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PETITIONER: DELHI MOTOR COMPANY AND ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: U.A. BASRURKAR AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/01/1968

BENCH: BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA BENCH: BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA SHAH, J.C. RAMASWAMI, V.

CITATION:  1968 AIR  794            1968 SCR  (2) 720

ACT: Transfer  of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), ss.  106,  107, 53A-Specific  Relief Act, 1877 (1 of 1877), s.  27A-Portions of business premises given on sub-lease-Documents  purportng to constitute sub-lease not registered-Applicability of  ss. 106,  107-Enforceability of agreement under s.  53A-Specific performance of contract-Effect of s. 27A.

HEADNOTE: Certain  documents were executed between the appellant  firm and  the respondent company in respect of premises of  which the  latter was a tenant.  According to the appellant  these documents  were  intended  to effect  a  sublease  of  three portions  of  the premises in question though  in  order  to avoid  consequences under the Delhi and  Ajmer-Merwara  Rent Control Act 10 of 1947 they apparently purported to create a partnership.  The firm was actually given possession of  two of the three portions thus given to it.  After some time the firm  was  dispossessed  by  the  company  of  the  premises occupied  by  it  and it therefore  filed  a  suit  claiming delivery  of possession.  In defence the  company  contended that the documents relied upon by the firm did not  evidence either a sub-lease or a partnership.  According to it  there were negotiations for a partnership which never  fructified. The  trial  court held that the documents  executed  by  the parties evidenced an agreement for a sub-lease and since the agreement did not require registration the firm was entitled to the reliefs claimed by it on the basis of the  agreement. In  appeal  by  the company the High  Court  held  that  the documents  constituted  a  completed lease of  at  least  an agreement  to  lease falling within s. 2(7)  of  the  Indian Registration  Act, and since the lease or the  agreement  to lease  was evidenced by documents in Writing and  they  were unregistered, the lease or the agreement to lease could  not be  enforced.  On this sole ground, the High  Court  allowed the  appeal  and  dismissed  the suit  of  the  firm,  which thereupon, appealed to this Court. HELD : (i) The three documents in question were relied on by the  appellant firm itself as evidence of the lease and  the terms thereof; the firm could not therefore be heard to  say that  these documents did not represent the completed  lease

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and did not, for that reason, require registration. [724  C- H] (ii) According  to  the  firm’s  case  based  on  the   said documents  rent  in the first instance was payable  to.  the company  in the shape of 10% of the profits of the firm  for the period 1st April 1950 to 30th June 1951.  Therefore  the lease  that came into existence through these documents  was certainly for more than a year.  Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act was thus clearly applicable and such a lease could  not have been validly made except under a  registered instrument.   Admittedly  there was no registration  of  the documents  which constituted the lease,  and,  consequently, the  firm  could not claim any rights on the basis  of  this lease evidenced by unregistered documents. [725 B-F] (iii)     Merely  because  the ]case was for  an  indefinite period and related to immovable property which was not  used for  agricultural or manufacturing purposes it could not  be held to be a lease from month to month 721 to  which  s.  106  of the  Transfer  of  Property  Act  was applicable.   There  was nothing in the terms of  the  lease which showed that it was from month to month. [725 F-H] Ram  Kumar  Das v. Jagadish Chandra Deb Dhabal  Deb  &  Anr. [1952] S.C.R. 269, distinguished. (iv) Section  53A  of the Transfer of Property Act  is  only meant to bring about a bar against enforcement of rights  by a  lessor  in respect of property of which  the  lessee  had already taken possession, but does not give any right to the lessee  to claim possession or to claim any other  right  on the  basis  of an unregistered lease.  Section 53A  is  only available  PA a defence to a lessee and not as conferring  a right  on  the basis of which the lessee  can  claim  rights against the lessor. [726 C-E] In  the present case the claim which was put forward by  the firm in the plaint, could by no means be construed as a mere defence  of the firm’s rights.  What the firm  was  actually seeking to do was to enforce the rights under the lease and, in  such a case, s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act  was clearly inapplicable. [727 H-728 A] Probodh Kumar Das & Ors. v. Dantmara Tea Company Ltd.,& Ors. I.A. 293, relied on. Ram Chander v. Maharaj Kunwar & Ors., I.L.R. 1939 All.  809. distinguished. (v)  Specific  performances  of  the  lease  could  not   be enforced because (a)     In    the   plaint   no    specific performance was claimed by the appellant, (b)The appellant’s own  case was that the entire contract was not  included  in the  three  written documents, and s. 27A  of  the  Specific Relief  Act under which only the contract could be  enforced requires  the  whole  contract to be  in  writing;  (c)  The difference  between the words of s. 53A of the  Transfer  of Property  Act and s. 27A of the Specific Relief  Act  brings out  clearly that the latter is applicable when  the  entire property under contract has been taken possession of by  the lessee in part performance of the contract.  In the  present case  only  two out of the three portions  of  the  premises leased out to it were taken possession of by the  appellant. [728 G-H, 729 H, 730 A-B]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 495 of 1965. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and decree  dated December 22, 1959 of the Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench at

