http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 19  

PETITIONER: DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND COLLECTOR, KAMRUP& ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DURGA NATH SARMA

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/09/1967

BENCH: BACHAWAT, R.S. BENCH: BACHAWAT, R.S. WANCHOO, K.N. (CJ) RAMASWAMI, V. MITTER, G.K. HEGDE, K.S.

CITATION:  1968 AIR  394            1968 SCR  (1) 561  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1969 SC 634  (23)  RF         1970 SC1157  (19)  RF         1972 SC2205  (17,18,26)  RF         1972 SC2301  (61)  RF         1975 SC1389  (21,23)  RF         1980 SC1789  (36)

ACT: The Assam Acquisition of Land for Flood Control and  Preven- tion of Erosion Act (6 of 1955) and the Assam Acquisition of Land for Flood Control and Prevention of Erosion  (Validity) Act  (21 of 1960)-If violative of Arts. 14 and 31(2) of  the Constitution. Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 31(5)(b)(ii)-Scope of.

HEADNOTE: The  Assam  Acquisition  of  Land  for  Flood  Control   and Prevention  of  Erosion  Act, 1955, was  passed  before  the Constitution   was  amended  by  the  Constitution   (Fourth Amendment) Act.  As the Act did not apply to the lands which were  taken  possession of before it came  into  force,  the Assam  Acquisition of Land for Flood Control and  Prevention of Erosion (Validation) Act, 1959, Act XXI of 1960 was pass- ed,  validating  the  acquisition of  lands  of  which  such possession  had been taken.  Under s. 2 of the 1960 Act  any land  taken over for the construction of embankments  before the  1955  Act came into force unless  the  acquisition  was validly made under any other law for the time being in force shall  be  deemed to have been validity acquired  under  the 1955  Act  and  is  deemed  to  have  vested  in  the  State Government  from  the  date  the  land  was  actually  taken possession  of; and compensation was payable  in  accordance with the principles in s. 6 of the 1955 Act.  Under s.  6(1) of the 1955 Act the owner of the land shall get compensation for  land  including standing crops and trees, if  any,  but excluding  buildings or structures, a sum not. exceeding  40 times the annual land revenue in case of periodic patta land and 15 times the annual land revenue in case of annual patta land.   Under s. 6(2) the owner shall get  compensation  for

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 19  

the  building or structure, if any, a sum equivalent to  the sale  proceeds  of  the  materials  plus  fifteen  per  cent thereof. In  1954. the Assam Government took possession of the  lands of the respondent for the construction of an embankment  and the   respondent   was  asked  to  submit  his   claim   for compensation under the 1955 and 1960 Acts after the 1960 Act was  passed.  He then filed a writ petition challenging  the validity  of  both  the  Acts and  prayed  for  a  direction prohibiting  the State Government from taking  action  under those Acts as the compensation payable was illusory and  in- adequate.   The  High  Court  held that  the  1955  Act  was violative  of  Art.  31(2), as it stood  before  the  Fourth Amendment  Act, that it was not protected by Art.  31A,  and that,  the 1960 Act was not independent of the 1955 Act  and fell with it. In  appeal  by  the  State  Government  to  this  Court  the appellant submitted that the two Acts were not violative  of Arts. 14 and 31(2) and were in any event protected by  Arts. 31A and 31 (5) (b) (ii). HELD:  (1) The constitutional validity of the 1955 Act  must be judged by   Art.  31(2)  as it stood  before  the  Fourth Amendment Act.Since the  assessment  of  land.  revenue   in Assam  many  years ago. the market value of  the  lands  has increased  by leaps and bounds.  Under s, 6(1) of  the  Act, the Collector, in determining the compensation, L/J(N)6SCI-10 562 should  take  into account the value of the land as  at  the date  of  the  acquisition and other factors,  but  this  is meaningless  because  under the first part of  s.  6(1)  the compensation  cannot exceed a fixed multiple of  the  annual land  revenue.   The State made no attempt to  show  that  a multiple  of  land revenue payable for the land -is  a  just equivalent of or has any relation to the market value of the land  ,on  the date of the acquisition.  The  sale  proceeds under  s. 6(2) can not be regarded as a just  equivalent  of the  value of the building and it stood at the time  of  the acquisition.  The Act, therefore, does not ensure payment of just equivalent of the land appropriated and is violative of Art.  31(2) as it stood before the Fourth Amendment.  [576H; 577F-H-, 578A-C] State of West Bengal v. Bela Banerjee, [1954] S.C.R. 558 and State  of Madras v. D. Namasivaya Mudaliar, [1964] 6  S.C.R. 936, followed. (2) The Act is a purely expropriatory measure.  It  provides for  acquisition  of lands both urban and  agricultural  for executing   works  in  connection  with  flood  control   or prevention  of erosion.  A piece of land acquired under  the Act  need not be an estate or - part of an estate.  The  Act is  not  a law concerning agrarian reform and hence  is  not protected by Art. 31A of the Constitution. [568G-H] Kochuni  v.  State of Madras, [1960] 3  S.C.R.  887;  Ranjit Singh  v.  State  of Punjab, [1965] 1 S.C.R. 82  and  P.  V. Mudaliar  v.  Special  Deputy Collector,  Madras,  [1965]  1 S.C.R. 641 followed. (3) The Act is a law for the acquisition of property and not a law for preventing danger to life or property, and so,  it is  not protected by Art. 31 (5) (b) (ii).  Article  31  (5) (b)  (ii); provides that nothing in Art. 31(2) would  affect the  provisions of any law which the State might make  after the  commencement of the Constitution for the  promotion  of public  health or the prevention of danger to life  or  pro- perty.   A  law  for  promotion  of  public  health  or  for prevention  of danger to life or property sometimes  has  to

