DEHAL SINGH Vs STATE OF H.P.
Bench: HARJIT SINGH BEDI,CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, , ,
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001215-001215 / 2005
Diary number: 4287 / 2005
Advocates: S. CHANDRA SHEKHAR Vs
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Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1215 OF 2005
DEHAL SINGH …. APPELLANT
Versus
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH .... RESPONDENT
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1216 OF 2005
DINESH KUMAR …. APPELLANT
Versus
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH .... RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
Chandramauli Kr. Prasad, J.
1. Both the appeals arise out of the same judgment and as
such they were heard together and are being disposed of by
this common judgment.
2. The case unfolded by the prosecution and accepted by
both the Courts i.e. trial and appellate Court is that on 18th
October, 2002 at 9.20 A.M. PW.16, Brijesh Sood, Station House
Officer, Police Station Sundernagar along with PW.8, Madan
Lal, Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police and other Police
personnel were present for a routine-check at Lalit Chowk at
Sundernagar in the District of Mandi. Brijesh Sood received a
secret information that a car bearing Registration No.HP-34-
7700 is coming from Mandi side in which two persons are
carrying huge quantity of ‘Charas’. The aforesaid information
was reduced into writing and intimation to the said effect was
sent to the Additional Superintendent of Police, Mandi. At
about 10 A.M., one Maruti Esteem car bearing Registration
No.HP-34-7700 came from Mandi side which was stopped by
PW.16, Brijesh Sood and he found two persons sitting in the
car, including the driver. Brijesh Sood made enquiry from the
person who was driving the car and he disclosed his name as
Dehal Singh (appellant in Criminal Appeal No.1215 of 2005)
and the other person sitting on the front seat by the side of the
driver-seat, disclosed his name as Dinesh Kumar, resident of
Goa (appellant in Criminal Appeal No.1216 of 2005). Brijesh
Sood gave option in writing to the accused persons, whether
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they want to give personal search or search of the vehicle before
a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer. Both the appellants gave
their consent for being searched by him. Accordingly PW.16,
Brijesh Sood searched the car and luggage lying inside the car
but nothing incriminating was found either in the car or the
luggage. A mechanic was called by PW.3, Churamani, who
opened the shields of the windows/doors when packets of
brown colour were found concealed between the shields and
doors wrapped with black and red adhesive tape. On opening
the packets, ‘Charas’ in the shape of stick and chappatis was
detected. Churamani was asked by PW.16, Brijesh Sood to
bring weighing scale and weight. He brought the weighing scale
from the grocery shop of PW.5, Ram Lal and on weightment 27
Kg. 800 gms. of Charas was found. Two samples of 50 grams
each were taken out after mixing the entire charas. It was duly
sealed.
3. Appellant, Dehal Singh produced the registration
certificate along with driving licence and other papers
concerning the vehicle. The appellants and seized Charas
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along with samples were taken to the Police Station where the
personal search of the appellants was conducted. The
samples of the Charas and other articles recovered from the
personal search of the appellants were deposited with PW.8,
Additional Malkhana Head Constable, Rajinder Kumar for safe
custody. First Information Report was thereafter drawn and a
special report sent to the Superintendent of Police. PW.8,
Rajinder Kumar sent one parcel of the sample to the Chemical
Examiner, who in his report opined that it contained Charas.
After usual investigation charge-sheet was submitted against
the two appellants and ultimately they were put on trial. They
pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. The prosecution in support of its case has all together
examined 16 witnesses besides various other documentary
evidence were also brought on record. In their statements,
under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure appellants
pleaded false implication and both of them have stated that the
appellant, Dinesh Kumar had taken lift in the car from Kullu to
Delhi.
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5. On appreciation of the evidence the trial court held both
the appellants guilty under Section 20 of Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and sentenced them to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10 years each
and to pay a fine of Rs.1,00,000/- each and in default of
payment of fine to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a further
period of four years.
6. Appellants preferred separate appeals against the
judgment and order of conviction and sentence and the High
Court of Himachal Pradesh by its common judgment dated
18th October, 2004 passed in Criminal Appeal Nos. 600 and
603 of 2003 dismissed both the appeals.
7. Both the appellants assail the aforesaid order by grant of
special leave to appeal.
8. Mr. Nagendra Rai, learned Senior Counsel appears on
behalf of the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.1215 of 2005,
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whereas appellant in Criminal Appeal No.1216 of 2005 is
represented by Mr. P.S. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel.
