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CASE NO.: Special Leave Petition (civil) 5  of  2000

PETITIONER: IN RE: S.K. SUNDARAM

       Vs.

RESPONDENT:

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       15/12/2000

BENCH: K.T. Thomas &  R.P. Sethi

JUDGMENT:

THOMAS, J.

   "The  contempt of court jurisdiction is not exercised to protect  the dignity of an individual judge, but to  protect the  administration  of justice from being maligned."  While dealing  with this contempt proceedings we remind  ourselves of the said observation made by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Supreme Court Bar Association vs.  Union of India & anr.  [1998 (4)) SCC 409].

   One S.K.  Sundaram, Advocate (hereinafter referred to as the  contemnor)  sent  a telegraphic  communication  to  Dr. Justice  A.S.  Anand, the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India  on 3.11.2000.   As  the present proceedings are founded on  the wordings  of  that  communication we feel  it  necessary  to extract the material portion thereof.  It reads thus:

   "I  call  upon  Shriman Dr.  A.S.  Anand  Hon’ble  Chief Justice of India to step down from the Constitutional office of Chief Justice of India forthwith, failing which I will be constrained  to  move the criminal court for offences  under Sections  420, 406, 471 Indian Penal Code for  falsification of  your age, without prejudice to the right to file a  writ of quo-warranto against you and for a direction to deposit a sum  of  Rs.3  crores for usurping to the  office  of  Chief Justice   of  India  even  after   attaining  the   age   of superannuation."

   Within  three days of despatch of the said telegram  the contemnor  filed  a  criminal  complaint  before  the  Chief Metropolitan  Magistrate,  Madras  (Chennai)   in  which  he arraigned  the  Chief Justice of India as an accused in  the case.   He  produced a copy of the above quoted telegram  as one  of  the  documents  appended with  the  complaint.   He averred in the complaint, inter alia, thus:

   "The   accused  (CJI)   after  attaining  superannuation usurped  the office of Chief Justice of India, travelled  to foreign  countries, taken part in many conferences, seminars

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inside  and  outside India making appointments to  the  apex court,  the  High Courts and other local bodies  and  caused loss  to  the Exchequer to the tune of not less  than  three crores  of  rupees, apart from drawing salary  and  enjoying other perquisites and the same is estimated at not less than Rs.1.50  crores  which the accused is bound to indemnify  to the  Government of India;  and the complainant reserves  the right  to  take proceedings for recovery of the  same.   The complainant  states that in order to squat without any legal right  or justification, but solely on the basis of giving a deliberate  false  age, the accused is occupying the  highly respected office of Chief Justice of India.  The complainant charges  the  accused for offences under Sections 420,  406, 466,  468  and 471 of the Indian Penal Code and  prays  that this  Hon’ble  Court may be pleased to issue notice  against the  accused and he be dealt with according to law and  thus render justice."

   On a note put up by the Registrar-General of the Supreme Court  regarding  the  said  telegraphic  communication  the matter  was  taken up on the judicial side and we passed  an order  on  7.11.2000 that prima facie we are satisfied  that the  contents  of the said telegram sent by S.K.   Sundaram, Advocate,  amount  to  gross contempt of  court.   Hence  we issued notice to Mr.  S.K.  Sundaram, Advocate.  In the same proceedings  we directed the Registry to inform Mr.   Harish N.  Salve, Solicitor General of India to assist the Court in these proceedings.

   The contemnor filed a written reply to the notice issued to  him.   Therein he said, inter-alia, that he had  sent  a telegram  and it was followed up with the criminal complaint filed  before  the  Magistrate   concerned.   The  contemnor endeavoured  to  justify his actions by saying that  he  had done what he believed to be right and fair within the bounds of  his  knowledge of law and language.  In  the  succeeding paragraph  the contemnor tried to defend his actions stating that  he had earlier filed a writ petition on behalf of  his client  relating to the question of age of Dr.  Justice A.S. Anand  and  that writ petition was dismissed.  We  reproduce here  what  the contemnor has stated on that aspect  in  his reply:

