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PETITIONER: DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SKIPPER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY(P) LTD. & ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       06/05/1996

BENCH: JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J) BENCH: JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J) PARIPOORNAN, K.S.(J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR 2005            1996 SCC  (4) 622  JT 1996 (4)   679        1996 SCALE  (4)202

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T B.P. JEEVAN REDDY,J.      A plot  of  land  was  put  to  auction  by  the  Delhi Development Authority  [D.D.A.]  in  October  1980.  Skipper Construction Company  [Skipper] offered the highest bid in A sum of  Rs. 9.82  crores. It was supposed to be a record bid at that time. According to the conditions of auction, twenty five percent  of the  amount was payable immediately and the rest within  ninety days.  Skipper deposited the twenty five percent but  did not  deposit  the  balance.  It  asked  for extension repeatedly  and it was granted repeatedly. As many as seven  extensions were  granted spread  over  the  period January, 1981  to  April,  1982.  Since  Skipper  failed  to deposit the  balance  consideration  even  within  the  last extended period,  proceedings were  taken for cancelling the bid. Skipper went to Court and on May 29, 1992 obtained stay of cancellation*.  D.D.A. applied  for  vacating  the  stay. Nothing  happened   but  usual   adjournments.  Skipper  was simultaneously making  representations to D.D.A. to give him further  time.   In  January   1983,  D.D.A.  constituted  a committee to  consider the  request  of  Skipper  and  other similar requests and to devise a formula for ensuring timely payments by  such purchasers.  The committee  reported  that cancellation of  bids in such matters usually land D.D.A. in protracted litigation and ------------------------------------------------------------ *We are unable to see what jurisdiction or justification the court could  have for  passing such  an order in an ordinary case of  sale and purchase of property, more so when Skipper had failed  to pay the balance consideration not only within the time stipulated but despite several extensions. suggested that  to enable  them to  pay the  monies  due  to D.D.A., the  purchasers  be  given  permission  to  commence development/construction on  the plot [though possession  as such be  not delivered]  subject to  the condition that  the

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property in the land would remain with the D.D.A.  until the entire consideration  is paid;  if the entire  consideration is not  paid according  to the revised  schedule, the D.D.A. should be  entitled to  re-enter the   plot and take it over along with  the construction,  if   any, made  thereon. [The idea was  to enable the  purchasers to undertake development and go  on with  the   construction which would make it easy for  them   to  sell    the  space  in  the  building  being constructed and  thus  raise funds for paying to D.D.A.] The committee recommended  further that  a revised  agreement be obtained   from  such  purchasers  incorporating  the  above terms.   When called  upon to execute the revised agreement, in   1984,  Skipper  raised  all  sorts  of  objections  and executed it  only in  the year 1987. Even before  permission to enter  upon the plot and to make construction thereon was granted under the revised agreement, Skipper appears to have been selling  the  place in the proposed building to various persons and  receiving monies. Once it got the permission to enter upon  the plot  and to  make construction  thereon, it became all  the more  easy for  it to  sell the space in the proposed building. It did not pay the first instalment under the revised  agreement in time but only after some delay. It did not pay the second instalment. Bank guarantees furnished by it  in terms  of revised  agreement were also found to be defective. Every  time the  D.D.A. thought of cancelling the agreement on  account of  the said defaults, an argument was put forward  that it  would cause great hardship to hundreds of persons who have purchased space in the proposed building and that they would be deprived of their hard-earned monies. Skipper has  been making some small token payments from time to time  meanwhile. While  the  endless  correspondence  and discussions  were  going  on  between  Skipper  and  D.D.A., Skipper went  to Delhi High Court by way of a writ petition, C.W.No.2371 of  1989, asking  for a  writ of mandamus to the D.D.A. to  sanction the building plans or in the alternative to grant  permission to  him to  start construction  at  his risk. On  March 19,  1990, the  High Court  passed an  order permitting Skipper  to commence  construction in  accordance with the  sanctioned plans  subject to  deposit of  a sum of Rupees twenty  lakhs in two instalments and Rs.1,94,40,000/- within one  month. Against  the said  order, D.D.A.  came to this Court  by way  of Special Leave Petitions (C) Nos. 6338 and 6339  of 1990.  Meanwhile, Writ  Petition (C) No.2871 of 1989 came  up for  final hearing  on December  21,1990.  The Delhi High Court made an order on that day directing Skipper to pay  to D.D.A.  a sum  of Rs. 8,12,88,798/- within thirty days and  to stop  all further construction with effect from January 9,  1991 till  the said  payment was  made.  It  was provided that  in  default  of  such  payment,  the  licence [revised  agreement  dated  August  11,  1987]  would  stand determined and  D.D.A. would  be entitled  to  re-enter  the plot. Reasons  for the order were given on January 14, 1991. Skipper failed to deposit the amount as per the direction of the High  Court. It  approached this Court by way of Special Leave Petition (C) No.196 of 1991. On January 29, 1991, this Court grantee an interim order subject to Skipper depositing Rs.2.5 crores  within one  month and  another sum  of Rs.2.5 crores  before   April  8,   1991.  Skipper   was  expressly prohibited from  inducting any  person in  the building  and from creating any rights in favour of third parties. Inspite of the  said prohibitory  orders from  this Courts  Skipper- issued an  advertisement on  February 4, 1991 in the leading newspapers of  Delhi insisting persons to purchase the space in the  proposed building. It published such, advertisements repeatedly. Special  Leave Petition  (C) No. 196 of 1991 was

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ultimately dismissed on January 25, 1993, whereafter, D.D.A. re-entered the plot and took physical possession of property on February  10, 1993  along with  the building thereon free from   all    encumbrances   in   terms   of   the   revised agreement/licence and as provided in the orders of the Delhi High Court dated December 21, 1990/January 14, 1991. It also forfeited the  amounts paid till then by Skipper in terms of the revised agreement and the said Judgment.      January  29,   1991  marks   the  watershed   in  these proceedings. Before  the said  date, Skipper  had  collected about Rupees  fourteen crores  from various parties agreeing to sell  the space  in the  proposed  building.  Even  after January 29,  1991, Skipper issued several advertisements and collected  substantial   amounts  -  Rupees  eleven  crores, according to  its own  version from various parties agreeing to sell the space in the said building. It appears that same space was sold to more than one person and monies collected. Not only  did Skipper  brazenly violate  the orders  of this Court dated  January 29,  1991 by issuing advertisements, it also filed  a suit in the Delhi High Court being Suit No.770 of 1993  seeking an  injunction restraining  the D.D.A. from interfering with  its alleged  title and possession over the plot and  for a  declaration that the re-entry by D.D.A. was illegal and  void ! It also sought for a declaration that it has discharged  all the  amounts  due  to  D.D.A.  and  that nothing was  due from it. It obtained interim orders staying re-auction of the plot.      Against the interim order of the High Court staying the re-auction of  the plot, D.D.A. approached this Court by way of Special Leave Petition (C) No.21000 of 1993. Noticing the conduct of  Skipper, this  Court initiated suo motu contempt proceedings against  Tejwant Singh  and his  wife,  Surinder Kaur, directors  of Skipper.  They were asked to explain (1) why did they institute Suit No.770 of 1993 in respect of the very same  subject matter  which was  already adjudicated by this Court  on January  23, 1993,  i.e.,  by  affirming  the orders of the High Court dated December 21, 1990 and January 14, 1991 and (2) why did they enter into agreements for sale and create  interest in the third parties in defiance of the orders of  this Court  dated January 29, 1991. After hearing the contemnors,  this Court found them guilty of contempt of this Court in the following words:      "We, therefore,  invoke  our  power      under Article 129 read with Article      142 of  the Constitution  and order      as follows:  We sentence contemner-      Respondent  is   Tejwant  Singh  to      undergo simple imprisonment for six      months  and   to  pay   a  fine  of      Rs.50,000  (Rupees  fifty  thousand      only).    We    further    sentence      contemner  respondent  2,  Surinder      Kaur to undergo simple imprisonment      for a  period of  one month  and to      pay a  fine  of  Rs.50,000  (Rupees      fifty thousand only). In default of      payment  of  fine,  the  contemners      shall   further    undergo   simple      imprisonment  for  one  month.  The      payment  of   fine  shall  be  made      within one month from today.           All  the  properties  and  the      bank accounts standing in the names      of the contemners and the Directors      of   M/S.    Skipper   Construction

