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PETITIONER: DEWAN DAULAT RAI KAPOOR ETC. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE & ANOTHER ETC. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT20/12/1979

BENCH: BHAGWATI, P.N. BENCH: BHAGWATI, P.N. TULZAPURKAR, V.D. PATHAK, R.S.

CITATION:  1980 AIR  541            1980 SCR  (2) 607  1980 SCC  (1) 685  CITATOR INFO :  R          1981 SC1729  (3)  R          1982 SC  16  (2)  E          1985 SC 339  (2,5,6)

ACT:      Delhi Municipal  Corporation Act  1957  Section  116  & Punjab Municipal  Act 1911,  Section  3(1)(b)-Assessment  of building for  municipal tax-Annual  value-Standard  rent  or contractual rent-Applicability of rent control legislation.      Wolds & phrases-Annual Value Reasonably-Meaning of.

HEADNOTE:      Section 3(1)(b) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911  defines "annual value" to mean, in the case of any house or building "the  gross annual  rent at  which  such  house  or building.... may  reasonably be expected to let from year to year" subject  to certain  specified  deductions.  The  same definition of  "annual value"  is to be found in section 116 of the  Delhi Municipal  Corporation Act, 1957 but with only difference that  there is  a, second  proviso to section 116 which is absent in section 3(1)(b).      One appeal  related to  a case  where the  building  is situated within  the jurisdiction of the New Delhi Municipal Committee and  is liable  to be  assessed to house tax under the Punjab  Municipal Act,  1911 while the other two related to cases where the building is situated within the limits of the Corporation  of Delhi  and is  assessable to  house  tax under the  Delhi Municipal  Corporation Act, 1957. The house tax under  both statutes  was levied  with reference  to the "annual value" of the building.      The common  question of  law  arising  in  the  appeals related to  the assessment of annual value for levy of house tax where the building is governed by the provisions of Rent Control Legislation  but where the standard rent has not yet been fixed.      The argument  of the Revenue was (i) that if it was not penal for  the landlord to receive the contractual rent from the tenant,  even if  it be  higher than  the standard  rent determinable under  the provisions  of the Act, it would not be incorrect  to say  that  the  landlord  could  reasonably expect to  let the  building at the contractual rent and the

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contractual rent  therefore provided  n correct  measure for determination of  the annual value of the building, and (ii) the period  of limitation  for  making  an  application  for fixation of  tho standard rent had expired long prior to the commencement of  the assessment  years and  in each  of  the cases, the  tenant was  precluded by  section 12 of the Rent Control Act  from making  an application for fixation of the standard rent with the result that the landlord was lawfully entitled to  continue to  receive the  contractual rent from the tenant without any let or hindrance.      Allowing the appeals, ^      HELD: 1.  Tho Court would have examined the validity of this argument  first on  principle and  then turned  to  the authorities, hut  it proposed  to reverse this order because the decisions in the Life Insurance Corporation’s 608 case  and   the  Guntur  Municipal  Council’s  case  (supra) completely covered  the. present  controversy  and  did  not leave any  scope for further argument. The decision in Padma Devi’s case  may be said to be distinguishable on the ground that in  the present  cases, unlike  Padma Devi’s  case, the standard  rent   of  the  building  was  not  fixed  by  the Controller and  hence it  could not  be  said  that  it  was unlawful or  penal for the landlord to receive anything more than the  standard rent.  But so far as the decision in Life Insurance Corporations case is concerned, it is difficult to sec how  its applicability  could be disputed, because there also, as  in the  present case,  the standard  rent  of  the building was  not fixed by the Controller and in the absence of the standard rent, it was open to the landlord to receive rent in  excess of  the standard rent determinable under the Act. The  only distinction  was that  under the  West Bengal Premises Rent  Control  (Temporary  Provisions)  Act,  1950, which came  up  for  consideration  in  the  Life  Insurance Corporation  s  case,  the  standard  rent  was  statutorily determinable on  the application  of a  mathematical formula without any  discretion being  left in the Controller, while under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 the standard rent was not  a   certain  and  definite  figure  to  be  arrived  at mathematically by  application of  the formula  laid down in section 6  but it was left to the Controller under section 9 sub-section (2)  to fix  the standard rent at such amount as appeared to  him to  be  reasonable  having  regard  to  the provisions of  section 6  and the circumstances of the case. Hence, until  the standard rent was fixed by the Controller, it could  not be said what would be the standard rent of the building. [622D-H, 623A]      2.  Undoubtedly   there  is   some  difference  in  the provisions of the two statutes but this difference is not of such a  character as  to affect  the applicapability  of the decision in  the Life  Insurance Corporation’s case. In that case too,  the prohibition  against the  landlord to receive any rent  in excess  of the standard rent was operative only after the  fixation of  the standard  rent by the Controller and so  long as  the standard rent was not fixed, it was not unlawful or  penal for  the landlord  to receive any rent in excess of the standard rent. If the standard rent though not fixed and  hence not  legally enforceable, could provide the measure for  the reasonable  expectation of  the landlord to receive  rent   from  a  hypothetical  tenant  in  the  Life Insurance Corporation’s  case, there  is no  reason  why  it should not  equally be  held to  provide such measure in the present cases.  As in the one case so also in the other? the upper limit  of the standard rent. though yet to be fixed by

