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PETITIONER: DEV SINGH & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: REGISTRAR, PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT15/04/1987

BENCH: KHALID, V. (J) BENCH: KHALID, V. (J) PATHAK, R.S. (CJ)

CITATION:  1987 AIR 1629            1987 SCR  (2)1005  1987 SCC  (3) 169        JT 1987 (3)    34  1987 SCALE  (1)869  CITATOR INFO :  RF&E       1992 SC2219  (53,58,63,135)

ACT:     Rules and Orders of the Punjab High Court Vol. I,  Chap- ter 18-A, Rules IX and X: Dismissal of ministerial staff  of subordinate  courts by District Judge--Service  appeal  dis- posed of by High Court--Whether judicial decision.     Constitution  of  India, Articles 136 and  235:  Removal from service of ministerial staff by District  Judge-Service appeal dismissed by High Court--Decision whether judicial or administrative-Whether  assailable in petition  for  special leave.

HEADNOTE:     Sub-section (2) of Section 35 of the Punjab Courts  Act, 1918 confers power of appointment of ministerial officers of all courts controlled by a District Court and their  suspen- sion  and  removal on the District  Court.  Sub-section  (3) makes  every appointment subject to such rules as  the  High Court  may prescribe in this behalf, while  sub-section  (4) makes  orders  passed by the District Judge subject  to  the control of the High Court. Chapter 18-A of the High Court Rules and Orders framed under Section  35(3)  controls  the  appointments,  promotion  and punishment  of  ministerial officials in  the  District  and other civil courts, other than the High Court. Sub-rule 2(a) of  Rule  IX in that Chapter enables the District  Judge  to inflict  any  of the penalties mentioned  in  sub-rule  (1): censure,  fine, recovery of any pecuniary loss,  withholding of  increments or promotions, suspension, removal  and  dis- missal  of the ministerial officers of his own court or  any court  subordinate  to  him other than the  Court  of  Small Causes. Sub-rule (2) of Rule X provides ’for appeals to  the High  Court  against penalties. Sub-rule  (3)  requires  the persons  appealing to the High Court to do so by a  petition to  the  District Judge, who shall forward the same  to  the Registrar of the High Court with remarks that he may wish to make.  After reading the petition the High Court may  either (a) summarily reject it without hearing the petitioner;  (b) refer it to the District Judge for report and on receipt  of such report reject the petition without hearing; or (c) hear

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the  petitioner,  and  where other persons are  held  to  be concerned such other person in open court. 1006 Sub-rule (4) forbids the petitioners to attend personally at the  High Court unless summoned and provides for  communica- tion  to them of orders on their petitions through the  Dis- trict Judge.     The appellants, who were the employees in the ministeri- al  establishment of the courts at Ferozepur and Zira,  were alleged to have taken a prominent part in raising objection- able  slogans against the Judicial Magistrate and  the  Dis- trict Judge, in a demonstration organised by the subordinate court officials, to protest against the slapping of a subor- dinate  by the Judicial Magistrate, Zira. They were  charge- sheeted  for  their misconduct. After enquiry it  was  found that they contravened Rule 7(1) of the Government  Employees (Conduct) Rules, 1966 by acting prejudicially to the  public order, decency and morality and were dismissed from  service by  the  District  Judge in his capacity  aS  the  punishing authority.     The  appellants  preferred a service appeal  before  the High Court which was dismissed.     While granting the special leave on 2nd April, 1982 this Court made the following order:               "Appeal will be heard  .......  on the prelim-               inary  issue as to whether the High  Court  in               disposal  of appeal was acting in  administra-               tive capacity under Art. 235 or as a  Tribunal               or  as a High Court and the  circumstances  in               which the appeal was maintained, if so."     It  was contended on behalf of the appellants  that  the decision  of  the High Court in this case was  the  judicial decision of a tribunal which could be examined by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. Dismissing the appeal, the Court,     HELD: 1.1 The appeal is not maintainable. Every decision or order by an authority which has a duty to act  judicially is not subject to appeal to this Court. Article 136  contem- plates appeals only from adjudications of courts and  tribu- nals.  Such adjudication must doubtless be judicial. if  the power  exercised was administrative in nature it  would  ex- clude such a tribunal from the ambit of Article 136. [1029C; 1028H; 1020D]     1.2 Every authority which is required to act  judicially either  by  its constitution or by virtue of  the  authority conferred upon it is 1007 not necessarily a tribunal for the purposes of Article  136. A  tribunal,  whose adjudication is subject to  appeal  must besides  being  under a duty to act judicially,  be  a  body invested with the judicial power of the State. [1029A]     1.3  There is a clear distinction between courts of  law exercising  judicial powers and other bodies.  Decisions  by courts  are  clearly  judicial. That Is not  the  case  with bodies  exercising  administrative or executive  powers.  In certain matters even judges have to act administratively and in so doing may have to act quasi-judicially in dealing with matters entrusted to them. It is only where the  authorities are required to act judicially either by express  provisions of the statute or by necessary implication that the decision of  such an authority would amount to a quasi-judicial  pro- ceeding.  When  Judges in exercise of  their  administrative functions  decide cases it cannot be said that  their  deci- sions  are either judicial or quasi-judicial decisions.  The test that has to be applied to find out whether an order  is