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    Co.(Pvt.)  Ltd.  and  their  wives,      sons and  unmarried daughters  will      stand attached."      At that stag Sri C.Ramaswamys learned council appearing for the  contemnors, requested for deferment of the sentence of imprisonment  subject to  conditions indicated by him. On the basis  of  the  said  offer,  this  Court  deferred  the sentence  of   imprisonment   subject   to   the   following conditions:      "(1). The  contemners shall furnish      bank guarantee  in  favour  of  the      Registrar General  of this Court in      the amount  of Rs.11 crores (Rupees      eleven crores  only) on  or  before      31-3-1995. The guarantee will be of      a nationalized  bank or any foreign      bank operating  in India  The  bank      guarantee  will   be  given  for  a      period of one year from the date of      furnishing the bank guarantee.      (2) The  contemners  shall  deposit      the entire  account of Rs.11 crores      by a  bank draft in the Registry of      this court on or before 30-11-1995.      If they  fail to  do  so  the  bank      guarantee  will  become  encashable      and  will   be  encashed  forthwith      after 30-11-1995.      (3) If  the contemners fail to give      the bank  guarantee by 31-3-1995 as      aforesaid,    the    sentence    of      imprisonment      will       become      enforceable at once.      (4) No application for extension of      time either  to  furnish  the  bank      guarantee or to make the payment as      aforesaid, will  be entertained  by      this Court.      (5) The  contemners shall not leave      the  country  without  the  express      permission of this Court.      (6) List of properties given by the      contemners is  taken on record. The      contemners will also file a list of      properties held  by their  sons and      unmarried daughters within one week      from today.      (7) If  and when  any property that      is attached  under  this  order  is      sought   to    be   alienated    or      encumbered to  raise money  to  pay      the  liability   of  Rs.11   crores      stated aboves  the contemners  will      be at liberty to approach the Court      for permission to do so.      (8)   The    attachment   of    the      properties and  the  bank  accounts      shall   stand    raised   on    the      contemners  furnishing   the   bank      guarantee as aforesaid.      (9) The  order with  regard to  the      disbursal of  the amount  deposited      will be  passed after  the  amounts      are deposited as aforesaid."      The contemnors deposited a sum of Rupees two crores but

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failed to  deposit the  balance. They also failed to furnish the Bank  guarantee. As  a result  of the said failure, they were committed  to prison.  Both the  contemnors have served out their sentence.      Meanwhile, D.D.A.  invited tenders  for the sale of the said  plot  of  land  along  with  the  construction  raised thereupon. The  highest offer  received was  in the  sum  of Rupees seventy crores from M/s. Banganga Investments. It was accepted  with   the   permission   of   this   Court.   The consideration has  been deposited  with the  D.D.A. and  the property transferred  in favour  of the  said purchaser.  At this stage,  the question  arose as  to what  should be done with the  hundreds  of  persons  who  have  been  duped  and defrauded by  Skipper and  who had  parted with  substantial amounts  on   the  basis   of  the   fraudulent  and   false representations  made   by  Skipper.   This  Court   made  a distinction between  persons who  purchased the space before January 29,  1991 and  the persons  who purchased  the space thereafter. The first concern of this Court was to reimburse the persons  who purchased  space in the said building prior to January  29, 1991.  Their claims  were said  to be in the region of  Rupees fourteen  crores. Accordingly,  this Court directed D.D.A.  to set apart a sum of Rupees sixteen crores [out of  the said  amount of  Rupees seventy  crores] and to make it  available to such purchasers in accordance with the orders of  this Court.  This Court  also  requested  Justice R.S.Lahoti of  the Delhi  High Court  to act  as  a  one-man Commission to  prepare a  list of  persons who  had paid the amounts prior  to January  29, 1991  and  to  determine  the amount paid  by each  of them.  After an  elaborate enquiry, Justice Lahoti  Commission submitted a Report dated February 2, 1996  according to  which a sum of Rupees 13,27,37,561.59 crores was  paid by  more than  seven hundred  persons.  The Commission asked  for directions  of this  Court whether the said persons should also be paid the interest in addition to the principal,  as claimed  by them.  When the report of the Commission came up for orders before this Court, Be directed that for  the time being only principal amount shall be paid to the  said purchasers  and that  the balance  amount along with interest accruing thereon shall be kept apart. This was done keeping  in view the interests of post-January 29, 1991 purchasers. It  is true  that  these  persons  did  purchase notwithstanding the  warning notice  of  D.D.A.  but  it  is equally possible  that many  of them  may have seen only the subsequent advertisements  of Skipper  and not  the  warning notice of D.D.A. published on February 13, 1991.      We may  clarify that  our order dated February 12, 1996 does not mean that the pre-January 29, 1991 are not entitled to interest  on the amounts paid by them for which they have a legitimate  claim. We  have only  kept  that  claim  under consideration pending further developments in the matter.      We may  also mention  that  this  Court  had  appointed another Commission  headed by  Justice O.Chinndppa  Reddy, a former Judge  of this Courts to enquire into the role played by the  officials of  the D . in the matter and to recommend appropriate action  against them.  Justice  Chinnappa  Reddy Commission submitted  a Report  promptly on  July  7,  1995, after conducting  a pain-staking  and elaborate  enquiry, on the basis  of which  this Court  had  directed  disciplinary action to be taken against certain officers of the D.D.A.      At this  stages several applications have been filed by the post-January  29 purchasers  to sell  the properties  of Tejwant Singh, his wife and children, which were attached by this Court  under its  Order dated  February 8, 1995 [in suo motu contempt  proceedings]  and  utilise  the  proceeds  so