   "The  contemnor  submits that even as on date,  the  age factor of the Chief Justice stands shrouded by mystery.  The confusion  stands  further confounded due to  the  documents supplied  to  the Press.  The contemnor on dismissal of  the writ  appeal  filed  on behalf of his client,  came  to  the conclusion  that  it was an uphill task and the question  in hand  was only a controversy.  But on seeing the Publication in  the  Hindu on 3.11.2000 the annexure found in  the  book "Big  Ego Small Men" he was subjected to the rudest shock of his  life and became agitated.  It led to the strong  belief that  Hon’ble  Mr.  Chief Justice Anand is holding the  post for  the  past  one  year even after  reaching  the  age  of superannuation  and  was  on the verge of continuing  for  a further  spell.   He felt the whole world was reeling  under his  feet.  The contemnor also virtually had a heart attack. Immediately  prompted  by  the   desire  for  bringing  this constitutional  crisis to an end he had rushed and sent  the telegram.   The contemnor was of the opinion that this was a matter, which cannot brook even a moment’s delay.  As he did not  find  any  reaction to the telegram,  actuated  by  his limited  knowledge,  attempted to seek redress  through  the criminal  court  by  filing a private complaint  before  the

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Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Court at Chennai."

   The  contemnor raised two preliminary objections.  First was  that  the  contempt proceedings  were  initiated  under Section  2(b)of  the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 (for  short "the  Act") and that refers only to civil contempt and hence the  present  proceedings must fail.  However, when  it  was pointed  out  to the learned counsel to the  contemnor  that Section  2(b)  was  got  typed  in   the  notice  due  to  a typographical  error and that it was corrected  subsequently as  Section 2(c) of the Act, learned counsel did not  pursue that objection.

   The  second  objection was that "hitherto all  suo  motu contempts  were initiated by a report of the witness to  the contempt,  which  would be the basis on which the  contemnor would be charged." In other words, he expected Hon’ble Chief Justice  of  India  to  initiate  the  contempt  proceedings against  him.   As mentioned by us at the very  outset,  the contempt  of  court  jurisdiction  is   not  to  protect  an individual  judge,  it is to protect the  administration  of justice  from  being maligned.  Hence, when his  expectation that  the  Chief  Justice  of   India  himself  would   have personally  filed  a petition against the contemnor did  not fructify,  he  cannot  question the maintainability  of  the action which was initiated suo motu by the court.

   The  third objection relates to the appointment of  Shri Harish  N.   Salve, learned Solicitor General for India,  as Amicus,  to  assist  the  court.   The  said  objection  was elaborated  by  the  contemnor  by stating  that  the  rules governing  contempt  proceeding envisage the appointment  of Solicitor  General only on the court framing the charge  and when  the  court intends to proceed with the case.  He  felt that  the appointment of the Solicitor General to assist the court,  made  in these proceedings, amounted to putting  the cart before the horse.

   There  is  neither any substance in nor any purpose  for raising  such  an  objection.   It appears to  us  to  be  a frivolous objection.  When the court appoints an advocate as Amicus  it  is  for  the  court to  get  assistance  in  the proceedings.   Power of the court in making such appointment is plenary and cannot be objected to by others.

   That  apart,  the  said  objection  was  raised  without reference   to  the  relevant   rules.   The  Supreme  Court formulated  rules in exercise of the powers under Section 23 of  the Contempt of Courts Act read with Article 145 of  the Constitution of India.  It is called "Supreme Court of India Rules  to  Regulate Proceedings for Contempt of the  Supreme Court,  1975".   Rule  10 says:  "The court may  direct  the Attorney  General or Solicitor General to appear and  assist the Court." Nowhere in the Rules a particular stage has been fixed  for the Court to make such appointment.  The power of the  Court to make such appointment is thus unrestricted and it can be ordered at any stage.  We therefore repel the said objection.

   On  the merits, Shri Karruppan, learned counsel for  the contemnor  raised mainly three lines of arguments.  First is that  the  action initiated against the contemnor is on  the telegraphic  communication  sent  by him to the CJI  and  it would not amount to publication and hence no contempt action could  be  taken  on  that  premise.   Second  is  that  the

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contemnor  bona fide believed that the year of birth of  Dr. Justice  Anand  was 1934 and hence he was actuated  by  good faith  in resorting to the acts done by him.  Third is  that sending  of the telegram, even if it amounts to publication, would  not  tend to undermine the administration of  justice and hence the proceedings are liable to be dropped.