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a  judicial order or not is the existence of a  lis  between the parties. [1028F; 1025C]     In  the instant case, the High Court while disposing  of the  appeal  was  not acting as a tribunal.  It  was  acting purely administratively. It was not resolving any dispute or controversy between two adversaries but only exercising  its power of control over the subordinate judiciary which is the same  as  control under Article 235 of the  Constitution  of India. [1028E; 1027C; 1029B; 1013C]     Durga  Shankar  Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh  &  Ors., [1955]  1 SCR 267; Bachhittar Singh v. The State of  Punjab, [1962] Snppl. 3 SCR 713; Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P.N.  Sharma & Anr, [1965] 2 SCR 366; Harinagar Sugar  Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala, [1962] 2 SCR 339; Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Lakshmichand and others, [1963] Suppl. 1 SCR  242; Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles  Limited, Bombay, [1963] Suppl. 1 SCR 625; Indo-China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Jasjit Singh, Additional Collector of Customs  & Ors.,  [1964] 6 SCR 594 and APHLC v. M.A. Sangma,  [1978]  1 SCR 393, referred to.     2.1 In deciding the appeal under Rule X in Chapter  18-A the  High Court exercises only a supervisory  administrative control  over the subordinate courts and does not act  as  a tribunal disposing of an appeal involving a lis between  two rival parties and arriving at a judicial decision. [1019D] 1008     2.2 The appeal under Rule X(3) has to be by a  petition, to be routed through the District Judge who sends it to  the Registrar  of the High Court. These are procedural  formali- ties which normally govern appeals preferred before the High Court  on the administrative side. The permission  given  to the authority who imposes penalty to record his own  remarks which he wishes to make concerning his own order is  further proof  of the fact that what the High Court has to  consider is not a matter on the judicial side but one in its power of control  and  superintendence over the  subordinate  courts. [1018A]  2.3  The  procedure contained in Rule X(3) of  hearing  the petition  not similar to the procedure followed  in  regular judicial  proceedings.  It is not obligatory  for  the  High Court to hear the petitioner. It can go into the papers  and reject it summarily without giving the petitioner an  oppor- tunity to be heard. Alternative, it could get a report  from the  District Judge and on receipt of such a report  dismiss it without hearing the petitioner. Thirdly, it could give  a hearing to the petitioner and also those who will be affect- ed. This manner of disposal of the petition makes it  appar- ent  that it is not strictly a judicial proceeding  but  has all  the  trappings of an administrative proceeding  and  an administrative decision. [1018E-H]     2.4 Sub-rule (4) of Rule X again marks a complete depar- ture from the normal judicial proceeding before a court. The petitioners  are forbidden to attend personally at the  High Court.  They  can do so only when summoned.  In  a  judicial proceeding,  the party has a right to appear  personally  or through  counsel.  This denial also robs the appeal  of  its character of a judicial proceeding. [1019C]    2.5 The fact that Rule X is found in Chapter 18-A,  which deals  with control, also gives the administrative shade  to the proceeding under this Rule. Section 35(4) of the  Punjab Courts Act, 1918, which stipulates that any order passed  by the  District Judge under this section shall be  subject  to the  control of the High Court, further fortifies  the  view that the proceedings under Rule X(3) and the decisions  made thereunder are not judicial in nature. [1019E]

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   It  cannot, therefore, be said that in the instant  case the High Court while deciding the appeal acted as a tribunal whose order can be challenged before this Court under  Arti- cle 136 of the Constitution. [1019F]     [The  Registrar to transfer the records of the  case  to the High Court. The latter to take the petition on its  file as a petition under 1009 Article  226  and  dispose  of  the  matter  expeditiously.] [1029D]

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1278  of 1982.     From  the  Judgment  and Order dated  30.9.1981  of  the Punjab  and  Haryana High Court in Service  Appeals  of  the Appellants.     V.M. Tarkunde, Mrs. Urmila Kapur and Ms. Janki  Sriniva- san for the Appellants. Kapil Sibal and Ratbin Dass for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     KHALID,  J. 1. The appellants were the employees in  the ministerial  establishment of the Courts at  Ferozepore  and Zira having entered into service varying from the year  1952 to 1965. They are members of the Punjab Civil Courts  Clerks Association.  On 24th July, 1980, there was an  incident  in the  Court  of Shri N.S. Mundra,  Judicial  Magistrate,  1st Class, Zira. On that day, one Jagdish Lal, a Senior Ahmad of the  Court was slapped. He is one of the appellants in  this appeal. On the day he was slapped, he presented a  represen- tation  to  the District and Sessions Judge Shri  Nehra.  An enquiry  was  directed to be held by the  Senior  Sub-Judge, Ferozepore into the incident. In this enquiry, it was  found that Shri Mundra, Judicial Magistrate, Zira slapped  Jagdish Lal. This incident caused resentment in the Association  and the  Association, therefore, felt that something  should  be done  to  demonstrate this resentment. Accordingly,  it  was decided by the Association that a request should be made  to the  District  and Sessions Judge, Ferozepore,  to  transfer Jagdish  Lal  from the Court at Zira to any other  Court  so that calm could be restored. The appellants among others met the  District  and Sessions Judge for this  purpose  on  28- 71980. It is alleged that the Sessions Judge did not  accede to the request of the representatives of the Association  to plead their case before him. This aggravated the  situation. Though  the association and their representatives  including the appellants were keen to resolve the matter, the District and  Sessions Judge adopted a hardened attitude. The  matter came to the notice of the High Court. An enquiry by  Justice S.P.  Goyal  of  the High Court of Punjab  and  Haryana  was directed  to  be held and it was scheduled for  9th  August, 1980. He was to reach the Canal Rest House at 4.00 P.M., but he could reach only at 7.30 P.M. At that time, the  District and Sessions Judge, along with other Judicial 1010 officers  were present to receive him. A  demonstration  was organised  by  the subordinate Court  officials.  There  was continued  slogan  shouting from 4.00 P.M.  till  7.30  P.M. before  Justice Goyal’s arrival. The appellants are said  to have  taken a prominent part in raising  objectionable  slo- gans. The slogans are:               "N.S.  Mundra Murdabad; N.S. Mundra  Hai  Hai;               Dakia  Mahajan Superintendent  Murdabad;  B.S.

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             Nehra  Murdabad; B.S. Nehra naun Chalta  Karo;               Katal Nehra Murdabad; B.S. Nehra Murdabad;" The  appellants  were  charge-sheeted for  this  conduct  of theirs.     2.  Justice Goyal alighted from his car and went  inside the visiting room of the rest house. He called the represen- tatives of the Association. Some of them met him. They  came out after the meeting. There were other demonstrators  wait- ing for the result of the talks. After they came back, those who  raised  slogans disbursed. On 11th  August,  1980,  the District  Judge  sent a letter to Shri G.S.  Khurana,  Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ferozepore, to hold preliminary enquiry into  the demonstration by the Court officials in  front  of the  Canal  Rest  House and the slogans  raised  there.  Mr. Khurana recorded the statements of some officers on the same day  and submitted his report on that very day  itself.  Ac- cording to his report, the appellants had taken a  prominent part  in raising objectionable slogans in question.  On  the basis  of this report, the District Judge placed the  appel- lants under suspension by his order dated 14-8-1980. On 12th August,  1980,  the District Judge had  intimated  the  High Court  about the finding in the preliminary report  and  had sought  guidance  of  the High Court.  The  appellants  were supplied with the articles of the charges and statements  of imputation  etc.  They gave their replies.  While  admitting that they had taken part in the demonstration on the day  in question they denied that they had taken a prominent part in the  demonstration as leaders in raising  objectionable  and defamatory slogans against their superior officers. A formal enquiry  was ordered against these appellants. After  a  de- tailed enquiry it was found that the appellants had  contra- vened  inter  alia  Rule 7(1) of  the  Government  Employees (Conduct) Rules, 19.66. and had thus acted prejudicially  to the  public order, decency and morality and thereby  contra- vened Rule 7(1) of the Government Employees (Conduct) Rules, 1966. The District Judge, Ferozepore in his capacity as  the punishing  authority then served a show cause notice on  all the appellants as to why the penalty of dismissal from serv- ice  be not imposed on them. The appellants submitted  their explanation. After 1011 considering  the replies, the District Judge, by  his  order dated  17.11.1980, imposed on them punishment  of  dismissal from service.     3. The appellants preferred a service appeal in the High Court  of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. The  High  Court considered the various contentions raised by the  appellants in  detail and dismissed the appeal as having no merit.  One of  the employees who had also filed appeal before the  High Court withdrew his appeal and is now reported to be practis- ing law.     This appeal has, therefore, come up before us by special leave  under  Article 136, against the order of  the  Single judge in the above mentioned service appeal.     We  have given only the bare facts in this judgment  for the  reason  that this Court issued notice on  the  SLP  for consideration  of  a preliminary point only  which  will  be evident  by the orders passed on 3.12. 198 1,  4-1-1982  and 2-4-1982.               "Order of the Court on 3-12-1981:               Issue  show cause notice on SLP returnable  on               4-1-1982,  on the question as to  whether  the               High  Court in disposing of the appeal of  the               petitioners   was  acting  in   administrative               capacity  or as a Tribunal or as  High  Court.