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realised to  reimburse them along with interest and damages. Notice of  the said  applications was given to Tejwant Singh and Surinder  Kaur and to the sons of the said persons whose properties were attached under the aforesaid orders. We have heard the parties at length on April 18, 1994.      S/Sri V.A.Bobde  and Dushyant  Dave, appearing  for the claimants [post-January  29, 1991  purchasers] and  Sri Arun Jaitley  for   the  D.D.A.  submitted  that  undergoing  the sentence of  imprisonment by  Tejwant  Singh  and  his  wife Surinder Kaur  does not  erase their  obligation to pay back the amounts to the said claimants whom they had deliberately and  fraudulently  induced  into  parting  with  substantial amounts in  clear and direct violation of the orders of this Court. They  submitted that  the order  of attachment of the properties of Tejwant Singh and his wife and children was an order independent  from the  order  of  punishment  imposing sentence of  imprisonment and  that the attachment was meant for realizing  amounts necessary for reimbursing the persons defrauded. The  attached properties  should now  be sold and the proceedings  therefrom utilised  for  paying  the  post- January 29,  1991  claimants,  it  is  submitted.  Sri  Arun Jaitley further  submitted that the claim of the pre-January 29, 1991 purchasers for interest on the amounts paid by them is still  there and  has to  be kept  in mind  while passing orders in  these applications.  It  is  submitted  that  the contemnors should not be allowed to keep or enjoy the fruits of their  contempt and  that until all the persons defrauded by  Skipper   are  fully   re-compensated,  the  contemnor’s liability does not cease.      S/Sri Harish  Salve and  Rajeev Dhavan,  appearing  for Tejwant Singh and Surinder Kaur respectively, took the stand that while  all the purchasers, whether pre- or post-January 29, 1991  should undoubtedly  be duly reimbursed, the monies for that  purpose should come out of the monies collected by the D.D.A. on account of the said plot. Interests of justice and considerations  of equity, which are the guiding factors for this  Court  while  acting  under  Article  142  of  the Constitution call  for such a direction. They submitted that as against  Rs.9.82 crores  payable to  D.D.A., Skipper  has paid more  than Rupees  fifteen crores  in all to D.D.A. The amounts received  from  the  purchasers  has  actually  been utilised for  raising the  construction which has now vested in the D.D.A. in terms of the orders of the Delhi High Court dated December  21, 1990/January  14, 1991.  D.D.A. thus not only got back the plot of the land but also the construction made by Skipper free of any encumbrances. They have realised a sum of Rupees seventy crores by selling the same. In other words, D.D.A.  has realised  a total  of Rupees  eighty five crores on  account of  the said  plot. It  is true that they have set  apart Rupees  sixteen crores  out of  that but yet they are  in possession of about Rupees sixty nine crores of the  said   money.  The   claim  of  post-January  29,  1991 purchasers is  in a  sum of  about Rupees  eleven crores. An amount of  Rupees five  crores  is  lying  with  the  Court. Whatever balance  amount is required to pay interest to pre- January 29,  1991 purchasers and to pay off the post-January 29, 1991  purchasers should  come out  of the said amount of Rupees sixty  nine crores  now with  D.D.A. Learned  counsel submitted that  on  account  of  various  proceedings  taken against Skipper  and their  directors and  the attachment of their properties  and the adverse publicity in, that behalf, it has become impossible for them to generate any monies for depositing in  this Court.  They requested that a Commission be appointed  to determine the value of the structure raised by Skipper on the said plot and also to determine the amount

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received by  Skipper from  post-January 29,  1991 purchasers and to  direct that  the amount  required to pay them should come out of the funds with the D.D.A.      Sri K.Madhav  Reddy, learned  counsel appearing for the two sons  of Tejwant Singh and Surinder Kour [Prabhjot Singh and Prabhjit  Singh], submitted  that the  businesses of the sons are  independent and  distinct from  their parents  and that none  of the  monies received by their parents from the aforesaid purchasers  has been  diverted to  them or  to the companies of  which they are directors. In facts the case of the  third  respondents  Prabhjot  Singh,  is  that  he  has separated from his father and that the company Technological Park (P)  Limited, at  NOIDA [of  which he  and his wife are directors] has nothing to do with the funds or activities of their parent..  The fourth  respondent. Prabhjit Singh, also submitted that  he and  his wife  are the  directors of  TeJ Properties  Private  Limited,  of  which  his  parents  were directors earlier but that the affairs of Tej Properties are in no  way connected  with the  affairs  and  funds  of  his parents. He  is a  director of  Tej Properties  as  well  as Skipper Properties Private Limited.      D.D.A. has  filed a  list of properties held by Tejwant Singh, his  wife, Surinder Kaur and their sons and daughters which according  to  them  really  belong  to  and  are  the properties of  Tejwant Singh  and his  wife. They  submitted that the  various companies  created by  Tejwant Singh,  his wife and  his children  are merely  fronts  and  devices  to defraud and defeat the claims of the purchasers and that for doing complete  Justice between  the parties  the  corporate veil should be lifted and all the said properties which have already been  attached, should  be proceeded with to realise the amounts  necessary for  paying the  pre-January 29, 1991 purchasers in  full [i  e., interest]  and  also  the  post- January 29,  1991 purchasers. In particular! Sri Jaitley has pointed out the transaction of lease relating to he property at No.3, Aurangzeb Road, New Delhi. The facts brought to our notice are  the following  on October  1,1993 Tej Properties (P) Limited  through its  Chairman  and  Managing  Directors Tejwant Singh,  executed a  lease  agreement  in  favour  of "Maple Leaf  Trading Company  Limited, a  company having its office at 111, Charemont Roads Dublin, Ireland" for a period of five  years [with  an option  to the  lease  to  have  it extended for  another four  years] at  a rent  of Rupees one lakh per  month. The lease agreement was to take effect from October 8,  1993. On  October 8, 1993, Maple Leaf executed a lease deed  in respect of the said property in favour of the Embassy of  Israel in  India, New Delhi for a period of nine years at  the rate of Rs.8,78,360/- per month. It is pointed out that Tejwant Singh and his wife, Surinder Kaur, were the only two directors of Tej Properties and that in 1988 and 19 one H.S.Sarna and Prabhjit Singh [one of the sons of Tejwant Singh] were  brought in  as its  directors. It  is submitted that this property really belongs to the contemnors and that this property  alone is sufficient to realise all the monies due to the persons defrauded by the said contemnors.      The issues  arising from the contentions of the parties are considered hereinafter topic-wise.           The nature  and ambit  of this      court’s power under Article the 142      of the constitution. Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India reads:      "142  Enforcement  of  decrees  and      orders of  Supreme Court and orders      as  to  descovery,  etc.---(1)  The      Supreme Court  in the  exercise  of