   Dealing  with  the first contention we may look  at  the definition  of "criminal contempt" in the Act.  Section 2(c) contains  the definition of "criminal contempt" which  reads thus:

   "Criminal  contempt"  means the publication (whether  by words,  spoken  or  written,  or by  signs,  or  by  visible representation,  or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which-

   (i)  scandalises  or tends to scandalise, or  lowers  or tends to lower the authority of, any court;  or

   (ii)  prejudices,  or interferes or tends  to  interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceedings;  or

   (iii)   interferes  or  tends  to  interfere  with,   or obstructs  or  tends  to  obstruct,  the  administration  of justice in any other manner".

   Criminal   contempt   is  thus   vivisected   into   two categories.    One  is  publication  of  any  matter   which scandalises  or  tends  to scandalise the authority  of  any court  etc.  etc.  Second is the doing of any act whatsoever which  scandalises  or tends to scandalise the authority  of any  court etc.  etc.  If an act is not a criminal  contempt merely  because  there  was no publication  such  act  would automatically  fall within the purview of the other category because  the latter consists of "the doing of any other  act whatsoever".   The  latter  category  is  thus  a  residuary category  so  wide  enough  from which no  act  of  criminal contempt  can  possibly escape.  The common denominator  for both  is  that  it scandalises or tends to  scandalise  etc. etc.  of any court.

   One  of  the earliest occasions when this Court  had  to deal with criminal contempt of court was when a Constitution Bench  of  this Court (Patanjali Sastri, CJ,  B.K.Mukherjea, S.R.   Das, Ghulam Hasan, and N.H.Bhagwati, JJ) decided  the case  of  Brahma Prakash Sharma & ors.  vs.  State  of  U.P. {1953  SCR  1169}.   Their  Lordships  referred  to  certain decisions  of English courts including some observations  of the  Privy Council and pointed out that there are  primarily two considerations in such matters.  In the first place, the reflection  on  the  conduct  or character  of  a  judge  in reference  to the discharge of his judicial duties would not be  contempt  if such reflection is made in the exercise  of the  right  of  fair and reasonable  criticism  which  every citizen possesses in respect of public acts done in the seat of  justice.  In the second place, when attacks or  comments are  made on a judge or judges, disparaging in character and derogatory  to  their  dignity,  care  should  be  taken  to distinguish  between  what is a libel on the judge and  what amounts really to contempt of court.

   The  position is that a defamatory attack on a judge may be  a libel so far as the judge is concerned and it would be open  to  him  to proceed against the libellor in  a  proper

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action  if he so chooses.  The Constitution Bench laid  down the ratio thus:

   "If,  however,  the  publication   of  the   disparaging statement  is calculated to interfere with the due course of justice  or  proper administration of law by such court,  it can  be punished summarily as contempt.  One is a wrong done to  the judge personally while the other is a wrong done  to the  public.  It will be an injury to the public if it tends to  create  an  apprehension  in the  minds  of  the  people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the judge or to  deter  actual  and prospective  litigants  from  placing complete  reliance  upon  the   court’s  administration   of justice,  or  if it is likely to cause embarrassment in  the mind  of the judge himself in the discharge of his  judicial duties.   It is well established that it is not necessary to prove   affirmatively   that  there   has  been  an   actual interference with the administration of justice by reason of such defamatory statement;  it is enough if it is likely, or tends   in   any  way,  to   interfere   with   the   proper administration of law."

   In  Halsbury’s Laws of England, the learned author cited various  decisions  of  courts in England, of which  one  at paragraph 28 in Volume 9 is worth extracting:

   "It  is also a contempt to write threatening or  abusive letters  to  a  judge  in relation to the  exercise  of  his judicial functions."

   In Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi  vs.  State of Gujarat and ors.  {1991 (4) SCC 406}  a three Judge Bench of this Court observed thus:

   "The  definition of criminal contempt is wide enough  to include  any  act by a person which would tend to  interfere with  the administration of justice or which would lower the authority  of  court.   The  public have a  vital  stake  in effective  and orderly administration of justice.  The Court has  the duty of protecting the interest of the community in the  due administration of justice and, so, it is  entrusted with  the  power  to commit for contempt of  court,  not  to protect  the dignity of the Court against insult or  injury, but,  to  protect and vindicate the right of the  public  so that  the  administration  of   justice  is  not  perverted, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with."

