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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  4092-4095 of 2002

PETITIONER: Deewan Singh & Ors.                                             \005Appellants

RESPONDENT: Rajendra Pd. Ardevi & Ors.                                        \005Respondents

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/01/2007

BENCH: S.B. Sinha & Markandey Katju

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 4076-4079 OF 2002 CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 4081-4084 OF 2002 CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 4086-4089 OF 2002

S.B. SINHA, J.                  Management of a temple known as Shri Rikhabdevji situated in the  village Dhulev near 40 miles away from Udaipur in Rajasthan is involved in  these appeal which arise out of judgments and orders dated 18.09.1997 and  06.02.2002 passed by the High Court of Rajasthan.

       Indisputably, the matter came up for consideration on an earlier  occasion before this Court in State of Rajasthan and Others v. Shri Sajjanlal  Panjawat and Others since reported in [(1974) 1 SCC 500].

       It is furthermore not in dispute that at one point of time the  management of the said temple was taken over by the Maharana of Mewar.  We need not go into the history of the said temple, as the same has been  noticed by this Court in the earlier round of litigations,.  The properties of  the said temple vested in the State of Rajasthan as the State of Mewar  merged with other princely States forming the United State of Rajasthan on  18.04.1948.  Various directions were issued by the Government of Rajasthan  in relation to the management of the said temple from time to time.   

       The legislature of the State of Rajasthan enacted Rajasthan Public  Trust Act, 1959 (for short "the Act").  Chapter I to IV thereof came into  force on 22.10.1959.  In exercise of its rule making power contained in  Section 76 of the Act, the State of Rajasthan framed Rules known as the  Rajasthan Public Trusts Rules, 1962 which came into force on and from  11.06.1962.  Chapter V to X and XII of the Act as also the Rules applicable  in relation thereto were brought into operation with effect from 1.07.1962.   

       Questioning the validity of some of the provisions of the Act  including Sections 52(1)(d) and 53 thereof, some members belonging to  Swetambers Jain sect filed a writ petition before the Rajasthan High Court  which was marked as writ petition No. 501 of 1962 praying inter alia for the  following reliefs:

(i)     The State of Rajasthan and its officers be restrained from enforcing  certain provisions of the Act and declare those provisions void,  

(ii)    Restrain the State and its officers from selling gold and silver  ornaments of temple and advancing loan from temple fund,

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(iii)   Restrain the respondents from carrying out management of the  temple and allow the petitioners to manage the temple according to  declaration of Samwat 1934.   

       Digambers filed an intervention application therein inter alia  contending that the said temple was a Digamber temple.

       The stand of the State of Rajasthan therein inter alia was that the  temple in question was a Hindu temple and not a Jain temple although the  Jains have the right of worship.  It was furthermore contended that the  temple belonged to the erstwhile State of Mewar and as such its  management vested in the State.

       Validity of some of the provisions of the Act were also questioned in  the said proceedings. The High Court of Rajasthan, however, in its judgment  dated 30.03.1966 held:

(i)     Temple of Shri Rikhabdevji is a Jain Temple of Shwetamber Jain  sect. (ii)    After merger of State of Mewar, the management of temple was  carried on by the Devasthan Deptt. of State and Committee  constituted by the erstwhile Ruler of Mewar became defunct.   (iii)   The temple vested in the State under Section 52(1) (a) and (c) of  the Act. (iv)    The State should take early steps to transfer the management to a  Committee as envisaged under Section 53 of the Act.  

       The matter came up before this Court, as noticed hereinbefore,  wherein this Court opined:

(i)     Shri Rikhabdevji Temple is a Jain temple not a Hindu Temple. (ii)    The management of the temple is vested in the State of Rajasthan. (iii)   If the State intends to apply Chapter X to the temple, it is for it to  include it in the list under Section 52(2) of the Act. Section 53  postulates the application of Chapter X for the vesting of  management in a Committee to be constituted by the State  Government.   (iv)    Chairman and members in the Committee of Management should  be appointed from the trustees or persons of the section of  denomination to which trust belongs.  (v)     High Court’s direction to constitute a Committee from  Management set aside.    

       When the Committee of Management, however, was not constituted  within a reasonable time, Swetambers again filed a writ petition bearing No.  S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 21 of 1981 before the Rajasthan High Court  inter alia contending that as the State having regard to the provisions  contained in Sections 52 and 53 of the Act exercises power coupled with  duties, the failure to publish the list and to constitute a Committee would  amount to dereliction of duties on its part.  In the said writ petition it was  prayed for:

(i)     To issue a Mandamus directing the State Government to issue a list  of public trusts under Section 52(2) of the Act and to constitute a  Committee for management  in terms of Section 53 of the Act. (ii)    To issue a suitable writ or direction to quash the order dated  29.9.1979 restraining the State from changing the denominational  character of the temple.      

       The State in its affidavit in opposition filed in the said proceedings  reiterated its position that the temple was a Hindu temple.

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       Although it had not been brought to the notice of the High Court but  now it stands admitted that the State in exercise of its power conferred upon  it under Section 52 of the Act notified the said temple vested in the State as a  self-supporting temple by a notification dated 25.06.1981 in the following  terms:

"No. F.8 (12) General/Dev/79/8550 :- In pursuance  to State Governments order no 21/781/R/JU/1/79,  dated 14-03-80 and same numbered page dated 17- 5-80 and letter no. 14 (3) Khan/Group \026 2/80 dated  7-1-81, the general public is hereby notified with,  list of temples and institutions managed and  controlled by Devasthanam Department,  Rajasthan, is being classified under those which  are in direct management, those which are self  sufficient and those which are handed  over(committed) to the State, on the basis of  available records and survey done till date.  All  properties of above classified temples and  institutions have vested in the State Government.   If any person or institutions, without the sanction  of the State Government, takes possession in any  manner or transfers or sells or mortages or gets  registered under the provisions of the Rajasthan  Public trusts Act, 1959 any temple or institutions  notified under this notification will be deemed to  be illegal.  If any person has any information in  respect of any temple or institutions, other than  notified but belonging to the State may inform the  Devastaham Commissioner in that regard, because  enquiry in respect of the temples belonging to the  erstwhile State of Jaipur and Jodhpur is in  progress.