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the Controller,  would enter  into the  determination of the reasonable rent. [623A-D]      3. It  is not  correct to say that under section 9 sub- section (2)  of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, it is left to the  unfettered and unguided discretion of the Controller to fix  any standard  rent which he considers reasonable. He is required  to fix the standard rent in accordance with the relevant formula laid down in section 6 and he cannot ignore that formula  by saying  that in  the circumstances  of  the case,  he  considers  it  reasonable  to  do  so.  The  only discretion given to him is to make adjustments in the result arrived at on the application of the relevant formula, where it is  necessary to  do so  by reason  of the  fact that the landlord  might  have  made  some  addition,  alteration  or improvement in  the building  or  circumstances  might  have transpired  affecting   the  condition  or  utility  of  the building or  some such  circumstances of  similar character. The compulsive  force of  the formula laid down in section 6 for the determination of the standard rent 609 is not in any way whittled down by section 9 sub-section (2) but a  marginal discretion  is given  to the  Controller  to mitigate the  rigour of  the formula where the circumstances of the  case so require. The amount calculated in accordance with the  relevant formula  set  out  in  section  6  would, therefore, ordinarily  represent the  standard rent  of  the building, unless  the landlord  of the  tenant., as the case may  be,   can  persuade   the  Controller  that  there  are circumstances requiring  adjustment in the amount so arrived at. There  is therefore  no material distinction between the West Bengal  Premises Rent  Control  (Temporary  Provisions) Act, 1950 and the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1050 so far as the provisions regarding  determination  of  standard  rent  are concerned  and   the  decision   in   the   Life   insurance Corporations  case   must  be   held  to  be  applicable  in determination of  the annual  value in  the  present  cases. [623D-H, 624A]      4. In  the Guntur  Municipal Council’s case also, as in the present cases. the standard rent of the building was not fixed by  the Controller  and under  the Andhra Pradesh Rent Act which  applied to  the town of Guntur, in the Absence of fixation of  the fair rent, it was lawfully competent to the landlord  to  recover  rent  hl  excess  of  the  fair-rent. determinable under that Act. [624B-C]      5. The  annual value  of the  building governed  by the Delhi Rent  Control Act, 1958 must be limited by the measure of standard  rent determinable  under that Act. The landlord cannot reasonably  expect to get more rent than the standard rent payable  in accordance with the principles laid down in the Delhi  Rent Control  Act, 1958.  It  is  true  that  the standard rent  of the  building not having been fixed by the Controller, the  assessing authority would have to arrive at its own  figure of standard rent by applying the, principles laid  down   in  the   Delhi  Rent  Control  Act,  1958  for determination of standard rent, but that is a task which the assessing authority  would have  to perform as a part OF the process of  assessment and in the Guntur Municipal Council’s case, this Court has said that it is not a.. task foreign to the function  of assessment and has to be carried out by the assessing authority. When the assessing authority arrives at its own  figures of standard rent by applying the principles laid down  in the  Act, it  does not,  in any way, usurp the function of  the Controller,  because it  does not  fix  the standard rent which would he binding on the landlord and the tenant, which  can be  done only by the Con- F troller under

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the Act  but it  merely  arrives  at  its  own  estimate  of standard rent  for the  purpose of  determining  the  annual value of  the  building.  That  is  a  perfectly  legitimate function  within  the  scope  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the assessing authority. [624G-H. 625A-C]      6. The  existing tenant  may be  barred from  making an application for  fixation of  the  standard  rent  and  may, therefore, be liable to pay contractual rent to the landlord but  the   hypothetical  tenant  to  whom  the  building  is hypothetically  to  be  let,  would  not  suffer  from  this disability created  by the bar of limitation and he would be entitled to make an application for fixation of the standard rent at  any time  within  two  years  of  the  hypothetical letting and  the limit  of the  standard  rent  determinable under the  Act. would  therefore, inevitably  enter into the bargain and  circumscribe the  rate of  rent  at  which  the building could reasonably be expected to he let. [625E-G]      7. It  is difficult  to sec how the annual value of the building could  vary accordingly  as it  is tenanted or self occupied. The circumstance that in each. 610 of the  present cases, the tenant was debarred by the period of limitation from making an application for fixation of the standard rent  and the landlord was consequently entitled to continue to  receive the contractual rent. cannot therefore, affect  the  applicability  of  the  decision  in  the  Life Insurance  Corporation’s   case  and  the  Guntur  Municipal Council’s case,  and it  must. be held that the annual value of the  building in  each of  these cases was limited by the measure of  the standard  rent determinable  under the  Act. [626B-C]      8. Even  if the standard rent has not been fixed by the Controller, the landlord cannot reasonably expect to receive from a  hypothetical tenant  anything more than the standard rent determinable under the Act and this would be so equally whether the  building has  been let  out to a tenant who has lost his  light to  apply for fixation of’ the standard rent or the building is self occupied by the owner. The assessing authority would.  in either  case, have to arrive at its own figure of the standard rent by applying principles laid down in the  Delhi Rent  Control Act,  1958 for  determination of standard rent and determine the annual value of the building on the basis of such figure of standard rent. [626G-H, 627A]      9. It  is clear  therefore that  in each of the present cases the  annual value  of the  building must be held to be limited by  the measure of the standard rent determinable on the principles laid down in the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and it cannot exceed such measure of standard rent. [627A-B]      Corporation of  Calcutta v.  Life Insurance Corporation [1970] 2  SCC 44;  Corporation of  Calcutta  v.  Padma  Devi [1962] 3  SCR 49;  Guntur Municipal  Council v.  Guntur Town Rate payers’  Association [1971]  2 SCR 423: M. M. Chawla v. J. S. Sethi [1970] 2 SCR 390 referred to.      Municipal  Corporation,   Indore   &   Ors.   v,   Smt. Ratnaprabha & Ors. [1977] 1 SCR 1017 distinguished.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL  APPELLATE   JURISDICTION:  Civil   Appeal   Nos. 11431144/73 and 1201 (N) of 1973.      From the  Judgment and  order dated  16-11-1972 of  the Delhi High  Court in  C.W. No.  580/71, LPA  No.  58/72  and 54/72.      P. N.  Lekhi and  M. K. Garg for the Appellants in C.A.

