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PETITIONER: DELHI CLOTH & GENERAL MILLS CO. LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF M.P. AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT12/09/1995

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J) HANSARIA B.L. (J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR  283            1995 SCC  (6)  62  JT 1995 (7)   154        1995 SCALE  (5)435

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      By an  order dated  November 1,  1991  the  matter  was referred to  a Bench  of three  judges  since  an  important question of  law relating  interpretation of  20  A  of  the Prevention of  Food Adulteration  Act, 1954 [for short, ’the Act’] as amended by Act 49 of 1964 was raised.      The  admitted   facts  are   that  the   appellant   is manufacturer of  Vanaspati ghee. The position not in dispute is that one Laxmi Narain resident of Joura was found selling Vanaspati ghee. The Food Inspector had purchased the article of food  of 1500  grams from  Laxmi Narain on payment of the price. On  analysis by the Public Analyst as per his report, Ext.  P3,   it  was  found  to  have  been  adulterated.  In consequence, Laxmi  Narain was  prosecuted  for  an  offence under s.16 of the Act.      The article  was sold  on March  24, 1964.  On March 1, 1965 when  it was  brought to  the notice of the trial court that the  appellant is  the manufacturer  of the adulterated article of  food, the  learned Magistrate had issued summons to the  appellant under  s.20A of the Act. He questioned the jurisdiction of  the Magistrate to issue summons by filing a revision before  the Sessions  Court and  also in  the  High Court. He  was unsuccessful  before both  the courts  below. Thus, this appeal by special leave.      Learned counsel  for the  appellant  candidly  admitted that on  March 24,  1964, i.e., the date on which the sample of the  adulterated article of food was sold, the appellant- company could also be prosecuted for alleged adulteration of the article  of food.  But his contention is that during the course of  the trial,  it could not be proceeded against it. His emphasis  is that  the Magistrate has power, on the date when the  complaint was  lodged before him, to issue summons to the  manufacturer, but  the Magistrate  could not proceed during the  trial on  the premise  that  the  accused  Laxmi

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Narain is  only a  dealer of the appellant and that there is no material  that Laxmi  Narain is a vendee on behalf of the appellant vendor;  and as  the latter  is not  a vendor,  he could not  be jointly  tried.  We  find  no  force  in  this contention.      The punishing Section 16 (1) postulates that subject to the provisions of sub-section (1-A), if any person -      "(a) whether by  himself or by any other      person on his behalf, imports into India      or manufactures  for  sale,  or  stores,      sells or distributes any article of food      -      (1)  which  is  adulterated  within  the      meaning of sub-clause (m) of clause (ia)      of Section  2 or  misbranded with in the      meaning of  clause (ix)  of that section      or the sale of which is prohibited under      any provision  of this  Act or  any rule      made thereunder  or by  an order  of the      Food (Health) Authority;      he shall,  in addition to the penalty to      which  he   may  be   liable  under  the      provisions of  Section 6,  be punishable      with imprisonment for a term which shall      not be  less than  six months  but which      may extent to three years, and with fine      which  shall   not  be   less  than  one      thousand rupees;.....      Section  20-A   empowers  the   Court  to  implead  the manufacturer etc. and provides as under :      "where at  any time  during the trial of      any offence  under the  Act  alleged  to      have been  committed by  any person, not      being the  manufacturer, distributor  or      dealer of any article of food, the court      is satisfied,  on the  evidence  adduced      before  it,   that  such   manufacturer,      distributor or  dealer is also concerned      with that  offence, then, the court may,      notwithstanding  anything  contained  in      sub-section (3)  of s.319 of the Code of      Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or      in s.20  proceed against him as though a      prosecution had  been instituted against      him under s.20."                          (Emphasis supplied)      A reading of Section 20-A clearly indicates that during the course of the trial for any of the offence under the Act alleged to  have  been  committed  by  any  person,  if  the evidence  adduced   before  the  Court  discloses  that  the manufacturer, distributor  or dealer  is also concerned with that  offence,   then  the   Court   has   been   empowered, notwithstanding anything  contained in  sub-section  (3)  of s.319 of  the Code  of Criminal  Procedure (for  short, ’the Code’) to  treat as  if the manufacturer, distributor or the dealer is  being proceeded  against under  Section 20 of the Act, as  originally instituted  thereunder. The  concept  of vendor and  vendee is  known to civil law and passing of the title in  the goods  is alien  to  the  prosecution  for  an offence under  the Act.  It cannot, therefore, be introduced in a  trial for the offence under the Act. The Act advisedly made a  person who  sells adulterated article of food liable to be  prosecuted for  the offence  of adulteration  of  the article of  food. During  the trial  when it  comes  to  the notice of  the Magistrate,  from the  evidence adduced, that

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the manufacturer,  distributor or  dealer of that article of food, which  is the  subject matter of adulteration, is also concerned  with   the  offence,  then  the  court  has  been empowered to  proceed against such manufacturer, distributor or dealer  as if  prosecution has  initially been instituted against him  under Section  20 of  the  Act.  In  fact,  for general offences,  Section 319  (1) of the Code empowers the court where  during the  course of  enquiry or  trial of  an offence, if it appears from the evidence that any person not being accused  has committed  any  offence  for  which  such person could  be tried together with the accused, to proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed. In  view of  the language  of Section 20-A of the Act, whatever is contained in sub-section (3) of Section 319 of the Code, would not stand in the way of the Magistrate to proceed at  a trial  against any  person, i.e., the original accused and  against others  mentioned in  Section 20-A.  In other words,  joint trial for the same offence is permitted. The object  appears to  be  that  in  a  case  where  common evidence discloses  that the  manufacturer,  distributor  or dealer is  also concerned  with the  offence for  which  the prosecution was  launched against  a person  from  whom  the article of  food was  purchased, to  avoid  multiplicity  of prosecution  and  also  keeping  in  view  the  doctrine  of autrefois acquit  the Legislature  introduced s.20A  to have joint trial.      The further contention that Laxmi Narain being a dealer of the  appellant, Section  20A has  no application,  as  it speaks of trial of a person not being, inter alia, a dealer, has no  merit, as  the section  has mentioned about trial of commission of the offence by any person; and, if that person be not  the manufacturer, distributor or dealer, Section 20A permits trial  of such  manufacturer, distributor  or dealer also, along  with the  person already  before the court. So, the fact  that the  person being tried is a dealer would not make the section non-operational.      In these  circumstances, we  are of the view that there was no  embargo on  the Magistrate  during the  trial of the offence to  issue notice  to the  appellant manufacturer for holding joint trial.      The appeal  is accordingly  dismissed.  We  direct  the Magistrate, Ist Class Joura, Distt. Morena, M.P., to proceed with the  trial in  Crl. Case  No.117/64, pending before him expeditiously since it is a long pending case.