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PETITIONER: DEOKINANDAN PRASAD

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT04/05/1971

BENCH: VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. BENCH: VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. SIKRI, S.M. (CJ) MITTER, G.K. REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN DUA, I.D.

CITATION:  1971 AIR 1409            1971 SCR  634  1971 SCC  (2) 330  CITATOR INFO :  R          1973 SC 834  (10)  F          1976 SC  37  (22)  F          1976 SC 667  (3)  R          1978 SC 803  (30)  F          1983 SC 130  (20)  RF         1983 SC1134  (2)  R          1984 SC1064  (10)  RF         1984 SC1560  (3)  R          1984 SC1855  (8)  F          1984 SC1905  (2,2,3,5,6)  F          1985 SC1196  (7)  F          1987 SC 943  (8)  F          1989 SC2088  (7)

ACT: Constitution  of India, 1950, Art. 32-Right to  pension,  if property-Petition to enforce-Maintainability. Bihar  Service  Code, r.  76-Automatic  termination  without opportunity to show cause-If violates Art. 311. Bihar Pension Rules, r. 46-Scope of.

HEADNOTE: The  petitioner  was  a Deputy Inspector of  Schools  and  a member of the Education department of the  respondent-State. On  September  2, 1953, the Director of  Public  Instruction passed  an order directing a censure to be recorded  in  the character roll of the petitioner.  On March 5, 1960, he  was reverted   to   the  Lower  Division  of   the   Subordinate Educational Service, as a result of an inquiry into  certain charges.   He filed a suit challenging the two  orders.   On August 5, 1961, the Munsiff passed an order restraining  the respondent from enforcing the order dated March 5, 1960.  On April  3, 1962, the temporary injunction was vacated by  the Subordinate Judge.  On April 11, 1963, the suit was  decreed and  the respondent was prohibited from enforcing the  order dated March 5, 1960.  This decree was set aside in appeal by the Subordinate Judge on June 24, 1964, and the petitioner’s second  appeal was dismissed by the High Court  on  February 11,  1965.   On  August  5, 1966,  the  Director  of  Public

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Instruction passed an order that the petitioner ’having  not been  on his duties for more than five years since March  1, 1960  has ceased to be in Government employ since  March  2, 1965 under r. 76 of the Bihar Service Code.’ The  petitioner having  completed 58 years of age addressed a letter to  the Director  of Public Instruction on July 18, 1967  requesting him to arrange for the payment of her. pension, and on  June 12,  1968 the Director of Public Instruction  passed  orders stating  that under r. 46 of the Bihar Pension Rules he  was not  entitled  to  any pension.  The  petitioner  filed  the present writ petition under Art. 32 challenging the  various orders. HELD:     (1)  No relief could be granted in respect of  the orders  dated September 2, 1953 and March 5, 1960,  as,  (a) they were already covered by the decision of the High  Court in  second  appeal.  (b) no relief  could  be  granted  with respect  to  an order passed as early as 1953; and  (c)  the orders  did  not  infringe any  fundamental  rights  of  the petitioner. [652G-H 653A-B] (2)  The order dated August 5, 1966, declaring, under r.  76 of the Service Code that the petitioner had ceased to be  in Government service should be set aside. [653-A-B] (a)  The  essential requirement for taking action under  the said  rule is that the government servant should  have  been continuously  absent from duty for over five  years.   Under this rule it is immaterial whether absence from duty by  the government  servant was with or without leave so long as  it is established that he was absent from duty for a continuous period  for over five years.  Admittedly the petitioner,  in the  present  case, was on duty till March 10, 1960  and  he ceased to attend to his duty only from March                             635 11,  1960.  Therefore, the order stating that he ’ceased  to be in government employ on March 2, 1965, was on the face of it erroneous.’ [643C-D, E; 644A-C] (b)  Assuming  that  the  order  should  be  read  that  the petitioner  was not on his duty continuously for  more  than five years from March 11, 1960 till August 5, 1966 the  date of  the order even then, the order would be  illegal.   From August 5, 1961, the date of temporary injunction granted  by the Munsiff till April 3, 1962, when that order was  vacated by  the Subordinate Judge, the Department did not allow  the petitioner  to  join  duty in the senior post  in  spite  of several  letters  written by him.  Again on April  11,  1963 when  the  Munsiff  granted  a  decree  in  favour  of   the petitioner,  the  respondent did not obtain any  stay  order from  the appellate court, and so, the decree of  the  trial court  was in full force till it was set aside in appeal  on June 24, 1964.  During that period, that is, from April  11, 1963  to June 24, 1964 the petitioner wrote several  letters requesting the respondent to permit him to join duty in  the senior  grade, but the respondent did not permit him  to  do so.   Therefore,  there was no question  of  the  petitioner being  continuously  absent from service for  over  5  years during  the period referred to when he was willing  but  the respondent  did not allow him to serve, and hence, r. 76  of the  Service  Code was not  applicable.  [644E-F;  645A-D,G; 646D-H; 647A-B,E-F] (c)  Even if the r. 76 was applicable and it was a  question of  automatic  termination of service, Art. 311  applies  to such cases also.  According to the respondents a  continuous absence  from duty for over five years apart from  resulting in  the forfeiture of the office also amounts to  misconduct under r. 46 of the Pension Rules disentitling the office  to receive pension.  The respondent did not give an opportunity

