http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 15  

PETITIONER: DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SKIPPER CONSTRUCTION AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT08/02/1995

BENCH: SAWANT, P.B. BENCH: SAWANT, P.B. MOHAN, S. (J) JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J)

CITATION:  1995 SCC  (3) 507        JT 1995 (2)   391  1995 SCALE  (1)734

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT: ORDER 1.   The facts leading to contempt proceedings are as under: On  8.10.1980, an auction was held by the Delhi  Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as the DDA ) of the 394 Commercial  Tower Plot, Jhandewalan, Block E, New  Delhi  ad measuring  about 2540 sq. mtrs.  The first respondent.   Ws. Skipper  Construction Co. (P) Ltd. (hereinafter referred  to as  the  Skipper)was the highest bidder, its bid  being  Rs. 9.82 crores.  As per the conditions of the auction,  Skipper deposited  25% of the bid amount.  The said bid was  confirm the  DDA on 14.10.1980. Skipper was called upon to make  the balance  of payment of 75% of the bid amount within 90  days as per the conditions of the auction. 2.   The Government of India issued directions to the DDA to accept the request of Skipper and to grant an indulgence  to it and directed the DDA to reschedule the recovery of 75% of the  bid amount with interest from the Skipper.   Consequent to  this,  DDA called upon the Skipper to enter  into  fresh agreement, license agreement and furnish bank guaranties  in compliance with the directions of the Central Government. 3.   On 11.8.1987, Skipper entered in a license   agreement, paid 50% of the original bid  and  secured  payment  of  the balance 50     % of the bid and interest at the rate of   18% per annum thereon by submitting bank guarantees for  Rs.9.82 crores,  in  terms ’of which a sum  of  approximately  1.944 crores was required to be paid as each instalment.  A  total of  5 instalments was payable every six months.,  the  first being due on 15.9.1987 and the last on or about 15.9.1989. 4.   Against the first instalment of Rs.1.944 crores falling due  on  15.9.1987, DDA recovered about Rs.  88.76  lacs  by encashment of the bank guarantee on 7.12.1987.    Thereafter the first respondent did not pay in terms of the agreement. 5.   On 4.10.1988, the Lt Governor issued a direction at the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 15  

request  of Skipper, deferring recovery from Skipper of  the 2nd instalment as per the agreement dated 11.8.1987 till one month after the sanctioning of the building plans. 6.   In  August,  1987,  the  first  respondent  filed  writ petition  in the High Court of Delhi, being CWP No. 2371  of ’1989.   The  principal relief sought in the  writ  petition related to sanctioning of building plans and permission  for construction.   An  interim order was passed  directing  the Skipper  to  furnish  fresh bank guarantee  since  the  bank guarantee  furnished  earlier had lapsed.  The DDA  did  not encash the fresh bank granite which was detective.  Time and again the DDA represented to the Court that the monies  were outstanding  from the Skipper and no indulgence ought to  be shown to them till the payments were made.  The question  of payment of the outstanding amount of over Rs. 8 crores under the principal sum itself was deferred from time to time. 7.   On  16.2.1990,  Lt.  Governor revoked the  order  dated 4.10.1988 deferring the payment of instalments.  As a result the  entire  sum became payable in one lump  sum.   However, this  order  of the Lt.  Governor was stayed by  the  Court. Thus v it became necessary f or the DDA to grant conditional and provincial sanction to plans of the building subject  to the payment of monies    due to the DDA. S.   On 19.3.1990, an interim order was passed    by     the Delhi High Court by which Skipper was permitted to  commence construction without first depositing the dues 395 of  the DDA.  Against this order an appeal  was  prefer-red. The  Division Bench directed tie payment of a token  sum  of Rs. 5 lacs which was offered by the Skipper as a gesture  of goodwill within 2 days; a sum Rs. 15 lacs within 15 days and 1.944  crores within one month to the, DDA.  It was  further directed that the quantum of monies and the mode of  payment will  be decided at the time of final disposal of  the  writ petition. 9.   Even this order was not complied with.  Notwithstanding this, the Skipper approached the Court once again for exten- sion of time to make payment and for direction to construct. The  Court extended the time by one month on 16.4.1990,  af- fording  liberty  to the DDA to encash the  bank  guarantee. The  bank  guarantee could not be encashed  because  it  was conditional.   By  then the entire monies  had  fallen  due. Those  amounts  had  not been paid.  The  1990  against  the interim  orders dated 19.3.1990 and 16.4.1990 passed by  the High Court of Delhi.  By an order dated 3.5.1990 this  Court stayed  further  construction and made it  conditional  upon payment of Rs. 1.944 crores. 10.  Suit No. 1 1875 of 1990 was filed by the Skipper for  a direction  that the DDA ought not to insist upon payment  by cash  or  draft  and ought to be  directed  to  encash  bank guarantee.    The  learned  Vacation  Judge  issued   orders directing  the DDA to invoke the bank  guarantee.   However, the suit was ultimately dismissed. 11.  On 21.12.1990, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court dismissed C.W.P. No.2371 of 1989 directing Skipper to pay to the  DDA by cash or demand draft a sum  of  Rs.8,12,68,789/- within  30 days; to stop construction till payment is  made; and in the event of non-payment by the skipper, DDA would be entitled  to enter upon the property and forfeit the  monies received by the DDA. 12.  On 14.1.1991, detailed reasons for its operative  order come to be rendered by the Division Bench of the Delhi  High Court  with further direction giving effect to clause 15  of the license agreement dated 11.18,1987 that in the event  of non-compliance  of the payment by the Skipper  the  property