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 19  

provide  for  destruction  and impairment of  the  value  of private  property and the taking of temporary possession  of the  property by the State.  Any substantial  abridgment  of the right of ownership of property including its destruction or  injuriously affecting it or taking away  its  possession and  enjoyment  from  the owner, amounted  to  a  taking  of property  within  the purview of Art. 31(2), before  it  was amended   by  the  Fourth  Amendment  Act.   But  for   Art. 31(5)(b)(ii)  a  law authorising such a taking  of  property would have been invalid unless it provided for compensation. The clause saved such laws from the operation of cl. (2) and these  laws were not invalid because they authorised such  a taking  without payment of compensation.  A law  authorising the  abatement  of a public menace by destroying  or  taking temporary  possession  of private properties, if  the  peril cannot be abated in some other way, can be regarded as a law for  promotion of public health or prevention of  danger  to life or property within the purview of cl. 5(b)(ii).  But it is not possible to say that a law for permanent  acquisition of  property is such a law.  The object of  the  acquisition may  be the opening of a public park for the improvement  of public  health or the erection of an embankment  to  prevent danger  to  life or property from flood.   As  the  acquired property  belongs  to the State, the State is free  to  deal with  it as it chooses after the acquisition.  It may  close the public park and use the property for other purposes,  or the river may recede or change its course so that it may  no longer  be necessary to keep the embankment.  The State  may then sell the property and appropriate the sale proceeds  to its  own use.  Acquistions of property for the opening of  a public park or for the erection of dams and embankments were always made under the 563 Land  Acquisition  Act and it could not have  been  intended that such acquisition could be made under laws coming within the   Purview   of  el.  (5)(b)(ii)   without   payment   of compensation.   Cl.  5(b)(11)  did  not  protect  laws   for acquisition of property from the operation of Art. 31(2)  as it  stood  before the Constitution (Fourth  Amendment)  Act. [574C-H; 575A-D] State  of  West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose,  [1954]  S.C.R. 587, and Dwarkadas Shriniwas of Bombay v. Sholapur  Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. [1954] S.C.R. 674, referred to. (4) The effect of the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act is that a deprivation of property, short of the transfer of the ownership or the right to possession of any property to  the State, is not within the purview of Art. 31(2).  A law, made after the Fourth Amendment Act providing for destruction  of property  or impairment of its value, is not invalid on  the ground that it does not provide for payment of compensation, because,  it is no longer within the purview of Art.  31(2), and, it is not necessary to invoke cl. (5) (b) (ii) to  save it.   It  cannot  therefore  be  contended  that  laws   for permanent  acquisition  of  property for  the  promotion  of public  health or prevention of danger to life or  property, should be held to be saved by Art. 31 (5) (b) (ii) and  that otherwise  the clause would be otiose.  Even now the  clause will protect laws providing for requisitioning or  temporary occupation  of property strictly necessary for promotion  of public  health or prevention of danger to life or  property. But as the Fourth Amendment did not amend cl. (5)(b)(ii) and did  not  change its original meaning, the clause  will  not save  laws for the Permanent acquisition of  property,  from the operation of Art. 31(2). [575G-H; 576A-C] (5)  There is unjust discrimination between owners  of  land

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 19  

similarly  situated by the mere accident of some land  being required  the  purposes mentioned in the 1955 Act  and  some land  being required or other purposes, and  therefore,  the Act  is violative of Art. 14.  In the State of  Assam,  some land  may  be taken under the 1955 Act for  the  purpose  of works and other measure in connection with flood control and prevention  of  erosion on payment of  nominal  compensation while,  an  adjoining  land may be taken  for  other  public purposes  under  the  Land Acquisition  Act  on  payment  of adequate   compensation.   Article  14  permits   reasonable classification   and   differential   treatment   based   on substantial  differences having reasonable relation  to  the object  sought to be achieved.  It is not possible  to  hold that  the differential treatment of the land acquired  under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and those acquired under the Assam Act of 1955 has any reasonable relation to the  object of the acquisition by the State. [578E-G; 579C-E] P.  Vajravelu  Mudaliar v. Dy.  Collector, [1965]  1  S.C.R. 614, followed. [Whether the Act is ultra vires on the ground that the State may acquire lands at its option either under the 1955 Act or under the Land Acquisition Act, left open.] [579H] (6) The core of the 1960 Act is the deeming provision of  s, 2,  under  which, certain lands are deemed  to  be  acquired under  the earlier Act.  The 1960 Act is entirely  dependent upon  the continuing existence and validity of  the  earlier Act of 1955.  As the earlier Act is unconstitutional and has no  legal existence the deemed acquisition tinder  the  1960 Act  is  equally  invalid.  As  this  deeming  provision  is invalid  all  the ancillary provisions fall  to  the  ground along  with  it  and  the provisions of  the  1960  Act  are incapable  of  enforcement  and  are  invalid.   The   State Legislature  has no power to enact that an acquisition  made under a constitutionally invalid Act is valid. [580D F-H] 564

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1100 of 1966. Appeal  from the judgment and order dated November 26,  1962 of the Assam High Court in Civil Rule No. 489 of 1961. S.  V.  Gupte,  Solicitor-General and Naunit  Lal,  for  the appellants. B. R. L. Iyengar, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat,  J. In 1954, the Assam Government took  possession of  the  lands of the respondent and several  other  persons situated  in the District of Kamrup for the construction  of the Pagdalia embankment.  In 1.955, the Assam Acquisition of Land for Flood Control and Prevention of Erosion  Ordinance. 1955 (Assam Ordinance No. 2 of 1955) was passed enabling the State  Government  to  acquire  lands  for  works  or  other development  measures  in connection with flood  control  or prevention  of erosion.  The Ordinance was replaced  by  the Assam  Acquisition of Land for Flood Control and  Prevention of  Erosion  Act, 1955 (Assam Act No. 6 of 1955)  which  was passed  on April 11, 1955 with the assent of the  President. In  April  1956,  the State Government passed  an  order  in writing  acquiring  the  lands taken over in  1954  for  the construction  of  the  Pagdalia embankment  under  s.  3  of Ordinance No. 2 of 1955.  It seems that the reference to the Ordinance  was a mistake and the acquisition was made  under Act  No. 6 of 1955.  On April 26, 1956, the  respondent  was served  with  the notice of the acquisition.   By  an  order

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 19  

dated  September 10, 1959, the Deputy  Commissioner,  Kamrup acting  on behalf of the State Government quashed the  Order dated  April  19, 1956 and directed that  fresh  acquisition proceedings under- the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 should  be started.  Pursuant to this order, some of the lands required for  the  Pagdalia embankment were acquired under  the  Land Acquisition  Act on payment of full compensation.   A  draft notification  for the acquisition of the respondent’s  lands under the Land Acquisition Act was sent by the Collector  of Kamrup  to  the  Assam Government  for  approval,  but  this proposal was eventually dropped.  On May 27, 1960. the Assam Acquisition  of  Land for Flood Control  and  Prevention  of Erosion  (Validation) Act, 1959 (Assam Act No. 21  of  1960) was  passed with the assent of the President.   In  November 1960.   the  State  Government  passed  an  order  for   the acquisition  of  the respondent’s lands under s.  3  of  the Assam  Acquisition of Land for Flood Control and  Prevention of  Erosion Act.  It was common case before the  High  Court that  this acquisition was made under s. 3 of Act No. 21  of 1960.  On November 6, 1960, the Collector of Kamrup served a notice upon the respondent informing him of the  acquisition order and asking him to submit his‘ claim for  compensation. On September 30, 1961, the respondent 565 filed a writ petition in the Assam High Court asking for  an order declaring Act No. 6 of 1955 and Act No. 21 of 1960  to be  invalid  and directing the State Government  to  forbear from  giving effect to the notices issued  thereunder.   The High  Court  allowed  the  petition and  issued  a  writ  of mandamus.directing  the State Government not to give  effect to the notices issued under Act No. 21 of 1960.  The present appeal  has  been filed under a certificate granted  by  the High Court. It is convenient at this stage to refer to the provisions of the impugned Acts.  The preamble to Act No. 6 of 1955  shows that  it  was  passed  to  make  provision  for  the  speedy acquisition   of   lands  necessary  for  works   or   other development measures  connection with flood or prevention of erosion.   Section 3 gives power to the State Government  to acquire land for those purposes by an order in writing.   It is in these terms:               "3.  Power to acquire land-If, in the  opinion               of the, State Government or such officer as is               empowered   in  this  behalf  by   the   State               Government  it  is necessary or  expedient  to               acquire  speedily any land for works or  other               development  measures in connection with  flood               control or prevention of erosion, the    State               Government  or such officer, may by, an  order               in writing, acquire any land stating the  area               and boundaries of the land." Section  4 provides for the service and publication  of  the order  of  acquisition.’  Under s. 5,  on  such  service  or publication  the land vests in the State Government and  may be  taken  possession of by the Collector.   Section  46  as amended   by  Act  No.  17  of  1959  which   provides   for compensation is in these terms:               "6.  Compensation-The owner of the land  which               has  vested  in the Government  under  section               5(1)  shall get compensation at the  following               rates,-               (1)   for  land including standing  crops  and               trees,   if  any  but  excluding,building   or               structure, a sum not exceeding forty times the               annual land revenue in case of Periodic  Patta