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Delhi in Regular First Appeal No. 78-D of 1953. Rameshwar Dayal and A. D. Mathur, for the appellants. Veda Vyasa,K.  K. fain and H. K. Puri, for respondent No. 6. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargava, J. The first appellant, Messrs.  Delhi Motor  Com- pany, is a partnership firm (hereinafter referred to as "the firm"),  of which the other four appellants Nos. 2 to 5  are partners.   Respondent No. 6, New Garage Ltd., is a  private limited company (hereinafter referred to as "the  Company"), of which respondent 722 No. 1 was the Managing Director, and respondents Nos. 2 to 5 were members of the Board of Directors.  The firm brought a’ suit  against  the  Company for possession of  part  of  the building  known  as "Scindia House"  situated  in  Connaught Circus, New Delhi, on the basis of an agreement of subleases Possession was claimed of a portion of the Show-Room on  the ground  floor,  of 1/2 portion of the Balcony,  and  another portion of the premises which were, in the year 1950, in the possession  of Messrs.  Kanwar Brothers Ltd.  The  case  put forward  by the firm was that the Company was the tenant  of Scindia  House  and was in occupation of the  Show-Room  and other  parts  of  the  building, while a,  part  of  it  was occupied  by Messrs.  Kanwar Brothers Ltd. as sub-lessee  of the  Company.  According to the firm, the agreement to  sub- lease, or the sub-lease on the basis of which possession was claimed by the firm from the Company, is evidenced by  three documents,  the  first one of which is letter, Ext.   P.  1, dated  20th  February,  1950, written by  K.  S.  Bhatnagar, appellant No. 2, on behalf of the firm, to U. A.  Basrurkar, respondent  No.  1,  who was the Managing  Director  of  the Company.   The second document is letter, Ext.  P. 2,  dated 22nd  February, 1950, written by respondent No. 1  Basrurkar to appellant No. 2 Bhatnagar; and the third document is Ext. P.  3,  which purports to be notes on agreement  arrived  at between Basrurkar and Bhatnagar on 22nd February, 1950.  The case  of the firm was that, though these documents  did  not purport in so many words to be an agreement of sub-lease. to be  granted by the Company to the firm, in substance and  in fact, the agreement arrived at was of a sub-lease in respect of the premises mentioned above.  Since, under the Delhi and Ajmer  Merwara Rent Control Act 19 of 1947, if  a  sub-lease had  been  granted by the Company to the  firm  without  the consent of the landlord, the Company would have been  liable to  ejectment from the premises, the agreement was not  made as  directly  evidencing a sub-lease, so that  the  landlord should  not  have an opportunity of suing  the  Company  for ejectment.  In February, 1950, when the agreement  evidenced by  these three documents was arrived at, respondent No.  1, U.  A. Basrurkar as     Director did not have the  authority to enter into this transaction on behalf of the Company with the firm and, consequently on 22nd March, 1950, the Board of Directors  of  the  Company, by a  resolution  Ext.   P.  9, authorised   the  Managing  Director  to  enter  into   this transaction.   Thereafter, the firm came into possession  of two portions of the leased property and started its business in them with effect from 1st April, 1950.  The two  portions of  the leased property, which came into the  possession  of the firm, were a portion of the ShowRoom on the ground floor and  a half portion of the Balcony on the first floor.   The agreement contained in these letters and, 723 documents  also  required parties to carry  out  some  other obligations  and,  according to the firm, it  complied  with them.   In order to avoid the, liability of the Company  for