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 15  

shall  stand vested in the DDA, free from all  encumbrances, in addition to the forfeiture of the monies. 13.  Against  the dismissal of CWP No. 2371 of 1989  Skipper filed SLP (C) No. 186 of 1991 before this Court. 14.  On 29.1.1991, a Division Bench on which one of us, P.B. Sawant, J., was a party).  It inter alia reads as under:               "(i) That the petitioners herein shall deposit               a sum of Rs.2.5. crores (Rupees two crores and               fifthly  lacs only) in cash/ bank  draft  with               the  Delhi  Development Authority  within  one               month  from  today and  the  petitioners  will               further  deposit similar amount  by  cash/bank               draft by 8th April, 1991.               (ii)  That the petitioners shall be  permitted               to resume the construction of the building  in               question  only after making the first  deposit               as  stated in clause (i) above. DDA filed  SLP               (C)  Nos,  6338-6339 of this Court  passed  an               interim order (in               (iii) That if the petitioners fail to  deposit               the   amounts   as   aforesaid,   the    Delhi               Development Authority will be free to act.  in               accordance with the impugned order dated  21st               December, 1990 of High Court               396               in CWP No. 2371 of 1980.               (iv) -Mat the petitioners shall not induct any               person in the building or create any right  in               favour of any third party.               (v)  -Mat  the matter be  listed  for  further               orders before this Court on 9th April, 1991." 15.  On 4.2.1991, in violation of the agreement and in gross contempt  of the above order, the Skipper issued  advertise- ment  in the leading newspapers seeking to create 3rd  party rights. 16.  On  25.1.1993, SLP(C) No. 186 of 1991 was dismissed  by this Court.  By virtue of the above order, the DDA on, 10.2. 1993  re-entered  and took physical possession of  the  said property,  free  from all encumbrances; monies paid  by  the Skipper were forfeited. 17.  Notwithstanding  all these, Skipper filed  yet  another suit on the original side of the High Court of Delhi,  being Suit No. 770 of 1993 for the reliefs of-. (i)  permanent   induction   restraining   the   DDA    from interfering with the title and possession of the property; (ii) for mandatory injuction directing the DDA to  recompute the principal amount and interest payable by Skipper; (iii)     for  a declaration that the  present  calculations are wrong; (iv) for  a  declaration that  re-entry/  re-possession  and determination  of the rights of Skipper are bad in  law  and nonest; (v)  for  a  declaration that all dues have,  been  paid  by Skipper to the DDA; and (Vi) a  declaration that clause 15 of the License  Agreement dated 1 1. 8. 1987 is non-est and bad in law. 18.  On  service  of  notice, DDA  filed  application,  I.A. No.8500  of 1993 in Suit No. 770 of 1993, for  rejection  of the  plaint  as  all  the  issues  raised  by  Skipper  were resjudicata and even otherwise the plaint was barred by law. The said application is pending disposal. 19.  On 8.11.93, DDA issued notices for auction of the  said property.   The 2nd respondent sought to implead  itself  in the  suit and on 1.12.1993 filed an application for stay  of auction which was opposed by the DDA.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 15  

20.  On 9.12.1993, a learned Single Judge of the Delhi  High Court allowed the auction to proceed with and restrained the DDA  from  accepting or confirming the bid  at  the  auction scheduled for 10. 12.1993. Aggrieved by this order DDA filed SLP(C)  No. 21000 of 1993 against the interim order  of  the Delhi High Court. 21.  I.A.  3  of  1994 is an  application  for  intervention filedon  behalf of DDA.  While disposing of SLP(C)  No.21000 of 1993 and the said I.A. No.3 of the 1994 we issued  notice on  29.11.94  by exercise of our Suo Moto  powers  directing Tejwant Singh and Mrs. Surinder Kaur to show cause as to why they should not be punished for contempt of court for  their following acts;               "(a)  Instituting  suit being Suit  No.770  of               1993 inthe Delhi High Court in respect of  the               same subject matter after this Court confirmed               the  orders  of  the  said  High  Court  dated                             21.12.1990  and 14.1.199 1, by its order  date d               23.1.1993.               397               (b)   Entering into agreement for and  handing               over  possession of and receiving  monies  and               creating  interests  in the  premises  in  the               building   under  construction  in  the   suit               property,  viz.,  the Commercial  Tower  Plot,               jhandewalan,  Block C, New Delhi,  admeasuring               about   2540  sq.  mtrs.  with   constructions               thereon which are already made, in defiance of               the  order  of  this  Court  passed  on   29th               January,   1991  Notice  returnable   on   3rd               January, 1993". 22.  In  response to this notice,  Tejwant  Singh  Contemner No.1,  filed  an  affidavit  expressing  unconditional   and unqualified  apology.   After  so expressing,  he  sets  out several   facts   to  offer  an  explanation   and   not   a justification  for  the  steps which  were,  taken  by  him. According to him, the purpose of filing Suit No. 770 of 1993 in  the Delhi High Court was to make payment  of  reasonable amount.  Although the prayers give an impression that  there could be no bar in filing of a suit in civil court, he would add that the intention of the deponent was not to indulge in litigation which was already concluded by the Supreme Court. ’The  intention  was to see that as far as  the  quantum  of interest  was concerned that can be scaled down and the  DDA could be persuaded to realise reasonable interest instead of exorbitant interest. 23.The deponent, on legal advice and in order to protect the property  by making the payments in instalments,  instructed his  counsel  to file suit in the High Court  of  Delhi  for mandatory  injunctions  and  declarations.   An  application under  Order  39 Rules 1 and 2 of Civil Procedure  Code  was also  filed in the suit under the bone fide belief that  the same could be filed under law in order to ensure that during the pendency of the suit also efforts should continuously be made to settle the matter amicably.  The Deponent instructed the  counsel to make averment that the company is ready  and willing to make the payment.  The counsel has  categorically stated  in  the application that the company  is  ready  and willing  to  pay the amount to DDA as  demanded by  them  in instalments. 24.The company also wrote a letter dated 10th July, 1993  to all  its valued customers apprising them about  the  dispute with  DDA.   In the letter also the company  made  it  amply clear that the matter can be resolved amicably and for  that

