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PETITIONER: DEO NARAIN CHOUDHURY

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHREE NARAIN CHOUDHARY

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       31/10/2000

BENCH: V.N.Khare,, S.N.Variava

JUDGMENT:

L.....I.........T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T..J       J U D G M E N T

     S.  N.  VARIAVA, J.

     Leave  granted.  This Appeal is against an Order dated 19th  March,  1999 by which the Civil Revision filed by  the Appellant  herein  has been dismissed.  The facts  necessary for  the  purpose of this Appeal are as follows:   Appellant and  Respondent  are brothers.  According to  the  Appellant their  disputes,  in  respect of a property at  Patna,  were referred  to Arbitration.  The Arbitrator/Umpire declared an Award  dated  21st  January, 1996.  On 14th  May,  1996  the Arbitrator/Umpire  gave  a  registered Notice, to  both  the parties,  that the Award had been made and that the same was filed in the Court.  On 14th May, 1996 the Arbitrator/Umpire filed  the Award in the Court of Sub Judge I Patna.  On 11th June, 1996 the Respondent filed a Caveat in the Court of the Sub  Judge.   It  is  mentioned  in  the  Caveat  that   the Respondent  has received a Notice dated 14th May, 1996  that an  Award  has been declared on 21st January, 1996 and  that the  Award has been registered on 20th April, 1996 and  that it  has been filed in the Court.  In the Caveat it is prayed that  before  any  Order is passed, on  the  alleged  Award, notice  be issued to the Caveator and he be heard.  On  16th July,  1996 the Court sent a Notice to the parties about the filing of the Award.  This Notice was admittedly received by the Respondent on 25th July, 1996.  On 1st August, 1996 both the  parties  applied for inspection of the Award.   Parties were permitted to and took inspection.  The Respondent filed his  objections  to  the Award on 21st  August,  1996.   The Appellant  contended  that  the objections  had  been  filed beyond  the period of limitation.  It was contended that the objections should thus be dismissed and a decree in terms of the  Award  be  passed.   This contention  was  tried  as  a preliminary  issue.  On 11th September, 1998 the trial Court rejected  the preliminary contention.  It was held that  the objection  had  been filed within the period of  limitation. The  Appellant filed Civil Revision No.  2173 of 1998.  This has  also been dismissed by the impugned Order.  Hence, this Appeal.   The  question for consideration in this Appeal  is when  does the period of limitation for filing objections to an  Award commence.  Under Article 119, Limitation Act, 1963 the  limitation  for filing a petition for setting aside  an Award  is 30 days from the date of service of the notice  of the filing of the Award.  Section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 reads as follows:  "14.  Award to be signed and filed.-

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(1)  When  the arbitrators or umpire have made their  award, they  shall sign it and shall give notice in writing to  the parties  of the making and signing thereof and of the amount of  fees  and charges payable in respect of the  arbitration and  award.   (2)  The arbitrators or umpire shall,  at  the request  of  any party to the arbitration agreement  or  any person  claiming  under such party or if so directed by  the Court  and  upon  payment  of the fees and  charges  due  in respect  of  the arbitration and award and of the costs  and charges  of  filing the award, cause the award or  a  signed copy  of  it,  together with any depositions  and  documents which  may  have  been taken and proved before them,  to  be filed in Court, and the Court shall thereupon give notice to the  parties  of  the filing of the award.   (3)  Where  the arbitrators  or umpire state a special case under clause (b) of Section 13, the Court, after giving notice to the parties and  hearing  them, shall pronounce its opinion thereon  and such  opinion shall be added to, and shall form part of, the award."