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 19  

             Land and fifteen times the annual land revenue               in case of Annual Patta land:-               Provided that in case of revenue free land and               land  paying revenue at concessional rate  the               compensation will be assessed on the basis  of               the revenue of similar revenue paying land  of               the neighbourhood.               In  determining this sum, the Collector  shall               take the following into consideration:-               (a)   The value of the land, as at the date of               acquisition,               (b)  the, adverse effect on the value  of  the               land  due to. possible floods, on the land  or               danger of erosion of such land,, 566               (c) The benefit the owner is likely to  derive               in respect ,of his other lands in the area due               to the control measures,,               (d)   The  damage  sustained  by  the   person               interested  by  reason of the  taking  of  any               standing  crops or trees which may be  on  the               land  at  the  time of  the  Collector  taking               possession thereof               (2)  For building or structure, if any, a  sum               equivalent   to  the  sale  proceeds  of   the               materials  of  the  same  plus  15  per   cent               thereof:-               Provided that if in lieu of this  compensation               the  owner chooses to take away the  materials               the Collector shall allow him to do so  within               such time as specified by him and the cost  of               the shifting of the buildings or structures as                             the  case  may be, as may be  approved   by  the               Collector  in the manner prescribed  shall  be               borne  by the Government, which cost  however,               shall  not exceed 20 per cent of the value  of               the buildings or structures as the case may be               as determined by the Collector." Section  7  provides for payment  of  interim  compensation. Under  s. 8, the Collector is required to make an  award  of the   compensation   allowable   for  the   land   and   its apportionment  among  the persons interested  in  the  land. Under  s. 9, on the application of any person  aggrieved  by the award, the Collector is required to refer the matter  to the  decision  of  an  arbitrator  appointed  by  the  State Government.   Section 10 empowers the Collector to use  such force as may be necessary to evict any person from the land. Section  II  imposes. penalties on persons  obstructing  the taking of possession of the land by the Collector.   Section 12 gives protection for action taken in good faith under the Act.   Section  13 bars the jurisdiction of  the  Courts  to question the legality of actions taken or orders made  under the Act.  Section 14 empowers, the State Government to  make rules.   Section  16  repeals  Ordinance  No.  2  of   1955. Ordinance No. 2 of 1955 contained similar provisions, and it is not necessary to repeat them.               The preamble to Act No. 21 of 1960 shows  that               its  object is to validate the acquisition  of               lands  taken  over  for  flood,  control   and               prevention of erosion.  Section 2 is in  these               terms:               "2. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained  in               the  Assam  Acquisition  of  Land  for   Flood               Control  and Prevention of Erosion  Act,  1955

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 19  

             (hereinafter  referred to as the ’said  Act’),               any  land  taken  over  for  the  purposes  of               construction  of embankments or  carrying  out               works   or  other  development   measures   in               connection with flood control or prevention of               erosion  before  this  Act  came  into  force,               except  where  acquisition  was  made  validly               under  any  other law for the  time  being  in               force, shall be deemed 567               to  have  been  validly  acquired  under   the               provisions  of  the ’said Act’  and  the  land               shall  absolutely  vest and  shall  always  be               deemed  to have been vested in the State  Gov-               ernment  from the date the land  was  actually               taken possession of.               (2)  The Collector shall, as soon as  may  be,               after  the commencement of this Act,  publish,               by  notification in the official Gazette,  the               description  of  land  deemed  to  have   been               acquired under sub-section (1)." Section  3 provides for payment of compensation.  It  is  in these terms:               "3.  The Collector shall, within a  period  of               six  months from the date of  commencement  of               this  Act, assess the value of land deemed  to               have   been  acquired  under  section   2   in               accordance  with the principles  contained  in               section 6 and make an award under Section 8 of               the  said Act respectively.  The owner of  the               land shall further be entitled to an  interest               at  the  rate of 6 per cent per annum  on  the               value  of the award, for the period  from  the               date the land was actually taken possession of               to the date of the award." Section 4 gives protection for action taken in good faith in connection with the land deemed to have been acquired  under section 2.Section 5 provides:               "Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the               provisions  of   the  said  Act  shall  apply,               mutatis mutandis in respect of the acquisition               of the land deemed to have been acquired under               Section 2 of this Act." Section  6  provides that if any question arises as  to  the interpretation   of  the  provisions  of  the  Act  or   the applicability  of  any of its provisions in respect  of  any land  the matter shall be referred to the Governor of  Assam whose decision shall be final. The respondent challenged the validity of Act No. 6 of  1955 and  Act No’ 21 of 1960 on the ground that they  contravened Arts. 14 and 31(2) of the Constitution.  The High Court held that  (1) Act No. 6 of 1955 was violative of Art.  31(2)  of the Constitution as it stood before the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act and was not protected by Art. 31A and (2)  s. 3  of Act No. 21 of 1960 declaring that certain lands  would be  deemed to be validly acquired under the earlier Act  was not a law providing for acquisition of land independently of the  earlier  Act and as the earlier Act  was  invalid,  the later Act fell with it.  The High Court did not express  any opinion  on  the  question  whether  the  two  Acts  were  I violative of Art. 14. 568 Before us, counsel ’forthe  appellants submitted that  the two Acts were not violative of     Arts.  14 and  31(2)  and were,   in,   any   event,  protected’   by   Arts,31A   and

