http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 5  

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  5025 of 1999

PETITIONER: Des Raj (Deceased) through L.Rs. & Ors.

RESPONDENT: Union of India &  Anr.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/10/2004

BENCH: SHIVARAJ V. PATIL & B.N. SRIKRISHNA

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

W I T H  

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5026 OF 1999

Shivaraj V. Patil J.

Certain agricultural lands including lands of these  appellants were acquired pursuant to the Notification dated  23.1.1965 issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition  Act, 1894 (for short ‘the Act’).  Award was made in March,  1969 fixing the compensation @ Rs. 2,000/- per bigha.  The  appellants and other claimants, not satisfied with the  amount of compensation so awarded, sought a reference  under Section 18 of the Act.  The Additional District Judge,  i.e., the reference court enhanced the compensation  @2,200/- per bigha from Rs. 2,000/-.  The appellants and  four other claimants filed appeals before the High Court  seeking further enhancement of the compensation amount.   The High Court disposed of six appeals including two  appeals of these appellants by common judgment on  11.10.1984 fixing the compensation @ Rs. 4,000/- per  bigha.  These appellants did not pursue the matter any  further, if aggrieved by the aforementioned judgment of the  High Court.  However, Pratap Singh and others, appellants  in one of the six appeals before the High Court, approached  this Court aggrieved by the aforementioned judgment of  the High Court.  This Court allowed their Civil Appeal No.  4099/88 by the order dated 22.11.1988 and remanded the  case to the High Court with certain observations to re- determine the amount of compensation.  The appellants  filed review applications long thereafter before the High  Court seeking review of the judgment of the High Court  dated 11.10.1984 on the ground that Pratap Singh and  others whose lands were also acquired under the same  notification and who were similarly placed, got higher rate  of compensation for the lands acquired along with the  statutory benefits, hence the appellants also  were entitled  for higher amount of compensation; under Section 28-A of  the Act, the appellants were also entitled for the amount of  compensation at the same rate which was allowed to Pratap  Singh and others.  The Division Bench of the High Court, by  impugned judgments dated 22.10.1997, dismissed the  review applications.  Hence,  these appeals.

Learned counsel for the appellants urged that when

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 5  

this Court has set aside one of the cases covered by  common judgment of the High Court, i.e., the case of  Pratap Singh and others and after remand of the case, the  amount of compensation has been considerably enhanced,  the same benefit ought to have been given to the  appellants; having regard to the provisions of Section 28-A  of the Act and keeping in view the legislative intention, the  benefit of enhanced compensation as determined in the  case of Pratap Singh and others ought to have been  extended to these appellants as well and this Court,  exercising power under Article 142 of the Constitution of  India to equalize the compensation in respect of similarly  placed people in all respects, could enhance the amount of  compensation @Rs. 40,000/- as fixed in the case of Pratap  Singh and others after remand of the case.  In support of  his submissions, he cited few decisions.

Despite service of notice, none represented the  respondents.

We have considered the submissions made by the  learned counsel for the appellants.  The facts that are not in  dispute are the following: The first appeals filed by these two appellants and  four others were disposed of by the High Court by the  common judgment dated 11.10.1984.  These two  appellants did not challenge the said judgment of the High  Court any further.  Pratap Singh and others, who were also  the appellants in the said judgment of the High Court,  approached this Court and at their instance, their appeal  was allowed by this Court and the case was remanded.  It is  thereafter the High Court has enhanced the amount of  compensation in the case of Pratap Singh and others.  The  judgment dated 11.10.1984 rendered by the High Court in  the case of these appellants had become final.  Long  thereafter, the appellants filed review applications seeking  the review of the judgment of the High Court dated  11.10.1984.  The High Court dismissed the review  applications by the impugned judgments.