   In  Dr.  D.C.  Saxena vs.  Hon’ble the Chief Justice  of India  {1996 (5) SCC 216} a contemnor filed a writ  petition against  the  then  Chief  Justice of  India  and  sought  a declaration  that the then Chief Justice of India was  unfit to  hold that office and hence he should be stripped of  his citizenship.   He also sought for a direction to register an FIR  against the then Chief Justice of India under different provisions  of IPC and to prosecute him under the Prevention of Corruption Act, and lastly he prayed for a direction that the  Chief  Justice  of  India should pay  a  sum  from  his personal  pocket  to  defray the expenses  incurred  by  the petitioner.  Dealing with the said acts of that individual a three Judge Bench of this Court, after holding him guilty of criminal contempt, has observed thus:

   "Scandalising  the court, therefore, would mean  hostile criticism  of  judges as judges or judiciary.  Any  personal

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attack  upon a judge in connection with the office he  holds is dealt with under law of libel or slander.  Yet defamatory publication concerning the judge as a judge brings the court or judges into contempt, a serious impediment to justice and an  inroad  on the majesty of justice.  Any caricature of  a judge  calculated  to lower the dignity of the  court  would destroy, undermine or tend to undermine public confidence in the administration of justice or the majesty of justice."

   Dealing  with the imputation that the then Chief Justice of  India  deliberately and willfully failed to perform  his duties the three Judge Bench further observed thus:

   "It  tends  to  lower the dignity and authority  of  the Court  and  also  sows  seeds   for  persons  with   similar propensity  to  undermine the authority of the Court or  the judiciary  as  a  whole;   he   crossed  all  boundaries  of recklessness and indulged in wild accusations."

   In  Re:   Ajay  Kumar  Pandey {1996  (6)  SCC  510}  the contemnor Ajay Kumar Pandey issued a notice to two Judges of this  Court  on 10.8.1996 containing a warning  that  unless those two judges tender unconditional apology to him and pay a  sum  of  Rs.2000/-  as compensation,  besides  a  further handsome  amount towards the mental agony inflicted on  him, he  would initiate criminal proceedings against the  judges. He  also  filed criminal complaint on 23.9.1996  before  the Court  of  Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi  against the two Judges alleging offences under Sections 167, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code.

   This  Court  after  making  a  survey  of  a  number  of decisions  including  Dr.   D.C.  Saxena’s  case,  made  the following observations:

   "We  may  observe that any threat of filing a  complaint against  the  Judge in respect of the  judicial  proceedings conducted  by him in his own court is a positive attempt  to interfere  with the due course of administration of justice. In  order  that the Judges may fearlessly and  independently act  in  the  discharge of their judicial functions,  it  is necessary  that they should have full liberty to act  within the sphere of their activity."

   It  is  unnecessary  now to multiply  the  citations  of decisions   which  deal  with   such  threats  and  criminal complaints  made against the judges, as the legal parameters are  well  neigh  laid down through  the  decisions  already referred  to  by  us.   The acts,  admittedly  done  by  the contemnor  and  reflected  poignantly   in  the  telegraphic communication   must   be  viewed   from  the  above   legal perspective.

   The  telegraphic  communication  sent by  the  contemnor contains  four  biddings.  The first is a command hurled  at the  CJI  to  step down forthwith  from  the  constitutional office.   The second is a threat administered to him that if the  command  is  not  obeyed forthwith, the  CJI  would  be described  as  an  offender  having  committed  offences  of cheating and falsification of records and criminal breach of trust.   The  third is another intimidatory epithet that  he would  file  a  writ  petition for a  direction  that  Chief Justice  of India should pay a sum of Rs.  3 crore.   Fourth is  an  imputation that the CJI A.S.  Anand is a usurper  in the  office  of  Chief Justice of India.  Any one  of  those

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postulates  would certainly scandalise and at any rate would tend  to scandalise and lower the authority of the courts as a whole, and particularly the Supreme Court of India.  Chief Justice  of India by virtue of his constitutional ranking is the head of the Indian judiciary.  When threats of the above nature  have been hurled at him they would unmistakably tend to undermine the position, majesty and dignity of the courts and the law.