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             There  will be interim injunction  restraining               the respondents from evicting petitioner No. 2               from  Government accommodation held by him  on               the condition that the said petitioner contin-               ues  to pay rent or compensation  at  hitherto               charged, pending notice."               "Order of the Court on 4. 1. 1982:               Special  leave  petition to be  heard  on  the               question  whether the High Court in  disposing               of the appeal of the petitioners was acting in               an  administrative capacity under Article  235               or  as  a Tribunal or as the High  Court.  The               special leave petition to be heard on 9.2.1982               on this question. Stay to continue till then."               "Order of the Court on 2.4. 1982:               Special leave granted. Printing of records and               filing  of statement of case  dispensed  with.               Security dispensed with. Appeal will be  heard               on present papers on the preliminary issue  as               to  whether  the  High Court  in  disposal  of               appeal               1012               was  acting in administrative  capacity  under               Article 235 or as Tribunal or as a High  Court               and the circumstances in which the appeal  was               maintained, if so. Hearing of appeal will  be-               fixed  on  second Tuesday in  July  1982  pre-               emptorily subject to overnight’s part heard." From the above orders it is clear that the question that  is to  be  decided in this appeal is whether  an  appeal  under Article  136 lies to this Court from the order  under  chal- lenge. That being so, it is necessary to consider the nature of the appeal before the High Court and the rules  governing that  appeal, before discussing the questions of law  raised by the appellant’s counsel with reference to various author- ities  of  this Court, to contend that article 136  was  at- tracted.     4.  The appointment of the ministerial officers  of  the District Courts and Courts of Small Causes and their suspen- sion and removal are provided under Section 35 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918. That Section reads as follows:                     "35(1)  The ministerial officers of  the               District  Courts  and Courts of  Small  Causes               shall  be  appointed and,may be  suspended  or               removed by the Judges of those Courts  respec-               tively.               (2)  The  ministerial officers of  all  Courts               controlled  by  a District Court,  other  than               Courts  of Small Causes, shall  be  appointed,               and  may be suspended or removed by  the  Dis-               trict Court.               (3) Every appointment under this section shall               be subject to such rules as the High Court may               prescribe in this behalf, and in dealing  with               any  matter under this Section, a Judge  of  a               Court of Small Causes shall act subject to the               control of the District Court.               (4) Any order passed by a District Judge under               this  section shall be subject to the  control               of the High Court."     5.  The High Court framed rules under this  section  for the  subordinate services attached to or controlled by  Dis- trict  Courts.  These rules apply  to  subordinate  services attached  to Civil Courts other than the High Court,  namely to  ministerial  and menial establishment  of  District  and

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Sessions Judge, Sub-Judge and Courts of Small Causes.  Chap- ter 1013 18-A  of  the rules is the one relevant for our  purpose.  A close  study  of the scheme and the  various  provisions  of Chapter  18-A  would make it abundantly clear that  the  ap- pointments, promotions, punishments etc. of the  ministerial officials of the Courts subordinate to the High Court,  were fully  within the powers of the District and Sessions  Judge subject  to the control of the High Court. Chapter  18-A  is captioned  ’control’. Though there were changes effected  by notifications  issued by the State of Punjab  regarding  ap- pointments,  promotions in other services, after the  coming into  force  of  the Government of India Act,  1935,  it  is enough to note for our purpose that the appointment,  promo- tion and punishment of ministerial officials in the District or other Civil Courts continued to be governed by the  rules in Chapter 18-A of the High Court Rules and Orders.     6. Control in chapter 18-A is the same as control  under Article 235 of the Constitution of India, Articles 233,  234 and  235  of the Constitution of India deal  with  the  High Courts’ control over the subordinate judiciary. Article  227 deals  with the power of superintendence over all Courts  by the High Court. Its predecessor section in the Government of India Act, 1935 was Section 224 which dealt with administra- tive functions of the High Court. Article 233 deals with the appointment  of  District Judges and Article  234  with  the recruitment of persons other than the District Judges to the judicial  service. Article 235 deals with the  control  over subordinate  courts  and the control under this  Article  is wider than the control under the corresponding provision  of the  Government of India Act. For our purpose, it is  suffi- cient to note that Chapter 18-A contains provisions relating to the control of the High Court over the subordinate  judi- ciary.     7. For the purpose of this appeal, we are concerned only with  Rules IX and X of the rules in Chapter 18-A.  Rule  IX deals  with punishment. We extract the entire section  since it  would be profitable to have a correct look at this  sec- tion.               "IX--Punishment--(1)  The following  penalties               may for good and sufficient reasons be imposed               upon members of the ministerial staff:-               (i) Censure,                  (ii)  Fine of an amount not  exceeding  one               month’s  salary for misconduct or  neglect  in               the performance of duties,               1014                     (iii) Recovery from pay of the whole  or               part  of any pecuniary loss caused to  Govern-               ment by negligence or breach of orders,                     (iv) Withholding of increments or promo-               tion including stoppage at efficiency bar,               (v) Suspension,               (vi) Removal, and               (vii) Dismissal.               (2)(a)  Any  of  the above  penalties  may  be               inflicted by the District Judge on the  minis-               terial officers of his own Court of any  Court               subordinate to him other than a Court of Small               Causes, and on the menials of his own Court.                        (b)  The  Judge of a Court  of  Small               Causes may inflict any of the above  penalties               on the ministerial officers or menials of  his               own Court.