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 15  

purpose  funds  are  required.  It was  requested  that  the valued  customers  shall  make the payment  of  amounts  due against them.  The bank draft/cash order be sent to the com- pany  in the name of DDA.  The company wanted to  hand  over the drafts to DDA. 25.On  this  explanation,  it  is urged  that  there  is  no intentional or deliberate flouting of the order dated 29. 1. 1991 passed by this Court. 26.The  order of 29.1.1991 was passed after the counsel  for Delhi  Development Authority expressed an apprehension  that the  answering  respondent  would  sell  away  or  otherwise dispose  of  the  plot to a third party  and  abscond.   The answering respondent-deponent was personally present in’ the Court  on 29.1.1991. On that date, permission  to  construct had  been  with  them barely for less  than  a  year  (w.e.f 19.3.1990) from this Court.  It was in that context that the injunction  was  interpreted.  He did not create  any  third party right himself.  However, he noticed that in respect of one  Khosla, the papers annexed to I.A. No.3 show  that  his son  had  signed  some  documents  evidencing  induction  of Khosla.  He 399 says  that there is no other case in relation to  which  any such impropriety has been committed. 27.  Surinder Kaur, wife of Tejwant Singh,   Contemner No.2, would  urge that she has nothing to do with the day  to  day running of the company nor has she ever acted or represented anywhere in regard thereto.  She has not signed any paper or document in relation to the transactions connected with  the present proceedings. 28.  An  Additional  Affidavit  was filed  on  27.1.1995  by Tejwant Singh, Contemner No.1. Paragraph 3 of the said addi- tional affidavit states:               "with  respect  to the act  of  entering  into               agreements for and handing over possession  of               and receiving monies and creating interests               in   the  premises  in  the   building   under               construction  in the suit property  viz.,  the               commercial  Tower Plot, Jhandewalan, Block  E,               New  Delhi, admeasuring about 2540 sq.  meters               with  constructions thereon which are  already               made  in  defiance  of the  order  of  Hon’ble               Supreme  Court  passed  on  29.1.1991  it   is               respectfully   necessary  at  this  stage   to               explain  the context in which the order  dated               29.1.1991  was  passed, understood  and  acted               upon   by  the  answering   respondent.    The               answering   respondent   is   explaining   the               collective  contemporaneous under standing  of               both  the parties and respectfully  submit  to               this Hon’ble Court that               there was  no   intentional   or    deliberate               flouting   of   the  order.   The   order   of               29.1.1991  was  passed after the  counsel  for               Delhi   Development  Authority  expressed   an               apprehension  that  the  answering  respondent               would  sell away or otherwise dispose  of  the               plot  to  a  third  party  and  abscond.   The               answering respondent/ deponent was  personally               present  in  the court on 29.1.1991.  On  that               date  permission  to construct had  been  with               them  barely  for  less than  a  year  (w.e.f.               19.3.1990) from the Hon’ble Delhi High  Court.               As on 29.1.1991, the construction on the  plot               has  barely commended and only a part  of  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 15  