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Nos. 1143-44/73 and for Respondents in C.A. No. 1201/73.      F. S.  Nariman P.  D. Singhania,  Homi Ranina, Ravinder Narain and T. Ansari in C.A. No. 1143/73 for the Intervener.      S. N.  kaeker Sol.  General and  A. V.  Ramgam for  the Respondent in C.A. No. 1144/73 and for the Appellant in C.A. No. 1201/73.      S. N. Kaeker, Sol. General, B. P. Maheshwari, S. Sethi, Bikramjit Nayyar  and E.  C. Sharma  for Respondent No. 1 in C.A. Nos. 1143-44/73      S.T. Desai, S. P. Nayyar and Miss A. Subhashini for the Intervener, C.I.T. Delhi. 611      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      BHAGWATI, J.  These  appeals  by  certificate  raise  a common question  of law  relating to  assessment  of  annual value for  levy of  house-tax where the building is governed by the  provisions of  Rent  Control  legislation,  but  the standard rent  has not yet been fixed. One appeal relates to a case where the building is situate within the jurisdiction of the  New Delhi  Municipal Committee  and is  liable to be assessed to  house tax  under the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 while the  other two  relate to  cases where the building is situate within the limits of the Corporation of Delhi and is assessable  to   house  tax   under  the   Delhi   Municipal Corporation Act,  1957. The house tax under both statutes is levied with  reference to  the annual value of the building. Section 3(1)(b)  of the  Punjab Municipal  Act, 1911 defines "annual value" to mean, in the case of any house or building "the gross  annual rent  at which  such  house  or  building ......may reasonably  be expected  to let from year to year" subject  to  certain  specified  deductions,  and  the  same definition of  "annual value"  is to be found in section 116 of the  Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 with only this difference that  there is  a second  proviso to  section 116 which is  absent in  section 3(1)(b).  That  proviso  reads: "Provided further  that in  respect of  any land or building the standard  rent of  which has  been fixed under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, the rateable value thereof shall not  exceed the  annual amount  of  standard  rent  so fixed." It  was, however,  common ground between the parties that this proviso is immaterial and, in fact, it was so held in Corporation of Calcutta v. Life Insurance Corporation(1). We may,  therefore, ignore the existence of this proviso and deal with both the categories of appeals on the basis of the same definition  of "annual  value".  "Annual  value"  of  a building, according  to this  definition, would be the gross annual rent at which the building may reasonably be expected to let from year to year (emphasis supplied).      It is  obvious from  this definition  that  unlike  the English Law where the value of occupation by a tenant is the criterion for fixing annual value of the building for rating purposes, here  it is the value of the property to the owner which is  taken as  the standard  for making  assessment  of annual value.  The criterion  is the  rent realisable by the landlord and  not the  value of the holding in the hands the tenant. The  rent which  the landlord  might realise  if the building were  let is  made the  basis for fixing the annual value of the 612 building. The  word "reasonably"  in the  definition is very important. What  the landlord might reasonably expect to get from a  hypothetical tenant,  if the  building were let from year  to   year,  affords   the  statutory   yardstick   for determining the  annual value.  Now, what is reasonable is a question of  fact and  it would  depend  on  the  facts  and

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circumstances of  a given  situation. Ordinarily, as pointed out by  Subba Rao,  J., speaking  on behalf  of the Court in Corporation of Calcutta v. Padma Devi(1); "a bargain between a willing  lessor and  a willing  lessee uninfluenced by any extraneous  circumstances  may  afford  a  guiding  test  of reasonableness. An  inflated or  deflated rate of rent based upon  fraud,   emergency,  relationship   and   such   other considerations  may   take  it   out  of   the   bounds   of reasonableness". The  actual rent payable by a tenant to the landlord  would  in  normal  circumstances  afford  reliable evidence of what the landlord might reasonably expect to get from a  hypothetical tenant,  unless the rent is inflated or depressed by  reason of  extraneous considerations  such  as relationship, expectation  of some  other benefit etc. There would ordinarily  be in  a free  market close  approximation between the  actual rent  received by  the landlord  and the rent which  he might  reasonably expect  to receive  from  a hypothetical tenant.  But where  the rent of the building is subject to  rent control legislation, this approximation may and often does get displaced. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the  effect of  rent  control  legislation  on  the determination of annual value      This is  fortunately not  a virgin  field. There are at least three  decisions of  this Court  which have  spoken on this subject.  The first  is the  decision in Corporation of Calcutta v.  Padma Devi (supra). The question which arose in that case  was whether  the "annual  value"  of  a  building governed by the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950 could be determined at a figure higher than the  standard rent  fixed under  the provision  of that Act. The  definition of  "annual value" in section 127(a) of the Calcutta  Municipal Act,  1923 under which the house tax was being  levied was  the same as in section 3(1)(b) of the Punjab Municipal  Act, 1911  or section  116  of  the  Delhi Municipal Corporation  Act, 1957  without the second proviso and hence  in order  to determine  the "annual value" of the building it  was necessary  to find out what was the rent at which the  building might reasonably be expected to let from year to  year. The  Court speaking  through  Subba  Rao,  J. emphasized  the   use  of   the  word  "reasonably"  in  the definition and  pointed out  that since it was penal for the landlord to receive any rent in excess of 613 the standard  rent fixed  under the  Act, the landlord could not reasonably  expect to  receive any higher rent in breach of the law. It is the standard rent alone which the landlord could reasonably  expect  to  receive  from  a  hypothetical tenant, because  to receive  anything more would be contrary to law. The learned Judge, after analysing the provisions of the Act, observed:           "A combined  reading of the said provisions leaves      no room  for doubt that a contract for a rent at a rate      higher  than   the  standard   rent  is  not  only  not      enforceable  but   also  that  the  landlord  would  be      committing an  offence if he collected a rent above the      rate of  the standard  rent. One  may legitimately  say      under  those   circumstances  that  a  landlord  cannot      reasonably be  expected to  let a  building for  a rent      higher than  the standard  rent. A law of the land with      its   penal   consequences   cannot   be   ignored   in      ascertaining the  reasonable expectations of a landlord      in the  matter of  rent. In  this view,  the law of the      land  must   necessarily  be   taken  as   one  of  the      circumstances obtaining  in the  open market placing an      upper limit  on the  rate of  rent for which a building