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                      (c) The District Judge may, with  the               previous sanction of the High Court,  delegate               to any Subordinate Judge the power to  inflict               penalties given in clause (a) to be  exercised               by  the  Subordinate Judge  in  any  specified               portion of the district subject to the control               of the District Court. Note:-  This  delegation has been made to  the  Senior  Sub- Judge,.  1st Class, in each district in regard to the  proc- ess-serving  establishment  of all Courts  in  the  district except  that of the District Judge’s Court and the Court  of the Judge, Small Causes, Lahore, Amritsar and Delhi.               (d)  Any  Subordinate Judge may  fine,  in  an               amount  not exceeding one month’s salary,  any               ministerial  officer  of  his  own  Court  for               misconduct  or neglect in the  performance  of               his duties.               (e)  The Senior Subordinate Judge may  inflict               any  of the above penalties on menials of  his               own  Court or the Courts of other  Subordinate               Judges in the same district."     In  Sub-Rule (1), eight penalties are categorised.  Sub- Rule  (2) enables the District Judge to inflict any  of  the penalties  mentioned in Sub-Rule (1). Rule IX(2)(c)  enables the  District Judge, with the previous sanction of the  High Court, to delegate to any Subordinate Judge 1015 the  power  to inflict penalties given in clause  (a).  Then comes  the  important section that deals with  appeals  i.e. Rule X. We think it useful to extract the Rule in full.               "X.  Appeals.--(1) The District Judge  may  on               appeal  or  otherwise reverse  or  modify  any               order made under rule IX(2) by any Court under               his control including a Court of Small Causes,               and his order shall be final:                        Provided  that nothing in  this  rule               shall  preclude the High Court  from  altering               where it deems fit any such appellate order of               a  District Judge on petition by an  aggrieved               person or otherwise:                        Provided  further that  the  District               Judge  shall  not enhance any  punishment  but               should, if he considers enhancement desirable,               refer the case to the High Court for orders.                        (2)  Appeals  against  penalties  in-               flicted  by a District Judge shall lie to  the               High Court in the following cases only:-                       (a)   Penalties  mentioned   in   Rule               IX(iii)  to (viii) in respect  of  ministerial               servants,  holding permanent  and  pensionable               posts;                       (b) Orders of substantive  appointment               by  promotion or otherwise to a permanent  and               pensionable  post the maximum pay of which  is               Rs.75 or more per mensem;                       (c)  Orders of  temporary  appointment               which is to last more than three months or has               in  fact  lasted  more than  three  months  in               respect  of posts the maximum pay of which  is               Rs.75 or more per mensem.                        (3)  Persons  appealing to  the  High               Court under this rule shall do so by petition.               Such  petition, accompanied by a copy  of  the               order  complained against, shall be  presented               to  the  District Judge who passed  the  order

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             within  one  month of the date of  such  order               (the period between the               1016               date of application for the copy and the  date               on  which it is supplied being excluded).  The               District  Judge will forward the  petition  to               the Registrar of the High Court without unnec-               essary  delay, and in forwarding the  same  he               will be at liberty to record any remarks which               he  may  wish to make  concerning  any  matter               stated in the petition.                        After reading the petition, the  High               Court may either--                       (a) Summarily reject it without  hear-               ing the petitioner;                       (b) refer it to the District Judge for               report  and on receipt of such  report  reject               the  petition without hearing the  petitioner;               or                       (c) hear the petitioner, and in  cases               where  other persons are held to be  concerned               in  the  subject of the petition,  such  other               person in open Court.                        Nothing  in these rules  shall  debar               the  High  Court  or a  District  Judge,  from               altering, if deemed fit, any order of  punish-               ment  or  appointment not provided  for  above               which  may  be  passed by  a  District  Judge,               Senior  Subordinate  Judge OF the Judge  of  a               Small  Causes Court in respect of  ministerial               or  menial  establishment  when  an  aggrieved               person  petitions or otherwise.  District  and               Sessions  Judges should not, therefore,  with-               hold any petition addressed to the High  Court               whether  an appeal lies to it in the  case  or               not  under these rules. In a case in which  no               appeal  lies the District and  Sessions  Judge               should  forward  it without any  comments  and               relevant  documents unless he wishes to do  so               or is so required by the High Court.                        (4)  Petitioners  are  forbidden   to               attend  personally  at the High  Court  unless               summoned  to do So. Orders on their  petitions               will  be  communicated  to  them  through  the               District Judge concerned.                        (5)  In order that a dismissed  offi-               cial  may  be able to exercise  his  right  of               appeal,  the  charge  against  him  should  be               reduced to writing, his defence should  either               be  taken  in, or reduced to writing  and  the               decision on such defence               1017               should  also be in writing. The record of  the               charge,  defence  and decision should  in  all               cases be such as to furnish sufficient  infor-               mation to the appellate authority to whom  the               dismissed official may prefer an appeal.                         (6)  Establishment orders, in  which               an  appeal lies to the High Court as a  matter               of  right, should state briefly the claims  of               the  persons  appointed as well  as  those  of               their  seniors,  if any,  who  are  considered               unfit  for the appointments in  question,  and               where  the  order of seniority  has  not  been               followed  the  reasons for departure  from  it