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ejectment  under  the Delhi and Ajmer Merwara  Rent  Control Act, 1947, the agreement was sought to be given the. form of a  partnership; and in order to enable the Company to  enter into such a transaction, a special resolution Ext.  P. 4 was passed  on 24th November, 1950 at an Extra-ordinary  General Meeting  of  the Share-holders of the Company  amending  the Memorandum  of Association of the Company.   This  amendment was  subsequently  approved by the District  Judge  and  was registered  with the Registrar of Companies.  So far as  the landlord  is  concerned,  lie was not a party  to  these  t- ransactions, though, on 5th April, 1951, the landlord gave a letter  Ext.  P. 22 recognising the possession of the  firm, but  he  specifically stated in that letter  that  the  firm would be a licensee and not a sub-lessee.  One other term in the,  agreement arrived at was that appellant No. 2,  K.  S. Bhatnagar, was to be taken as a Director of the Company  and he  was  in fact included in the Directors  of  the  Company thereafter.   The  further case of the firm  was  that  when Messrs.   Kanwar  Brothers Ltd. vacated the portion  of  the premises  which was included in the sub-leases  the  Company did  not  give  possession of that  portion  of  the  leased property to the firm and also started obstructing the use of those portions of the property by the firm of which the firm had  secured  possession by 1st April, 1950.  A  stage  came when the firm was completely dispossessed from the  property ]eased and, ultimately, after giving   notices,   the   firm instituted a suit on 18th June, 1952.   The principal prayer in the suit was for delivery of possession in     respect of all the three portions of the leased property.  Then,  there was  a  claim for damages to the extent of Rs.  10,000/-  in respect  of  loss incurred on account of  dispossession  and obstruction in use of the leased property at the instance of the  Company.  Injunctions were also sought restraining  the Company  from  interfering with the rights of the  firm  and with their uninterrupted use of the leased property.   There were  further  prayers for other  consequential  injunctions which need not be described in detail. On  behalf  of the Company and its Directors, the  plea  put forward  was that there was no agreement of sub-lease  or  a completed  sub-lease  between the Company and the  firm  and that,  in  fact, all that took place were  negotiations  for entering  into  a  partnership.   Even  the  agreement   for partnership  was never completed, so that the firm  was  not entitled to any relief at all. The  trial Court held that the contract evidenced  by  these documents  was an agreement for a sub-lease and, since  this agreement  did  not  require  registration,  the  firm   was entitled to the 724 reliefs claimed on the basis of this agreement.  The Company and  its Directors appealed to the High Court of Punjab  and that Court held that these documents constituted a completed lease  or at least an agreement to lease falling  within  s. 2(7) of the Indian Registration Act and, since the lease  or the agreement to lease was evidenced by documents in writing and  they were unregistered, the lease or the  agreement  to lease could not be enforced.  On this sole ground, the  High Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit of the firm. The firm has now come up in, appeal to this Court by special leave. The  first  point urged on behalf of the firm was  that,  in this  case, there was a completed sub-lease, but it did  not require  registration  for Iwo reasons.   The  first  reason advanced  was  that  the  lease was  not  evidenced  by  the documents Exts.  P. 1, P. 2 and P. 3 only, but was, in fact,