   In  this connection we also considered the contention of the  learned  counsel for the contemnor that sending such  a telegram  would  not  amount to publication.  On  the  legal premise  the  contention  is  unacceptable.   A  telegraphic message  can be transmitted only after the sender gives  the contents  of the message to the telegraph office which would invariably  be  manned  by the staff of  that  office.   The message  after  transmission reaches the destination  office which  also  is  manned by the members of the  staff.   From there  only  the message would be despatched to the  sendee. At  all  those levels the message is open to be read  by  at least  those who are engaged in the process of transmission. It must be remembered that a telegraphic message is not like a letter handwritten by the sender and enveloped in a sealed cover to be opened only by the sendee for reading.

   In  this connection a reference can be made to Gatley on "Libel   and  Slander"  under   the  Chapter   "Publication" (Chap.6).  The learned author has stated the following:

   "222.   How  publication  is effected.   Publication  is effected  by  any  act on the part of  the  defendant  which conveys  the defamatory meaning of the matter to the  person to  whom it is communicated.  223.  If for example, a person reads  a defamatory letter, knowing it is defamatory, to any person  other than the person defamed, there is  publication of  the libel.  Again, if the writer of a defamatory  letter hands  the  letter to his clerk to be copied or  typewritten before  it is sent to the person defamed, and the clerk does copy  or  typewrite the letter, there is publication of  the libel to the clerk."

   That  apart,  it  is not now open to  the  contemnor  to contend  that  there was no publication of  the  telegraphic communication  despatched  by  him to the Chief  Justice  of India  because  when he filed the criminal complaint in  the court  in implementation of the telegraphic threat hurled to the  CJI,  he  appended a copy of  the  telegram  therewith. Thus, he made it public at his own volition.

   Now,  we will consider the alternative contention of the learned counsel for the contemnor that it was an act done in good faith as he believed honestly that the year of birth of Dr.  Justice A.S.  Anand was 1934.

   The  expression  "good faith" in criminal  jurisprudence has a definite connotation.  Its import is totally different from  saying that the person concerned has honestly believed the truth of what is said.  Good faith is defined in Section 52 of the Indian Penal Code thus:

   "Nothing  is said to be done or believed in ‘good faith’ which is done or believed without due care and attention."

   See  the language of the law in this regard.  It  starts in the negative tone excluding all except what is allowed to

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be  within its amplitude.  Insistence sought to be  achieved through  the commencing words of the definition "nothing  is said  to  be  done or believed in good faith"  is  that  the solitary  item included within the purview of the expression "good  faith" is what is done with "due care and attention". Due  care  denotes the degree of reasonableness in the  care sought   to  be  exercised.   In  Black’s  Law   Dictionary, "reasonable  care"  is explained as "such a degree of  care, precaution,  or  diligence  as may fairly  and  properly  be expected  or  required, having regard to the nature  of  the action,  or  of  the subject matter  and  the  circumstances surrounding the transaction.  It is such care as an ordinary prudent  person would exercise under the conditions existing at the time he is called upon to act."

   So  before  a person proposes to make an  imputation  on another  the  author  must first make an  enquiry  into  the factum  of the imputation which he proposes to make.  It  is not  enough  that  he does just a make-believe show  for  an enquiry.   The enquiry expected of him is of such a depth as a  reasonable  and prudent man would make with  the  genuine intention  in knowing the real truth of the imputation which is  up in his sleeves.  If he does not do so he cannot claim that what he did was bona fide i.e.  done in good faith.

   Dealing  with the expression "good faith" in relation to the  exceptions  enumerated under Section 499 of the  Indian Penal  Code  (relating  to the offence of  defamation)  this Court in Harbhajan Singh vs.  State of Punjab and anr.  {AIR 1966 SC 97} has stated thus:

   "The  element  of  honesty which is  introduced  by  the definition  prescribed  by  the General Clauses Act  is  not introduced  by the definition of the Penal Code;  and we are governed  by the definition prescribed by S.52 of that Code. So,  in considering the question as to whether the appellant acted in good faith in publishing his impugned statement, we have  to  enquire  whether  he   acted  with  due  care  and attention.   There  is no doubt that the mere plea that  the accused  believed  that what he stated was true  by  itself, will  not  sustain  his case of good faith under  the  Ninth Exception.   Simple belief or actual belief by itself is not enough.   The  appellant  must show that the belief  in  his impugned  statement had a rational basis and was not just  a blind  simple belief.  That is where the element of due care and  attention plays an important role.  If it appears  that before  making  the statement the accused did not  show  due care  and  attention,  that would defeat his  plea  of  good faith."