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             should be stated."     8. Rule X(1) deals with the powers of the District Judge to reverse or modify any order made under Rule IX(2)  passed by  any Court under his control. This  sub-section  contains two  provisos.  The first proviso gives the  High  Court  an absolute  power to alter when it deems fit any order  passed by  the  District Judge in appeal when an  aggrieved  person moves  the High Court or even suo moto. The  second  proviso restricts  the powers of the District Judge to  enhance  any punishment imposed and makes it subject to the orders of the High  Court when such a case is referred to the  High  Court for  orders. Rule X(2) deals with appeals against  penalties inflicted  by  District Judge as in the case on  hand.  This section  provides that appeals shall lie to the  High  Court from  orders imposing penalties by the District  Judge,  but not  in all cases. Appeals lie only against orders  imposing penalties  mentioned in Rule IX(iii) to IX(viii).  In  other words, an appeal does not lie when the District Judge passes an  order  imposing a penalty of censure or of fine  of  not more  than one month’s salary for misconduct or  neglect  in the performance of duties.     9.  We are not concerned here with the orders  mentioned in  Rule X(2)(b) and (c). Sub-rule (3) of Rule X deals  with the procedure in filing appeals to the High Court. It states that appeals shall be by a petition. It obligates  presenta- tion  of the petition to the District Judge who  passed  the order within the time prescribed therein. The District Judge is directed to forward the petition to the Registrar of  the High Court without unnecessary delay. The District Judge  is given powers to record his remarks which he may wish to make concerning any matter stated in the petition.     10. A reading of this sub-rule makes it abundantly clear that  the appeal to be heard by the High Court is  something which it has to do in 1018 exercise  of  its  powers of control  over  the  subordinate courts on the administrative side. The appeal has to be by a petition. It is to be routed through the District Judge  who sends  it to the Registrar of the High Court. These are  the procedural  formalities which normally govern  appeals  pre- ferred  before the High Court, on the  administrative  side. The permission given to the authority who imposes penalty to record  his own remarks which he wishes to  make  concerning his  own  order is further proof of the fact that  what  the High  Court has to consider is not a matter on the  judicial side  but  one in its power of control  and  superintendence over  the subordinate courts. Appeals under the general  law have their own procedure, which is different from the proce- dure  detailed  for  the appeals under these  rules  of  the deciding authority forwarding the appeal through the  proper channel  to the controlling authority and of the freedom  of the  deciding  authority to give its own  remarks  over  and above  the  order already passed. This  procedure  robs  the appeal  to  the  High Court of the  characteristics  of  the normal  appeal  culminating in judicial orders.  The  matter will be further clear when we look at the procedure that  is to be followed by the High Court in disposing of the appeals contained in this subsection itself.     11. Rule X(3) enables the High Court to summarily reject the appeal without hearing the petitioner or refer it to the District  Judge  for report and on receipt  of  such  report reject the petition without hearing the petitioner; secondly to hear the petitioner, and in cases where other persons are held  to be concerned in the subject of the  petition,  such other person in open court. The procedure contained in  this

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rule of hearing the petition is not similar to the procedure followed in regular judicial proceedings. Under these  rules it  is not obligatory for the High Court to hear  the  peti- tioner.  It can go into the papers and reject  it  summarily without giving the petitioner an opportunity to be heard. It can  also  refer it to the District Judge  for  report.  The second  method  of  disposal of this petition is  to  get  a report  from  the District Judge and on receipt  of  such  a report  to  dismiss it without hearing  the  petitioner  and thirdly  to give a hearing to the petitioner and also  those who  will be affected by the disposal of the  petition.  The manner of disposal of the petition under this rule makes  it abundantly  clear  that this petition which  the  appellants call an appeal is not strictly a judicial proceeding involv- ing  a lis between two adversaries and the decision  thereon is  not a judicial decision. It has all the trappings of  an administrative proceeding and an administrative decision. 1019     Sub-clause  (4)gives further insight into the nature  of the appeal. It reads:               "(4)  Petitioners  are  forbidden  to   attend               personally  at the High Court unless  summoned               to  do so. Orders on their petitions  will  be               communicated  to  them  through  the  District               Judge concerned." This again marks a complete departure from the normal  judi- cial proceeding before a court. The petitioners are  forbid- den  to attend personally at the High Court. They can do  so only  when summoned to do so. In a judicial proceeding,  the party has a right to appear personally or through his  coun- sel. Here that right is denied to him. This denial also robs the appeal of its character of a judicial proceeding. Orders passed by the High Court on such petitions will be  communi- cated to the parties through the District Judge concerned.     12. A close study of these rules leaves no doubt in  our mind  that  in deciding the appeal under Rule  X,  the  High Court  exercises only a supervisory  administrative  control and  does not act as a Tribunal disposing of an  appeal  in- volving  a lis between two rival parties and arriving  at  a judicial  decision. As indicated above Rule X is in  Chapter 18-A which deals with control. This gives the administrative shade  to  the  proceeding under this  rule.  Section  35(3) contains  the  rule making power. Section  35(4)  stipulates that  any  order  passed by the District  Judge  under  this section  shall be subject to the control of the High  Court, thus  fortifying our conclusion that the  proceedings  under this  section  and  the decisions made  thereunder  are  not judicial in nature. This appeal can be disposed of with this conclusion  and it is not necessary to refer to the  various authorities  cited before us. However, for the  completeness of the judgment, we think it proper to briefly refer to  the various  authorities  cited before us, for and  against  the position  that the High Court, while deciding  this  appeal, acted  as  a Tribunal whose order can be  challenged  before this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, though  in our view the decisions cited dealt with situations different from the one we are dealing here.     13. In Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh  and Others, [1955] 1 SCR 267 a Constitution Bench of this  Court was considering the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court  under Article  136 of the Constitution in an election case. It  is not necessary for our purpose to state the facts of the case here.  It was contended that the special  jurisdiction  that was conferred in the Election Tribunal could be in- 1020

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voked  by  an aggrieved party only by means of  an  election petition,  whose decision was final and conclUsiVe and  that therefore  a  challenge to the order of the  Tribunal  under Article  136  of the Constitution was not  maintainable.  To support  this  contention Article 329  and  the  nonobstante clause  therein were called in to aid. This  Court  repelled that  contention as untenable though apparently  attractive. This  Court held that the expression ’Tribunal’ as  used  in Article 136 did not mean samething as ’Court’, but  included in  its  ambit all adjudicating bodies  provided  they  were constituted by the State and were invested with the judicial as  distinguished  from purely administrative  or  executive functions.  This decision has been pressed into  service  by the  appellants’ counsel to contend that the High  Court  in the  case on hand having been constituted by the  State  and invested  with judicial power was a Tribunal and  therefore, its  decision could be examined by this Court under  Article 136.  In our view, this decision cannot help the  appellants because  this decision clearly held that if the power  exer- cised  was administrative in nature it would exclude such  a Tribunal from the ambit of Article 136.     14.  In Bachhittar Singh v. The State of Punjab,  [1962] Suppl. 3 SCR 7 13, an employee in PEPSU was dismissed by the Revenue Secretary. Against this order he preferred an appeal to  the State Government. The Revenue Minister,  PEPSU  felt that  the order of dismissal was too harsh and  instead,  he should be reverted and made an endorsement to that effect on the  file, but no written order was served on the  employee. After the merger of PEPSU with Punjab, the Revenue Minister, Punjab, sent the file to the Chief Minister for his  advice. The  Chief Minister passed an order confirming the order  of dismissal and the order was duly communicated to the employ- ee. This order was challenged by him before the High  Court. It  was  contended  before the High Court by  the  State  of Punjab,  with success, that the order of  dismissal  started with proceedings beginning with the enquiry and  culminating in punishment and that the first part involved a decision on evidence while the second part of taking action an  adminis- trative  one.  This dichotomy was  ingeniously  put  forward before  this Court to render the appeal not maintainable  by contending  that the order of dismissal was not  a  judicial order. This Court repelled that contention. This Court  held that  departmental  proceedings taken against  a  Government servant  were not divisible in the sense in which  the  High Court understood it. There is just one continuous proceeding though  there are two stages in it. Mudholkar,  J.  speaking for  the Constitution Bench observed thus in repelling  this contention: 1021               "   .....  There is just one  continuous  pro-               ceedings  though there are two stages  in  it.               The  first  is coming to a conclusion  on  the               evidence  as  to whether the  charges  alleged               against the Government servant are established               or not and the second is reached only if it is               found that they are so established. That stage               deals with the action to be taken against  the               Government  servant concerned. The High  Court               accepts  that  the first stage is  a  judicial               proceeding  and indeed it must be  so  because               charges  have to be framed, notice has  to  be               given and the person concerned has to be given               an opportunity of being heard. Even so far  as               the second stage is concerned, Article  311(2)               of  the Constitution requires a notice  to  be