     Thus, under Section 14(1) the Arbitrator has to give a notice  to  the parties.  Then the Arbitrator or the  Umpire has  to  file the Award in Court.  Under Section  14(2)  the Court  "shall  thereupon give notice to the parties  of  the filing of the Award".  It is now settled law that the period of  limitation under Article 119 of the Limitation Act, 1963 will  start running from the date the notice has been  given by  the  Court under Section 14(2) of the  Arbitration  Act, 1940.   In  this case, admittedly, notice has been given  by the  Court  on  16th  July, 1996.  Admittedly  it  has  been received  by  the  Respondent  on   25th  July,  1996.   The objections  are  filed  on 21st August, 1996.  It  has  been submitted by Mr.  Misra that the term "notice" under Section 14(2)  of  the Arbitration Act has been interpreted by  this Court  in various decisions to mean any communication  which give  notice  to the parties about the filing of the  Award. He  submitted  that  it has been held that notice  does  not necessarily  mean  communication in writing.   He  submitted that  it  has  been held that the expression  "give  notice" simply  means  giving intimation of the filing of the  Award and  that such intimation could also be communicated orally. He  submitted  that if a party has been informed  about  the filing  of  the  Award then that is  sufficient  because  no particular  mode of service has been prescribed.  In support of  his  submission  he relied upon the  case  of  Nilkantha Shidramappa  Ningashetti  v.  Kashinath Somanna  Ningashetti reported  in  1962(2) S.C.R.  551.  This case  supports  the proposition   canvassed  by  Mr.    Misra  except  that  the authority  makes it very clear that the intimation,  whether oral or in writing, must be from the Court.  Mr.  Misra also relied  upon  the case of Food Corporation of India  v.   E. Kuttappan reported in (1993) 3 S.C.C.  445, wherein again it is  reiterated  that the notice need not be in writing.   In this  case the Arbitrator had forwarded the Award along with the  entire  record to the Respondent’s counsel.   This  was done  at  the  request  of the  Respondent’s  counsel.   The Respondent’s counsel then filed the Award in the Court.  The Court  thereupon issued notice to the parties.  The question was  what  was the date from which the period of  limitation started  running.  This Court held that as the  Respondent’s counsel  filed  the Award in Court he did so as an agent  of the  Arbitrator.   It  was  held that  as  the  Respondent’s counsel  had filed the Award in the Court the Respondent had knowledge  about  the filing of the Award and the period  of limitation  started running from the date when the Award was

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filed  in the Court by the Respondent’s counsel.  This Court held that the mere fact that subsequently Court had issued a notice  to  the  parties  did   not  extend  the  period  of limitation.   Thus  in  this case the notice  by  Court  was deemed  to be the act of the Respondent’s counsel in  filing the Award in Court.  Mr.  Misra also relied upon the case of Secretary to Govt.  of Karnataka v.  V.  Harishbabu reported in (1996) 5 S.C.C.  400.  In this case it has been held that even  though a notice under Section 14(2) is mandatory, such notice  need not be in writing and may be oral.  It has also been  held  that  no  formal   mode  for  service  has  been prescribed  and  all  that is essential is  that  notice  or intimation  or communication must be issued by the Court  to the  parties  and served upon the parties.  It is held  that the  notice  to  the pleader is sufficient  compliance  with Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act.  It is held that where a  party  has knowledge aliunde of the filing of the  Award, appears  before the Court and seeks time to file  objections to  the  Award,  it shall be deemed that he  has  notice  of filing  of  the Award.  Mr.  Misra then showed to Court  the Order Sheets.  He pointed out from the Order Sheets that the Award  had been filed on 14th May, 1996.  He submitted  that admittedly  the Respondent had received the notice from  the Arbitrator/Umpire  that  the  Award had been so  filed.   He submitted  that  the  Respondent then filed Caveat  on  11th June,  1996.   He submitted that the Respondent having  been put  to  notice  should have appeared in the Court  on  19th June,  1996  when  the matter was again  placed  before  the Court.   He submitted that after 19th June, 1996 the  matter again  appeared before the Court on 11th July, 1996 and 16th July,  1996.   He  submitted  that as  the  Respondent  had, aliunde, got knowledge of the filing of the Award the period of  limitation  had started to run.  He submitted  that  the fact  that the Respondent had not appeared in Court on  11th July,  1996 and 16th July, 1996 did not stop limitation.  He submitted  that  the period of limitation having started  to run  the  objections filed on 21st August, 1996 were  beyond the  period of limitation.  There can be no dispute with the proposition  of  law that the notice need not be in  writing and  can be oral.  However, all the authorities clearly  lay down  that  the notice must be some act of the  Court.   The proposition  that  a  notice must be by the  Court  is  also confirmed  by an authority of this Court in the case of  Ch. Ramalinga  Reddy  v.   Superintending Engineer  reported  in (1999)  9  S.C.C.  610.  In this case it has been held  that mere intimation by an Arbitrator is not sufficient and it is the Court which has to give notice.  We are unable to accept the  submissions of Mr.  Misra.  Mere filing of a Caveat did not  start  the  period of limitation.  By  the  Caveat  the Respondent  was  merely asking the Court to give it  notic