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    its  jurisdiction   may  pass  such      decree or  make such  order  as  is      necessary   for    doing   complete      justice  in  any  cause  or  matter      pending before  it, and  any decree      so passed or order so made shall be      enforceable     throughout      the      territory of  India in  such manner      as may  be prescribed  by or  under      any law  made  by  Parliament  and,      until provision  in that  behalf is      so made,  in  such  manner  as  the      President may by order prescribe."      In re:  Vinay Chandra Mishra [1995 (2) S.C.C.584], this Court dealt  with the  scope and  width of the power of this Court under  Article 142.  After referring  to  the  earlier decisions  of   the  Court  in  extenso,  it  is  held  that "statutory provisions  cannot  override  the  constitutional provisions and  Article 142(1)  being a constitutional power it  cannot  be  limited  or  conditioned  by  any  statutary provision.  [Para   48]".  lt   is  also   held  that   "the jurisdiction and  powers of this Court under Article 142 are supplementary in   nature  and are  provided to  do complete justice in  any matter....". In other words, the power under Article 142  is  meant  to  supplement  the  existing  legal framework - to do complete justice between the parties - and not to supplant it. It is conceived to meet situations which cannot be  effectively  and  appropriately  tackled  by  the existing provisions of law. As a matter of fact, we think it advisable to  leave this power undefined and uncatalogued so that it  remains elastic  enough to  be moulded  to suit the given situation.  The very fact that this power is conferred only upon  this Court,  and on  no one  else, is  itself  an assurance that  it will  be  used  with  due  restraint  and circumspection, keeping in view the ultimate object of doing complete justice  between the  parties. Now,  coming to  the facts of the case before us, the question is not what can be done, but  what should  be done?  We are of the opinion that even while  acting under  Article 142 of the Constitution of India, we  ought not  to re-open the orders and decisions Sf the Courts which have become final. We do not think that for doing complete  justice between the parties before us, it is necessary to  resort to  this extra-ordinary  step.  We  are saying this  in view  of the contention urged by S/Sri Salve and Dhavan that since the D.D.A. has taken over not only the plot but  also the  construction raised  by Skipper  thereon [free from  all encumbrances]  in addition  to  the  sum  of Rs.15.89 crores  [said to  have been paid by Skipper towards the  sale  consideration  of  the  said  plot],  the  monies required for paying the persons defrauded should come out of the kitty of D.D.A. It must be remembered that the plot, the construction raised  thereon and  the  monies  already  paid towards the  sale consideration  of the  said plot  have all vested absolutely  in the  D.D.A. free from all encumbrances under and  by virtue of the decision of the Delhi High Court dated December 21, 1990/January 14, 1991, which decision has indeed been affirmed by this Court by dismissing the Special Leave Petition  preferred against  it. It may not be open to us to  ignore the  said decisions  and orders, including the orders  of   this  Court,   and/or  to   go   behind   those decisions/orders and  say that the amount received by D.D.A. toward, sale  consideration from Skipper or the value of the construction raised  by Skipper  on the  said plot should be made available  for paying  out  the  persons  defrauded  by Skipper. We  must treat  those decisions and orders as final

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and yet  devise ways  and means  of doing  complete  justice between the parties before us.           "The contemnor  should not  be      allowed  to  enjoy  or  retain  the      fruits of his contempt":      The  principle   that  a  contemnor  ought  not  to  be permitted to enjoy and/or keep the fruits of his contempt is well-settled. In Mohd.Idris v. R.J. Babuji [1985  (1)   S.C.R.598],  this   Court  held   clearly  that undergoing the  punishment for  contempt does  not mean that the Court is not entitled to give appropriate directions for remedying and rectifying the things done in violation of its Orders. The  petitioners therein had given an undertaking to the Bombay High Court. They acted in breach of it. A learned Single Judge  held them  guilty of  contempt and  imposed  a sentence of  one month’s  imprisonment. In addition thereto, the learned  Single Judge  made  appropriate  directions  to remedy the  breach of  undertaking. It  was contended before this Court  that the  learned Judge  was  not  justified  in giving the  aforesaid directions to in additing to punishing the petitioners  for contempt  of court.  The  argument  was rejected holding  that "the  Single Judge was quite right in giving  appropriate  directions  to  close  the  breach  [of undertaking]".      The above  principle has  been applied even in the case of violation of orders of injunction issued by Civil Courts. In Clarke  v. Chadburn  [1985 (1)  All.E.R. 211], Sir Robert Megarry V-C observed:      "I need  not cite authority for the      proposition  that  it  is  of  high      importance that orders of the court      should    be     obeyed.    Willful      disobedience to  an  order  of  the      court is  punishable as  a contempt      of court,  and I feel no doubt that      such disobedience  may properly  be      described as  being illegal.  If by      such   disobedience   the   persons      enjoined  claim   that  they   have      validly effected some charge in the      rights and liabilities of others, I      cannot see  why it  should be  said      that although  they ere  liable  to      penalties for contempt of court for      doing what  they did,  nevertheless      those acts  were validly  done.  Of      course, if  an act  is done,  it is      not undone  merely by  pointing out      that it  was done in breach in law.      If a  meeting is  held in breach of      an injunction,  it cannot  be  said      that the meeting has not been held.      But the  legal consequences of what      has been  done in breach of the law      may plainly  be very  much affected      by the  illegality. It  seems to me      on principle  that those who defy a      prohibition ought nat to be able to      claim  that  the  fruits  of  their      defiance are  good, and not tainted      by  the  illegality  that  produced      them."      To the  same effect are the decisions of the Madras and Calcutta High  Courts in  Century Flour Mills Limited  v. S. Suppiah &  Ors.   [A.I.R.1975 Madras  270] and  Sujit Pal v.

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Prabir Kumar Sun [A.I.R.1986 Calcutta 220]. In Century Flour Mill Limited, it was held by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court that  where an act is done in violation of an order of stay or  injunction, it  is the  duty of  the  Court,  as  a policy,  to   set  the   wrong  right   and  not  allow  the perpetuation of  the wrong-doing.  The inherent power of the Court, it  was held,  is not  only available in such a case, but it  is bound  to be exercise it to undo the wrong in the interest of  justice. That  was a  case where  a meeting was held contrary  to an  order of injunction. The Court refused to recognize that the holding of the meeting is a legal one. It put  back the  parties in the same position as they stood immediately prior to the service of the interim order.      In Suraj  Pal, a  Division Bench  of the  Calcutta High Court has taken the same view. There, the defendant forcibly dispossessed the  plaintiff in  violation of  the  order  of injunction and  took possession  of the  property. The Court directed the restoration of possession to the plaintiff with the aid  of police.  The Court observed that no technicality can prevent  the Court from doing justice in exercise of its inherent powers.  It held  that the  object of  Rule 2-A  of Order  39  will  be  fulfilled  only  where  such  mandatory direction is  given for  restoration of  possession  to  the aggrieved party. This was necessary, it observed, to prevent the abuse of process of law.      There is  no doubt  that this  salutory rule  has to be applied and given effect to by this Court, if necessary,  by over-ruling any  procedural or other- technical  objections. Article 129-  is a  constitutional power and  when exercised in tandem  with Article 142, all such objections should give away. The Court must ensure full justice between the parties before it.      Claims  of   Prabhjot   Singh   and      Prabhjit  Singh  [Sons  of  Tejwant      Singh]:      Prabhjot Singh  Sabharwal, third respondent, stated  in his counter-affidavit  filed  in  Interlocutory  Application No.29 of  1996 that  he is  in no  way concerned   with  the several companies pointed out by the D.D.A. [as belonging to Tejwant Singh  and members  of his  family] and  that he  is interested only  in one  company, Technological Park Private Limited, NOIDA.  He stated  that he  and his  wife  are  the directors of  thif company  and that it does not deal in any manner with  Delhi Development Authority. He stated that his parents are  in no  way concerned  with  Technological  Park Private Limited.  He stated "I have separated from my father and  I   have  no   dealings  with   the  Delhi  Development Authority". It is significant to notice that this respondent does not  say when was he separated from his father, whether the said  ’separation’ is  evidenced by  writing, nor has he stated that the said separation - or partition, as it may be called -  was reported to the Income Tax Authorities and was accepted and  recorded by them. The affidavit is quite vague in this respect.      Prabhjit Singh,  fourth  respondent,  [another  son  of Tejwant  Singh]   has  filed  a  separate  counter-affidavit stating that  he and  his wife  are  the  directors  in  two companies,  Tej   Properties  Private  Limited  and  Skipper Properties Private  Limited. Tej Properties is said to be an investment company  which is not carrying on any activity at present. Skipper properties is said to be running in a loss. He stated that he has no connection with the other companies pointed out  by  the  D.D.A.  He  admitted  the  transaction relating to  the property at No.3, Aurangzeb Road, New Delhi but submitted  that he  is in  no  way  connected  with  the