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    can reasonably be expected to let". It may  be noted  that in this case the standard rent of the building was  fixed under the Act and since it was penal for the landlord  to receive  any rent  higher than the standard rent fixed  under the  Act, it  was held  that the  landlord could not  reasonably expect  to receive  anything more than the standard  rent from a hypothetical tenant and the annual value of the building could not exceed the standard rent.      The next  decision to  which  we  must  refer  in  this connection is  the decision  of this Court in Corporation of Calcutta v.  Life Insurance  Corporation (supra).  This case also related  to a  building situate  in Calcutta  which was governed by the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act,  1950. Section 2(10) (b) of the Act defined "standard rent" to mean "where the rent has been fixed under section 9, the rent so fixed, or at which it would have been fixed if  application were  made under  the  said  section". Here, unlike  Padma Devi’s  case, the  standard rent  of the building had  not been  fixed under  section 9  but  it  was common ground  between the  parties that Rs. 2,800 per month being the  amount of  the agreed rent represented the figure at which  the standard  rent would  have been  fixed  if  an application had  been made  for the  purpose under section 9 and the standard rent of the building was therefore 614 Rs. 2,800 per month within the meaning of the second part of the definition  of that  term. The  question which arose for consideration was  whether the  annual value of the building was liable  to be determined on the footing of this standard rent or  it could  be determined  by taking into account the higher rent received by the tenant from its sub-tenants. The principle of  the decision  in Padma Devi’s case was invoked by the  assessee for contending that the annual value of the building could not be determined at a figure higher than the standard rent  and this  contention was upheld by the Court, though there  was  no  fixation  of  standard  rent  by  the Controller under section 9 and the statutory prohibition was only against  receipt of rent in excess of the standard rent fixed under the Act. The Court pointed out that the standard rent stood  defined by  the latter part of section 2(10) (b) and  by   virtue  of   that  provision  it  was  statutorily determined at  Rs. 2,800  per month  though not fixed by the Controller  under  section  9  and  proceeded  to  hold,  by applying the principle of the decision in Padma Devi’s case, that the landlord could not reasonably expect to receive any rent higher  than the  standard  rent  from  a  hypothetical tenant and  the annual  value of  the  building  could  not, therefore, be  fixed at  a figure than the standard rent. It will be  seen that  this decision marked a step forward from the decision  in Padma Devi’s case because here the standard rent was  not fixed by the Controller under section 9 and it was not penal for the landlord to receive any rent in excess of the statutorily determined standard rent of Rs. 2.800 per month and  yet it  was led  by this  Court that the standard rent determined  the upper  limit of  the rent  at which the landlord could  reasonably expect  to let  the building to a hypothetical tenant.  It may  be pointed out that an attempt was made  on behalf  of the  Corporation to  distinguish the decision in  Padma  Devi’s  case  by  contending  that  that decision was  based on  the interpretation of section 127(a) of the  Calcutta Municipal  Corporation Act,  1923 while the provision which  fell for  interpretation in  this case  was section 168  of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1951 which  was   different  from  section  127(a),  in  that  it contained a proviso that "in respect of any land or building

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the standard rent of which has been fixed under section 9... the annual  value thereof shall not exceed the annual amount of the  standard rent  so fixed" which was absent in section 127 (a).  The argument was that under the proviso the annual value was  limited to  the standard rent only in those cases where the  standard rent was fixed under section 9 and since in the  case before  the Court  the  standard  rent  of  the building was  not fixed  under section 9, the proviso has no application and  the assessing  authority was  not bound  to take into account the limi- 615 tation of  the standard rent. This argument was negatived by the Court  and it was held that the enactment of the proviso in section  168 of  the Calcutta  Municipal Corporation Act, 1951 did  not alter  the law  and by  the  addition  of  the proviso, the  meaning of the expression "gross rent at which the land  or building  might reasonably  be expected to let" was not  changed. It was for this reason that we pointed out at the  commencement of  the judgment  that the existence of the  proviso   in  section   116  of   the  Delhi  Municipal Corporation Act,  1957 is  immaterial and  we may proceed to deal with  the appeals  arising under  that Act  as  if  the definition of "annual value" did not contain that proviso.      That takes us to the third decision in Guntur Municipal Council v.  Guntur Town  Rate Payers’  Association(1)  which extended still  further the  principle of  the  decision  in Padma Devi’s  case. This  was a  case where the annual value was   to   be   determined   under   the   Madras   District Municipalities Act,  1920  which  applied  in  the  city  of Guntur. Section  82  sub-section  (2)  of  the  Act  gave  a definition of  "annual value"  practically in the same terms as section  3(1)(b) of  the Punjab  Municipal Act,  1911 and section 116  of the  Delhi Municipal  Corporation Act,  1957 without the  second proviso.  There was also in force in the city of Guntur, the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease Rent and Eviction) Control  Act, 1960,  which provided inter alia for fixation of fair rent of buildings. It is necessary to refer to a material provisions of this Act. Section 4, sub-section (1) conferred power on the Controller, on application by the tenant or  landlord of  a building, to fix the fair rent for such building  after holding  such inquiry as he thought fit and sub-section  (2) to  (5) of  section  4  laid  down  the formulae for determination of fair rent in different classes of cases.  Sub-section (1)(a) of section 7 gave teeth to the determination of  fair rent  by  providing  that  where  the Controller has  fixed the  fair  rent  of  a  building,  the landlord shall  not claim,  receive  or  stipulate  for  the payment of  anything in  excess of  such fair  rent and sub- section 2(a)  of that section recognised that where the fair rent of a building has not been fixed by the Controller, the agreed rent  could be  lawfully paid  by the  tenant to  the landord and  it was only payment of a sum in addition to the agreed rent that was prohibited by that sub-section. Section 29 made it penal for any one to contravene the provisions of subsections 1(a)  and 2(a)  of section 7. Now there could be no doubt  that if  the fair  rent of  a building  were fixed under section  4, sub-section  (1), the  decision  in  Padma Devi’s case would be clearly 616 applicable and the annual value would be limited to the fair rent so fixed. But, would the same principle apply where the fair rent  were not fixed ? Would the annual value in such a case be liable to be assessed in the light of the provisions contained in  the Rent  Act ?  That was  the question  which arose before  the Court  in the  Guntur Municipal  Council’s