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to the petitioner to show cause against the order  proposed. Hence there was violation of Art. 311. [647GH ; 648D-E] Jai  Shankar  v. State of Rajasthan, [1966]  1  S.C.R.  825, followed. (3)  The order dated June 12, 1968 stating that under r.  46 of the Pension Rules the petitioner was not entitled to  any pension should also be set aside. [649C] Payment of pension under the rules does not depend upon  the discretion  of the State Government but is governed  by  the rules and a government servant, coming within those rules is entitled to claim pension.  Under r. 46 a Government servant dismissed   or   removed  for  misconduct,   insolvency   or inefficiency  is not eligible for pension.  In  the  present case it was contended that the petitioner’s absence for over five  years,  amounted  to misconduct  and  inefficiency  in service.   But when the order dated August 5, 1966 has  been held to be illegal then the order dated June 12, 1968  based upon it also falls to the ground. [649B-C;D-H;65OA-B] (4)  The  grant of pension does not depend upon  any  order. It is only for the purpose of quantifying the amount  having regard  to the service and other allied matters that it  may be  necessary for the authorities to pass an order  to  that effect, but the right to receive pension flows to an officer not  because of any such order but by virtue of  the  rules. The  right of the petitioner to receive pension is  property under Art. 31(1) and by a mere executive order the State had no power to withhold it.  Similarly, the said claim is  also property under Art. 19(1) (f).  It, therefore follows,  that the  order  dated June 12, 1968 denying the  petitioner  the right to receive pension affected his fundamental right  and as such the writ petition was maintainable. [650G-H; 652B-C, D-F] K.   R.  Erry  v. State of Punjab, I.L.R.  [1967]  Punjab  & Haryana 279, (F.B) approved. 636 (5)  The  bar against the Civil Court entertaining any  suit relating to the matters under the Pension Act does not stand in  the way of a writ of mandamus being issued to the  State to properly consider the claim of the petitioner for payment of pension according to law.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 217 of 1968. Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for  the enforcement of fundamental rights. Bishan Narain, B. B. Sinha, S. N. Misra, S. S. Jauhar and K.   K. Sinha, for the petitioner. B. P. Jha, for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Vaidialingam, J.-In this writ petition under Art. 32 of  the Constitution,  the petitioner prays for the issue of a  writ to the respondents in the nature of Certiorari or any  other appropriate  writ, direction or order quashing  four  orders dated  September 2, 1953, March 5, 1960, August 5, 1966  and June 12, 1968.  He further prays for issue of a writ in  the nature  of a Writ of Mandamus directing the  respondents  to treat him as having retired at the age of 58 and to pay  him the pension that he is entitled to. Though four orders are cought to be quashed, as we will show in due course, the grievance of the petitioner regarding the orders  dated  September 2, 1953 and March. 5, 1960  can  no longer  be considered by this Court in this  writ  petition. In  consequence only the last two orders,  mentioned  above,

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survive for consideration. We will refer briefly to the circumstances leading up to the passing  of  the  orders, referred to  above,  in  order  to appreciate the circumstances under which the last two orders in  particular  came  to be made as well as  the  ground  of attack levelled against these orders. The  petitioner  joined service as an Assistant  Teacher  on September  1,  1928 in the Patna Practising School  and  was promoted as Sub-Inspector of Schools, Lower Division, in the Subordinate  Educational  Service from May  31,  1934.   The petitioner  later  on was promoted as  Deputy  Inspector  of Schools  in  Upper Division of the  Subordinate  Educational Service  and  was  posted at  Seraikella  in  the  Singhbhum District  in the Chhotanagpur Division, Bihar from  November 1,  1949.   The  State of Seriakella having  merged  in  the erstwhile province of Bihar, the provincial                             637 Government  took  over and assumed control directly  of  the education  in  the  locality through its  employees  of  the Education  Department  unlike other parts of,  the  province where the education was under the control and management  of the District and Local Boards.  The service rendered by  the petitioner  as Deputy Inspector of Schools,  Seraikella  was found  satisfactory by the superior officers  including  the Director of Public Instruction and hence he was  recommended to  be appointed to a superior post of Education Officer  in the  Community  Project.  By about the end of 1951,  he  was transferred  to  Purulia  in  the  district  of  Manbhum  as Additional Deputy Inspector of Schools.  The petitioner  was later  on transferred to Bettiah in or about May, 1953.   At Bettiah  the petitioner received a copy of the  order  dated September  2, 1953 from the Director of  Public  Instruction directing a censure to be recorded in the character roll of the petitioner based on the report of one Shri Kanhaya  Lal, District  Inspector  of  Schools,  who,  according  to   the petitioner,  was  inimically  disposed  towards  him.    The attempt of the petitioner to have the order dated  September 2,  1953 cancelled proved unsuccessful.  This is  the  first order that is sought to be quashed by the petitioner. The  petitioner  on  the basis of  certain  allegations  was placed  under  suspension on February 6, 1954  and  relieved from  his  duty  as Deputy Inspector  of  Schools,  Bettiah. There  was a charge sheet issued to the petitioner on  March 16,  1954  and  he  was found  guilty.   But  these  inquiry proceedings were later on set aside and a fresh inquiry  was ordered.   In  consequence  the  order  of  suspension   was cancelled,  but immediately thereafter a fresh  inquiry  was conducted  in  which he was again found guilty  as  per  the report of the Inquiry Officer dated September 22, 1959.  The Disciplinary  Authority,  who  was the  Director  of  Public Instruction. passed an order on March 5, 1960 accepting  the finding   of  the  Inquiry  Officer  recorded  against   the petitioner and held that the charges had been proved against him.    Accordingly,  by  this  order  the  petitioner   was reverted,  as punishment, to Lower Division  of  Subordinate Educational Service and also directing a censure entry to be recorded in Us personal character roll.  This is the  second order that is challenged in this writ petition. It  is not necessary for us to deal in any detail about  the first  and  the second order as both those  orders  are  now concluded against the petitioner by the decision of the High Court. The petitioner filed title suit No. 86 of 1961 in the  Court of the Munsif, III, Patna, for a declaration challenging the order dated March 5, 1960 as well as the inquiry proceedings