9. Mr. Rai submits that according to the prosecution two
samples of 50 gms. each were taken and sent to the Forensic
Science Laboratory for examination, but net weight of the
sample received in the laboratory was 65.5606 gms. This
discrepancy in weight of sample, in the submission of Mr. Rai,
casts serious doubt to the credibility of the prosecution case
and this is enough to reject the case of the prosecution.
Credibility of the recovery proceedings, in his submission is
eroded if the quantity found by the analyst is more than the
quantity sealed and sent to him. He points out that taking
into consideration the discrepancy in the weight of the
samples at the time when it was taken and in the laboratory,
this Court in the case of Noor Aga vs. State of Punjab and
another, 2008(16) SCC 417, held the case of the prosecution
to be not trustworthy. Our attention has been drawn to
paragraph 97 of the judgment which reads as follows:
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“97. The fate of these samples is not disputed. Although two of them were kept in the malkhana along with the bulk, but were not produced. No explanation has been offered in this regard. So far as the third sample, which allegedly was sent to the Central Forensic Science Laboratory, New Delhi is concerned, it stands admitted that the discrepancies in the documentary evidence available have appeared before the court, namely:
(i) While original weight of the sample was 5 gm, as evidenced by Exts. PB, PC and the letter accompanying Ext. PH, the weight of the sample in the laboratory was recorded as 8.7 gm.
(ii) Initially, the colour of the sample as recorded was brown, but as per the chemical-examination report, the colour of powder was recorded as white.”
(underlining ours)
10. Reliance has also been placed on a decision of this Court
in the case of Rajesh Jagdamba Avasthi vs. State of Goa,
2005(9) SCC 773, and our attention has been drawn to
paragraph 14 of the judgment which reads as follows:
“14. We do not find it possible to uphold this finding of the High Court. The appellant was charged of having been found in possession of charas weighing 180.70 gm. The charas recovered from him was packed and sealed in two envelopes. When the said envelopes were opened in the laboratory by the Junior Scientific Officer, PW 1, he found the quantity to be different. While in one envelope the difference was only minimal, in the other the difference in weight was significant. The High Court itself found that it could not be described as a mere minor discrepancy. Learned counsel rightly submitted before us that the High Court was not justified in upholding the conviction of the appellant on the basis of what was recovered only from envelope A ignoring the quantity of charas found in envelope B. This is
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because there was only one search and seizure, and whatever was recovered from the appellant was packed in two envelopes. The credibility of the recovery proceeding is considerably eroded if it is found that the quantity actually found by PW 1 was less than the quantity sealed and sent to him. As he rightly emphasised, the question was not how much was seized, but whether there was an actual seizure, and whether what was seized was really sent for chemical analysis to PW 1. The prosecution has not been able to explain this discrepancy and, therefore, it renders the case of the prosecution doubtful.”
11. We do not find any substance in the submission of Mr.
Rai and the decisions relied on are clearly distinguishable. The
vehicle was intercepted and searched on a highway and it has
come in the evidence of PW.16, Brijesh Sood that he had sent
PW.3, Churamani to bring weighing scale and weight from the
grocery shop of PW.5, Ram Lal. From the evidence of PW.3,
Churamani and PW.5, Ram Lal, the grocery shop owner it is
evident that the weighing scale and the weight came from the
grocery shop. It is common knowledge that weighing scale and
weight kept in the grocery-shop are not of such standard
which can weigh articles with great accuracy and therefore
difference of 15 gms. in weight, in the facts and circumstances
of this case, is not of much significance. Sample was taken by
a common weighing scale and weight found in a grocery shop,
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whereas the weight in the laboratory recorded with precision
scale. This would be evident from the fact that the weight of
the sample recorded in the laboratory was 65.5606 gms. In
this background, small difference in weight loses its
significance, when one finds no infirmity in other part of the
prosecution story.
12. Now referring to the decision of this Court in the case of
Noor Aga (supra) the difference in the weight at the time of
taking samples and at the laboratory was considered material
as in the said case the sample was taken by the Custom
Officials at the Airport and the Court came to the conclusion
that weight was taken from a precision scale. Further it is not
only the discrepancy in the weight which led this Court to
reject the case of the prosecution but had taken into
consideration several other discrepancies to come to the said
conclusion. This shall be evident from paragraph 98 of the
judgment, which reads as follows:
“98. We are not oblivious of the fact that a slight difference in the weight of the sample may not be held to be so crucial as to disregard the entire
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prosecution case as ordinarily an officer in a public place would not be carrying a good scale with him. Here, however, the scenario is different. The place of seizure was an airport. The officers carrying out the search and seizure were from the Customs Department. They must be having good scales with them as a marginal increase or decrease of quantity of imported articles whether contraband or otherwise may make a huge difference under the Customs Act.”