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 19  

31(5)(b)(ii). The respondent was not represented by counsel, but ’we have had the advantage of the argument of Mr. lengar who assisted as amicus curiae’. The  validity of both the Acts is in issue in  this  appeal. On  the  question of the validity of Act No. 6 of  1955  the following  points  arise  for  decision:  (1)  is  the   Act protected   by  Art.  31A;(2)  is  it  protected   by   Art. 31(5)(b)(ii);  (3) does it infringe Art. 31(2); (4)   is  it violative  of Art. 14?  With regard to the validity, of  Act No. 21 of 1960, the following points arise for decision: (1) is it a law providing for acquisition of lands independently of Act No. 6 of 1955, and if not, is it valid? (2) If it  is an independent piece of legislation, (a) is it protected  by Art. 31A; (b) is it protected by Art. 31(5)(b)(ii); (c) does it contravene Art. 31(2). and (d)is it violative of Art. 14? Counsel for the appellants submitted that Act No. 6 of 1955 is  a  law providing for the acquisition of estates  and  is protected  by Art. 31A(1)(a).  We are unable to accept  this contention.   It  is now well settled  that  Art.  31A(1)(a) envisages   only  laws  concerning  agrarian   reform.    In Kochuni’s  case(1),  the Court by a majority  decision  held that  the  Madras Marumakkathayam (Removal of  Doubts)  Act, 1955 which deprived a sthanee of his properties and  vested- them in  the  tarwad contravened Art. 19(1)(f) and  was  not protected by   Art.  31A  and that Art. 31A saved  laws  for agrarian reform only     and  did  not enable the  State  to divest a proprietor of his estate  and  vest it  in  another without reference to any agrarian reform.    In Ranjit Singh v.  State of Punjab(2), the Court held that the East  Punjab Holdings  (Consolidation  and Prevention  of  Fragmentation) Act, 1948 as amended by Act No. 27 of 1960 was protected  by Art.  31A, as the general scheme of the Act  was  definitely agrarian reform and under its provisions something ancillary thereto  in  the interests of rural economy had  to  be  un- dertaken  to  give  full effect to the reforms.   In  P.  V. Mudaliar  v. Special Deputy Collector, Madras(3), the  Court held that the Land Acquisition (Madras Amendment) Act,  1961 providing  for the acquisition of lands for  housing  scheme was not a law with reference: to any agrarian reform and was not protected by Art. 31A.  In the light of these decisions, we must bold that Act No. 6 of 1955 is not a law  concerning agrarian reform and -is not protected by Art. 31A.  The  Act is   a  purely  expropriatory  measure.   It  provides   for acquisition  of  lands  both  urban  and  agricultural   for executing  works  in  connection  with  flood  control.   or prevention  of erosion- A piece of. land acquired under  the Act  need not be an estate or part of an estate.  It has  no relation to agrarian reform, land tenures or the elimination of intermediaries.  We may (1) [1960] 3 S.C.R. 887, 897-905. (2)  [1965] 1 S.C.R. 82. (3)  [1965] 1 S.C.R. 614. 569 add  that there is nothing’ on’, the record to,’  show  that the respondent’s lands are estates or parts of estates. Counsel  for the, appellants next submitted that nothing  in Art. 31(2) can affect Act No, 6; of 1955 as it is a law for, the  prevention  of danger to life or  property  within  the purview  of Art. 31(5) (b)(ii) This, contention is  somewhat novel, and requires close examination. Our  attention has been drawn to certain opinions  expressed in our earlier decisions that Art. 31(2) occupies, the field of  eminent domain and Art. 31(5)(b)(ii) contains  a  saving clause  with regard to the police powers of the State.   The concepts  of eminent domain and police powers  are  borrowed

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 19  

from: American law.  The constitutional guarantee of the due process  clause, in the United States Constitution  requires that  no  private  property shall be taken  for  public  use without  just compensation.  In the exercise of  its  police power,  the  State may pass regulations designed  to  ensure public  health, public morals, public safety as also  public convenience or general prosperity, see Chicago, Burlington & Quincy   Railway   Company  v.  People  of  the   State   of Illinois(1).  In the exercise of its eminent  domain  power, the  State  may  take any property from the  owner  and  may appropriate  it for public purposes The police  and  eminent domain  powers  are essentially  distinct.Under  the  police power many restrictions may be imposed and   the    property may  even  be destroyed without  compensation  being  given, whereas under the power of eminent domain, the property  may be  appropriated  to public use on payment  of  compensation only.  The distinction between the two powers is brought out clearly in the following passage in American  Jurisprudence, 2nd End, Vol. 16, Art. 301,. p. 592:               "The state, under the police power, cannot  in               any  manner  actually  take  and   appropriate               property for public use without  compensation,               for   such   action  is   repugnant   to   the               constitutional  guaranty  that  where  private               property  is appropriated for public use,  the               owner  shall receive reasonable  compensation.               Thus,  there is a vital difference,  which  is               recognised by the authorities, between an  act               passed with exclusive reference to the  police               power  of  the state, without any  purpose  to               take and apply property to public uses, and an               act which not only declares the existence of a               nuisance   created   by   the   condition   of               particular  property, but in addition, and  as               the  best  means of accomplishing the  end  in               view,  authorizes  the  same  property  to  be               appropriated by the public." In Sweet   v.Rechel(2) the validity of  an Act to enable the City of Boston to abate a nuisance existing therein and  for the preservation    of  the  public health in  the  City  by improving the drainage of (1) 200 U.S. 561 :50 L.Ed. 596, 609. (2) 159 U.S. 380:40 L.Ed. 188. 570 the  territory  was  sustained on the ground  that  the  Act provided  for  payment  of  just  compensation.   The  Court pointed out that private property the condition of which was such  as to endanger the public health could not be  legally taken  by  the Commonwealth and appropriated to  public  use without  reasonable compensation to the owner.  In  Delaware L. & W. R. Co. v. Morristown(1) an Ordinance establishing  a public  hack  stand on private property without  payment  of compensation  was  struck down on the ground  that  assuming that the creation of the public hack stand would be a proper exercise of the police power it did not follow that the  due process clause would not safeguard to the owner just compen- sation  for  the use of the property.  In United  States  v. Caltex (Philippines)(2), the Court held that no compensation was payable by the United States for the destruction by  its retreating  army of private property to prevent its  falling into   enemy   hands.   But  the   Court   recognised   that compensation would be payable for the army’s  requisitioning of private property for its subsequent use.  The Court  said that in times of imminent peril-such as when fire threatened a  whole  community-the  sovereign  could,  with   immunity,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 19  