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on  the basis of which the said order was passed.   He  also challenged the order of censure passed on September 2,  1953 and  further  incorporated in the order of  March  5,  1960. Though the suit was 638 contested  by the respondents, it was ultimately decreed  on April  11,  1963.  The respondents filed  title  appeal  No. 132/24  of 1963-64 before the Subordinate Judge,  11  Court, Patna,  challenging the decree of the Munsif.  On  June  24, 1964  the  appeal  was allowed, with  the  result  that  the petitioner’s title suit No. 86 of 1961 stood dismissed.  The petitioner’s Second Appeal No. 640 of 1964 was dismissed  by the High Court on May 4, 1967.  From these proceedings it is clear  that the order of censure dated September 2, 1953  as well  as  of reversion dated March 5, 1960  have  both  been found  to be correct by the High Court and it is  no  longer open  to the petitioner to canvass those orders again.   But it  may be necessary for us to refer to certain  proceedings connected  with the title suit when we deal with the  attack of  the petitioner against the legality of the orders  dated August  5,  1966  and  June 12, 1968.   When  the  order  of reversion dated March 5, 1960 was passed, the petitioner was working as Deputy Inspector of Schools, Deoghar.  The office of  the  Deputy  Inspector of Schools was  closed  for  Holi holidays from March 11, 1960 and the petitioner claims  that he left the headquarters to go to Patna with the  permission of  the  authorities.   The order dated March  5,  1960  was received by him at Patna on March 23, 1960 when he was  ill. He  applied  for  leave.  According to  the  petitioner,  he obtained an order of temporary injunction on October 5, 1961 in his title suit No. 86 of 1961 restraining the respondents from  giving  effect  to  the  order  dated  March  5,  1960 reverting  him  to  the Lower Division  in  the  Subordinate Educational service.  Though he offered to join the post  to which he was entitled originally, he was not allowed by  the respondents  to join the Upper Division of  the  Subordinate Educational  Service.   The  action  of  the  respondent  in refusing  to  permit  him  to  join  duty  was  in  flagrant violation  of the order of temporary injunction  granted  by the Munsif, Patna. On August 5, 1966 the Director of Public Instruction  passed an order that the petitioner "having not been on his  duties for more than five years since March 1, 1960, has ceased  to be  in Government employ since March 2, 1965 under r. 76  of the    Bihar   Service   Code".    The    petitioner    made representations  for cancellation of this order but  without any  success.   This  is  the  third  order  that  is  being challenged. The petitioner having completed 58 years of age, addressed a letter  to  the Director of Public Instruction on  July  18, 1967  requesting  him  to arrange for  the  payment  of  the petitioner’s   pension.   No  reply  was  received  by   the petitioner  for a long time inspite of  repeated  reminders. Ultimately   on  June  12,  1968  the  Director  of   Public instruction  passed orders on the petitioner’s  ,application dated July 18, 1967 regarding payment of pension. 639 In  this  order it is stated that under r. 46 of  the  Bihar Pension  Rules  (hereinafter to be referred as  the  Pension Rules), the Department is unable to grant any pension to the petitioner.   We will refer to this rule at the  appropriate stage but it is enough to take note of the fact that  under the  said  rule, no pension may be granted to  a  government servant  dismissed or removed for misconduct, insolvency  or inefficiency.   According  to the petitioner this  order  is

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illegal  and void.  This is the fourth order that  is  under challenge. According  to the petitioner the order dated August 5,  1966 is an order removing him from service and it is illegal  and void  as it has been passed in contravention of Art. 311  of the  Constitution.  Further the order is also not legal  and not  warranted  by  the  Rules  for  the  reason  that   the petitioner had not been absent from duty for over five years continuously.   According  to  the  petitioner  there  is  a further  infirmity  in  the order  as  the  respondents  are inconsistent  in their pleas regarding the date  from  which the period of continuous absence has to be calculated.  This plea  is based upon the different dates given in  the  order dated  August  5, 1966 and the dates given in  the  counter- affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents.  The attack on the order dated June 12, 1968 is two fold, namely, (a)  that it  is  not warranted by r. 46 of the  Pension  Rules  under which it is purported to be passed; and (b) the petitioner’s right to get pension is property and by the respondents  not making   it  available  to  him,  his   fundamental   rights guaranteed   under   Arts.  19(1)(f)  and   31(1)   of   the Constitution, have been affected. The  Assistant  Director of Education has  filed  a  counter affidavit  on behalf of the respondents.  According  to  the respondent the orders of censure passed on September 2, 1953 and of reversion dated March 5, 1960 are valid and legal and in  passing those orders no violation of any rules has  been made.    The  petitioner  was  given  full  opportunity   to participate  to  the inquiry proceedings and  it  was  after considering the report as well as the explanation  furnished by  the petitioner that the order of reversion  was  passed. The  petitioner  is not entitled to challenge any  of  those orders  as they are concluded by the decision of  the  Patna High  Court dated March 4, 1967 in Second Appeal No. 640  of 1964. Regarding the order dated August 5, 1966, it is admitted  by the  respondents that the petitioner was on duty till  March 10,  1960.  He ceased to attend office only from  March  11, 1960.   It  is further admitted that it has been  stated  by mistake  in  the order that the petitioner has not  been  on duty for more than five years since March 1, 1960.  The date "March 1, 1960 should be read                             640 as  "March 11, 1960".  The respondents dispute the  averment of  the  petitioner  that  he  left  the  headquarters  from March .11, 1960 with the permission of the authorities.   On the other hand, according to them, the petitioner had put in an   application  in  the  office  of   the   Sub-Divisional Educational Officer for leave on March 11, 1960 and that  he did  not  obtain  any  prior  permission  for  leaving   the headquarters.   It is further averred that the  order  dated March  5,  1960 reverting the petitioner came  into-  effect immediately  and  the petitioner was also  informed  of  the same.   It  is  specifically pleaded by  the  respondent  as follows:               "In other words since 11-3-1960 till  5-8-1968               he  was continuously not in service  for  more               than  5 years.  By virtue of rule 76 of  Bihar               Service Code of 1952 the petitioner ceased  to               be  in  the service of the  Government  as  he               remained  absent from duty continuously for  5               years  and this itself amounts  to  misconduct               and  inefficiency  in  the  service.   In  the               present case the provisions of article 311  do               not  apply to the- facts of this case  because