13. Further in the said case it has been observed that
discrepancy in weight individually may not be fatal. It is apt
to reproduce paragraph 119 (3) and (4) of the said judgment in
this regard:
119. Our aforementioned findings may be summarised as follows:
1. xxx xxx xxx xxx 2. xxx xxx xxx xxx
3. There are a large number of discrepancies in the treatment and disposal of the physical evidence. There are contradictions in the statements of official witnesses. Non-examination of independent witnesses and the nature of confession and the circumstances of the recording of such confession do not lead to the conclusion of the appellant’s guilt.
4. Finding on the discrepancies, although if individually examined, may not be fatal to the case of the prosecution but if cumulative view of the scenario is taken, the prosecution’s case must be held to be lacking in credibility.
5. xxx xxx xxx xxx 6. xxx xxx xxx xxx”
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14. Now, we proceed to consider the decision of this Court in
the case of Rajesh Jagdamba Awasthi (supra) relied on by
the appellants and find the same clearly distinguishable. In
the said case on fact the Court found the recovery proceeding
to be suspicious and further there was every possibility of the
seized substance tampered. Those infirmities led this Court to
doubt the truthfulness of the prosecution case. This is evident
from paragraph 15 of the judgment which reads as follows:
“15. This is not all. We find from the evidence of PW 4 that he had taken the seal from PSI Thorat and after preparing the seizure report, panchnama, etc. he carried both the packets to the police station and handed over the packets as well as the seal to Inspector Yadav. According to him on the next day, he took back the packets from the police station and sent them to PW 3 Manohar Joshi, Scientific Assistant in the Crime Branch, who forwarded the same to PW 1 for chemical analysis. In these circumstances, there is justification for the argument that since the seal as well as the packets were in the custody of the same person, there was every possibility of the seized substance being tampered with, and that is the only hypothesis on which the discrepancy in weight can be explained. The least that can be said in the facts of the case is that there is serious doubt about the truthfulness of the prosecution case.”
15. Mr. Rai, then submits that though option was given to the
appellant to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or nearest
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Magistrate but they were not apprised of their right to be
searched in their presence and hence the procedure followed
does not fulfill the requirement of Section 50 of Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to
as the “Act’”). He emphasized that accused is not to be given an
option to be searched in the presence of the Gazetted Officer or
Magistrate but to be apprised of his right to be searched in their
presence. According to him conveying option and apprising the
right are distinct. According to him, this does not satisfy the
mandate of Section 50 of the Act and once its violation is
established the search and seizure is rendered illegal and on
this ground alone appellants’ conviction is vitiated. He points
out that the Charas was not recovered from the possession of
the appellants but from the vehicle, but nonetheless appellants
were also searched and thus it was obligatory to follow the
provisions of Section 50 of the Act. He finds support to the
aforesaid submission from the decision of this Court in the case
of Dilip and another vs. State of M.P., 2007 (1) SCC 450,
and our attention has been drawn to paragraph 16 of the
judgment which reads as follows:
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“16.In this case, the provisions of Section 50 might not have been required to be complied with so far as the search of scooter is concerned, but keeping in view the fact that the person of the appellants was also searched, it was obligatory on the part of PW 10 to comply with the said provisions. It was not done.”
16. This submission of Mr. Rai does not commend us at all.
In the present case the vehicle was searched and the Charas
was recovered from the vehicle and persons of the appellants
were not searched. As the recovery has been from the vehicle
the provision of Section 50 of the Act, in our opinion, was not
required to be complied with. It is relevant here to mention
that appellants were not searched at the place where the
vehicle was intercepted and searched but after they were
arrested, and brought to the Police Station, their search was
made to find out the articles possessed by them before lodging
them in lock-up.