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case. The  Guntur Municipal  Council urged that the decision in Padma  Devi’s case  was not  applicable and  attempted to distinguish it  by saying  that under section 7, sub-section (1) it  was only  after the  fixation  of  fair  rent  of  a building that  the landlord  was debarred  from claiming  or receiving payment  of any  rent in  excess of such fair rent and since the fair rent of the building in that case had not been fixed, it was not penal for the landlord to receive any higher  rent   and  the   assessment  of  annual  value  was therefore, not  "limited or governed by the measure provided by the  provisions of  the Act for determination of the fair rent." This  attempt, however,  did not find favour with the court and it was held that there was no distinction "between buildings the  fair rent of which has been actually fixed by the Controller  and those  in respect  of which no such rent has been  fixed." The  Court pointed  out: "It  is perfectly clear that  the landlord  cannot lawfully expect to get more rent than  the fair rent which is payable in accordance with the principles  laid down  in the  Act.  The  assessment  of valuation must take into account the measure of fair rent as determinable under  the  Act.  It  may  be  that  where  the Controller has  not  fixed  the  fair  rent,  the  municipal authorities will  have to arrive at their own figure of fair rent but  that can be done without any difficulty by keeping in view the principles laid down in section 4 of the Act for determination of  fair rent." It will thus be seen that even though fair  rent had  not been  fixed under  the Act  as in Padma Devi’s  case, nor  was it statutorily determined as in the  Life  Insurance  Corporation’s  case  (there  being  no provision in  the Andhra  Pradesh Rent  Act similar  to  the latter part of section 2(10)(b) of the West Bengal Rent Act) and it was clear from the provisions of the Rent Act that it was only  after the fair rent of a building was fixed by the Controller that  the  prohibition  against  receipt  of  any amount in  excess of fair rent became applicable and so long as the fair rent was not fixed by the Controller it was open to the  landlord to  receive the  agreed rent even though it might be  higher than  the fair rent, yet it was held by the court that  in view  of the  provisions in  the Rent  Act in regard to  fair rent,  the  landlord  could  not  reasonably expect to  receive from  a hypothetical tenant anything more than the fair rent payable in accordance with the principles laid down in the Rent Act and the annual value was liable to be determined on the 617 basis of  fair rent  as determinable under the Rent Act. The Court observed  that the  assessing authority  would have to arrive at  its own  figure of  fair  rent  by  applying  the principles laid down in sub-sections (2) to (5) of section 4 for  determination  of  fair  rent.  This  decision  clearly represented a  further extension  of the  principle in Padma Devi’s case  to a  situation where no standard rent has been fixed by  the Controller  and in  the absence of fixation of standard rent,  there is  no prohibition  against receipt of higher rent by the landlord.      It is  in the  light of  these decisions  that we  must consider whether  in case  if a building in respect of which no standard  rent has been fixed by the Controller under the Delhi Rent  Control Act,  1958  the  annual  value  must  be limited to  the measure  of standard rent determinable under that Act  or it can be determined on the basis of the higher rent actually  received by the landlord from the tenant. But before we proceed to examine this question, we must refer to a recent  decision of  this Court  in Municipal Corporation, Indore & Ors. v. Smt. Ratnaprabha & Ors.(1) which apparently

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seems to  strike a  different note. That was a case relating to  a  building  situated  in  Indore  and  subject  to  the provisions of  the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The  building was self occupied and hence there was no occasion to  have its standard rent fixed by the Controller. The annual  value of  the building was sought to be assessed for rating  purposes  under  the  Madhya  Pradesh  Municipal Corporation  Act,  1956  and  section  138(b)  of  that  Act provided that  the  annual  value  of  any  building  shall, notwithstanding anything  contained in any other law for the time being in force be deemed to be the gross annual rent at which such building might reasonably be expected to let from year to  year, subject  to certain specified deductions. The argument of  the assessee  was that  even though no standard rent in respect of the building was fixed by the Controller, the reasonable rent contemplated by section 138(b) could not exceed the  standard rent  determinable under the Act and it was incumbent on the Municipal Commissioner to determine the annual value  of the building on the same basis on which its standard rent  was required  to be fixed under the Act. This argument was  sought to be supported by relying on the three decisions to  which we have already made a reference. Now it would appear that the decision in Guntur Municipal Council’s case was  clearly applicable  on the  facts of this case and following that  decision the  Court ought  to have held that the annual value of the building could not exceed 618 the standard  rent determinable  under section  7 of the Act and the  assessing authority  should have arrived at its own estimate of  the standard  rent by  applying the  principles laid down  in that section and determine the annual value on the basis of such standard rent. But the Court negatived the applicability of  the decision in Guntur Municipal Council’s case and  the earlier  two cases  by relying  on  the  words "notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being  in force"  in section  138(b). The Court pointed out that  while ’the  requirement of  the law  is  that  the reasonable letting  value should  determine the annual value of the building, it has also been specifically provided that this would  be so "notwithstanding anything contained in any other law  for the time being in force" and observed that it would be  a proper  interpretation of  these words  "to hold that in  a case  where the  standard rent  of a building has been  fixed   under  section   7  of   the  Madhya   Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, and there is nothing to show that there has  been  fraud  or  collusion,  that  would  be  its reasonable letting  value, but where this is not so, and the building has  never been  let out  and is  being used  in  a manner where  the question  of fixing its standard rent does not arise,  it would  be permissible  to fix  its reasonable rent without  regard to the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control  Act, 1961.  This view  will,  in  our opinion, give  proper effect  to the  non-obstante clause in clause (b),  with due regard to its other provision that the letting value  should  be  "reasonable".  The  Court  leaned heavily on  the non-obstante  clause in  section 138(b)  and distinguished the  decision in  Guntur  Municipal  Council’s case and the earlier two cases on the ground that in none of the three  Municipal Acts  which came  up for  consideration before the  Court in  these cases,  there was  any such non- obstante clause.  We  are  not  at  all  sure  whether  this decision represents  the correct  interpretation of  section 138(b) because  it is  rather difficult  to see how the non- obstante clause  in that  section can  possibly  affect  the interpretation  of  the  words  "the  annual  value  of  any

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building shall.................... be deemed to be the gross annual  rent  at  which  such  building..  might  reasonably ........ be  expected to  be let  from year  to  year."  The meaning of these words cannot be different in section 138(b) than what  it is in section 127(a) of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act,  1923  and  section  82(2)  of  the  Madras District, Municipality  Act, 1920 and the only effect of the non-obstante clause  would be that even if there is anything contrary in  any other  law for the time being in force that should not  detract from  full effect  being given  to these words according to their proper meaning. But it is not 619 necessary for  the purpose  of the  present appeals to probe further into  the question  of correctness of this decision, since there  is no  non-obstante clause  either  in  section 3(1)(b) of  the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 or in section 116 of the  Delhi  Municipal  Corporation  Act,  1957  and  this decision has therefore, no application.      Now let  us turn to the present appeals and see how far the trilogy of decisions referred to earlier throws light on the solution of the problem before us. We may first refer to the relevant  provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 for that  was the law in force at the material time relating to restrictions  of rent  of buildings  situate  within  the jurisdiction of  the Delhi Municipal Corporation and the New Delhi Municipal  Committee. Section  2(k) defined  ’standard rent’ in relation to any premises to mean "the standard rent referred to in section 6 or where the standard rent has been increased under section 7, such increased rent." Sub-section (1) of  section 4  provided that, subject to a single narrow exception which  is not material for our purpose, "no tenant shall, notwithstanding  any agreement  to  the  contrary  be liable to  pay to  his landlord  for the  occupation of  any premises any  amount in  excess of  the standard rent of the premises" and  sub-section (2)  of section  4 declared that, subject to  provision of  sub-section (1) "any agreement for the payment  of rent in excess of the standard rent shall be construed as  if it were an agreement for the payment of the standard rent  only". Section  5 sub-section  (1) enacted  a prohibition  injuncting  that  "no  person  shall  claim  or receive  any   rent  in   excess  of   the  standard   rent, notwithstanding  any   agreement  to  the  contrary."  Then, section 6  proceeded  to  set  out  different  formulae  for determination of standard rent in different classes of cases and each  formula gave  a precise  and clear-cut  method  of computation yielding  a definite  figure of standard rent in respect of  building falling  within its coverage. Section 9 sub-section (1)  provided that  the Controller  shall, on an application made  to  him  in  this  behalf  either  by  the landlord or  by the  tenant, fix  in respect of any premises the standard  rent referred  to in section 6 and sub-section (2) of  section 9 laid down that in fixing the standard rent of any  premises, the  Controller shall  fix an amount which appears to  him  to  be  reasonable  having  regard  to  the provisions of  section 6  and the circumstances of the case. Sub-section (4)  of section  9 provided for determination of standard rent  in a  case where  for any  reason it  was not possible to  determine the  standard rent  on the principles set forth  under section 6 and said that in such a case "the Controller may  fix such  rent as would be reasonable having regard to the situation, locality 620 and condition  of the  premises and  the amenities  provided therein and  where  there  are  similar  or  nearly  similar premises in the locality, having regard also to the standard

