http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 8  

PETITIONER: DEJAPADA DAS AND ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/04/1980

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) SEN, A.P. (J)

CITATION:  1980 AIR 2031            1980 SCR  (3) 586  1980 SCC  (3) 412

ACT:      Coal Mines  (Nationalisation Amendment)  Act 1976  (Act No. LXVII  of 1976),  Sections 3(3)  and 4  scope of-Whether Section 3(3)  offends Article  14 of  the Constitution in as much as  in regard  to Coal Mines where mining is prohibited by that  provision the workmen are left in the cold while in regard to nationalised coal mines the workmen are taken care of and  benefits assured  Private managements whether deemed custodians   under    Section   5    of   the   Coal   Mines Nationalisations Act 1973.

HEADNOTE:      Dismissing the Writ Petitions, the Court, ^      HELD: 1. The provision contained in Section 3(3) of Act LXVII of 1976 is peremptory and the prohibition is mandatory because there  is punishment  provided for  contravention of that provision.  Breach of  Section 3(3)  is made punishable with imprisonment. The 1976 Act totally prohibits working of any coal  mines by  any agency  other than  those which have been set  out in Section 3(3). Surely, there is no authority for the  managements under  whom the present petitioners are alleged to  be workmen  to operate coal mines in the face of the prohibition  of the  1976 Act.  Even for granting leases and their  renewal by  the State itself, the frown and force of  the   law  stand  four  square  between  the  mines  and extraction of  coal by  any but  the agencies  specified  in section 3(3) of the 1976 Act [589F-G, 591A, B & C]      2. Investigation  of the  State or  intimation  by  the private managements  are obligatory  under  the  appropriate legislation  and  in  the  absence  of  any  intimation  the presumption is  that there are no such coal mines as are set up before  the Court.  What apparently  has been done, if at all, is  to do  what has been described as ’scratching’ that is surface  mining of coal bearing areas, destructive of the natural resources  of the nation without any thought for the morrow and  without any  reference to  the  planned,  phased programme of  exploitation of  coal for  the benefit  of the country in  the  public  sector.  The  mines,  if  any,  are illicitly being  operated, there  being no  sanction of  the law. It  is precisely  to prevent  this mischief of slaugter

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 8  

mining that  s.3(3) was  introduced and  s.4 was  enacted to make  the   activity   punishable.   The   proscription   is comprehensive and  the penalty  makes it imperative. When it is accepted  that it  is not  permissible to  operate  these mines save  by those  specified  in  the  1976  statute,  it necessarily follows  that workmen,  genuine or other, cannot claim any fundamental right to work these mines. [591D-G]      3. The  prohibition of  mining as  under s. 3(3) of the 1976 Act,  is in  the public interest and indeed, the scheme shows that wherever public interest requires exploitation of coal mines  it has  been permitted  in the public sector and even in  the private  sector so  far  as  certain  specified industries,  such   as  iron   and  steel   industries,  are concerned. The  ban is  part of a national policy, conceived for conservation of a vital national resource and the wisdom of the regulation of 587 fuel sources  and their  planned user  is  beyond  argument. Therefore, the  language of s. 3(3) is express, explicit and admits of  no exception.  An aware Court will not relax when the language  is peremptory, the legislation is charged with a critical  purpose  and  even  the  commiserative  case  of workmen-not wolves  in sheep’s clothing, cannot override the larger cause  of the nation. No nation, no workmen. [591G-H, 592A]      4. It  is audacious  for the  dubious managements under whom the  petitioners are supposed to be innocent workmen to represent to  the Court  that they  are "deemed  custodians" working on behalf of the Central Government. [592D-E]      Under section  S, notifications  are a sine qua non for custodianship, actual or deemed and absent such notification taking over  management no  private  agency  can  self-style itself as  "deemed custodian".  Therefore,  the  managements other than  those specified in section 3(3) of the 1976 Act, can not  claim to  extract coal from any coal mines. If this be so,  no one  can claim  as a  workman, although in public interest, although  it is  imperative  that  such  operation should stop. [593E-F]      5.  There   is  no  violation  of  Article  14  of  the Constitution vis-a-vis  the workmen  concerned assuming them to be  real workmen. After the dismissal of the management’s writ petitions,  the argument that the Act impugned is ultra vires vis  a vis workmen is a daring legal workmanship. If a larger Bench of this Court has already upheld the vires of a statute the  discovery of  a new  argument cannot invalidate that decision. That proposition will make the binding effect of precedents,  read in  the light  of Art.  141 a vanishing cream once a novel thought strikes a legal brain. [593F-H]      The question  of discrimination  between two classes of workmen hardly  arises because  one set  of mines  has  been closed down  validly.  If  the  closure  is  valid,  no  one employed there  has a right to force it open on the score of discrimination. Denial  of lay-off  or other benefits belong to a  different jurisdiction.  If  any  workmen  are  really aggrieved that  their interests  are not  protected and that their future is in jeopardy, it is certainly open to them to make  representation   to   the   Central   Government   for consideration of  their lot,  and certainly  a welfare State will give due consideration for such representation if it is satisfied that the grievance is genuine. [594A-B]      6. Section  3(3) of  the 1976  Act being  mandatory and having been  held constitutional  by this  Court, it  is  no longer permissible  for any  court in  India  to  appoint  a receiver or  otherwise permit  extraction of coal or cooling coal. [594D-E]