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affairs of  his father  or with Skipper Construction Private Limited. It  is significant  to notice  that this respondent does mot say that he is separated or divided from his father nor does  he explain how he and his wife became directors of Tej Properties  of which his parents were the sole directors at the time of grant of afore-mentiomed lease.      Lifting the corporate veil:      In Aron  Salomon v.  Salomon &  Company  Limited  (1897 Appeal Cases  22), the  House of  Lords had  observed,  "the company is  at law  a different  person altogether  from the subscriber...; and though it may be that after incorporation the business  is precisely the same as it was before and the same persons  are managers  and the  same hands received the profits, the  company  is  not  in  law  the  agent  of  the subscribers or  trustee for them. Nor are the subscribers as members liable,  on any  shape or form, except to the extent and in  the  manner  provided  by  that  Act".  Since  then, however,  the   Courts  have   come  to   recognize  several exceptions to  the said  rule. While  it is not necessary to refer to  all of  them, the  one relevant to us is "when the corporate personality is being blatantly used as a cloak for fraud or improper conduct". [Gower: Modern Company Law - 4th Edn. (1979)  at P.137].  Pennington [Company  Law - 5th Edn. 1985 at  P.53] also  states that  "here  the  protection  of public interests  is of  paramount importance  or where  the company has  been formed to evade obligations imposed by the law",  the  court  will  disregard  the  corporate  veil.  A Professor of  Law, S.Ottolenghi in his article "From Peeping Behind the  Corporate Veil,  to Ignoring it Completely" says "the concept  of ’piercing the veil’ in the United States is much More  developed than  in the  UK. The  motto, which was laid down  by Sanborn,J. and cited since then as the law, is that ’when  the notion  of legal  entity is  used to  defeat public convenience,  justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association of persons.  The  same  can  be  seen  in  various  European jurisdictions". [(1990)  53 Modern  Law Review 338]. Indeed, as far  back  1912,  another  American  Professor  L.Maurice Wormser examined  the American decisions on the subject in a brilliantly written  article "Piercing the veil of corporate entity" [published  in (1912)  XII Columbia  Las Review 496] and summarized their central holding in the following words:      "The various classes of cases where      the  concept  of  corporate  entity      should  We  ignored  and  the  veil      drawn aside  have vow  been briefly      reviewed.  What  general  rule,  if      any, can  be laid down? The nearest      approximation   to   generalization      which  the  present  state  of  the      authorities would  warrant is this:      When the  conception  of  corporate      entity  is   employed  to   defraud      creditors,  to  evade  an  existing      obligation,   to    circumvent    a      statute, to  achieve or  perpetuate      monopoly, or  to protect knavery or      crime, the  courts will  draw aside      the web  of entity, will regard the      corporate company as an association      of  live,   up-and-doing,  men  and      women  shareholders,  and  will  do      justice between real persons."      In Palmer’s  Company law, this topic discussed in Part- II  of  Vol-I.  Several  situations  where  the  court  will

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disregard the  corporate veil  are  set  out.  It  would  be sufficient for  our purposes  to quote the eighth exception. It runs:  "The courts  have further shown themselves willing to ’lifting  the veil’  where the device of incorporation is used for  some illegal or improper purpose....Where a vendor of land  sought to avoid the action for specific performance by transferring  the land in breach of contract to a company he had formed for the purpose, the court treated the company as a  mere ’sham’ and made an order for specific performance against both the vendor and the company". Similar views have been expressed  by all  the commentators  on the Company Law which we do not think it necessary to refer.      The law as stated by Palmer and Gower has been approved by this  Court in  Tata Engineering  and Locomotive  Company Limited v.  State of  Bihar [1964  (6)  S.C.R.  885  ].  The following passage form the decision is apposite:      "Gower   has    classified    seven      categories of  cases where the veil      of  a   corporate  body   has  been      lifted.  But,   it  would   not  be      possible  to   evolve  a   rational      consistent and inflexible principle      which can be invoked in determining      the question as to whether the veil      of the corporation should be lifted      or not.  Broadly,  where  fraud  is      intended  to   be   prevented,   or      trading with  enemy is sought to be      defeated, the  veil of  corporation      is lifted by judicial decisions and      the   shareholders are  held to  be      ’persons who  actually work for the      corporation ."      In DHN  Food Distributors Ltd. & Ors. v. London Borough of Tower  Hamlets [  1976 (3)  All.E.R. 462 ], the  Court of Appeal dealt  with a group of companies. Lord Denning quoted with approval  the statement  in Gower’s  Company  Law  that "there is  evidence of  a general  tendency  to  ignore  the separate legal entities of various companies within a group, and to  look instead  at the  economic entity  of the  whole group". The  learned Master  of Rolls  observed  that  "this group is  virtually the  same as  a partnership in which all the three  companies are  partners". He  called it a case of "three-in-one" - and, alternatively, as "one-in-three".      The  concept   of  corporate   entity  was  evolved  to encourage and promote trade and commerce : but not to commit illegalities or  to defraud  people. Where,  therefore,  the corporate  character   is  employed   for  the   purpose  of committing illegality  or for  defrauding others,  the court would ignore  the corporate  character and  will look at the reality behind the corporate veil so as to enable it to pass appropriate  orders   to  do  justice  between  the  parties concerned. The  fact that  Tejwant Singh  and members of his family  have  created  several  corporate  bodies  does  not prevent this  Court from  treating all of them as one entity belonging to  and controlled  by Tejwant Singh and family if it is  found that  these corporate  bodies are merely cloaks behind which  lurks Tejwant  Singh  and/or  members  of  his family and  that the  device of  incorporation was  really a Ploy adopted  for committing  illegalities and/or to defraud people.      The concept of resulting trust and equity:      In Attorney  General for  India v. Amratlal Prajivandas [1994 (5)  S.C.C.54], a  Constitution Bench  of  this  Court comprising  nine-Judges  including  one  of  us  (B.P.Jeevan