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             given  to  the  person concerned  as  also  an               opportunity  of being heard.  Therefore,  this               stage  of the proceeding is no  less  judicial               than the earlier one. Consequently any  action               decided  to  be  taken  against  a  Government               servant found guilty of misconduct is a  judi-               cial order and as such it cannot be varied  at               the will of the authority who is empowered  to               impose the punishment. Indeed, the very object               with  which notice is required to be given  on               the  question of punishment is to ensure  that               it will be such as would be justified upon the               charges established and upon the other attend-               ant  circumstances  of the case.  It  is  thus               wholly erroneous to characterise the taking of               action  against a person found guilty  of  any               charge at a departmental enquiry as an  admin-               istrative order." This  judgment will not help us in this case. It  only  lays down  a general principle that a departmental enquiry and  a decision is one continuous process consisting of the enquiry part and the decision making part, both the aspects of which are judicial in nature, and the decisions taken therein  are in exercise of judicial power.    15. The counsel for the appellants placed strong reliance on the decision of a Constitution Bench in the case of Asso- ciated  Cement  Companies Ltd. v. P.N. Sharma  and  another, [1965]  2 SCR 366, to contend that the decision of the  High Court  in this case was a judicial  decision of  a  Tribunal within the scope of Article 136. In that judgment this Court considered  most of its previous decisions relating  to  the scope  of Article 136. What fell to be decided in that  case was  whether  the State Government was a  Tribunal  when  it exercised  its  authority under Rule 6(5) and  6(6)  of  the Punjab Welfare Officers Recruitment and Conditions of  Serv- ice Rules, 1952. It is necessary to 1022 briefly  state the facts of the case.  The  employer-company appointed  the first respondent as a Welfare Officer as  re- quired by the Factories Act. 1984 and as per the rules  men- tioned  above.  The letter of appointment  stated  that  the first respondent was liable to be transferred from one  unit of  the company to another and that his services  could  bet terminated by one month’s notice or with one month’s pay  in lieu thereof. The Welfare Officer was not prepared to go  10 a  place to which he was transferred. Thereupon the  company terminated  the  services  of the 1st  respondent  with  one month’s  salary.  He appealed to the State of  Punjab  under Rule 6(6). The State of Punjab ordered his reinstatement. As the  previous  concurrence of the  Labour  Commissioner,  as required  by  rule 6(3), proviso (2) was not  obtained,  the company  brought  the  matter to this  Court  under  Article 136(1)  of  the Constitution. A  preliminary  objection  was raised  before this Court that the appeal to this Court  was incompetent because the second respondent was not a Tribunal when  it  decided the appeaL.within the meaning  of  Article 136(1) of the Constitution. Rule 6(6) read as follows:               "6(6) A welfare officer upon whom the  punish-               ment  mentioned in clause (v) of sub-rule  (3)               is imposed may appeal to the State  Government               against the order of punishment within  thirty               days from the date of receipt of the order  by               him.  The  decision of  the  State  Government               shall be final and binding." It was by virtue of this rule that the State Government  got

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the powers of appeal. Dealing with the preliminary objection the  Constitution Bench speaking through Gajendragadkar,  CJ referred  to  this Court’s  earlier  decision  in  Harinagar Sugar  Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sundar Jhun    jhunwala and  oth- ers, [1962] 2 SCR 339, and observed as follows:               "   .....  On the preliminary question  as  to               whether   the  appeals  were  competent,   the               learned  Judge agreed with the majority  deci-               sion that the Central Government was a  tribu-               nal  within  the meaning  of  Article  136(1).               Construing  Article 136(1), the learned  Judge               observed  that courts and tribunals act  judi-               cially  in  both senses which he  had  earlier               discussed  and  in  the  term  ’tribunal’  are               included all others, which are not so  includ-               ed.  Among the powers of the State,  said  Hi-               dayatullah, J. is included the power to decide               controversies  between  parties. This  is  un-               doubtedly  one of the attributes of the  State               and is aptly called the judicial power               1023               Of  the State. Broadly speaking, certain  spe-               cial  matters  go before  tribunals,  and  the               residue  goes  before the ordinary  courts  of               civil  judicature. Their procedure’, may  dif-               fer,  but  the functions are  not  essentially               different  (pp.  362-63). Thus,  it  would  be               noticed that all the learned Judges who  heard               this case, were agreed in taking the view that               the essential power which was exercised by the               courts  and tribunals alike was  the  judicial               power of the State."     16. This Court then referred to its decision in  Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Lakshmichand and Others, [1963] Suppl. 1 SCR  242 in which the finding that an appeal  under  Article 136(1)  against  the  order of a  Conciliation  Officer  was incompetent,  was considered. Under clause 29 of  the  order promulgated in 1954 under the U.P. Industrial Disputes  Act. 1947, the Conciliation Officer could grant or refuse permis- sion  to  alter the terms of employment of  workmen  at  the instance  of  the employer. This Section did  not  suit  the employer. That was challenged before this Court. This  Court held  that the Conciliation Officer was not a  Tribunal  be- cause  he  was not invested with the judicial power  of  the State as he was empowered merely to lift the ban statutorily imposed  on the employers’ rights and was not authorised  to pronounce  a  final  and binding decision  in  any  dispute. Regarding the conclusion in that case this Court observed as follows:               "  .....  The condition precedent for bringing               a  tribunal within the ambit of  Article  136,               observed  Shah, J., who spoke for  the  Court,               ’is  that  it  should be  constituted  by  the               State’  and he added that a tribunal would  be               outside the ambit of Article 136 if it is  not               invested  with any part of the judicial  func-               tions  of  the  State  but  discharges  purely               administrative  or  executive  duties.   After               examining  the scheme of the  relevant  provi-               sion, it was observed that ’in deciding wheth-               er  an  authority required to  act  judicially               when dealing with matters effecting rights  of               citizens may be regarded as a tribunal’ though               not  a  court, the principal incident  is  the               investiture of the ’trappings of a  court’such