destroy the property of a few that the property of many  and the lives of many more could be saved.  Indeed, it would  be folly  not to destroy some building so that an  entire  town may be saved from the conflagration, as will appear from the following  historic  incident referred to in  Respublica  v. Sparhawk(3):               "We  find,  indeed, a  memorable  instance  of               folly  recorded- in the 3 vol. of  Clarendon’s               History, where it is mentioned,, that the Lord               Mayor of London in 1666. when the city was  on               fire,  would  not  give  directions  for,   or               consent  to,  the pulling  down  forty  wooden               houses  or  to removing  the  furniture,  etc.               belonging  to the lawyers of the temple,  then               on   the  circuit,  for  fear  he  should   be               answerable for a trespass; and in  consequence               of  this  conduct, half that  great  city  was               burnt." If  Art.  31(5)(b)(ii) is regarded as a saving  clause  with regard  to the police power of the State, it is  clear  that under a law designed to promote public health or to  prevent danger  to  life  or  property the State  may  in  cases  of imminent  peril  destroy  or impair  the  value  of  private property without any obligation to pay compensation, but  it cannot   arrogate  to  itself  the  power  to  acquire   and appropriate to its own use private property without  payment of compensation. We  shall now examine our earlier decisions in The State  of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose and Other(1) and  Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. The SholapurSpinning and Weaving Co. (1) 276 U.S. 182:72 L.Ed. 523, 527. (2) 344 U.S. 149:97 L.Ed. 157. (3) 1 Dall. 357, 363: 1 L.Ed. 174. (4) [1954] S.C.R. 587. 571 Pd., and others(1), where reference was made to the concepts of’ eminent domain and police power in relation to cls.  (1) and   (2)  of  Art.  31  before  the  Constitution   (Fourth Amendment)  Act  and  Art. 31(5)(b)(ii).   The  decision  of Patanjali Sastri C. J., Mahajan, Bose, Ghulam Hasan, JJ.  in those two cases (Das and Jagannadhadas, JJ. dissenting)  was that cls. (1) and (2) of Art. 31 were not mutually exclusive in  scope  but  should be read together  and  understood  as dealing with the same subject, namely, the protection of the right to property by means of limitations on the State power to take away private property, the deprivation contemplated’ by  cl.  (1) being no other than the acquisition  or  taking possession  of  the property referred to in  cl.  (2).   The effect  of  the majority, decision was  that  a  substantial abridgment  of  the rights of ownership which  withheld  the property  from the possession and enjoyment of the owner  or seriously impaired its use or enjoyment by him or materially reduced  its value amounted to a taking of  property  within the  purview  of  Art. 31(2).  On the  subject  of  eminent. domain  and- police power in relation to cls. (1),  (2)  and (5)(b)(ii) the learned Judges expressed different  opinions. Patanjali  Sastri, C. J. at pp. 605, 606, 610, 612  and  614 said  that (a) the power of’ eminent domain was the  subject of express grant in Entry No. 33: of List I and Entry No. 36 of  List  II  and  Art. 31 defined  the  limitation  on  the exercise of this power, (b) cl. (5)(b)(ii) of Art. 31 showed that but for that clause compensation would be payable  even for  the exercise of the State’s power in an  emergency  to, demolish an intervening building to prevent a  conflagration

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 19  

from  spreading and it was because of that clause that  such destruction  did not entail liability to  pay  compensation, (c) the American doctrine of police power as a distinct  and specific  legislative  power  was  not  recognised  in   our Constitution,   (d)  the  power  of’  social   control   and regulation was implicit in the entire legislative field,  it was  not  conferred  by cl. (1) nor did cl.  (5)  define  it exhaustively in relation to property rights.  Mahajan, J. at pp.  695  to697 and 700 said that (a) cl.  (2)  defined  the powers of the legislature in the field of eminent domain and (b)  cl.  (5)(b)(ii) was$ not inserted by  way  of  abundant caution  but was a comprehensivesaving clause  defining  the classes  of  deprivation  of  property  without  payment  of compensation, as for instance in cases of emergency in order to  prevent  a  fire from spreading.  Bose,  J.  at  p.  734 deprecated  the use of doubtful words like police power  and eminent  domain in construing our Constitution.  Das,  J  at pp. 638, 643, 645, 647-650 said, that (a) cl. (1) dealt with police power and Art. 31(2) dealt with the power of  eminent domain,  (b) cl. (5)(b)(ii) did not exhaustively define  the police power; it was inserted by way of abundant caution  to except  from  the purview of cl. (2) some instances  of  the exercise  of  police  power  superficially  resembling   the exercise of the power of eminent domain and (1) [1954] S.C.R. 674. 572 (c)  acquisition of land for any’ of the purposes  mentioned in cl.the (5)(b)(ii) ’was ’precisely the kind of acquisition which  was always made on payment of compensation under  the Land  Acquisition.   Act,  1894 and a  construction  of  cl. (5)(b)(ii)  which  took  out of -Art. 31 (2) a  I  law  made ’really and essentially in exercise of the power of  eminent domain could not readily be accepted as cogent -or  correct. Jagannadhadas, J. at pp. 669, 670 and 672 said that (a)  cl. (1) was not a declaration of the American doctrine of police power  nor  had it reference only to the  power  of  eminent domain,(b)     with  respect  to matters enumerated  in  the legislative lists the legislature could exercise every power including   the police power-if it was necessary  to  import this concept-in so far as it was not provided in Arts. 19(2) to 19(6), 31(5)(b)(ii) or other specific provisions, (c)  an acquisition  under  cl.  (2)  did  not  necessarily  involve transfer  of title or possession and this was  indicated  by cl.  (5)(b)(ii) which more often than not would cover  cases of destruction of property. From  the ’Several conflicting opinions expressed  in  those two  cases  it  is  difficult to say that  the  Court  or  a majority of Judges held that cl. (5)(b)(ii) saved the police power  of  the  State  in the  ,strict  technical  sense  as understood in American law.  All we need say is that if  cl. (5)(b)(ii)  is construed as saving the police power  of  the State,  such police power must be exercised subject  to  the constitutional  restriction  as  evolved  by  the   American judicial   decisions   that  private  property   cannot   be appropriated, to public use without payment of compensation. But  we  prefer  to  construe  Art.  1  an  cl.   (5)(b)(ii) uninfluenced by the American concepts of eminent domain  and police power. We shall endeavour to ascertain the meaning of Art. 31(5)(b) (ii)  in  the  context of Art. 31 as  it  stood  before  the Constitution  (Fourth Amendment) Act and thereafter  in  the context of Art. 31 as it stands after the Fourth  Amendment. Article  31  as  it stood before  the  Constitution  (Fourth Amendment) Act was in these ,terms:               "31(1).   No person shall be deprived  of  his