             basement  had been done.  No building  was  in               existence.    To   preclude   the    answering               respondent  from  in any  manner  giving  away               physical possession of either the plot or  the               proposed  building (yet to come up) the  order               of               29.1.1991  was passed.               It  is most respectfully submitted that at  no               time during the proceedings, was any reference               made or intended to prohibit or in any  manner               fetter the booking of space in the building or               collecting  money in respect thereof The  fact               was  that this was the common  collective  and               collided  understanding  of  all  the  parties               including  the Delhi Development Authority  is               evident  from the fact that the bookings  were               done  before January, 1991 and after  January,               1991 to the knowledge of everyone without  any               objection,  protest and demur.  Indeed in  the               numerous court proceedings in different courts               including the Hon’ble Supreme Court after 1991               not  the slightest grievance was made  and  no               contempt  petition  was ever  moved  by  Delhi               Development  Authority (till the present  last               round  of  proceedings). indeed,  it  is  most               respectfully  submitted  that  had   answering               respondent known or remotely contemplated that               even  booking sought to be fettered, it  would               have  either  moved  the  Hon’ble  Court   for               clarification   or  would   have   immediately               desisted."               28A.  Paragraph (k) reads thus:               "After  29.1.1991  the company  entered   into               agreement  with various persons/parties.   The               copies  of  the agreements entered  into  with               them are annexed herewith and are collectively               marked  as  Annexures  ’A’  and  ’B’.   It  is               pertinent to               399               mention that the company openly advertised  in               the  Newspapers  and  the next  day  DDA  also               advertised,   in  the  Newspapers  about   the               Court’s  order  dated 29.1.1991.  it  is  only               after  seeing  both  the  advertisements   the               speculative  buyers came forward to  book  the               flats  and each and every person  who  entered               into  the  agreements with  the  company  were               fully aware of the pendency of the  litigation               and hence no third party rights were created." 29.W.   G.  Ramaswamy,  learned  senior  counsel   for   the contemners submits, before filing Suit No. 770 of 1993,  the contemners took legal advice.  It was opined that the  Civil Writ  Petition No. 2371 of 1989 filed before the High  Court was not a substitute for suit.  The fact that writ  petition was  dismissed and the SLP thereon was also  dismissed  will not take away the right to file an independent suit.  It was only  because of that the contemners filed the suit.   There was  no  deliberate  intention to  obstruct  the  course  of justice.   May be, the contemners were misguided.   Whatever might  have  been  the conduct of the  contemners  they  had offered unqualified apology in both the affidavits. 30.Actually, the contemners do not want the learned  counsel to  advance arguments in defence of their conduct.  They  we only kneeling before the court and praying for mercy. 31.  As  regards  the alleged flouting of  the  order  dated

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 15  

29.1.1991, three questions would arise: (1)  whether  there  is  disobedience  of  the  order  dated 29.1.1991. (2)  If  it  is  answered in the  affirmative,  whether  the disobedience in wilful? (3) If wilful, what is the consequence? 32.   In his, submission, legal advice is a factor     to decide whether a disobedience is wilful or   not.    He   is prepared to disclose even the name of the senior counsel who had  given  the opinion.  As a matter of  fact,  in  Hoshiar Singh  v. Gurbachan Singh AIR 1962 SC 1089 this Court  found fault  with  the contemners therein for not  disclosing  the name  of the counsel who gave the legal opinion.   It  could never  have been the intention of the contemners  to  openly flout   the  order  dated  29.10.1991.  By   entering   into agreements contemners were not creating rights in favour  of third parties.  The speculative purchasers being fully aware of the legal proceedings yet chose to purchase the  property which agreements, if ultimately, did not fructify into sale, they  would  be entitled to only refund.   Before  29.1.1991 1,000 agreements were entered into and after 29.1.1991 1,750 agreements   were   entered  into.   Out  of   these   1,750 agreements,  the  agreements in respect of  835  cases  were executed while in the case of remaining 915, the  agreements have  not  been  executed.  Ibis is  the  factual  position. Since the DDA did not take out the contempt application, the contemners  were lulled into the belief that what they  were doing was right.  Further, the exact scope of the order that the  contemners should not even enter into contract was  not understood  by  the contemners properly  Creation  of  right could only mean, in the context, an obligation to refund. 33.  The  notice  for contempt has been  issued  practically after nearly three years.  If such a notice had been  issued by the High Court he could have pleaded limitation contained under Section 20 of the 400 Contempt  of Courts Act, 197 1, as a defence.   However,  as regards exercise of suo Moto powers of this court under  Ar- ticle  129 of the Constitution of India the  contemners  are not raising any such plea. 34.Mr.  Arun  Jaitley,  learned counsel for  the  DDA  would submit that the filing of suit No. 770/93 is nothing but  an abuse of process of court.  The matter had reached  finality by  orders of this Court.  Yet to say the suit was filed  to protect  the  rights  of the contemners  is  ingenious.   By filing a suit (No.770 of 1993) and obstructing the course of justice after this Court dismissed SLP(C) No. 1 86 of 199 1, is  a  clear  case  of criminal contempt  as  laid  down  in Advocate-General, State of Bihar v. M/s-Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries  1980  (3) SCC 311 at 315.  This Court  had  come down  heavily  upon persons who  indulge  in  obstructionist methods  to  defeat or delay justice as laid down  in  Bloom Himmatlal Desai 1994(6) SCC 322 at page 327. 35.In  this case, there is a deliberate disobedience of  the order dated 29.1.1991. The agreement dated 11th August, 1987 between  contemners  and DDA clearly postulates  that  legal possession  and  ownership shall remain  with  the  licenser until  full  payment of the bid amount along  with  interest payable  thereon has been made by the licensee.   Therefore, the creation of rights in favour of third parties was  never contemplated and there was no scope for misunderstanding the order  dated 29.1.1991. During the state of C.W.P. No.  2371 of  1989 before the High Court the contemners  came  forward with  a  plea that there were 870 buyers of flats  but  this figure goes on increasing from time to time.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 15  