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rent payable  in respect  of such  premises". Section 9 sub- section  (7)  enjoined  the  Controller,  while  fixing  the standard rent  of any premises, to specify a date from which the standard  rent so  fixed shall  be deemed to have effect and added  a proviso  that in  no case the date so specified shall be  earlier than  one year  prior to  the date  of the application for  the fixation  of the standard rent. Lastly, section 12  laid down a period of limitation within which an application for fixation of the standard rent may be made by the  landlord   or  the   tenant  by   providing  that  such application must  be made  within 2  years from  the date of commencement of  the Act  in case  of premises  let prior to such commencement  and if  the premises  were let after such commencement, then within 2 years from the date on which the premises were  let to  the tenant. The proviso to section 12 empowered the  Controller to entertain the application after the expiry  of the  period of limitation if he was satisfied that the  applicant was  prevented by  sufficient cause from filing the  application in  time. These  provisions  of  the Delhi Rent  Control Act,  1958  came  up  for  consideration before this  Court in  M. M.  Chawla v. J. S. Sethi(1) where the question  was whether  in answer  to a suit for eviction filed by  the landlord,  the tenant  was entitled  by way of defence to  ask the  Controller to  fix the standard rent of the premises  and to resist eviction by paying or depositing the standard  rent so  fixed even  though at the date of the filing of  the defence,  the period of limitation for making an  application  for  fixation  of  the  standard  rent  had expired. The  argument of  the tenant  was that by reason of the prohibition  enacted in section 4 and sub-section (1) of section 5,  it was not competent to the landlord to claim or receive any  amount in  excess of the standard rent and even though the  period of  limitation prescribed  for making  an application for  fixation of  standard rent had expired, the tenant was  entitled to ask the Controller by way of defence to fix the standard rent, since the period of limitation was applicable only where a substantive application was made for fixation of  standard rent  and it  had no application where the fixation  of standard rent was sought by way of defence. This  Court   speaking  through   Shah,  J.   negatived  the contention of  the tenant  and construing  the scheme of the Act, pointed out:           ".............................. the prohibition in      sections 4  and 5  operate only after the standard rent      of 621      premises is  determined and  not till  then. So long as      the standard  rent is not determined by the Controller,      the tenant  must pay  the contractual  rent: after  the      standard  rent   is  determined  the  landlord  becomes      disentitled to  recover an  amount  in  excess  of  the      standard rent  from the date on which the determination      operates.           We are  unable to  agree that  standard rent  of a      given tenement  is by virtue of s. 6 of the Act a fixed      quantity, and  the liability for payment of a tenant is      circumscribed thereby  even if the standard rent is not      fixed by  order of  the Controller. Under the scheme of      the Act  standard rent  of a  given  tenement  is  that      amount only  which the Controller determines. Until the      standard rent  is fixed  by the Controller the contract      between the  landlord and  the  tenant  determines  the      liability of the tenant to pay rent. That is clear from      the terms of section 9 of the Act. That section clearly      indicates that  the Controller  alone has  the power to

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    fix the  standard rent, and it cannot be determined out      of court.  An attempt  by the  parties to  determine by      agreement  the  standard  rent  out  of  court  is  not      binding. By  section 12  in an application for fixation      of standard  rent of  premises the  Controller may give      retrospective  operation  to  his  adjudication  for  a      period not  exceeding one  year before  the date of the      application.  The   scheme  of   the  Act  is  entirely      inconsistent  with   standard  rent   being  determined      otherwise than by order of the Controller. In our view,      the prohibition  against recovery  of rent in excess of      the standard  rent applies  only from the date on which      the  standard  rent  is  determined  by  order  of  the      Controller and not before that date." it was,  thus, held  that the  prohibition in  section 4 and sub-section  (1)  of  section  5  against  recovery  by  the landlord of  any amount  in excess  of the standard rent was operative only  after the  standard rent  was fixed  by  the Controller under  section 9  and until the standard rent was so fixed,  it was  lawful for  the landlord  to receive  the contractual rent  from the  tenant  and  if  the  period  of limitation prescribed for making an application for fixation of the  standard rent  had expired,  the tenant  could  not, thereafter, get  the standard  rent fixed  by the Controller and would  continue to be liable to pay the contractual rent to the landlord. The Revenue relied heavily on this decision and contended  that since in each of the present appeals the building was let out to the tenant, but its standard rent 622 was not  fixed by  the Controller  under section  9 and  the period of  limitation for making an application for fixation of the  standard rent had expired, the landlord was entitled to continue  to receive the contractual rent from the tenant without any  legal impediment  and hence the annual value of the  building   was  not   limited  to   the  standard  rent determinable in  accordance with the principles laid down in the Act,  but was  liable to be assessed by reference to the contractual  rent  recoverable  by  the  landlord  from  the tenant. The  argument of  the Revenue was that if it was not penal for  the landlord to receive the contractual rent from the tenant,  even if  it be  higher than  the standard  rent determinable under  the provisions  of the Act, it would not be incorrect to say that he landlord could reasonably expect to  let  the  building  at  the  contractual  rent  and  the contractual rent  therefore provided  a correct  measure for determination of  the annual  value of  the  building.  This argument, plausible though it may seem at first blush, is in our opinion not well founded and must be rejected.      Ordinarily we  would have examined the validity of this argument  first   on  principle   and  then  turned  to  the authorities, but  we propose  to reverse  this order because the decisions  in the  Life Insurance Corporation’s case and the Guntur Municipal Council’s case (supra) completely cover the present  controversy and  do not  leave  any  scope  for further argument.  Of course,  the decision  in Padma Devi’s case may be said to be distinguishable on the ground that in the present  cases, unlike  Padma Devi’s  case, the standard rent of  the building  was not  fixed by  the Controller and hence it could not be said that it was unlawful or penal for the landlord to receive anything more than then the standard rent.  But   so  far  as  the  decision  in  Life  Insurance Corporation’s case  is concerned, it is difficult to see how its applicability  could be disputed, because there also, as in the  present case,  the standard rent of the building was not fixed  by the  Controller and in the absence of fixation