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 19  

             property save by authority of law.               (2)   No  property,  movable   or   immovable,               including  any interest in, or in any  company               owning,    any   commercial   of    industrial               undertaking  shall be taken possession  of  or               acquired  for  public purposes under  any  law               authorising  the taking of such possession  or               such acquisition, unless the law provides  for               compensation for the property taken possession               of or acquired and either fixes the amount  of               the compensation, or specifies the  principles               on  which.  and  the  manner  in  which,   the               compensation is to be determined and given. 573               (3)No such law as is referred to in clause (2)               made by the legislature of a State shall  have               effect  unless such law, having been  reserved               for  the consideration of the  President,  has               received his assent.               (4) If any Bill pending at the commencement of               this  Constitution  in the  Legislature  of  a               State  has, after it has, been passed by  such               Legislature,    been   reserved    for    the.               consideration   of  the  President   and   has               received  his  assent,  then,  notwithstanding               anything  in  this Constitution,  the  law  so               assented to shall not be called in question in               any  court on the ground that  it  contravenes               the provisions of clause (2).               (5) Nothing in clause (2) shall affect-               (a)   the provisions of any existing law other               than  a law to which the provisions of  clause               (6) apply, or               (b) the provisions of any law which the  State               may hereafter make-               (i) for the purpose of imposing or levying any               tax or penalty, or               (ii)  for  the promotion of public  health  or               the prevention of danger to life or  property,               or               (iii)  in pursuance of any  agreement  entered               into between the Government of the Dominion of               India  or  the  Government of  India  and  the               Government of any other country, or otherwise,               with respect to property declared by law to be               evacuee property.               (6) Any law of the State enacted not more than               eighteen  months  before the  commencement  of               this Constitution may within three months from               such   commencement   be  submitted   to   the               President    for   his   certification;    and               thereupon,   if   the  President   by   public               notification  so  certifies, it shall  not  be               called in question in any court on the  ground               that  it contravenes the provisions of  clause               (2)  of  this article or has  contravened  the               provisions  of sub-section (2) of section  209               of the Government of India Act, 1935." Clauses  (1)  and  (2) of Art. 31 were  limitations  on  the executive and the legislative powers of the State to deprive any  person  of  his  property.   Clause  (2)  imposed   the limitation  that the law authorising the taking of  property for  public purposes must provide for compensation  for  the property.  Clause (3) imposed the additional limitation that if  such  a law was made by the legislature of a  State.  it

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 13 of 19  

must have received the assent of the President.  Clauses (4) and (6) saved certain laws from the operation of cl. (2) and those laws could not be called in question in any Court on 574 the  ground  that  it contravened cl.  (2).   Clause  (5)(a) provided -that nothing in cl. (2) would affect any  existing law  other  than a law to which the provisions  of  cl.  (6) applied.   Under cls. (5)(b)(i) .and (5)(b)(iii) nothing  in cl.  (2) would affect the provisions of laws .made  for  the purpose  of  imposing  or levying any tax  or  penalty  :and certain  laws with respect to evacuee property.  We are  not concerned  in  this appeal with the interpretation  of  cls. (4),  (5)(a),  (5)(b)(i), (5)(b)(iii) and 6. We  express  no opinion on their interpretation.  Clause (5)(b)(ii) provided that nothing in cl. (2) would .affect the provisions of  any law which the State might make after the commencement of the Constitution  "for  the promotion of public  health  or  the prevention  of  danger  to life or property." It  is  to  be noticed that cl. (5)(b)(ii) saved laws for the promotion  of public  health  or  the prevention of  danger  -to  life  or property.   It  did  not save laws for  the  acquisition  of property.   We  are satisfied that cl.  (5)(b)(ii)  was  not intended  to  except laws for the acquisition  of  property, from the purview of cl. (2).  Any substantial abridgment  of the rights of ownership including destruction and  injurious affection of the property and taking away its possession and enjoyment  from the owner amounted to a taking  of  property within  the  purview  of cl. (2) as  interpreted  in  Subodh Gopal’s  case(1) and Dwarkadas Shrinivas’s case(1).   A  law for  promotion of public health or for prevention of  danger to life or property sometimes has to provide for destruction and  impairment of value of private property and the  taking of  temporary possession of the property by the  State.   It may  be  necessary to destroy contaminated food or  to  burn plague-infested  buildings  for  the  promotion  of   public health,  to  pull  down a building to prevent  a  fire  from spreading and consuming other buildings in the locality,  to demolish  a building in a ruinous condition endangering  the safety  of its occupants and other persons in its  vicinity. The  destruction  and the temporary taking of  property  for such purposes, though necessary for promoting public  health or preventing danger to life or property, amounted to taking of  property within cl. (2).  But for cl. (5)(b)(ii), a  law authorising  such a taking of property would have  been  in- valid   unless   it  provided  for   compensation.    Clause (5)(b)(ii) saved such laws from the operation of cl. (2) and those  laws were not invalid because they authorised such  a taking without payment’ of compensation.  A law  authorising the  abatement  of a public menace by destroying  or  taking temporary  possession  of private properties  if  the  peril cannot be abated in some other way can be regarded as a  law for  promotion of public health or prevention of  danger  to life or property within the purview of cl. (5)(b)(ii).   But it  is  not  possible  to  say  that  a  law  for  permanent acquisition  of property is such a law.  The object  of  the acquisition  may  be the ,opening of a public park  for  the improvement of public health or (1) [1954] S.C.R. 587.     (2) [1954]  S.C.R. 674. 575 the  erection of an embankment to prevent danger to life  or property   from   flood,.   Whatever  the  object   of   the acquisition  may  be, the acquired property belongs  to  the State.   The State is free to deal with the property  as  it chooses after the acquisition.  It may close the public park and  use  the property for other purposes.   The  river  may

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 14 of 19  

recede  or  change its course so that it may  no  longer  be necessary to keep the embankment and the State may then sell the  property and appropriate the sale proceeds to  its  own use.   Clause (5)(b)(ii) was intended to be an exception  to cl.  (2) and must be ,strictly construed.   Acquisitions  of property  for  the  opening  of a public  park  or  for  the erection of dams and embankments were always made under  the Land  Acquisition Act, and it could not have  been  intended that  such  acquisitions  could be made  under  laws  coming within  the  purview of cl. (5)(b)(ii) without  payment  (of compensation.   We  have  come to the  conclusion  that  cl. (5)(b)  (ii)  did  not  protect  laws  for  acquisition   of properties from the (operation of cl. (2) as it stood before the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act. The Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act amended cl. (2)  and inserted a new clause (2A).  The amended cl. (2) and the new cl. (2A) are in these terms:               "31(2).   No  property shall  be  compulsorily               acquired  or requisitioned save for  a  public               purpose  and save by authority of a law  which               provides for compensation for the property  so               acquired or requisitioned and either fixes the                             amount  of  the compensation or  speci fies  the               principles on which, and the manner in  which,               the  compensation  is  to  be  determined  and               given;  and  no such law shall  be  called  in               question in any, court on the ground that  the               compensation  provided  by  that  law  is  not               adequate.               (2A).   Where a law does not provide  for  the               transfer   of  the  ownership  or   right   to               possession of any property to the State or  to               a  corporation  owned  or  Controlled  by  the               State,  it shall not be deemed to provide  for               the  compulsory acquisition or  requisitioning               of property, notwithstanding that it  deprives               any person of his property." The  effect  of the Constitution (Fourth Amendment)  Act  is that  a  deprivation of property short of  transfer  of  the ownership or the right to possession of any property to  the State  is  not within the purview of cl. (2).   A  law  made after the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act providing  for destruction  of property or impairment of its value  is  not invalid   because  it  does  not  provide  for  payment   of compensation.  But we have seen that in the context of  Art. 31  as it stood before the Constitution  (Fourth  Amendment) Act,  cl. (5)(b)(ii) was not intended to save laws  for  the acquisition of property from the operation of cl. (2).   The Fourth Amendment did not amend cl. (5)(b)(ii) nor change its original  meaning.   Cases  of destruction  of  property  or impairment 576 of its value are no longer within the purview of cl. (2) and it is.., not necessary to invoke cl. (5)(b)(ii) to save laws made after the Fourth Amendment providing for such forms  of taking  of  property.  But even now, cl. (5)(b)(ii)  is  not wholly   otiose.   Clause  (5)(b)(ii)  will   protect   laws providing  for  requisitioning or  temporary  occupation  of property  strictly necessary for promotion of public  health or  prevention of danger to life or property.  The  law  may authorise the State to requisition the property  temporarily for   abating   the  public  menace   without   payment   of compensation  if the menace cannot be abated in  some  other recognised  way.   We  hold that a law  for  acquisition  of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 15 of 19  