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Reddy,J.) dealt  with the  challenge to  the validity of the definition of  "illegally acquired properties" in clause (c) of  Section   3(1)  of   Smugglers  and   Foreign   Exchange Manipulators [Forfeiture  of Property]  Act, 1976  [SAFEMA]. The said  Act provided that where a person earned properties by  smuggling   or  other   illegal  activities,   all  such properties, whether  standing in  his name or in the name of his relations  or associates will be forfeited to the State. while dealing  with the  justification for  such  a  radical provision, this Court held:      "So far  as justification of such a      provision is  concerned.  there  is      enough and  more.  After  all,  all      these illegally acquired properties      are earned  and  acquired  in  ways      illegal and  corrupt -  at the cost      of the  people and  the State.  The      State is deprived of its legitimate      revenue  to   that  extent.   These      properties  must   justly  go  back      where they  belong  to  the  State.      What we  are saying  is nothing new      or heretical. Witness the facts and      ratio of  a recent  decision of the      Privy Council  in Attorney  General      for Hang Kong v. Reid [1993 (3) WLR      1143]. The  respondent, Reid, was a      Crown-prosecutor in  Hong Kong.  He      took bribes  as  an  inducement  to      suppress      certain      criminal      prosecutions and with those monies,      acquired properties in New Zealand,      two of  which were held in the name      of himself  and his  wife  and  the      third in the name of his solicitor.      He was  found guilty of the offence      of bribe-taking  and sentenced by a      criminal court.  The Administration      of Hong  Kong claimed that the said      properties in New Zealand sere held      by   the    owners    thereof    as      constructive trustees for the Crown      and must be made over to the Crown.      The Privy Council upheld this claim      overruling the New Zealand Court of      Appeals. Lord Templeman, delivering      the   opinion   of   the   Judicial      Committee, based  his conclusion on      the simple  ground that any benefit      obtained by  a fiduciary  through a      breach of duty belongs in equity to      the beneficiary.  It is held that a      gift accepted  by  a  person  in  a      fiduciary position  as an incentive      for his  breach of duty constituted      a bribe  and, although  in  law  it      belonged  to   the  fiduciary,   in      equity he  not only became a debtor      for the  amount of the bribe to the      person to  whom the  duty was  owed      but he  also held the bribe and any      property  acquired   therewith   on      constructive trust for that person.      It is  held  further  that  if  the      value of the property  representing

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    the bribe depreciated the fiduciary      had to  pay to  the injured  person      the difference  between that  value      and  the   initial  amount  of  the      bribe,   and    if   the   property      increased in  value  the  fiduciary      was  not  entitled  to  retain  the      excess since equity would not allow      him to  make any  profit  from  his      breach of  duty. Accordingly, it is      held that  tn the  extent that they      represented bribes  received by the      first respondent,  the New  Zealand      properties were  held in  trust for      the Crown,  and the  Crown  had  an      equitable  interest   therein.  The      learned Law  Lord observed  further      that if  the theory of constructive      trust is not applied and properties      interdicted  when   available,  the      properties ’can  be  sold  and  the      proceeds  whisked   away  to   some      Shangri La  which hides  bribes and      other corrupt  moneys  in  numbered      bank accounts;  - to  which we  are      tempted to add - one can understand      the immorality  of the  Bankers who      maintained numbered accounts but it      is  difficult   to  understand  the      amorality of  the  Governments  and      their  laws   which  sanction  such      practices -  in effect  encouraging      them. The  ratio of  this  decision      applies  equally   where  a  person      acquires  properties  by  violating      the law  and at  the expense of and      to the  detriment of  the State and      its  revenues  where  an  enactment      provides for such a course, even if      the fiduciary relationship referred      to in  Reid is  not present. It may      be seen  that the  concept employed      in Reid  was a  common law concept,      whereas  here   is  a  case  of  an      express     statutory     provision      providing for  such forfeiture. May      we  say  in  conclusion  that  ’the      interests of  society are paramount      to individual interests and the two      must  be   brought  into  just  and      harmonious   relation.    A    mere      property career  is not  the  final      destiny of  mankind, if progress is      to be  the law  of the future as it      has been of the past’. (Lewis Henry      Morgan : Ancient Society)"      In  Reid,   the  Privy   Council  made   the  following observations which  we find  of  crucial  relevance  to  our present-day society:      "A bribe  is a  gift accepted  by a      fiduciary as  an inducement  to him      to  betray   his  trust.  A  secret      benefit,  which   may  or  may  not      constitute a  bribe  is  a  benefit      which the  fiduciary  derives  from

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    trust  property   or  obtains  from      knowledge which  he acquires in the      course,   of acting  as a fiduciary      ....Bribery  is  an  evil  practice      which threatens  the foundations of      any  civilised  society.....  Where      bribes are  accepted by  a trustee,      servant, agent  or other fiduciary,      loss and  damage are  caused to the      beneficiaries, master  or principal      whose    interests     have    been      betrayed.......When  a   bribe   is      offered and accepted in money or in      kind,   the   money   or   property      constituting the  bribe belongs  in      law to the recipient. Money paid to      the false fiduciary belongs to him.      The  legal   estate   in   freehold      property  conveyed   to  the  false      fiduciary by  way of bribe vests in      him. Equity  however which  acts in      personam   insists   that   it   is      unconscionable for  a fiduciary  to      obtain  and  retain  a  benefit  in      breach of  duty. The  provider of a      bribe cannot  recover it because he      committed a  criminal offence  when      he  paid   the  bribe.   The  false      fiduciary who received the bribe in      breach of duty must pay and account      for the bribe to the person to whom      that duty  was owed. In the present      case as  soon as Mr.Reid received a      bribe in  breach of  the duties  he      owed  to  the  Government  of  Hong      Kong, he  became a debtor in equity      to the Crown for the amount of that      bribe...........  As  soon  as  the      bribe was received, whether in cash      or in  kind, the   false  fiduciary      held the  bribe on  a  constructive      trust      for      the      person      injured........  If   the  property      representing the  bribe exceeds the      original    bridge    value,    the      fiduciary cannot retain the benefit      of the  increase in  value which he      obtained solely  as a result of his      branch   of duty.....  When a bribe      is  accepted   by  a  fiduciary  in      breach of  his duty  then he  holds      that bribe  in trust for the person      to whom  the duty  was owed. If the      property  representing   the  bribe      decreases in  value  the  fiduciary      must pay  the difference    between      that value  and the  initial amount      of the  bribe because he should not      have accepted the bribe or incurred      the risk  of loss.  If the property      increases in  vales, the  fiduciary      is not  entitled to  any surplus in      excess of the  initial value of the      bribe because  he is not allowed by      any means to make a profit out of a