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of the standard rent, it was open to the landlord to receive rent in  excess of  the standard rent determinable under the Act. The  only distinction which could be urged on behalf of the Revenue  was that  under the  West Bengal  Premises Rent Control (Temporary  Provisions) Act, 1950, which came up for consideration in  the Life Insurance Corporation’s case, the standard  rent   was   statutorily   determinable   on   the application of a mathematical formula without any discretion being left  in the  Controller, while  under the  Delhi Rent Control Act,  1958, the  standard rent was not a certain and definite  figure   to  be   arrived  at   mathematically  by application of  the formulae  laid down  in section 6 but it was left  to the  Controller under section 9 sub-section (2) to 623 fix the  standard rent  at such amount as appeared to him to be reasonable  having regard  to the provisions of section 6 and the  circumstances of  the case  and  hence,  until  the standard rent  was fixed  by the Controller, it could not be said what  would be  the standard  rent of the building. Now undoubtedly there  is some  difference in  the provisions of the two  statutes but  this difference  is  not  of  such  a character as  to affect the applicability of the decision in the Life  Insurance Corporation’s case, because in that case too, the  prohibition against  the landlord  to receive  any rent in excess of the standard rent was operative only after the fixation  of the  standard rent by the Controller and so long as the standard rent was not fixed, it was not unlawful or penal  for the  landlord to receive any rent in excess of the standard rent. If the standard rent though not fixed and hence not legally enforceable, could provide the measure for the reasonable  expectation of  the landlord to receive rent from  a   hypothetical  tenant   in   the   Life   Insurance Corporation’s case,  there is  no reason,  why it should not equally be  held to  provide such  measure  in  the  present cases; as  in the  one case  so also in the other. The upper limit of  the standard  rent, though  yet to be fixed by the Controller,  would  enter  into  the  determination  of  the reasonable rent.  Moreover, it  is not  correct to  say that under section  9 sub-section  (2) of  the Delhi Rent Control Act,  1958  it  is  left  to  the  unfettered  and  unguided discretion of  the Controller to fix any standard rent which he considers, reasonable. He is required to fix the standard rent in  accordance with  the relevant  formula laid down in section 6  and he  cannot ignore that formula by saying that in the circumstances of the case, he considers it reasonable to do  so. The  only discretion  given to  him  is  to  make adjustments in  the result  arrived at on the application of the relevant  formula, where  it is  necessary to  do so  by reason of  the fact  that the  landlord might have made some addition, alteration  or  improvement  in  the  building  or circumstances might  have transpired affecting the condition or utility  of the  building or  some such  circumstances of similar character. The compulsive force of the formulae laid down in section 6 for the determination of the standard rent is not in any way whittled down by section 9 sub-section (2) but a  marginal discretion  is given  to the  Controller  to mitigate the  rigour of the formulae where the circumstances of the  case do require. The amount calculated in accordance with the  relevant formulae  set out  in  section  6  would, therefore, ordinarily  represent the  standard rent  of  the building, unless the landlord or the tenant, as the case may be, can persuade the Controller that there are circumstances requiring adjustment  in the  amount so arrived at. It would thus be  seen that  there is no material distinction between

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the West Bengal Premises 624 Rent Control  (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950 and the Delhi Rent Control  Act, 1958  so far  as the provisions regarding determinations  of  standard  rent  are  concerned  and  the decision in  the Life  Insurance Corporation’s  case must be held to  be applicable in determination of that annual value in the present cases.      But more  than the  decision in the Life Insurance case decision, it is the Guntur Municipal Council’s case which is nearest to the present case and is almost indistinguishable. In that  case also,  so in  the present  cases, the standard rent of  the building  was not  fixed by  the Controller and under the  Andhra Pradesh Rent Act which applied in the town of Guntur,  in the  absence of fixation of the fair-rent, it was lawfully  competent to  the landlord  to recover rent in excess  of   the  fair-rent  determinable  under  that  Act. Moreover, the  Andhra Pradesh Rent Act did not prescribe any clear-cut formula to be applied mechanically for statutorily determining the  standard rent,  but  it  was  left  to  the Controller to fix the standard rent having regard to (a) the prevailing rates  of rent  in the  locality for  the same or similar accommodation in similar circumstances during the 12 months prior  to 5th  April,  1944;  (b)  the  rental  value entered in the property tax assessment book of the concerned local authority  relating to  the period mentioned in clause (a) and  (c) the  circumstances of  the case,  including any amount paid  by the  tenant by  way of  premium or any other like sum  in addition  to rent  after 5th  April 1944 with a provision for allowance of increase depending on the quantum of the  rent so  arrived at.  The  discretion  left  to  the Controller to  fix the  fair rent  was thus much larger than that under  the Delhi  Rent Control Act, 1958 and yet it was held that,  even though  the fair  rent was not fixed by the Controller, the  annual value  was limited by the measure of the fair-rent determinable under the Act. The view taken was that there  was no  material distinction  between  buildings fair-rent of which has been actually fixed by the Controller and those  in respect  of which  no such rent has been fixed and even  if  the  fair-rent  has  not  been  fixed  by  the Controller, the  upper limit  of the  fair-rent  payable  in accordance with the principles laid down in the Act is bound to enter  into the  determination  of  the  rent  which  the landlord  could   reasonably  expect   to  receive   from  a hypothetical tenant.  The principle of this decision applies wholly and  completely in  the present  cases and  following that principle,  it must  be held that the annual value of a building governed by the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 must be limited by  the measure  of standard rent determinable under that Act.  The landlord cannot reasonably expect to get more rent than  the standard  rent payable in accordance with the principles laid down in the Delhi Rent 625 Control Act,  1958. It is true that the standard rent of the building not  having  been  fixed  by  the  Controller,  the assessing authority  would have  to arrive at its own figure of standard rent by applying the principles laid down in the Delhi Rent  Control Act,  1958 for determination of standard rent, but that is a task which the assessing authority would have to  perform as  a part of the process of assessment and in the  Guntur Municipal Council’s case, this Court has said that it  is not a task foreign to the function of assessment and has  to be  carried out by the assessing authority. When the  assessing  authority  arrives  at  its  own  figure  of standard rent  by applying  the principles  laid down in the