property is not protected by cl. (5)(b)(ii) of Art. 31 as it now stands after the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act. In  our opinion, Act No. 6 of 1955 is a law for  acquisition of  property and not a law for preventing danger to life  or property  and  is not protected by cl. (5)(b)(ii)  from  the operation of cl. (2). The Assam Embankment and Drainage Act, 1941 (Assam Act No. 7 of 1941) which is in force in the State of Assam shows  that flood control, drainage and construction of embankments  are possible  without acquisition of private property.  The  Act recognises  both private and public embankments.  Section  4 of  the  Act  authorises the Embankment  Officer  to  remove obstructions  endangering the stability of  embankments  and drains,   to  remove  and  alter  embankments   and   drains endangering safety to any town or village or likely to cause loss of property and to construct embankments and drains the absence  of  which  endangers  the safety  of  any  town  or village.   In case of grave and imminent danger to  life  or property he may forthwith commence the execution of any such work.   Sections  7  to 9 contemplate  the  preparation  and execution of schemes for improvement of drains,  embankments and flood protection.  The scheme may provide for the charge of  an  annual rate on all lands benefited  by  the  scheme. Section 10 provides for payment of compensation for any loss arising inter alia from the carrying out of works under  ss. 4  and 9. This Act is in operation in Assam for the last  25 years   and  necessary  measures  for  flood   control   and construction of embankments have been carried out under this Act.   This Act shows that it is possible for the  State  to take   all   necessary  measures  for  flood   control   and construction of embankments without arrogating to itself the power  of  acquiring  private property  without  payment  of adequate compensation. It follows that Act No. 6 of 1955 is not protected from  the operation  of  Art.  31(2) either by Art.  31A  or  by  Art. 31(5)(b)(ii).   The  next question is whether Act No.  6  of 1955  contravenes Art. 31(2).  The constitutionality of  the Act  must  be judged by Art. 31(2) as it  stood  before  the Constitution  (Fourth Amendment) Act.  In The State of  West Bengal v. Bela Banerjee and Others(1) (1) [1954] S.C.R. 558. 577 the   Court   held  that  while  the   legislature   had   a discretionary  power  of laying down  the  principles  which should govern the determination of the amount to be given to the  owner  for the property appropriated,  such  principles must  ensure that what is determined as payable was  a  just equivalent  of  what  the owner was  deprived  of  and  that subject  to this basic requirement of  full  indemnification for  the expropriated owner, the Constitution  allowed  free play  to  the legislative ’judgment as  to  what  principles should  guide the determination of the amount payable.   The Court decided that West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948 passed primarily for the settlement of  immigrants from  East  Bengal fixing the market value on  December  31, 1946 as the ceiling on compensation without reference to the value of the land at the time of the acquisition which might be  made many years later offended Art. 31(2) as it did  not ensure payment of the just equivalent of the land.  The  Act was not saved from the operation of Art. 31(2) by Art. 31(5) as it was not certified by the President as provided for  by Art. 31(6).  In West Ramnad Electric Distribution Co.  Ltd., v.  State of Madras,(1), the Court rejected  the  contention that  the Madras Electricity Supply  Undertakings  (Acquisi- tion) Act No. 19 of 1954 was violative of Art. 31(2), as the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 16 of 19  

appellant  did  not furnish any material to  show  that  the compensation payable under the Act was not a just equivalent of  the  property  acquired.   In  State  of  Madras  v.  D. Namasivaya  Mudaliar(2),  the  Court held  that  the  Madras Lignite  (Acquisition of Land) Act No. 21 of 1953  providing for  assessment of compensation on the basis of  the  market value  of the land prevailing on August 28, 1947 and not  on the  date on which notification was issued under s. 4(1)  of the  Land  Acquisition Act and providing  that  in  awarding compensation the value of non-agricultural improvements com- menced  since  April  28,  1967  would  not  be  taken  into consideration  did not ensure payment of just equivalent  of the  land  appropriated  and was in  contravention  of  Art. 31(2).  Now, Act No. 6 of 1955 by s. 6(1) provides that  the owner of the land shall get compensation for land  including standing crops and trees, if any, but excluding buildings or structure  a  sum  not exceeding 40 times  the  annual  land revenue  in  case of periodic patta land and  15  times  the annual land revenue in case of annual patta land.  The  res- pondent   in  his  petition  definitely  charged  that   the compensation   payable  under  the  Act  was  illusory   and inadequate.  The State of Assam made no attempt to show that a  multiple of land revenue payable for the land is  a  just equivalent of or has any relation to the market value of the land on the date of the acquisition.  It is well known  that since the assessment of land revenue in Assam many years ago the  market  value  of lands has  increased  by  leaps  ,and bounds.   The  latter part of s. 6(1) makes  a  pretence  of saying  that in determining the compensation  the  Collector shall take (1) [1963] 2 S.C.R. 747.        (2)  [1964] 6 S.C.R. 936. L/J(N)6SCI-11 578 into  account  the value of the land as at the date  of  the acquisition  and  other  factors, but  this  is  meaningless considering  that  under  the  first part  of  s.  6(1)  the compensation  cannot exceed a fixed multiple of  the  annual land  revenue.  Section 6(2) provides that the  owner  shall get  compensation for the building or structure, if  any,  a sum equivalent to the sale proceeds of the materials of  the same  plus  15 per cent thereof.  The sale proceeds  of  the materials  cannot  be regarded as a just equivalent  of  the value  of  the  building  as it stood at  the  time  of  the acquisition.   In our opinion.  Act No. 6 of 1955  does  not ensure payment of a just equivalent of the land appropriated and is violative of Art. 31(2) as it stood before the Fourth Amendment. The next question is whether Act No. 6 of 1955 offends  Art. 14  of the Constitution.  The Land Acquisition Act, 1894  is in force in the State of Assam and under it private property may be acquired for any public purpose on payment of  market value  of  the land at the date of the  publication  of  the notification  under  s. 4(1).  Section 17 of the  Act  makes special  provision  for the speedy acquisition of  waste  or arable  land  in cases of emergency.  While that Act  is  in force  in the State of Assam, the State  Legislature  passed Act No. 6 of 1955 providing for speedy acquisition ,of  land for the public purpose of carrying out works or other  deve- lopment  measures  in  connection  with  flood  control   or prevention of erosion on payment of compensation assessed on the  basis  of a multiple of the annual land  revenue.   The result is that in the State ,of Assam some land may be taken under  Assam Act No. 6 of 1955 for the purpose of works  and other   measures  in  connection  with  flood  control   and prevention  of  erosion on payment of  nominal  compensation