In the impugned judgments, the High Court has taken  note of the fact that the appellants did not challenge the  judgment of the High Court dated 11.10.1984 in appeal, as  was done by Pratap Singh and others.  As a result,  judgment and decree dated 11.10.1984 in their cases  became final.  In the impugned judgment, the High Court  has stated thus:-

"It is pertinent to note that the applicants herein,  namely the appellants in RFA Nos. 143/75 &  130/75, did not challenge the judgment dated  11.10.1984 in appeal, as was done by Pratap  Singh and others.  As a result, judgment and  decree dated 11.10.1984 in their case became  final."          The High Court also has noticed that although in the  review applications reliance was sought to be placed on  Section 28-A of the Act claiming re-determination of the  amount of compensation equal to that awarded to other  interested persons in the same village, however, during the  course of the hearing, learned counsel for the appellants  abandoned that plea in the light of the judgment of this  Court in Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodriguese & Anr.  etc. vs. Land Acquisition Collector & Anr. [ JT 1996 (10

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 5  

SC 573].  In this view, the High Court, by the impugned  judgments, dismissed the review applications filed by the  appellants.

The decision in B.N. Natarajan & Ors. Etc. vs. State  of Mysore and Ors. Etc. [AIR 1966 SC 1942] does not  help the appellants.  That was a case dealing with the  power of executive to make rules regulating the recruitment  and conditions of service of persons appointed to public  services \026 whether executive was entitled to frame rules  retrospectively.  Further in that case, in paragraph 24,  specific directions were given exercising power under Article  142 of the Constitution of India to cover the cases of those  appellants who had not prosecuted their appeals.  Para 24  of the judgment reads:-

"24.    In the result, the appeals both of the State  and the other appellants are allowed and  judgment of the High Court set aside.  We may  mention that some of the appellants have not  prosecuted their appeals but there is no reason  why they should not have the benefit of this  judgment, and exercising our powers under  Article 142 of the Constitution, we direct that in  order to do complete justice they should also  have the benefit of the judgment given by us.   There will be no order as to costs."          No such direction was given by this Court in Civil Appeal  No. 4099/88 of Pratap Singh and others and the directions  given there were confined to them only.

       In M/s. Shenoy and Co., Bangalore and Ors. vs.  Commercial Tax Officer, Circle II, Bangalore and Ors.  [AIR 1985 SC 621], this Court was concerned with validity  of Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas for  Consumption, Use or Sale Therein Act, 1979.  That was a  case where the validity of the provisions of the Act was  challenged by a batch of writ petitions and the Division  Bench of the High Court struck down the Act as invalid.   State Government filed an appeal to the Supreme Court  against only one party and the appeal was allowed.  As a  result, there was revival of the Act and it was binding on all  the persons though they were not parties to the appeal.   Hence, this decision also does not advance the case of the  appellants.

The decision of this Court in Ram Chand & Ors. Vs.   Union of India & Ors. [JT 1993 (5) SC 465] is also of no  avail to the appellants.  In that case, the court was  concerned with the long delay of 15 to 21 years in making  the award after declaration was made and certain directions  were given to give benefit of the compensation amount  having regard to the long delay.

The decision of this Court in Union Carbide  Corporation etc. etc. vs.  Union of India etc. etc. [ AIR  1992 SC 248] dealt with the power of this Court under  Article 142 in relation to the facts of that case.  It cannot be  denied that this Court can exercise power under Article 142  in appropriate cases.  We fail to understand how this case  helps the appellants having regard to the fact that in their  cases, the common judgment of the High Court dated  11.10.1984 had become final and that judgment could not  be reviewed as sought to be done by the appellants.  This is

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 5  

not a case where power under Article 142 may be exercised  having regard to the statutory provisions as applied to the  facts of the case.

The case of Bihar State Housing Board, State of  Bihar and Ors. Vs. Ban Bihari Mahato & Ors. [ AIR 1988  SC 2134] also does not support the contention of the  appellants as is evident from para 2 of the judgment itself.   It was on the peculiar facts and circumstances of those  cases that certain directions were given and no issue of law  was decided.