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             his services are not terminated on account  of               any charge but are automatically terminated by               virtue  of  the statute i.e. rule  76  of  the               Bihar Service Code 1952.  Article 311  applies               where the services of a government servant are               terminated  in respect of any charge.  But  it               does  not  apply where  a  government  servant               ceases to be a government servant by virtue of               any statute." According  to  the  respondent  there  has  been  no  breach committed  of  Art. 311 of the Constitution when  the  order dated August 5, 1966 was passed on the basis of r. 76 of the Bihar Service Code, 1952 (hereinafter to be referred as  the Service  Code).  It is to be noted at this stage that  there is a variation regarding the dates of continuous absence for over  five years mentioned in the order and in the  counter- affidavit.  They will be dealt with by us when the attack of the  petitioner  on the order dated August 5, 1966  is  con- sidered.   It  is further admitted by the  respondents  that even  after the injunction order was passed by  the  Munsif, the  Department  was always insisting on the  petitioner  to join  in the lower grade to which post he had been  reverted and that the petitioner never joined that post. Dealing  with the order dated June 12, 1968 in and by  which the  petitioner was informed that the Department was  unable under  r. 46 of the Pension Rules to grant him pension,  the respondents state that the order is valid and fails squarely under the said rule.  According to the respondents the order dated  August  5, 1966 is an order removing  the  petitioner from  service  for not attending to his duty for  more  than five  years  and  that  by  itself  amounts  to  misconduct. Therefore, the petitioner was not entitled to claim                             641 any  pension.  There is also an averment to the effect  that there  is  no  question  of any  fundamental  right  of  the petitioner  being  affected by the orders under  attack  and hence the writ petition is not maintainable. The petitioner has filed a rejoinder wherein he has  pointed out  the inconsistent dates given in the order dated  August 5, 1966 and in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of  the respondents   by  the  Assistant  Director   of   Education. According to the petitioner in whatever manner the period is calculated either as per the dates given in the order or  by the  dates given in the counter-affidavit, rule 76 does  not apply  as he has not been continuously absent from duty  for over  five years.  The petitioner further avers that he  was absent  from duty after taking the permission of the  autho- rities.   According  to  the  petitioner  he  has  not  been continuously  absent  from duty for over five years  if  the period  is  properly  calculated according  to  the  various orders  passed  by the Munsif.  Patna, in  his  title  suit. According to the petitioner, when a court has restrained the respondents from giving effect to the order of reversion and when  he offered to join duty in the post from which he  was reverted,  the respondents without any regard for the  court orders, did; not permit him to join duty, but, on the  other hand, insisted that he should join duty in the lower rank to which  he  had  been  reverted.   This,  according  to   the petitioner,  is illegal.  The petitioner further  reiterates his  allegation  that he was entitled to  pension  and  that withholding  of  the same affects  his  fundamental  rights. According to the petitioner the respondents do not deny  his right  to get pension but, on the other hand, plead that  as he  has been removed from service by the order dated  August 5, 1966, he is not entitled to pension by virtue of r. 46 of

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the Pension Rules.  He further points out that as the  order dated  August 5, 1966 is illegal, the order dated  June  12, 1966,  which is based upon the earlier order, is  also  null and void. The  questions that arise for consideration are whether  the orders dated August 5, 1966 and June 12, 1968 are legal  and valid.   Before we consider that aspect, it is necessary  to state that in order to sustain this petition under Art.  32, the petitioner will have to establish that either the  order dated  August  5,  1966 or June 12, 1968, or  both  of  them affect his fundamental rights guaranteed to him.  The  order of  August  5,  1966, according to the  petitioner,  is  one removing  him from service and it has been passed in  viola- tion  of Art. 311. That the said order is one  removing  the petitioner from service is also admitted by the  respondents in  paragraph  11 of the counter-affidavit  filed  on  their behalf  by  the Assistant Director of  Education.   Assuming that  the  said order has been passed in violation  of  Art. 311,  the  said circumstance will not give a  right  to  the petitioner to approach this Court under Art. 32.  The  stand taken by the petitioner is that his right to get 41-1 S.C. India/71 642 pension is property and it does not cease to be property  on the  mere  denial or cancellation by the  respondents.   The order dated June 12, 1968 is one withholding the payment  of pension  or  at  any  rate  amounts  to  a  denial  by   the respondents  to his right to get pension.  Either  way,  his rights  to  property are affected under Arts.  19(1)(f)  and 31(1)  of the Constitution.  His right to pension cannot  be taken away by an executive order.  In the counter affidavit, the respondents do not dispute the rights of the  petitioner to get pension, but they take the stand that the order dated June  12, 1968 is justified by r. 46 of the  Pension  Rules. This aspect will be dealt with by us later.  There is only a bald  averment  in the counter-affidavit that  there  is  no question  of  any  fundamental  right  and  therefore   this petition is not maintainable.  As to on what basis this plea is  taken,  has not been further clarified in  the  counter- affidavit.  But before us Mr. B. P. Jha, learned counsel for the  respondents, urged that by withholding the  payment  of pension  by  the State, no fundamental rights of  the  peti- tioner have been affected. We are not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Jha that no  fundamental  rights of the petitioner  are  affected  by passing  the order dated June 12, 1968.  ’We will  refer  to the  relevant Pension Rules bearing on the matter  and  also certain decisions.  In our opinion, the right to get pension is "property" and by withholding the same, the  petitioner’s fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts. 19(1)(f) and 31(1) are  affected.  As the matter is being discussed more  fully in the latter part of the judgment, it is enough to state at this  stage  that the writ petition is  maintainable.   Even according  to the respondents the order dated June 12,  1968 has no independent existence and that order has been  passed on the basis of the earlier order dated August 5, 1966.   In our  opinion,  if the order dated August 5, 1966  cannot  be sustained, it will follow that the order dated June 12, 1968 will  also fall to the ground.  Hence we will deal,  in  the first instance, with the validity of the order dated  August 5,  1966.  The full text of the order dated August  5,  1966 passed  by the Director of Public Instruction, Bihar, is  as follows: "Number-7 / 07 / 60 Edn. 3791               Sri  Devaki  Nandan Prasad,  Sub-Inspector  of