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             as  authority  to determine matters  in  cases               initiated by parties. sitting in public, power               to  compel  attendance  of  witnesses  and  to               examine them on oath, and others  .......               Some,  though not necessarily all  such  trap-               pings,  will  ordinarily  make  the  authority               which  is  under a duty to act  judicially,  a               ’tribunal’." 1024     17.  Then  dealing with the question whether  the  State Government  when it exercised its authority under rule  6(5) and rule 6(6) was a tribunal or not, this Court observed  as follows:               "The  question which we have to decide in  the               present appeal is whether the State Government               is a tribunal when it exercises its  authority               under  Rule 6(5) or Rule 6(6). No  rules  have               been made prescribing the procedure which  the               State Government should follow in dealing with               appeals  under these two sub-rules, and  there               is  no statutory provision conferring  on  the               State Government any specific powers which are               usually  associated with the trial  in  courts               and  which are intended to help the  court  in               reaching  its decisions. The  requirements  of               procedure which is followed in courts and  the               possession  of  subsidiary  powers  which  are               given to courts to try. the cases before them,               are described as trappings of the courts,  and               so,  it may be conceded that  these  trappings               are  not  shown to exist in the  case  of  the               State  Government  which hears  appeals  under               Rule  6(5)  and Rule 6(6). But as  we  already               stated,  the consideration about the  presence               of all or some of the trappings of a court  is               really  not decisive. The presence of some  of               the trappings may assist the determination  of               the question as to whether the power exercised               by  the  authority which  possesses  the  said               trappings, is the judicial power of the  State               or  not. The main and the basic test  however,               is  whether  the adjudicating  power  which  a               particular authority is empowered to exercise,               has been conferred on it by a statute and  can               be  described as part of the State’s  inherent               power  exercised in discharging  its  judicial               functions. Applying this test, there can be no               doubt  that the power which the State  Govern-               ment exercises under Rule 6(5) and Rule  6(6),               is  a part of the State’s judicial  power.  It               has been conferred on the State Government  by               a  statutory Rule and it can be  exercised  in               respect of disputes between the management and               its Welfare Officers. There is, in that sense,               a  lis; there is affirmation by one party  and               denial by another, and the dispute necessarily               involves  the  rights and obligations  of  the               parties  to  it.  The order  which  the  State               Government  ultimately passes is described  as               its decision and it is made final and binding.               Besides,  it  is an order  passed  on  appeal.               Having regard to these distinctive features of               the power conferred on the State Government by               Rule 6(5) and Rule               1025

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             6(6), we feel no hesitation in holding that it               is  a Tribunal within the meaning  of  Article               136( 1)." What  follows  from this case and the  authorities  referred therein is this: The State is invested in Some cases with  a power to decide controversies between parties. This power is undoubtedly  one of the attributes of the State and that  is called  the  judicial  power of the State. What  has  to  be remembered  is that this power is exercised to resolve  con- troversies between parties. In Associated Cement’s case also this  Court took notice of the fact that a  dispute  existed between the management and its welfare officer. It was  held that  there  existed  a lis the decision of  which  lis  was rendered  by  the State in exercise of its  judicial  power. This was the test that has to be applied to find out whether an order is a judicial order or not.     18. In Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles Limited, Bombay, [1963] Suppl. 1 SCR 625 the question considered by a Constitution Bench was whether the decision of an arbitrator to whom industrial disputes were voluntarily referred  under Section  10-A  of  the Industrial Disputes  Act,  1947.  was quasi-judicial  in character and his decision amounted to  a determination or order under Article 136(1) of the Constitu- tion  of  India. This Court held that for  invoking  Article 136(1),  two conditions must be satisfied--(1) The  proposed appeal  must  be from any judgment,  decree,  determination, sentence or order, that is to say, it must not be against  a purely executive or administrative order. If the  determina- tion  or  order giving rise to the appeal is a  judicial  or quasi-judicial  determination or order, the first  condition is satisfied. (2) The second condition imposed by the  Arti- cle  is that the said determination or order must have  been made or passed by any Court or Tribunal in the territory  of India.  These conditions, therefore, require that the  order complained  against must have a judicial  or  quasi-judicial character  and  the  authority  whose  order  is  complained against  must  be  a Court or a Tribunal.  Unless  both  the conditions are satisfied, Article 136(1) cannot be  invoked. The  decision of the arbitrator, it was held, could be  cha- racterised  as  quasi-judicial  one, but the  power  of  the arbitrator is not in exercise of the sovereign power or  one by conferment of a statutory power by the State. He gets the power to adjudicate by virtue of the authority given by  the parties.  It was held that an appeal from the order  of  the arbitrator did not lie under article 136(1) of the Constitu- tion.     19.  In Indo-China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd.  v.  Jasjit Singh, Additional Collector of Customs and Others, [1964]  6 SCR 594 the question 1026 debated was whether the Central Board of Revenue  exercising its appellate power under Section 190 of the Sea Customs Act or the Central Government exercising its revision  jurisdic- tion under Section 191 could be held to be a Tribunal  under Article 136. This Court repeated the principle laid down  in the earlier decisions that two conditions have to be  satis- fied  before  an appeal could be entertained in  this  Court under Article 136: the order impugned must be an order of  a judicial  or  quasi-judicial  character and  should  not  be purely  an administrative or executive order; and  that  the said  order should have been passed either by a Court  or  a Tribunal  in  the territory of India.  After  examining  the earlier  decisions and the tests laid down therein and  also after  examining  the  procedure prescribed in  the  Act  in relation  to the adjudication of disputes under  these  sec-