36.  Ultimately,  at the stage, of Suit No. 770 of 1993  the number  of buyers came to 2,700.  In the agreements  entered into  after  the  order dated 29.1.1991  there  is  a  clear recital that possession is delivered.  If this cannot amount to  creating rights in favour of third parties nothing  else would. 37.  We will now proceed to consider the merits of the above contentions. 38.  The  contempt  proceedings  in  this  case  have   been initiated  under Article 129 of the Constitution  of  India. The said Article reads as follows:               "Supreme  Court to be a court of record.   The               Supreme  Court shall be a court of record  and               shall   have  all  powers  of  such  a   court               including the power to punish for contempt  of               itself" 39.  This Court in Shri.  C.K. Daphary vs. Shri.  O.P. Gupta 1971 (1) SCC 626 pointed out that it cannot be disputed that in a case of contempt of Supreme Court, the Court can  issue notice suo moto. 40.  About the nature of power, this Court referring to  the Privy  Council  ruling in Sukhdev Singh  Sodhi  v.The  Chief Justice and Judges of the Pepsu High Court 1954 SCR at  page 461, held:               "Finally,  in Parashurain Detaram v.  Emperor,               AIR 1945 PC 134 at 136 the Privy Council  said               that  "this  summary power  of  punishing  for               contempt .... is a power which a court must of               necessity possess." 41.  In this case, as the notice dated 29.11.1994 indicates, it consists of : (1)  Civil Contempt and (2)  Criminal Contempt. 401 Civil  contempt is defined under  Section 2(b) of  the  Act. Thus, any wilful  disobedience to the order of the Court  to do  or  abstain from doing any act is prima  facie  a  civil contempt.   Civil contempt  arises where power of the  Court is  invoked and exercised to enforce obedience to orders  of the court. 42.  On  the  contrary, criminal contempts are  criminal  in nature.   It  may include out rages on the  Judges  in  open Court,  defiant disobedience to the Judges in Court,  libels on  Judges  or  courts or interfering  with  the  courts  of justice  or any act which tends to prejudice the  courts  of justice. 43.  Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts  Act,       1971 (hereinafter referred toas the    Act)   posits    criminal contempt to mean: Publication (a) by words spoken or written; (b) or written or by sings; (c) or by visible act whatsoever which- (d) or any other act whatsoever which- (i) (a)  scandalizes  or tends to scandalise, (b)  or  loweres  or tends to lower  the  authority  of  any court’or (ii) prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of any judicial proceeding; or (iii) (a) interferes or tends to interfere with, (b) or obstructs or tends to obstruct  the administration of justice  in any other manner. 44.  It  can be categorically stated that the  power   as  a court of record to punish for contempt is beyond dispute. 45. In dealing with the scope of the said Section this Court observed in Rachapudi Subba Rao v. advocate General   Andhra

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 15  

Pradesh 1981 (2) SCC 577 at 583 as follows ;               "It  is noteworthy,that in teh  categorisation               of contempt in three sub-clauses (1)  to (iii)               only    category   (ii)refers   to    judicial               proceeding.  Scandalising  of  court  in   its               administrative  capacity will also be  covered               by  sub-clauses  (1)  and  (iii)  The   phrase               "administration  of  justice"  in   sub-clause               (iii)  is far wider in scope  than "course  of               any judicial proceedings". The last words  "in               any other manner" of sub-clause  (iii) further               extended  its  ambit and give it  a  residuary               character. Although sub-clauses (1) and  (iii)               discribe three  distinct  species of "criminal               contempt."   Interference   or   tendency   to               interfere  with  any  judicial  proceeding  or               administration  of justice is a common element               of sub-clauses (ii) and (iii) This element  is               not  criminal  contempt of  the  kind  falling               under sub-clause (i)".  402 is  clear  that on 25-1.1993, SLP (C) No. 1 86 of  1991  was dismissed thereby confirming the judgment of the Delhi  High Court  rendered  in  CPW No. 2371 of  1989  dated  14.1.1991 reported  in  Skipper Construction Co.(P) Ltd.  &  Anr.  vs. D.A. & Ors. 43 (1991) Delhi Law Times 636.  Thereafter, Suit No.  770 of 1993 was filed practically for the  same  relief which  formed the subject matter of the earlier  writ  peti- tion, CWP No. 2371 of 1989. 48.  After the dismissal of SLP(C) 186 of 1991, the DDA  re- entered  and  took physical possession of  the  property  on 10.2.1993, free from all encumbrances, forfeiting the monies paid by the contemners.  Yet prayer No. 1 in the suit is for injunction  restraining the DDA from interfering with  title and possession. 49.Under the terms of the license deed dated 11th    August, 1987 entered into between     DDA  (the  licensor)  and  the contemners   (licensee),  it  was  clearly   stipulated   at paragraphs 1 and 2 as under:               1.That  the  licensee shall  have  license  to               enter upon the plot described hereinabove  for               a  period of two and half years from the  date               of execution of this licence only for purposes               of  starting construction of the  building  in               accordance with the sanctioned building plans.               2.That  the  licencee shall not be  deemed  to               have any right, title or interest in the  said               plot nor shall he have any right to grant such               a  a  right in favour of any  persons.   Legal               possession  and  ownership of  the  said  plot               shall  remain  with the  licensor  until  fill               payment  of the bid amount alongwith  interest               payable thereon has been made by de licensee. 50.     Of course, in this case, possession was handed  over to  the contemners when they had not even cleared the  first instalment.   That  itself  has been criticised  by  us  and relegated to an enquiry.  But, in this case, after  disposal of SLP(C) 186 of 1991 when DDA has taken physical possession of  the  plot, to file a suit and pray  for  injunction,  as stated  above, would clearly constitute  criminal  contempt. Similarly, the other prayers are aimed at attacking directly or indirectly the adverse finding rendered by +he High Court in  CWP  No.2371 of 1989.  The High Court, in  no  uncertain terms,  held at paragraph 26 of its judgment reported in  43 (1991) Delhi Law Times 636 as under:

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 15  

             "We, therefore, reject all submissions made on               behalf  of the petitioners and hold  that  the               D.D.A.  is  entitled  to  recover  the  entire               amount  of Rs.8,12,68,789/- as on 1.7.1990  in               lump  sum in cash or through bank draft.   The               decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  in   Dunlop               (supra)  entitles  the D.D.A. to  insist  upon               cash payment and to reject the bank guarantee.               Since  there  is a deliberate  breach  of  the               obligations  under  the Licence Deed  and  the               Agreement  dated 11.8.1987 by the  petitioners               legal consequences. as mentioned in term 15 of               the Licence Deed, spring into action." 51.Yet,  the  prayers, above stated, are made in  the  suit. The only semblance of defence that is put forth is the  suit came to be filed armed with the legal advice.  We are afraid such a plea is worthless.  As stated above, in the case of a criminal  contempt, the intention or motive  is  irrelevant. Therefore,  even assuming bona fide the  contemners  thought they  could  file the suit because it was  "legally  opined" that the was not a substitute, the so-called bona fides  are totally irrelevant. 52.The  filing of the suit No. 770 of 1993 is nothing but  a wilful action on the 403 part  of  the contemners to underline the  dignity  of  this Court and the majesty of law.  The conduct of the contemners tends to bring the authority and administration of law  into disrespect or even disregard.  It equally tends to interfere with  or  prejudice  the litigants  during  the  litigation. Abuse  of the process of court calculated to hamper the  due course of judicial proceeding or the orderly  administration of  justice  is a contempt of court.  In  Advocate  General, State  of Bihar v. Madhya Pradesh Khair  Industries  1980(3) SCC 311 at page 315, this court observed;               "while  we are conscious that every  abuse  of               the  process  of  court  may  not  necessarily               amount  to  contempt to court , abuse  of  the               process of the court calculated to hamper  the               due  course  of a judicial proceeding  or  the               orderly  administration  of justice,  we  must               say,  is a contempt of court.  It may be  that               certain  minor  abuses of the process  of  the               court  may be suitably dealt with  as  between               the  parties, by striking out pleadings  under               the provisions of order 6, rule 16 or in  some               other manner.  But, on the other hand, it  may               be necessary to punish as a contempt, a course               of conduct which abuses and makes a mockery of               the  judicial process and which  thus  extends               its pernicious influence beyond the parties to               the  action  and effects the interest  of  the               public in the administration of justice." 53.Again as stated by Sir John Donaldson in Attorney General v.  Newspaper Publishing PIc, C.J. Miller Contempt of  court 1989 Clarendon Press, Oxford: ’               "An action for contempt of court arose:               ’where   the   conduct   complained   of    is               specifically  intended to impede or  prejudice               the administration of justice.  Such               an intent cannot be expressly or admitted, but               can  be  inferred from all  the  circumstances               including    the   foreseeability    of    the               consequences of the conduct.’