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    breach of duty."      We respectfully  agree with  each and  every  statement contained in  the above  extract. MAY  WE SAY IN PARENTHESES that a  law providing  for forfeiture of properties acquired by holders of ’public officer" [ including the offices/posts in the  public sector  corporations] by indulging in corrupt and illegal  acts and  deals, is  a crying  necessity in the present state  of our  society. The law must extend not only to - as does SAFEMA - properties acquired in the name of the holder of  such office  but also  to properties  held in the names  of  his  spouse,  children  or  other  relatives  and associates. Once it is proved that the holder of such office has indulged  in corrupt  acts all such properties should be attached forthwith.  The law  should  place  the  burden  of proving that  the attached properties were not acquired with the aid  of monies/properties  received  in  the  course  of corrupt deals  upon the  holder of  that  property  as  does SAFEMA whose  validity has already been upheld by this court in the  aforesaid decision of the larger Constitution Bench. Such a  law has  become an absolute necessity, if the canker of corruption  is not  to  prove  the  death-khell  of  this nation. According  to several  perceptive observers, indeed, it has  already reached near-fatal dimensions. It is for the parliament to  act in  this  matter,  if  they  really  mean business. It may be recalled that in this very case, Justice Chinnappa Reddy  Commission [appointed  to investigate  into the conduct  of the  officials of the D.D.A. in handing over the possession  of the plot to skipper without receiving the full consideration and also in conniving at the construction thereon] has  reported that  several top  officials  of  the D.D.A. have  indeed connived at and acted hand in glove with Skipper to  confer illegitimate gain upon the latter. On the basis of  the said  report. disciplinary enquiries have been ordered against certain officials which are now pending. for the reason  that the  enquiries are  pending. For the reason that the  enquiries are pending. we desist form referring to the findings of the commission except to broadly mention its conclusion.      We are  of the  opinion that  the holding  in  Amratlal Prajivendas and in Reid should guide us while exercising the extra-ordinary powers  of this  Court while acting under the said  Article  form  making  appropriate  orders  for  doing complete  justice   between  the   parties*.  The  fiduciary relationship may  not exist in the present case nor is it as case of  a holder  of public office, yet if it is found that someone has acquired properties by defrauding the people and if it is found that the persons defrauded should be restored to the  position in  which they  would have been but for the said fraud, the court can make all necessary orders. This is what equity  means and  in India  the Courts  are  not  only courts of law but also courts of equity.      D.D.A.s responsibility to reimuburse the purchasers:      S/Shri  Bobde   and  Dave,   learned  counsel  for  the purchasers,  countended   that  inasmuch   as  several   top officials  of  the  D.D.A  had  colluded  with  Skipper  and connived at  their wrong  doing, the  D.D.A.  must  be  held equally liable  to reimburse  the purchasers.  Indeed, their submission is  that D.D.A.  stood  by  and  took  no  action whatsoever while Skipper was issuing repeated ------------------------------------------------------------ *In other  words, while  action under  Article  142  of  the Constitution, this  Court will respect a statue, the absence of a  statue or  statutory provision will not inhibit her to make orders necessary for doing complete justice between the parties.

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advertisements [even  after January  29, 1991,  in open  and brazen defiance  of this  Court’s Orders] and, therefore, it must be made equally liable to reimburse the said purchasers in full.  We find  it difficult  to agree. Firstly, the said contention is not factually correct. As has been pointed out hereinabove, son  after the  publication of an advertisement by Skipper  in the newspapers inviting the citizens at large to come  and purchase  the space in the proposed building on February 4,  1991, the  D.D.A. came  forward with  a warning notice published  in all  leading national  dailies advising citizens not  to purchase  space in  the building in view of the orders  of this  Court. It  is true that even thereafter Skipper has  been  issuing  similar  advertisements  but  it cannot be  said with  any reasonableness  that D.D.A. should have responded  to each  such advertisement  by publishing a warning. It  would have  done that  but it cannot be faulted for not  doing it.  It is, therefore, factually incorrect to say that  D.D.A. stood by and allowed Skipper to defroud the people by issuing advertisements. Secondly, even if there is any collusion  between  the  officials  of  the  D.D.A.  and Skipper as  alleged by  the learned  counsel,  the  question still arises whether D.D.A. be held bound by such actions of its officials  acting beyond their authority, indeed, acting adverse to the interests of D.D.A. intentionally. We are not suggesting nor  are we  laying down the proposition that the D.D.A. is  not bound  by the acts and deeds of its officials but are  only saying  that where  the acts  and deeds of the officials are  not only  beyond their authority but are done with a  malafide intent, it may not be just end fair to bind D.D.A. with such malafide acts and deeds. Be that as it may, it is  not necessary  for the purpose of this case to pursue this line  of enquiry  further or  to express  any  definite opinion thereon.      What are the directions called for in this matter?      In  the   light  of  the  factual  and  legal  position adumbrated hereinabove,  the question  arises what  are  the appropriate directions  to be  made in  the matter? In other words, the question is what directions and orders are called for by  this Court  acting under  its contempt  jurisdiction under Article  129 and  its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142  to do  complete  justice  between  the  parties before us? On one hand, the position is that the pre-January 29, 1991  purchasers have  to be  reimbursed in  full  which means that  they   should  also  be  paid  interest  at  the appropriate rate on the amounts advanced by them to Skipper. [They have only been paid the principal amount in the sum of Rs.13,27,37,561.59p pursuant to the Report of Justice Lahoti Commission.] Secondly,  the post-January 29, 1991 purchasers have also  to be  reimbursed in  full. According to Skipper, the amounts  collected from post January 29, 1991 purchasers is in  the region  of Rupees  eleven crores. The counsel for the petitioners,  however, say  that some  of them are bogus purchasers set  up  by  Skipper  itself  to  defeat  genuine claims. As  against these  claims, only  an amount  of about Rupees six  crores is  now available  which is kept in fixed depositing in  nationalized banks.  The balance  has  to  be realized. In our opinion, as at present advised, it would be enough for  the above  purpose if  we  proceed  against  one property, viz.,  No.30, Aurangzeb  Road,  New  Delhi,  which appears to  us, on  the facts and material placed before us, to belong  wholly and  exclusively to  Tejwant Singh and his wife. We  ignore the  corporate veil  and we ignore the fact that as  present their son, Prabhjit Singh, and his wife are the directors. [We have already held that Prabhjit Singh has not explained  in his  affidavit how  did he  and  his  wife