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 17 of 19  

while  an  adjoining  land may be  taken  for  other  public purposes  under  the  Land Acquisition  Act  on  payment  of adequate   compensation.   The  question  is  whether   this differential  treatment of land acquired under the two  Acts is permissible under Art. 14.  The constitutional  guarantee of Art. 14 requires that all persons shall be treated  alike in  like circumstances and conditions.  The Article  permits reasonable  classification and differential treatment  based on substantial differences having reasonable relation to the objects  sought to be achieved.  It is not possible to  hold that the differential treatment of the lands acquired  under the  Land  Acquisition Act, 1894 and  those  acquired  under ’Assam Act No. 6 of 1955 has any reasonable relation to  the object  of acquisition by the State.  In P. V.  Mudaliar  v. Dy.  Collector(1), the Court held that the Land  Acquisition (Madras  Amendment) Act, 1961 providing for the  acquisition of lands for housing schemes and laying down principles  for fixing  compensation different from those prescribed in  the Land   Acquisition   Act   was   violative   of   Art.   14. Discrimination  between persons whose lands  were  -acquired under  housing schemes and those whose lands were  ;acquired for other purposes could not be sustained, under Art. 14. [1965] 1 S.C.R. 614. 579 Although  it was contended that the amending Act was  passed to  meet  an  urgent demand to clear up slums,  the  Act  as finally  evolved  was not confined to any such  problem  and land  could be acquired under the amending Act  for  housing schemes and other objectives.  The Court said at p. 634:               Out of adjacent lands of the same quality  and               value,  one  may  be acquired  for  a  housing               scheme  under the Amending Act and  the  other               for a hospital under the principal Act; out of               two  adjacent  plots  belonging  to  the  same               individual and of the same quality and  value.               one  may be acquired under the  principal  Act               and  the other under the Amending  Act.   From               whatever  aspect the matter is looked at.  the               alleged  differences  have  no  I   reasonable               relation to the object sought to be achieved." In  our  opinion, the classification of  land  required  for works  and other measures in connection with  flood  control and prevention of erosion and land required for other public purposes has no reasonable relation to the object sought  to be achieved. viz., acquisition of the land by the State.  In either case, the owner loses his land and in his place,  the State  becomes  the owner.  There is  unjust  discrimination between  owners  of  land similarly  situated  by  the  mere accident of some land being required for purposes  mentioned in Assam Act No. 6 of 1955 and some land being required  for other  purposes.   We hold that Assam Act No. 6 of  1955  is violative of Art. 14. On behalf of the respondent it was contended that Act No.  6 of  1955  is violative of Art. 14 on the  additional  ground that  it  is  open  to the  State  to  acquire  property  in connection  with  flood  control or  prevention  of  erosion either under the Land Acquisition Act or under Assam Act No. 6 of 1955 at its sweet will.  There is considerable force in this  contention.   The  record shows that  even  after  the passing of Act No. 6 of 1955 the State of Assam has acquired other  lands  for erecting embankments  in  connection  with flood  control and has paid full compensation to  owners  of those lands under   the  Land  Acquisition  Act.    However, Counsel for the appellants    con-tends that in view of Art. 254(2) of the Constitution Assam   Act   No.   6   of   1955

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 18 of 19  

supersedes the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in so  far as  the later  Act enables acquisition of property for the  purposes of  works and other development measures in connection  with flood control or prevention of erosion.  We have not  ’heard full  arguments on this new contention realised  by  counsel for the appellants.  We, therefore, do not propose to decide it  or to strike down Act No. 6 of 1955 on the  ground  that the State may acquire lands at its option either under Assam Act  No. 6 of 1955 or under the Land Acquisition  Act.   For the purposes of this case it is sufficient to say that Assam Act  No.  6 of 1955 is violative of Art. 14  on  The  ground mentioned in the earlier paragraph. 580 it  follows  that Assam Act No. 6 of 1955  is  violative  of Arts.  14 and 31(2) of the Constitution and must  be  struck down.  The next question is whether Assam Act No. 21 of 1960 is  valid.  This Act provides that any land taken  over  for the purposes of construction of embankments or carrying  out works or other development measures in connection with flood control  or prevention of erosion before it came into  force shall  be  deemed to have been validly  acquired  under  the provisions of Assam Act No. 6 of 1955 unless the acquisition was  validly made under any other law for the time being  in force.   By  force of Assam Act No. 21 of 1960 the  land  so taken  over is deemed to be. acquired under Assam Act No.  6 of 1955.  As Assam Act No. 6 of 1955 is invalid, the  deemed acquisition  under  Assam  Act No. 21  of  1960  is  equally invalid.   The State legislature has no power to enact  that an acquisition made under a constitutionally invalid Act  is valid. Counsel  submitted that Assam Act No. 21 of 1960 is a  piece of   legislation   providing   for   acquisition   of   land independently  of the earlier Act and the validity  of  this Act  must be judged by reference to Art. 31(2) as  it  stood after  the  Constitution  (Fourth Amendment)  Act.   We  are unable  to  accept  this  contention.   In  support  of  his contention. counsel drew our attention to the provisions  of ss.  2,  3,  4  and 5. Under s. 2, the  land  deemed  to  be acquired  under the earlier Act vests and is deemed to  have vested  in the State Government from the date the  land  was actually taken possession of.  Under s. 3, the Collector  is enjoined to assess the value of the land deemed to have been acquired  under s. 2 in accordance with the principles  laid down in s. 6 and to make an award under s. 8 of the  earlier Act  and  the owner is entitled to claim  certain  interest. Section 4 protects action taken in good faith in  connection with the land deemed to have been acquired under s. 2. Under s.  5,  except  as otherwise provided  under  the  Act,  the provisions  of the earlier Act shall apply mutatis  mutandis in  respect of the acquisition of land deemed to  have  been acquired under s. 2. It is to be seen that the core of Assam Act  No. 21 of 1960 is the deeming provision of s.  2  under which  certain  lands are deemed to be  acquired  under  the earlier Act.  As this deeming provision is invalid, all  the other ancillary provisions fall to the ground along with it. The  later  Act is entirely dependent  upon  the  continuing existence  and validity of the earlier Act.  As the  earlier Act  is  unconstitutional and has no  legal  existence,  the provisions   of  Act  No.  21  of  196O  are  incapable   of enforcement  and are invalid.  In view of this-  conclusion, the  other questions with regard to the validity of Act  No. 21 of 1960 do not arise.  The Assam High Court rightly  held that  the notices of acquisition issued under Assam Act  No. 21 of 1960 are invalid. In the result, the appeal. fails and is dismissed.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 19 of 19  

V.P.S.                           Appeal dismissed. 581