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completed  subsequently  when, after the resolution  of  the Board  of  Directors  of  the  Company,  the  Company   gave possession  of the leased property to the firm on  or  about the  1st  April, 1950.  The second reason was that,  in  any case,  this lease was not a lease from year to year  or  for any  term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent,  so that  s.  107  of  the Transfer  of  Property  Act  was  not applicable  and  registration  was  not  compulsory.   These submissions  fail, because the lease, as relied upon by  the firm, has to be held to be a lease of immovable property for a  term  exceeding  one  year, and such  a  lease  is  fully governed  by  s. 107 of the Transfer of Property  Act.   The firm itself came forward with the case that the rights  that were  being claimed were under a lease and the lease was  in respect  of  immovable  property  consisting  of  the  three portions  of  the Scindia House which  have  been  mentioned above.   It was, however, urged that this lease was not  for any  fixed term at all and was for an indefinite period,  so that  it could not be held to be a lease from year  to  year either.   It was further submitted that yearly rent had  not been  reserved  in  respect  of  this  lease.   Even   these submissions  were  made on the basis that the terms  of  the lease have to be ascertained from the three documents  Exts. P.  1, P. 2 and P. 3 which were relied upon by the  firm  to claim  the  relief in the suit.  It appears to us  that,  if these  documents  are  properly  interpreted,  an  inference necessarily  follows  that the lease, if any,  brought  into existence  by  these documents was certainly  for  a  period exceeding  one  year.  Since reliance was  placed  on  these documents  on  behalf of the firm to urge that there  was  a completed  lease, learned counsel for the firm was asked  to point  out  the provision which fixed the  rent  payable  in respect  of  the leased property.  The  only  provision,  on which he relied to show that rent had, in fact, been  agreed upon the fixed, was para 1 of Ext.  P. 3 which 725 contains  notes  on agreement, dated  22nd  February,  1950. That paragraph is as follows :-               "Profit  share of party No. 1 would be 10%  of               net profit of New Delhi business only and will               be  settled at the end of the 1st  closing  of               the  financial year which would be 30th  June,               1951." Accepting this submission that this paragraph lays down  the rent  payable, it is clear that, under it, the rent  payable for  the first time would be 10 % of the net profits  earned by the firm in its New Delhi business up to 30th June, 1951. The  period would naturally begin on the date on  which  the lease  commenced.  That date, according to the firm  itself, was 1st April, 1950.  From these facts it follows that  when the  rent is to be paid for the first time, it would  be  an amount  of 10% of the net profits earned by the firm in  its New  Delhi business between 1st April, 1950 and  30th  June, 1951, and, naturally enough, the rent will be in respect  of the  same period.  This term, therefore, clearly  laid  down that  the very first payment of rent was to be for a  period of  one  year  and three months, so  that,  even  though  so further  period for the continuance of the lease after  30th June, 1951 was laid down, the lease at least made rent  pay- able for the first period of fifteen months.  The lease was, therefore,  at  least for a period of  fifteen  months  and, consequently, for a period exceeding one year.  Section  107 of   the  Transfer  of  Property  Act  was,  thus,   clearly applicable  and  such a lease could not  have  been  validly made,  except  under a registered  instrument.   Admittedly,

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there was no registration of the documents which constituted the  lease  and consequently, the firm could not  claim  any rights on the basis of this lease evidenced by  unregistered documents. Learned counsel tried to urge that, since in these documents no  definite period for the lease was mentioned,  we  should hold  that  s.  106  of the Transfer  of  Property  Act  was applicable  and  the  lease being in  respect  of  immovable property   for   purposes   other   than   agricultural   or manufacturing  must  be deemed to be a lease from  month  to month.   We  are unable to accept this  submission,  because none of the documents, on which reliance has been placed  on behalf  of the firm to prove the lease, contains any  clause indicating that the tenancy was to be from month to month or the rent was payable monthly.  In fact, the indication  from para 1 of Ext.  P. 3 quoted above is that the rent was to be payable annually, so that the contract itself seems to  give an  indication that it was to be a lease from year  to  year and annual rent was payable.  These circumstances,  however, are  immaterial, because we have already  indicated  earlier our 726 finding that this lease was at least for a minimum period of 15  months  and,  consequently, S. 107 of  the  Transfer  of Property   Act  becomes  applicable,  irrespective  of   the question whether it was a lease from month to month or  from year to year.  The High Court was, therefore, quite  correct in  holding  that  on the basis of this  lease  the  reliefs claimed by the firm could not be granted to it. In  these  circumstances,  an argument was  put  forward  on behalf  of the firm that, though this contract to lease  had not  been registered, the firm could claim possession  under it  in view of the provisions of s. 53A of the  Transfer  of Property  Act, because, in this case, the Company  would  be debarred  from  enforcing  against the  firm  any  right  in respect of that property of which the firm had already taken possession, viz., part of the Show-Room and a portion of the Balcony.   In  our  opinion, this argument  proceeds  on  an incorrect interpretation of s. 53A. because that section  is only  meant  to  bring about a bar  against  enforcement  of rights  by  a  lessor in respect of property  of  which  the lessee  had  already taken possession, but do not  give  any right  to  the lessee to claim possession or  to  claim  any other rights on the basis of an unregistered lease.  Section 53A  of the Transfer of Property Act is only available as  a defence  to  a lessee and not as conferring a right  on  the basis  of  which  the lessee can claim  rights  against  the lessor. is interpretation of s. 53A was clearly laid down by their  Lordships of the Privy Council in Probodh  Kumar  Das and Others v. Dantra Tea Company Limited & Others(1). Learned counsel for the firm, however, relied on a  decision of the Allahabad High Court in Ram Chander v. Maharaj Kunwar and Others(2).  In that case. the lessee, under a registered lease  which  was  detective and (lid not  comply  with  the requirement  of  s.  107 of the Transfer  of  Property  Act, brought  a suit against a subsequent purchaser of the  house of the lessor on the allegation that the purchaser ha(],  in collusion with the Municipal Board, procured the  demolition or a portion of the house, and claimed a relief of perpetual injunction  retraining  the purchaser from  demolishing  the house  or otherwise interfering with the lessee’s rights  as such.  and for restoration of the demolished portion at  the purchaser’s cost.  The High Court, in allowing the claim  of the lessee, held               "Now, in the present case, what is it that the