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             Schools,  Deoghhar,  having not  been  on  his               duties for more than 5 years since 1-3-60  has               ceased to be in Government employ since 2-3-65               under rule 76 of the Bihar Service Code.                                   (Sd.) K. Ahmed                               Director of Public Instruction                                           Bihar. 643 Memo No. 3791 Patna, dated 5th August, 1966. Copy  forwarded  to Sri Devaki Nandan  Prasad,  New  Yarpur, Patna for information."               Rule 76 of the Service Code reads as follows:               "Unless  the State Government, in view of  the               special   circumstances  of  the  case   shall               otherwise  determine,  A  Government   servant               after  five years of continuous  absence  from               duty,  elsewhere  than on foreign  service  in               India,  whether with or without leave,  ceases               to be in Government employ." The  essential requirement for taking action under the  said rule  is  that  the  government  servant  should  have  been Continuously  absent from duty for over five  years.   Under this rule it is immaterial whether absence from duty by  the government  servant was with or without leave so long as  it is established that he was absent from duty for a continuous period for over five years.  We are referring to this aspect because  it  is the case of the petitioner that  he  availed himself of leave with effect from March 11, 1960 and he left the headquarters after obtaining the necessary sanction from his superior officers.  On the other hand, it is the case of the  respondents  that the petitioner merely putting  in  an application   for  leave  from  March  11,  1960  left   the headquarters  without obtaining the prior permission of  the superiors.   It  is not necessary for us to deal  with  this controversy,  as  under  the rules absence  for  the  period stated  therein,  either  with or without  leave,  are  both treated on the same basis. According  to the dates given in the order,  the  petitioner has  not  been on his duties for more than five  years  from March 1, 1960 and that he ceased to be in government  employ from March 2, 1965.  According to the petitioner this  order is  illegal  because he was on duty till March 10,  1960  in which  case  continuous absence of five years would  not  be completed  on  March 2, 1965.  But the more  serious  attack against  this  order  is that there is no  question  of  the petitioner  not  being on his duties continuously  for  more than  five years.  On the other hand, according to  him,  he has  always  been ready and willing to do his duty  and  the respondents  have illegally prevented him from joining  duty by ignoring orders of the civil court.  In this  connection, on  behalf  of the petitioner, Mr.  Bishan  Narain,  learned counsel,  has  referred  us to  the  details  regarding  the institution  of  the  title  suit No.  86  of  1961  by  the petitioner  as  well  as to certain orders  passed  by  that court.   He  has  also drawn our attention  to  the  letters written  by  the petitioner to the authorities  offering  to work   and  the  respondents  not  sending  any  reply   and ultimately  asking  the  petitioner  to  join  duty  in  the reverted  post,  though  the order  of  reversion  has  been declared,  illegal  by the Munsif, Patna.  We  have  already referred 644 to the averments in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents.  So far as this aspect is concerned, it  is admitted  in paragraph 8 of the counter-affidavit  that  the

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petitioner  was  on  duty till March 10, 1960  and  that  he ceased  to  attend  to his duty only from  March  11,  1960. Therefore,  the  averment of the petitioner that he  was  on duty  till  March  10, 1960 is accepted as  correct  by  the respondents.   Therefore, it follows that even according  to the  respondents, the petitioner was absent from  duty  con- tinuously for more than five years only from March 11,  1960 and  he ceased to be in government employ on March 2,  1965. Without  anything  more  it can be  easily  said  that  this calculation  is absolutely erroneous because from the  dates mentioned above, the petitioner cannot be considered not  to have been on duty for more than five years. There  is  a  slight  shift  in  the  stand  taken  by   the respondents in the counter-affidavit.  While they admit that the  date  from  which  the  period  of  absence  should  be calculated  is  March 11, 1960 and not March 1,  1960,  they have  stated that the petitioner. was absent from March  11, 1960  till August 5, 1966, the date on which the  order  was passed and hence he was continuously not in service for more than five years.  That is even the outer period given in the order dated August 5, 1966, namely, March 2, 1965 is changed by the respondents to the date of passing of the order dated August 5, 1966. We will now proceed on the basis that the order dated August 5, 1966 should be read in such a manner that the  petitioner was  not on his duty continuously for more than  five  years from   March  11,  1960  till  August  5,  1966.   If   the, respondents  are able to establish this circumstance, it  is needless  to state that r. 76 of the Service Code will  come into   operation  irrespective  of  the  fact  whether   the petitioner  was absent with or without leave.  According  to the petitioner, he has not been continuously absent for over five.  years even during the above period as stated  by  the respondents. It  is  now  necessary  to  refer  to  certain   proceedings connected  with the title suit No. 86 of 1961 instituted  by the  petitioner in the Court of the Munsif III,  Patna.   In that suit the petitioner challenged the order dated March 5, 1960  in and by which he was reverted to the lower  division of  the  Subordinate Educational Service and a  censure  was directed   to  be  recorded  against  his  character   roll. According  to  the  respondents in this  suit  Me  order  of censure passed on September 2, 1953 was also challenged.  On August  5, 1961, the Munsif passed an order restraining  the present  respondents  from operating  the  punishment  order passed   on  March  5,  1960  by  the  Director  of   Public Instruction on the petitioner till the disposal of the suit. It  is now admitted by the respondents that  the  petitioner was on duty till March 10, 1960 and                             645 that he was absent only from March 11. 1960.  That there was an  order  of  temporary  injunction  passed  by  the  court restraining the respondents from giving effect to the  order of March 5, 1960 is not challenged in the counter-affidavit. According  to the petitioner he went on October 13, 1961  to join  his post from which he was illegally reverted, but  in spite of the order of the Munsif, Patna, the respondents did not  permit him to join duty.  That he was prepared to  join duty  and  work  is clear from the letters  written  by  the petitioner to the Director of Public Instruction on  October 13, 1961, October 24, 1961 and November 1, 1961.  There  was no  reply by the respondents.  It is no doubt true  that  on April  3,  1962,  the temporary injunction  granted  by  the Munsif,  Patna,  was vacated by the Subordinate  Judge.   On April  11, 1963 the title suit No. 86 of 1961 instituted  by