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tions, it was held that the Central Board of Revenue and the revisional authority, the Central Government, had the  char- acter  of a Tribunal under Article 136 of  the  Constitution and  thus the preliminary objection that the appeal was  not maintainable  was overruled. Since great stress was laid  by the learned counsel for the appellants on this authority, we would  like  to extract the relevant portion on  which  such reliance was placed to distinguish it from the facts of  our case.               "   ......   The fact that the status  of  the               Customs Officer who adjudicates under  Section               167  (12A) and section 183 of the Act  is  not               that of a Tribunal, does not make any  differ-               ence  when  we reach the stage  of  appeal  or               revision. A period of limitation is prescribed               for  the appeal, a procedure is prescribed  by               Rule  49 that the appeal or revision  must  be               accompanied by a copy of the decision or order               complained against, and the obvious scheme  is               that  both  the appellate and  the  revisional               authorities must consider the matter judicial-               ly on the evidence and determine it in accord-               ance with law. It is obvious that heavy  fines               are  imposed  in  these  proceedings  and  the               confiscation orders passed may affect ships of               very large value. By his appeal or  revisional               application the ship owner naturally  contends               that the order of confiscation is improper  or               invalid  and he sometimes urges that the  fine               imposed  is unreasonable and excessive.  Where               disputes  of this character are raised  before               the appellate or the revisional authority,  it               would  be difficult to accede to the  argument               that  the  authority which  deals  with  these               disputes in its appellate or revisional juris-               diction  is not a tribunal under Article  136.               These  authorities  are  constituted  by   the               legislature  and  they are empowered  to  deal               with the               1027               disputes  brought  before  them  by  aggrieved               persons.  Thus,  the scheme  of  the-Act,  the               nature  of the proceedings brought before  the               appellate and the revisional authorities,  the               extent  of the claim involved, the  nature  of               the penalties imposed ’and the kind of enquiry               which the Act contemplates, all indicate  that               both the appellate and the revisional authori-               ties  acting under the relevant provisions  of               the Act constitute Tribunals under Article 136               of the Constitution, because they are invested               with the judicial power of the State, and  are               required to act judicially. Therefore, we must               over-rule the preliminary objection raised  by               the  Additional Solicitor General and  proceed               to deal with the appeal on the merits." This  judgment can be easily distinguished from the case  on hand  on  the finding that the High Court in this  case,  as already indicated by us, was acting purely  administratively and  was  not making a judicial decision and  the  procedure adopted was totally different from the procedure in a Court. This  decision, therefore, cannot create any hurdle for  our conclusion against the appellants.     20. In APHLC v. M.A. Sangma, [1978] 1 SCR 393 this Court was dealing with the jurisdiction of the Election Commission

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to decide the question of a symbol to the parties contesting the  election. It was held that the decision from the  Elec- tion Commission was amenable to appeal under Article 136  of the Constitution of India since the powers were conferred on the Election Commission by rules, that the Election  Commis- sion  was dealing with the matter between two rival  parties and  that the decision taken was a judicial  decision.  Here again,  the Court reiterated the several tests to  determine whether a particular body or authority was a Tribunal within the ambit of Article 136 or not. These tests are not exhaus- tive. The two necessary pre-requisites for that authority to come  within Article 136(1) are that it must be  constituted by  the State and invested with some judicial power  of  the State.  These  two tests, it was held, were  unfailing  one, while some of the other test or tests may not be present. At pages 409 and 410 the matter is made abundantly clear in the following statement of law by the Court:               "   ......   There is thus a lis  between  two               groups  of the Conference. The  Commission  is               undoubtedly the specified and exclusive  adju-               dicating authority of this lis. The Commission               is  created by the Constitution and the  power               to  adjudicate the dispute flows from  Article               324 as well as               1028               from  Rule 5 and is thus conferred  under  the               law  as  a fraction of judicial power  of  the               State.  The Commission has prescribed its  own               procedure  in  the Symbols Order,  namely,  to               give a hearing to the parties when there is  a               dispute with regard to recognition or  regard-               ing choice of symbols  .....  "                        "   .......  To repeat, the power  to               decide  this particular dispute is a  part  of               the  State’s judicial power and that power  is               conferred on the Election Commission by  Arti-               cle 324 of the Constitution as also by rule  5               of  the rules. The principal  and  non-failing               test which must be present in order to  deter-               mine whether a body or authority is a tribunal               within  the ambit of Article 136(1),  is  ful-               filled in this case when the Election  Commis-               sion  is  required  to  adjudicate  a  dispute               between two parties, one group asserting to be               recognised  political party of the  State  and               the other group controverting the  proposition               before it, but at the same time not laying any               claim to be that party  .......                   21. We have considered the above decisions               carefully.  In our view, the  principles  laid               down in these cases cannot help the appellants               in  support  of the plea that the  High  Court               While disposing of the appeal was acting as  a               tribunal.  The relevant provisions  quoted  in               the  earlier part of the judgment relating  to               the  appeal  in  question,  in  our  judgment,               clearly establish that the High Court acted on               the  administrative side in deciding  the  ap-               peal.                   22.  There is a clear distinction  between               courts  of law exercising judicial powers  and               other bodies. Decisions by courts are  clearly               judicial.  That  is not the case  with  bodies               exercising administrative or executive powers.               In  certain  matters even Judges have  to  act

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             administratively  and in so doing may have  to               act  quasi-judicially  in  dealing  with   the               matters  entrusted to them. It is  only  where               the authorities are required to act judicially               either by express provisions of the statute or               by necessary implication that the decisions of               such  an  authority would amount to  a  quasi-               judicial  proceeding. When Judges in  exercise               of their administrative functions decide cases               it  cannot  be said that their  decisions  are               either judicial or quasi-judicial decisions.                   23. Every decision or order by an authori-               ty  which has a duty to act judicially is  not               subject  to appeal to this Court. Article  136               contemplates  appeals to this Court only  from               adjudications of courts and tri-               1029               bunals.  Such adjudication must  doubtless  be               judicial.  This does not mean that  every  au-               thority  which is required to act  judicially,               either by its constitution or by virtue of the               authority conferred upon it, is necessarily  a               tribunal  for  the purpose  of  Article  136-A               tribunal,  whose  adjudication is  subject  to               appeal, must besides being under a duty to act               judicially, be a body invested with the  judi-               cial power of the State.                   24.  In the appeal before the High  Court,               the  High Court was following its  own  proce-               dure,  a  procedure not normally  followed  in               judicial  matters.  The  High  Court  was  not               resolving  any dispute or controversy  between               two adversaries. In other words, while  decid-               ing  this appeal there was no |is  before  the               High Court. The High Court was only exercising               its  power  of  control  while  deciding  this               appeal.  We have. therefore, no hesitation  to               hold  that  the appeal  is  not  maintainable.               However,  we  do  not propose  to  dismiss  it               without leaving any remedy to the  appellants.               We  direct the Registrar to transfer  the  re-               cords  of the case to the Punjab  and  Haryana               High  Court requesting the High Court to  take               this petition on its file as a petition  under               Article  226  and  dispose of  the  matter  as               expeditiously  as  possible on  the  available               pleadings  and  documents. There  will  be  no               order as to costs.               P.S.S.               Appeal dismissed.               1030