   Thus,  a  contemnor, if he is to establish "good  faith" has to say that he conducted a reasonable and proper enquiry before  making  an imputation that Dr.  Justice A.S.   Anand has  usurped  in the office of CJI as his year of birth  was definitely  1934 and that was the reason which actuated  him to venture for launching the acts which he perpetrated.

   In the above context we may point out that the contemnor himself  filed  a  writ petition in 1991, on behalf  of  his client,  (one Smt.  Kasturi Radhakrishnan) when Dr.  Justice A.   S.   Anand was the Chief Justice of the High  Court  of Madras.   The  contemnor in that writ petition  arrayed  the President  of  India  as  respondent No.1,  the  then  Chief Justice  of  India as respondent No.2 and Dr.  Justice  A.S.

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Anand  as respondent No.3 and prayed for a writ of  mandamus directing  the President of India to decide the question  of age  of Dr.  Justice A.S.  Anand in conformity with  Article 217(3)  of the Constitution of India.  Though the said  writ petition  was dismissed by the Single Judge and the  Letters Patent  Appeal  filed by the contemnor against dismissal  of the  writ petition was also dismissed by a Division Bench of the  Madras High Court on 1.8.1991 the President of India in consultation  with  the then Chief Justice of India  decided the  question  relating  to his age as  early  as  16.5.1991 holding  that the date of birth of Dr.  Justice A.S.   Anand was  1.11.1936.  The documents which the President of  India then considered for that purpose were (1) The certificate of matriculate  examination  dated  1.9.1951   issued  by   the University  of  J & K in respect of Adarsh Sein  Anand  (the present  CJI) which showed explicitly that his date of birth was 1.11.1936.  (2) The passport issued to Adarsh Sein Anand (the  present CJI) on 3.8.1960, also explicitly showed  that his date of birth was 1.11.1936.  (3) The report prepared by the  then  CJI  in respect of the age of Dr.   Justice  A.S. Anand,  who  was  then  a  Judge of  the  High  Court.   The President’s   Secretariat  issued  an   order  way  back  on 16.5.1991, which can be extracted below:

   "The  petition  from  Shri   S.K.   Sundaram,  Advocate, Madras,  to  the President on behalf of his client  Shrimati Kasturi   Radhakrishnan,   Chairperson,    Madras   Citizens Progressive  Council,  Madras  and  the  records  have  been perused  and  the  matter considered by  the  President,  in consultation with the Chief Justice of India.  The President has  come to the conclusion that the petitions of Shri  S.K. Sundaram,  Advocate,  Madras, in respect of the age  of  Dr. Justice  A.S.   Anand of the Madras High Court, be  rejected and  that  no inquiry as stipulated under Article 217(3)  of the Constitution need be undertaken."

   Once  the  age  of  Dr.   Justice  A.S.   Anand  was  so determined  by  the  President of India in exercise  of  his constitutional authority, in whom alone is the power reposed to  determine the question of the age of a judge of the High Court,  it  was  not open to this contemnor  to  raise  this question  over  again and again.  When this  contemnor  once again  raised  the question of the age of Dr.  Justice  A.S. Anand,  in  the year 1999, the Government of India issued  a press  communication  which, after referring to the  earlier proceedings  adopted  by the President of India, has  stated thus:   "This  plea  was again rejected on the  ground  that there  was no basis for reopening the matter.  The  decision of  the  President  is  final   under  Article  217  of  the Constitution."

   When the contemnor filed a criminal complaint before the Chief  Metropolitan  Magistrate against the present  CJI  he adverted to the following as the basis for his case:

   "The   complainant  states  that  in  the  Hindu   dated 3.11.2000 at page 13 a photostat copy of the age particulars of  the accused printed which categorically states that  the accused  had given his date of birth as 1934.  But the  fact remains that the accused had not chosen to give any original date  of birth from the School Certificate:  Municipality or from  the College authorities.  The date of birth  published in  the  Hindu  dated  3.11.2000 clearly  reveals  that  the accused  had already attained the age of superannuation  but still  he  is holding the high constitutional office of  the

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Chief Justice of India in charge of Administration of nearly 21 State High Courts."