17. Not only this, the prosecution has also claimed
compliance of Section 50 of the Act. Section 50(1) of the Act,
which is relevant for the purpose, reads as follows:-
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50. Conditions under which search of persons shall be conducted.(1) When any officer duly authorised under Section 42 is about to search any person under the provisions of Section 42 or Section 43, he shall, if such person as requires, take such person without unnecessary delay to the nearest Gazetted Officer of any of the departments mentioned in Section 42 or to the nearest Magistrate.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
18. From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision it is
evident that it comes into play only when search of a person
other than vehicle etc. is taken. Further the authorized officer
is to apprise person about to be searched to be taken to the
nearest Gazetted Officer or to the Magistrate, if the person
about to be searched so requires. Such an option was given to
the appellants and, in our opinion, it is nothing but apprising
them of their right. Option to choose is given to an accused
when he has right to choose. It is communication of right
either to accept or reject. Therefore, in our opinion giving the
appellants option to be searched satisfied the requirement of
Section 50 of the Act. In the case of Dilip (supra) relied on by
the appellants the question which fell for consideration was as
to whether Section 50 of the Act if at all required to be
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complied with and in the background of the fact that before
search and seizure of the contraband from the scooter,
personal search of the accused was carried out, this Court
held that it was so required. This would be evident from
paragraph 12 of the judgment which reads as follows:
“12.Before seizure of the contraband from the scooter, personal search of the appellants had been carried out and, admittedly, even at that time the provisions of Section 50 of the Act, although required in law, had not been complied with.”
19. In the present case, as observed earlier, the vehicle was
searched at the first instance and therefore there was no
requirement at all to inform the appellants their right to be
searched in the presence of the Gazetted Officer or Magistrate.
Not only this, we have found that by giving option the
appellants were apprised of their right and therefore the
provision of Section 50 of the Act was fully complied with.
20. Mr. P.S. Mishra while adopting the submission advanced
by Mr. Rai, has made an additional submission. He contends
that appellant Dinesh Kumar cannot be held to be in
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conscious possession of the Charas as he had taken lift in the
vehicle and he was not aware of the fact that Charas was
being transported in the vehicle. In this connection he had
referred to the statements of the appellants recorded under
Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Both of them
had specifically pleaded that this appellant had taken lift in
the car. According to Mr. Mishra if this explanation is
accepted, this appellant deserves to be acquitted.
21. We do not find any substance in this submission of Mr.
Mishra. Statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure is taken into consideration to appreciate the
truthfullness or otherwise of the case of prosecution and it is
not an evidence. Statement of an accused under Section 313 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure is recorded without
administering oath and, therefore, said statement cannot be
treated as evidence within the meaning of Section 3 of the
Evidence Act. Appellants have not chosen to examine any other
witness to support this plea and in case none was available they
were free to examine themselves in terms of Section 315 of the
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Code of Criminal Procedure which, inter alia, provides that a
person accused of an offence is a competent witness of the
defence and may give evidence on oath in disproof of the
charges. There is reason not to treat the statement under
Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as evidence as
the accused cannot be cross-examined, with reference to those
statements. However, when an accused appears as witness in
defence to disproof the charge, his version can be tested by his
cross-examination. Therefore, in our opinion the plea of the
appellant Dinesh Kumar that he had taken lift in the car is not
fit to be accepted only on the basis of the statements of the
appellants under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
22. Both the appellants have been found travelling in the car
from which Charas was recovered and, therefore, they were in
possession thereof. They were knowing each other. They were
not travelling in a public transport vehicle. Distinction has to
be made between accused travelling by public transport
vehicle and private vehicle. It needs no emphasis that to bring
the offence within the mischief of Section 20 of the Act
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possession has to be conscious possession. Section 35 of the
Act recognizes that once possession is established the Court
can presume that the accused had a culpable mental state,
meaning thereby conscious possession. Further the person
who claims that he was not in conscious possession has to
establish it. Presumption of conscious possession is further
available under Section 54 of the Act, which provides that
accused may be presumed to have committed the offence
unless he accounts for satisfactorily the possession of
contraband. The view which we have taken finds support from
a judgment of this Court in the case of Madan Lal and
another vs. State of H.P., 2003 (7) SCC 465, wherein it has
been held as follows:
“26. Once possession is established, the person who claims that it was not a conscious possession has to establish it, because how he came to be in possession is within his special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory recognition of this position because of the presumption available in law. Similar is the position in terms of Section 54 where also presumption is available to be drawn from possession of illicit articles.
27. In the factual scenario of the present case, not only possession but conscious possession has been
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established. It has not been shown by the accused- appellants that the possession was not conscious in the logical background of Sections 35 and 54 of the Act.”
23. Thus we do not find any merit in these appeals and they
are dismissed accordingly.
………..………………………………….J. ( HARJIT SINGH BEDI )
……………………………………………J. (CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)
New Delhi, August 31, 2010.
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