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 15  

54.At  this  stage, it is worthwhile for us  to  quote  Lord Hardwicke, L.C., St.James’s Evening Post (1742) 2Atk.409  at P.47 1:               "There   cannot   be   anything   of   greater               consequence  than  to  keep  the  streams   of               justice  clear  and  pure,  that  parties  may               proceed  with  safety both to  themselves  and               their characters." 55.Thus,  we are clearly of the opinion that the  contemners arc  guilty  of criminal contempt as defined  under  Section 2(c) of the Act. 56.Now we come to other part of contempt as to whether there has  been  a disobedience of our order dated  29.1.91.  That order  in clause (iv) specifically stated (it is  worthwhile repetition):               "’That  the petitioners shall not  induct  any               person in the building or create any right  in               favour of any third party." 57.The contemners had caused the advertisement dated  4.2.91 as follows:                           "SKIPPER                     GROUP OF COMPANIES                        (ANNOUNCES)           ISSUE of Commercial Flats for retired/           Retiring Personnel/Professionals/Self           employed & other persons in our                 BAU MAKHAN SINGH HOUSE           JHANDEWALAN TOWER, JHANDEWALAN EXTN.               404               at highly concessional rates            It   is   once   in   a    lifetime               opportunity  to own a commercial  property  of               your own in "Bau Makhan Singh House"            A  Prime project in the  middle  of               high  business  environment. The  location  of               tower is as rare as the offer itself.            (SALIENT FEATURES               *     Ultra  modern multi  commercial  complex               (Shopping cum office complex)               *     Ground    to   3rd    Floor    centrally               airconditioned with escalators.            *     Excellent     quality      of               construction,            *  Interest free  payment  schedule               linked     with construction.               *     Excellent investment returns.)" 58.  The object of this is nothing more than  to  create rights in favour of third parties.   It  is somewhat surprising that the contemners’ ingenuity grows  by the  passage  of  time.  As rightly contended  by  Mr.  Arun Jaitley at the time when the writ petition came to be  filed before the High Court, as the High Court had noted in the above extract, the booking for only  870 flats but later  it gets increased and today, that figure has swollen to  2,570. As Mr. G. Ramaswamy admits there are agreements entered into even  after the order of 29.1.91 as evidenced by the  state- ment  in  sub-paragraph  (k) of  the  additional   affidavit extracted  above.  A curious argument was put forth that  by mere entering  into agreement no interest is created in  the immovable  property.  Of course, this stems from Section  54 of  the  Transfer  of  Property  Act.   But,  does  not  the agreement   holder  have a right to  get  another  document, namely  the sale deed? Equally, does he not have a right  to enforce   the  agreement  and  seek   specific   performance thereof?  It  is preposterous  came forward  to  speculative

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 15  

purchase  the property and their  right is only to refund as per  the terms of the agreement. For  a moment, we  are  not on the nature of rights of the   unintending purchasers. The question   is  whether the said  clause (iv)  of  the  order dated  29.1.91  has been  flouted? This  is of a case  of  a stray  act but deliberate repetitive acts by   making   hard bargains  by dubious  methods. It  is fallacious to  contend that because  of legal opinion  the contemners  thought   of entering  into   such  agreements,  would  not   amount   to inducting  any person  in the builidng or  would not  amount to creation of any right in favour of any third  party. This is  an   intentional  act to cheat the public with  with  an evil design. As  on 29.1.1991 the construction  on the  plot has barely  commenced and only a  part  of the  basement had been  done. No building was in  existence. To  preclude  the answering  respondent   from  in any   manner   giving  away physicla   possession  of either the plot  or  the  proposed building    (yet  to come), the order  dated  29.1.1991  was passed. 59.  It  is submitted that the order passed  by  this  Court dated 29.1.1991 was an order restraint against the  deponent not  to induct any personnel in the building to  create  any right  in  favour of any third party in   meantime.   It  is submitted that the purpose of this injunction was to  ensure that  the deponent did not alienate the building  in  favour of  a third person to relieve himself from the liability  to make payment of the dues and vanish from the scene. 60. The above statement in the affida- 405 vit of the contemner No. 1, in our considered opinion, is  a clear attempt to circumvent the order. 61.  It is difficult to appreciate as to how the  contemners could contend that they were  lulled  into the  belief  that they  could enter into the agreements as otherwise  the  DDA would have moved the court by way of contempt proceedings. 62.  It is rather strange that as late as 25.11.92     the following letters should be written by the contemners:               "Mrs.  Anjana Khosla,               602, Hemkunnt Tower,               6, Rajendra Place,               New Delhi.               Respected Madam,               We are pleased to handover you vacant peaceful               physical  possession  of shops No.  3  and  4,               measuring  super area  Jhandewalan  Extension,               New Delhi.               We  assure you that the aforesaid shops No.  3               and  4  are  free from  all  kinds  of  sales,               encumbrances, disputes, litigations, stays and               orders and you are the only rightful owner  of               aforesaid shops No. 3 and 4.               Thanking you.               Yours faithfully,               For and on behalf of               Skipper Construction Co. Pvt.  Ltd.               sd/               (Director)"           Emphasis supplied)               Mrs. Anjana Khosla     Date 25.11.92               602, Hemkunt Tower               6, Rajendra Place,               NEW DELHI               Respected Madam.               We are please to hand over you vacant peaceful               physical   possession  of  shops  3   and   4,               measuring  super area  Jhandewalan  Extension,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 13 of 15  