   What  was contained in the "Hindu" dated 3.11.2000 was a statement  issued  by  Mr.   Ram  Jethmalani,  former  Union Minister for Law, in answer to a statement issued by Mr.  K. Parasaran,  former Attorney General for India, in the  Hindu published  on 25.10.2000.  We have absolutely no doubt  that when  the President of India resolved the question of age of Dr.   Justice  A.S.  Anand in 1991 when he was the Judge  of the  High Court, that too pursuant to the contemnor  himself raking  up  the question then, he should have, as a  dutiful citizen  of India, realised that the said decision  attained finality  so far as the question of the age of Dr.   Justice A.S.   Anand is concerned.  Such decision was based on  very weighty  and formidable materials available to the President of  India then.  Thus the telegraphic communication and  the criminal  complaint launched by him smacks of utter lack  of bona fides.

   Well,  if  he is determined to feign that he  would  not look  at  any  one of those materials as well as  the  final decision  rendered  by the President of India regarding  the age  of  Dr.   Justice  A.S.  Anand,  and  then  decided  to persistently  jump  into the foray with the tirade,  putting himself  into  the outfit and chasuble of  his  professional insignia,  it  is only reminiscent of the Spanish  hero  Don Quixote  of  La  Mancha.  On the part of this Court  we  may observe  that if the contemnor had stopped with his telegram we  would have persuaded ourselves to ignore it as a case of ranting  gibberish.  But when he followed it up with lodging of a criminal complaint before a criminal court in which CJI was  arrayed  as  an accused having  committed  offences  of cheating,  criminal  breach  of trust and  falsification  of records,  we realised that he seriously meant to malign  and undermine the dignity and authority of this Court.

   It  may  be relevant to point out that the note  of  the Registrar,  on  the  basis of which Suo  Motu  Contempt  was initiated against the contemnor specifically referred to and reproduced  the  Presidential Order dated  16.5.1991  issued under  Article 217(3) of the Constitution.  The defiant  and malafide attitude of the Contemnor is apparent from the fact that  despite knowing about the actual date of birth of  the Chief  Justice  of  India and the Presidential  Order  dated 16.5.1991  which  was read over by the Solicitor General  in the  open  Court on 21st November, 2000 in presence  of  the contemnor,  he  chose to adhere to his false claim  alleging the age of the Chief Justice of India to be the year 1934.

   We  have,  therefore, not a speck of doubt in  our  mind that the impugned action of the contemnor is a case of gross criminal contempt of court.  It is a serious matter for this Court  because  vilification of the high personage of  Chief Justice  of  India would undermine the majesty of the  court and  dignity  of this institution.  We, therefore, hold  him guilty  of criminal contempt and convict him thereunder.  We sentence him to undergo imprisonment for six months.

   But  then,  we consider another aspect.   The  contemnor said  that  he is a heart patient.  Mr.  Harish  N.   Salve, learned  Solicitor  General  pleaded with us that  the  said statement  of the contemnor may be considered as a ground in deciding  how to inflict the punishment.  We therefore order that  the sentence of imprisonment for six months will stand

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suspended  for  a  period of one month from today.   If  the contemnor  would  give an undertaking in this court, in  the form of an affidavit, to the effect that he would not commit or even attempt to commit any act of criminal contempt, then the  sentence now imposed by us would remain suspended for a further  period of five years.  But if the contemnor commits any  act of criminal contempt during the said period of five years, the suspension of the sentence will stand revoked and then  he  will have to undergo the sentence of  imprisonment for  six  months.  Otherwise the question of revival of  the sentence  would depend upon the order which this Court would pass  on the expiry of five years.  Ordered accordingly.  We place  on  record  our gratitude to Shri Harish  N.   Salve, learned  Solicitor General for India, for the assistance  he rendered to us in these proceedings.

   A  copy  of this judgment will be forwarded to  the  Bar Council  of Tamil Nadu and also to the Bar Council of India, for information.