed  this  

presumption when he was before the trial court.  

The  trial  court’s  acquittal  bolsters  the  

presumption that he is innocent.  

2. The power of reviewing evidence is wide and the  

appellate  court  can  re-appreciate  the  entire  

evidence on record. It can review the trial court’s  

conclusion with respect to both facts and law, but  

the  Appellate  Court  must  give  due  weight  and  

consideration to the decision of the trial court.  

3. The appellate court should always keep in mind  

that the trial court had the distinct advantage of  

watching  the  demeanour  of  the  witnesses.  The  

trial court is in a better position to evaluate the  

credibility of the witnesses.  

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4. The  appellate  court  may  only  overrule  or  

otherwise  disturb  the  trial  court’s  acquittal  if  it  

has “very substantial and compelling reasons” for  

doing so.  

5.  If  two  reasonable  or  possible  views  can  be  

reached - one that leads to acquittal, the other to  

conviction  -  the  High  Courts/appellate  courts  

must rule in favour of the accused.   

42. We have considered the entire evidence and documents  

on  record  and  the  reasoning  given  by  the  trial  court  for  

acquitting  the  accused  and  also  the  reasoning  of  the  High  

Court for reversal of the judgment of acquittal.   

43. On  careful  marshalling  of  the  entire  evidence  and  the  

documents on record, we arrive at the conclusion that the view  

taken by the trial court is certainly a possible or plausible view.  

The settled legal position as explained above is that if the trial  

court’s view is possible or plausible, the High Court should not  

substitute the same by its own possible view.   In the facts and  

circumstances of this case, the High Court in the impugned  

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judgment was not justified in interfering with the well reasoned  

judgment and order of the trial court.   

44. Consequently, this appeal filed by the appellant is allowed  

and disposed of and the impugned judgment of the High Court  

is set aside.

…….……………………..J.    (Dalveer Bhandari)

…….……………………..J.    (Harjit Singh Bedi)

New Delhi; September 1, 2009.

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