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the   petitioner  was  decreed  and  the  respondents   were prohibited  from  enforcing the order dated  March  5,  1960 reverting the petitioner from the senior grade to the  lower grade   of   the  Subordinate  Educational   Service.    The petitioner  again  wrote a letter on April 18, 1963  to  the Director   of  Public  Instruction  drawing   the   latter’s attention to the decree passed in title suit No. 86 of  1961 and requesting him to permit the petitioner to join duty  as Deputy Inspector of Schools.  There was a reply on  November 27,  1963  by  the Director of Public  Instructions  to  the effect  that the plea of the petitioner has been  considered at  all levels of the Directorate and the  Government.   The petitioner  was directed to report himself to  the  Regional Deputy Director of Education, Bhagalpur Division and to join duty in "Lower Division of Subordinate Educational Service". The  letter  proceeds to state "in case of  disobedience  of order  you  will be charged with insubordination".   We  are constrained to remark that the attitude taken in this letter on   behalf  of  the  State  is  not  commendable  at   all. Admittedly there was a decree passed by the Munsif in  title suit  No.  86  of 1961 on April  11,  1963  restraining  the respondents  from giving effect to the order dated March  5, 1960  reverting  the  petitioner from  the  post  of  Deputy Inspector  of Schools to the Lower Division  of  Subordinate Educational   Service.   Admittedly  the  respondents   were parties  to  the said decree and they had not  obtained  any order  of  an Appellate Court staying the operation  of  the decree in the suit.  The effect of the decree passed by  the Munsif  was that the petitioner was entitled to work in  the original  post which he was holding prior to his  reversion. That  these aspects have been missed by the  respondents  is evident  from  the reply of November 27, 1963  sent  by  the Director  of  Public  Instruction.  The  petitioner  sent  a further letter dated December 6, 1963 in reply to the letter of  the  Director of Public Instruction dated  November  27, 1963.   In this letter the petitioner again referred to  the decree  of  the  Munsif, Patna, dated  April  11,  1963  and pointed  out that he was entitled to hold the original  post which he was occupying 646 prior  to the order of reversion, which has;  been  directed not  to  be  put into operation by the  court.   He  further pointed  out  that the directions contained  in  the  letter dated  November  27,  1963 sent by the  Director  of  Public Instruction  was  not in conformity with the decree  of  the Munsif.  He further made a request that he should be allowed to  join duty in the original post in the senior  grade  and also  made a further request for payment of arrears  of  his salary.   There  was  no reply by the  respondents  and  the petitioner  was not allowed to join duty as desired by  him. The  above  correspondence  is not at all  disputed  by  the respondents.   In  fact they have admitted in  the  counter- affidavit  that  even  after the order  of  injunction,  the Department  was always insisting on the  petitioner  joining duty  as  Sub-Inspector of Schools, that is,  in  the  lower grade  and  that the petitioner never joined  duty  in  that post.  To complete the narration on this aspect. the  decree of  the Munsif in favour of the petitioner  restraining  the respondents from enforcing the order dated March 5, 1960 was set  aside  on appeal by the Subordinate Judge on  June  24, 1964   in   title  appeal  No.  132/24  of   1963/64.    The petitioner’s Second Appeal No. 640 of 1964 was dismissed  by the High Court on February 11, 1965. From the narration of the above facts, it will be clear that from  October  5,  1961, the date  of  temporary  injunction

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granted by the Munsif, till April 3, 1962, when the order of temporary  injunction was vacated by the Subordinate  Judge, the Department did not allow the petitioner to join duty  in the  senior post, which he was entitled to occupy by  virtue of the order of injunction.  We have already referred to the fact that the petitioner sent letters dated October 5, 1961, October  13,  1961, October 20, 1961 and  November  1,  1961 expressing  his  readiness and willingness to  work  in  the senior  post.   The respondents did not permit him  to  join duty.  Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner  was absent  from  duty during this period.  Again on  April  11, 1963,  the  Munsif  granted  a  decree  in  favour  of   the petitioner in the suit.  The respondents did not obtain  any stay  order from the Appellate Court.  So the decree of  the trial  court  was  in full force till it was  set  aside  on appeal on June 24, 1964.  During the period April 11,  1963, June  24, 1964, the petitioner wrote several letters and  to which  we  have  made a reference  earlier,  requesting  the respondents to permit him to join duty in the senior  grade. The  respondents  did  not permit him to join  duty  in  the senior  grade;  but,  on the other  hand,  insisted  on  the petitioner’s  joining duty in the lower grade on  threat  of disciplinary  action  being  taken.  This  attitude  of  the respondents,  we have already pointed out, was  in  flagrant violation of the order of the Munsif.  Therefore, during the period  April 11, 1963 to June 24, 1963, it cannot  be  said that the petitioner was absent from duty.  Hence it will be                             647 seen that the claim made by the respondents in the  counter- affidavit  that  the petitioner, since March 11,  1960  till August 5, 1966 was continuously not in service for over five years is fallacious.  There is no question of the petitioner not  being in continuous service for over five years  during the period referred to above.  On the other hand, the period during  which  it could be said ’,,hat  the  petitioner  was absent was from March 11, 1960, the date on which he  claims to have gone on leave till October 5, 1961 when the order of temporary injunction was passed by the Munsif.  From October 5,  1961 to April 3, 1962, we have already pointed out,  the petitioner  cannot  be considered to have been  absent  from duty.  Therefore, the continuity of absence is broken during this period.  The petitioner can again be considered to have been absent from duty from April 3, 1962, the date on  which the  order  of  temporary  injunction  was  vacated  by  the Subordinate Judge, till April 11, 1963, the date on which  a decree   was  granted  by  the  Munsif  in  favour  of   the petitioner.   During this period he was absent.   But  again the continuity of absence is broken during the period  April 11, 1963 the date of the decree of the Munsif, till June 24, 1964,  the  date  when the Subordinate  Judge  reversed  the decree of the trial court.  We have already referred to  the various letters written during this period by the petitioner as  well  as  the  reply sent  by  the  Director  of  Public Instruction  on  November 27, 1963.  During this  period  he cannot  be  considered to be absent from  duty.   The  third period  from which he can be again considered to  be  absent from  duty is June 24, 1964, the date of the decree  of  the Subordinate Judge till August 5, 1966, the date on which the order was passed purporting to be under r. 76 of the Service Code.   The  above  circumstances  clearly  show  that   the petitioner  cannot be considered to have  been  continuously absent from duty for over five years during the period March 11,  1960  to August 5, 1966. if that is so,  the  essential condition  for the application of r. 76 of the Service  Code is  lacking and, therefore, it follows that the order  dated