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 8  

JUDGMENT:      ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:  Writ Petition  Nos. 1311, 1269- 70, 1113,  1109, 1479-1480,  924-925, 1478, 1250-1251, 1219, 926-927, 1072-1076,  1565, 1652-1654, 1434-1435, 1648, 1306- 1310, 13121314,  1590-1591, 1588-1589  of 1979 and 400, 192, 448 and 462 of 1980.            (Under Article 32 of the Constitution)      A. K.  Sen and  S. K.  Sinha for  the Petitioners in WP Nos. 1306- 1314/79, 1434, 1113, 1109, 1250-1251, 1219, 1072- 1076, 1565, 1652-1654, 1435/79 and 192/80. 588      K. N.  Choubey and A. K. Srivastava for the Petitioners in WP  Nos. 1269-1270,  1590-1591, 1588-1589,  924-925, 926- 927/79.      M. P. Jha for the Petitioners in W.P. 1648/79.      A. K.  Ganguli, for  the Petitioner  in W.P. Nos. 1479- 1480/79.      Arun Madan for the Petitioners in W.P. No. 40()/80.      S. N. Jha for the Petitioners in W.P. No. 488/80.      K. N.  Choubey and  Mukul Mudgal for the Petitioners in W.P. 462/80.      Lal Narain Sinha Att. Genl., M. K. Banerjee Addl. Sol’. Genl., and  Miss A.  Subhashini for  the Respondent Union of India, Central  Coal Fields,  Easter Coal  Field in WP. Nos. 1307, 1310,  1312,  1314  and  Respondent  3  in  W.P.  Nos. 1308,1588, 1589, 1434, 1072-1076/79.      Lal Narain  Sinha Att.  Genl. and  U. P.  Singh for the Respondents, State  of Bihar  and Its officials in W.P. Nos. 1588-89, 1434,  1109,  924-925,  1250-1251,  926-927,  1219, 1250-1251, 1072,  1290-91, 1648, 1479-80, 1073-1074, 1565/79 and 400, 192, 488 and 462/80.      Lal Narain  Sinha Att.  Genl. and  Rathin Dass  for the Respondents (West  of Bengal)  in W.P. Nos. 1306-1314, 1073- 1074/79.      P. K.  Chatterjee for  the State of West Bengal in W.P. 1072/79.      A. K.  Srivastava for  the Caveator/Respondent No. 4 in W.P. Nos. 1652-1654 of 1979.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      KRISHNA  IYER,   J.  ’Survival   after  death’  is  the expression  that   aptly  describes   these  writ  petitions relating to  coal mining  by private  agencies long  after a prohibitory legislation and an order by this Court repelling the challenges  to the  vires of that Act. Parliament by the Coal Mines  (Nationalisation) Amendment  Act, 1976  (Act No. LXVII of  1976) (For short, the 1976 Act) totally prohibited all mining  of coal  save by instrumentalities set out in s. 3, sub s. (3) which we may excerpt here:           (3) on  and from  the commencement of Section 3 of      the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Amendment Act, 1976.-           (a) no person, other than-                (i)   the Central  Government or a Government                     company or  a corporation owned, managed                     or controlled by the Central Government,                     or 589                (ii) a  person to  whom a sub-lease, referred                     to in  the proviso  to cl. (c), has been                     granted by  any such Government, company                     or corporation, or                 (iii) a company engaged in the production of                     iron  and  steel  shall  carry  on  coal