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became  directors   in  the   place  of  his  parents.]  Tej Properties private  Limited, which  is said  to own the said property, was  intially having  only  two  directors,  viz., Tejwant Singh  and his  wife, Surinder  Kaur. It  is Tejwant Singh who  executed the  lease deed  in respect  of the said property in  favour of  ’Maple Leaf’  on  October  1,  1993, effective from  October 8,  1993. On October 8, ]993 itself, Maple Leaf  executed a  lease deed  in respect  of the  said property in  favour of  an Embassy  of Israel  in India, New Delhi for  a period of nine years at a rent of Rs.8,38,360/- per month.  It is crystal clear that the property belongs to Tejwant Singh  and the  corporate veil  and  the  change  of directorships are  all  mere  devices  to  screen  the  said property and  its income  from their creditors including the purchasers aforesaid.  Tej  Properties  Private  Limited  is nothing but  a fig-leaf  and that too an inadequate one - to cover up  the reality.  The reality  is Tejwant  Singh,  the contemner, who is the author of all these deals and devices. The transfer  of share-holding,  if any,  between the father and the  son [and  their  respective  wives]  must  also  be treated as  a sham  transaction. The  above  course  appears tastified and  necessary looked at from any angle, viz., (a) that the contemnors should not be allowed to enjoy or retain the fruits  pf their contempt; (b) the interests of justice, which call for the lifting of the corporate veil - the said- property is  in truth  and effect  the property  of  Tejwant Singh and  members of  his family  and must  be available to satisfy the claims of the persons defrauded by him; (c) that while acting  under Article  142 of  the Constitution,  this Court must  do complete  justice between the parties and for that purpose,  it is  necessary to  ensure that a person who has  defrauded   a  large   number  of  persons  by  issuing advertisements in  the leading newspapers published from the capital inviting  people to  come and  purchase space in the said building  in open  and brazen  violation of  clear  and specific orders  of this  Court should  not  be  allowed  to benefit from his fraud and/or contemptuous acts.      Accordingly, it is directed that: (1) the  property at  No.3, Aurangzeb Road, New Delhi, shall be attached, if not already attached - and if it has already been attached, it shall continue to be under attachment; (2) the Embassy of Israel in India, New Delhi, the lessee of the said  property, is requested to deposit the monthly rent payable in  respect of  the said building in this Court with effect from  the date of receipt of a copy of this order and continue to  deposit the  same until  further  orders.  Such deposit  in  Court  shall  discharge-  the  Embassy  of  its obligation to pay rent to ’Maple Leaf’, its landlord. (3) Tejwant  Singh and his wife, Surinder Kaur, are directed to deposit  in this  Court a sum of Rupees ten crores within two months  from today.  In default,  steps will be taken to sell the  property at  No.3, Aurangzeb  Road, New  Delhi  by inviting tenders  from the public. The said amount of Rupees ten crores  is tentatively arrived at as the amount required to reimburse the pre-January 29, 1991 purchasers in full, as explained hereinabove,  and  also  to  reimburse  the  post- January 29,  1991 purchasers  in full.  [This shall  not  be treated as  the final figure required in this behalf.] While fixing this amount, we have taken into account the fact that about Rupees  six crores is now available with this Court as stated supra; (4) the attachment of properties belonging to Tejwant Singh, his wife  and  children,  already  effected,  including  the properties mentioned  in the application, I.A.No.29 of 1996, filed by  the D.D.A.  shall continue  to be in force pending

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further orders.  It is, however, open to any of them to come forward with  a proposal to sell any of those properties and if this  Court is satisfied about the bonafides of the deal, the attachment will be lifted on condition that the confederation so  received is  deposited into this Court. It is obvious  that any  such deposit  will  be  treated  as  a deposit towards  the direction  regarding deposit  of Rupees ten crores contained in Direction No.3 above; (5) since  it is necessary to ascertain the persons who have paid  amounts   to  Skipper   after  January  29,  1991  for purchasing the  space in  the said  building, and to exclude the  claims   of  non-genuine   persons,  we   appoint   Sri O.Chinnappa Reddy, a former Judge of this Court, as the one- man Commission  to ascertain  the number and identity of the persons who  have purchased  the space in the building being raised by  Skipper  after  January  29,  1991  and  also  to determine the  amounts paid  by each of them. The Commission is requested  to submit  its Report  within a  period of six months,  as  far  as  possible.  The  remuneration  and  the expenses of  Sri Justice  O.Chinnappa Reddy  will  be  borne entirely by  the D.D.A.  out of the funds now lying with it, as per his terms.      Ordered accordingly.      Before parting with this case, we feel impelled to make a  few   observations.  What   happened  in   this  case  is illustrative of what is happening in our country on a fairly wide scale  in diverse  forms. Some  Persons  in  the  upper strata [which  means the  rich and  the influential class of the society] have made the ’property career’ the sole aim of their life.  The means  have become  irrelevant -  in a land where its  greatest son born in this century said "means are more important  than the ends". A sense of bravado prevails; everything  can   be  managed;  every  authority  and  every institution can  be managed.  All it takes is to "tackle" or "manage" it in an appropriate manner. They have developed an utter disregard  for law  - nay,  a  contempt  for  it;  the feeling that  law is  meant for  lesser mortals  and not for them. The  courts in  the country have been trying to combat this trend, with some success as the recent events show. But how many  matters can  we handle.  How  many  more  of  such matters are  still there?  The real question is how to swing the polity  into action,  a polity which has become indolent and soft in its vitals? Can the courts alone do it? Even so, to what extent, in the prevailing state of affairs? Not that we  wish  to  launch  upon  a  diatribe  against  anyone  in particular but  Judges of  this Court are also permitted, we presume, to  ask in  anguish, "what  have  we  made  of  our country in less than fifty years"? Where has the respect and regard for lag gone? And who is responsible for it?      On this  occasion, we  must  refer  to  the  mechanical manner in  which some  of  the  courts  have  been  granting interim  orders   -  injunctions  and  stay  orders  without realizing the harm such mechanical orders cause to the other side and  in some  cases to public interest. It is no answer to say  that "let us make the order and if the other side is aggrieved, let  it come  and apply  for vacating  it".  With respect, this  is not  a correct attitude. Before making the order, the  court must  be satisfied that it is a case which calls  for   such  an   order.  This  obligation  cannot  be jettisoned    and     the    onus     placed    upon     the respondents/defendants to  apply for  vacating it. Take this very case: a person purchases a property in auction. He does not pay  as per the stipulated terms. He obtains a series of extensions. Still  he doesn’t  deposit and  when the  vendor proposes to  cancel the  allotment, the  court is approached

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and it  stays the  cancellation. The vendor [D.D.A.] applies for  vacating   it  but   nothing  happens  except  repeated adjournments. This has happened more than once. We find that as and  when Skipper  was not  able to manage the D.D.A., he approached the court and it provided him a breather. He then gets time to manage the D.D.A.. This went on upto the end of 1990 when fortunately the Delhi High Court came with a tonne of bricks  upon Skipper  and which  order was  affirmed  two years’ later by this Court.      Ultimately, no  doubt, Skipper  has met its nemesis but meanwhile hundreds  of persons are cheated out of their hard earned monies;  their dreams  of owning a flat are shattered rudely.      All this means that each of us in this land should wake up to  his duty and try to live up to it. We do not think we need say more.      List the matter for further orders on July 16, 1996.                     *A  copy   of  this   Judgment  may   be                     communicated to  Mr.Justice  O.Chinnappa                     Reddy, a  former Judge of this Court, at                     the address,  Plot No.209, Jubilee Hills                     Cooperative  Housing   Society,  Jubilee                     Hills, Hyderabad  - 500033  within three                     days.