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Act, it  does not,  in any  way, usurp  the functions of the Controller, because  it does not fix the standard rent which would be  binding on  the landlord and the tenant, which can be done  only by the Controller under the Act, but it merely arrives at its own estimate of standard rent for the purpose of determining  the annual  value of the building. That is a perfectly  legitimate  function  within  the  scope  of  the jurisdiction of the assessing authority.      Now it  is true that in the present cases the period of limitation for  making an  application for  fixation of  the standard rent  had expired long prior to the commencement of the assessment  years and  in such  of the cases, the tenant was precluded  by section  12 from making an application for fixation of  the standard  rent with  the  result  that  the landlord was  lawfully entitled  to continue  to receive the contractual  rent   from  the  tenant  without  any  let  or hindrance. But  from this  fact-situation which prevailed in each of  the cases,  it does  not follow  that the  landlord could, therefore,  reasonably expect  to  receive  the  same amount of  rent from  a hypothetical  tenant.  The  existing tenant may be barred from making an application for fixation of the  standard rent  and may,  therefore, be liable to pay the contractual  rent to  the landlord, but the hypothetical tenant to  whom the  building is  hypothetically to  be  let would not  suffer from this disability created by the bar of limitation and  he would  be entitled to make an application for fixation  of the  standard rent  and may,  therefore, be liable to  pay the contractual rent to the landlord, but the hypothetical tenant  to whom  the building is hypothetically to be  let would  not suffer from this disability created by the bar  of limitation  and he  would be entitled to make an application for  fixation of  the standard  rent at any time within two  years of  the hypothetical letting and the limit of the  standard rent  determinable  under  the  Act  would, therefore,   inevitably   enter   into   the   bargain   and circumscribe the  rate of  rent at  which the building could reasonably be  expected to  be let.  This  position  becomes absolutely clear  if we  take a  situation where  the tenant goes out  and the  building comes to be self-occupied by the owner. It  is  obvious  that  in  case  of  a  self-occupied building, the  annual value  would be limited by the measure of standard  rent determinable  under the  Act, for  it  can reasonably be  presumed that  no hypothetical  tenant  would ordinarily agree to pay 626 more rent than what he could be made liable to pay under the Act. The  anomalous situation  which would thus arise on the contention of the Revenue would be that whilst the tenant is occupying the building the measure of the annual value would be the  contractual rent,  but if the tenant vacates and the building  is   self-occupied,  the  annual  value  would  be restricted to  the standard rent determinable under the Act. It is  difficult to see how the annual value of the building could vary  accordingly as  it is tenanted or self-occupied. The circumstance  that in  each of  the  present  cases  the tenant was  debarred by the period of limitation from making an application  for fixation  of the  standard rent  and the landlord was  consequently entitled  to continue  to receive the  contractual   rent,   cannot   therefore   affect   the applicability  of   the  decisions  in  the  Life  Insurance Corporation’s case  and the  Guntur Municipal Council’s case and it must be held that the annual value of the building in each of  these cases  was limited  by  the  measure  of  the standard rent determinable under the Act.      The problem  can also  be looked  at  from  a  slightly

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different angle.  When the Rent Control Legislation provides for fixation  of standard rent, which alone and nothing more than which  the  tenant  shall  be  liable  to  pay  to  the landlord, it does so because it considers the measure of the standard rent  prescribed by  it to  be reasonable.  It lays down the  norm of  reasonableness  in  regard  to  the  rent payable by  the tenant  to  the  landlord.  Any  rent  which exceeds this  norm of  reasonableness  is  regarded  by  the legislature  as   unreasonable  or   excessive.   When   the legislature has  laid down  this standard of reasonableness, would it be right for the Court to say that the landlord may reasonably expect  to receive  rent  exceeding  the  measure provided by  this standard?  Would it  be reasonable  on the part of the landlord to expect to receive any rent in excess of the  standard or  norm of reasonableness laid down by the legislature and  would such  expectation be  countenanced by the Court  as reasonable?  The legislature obviously regards recovery  of   rent  in  excess  of  the  standard  rent  as exploitative of  the tenant  and would  it be proper for the Court to  say that it would be reasonable on the part of the landlord to  expect to  recover such  exploitative rent from the tenant  ? We  are, therefore,  of the view that, even if the standard  rent has not been fixed by the Controller, the landlord  cannot   reasonably  expect   to  receive  from  a hypothetical tenant  anything more  than the  standard  rent determinable under  the Act  and this  would be  so  equally whether the  building has  been let  out to a tenant who has lost his right to apply for fixation of the standard rent or the building  is self-occupied  by the  owner. The assessing authority would,  in either  case, have to arrive at its own figure of the standard rent by 627 applying principles laid down in the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 for  determination of  standard rent  and determine the annual value  of the building on the basis of such figure of standard rent.      It is,  therefore, clear  that in  each of  the present cases, the  annual value  of the building must be held to be limited by  the measure of the standard rent determinable on the principles laid down in the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and it  cannot exceed  such measure  of  standard  rent.  We accordingly allow  Appeals Nos.  1143 and  1144 of  1973 and declare in  such of  these two  cases that the assessment of the Annual  value of  the building in excess of the standard rent determinable  on the  principles laid down in the Delhi Rent Control  Act, 1958  was illegal and ultra vires. So far as Appeal  No. 1201(N)  of 1973  preferred by  the Municipal Corporation of  Delhi is concerned, it relates to assessment of annual  value of self-occupied building and since we have held that  in case of self-occupied building also the annual value must  be determined  on the basis of the standard rent determinable under  the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958  and there we have agreed with the judgment of the High Court,  that appeal  must be dismissed. The assessee in each case will get his costs throughout. N.K.A.                     C.A. Nos. 1143 & 1144/73 allowed.                                  C.A. 1201 (N)/73 dismissed. 628