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 8  

                   mining operation, in India, in any form;           (b)   excepting the  mining leases  granted before                such   commencement    in   favour   of   the                Government, company  or corporation, referred                to in  clause (a),  and any sub-lease granted                by   any    such   Government,   company   or                corporation, all other mining leases and sub-                leases  in   force  immediately  before  such                commencement, shall, in so far as they relate                to the  winning  or  mining  of  coal,  stand                terminated;           (c)   no lease for winning or mining coal shall be                granted in  favour of  any person  other than                the  Government,   company  or   corporation,                referred to in clause (a) .      Provided that the Government, company or corporation to whom a lease for winning or mining coal has been granted may grant a sublease to any person in any area on such terms and conditions as  may be  specified in  the instrument granting the sub-lease,  if the Government, company or corporation is satisfied that-           (i)   the reserves  of coal  in the  area  are  in                isolated small  pockets or are not sufficient                for scientific  and economical development in                a coordinated and integrated manner, and           (ii) the  coal produced  by the sub-lease will not                be required to be transported by rail. It is  obvious that  the provision  is  peremptory  and  the prohibition  is   mandatory  because   there  is  punishment provided for  contravention of  that provision. Section 4(1) of the  1976 Act  makes a  breach of s. 3(3) punishable with imprisonment.      This broad  spectrum ban in law arrested the extraction of coal  and was  naturally assailed  as ultra  vires by the managements themselves  in writ  petitions under  Art. 32. A bench of  seven judges  of  this  court  heard  erudite  and elaborate arguments,  at the end of which the writ petitions were dismissed.  But it  is not  unusual for  many litigants ’even though vanquished, to argue still’. Here, however, the challenge and  challenger are  of different colour. For, the petitioners before us 590 claim to  be workmen  who are  thrown out  of employment  on account of  the 1976  Act and lament in this Court that they are discriminated  against and  on that  score  the  law  is violative of  Art. 14  of the  Constitution.  The  plea  put forward is  that in   regard  to nationalised coal mines the workmen are  taken care of and their benefits assured, while in regard  to coal  mines where  mining is  prohibited by s. 3(3) of  the 1976 Act the workmen are left in the cold. This is stated  to be discrimination between workmen and workmen, thus contravening  the mandate  of equality  before the law. Maybe, the  writ missiles  of the  managements  proved  damp squibs but the workers undaunted by that rebuff, want to try a new  weapon of  ultra vires.  The  coal  will  go  to  the employers and the wages to the workers.      The Union  of India  resists this  relief and  contends that the writ petitioners are mere reincarnations of the old managements which  have fought and lost and are masquerading as workmen so as to facilitate a second challenge. The State asserts that  clandestine  coal  mining  mafia  having  been stopped, these  racketeers  are  playing  the  maricha  game through bogus  workers in   tears.  Without going  into  the merits of  this averment  we  may  state  that  every  other conceivable objection  to the  validity of  the 1976 Act and