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             plaintiff  is  attempting to do ?  He  is  not               attempting  to set up a transfer which  is  he               has not instituted a suit for the  declaration               of the validity of the transfer;               (1) I.L.R. [1939] All. 809.               (1)   66 I.A. 293.               727               he  has  not  instituted a suit  in  which  he               claims   an   order  against   the   defendant               directing him to perform any convenant of  the               transfer.   What  he is seeking to  do  is  to               debar the defendants from interfering with his               possession into which he has entered with  the               consent of his transferor after the  execution               of a transfer in his favour.  He is, in  other               words,  seeking to defend the rights to  which               he is entitled under s. 53A of the Transfer of               Property Act.  The defendants Nos.  1 and 2 in               demolishing part of the property of which  the               plaintiff had obtained possession were  acting               suo  motu with the aid of the Municipal  Board               of  Moradabad.  It is the defendants  who  are               seeking  to  assert  rights  covered  by   the               contract.  The plaintiff seeks merely to debar               them  from doing so; the plaintiff is  seeking               to  protect  his rights.  In a sense,  in  the               proceedings  he is really a defendant  and  we               see  nothing in the ;terms of section  53A  of               the Transfer of Property Act to disentitle him               from maintaining the present suit." Without expressing any opinion as to the correctness of  the view taken by the Allahabad High Court, we have to point out that  the  interpretation put on s. 53A of the  Transfer  of Property  Act even by that Court is of no assistance to  the firm in the present case.  In this case, the firm is seeking to enforce rights under the unregistered lease and to seek a decree  for  possession against the lessor.   The  Allahabad High  Court  in that case proceeded on the  basis  that  the plaintiff  of that suit was in the position of  a  defendant and was only seeking to protect his right,; by resort to the provisions  of  s. 53A of the Transfer of Property  Act,  so that  no principle was laid down by the High Court  that  s. 53A  is available to a lessee otherwise than as  a  defence. We are unable to accept the submission that the judgment  in that case should be read as recognising a right of a  lessee to  enforce rights on the basis of an unregistered lease  by resort to that provision, of law.  In, fact, if that case be interpreted as laying down such a principle, it must be held that it. has been directly over-ruled by the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Probodh Kumar Das and Others(1) and  is not correct.  ’Mat decision may be justified, if  at all, on the basis that, though the lessee in that case was a plaintiff, he was actually -seeking protection under s.  53A of  the  Transfer  of  Property Act by  being  in  the  real position of a defendant.  On the question whether a  person, who sues as a plaintiff, may still be regarded as  defending the   rights  ’Sought  to  be  conferred  upon  him  by   an unregistered  deed,  we  need express no  opinion.   In  the present case before us, the claim, which was put forward  by the firm in the plaint, can by (1) 66 I.A. 293. 728 no  means  be  construed as a mere  defence  of  the  firm’s rights.   What  the  firm is actually seeking to  do  is  to enforce  the rights under the lease and, in such a case,  s.