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August  5,  1966 is not supported by r. 76  of  the  Service Code. Therefore that order is illegal and has to be quashed. A contention has been taken by the petitioner that the order dated  August 5, 1966 is an order removing him from  service and  it  has  been passed in violation of Art.  311  of  the Constitution.   According  to the respondents  there  is  no violation  of  Art.  311.  On the other hand,  there  is  an automatic  termination of the petitioner’s employment  under r.  76  of  the Service Code.  It may not  be  necessary  to investigate  this  aspect further because on facts  we  have found  that  r. 76 of the Service Code has  no  application. Even if it is a question of automatic termination of service for  being  continuously absent for over a’ period  of  five years,  Art.  311 applies to such cases as is laid  down  by this Court in Jai 648 Shanker  v. State of Rajasthan (1).  In that  decision  this Court  had  to  consider Regulation No. 13  of  the  Jodhpur Service Regulations, which is as follows:               "13.    An  individual  who  absents   himself               without  permission  or  who  remains   absent               without  permission  for one month  or  longer               after   the  end  of  his  leave   should   be               considered to have sacrificed his  appointment               and  may only be reinstated with the  sanction               of the competent authority." It  was contended on behalf of the State of  Rajasthan  that the above regulation operated automatically and there was no question of removal from service because the officer  ceased to  be  in  the service after the period  mentioned  in  the regulation.   This  Court rejected the said  contention  and held  that an opportunity must be given to a person  against whom such an order was proposed to be passed, no matter  how the  regulation described it.  It was further held "to  give no  opportunity is to go against Art. 311 and this  is  what has happened here". In  the case before us even according to the  respondents  a continuous absence from duty for over five years, apart from resulting  in the forefeiture of the office also amounts  to misconduct under r. 46 of the Pension Rules disentitling the said  officer  to receive pension.  It is  admitted  by  the respondents that no opportunity was given to the  petitioner to show cause against the order proposed.  Hence there is  a clear violation of Art. 311.  Therefore, it follows even  on this ground the order has to be quashed. The  further  question is about the legality  of  the  order dated  June 12, 1968 purporting to be passed under r. 46  of the Pension Rules.  The petitioner wrote a letter dated July 18,  1967 requesting the Director of Public Instructions  to arrange  for payment of his pension as he had  attained  the age  of superannuation.  The order dated June 12,  1968  was passed  in reply to the said request of the petitioner.   In this  order  it is stated that under r. 46  of  the  Pension Rules,  the  Department is unable to grant  pension  to  the petitioner.  Rule 46 of the Pension Rules is as follows:               "46.    No  pension  may  be  granted   to   a               Government  servant dismissed or removed,  for               misconduct, insolvency or inefficiency, but to               Government  servants so dismissed  or  removed               compassionate  allowance may be  granted  when               they  are deserving of special  consideration,               provided  that  the allowance granted  to  any               Government servant shall not exceed two-thirds               of the pension which (1)  [1966] 1 S. C. R. 825.

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                           649               would  have been admissible to him if  he  had               retired on medical certificate." It  will  be  seen that under the  said  rule  a  Government servant  who has been dismissed, or removed for  misconduct, insolvency or inefficiency is not eligible for pension.  The respondents  ’have admitted in their counter-affidavit  that the  order dated August 5, .1966 purporting to be under  r. 76  of  the Service Code is an order of removal  and  it  is further  pleaded by them that the petitioner’s  absence  for over  five  years  itself  amounts  to  misconduct,duct  and inefficiency  in  service.  We have already  held  that  the ,order dated August 5, 1966, is illegal.  If that is so,  it follows  ,.that  the petitioner has  not  been  continuously absent from duty for over five years and he is not guilty of any  misconduct or in-efficiency in service.  Therefore,  it will  further follow that withholding of pension under  the- order  dated  June  12, 1968 on the basis of r.  46  of  the Pension Rules, is illegal. The  respondents  have not taken up the  position  that  the offic ers  like the petitioner are not entitled to  pension. A  reference  to r. 5 of the Pension Rules  shows  that  the officers mentioned therein are entitled to pension.   There is  no controversy that the petitioner is an officer in  the Education Department of the Bihar ’Education Service.  It is item  No. 3 of the Schedule to r. 5. Rule 42  declares  that every pension shall be held to have been granted Subject  to the  conditions  contained in Chapter VIII.  It is  not  the case  of the respondents that Chapter VIII which applies  to re-employment  of pensioners, has any relevancy to the  case on  hand.   We have already referred to r. 46.   Under  that rule   a  Government  servant  dismissed  or   removed   for misconduct, insolvency or ’inefficiency is not eligible  for pension.  But that rule clearly con-templates that action by way of dismissal or removal in respect of the three  matters mentioned  therein  has already taken place -according  to law.   The  bar  under  r. 46 will  operate  only  when  the conditions  mentioned  therein are satisfied.  In  fact  the consequences  envisaged under the rule flow from the  action already  taken.   Rule  129  provides  for  the  payment  of superannuation  pension to a Government servant entitled  or compelled by the ,rules to retire at a particular age.  Rule 134  clarifies  the  payment of  retirement  pension  to  a Government  servant  permitted to retire after  completing qualifying  service for 30 years or any such less  ,time  as may  for  any  special  class  of  Government  servants   be prescribed.   Rule  135  provides  for  Government  servants mentioned in r. 5 to be entitled on their resignation  being accepted to -a retiring pension after completing qualifying service  of not less than 25 years.  Rule 146 provides  the scale of pension for Government servants mentioned in r.  5. We  have only referred to -some of the important  rules  to show  that the payment of pension does not depend upon  the discretion of the State; but, on the 650 other hand, payment of pension is governed by the Rules  and a Government servant coming Within the Rules is entitled  to claim  pension.   The order dated June 12, 1968  has  to  be quashed in view of the fact that the foundation for the said order  is the one based on the order dated August  5,  1966, which  has been quashed by us.  When the order dated  August 5, 1966 can no longer survive, the order dated June 12, 1968 quite naturally falls to the ground. The last question to be considered, is, whether the right to receive  pension by a Government servant is property, so  as