In our view, the appellants are not entitled to claim  enhanced compensation pressing into service the provisions  of Section 28-A of the Act.  The learned counsel for the  appellants before the High Court did not press the claim of  the appellants on this ground as recorded in the impugned  judgments, having not made the applications within the  prescribed time.  Moreover, benefit of Section 28-A is  available only to the parties who had not sought reference  under Section 18 of the Act for enhancement of the  compensation.  This provision is not available to persons  who seek for reference under Section 18 of the Act for  enhancement of the compensation and do not challenge  judgment of the reference court or the judgment of the  High Court thereafter. A bench of three learned Judges of  this Court in Scheduled Caste Co-operative Land  Owning Society Ltd., Bhatinda vs. Union of India &  Ors. [(1991) 1 SCC 174] in this regard, in para 4, has held  thus:-

"4.     ................................Any person who  does not accept the award so made may, by  written application to the Collector, required that  the matter be referred for the determination of  the court whereupon the provisions of Sections  18 and 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such  reference as they apply to a reference under  Section 18. It is obvious on a plain reading of  sub-section (1) of Section 28-A that it applies  only to those claimants who had failed to seek a  reference under Section 18 of the Act. The  redetermination has to be done by the Collector  on the basis of the compensation awarded by the  court in the reference under Section 18 of the  Act and an application in that behalf has to be  made to the Collector within 30 days from the  date of the award. Thus only those claimants  who had failed to apply for a reference under  Section 18 of the Act are conferred this right to  apply to the Collector for redetermination and  not all those like the petitioners who had not  only sought a reference under Section 18 but  had also filed an appeal in the High Court against  the award made by the reference court. The  newly added Section 28-A, therefore, clearly  does not apply to a case where the claimant has  sought and secured a reference under Section 18  and has even preferred an appeal in the High  Court. This view, which we take on a plain  reading of Section 28-A finds support from the  judgment of this Court in Mewa Ram v. State of  Haryana. ((1986) 4 SCC 151 : (1986) 3 SCR  660)."

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 5  

       This Court again in the case of Babua Ram & Ors.  vs. State of U.P. & Anr. [(1995) 2 SCC 689] following the  decision in Scheduled Caste Co-operative Land Owning  Society Ltd., Bhatinda (supra), in para 36, has stated thus:-

"36. The next question is whether an interested  person who sought and secured reference under  Section 18 but was either unsuccessful and filed  no appeal or had carried in appeal but  unsuccessful, would be entitled to  redetermination when the compensation was  enhanced by the appellate court either under  Section 54 or on further appeal under Articles  132, 133 and 136 of the Constitution. In Mewa  Ram case this Court held in paragraph 5 that  Section 28-A provides for the determination of  amount of compensation subject to the  conditions laid down therein are fulfilled. For  such redetermination, the forum is the Collector  and the application has to be made before him  within 30 days from the date of the award under  Section 26 and the right is restricted to persons  who had not applied for reference under Section  18 of the Act. If these conditions are satisfied,  the petitioner could have availed of the remedy  provided under Section 28-A of the Act."

Admittedly, the appellants in these cases did seek for  reference under Section 18 of the Act; filed appeals before  the High Court  and after the High Court delivered the  judgment on 11.10.1984, did not challenge the same.  The  applications were not made under Section 28-A of the Act  within the prescribed period of limitation also in these  cases. At any rate, the grounds raised in the review  applications were not the grounds which could be accepted  to review or modify the judgment of the High Court dated  11.10.1984.  In our view, the High Court was right in  dismissing their review applications for the reasons stated  in the impugned judgments.

Thus, having regard to all aspects of the matter, it is  not possible to find fault with the impugned judgments.   Further, in our view, these are not the fit cases to exercise  power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India having  regard to what is stated above and in view of the clear legal  position as stated in Scheduled Caste Co-operative Land  Owning Society Ltd., Bhatinda (supra).  Hence, finding no  merit in these appeals, they are dismissed but with no  order as to costs.