             New   Delhi  against  total  payment  of   Rs.               19,12,163/made by you to us as under: Date       Mode of payment                       Amount 07.08.87   cash                                  1,32,000.00 25.11.92   cash order No.04 165            drawn on Punjab National            Bank, Rajendra Place, New Delhi            being the full and final payment     17,80,163.00 (Rupees Nineteen Lac Twelve Thousand One Hundred and Sixty Three)                    19,12,163.00 We assure you that the aforesaid shops Nos 3 and 4 are  free from   all   kinds   of   sales,   encumbrances,   disputes, litigations, stays, and orders and you are the only rightful owner of aforesaid shops Nos 3 and 4. Thanking you, For and behalf of Skipper Construction Co. Pvt Ltd s/d (Director) (Emphasis Supplied) 62.However,  this is sought to be over by  saying  Contemner No. I was not responsible but his son did it.  This argument has  to be stated to be rejected.  The plea to  support  six other similar agreements, with Khosla family, as if  entered into by mistake, cannot hold water. 63.  When our order dated 29.1.91 is clear and  unambiguous, to support these agreements on the so called "collective 406 contemporaneous  understanding  of  both  the  parties",  is mischievous.  Thus, we have no doubt in our mind that  there is a wilful disobedience of our order dated 29.1.91. 64.  In  considering  whether the action of  the  contemners amounted  to  contempt  of court we take  into  account  the entire  course of conduct of the contemners.  As  our  order dated  25.1.95 would disclose, the contemners have  indulged in  judicial adventurism by raiding one court or the  other. Each  of  such raids is a clear abuse of  process  of  court calculated to obstruct the due course of judicial proceeding and  the administration of justice.  Thus, we conclude  that the  contemners are guilty of contempt of court.  No  doubt, the contemners have tended apology.  This apology is  coming forth  after sensing that the adventures have turned out  to be  misadventures, realising that the contemners have  ended up  in a cul-de-sac.  An apology is not a weapon of  defence forged to purge the guilt of the offences nor is it intended to  operate  as a universal panacea.  It is intended  to  be evidence of real contritenses, the manly consciousness of  a wrong  done, of an injury inflicted, and the earnest  desire to make such reparation as lies in the wrong- doer’s power." We do not find the apology to be so in this case.  The  con- duct of contemners is highly reprehensive.  The question now is what sentence we should impose on the contemners.   Here, it  is necessary to bear in mind that the second  respondent is  the wife of the first respondent.  She does not seem  to have  played any active role in all these  transactions  and events.  As an Indian wife, dutiful and obedient, she  seems to  have  only followed the dictations and  desires  of  her husband.   In the process she has done no more than  lending her name both as a Director to the Skipper as well as to the various  acts  done by him in the name of the  company.   It will  be unrealistic to ignore this fact against our  social background.  We must therefore take a pragmatic view of  the matter and distinguish her case from that of her husband  as far  as the punishment to be imposed on them  is  concerned. Such  a distinction will in no way minimise the  gravity  of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 14 of 15  

the contempt that she has committed. 65.  We therefore, invoke our power under    Article     129 read with Article 142 of the  Constitution   and  order   as follows:               We  sentence  contemner-  respondent  No.   1,               Tejwant  Singh to undergo simple  imprisonment               for  six  months  and to pay  a  fine  of  Rs.               50,000/-(Rupees   fifty  thousand  only.)   We               further  sentence contemner  respondent  No.2,               Surinder  Kaur to undergo simple  imprisonment               for a period of one month and to pay a fine of               50,0001-  (Rupees  fifty  Thousand  only)   In               default  of  payment of  fine  the  contemners               shall further undergo, simple imprisonment for               one month.  The payment of fine shall be  made               within one month from today. 66.  All  the properties and the bank accounts  standing  in the names of the contemners and the Directors of M/S Skipper Construction  Co.  (Pvt.)  Ltd, and their  wives,  sons  and unmarried daughters will stand attached. 67.  Before parting with this case, we may add: Judiciary is the bed rock and hand maid of orderly life  and civilised society. If the people would lose faith in justice imparted  by  the  highest court of the Iand woe  to  be  to orderly life.  The fragment of 407 civilised society would get broken up and crumble down. 68. At the request of Shri G. Ramaswamy, the learned counsel appearing  for  the  contemners, we defer  the  sentence  of imprisonment  imposed on both the contemners subject to  the conditions and till the time stated below:- (1)The contemners shall furnish bank guarantee in favour  of the Registrar General of this Court in the amount of Rs.  11 crores (Rupees eleven crores only) on or before 31st  March, 1995.   The  granite  will of a  nationalised  bank  or  any foreign bank operating in India.  The bank guarantee will be given  for a period of one year from the date of  furnishing the bank guarantee. (2)The contemners shall deposit the entire amount of Rs.  11 crores  by a bank Draft in the Registry of this Court on  or before 30th November, 1995.  If they fail to do so, the bank guarantee  will  become  encashable  and  will  be  encashed forthwith after 30th November, 1995, (3  ) If the contemners fail to give the bank  guarantee  by 31st March, 1995 as aforesaid, the sentence of  imprisonment will become enforceable at once. (4)No  application for extension of time either  to  furnish the bank guarantee or to make the payment as aforesaid, will be entertained by this Court. (5)The  contemners shall not leave the country  without  the express permission of this Court. (6)List  of properties given by the contemners is  taken  on record.  The contemners will also file a list of  properties held  by their sons and unmarried daughters within one  week from to-day. (7)If  and  when any property that is  attached  under  this Order is sought to be alienated or encumbered to raise money to  pay  the liability of Rs.  11 crores stated  above,  the contemners  will  be at liberty to approach  the  Court  for permission to do so. (8)The  attachment of the properties and the  bank  accounts shall  stand  raised on the contemners furnishing  the  bank guarantee as aforesaid. (9)The  order  with regard to the disbursal  of  the  amount deposited will be passed after the amounts are deposited  as

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 15 of 15  

aforesaid. 69. The contempt petition is ordered in the above terms. 408