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to  attract  Arts. 19(1)(f) and 31(1) of  the  Constitution. This  question  falls  to be decided in  order  to  consider whether the writ petition is maintainable under Art. 32.  To this aspect, we have already adverted to earlier and we  now proceed to consider the same. According to the petitioner the right to receive pension  is property  and  the respondents by an executive  order  dated June  12, 1968 have wrongfully withheld his  pension.   That order  affects his fundamental rights under  Arts.  19(1)(f) and 31(1) of the Constitution.  The respondents, as we  have already   indicated,  do  not  dispute  the  right  of   the petitioner  to  get  pension, but for the  order  passed  on August  5,  1966.   There is only a  bald  averment  in  the counter-affidavit that no question of any fundamental  right arises for consideration.  Mr. Jha, learned counsel for  the respondents,  was not prepared to take up the position  that the  right  to receive pension cannot be  considered  to  be property under any circumstances.  According to him in  this case,  no  order  has  been passed  by  the  State  granting pension.  We understood the learned counsel to urge that  if the State had passed an order granting pension and later  on resiles from that order, the latter order may be  considered to affect the petitioner’s right regarding property so as to attract Arts. 19(1)(f) and 31(t) of the Constitution. We are not inclined to accept the contention of the  learned counsel for the respondents.  By a reference to the material provisions  in the Pension Rules, we have already  indicated that  the  grant of pension does not depend  upon  an  order being  passed by the authorities to that effect.  It may  be that  for  the  purposes of quantifying  the  amount  having regard to the period of service and other allied matters, it may  be  necessary for the authorities to pass an  order  to that  effect, but the right to receive pension flows  to  an officer  not because of the said order but by virtue of  the Rules.   The  Rules, we have already  pointed  out,  clearly recognise  the  fight  of persons  like  the  petitioner  to receive pension under the circumstances mentioned therein. 651 The question whether the pension granted to a public servant is property attracting Art. 31(1) came up for  consideration before  the Punjab High Court in Bhagwant Singh v. Union  of India  (1).   It  was held that  such  a  right  constitutes "property" and any interference will be a breach of Art. 3 1 (1) of the Constitution.  It was further held that the State cannot  by an executive order curtail or abolish  altogether the  right of the public servant to receive  pension.   This decision was given by a learned Single Judge.  This decision was taken up in Letters Patent Appeal by the Union of India. The  Letters Patent Bench in its decision in Union of  India v.  Bhagwant Singh (2)approved the decision of  the  learned Single  Judge.   The  Letters Patent  Bench  held  that  the pension  granted  to a public servant on his  retirement  is "property"  within  the  meaning  of Art. 3  1  (1)  of  the Constitution and he could be deprived of the same only by an authority  of  law  and that pension does not  cease  to  be property  on the mere denial or cancellation of it.  It  was further  held  that the character of pension  as  "property" cannot  possibly  undergo  such mutation at the  whim  of  a particular person or authority. The  matter again came up before a Full Bench of the  Punjab and Haryana High Court in K. R. Erry v. The State of  Punjab (1).  The High Court had to consider the nature of the right of  an  officer to get pension.  The  majority  quoted  with approval  the  principles  laid  down  in  the  two  earlier decisions  of  the same High Court, referred to  above,  and

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held  that  the  pension is not to be treated  as  a  bounty payable on the sweet will and pleasure of the Government and that  the  right  to superannuation  pension  including  its amount is a valuable right vesting in a Government  servant. It  was  further held by the majority that  even  though  an opportunity  had already been afforded to the officer on  an earlier occasion for showing cause against the imposition of penalty for lapse or misconduct on his part and he has  been found  guilty,  nevertheless,  when a cut is  sought  to  be imposed  in the quantum of pension payable to an officer  on the  basis  of  misconduct already  proved  against  him,  a further  opportunity  to show cause in that regard  must  be given  to  the officer.  This view regarding the  giving  of further  opportunity was expressed by the learned Judges  on the  basis of the relevant Punjab Civil Service Rules.   But the learned Chief Justice in his dissenting judgment was not prepared  to  agree  with  the  majority  that  under   such circumstances  a further opportunity should be given  to  an officer when a reduction in the amount of pension payable is made  by the State.  It is not necessary for us in the  case on hand, to consider the question whether (1) A. T. R. 1962 Punjab 503.    (2) I. L. R. 1965 Punjab 1. (3) I. L. R. 1967 Punjab & Haryana 278 652 before  taking  action  by way of reducing  or  denying  the pension on the basis of disciplinary action already taken, a further notice to show cause should be given to an  officer. That  question does not arise for consideration  before  us. Nor are we concerned with the further question regarding the procedure,  if any, to be adopted by the authorities  before reducing or withholding the pension for the first time after the  retirement of an officer.  Hence we express no  opinion regarding  the  views  expressed by  the  majority  and  the minority Judges in the above Punjab High Court decision,  on this  aspect.   But we agree with the view of  the  majority when  it has approved its earlier decision that  pension  is not  a bounty payable on the sweet will and pleasure of  the Government and that, on the other hand, the right to pension is a valuable right vesting in a government servant. This  Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v.  Ranojirao  Shinde and another (1) had to consider the question whether a "cash grant"  is "property" within the meaning of that  expression in Arts. 19(1)(f) and 31(1) of the Constitution.  This Court held  that it was property, observing "it is obvious that  a tight to sum of money is property". Having due regard to the above decisions, we are of the opi- nion that the right of the petitioner to receive pension  is property  under Art. 3 1 (1) and by a mere  executive  order the State had no power to withhold the same.  Similarly, the said  claim is also property under Art. 19(1)(f) and  it  is not  saved  by sub-article (5) of Art.  19.   Therefore,  it follows  that  the  order dated June 12,  1968  denying  the petitioner fight to receive pension affects the  fundamental right  of the petitioner under Arts. 19(1)(f) and  31(1)  of the  Constitution, and as such the writ petition under  Art. 32  is maintainable.  It may be that under the  Pension  Act (Act  23  of  1871) there is a bar  against  a  civil  court entertaining  any  suit relating to  the  matters  mentioned therein.   That  does  not stand in the way  of  a  Writ  of Mandamus being issued to the State to properly consider  the claim of the petitioner for payment of pension according  to law. To  conclude:  No relief can be granted in  respect  of  the orders dated September 2, 1953 and March 5, 1960 as they are already  covered  by the decision of the  Patna  High  Court

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dated  May 4, 1967 in Second Appeal No. 640 of  1967.   Even assuming  that  the contention of the  petitioner  that  the order  dated  September  2,  1953 was  not  the  subject  of adjudication in the litigation leading up to the decision of the   High  Court,  in  the  second  appeal,   is   correct, nevertheless, no relief can be granted as the order has been passed as early as 1953.  Further, the representations made (1)  [1968] 3 S. C. R. 489. 653 by him for cancellation of the said order have been rejected long  ago.   Further,  there  is  no  infringement  of   any fundamental  right  of the petitioner by  that  order.   The order  dated  August 5, 1966 declaring under r.  76  of  the Service  Code  that  the  petitioner has  ceased  to  be  in government employ is set aside and quashed.  The order dated June 12, 1968 stating that under r. 46 of the Pension Rules, the Department is unable to grant the petitioner pension  is also  set  aside  and quashed.  As  the  petitioner  himself claims   that   he  has  been  retired   from   service   on superannuation,  a  writ of mandamus will be issued  to  the respondents  directing  them to consider the  claim  of  the petitioner  for  payment of pension according to  law.   The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above.  The petitioner   is  entitled  to  his  costs  from  the   first respondent, the State of Bihar. V.P.S.                                  Petition allowed. 654