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53A of the Transfer of Property Act is clearly inapplicable. Reliance was also placed on behalf of the firm on the  deci- sion of this Court in Ram Kumar Das v. Jagadish Chandra  Deb Dhabal Deb and Another(1), in which case also, a  registered Kabuliyat  executed  by the lessee did not comply  with  the requirements of s. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act,  and on the facts of the case it was held that, though under  the Kabuliyat the land was leased out for a period of ten years, the lease in fact must be presumed to be from month to month under  s.  106 of that Act.  The facts of  that  case  were, however,  quite different.  In that case, the terms  of  the lease  were not ascertained from the Kabuliyat in which  the period  of  lease was fixed at 10 years.  The terms  of  the lease  were  ascertained  from  other  documents,  including receipts  for rent paid by the lessee to the lessor, and  on the  basis  of that evidence it was found that a  lease  had come into existence under which rent was being paid monthly. No  such  circumstances appear in the case  before  us.   In fact, it was at no stage pleaded and no evidence was led  to show  that, independently on the three documents  Exts.   P. 1, .P. 2 and P. 3, there was material from which it could be inferred  that  a lease from month to month  had  come  into existence  between the firm and the Company.  No such  point was urged either in the trial Court or before the High Court and no such finding of fact exists.  In these circumstances, s.  106  of the Transfer of Property Act  would  clearly  be inapplicable,  and  the  lease has to be held to  be  for  a period exceeding one year for the reasons given by us above. In the alternative, learned counsel for the firm urged  that the firm was entitled to contend that these documents  Exts. P.  1 to P. 3 constituted an agreement in writing  to  lease the property in suit and could claim specific performance of this contract.  There are three reasons why we are unable to accept  this submission.  The first is that, in  the  plaint itself,  no specific performance of contract was claimed  on behalf of the firm.  Though the pleadings included averments about this contract, the relief claimed was for a decree for possession,  damages and injunctions.  These  reliefs  could only be claimed on the basis of a completed lease and  could not  be the reliefs in a suit for specific performance of  a contract to lease.  The second reason is that, as  mentioned by  us earlier, the firm itself came forward with  the  case that the entire contract was not included within these three documents Exts.  P. 1 to P. 3, because, at the stage when (1)  [1952] S.C.R. 269. 729 these  documents came into existence, the Managing  Director of  the  Company  had  no authority to  enter  into  such  a contract on behalf of the Company and that the contract  was only  completed  subsequently when the  Board  of  Directors passed  a  resolution authorising the Managing  Director  to enter into such a contract and actual possession of part  of the property was given on or about the 1st April, 1950.  The contract  being a contract to lease immovable  property  and unregistered,  specific  performance  of  it  could  not  be sought,  except  under s. 27A of the  Specific  Relief  Act. That  section, however, applies only if the entire  contract is made in writing, while, according to the case put forward on  behalf of the firm itself,’ the entire contract was  not in  writing.  The third reason why specific  performance  of the  contract cannot be claimed by the firm under s. 27A  of the  Specific  Relief Act is that such a  claim  under  that provision  of  law is only available to a lessee,  when  the lessee,  in  part  performance of the  contract,  has  taken possession of the property, or, being already in possession,

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continues in possession in part performance of the contract. In the present case, the pleas put forward on behalf of  the firm  itself show that the firm never got possession of  the entire  property to which the contract related.   Possession was  taken by the firm of only two items of property,  while the  firm  never obtained possession of the  third  item  of property   which  was  in  possession  of  Messrs.    Kanwar Brothers’  Ltd.   Clause  (b) of s. 27A can  apply  only  if possession  of  the entire property, which is  the  subject- matter  of  the  contract of lease, has been  taken  by  the lessee.  The pleadings in the plaint show that, even  though the  third  item  of property was vacated  by  M/s.   Kanwar Brothers Ltd. in December, 1950, possession of that property was never obtained by the firm. To  meet this objection, it was urged by learned counsel  on behalf  of the firm that we should interpret s. 27A  of  the specific  Relief Act as being applicable even if  possession of part of the property, which is the subject-matter of  the contract,  is obtained by the lessee; but we are  unable  to accept  this submission.  The language used makes  it  clear that  possession must be obtained of the entire property  to which  the  contract  relates.  In this  connection,  it  is significant  to  note that under s. 53A of the  Transfer  of Property  Act, a transferor is barred from interfering  with the  rights of the transferee, even if the  transferee  gets possession  of any part of the property sought to be  trans- ferred  by  the  unregistered document  of  transfer.   That section  specifically uses the expression "taken  possession of the property or any part thereof", whereas the words used in s. 27A of the Specific Relief Act are : "taken possession of  the  property".   The omission of the  words  "any  part thereof" in s. 27A of the Specific Relief Act when  compared with the provision in s. 53A of the 730 Transfer  of  Property Act clearly brings out  the  position that  the former section is only applicable when  possession of  the entire property, which is the subject-matter of  the contract,  has been taken, while the latter section is  made applicable  even if the lessee takes possession of any  part of the property.  Consequently, on the facts of the  present case,  the firm could not claim specific performance of  the contract  under s. 27A of the Specific Relief Act,  even  if such  a  claim  had been put forward in  the  plaint.   This alternative contention also, therefore, fails. The appeal is, consequently. dismissed, but, in view of  the cirucumstances  of this case and the conduct of the  parties relating  to the contract, we direct parties to  bear  their own costs of the appeal. G.C.                                                  Appeal dismissed. 731