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 8  

other sister  enactments had  been urged  in vain before the seven judges’ bench. Now the alleged workmen are complaining of  discriminatory  denial  of  benefits  to  one  class  of workers. The  Union of India counters this plea as factually a ruse  for clandestine  mining operations by management and legally a  second battle  after the  legal Waterloo,  hoping against hope that there is nothing to lose in a gamble. Even if a  spell of stay were got the gain will outweigh possible losses in litigation. Indeed, the State’s contention is that considerable losses to Government and traumatic consequences on the  nation are being daily inflicted by such clandestine operations. The  whole mischief contemplated by the 1976 Act is being  continued under  the guise  of invalidity  of  the legislation  and,  alternatively,  by  going  to  court  and getting receivers  appointed  so  that  a  legal  colour  is imparted to lawless depradations.      It is  true that  nationalisation of coal, as a policy, has been  evolved over  the seventies. In the beginning, the management of coal mines was taken over and at a later stage ownership itself  vested in  the Union of India by virtue of ownership  of   all   coal   mines   is   the   simple   and incontrovertible fact emerging from the bunch of legislation we have been taken through. We are not going into the catena of enactments  and their  sequence covering  this  question, because they  are being  discussed  in  greater  detail  and fuller depth  in the  comprehensive judgment  where  reasons have yet to be given but the result, by way 591 Of brief  order, has  already been  announced. Suffice it to say that the  1976 Act totally prohibits working of any coal mines by any agency other than those which have been set out in s.  3(3). Surely, there is  authority for the managements under whom the present petitioners are alleged to be workmen to operate  coal mines in the face of the prohibition in the 1976 Act. There is a point of dispute raised by the Union of India that  the managements  which have  come up before this Court do  not have  even leases under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957. This is controverted by the other side but we may side-step that issue because it is not  essential for  the decision  of this  case. For  one thing, no  such lease  is before  us. For  another, what  is relied on  in some  cases is hukumnamas which cannot do duty for leases.  Even granting  leases and  their renewal by the State itself  as is  asserted in  a few cases, the grown and force of  the law  stand four  square between  the mines and extraction of  coal by  any but  the agencies  specified  in s.3(3) of the 1976 Act.      It is  common ground  that there is no specification of the  coal   mines  in   question  in  the  schedule  to  the nationalisation  legislation  of  1973,  nor  is  there  any specific notification relating thereto. Investigation by the State  or   intimation  by   the  private   managements  are obligatory under  the appropriate  legislation  and  in  the absence of  any intimation-none has been produced before us- we have  to presume that these are no such coal mines as are set up  before us. What apparently has been done, it at all, is to  do what  has been  described as  ’scratching that  is surface mining  of coal  bearing areas,  destructive of  the natural resources  of the nation without any thought for the morrow and  without any  reference to  the  planned,  phased programme of  exploitation of  coal for  the benefit  of the country in  the public  sector. We are satisfied that on the materials placed before us in all these cases, the mines, if any, are  illicitly being  operated, there being no sanction of the  law. It  is precisely  to prevent  this mischief  of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 8  

slaughter mining  that s.  3(3) was  introduced and s. 4 was enacted to make the activity punishable. The proscription is comprehensive and  the penalty  makes it imperative. Once we accept the  position that  it is  not permissible to operate these mines  save by  those specified in the 1976 statute it necessarily follows  that workmen,  genuine or other, cannot claim  any  fundamental  right  to  work  these  mines.  The prohibition of  mining coal  except as  under s. 3(3) of the 1976 Act,  is in  the public interest and indeed, the scheme shows that wherever public interest requires exploitation of coal mines  it has  been permitted  in the public sector and even in  the private  sector so  far  as  certain  specified industries,  such   as  iron   and  steel   industries,  are concerned. The ban is part of a 592 national policy,  conceived  for  conservation  of  a  vital national resource  and the  wisdom of the regulation of fuel sources  and   their  planned   user  is   beyond  argument. therefore, the  language of s. 3(3) is express, explicit and admits of  no exception.  An aware court will not relax when the language  is peremptory, the legislation is charged with a critical  purpose and  even  the  commiserative  cause  of workmen-not wolves  in sheep’s  clothing. as  is  asserted,- cannot override the larger cause of the nation. No nation no workmen;      Assuming for a moment that the private managements are, as Dr.  Chitale and  Shri A. K. Sen urged, deemed custodians within the  scheme of  the legislative  take-over, they  are necessarily to  operate oh behalf and under the direction of the Central  Government.  Here  is  the  Central  Government protesting, as  stridently as  it can,  against  the  mining operations by  the alleged  mine-owners. Both  the State and Central Governments  are making common cause and demand that no deemed custodian need’ work any mine on their behalf. How can  a   surrogate  custodian  exceed  the  command  of  the principal to  stop mining  ? The  whole case of the Union of India is  that a  clandestine cluster  a sort  of coal mafia which may even have got sham registers of workmen-is defying Government and  extracting coal  on the sly. It is audacious for the  dubious managements,  under whom the petitioner are supposed to  be innocent  workmen, to represent to the court that they  are ’deemed custodians’, working on behalf of the Central Government.      Nor are  we prepared  to accept the naive case that the petitioners’ employers  can be regarded as deemed custodians under  s.   S.  We   may  read  s’.  S  of  the  Coal  Mines nationalisation Act, 1973.           5. Power  of Central  Government to direct vesting      of rights in a Government company:-           (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sections      3 and 4, the Central Government may, if it is satisfied      that a  Government company is willing to comply, or has      complied,  with  such  terms  and  conditions  as  that      Government may think fit to impose, direct, by an order      in writing,  the right,  title and interest of an owner      in relation  to a  coal mine  referred to in Section 3,      shall;  instead  of  continuing  vest  in  the  Central      Government, vest  in the  Government  company either on      the date  of publication  of the  direction or  on such      earlier or  later date  (not being  a date earlier than      the  appointed   day),  as  may  be  specified  in  the      direction. 593           (2) Where  the right,  title and  interest  of  an      owner in  relating to a coal mines vest in a Government

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 8  

    company under  sub-section (1),  the Government company      shall on  and from  the date of such vesting, be deemed      to have become the lessee in relation to such coal mine      as if  a mining  lease in relation to the coal mine had      been granted  to the  Government company and the period      of such lease shall be the entire period for which such      lease  could   have  been  granted  under  the  Mineral      Concession Rules; and all the rights and liabilities of      the Central  Government in  relation to  such coal mine      shall, on  and from the date of such vesting, be deemed      to   have    become   the   rights   and   liabilities,      respectively, of the Government company.           (3) The provisions of sub-section (2) of section 4      shall apply  to a  lease which  vests in  a  Government      company as  they apply to a lease vested in the Central      Government  and  references  therein  to  the  "Central      Government" shall  be construed  as references  to  the      Government company. D      The notification  required under  s. 5  authorising the mine  to   be  worked,   is  admittedly   absent.  No   such notification exists or has been hinted at or is existing. In the absence  of the relevant notification contemplated by s. 5, it  is impossible  to postulate  ’deemed  custodianship’. There are  scheduled mines  or  notified  mines,  under  the scheme of  statutory management  in the Management Take-over Act. Notifications  are a  sine sua  non for custodian-ship, actual or  deemed and  absent such  notification taking over management no private agency can self-style itself as deemed custodian. It  follows that  on any  view of  the matter the managements other  than those specified under s. 3(3) of the 1976 Act  can claim  to extract coal from any coal mines. If this conclusion is sound, as we have demonstrated it is, the inference is  irresistible that  no one can claim to extract coal as  a workman,  although  in  public  interest,  it  is imperative that  such operation  should stop.  We hold  that there is no violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution, vis-a- vis is  the workmen  concerned  assuming  them  to  be  real workmen. We  have grave  doubts about  the veracity  of this piece of workmanship that the petitioner and others of their ilk are  actual, not  imaginary. Anyway, after the dismissal of the  managements’ writ  petitions, the  argument that the Act impugned  is ultra  vires vis  a vis workmen is a daring legal workmanship.  If a  larger bench  of  this  Court  has already upheld the vires of a statute the discovery of a new argument cannot  invalidate that  decision. That proposition will make  the binding  effect of  precedents, read  in  the light of  Art. 141,  a vanishing  cream once a novel thought strikes a legal brain. 594      The question  of discrimination  between two classes of workmen hardly  arises because  one set  of mines  has  been closed down  validly.  If  the  closure  is  valid,  no  one employed there  has a right to force it open on the score of discrimination. Denial  of lay-off  or other benefits belong to a  different jurisdiction.  If  any  workmen  are  really aggrieved that  their interests  are not  protected and that their future is in jeopardy, it is certainly open to them to make  representation   to   the   Central   Government   for consideration of  their lot,  and certainly  a welfare State will give due consideration for such representation if it is satisfied that  he grievance is genuine. We dismiss the Writ Petition with costs.      It has been mentioned on more than one occasion in this court that  interlocutory  orders  have  been  passed,  that Receivers have  been appointed  by civil  courts,  including

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 8  

High Courts,  and that working of mines is licitly going on. In the face of the all-pervasive statutory prohibition which is peremptory  in language and punishable in consequence, it is surprising  that any  Receiver could  at all dare to work mines. While  we disapprove  of  that  conduct  we  make  it perfectly plain  that there will be no more sanction for any receiver or other officer of court to extract coal or coking coal from  any mine  in India.  Section 3(3) of the 1976 Act being mandatory  and having been held constitutional by this Court, it is no longer permissible for any court in India to appoint a receiver or otherwise permit extraction of coal or cooking coal. We vacate all interim orders forthwith      It may  be fair  to the learned Attorney General, whose hunch we  share to  state that this wealth of "workers" writ petitions is a kind of litigative puppetry, the illicit mine exploiters being  the puppetteers  and those  who figure  as worker petitioners being the puppets. S.R.                                    Petitions dismissed. 595