***                     ***                     *** Schedule \026 B List of self sufficient temples and institutions  managed and controlled by Devasthanam  Department C Name of  temple Address Place District 1 2 3 4 5 ***                     ***                     *** 30. Temple of  Shri  Rikhabdevji Vill-Dhuleva Vill-Dhuleva Udaipur"

       It appears that thereafter Digambers also filed a writ petition on  19.04.1983 which was marked as S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2247 of 1983

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for the following reliefs:

(i)     To declare that Shri Rikhabdevji temple is a Digamber Jain temple.   (ii)     The State be directed to publish a list of trusts under Section 52  (2) of the Act and consequently constitute a Committee for  management of Digambers.    

       In its counter-affidavit, however, the State agreed to carry out its  obligations under the Act as also the directions of this Court and the High  Court.   

       By a judgment and order dated 5.02.1997, a learned Single Judge of  the High Court inter alia directed the State:

(i)     to publish list of trusts under 52(2) of the Act. (ii)    to hold inquiry under Rule 36 to determine denominational  character of the temple.   (iii)   after completion of inquiry within 3 months, to constitute   Committee for management under Section 53 of the Act.  

       The Division Bench of the High Court by reason of the impugned  judgment dated 18.09.1997 while affirming the said directions made certain  modifications in regard to constitution of Committee leaving the matter at  the discretion of the State Government opining Sections 52 and 53 of the Act  confers such discretion to it.   

       Review petitions filed thereagainst have been dismissed by judgment  and order dated 06.02.2002.

       There are four sets of appeals before us.

       The first set of appeals, viz., Civil Appeal Nos. 4092-4095, has been  filed by the Swetamber Jain sect and is directed against the judgment of the  Division Bench of the High Court dated 18.09.1997.  The second set of  appeals, viz., Civil Appeal Nos. 4086-4089 of 2002, has also been filed by  the Swetamber Jain sect and is directed against the order of the Division  Bench of the High Court dismissing the review petitions filed against the  judgment and order dated 18.09.1997.

       The third set of appeals, viz., Civil Appeal Nos. 4081-4084 of 2002, is  at the instance of the State Government against the judgment and order dated  18.09.1997.  The fourth set of appeals, viz., Civil Appeal Nos. 4076-4079 of  2002, is filed by the Digamber Jain sect against the judgment and order  dated 18.09.1997.

       It is furthermore not in dispute that another notification has been  issued on 5.12.1997 by the State under Section 52 of the Act in obedience of  the order of the Division Bench of the High Court stating: "No. F 14(17)Dev/82: Pursuant to the judgment  dated 18.9.97 passed by the Hon’ble Rajasthan  High Court, Jodhpur in DB (Civil) Special Appeal  No. 663/97 \026 State versus Veerchand Seroiya and  513/97 \026 State versus Shrieyas Prasad and others  and under Section 52 of Chapter X of the  Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959, it is necessary  that a list of registered public trusts having a gross  annual income of Rs. 10,000 or more have to be  published in the Rajasthan Gazette within a period  of three months.

Therefore the list of such Registered Public Trusts  and Trusts Managed and Controlled by the

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Devasthan Department under direct charge, self- supporting, supurgisreni which are handed over to  the Government is published under: ***             ***             *** Chapter KA Temples controlled and managed by the Devastan  Department C Name of  temple Address Place District ***                     ***                     *** 30. Shri  Rikhabdevji Gram Dhule Gram Dhule Udaipur"

       Although, as noticed hereinbefore, the High Court directed the State  of Rajasthan to issue notifications in terms of Section 52 of the Act, having  regard to the fact that such notifications have since been issued and  published in the official gazette, in our opinion, it is not necessary to dilate  on the question as to whether the judgment of the High Court to the  aforementioned effect was correct or not.

       The Act was enacted to regulate and to make better provision for the  administration of public religious and charitable trusts in the State of  Rajasthan.  The management of the said trust is to be vested in the  Devasthan Commissioner constituted under Section 7 of the Act which is in  the following terms:

"7. Devasthan Commissioner-(1) The State  Government shall, by notification in the official  Gazette, appoint an officer to be called the  Devasthan Commissioner who, in addition to other  duties and functions imposed on him by or under  the provisions of this Act or any other law for the  time being in force, shall, subject to the general  and special orders of the State Government,  superintend the administration and carry out the  provisions of this Act throughout the territories to  which this Act extends.   

(2)     The Commissioner shall be a corporation  sole by the name of "Devasthan Commissioner of  the State of Rajasthan", shall as such have  perpetual succession and a common seal and may  sue and be sued in his corporate name."     

       Section 17 provides for registration of public trusts.  Section 18  provides for inquiry about registration.  Sections 52 and 53 of the Act read  as under:

"52. Application of chapter.-(1) The provisions  contained in this Chapter shall apply to every  public trust-

(a)     which vests in the State Government, or (b)     which is maintained at the expense of the  State Government, or  (c)     which is managed directly by the State

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Government, or  (d)     which is under the superintendence of the  Court of Wards, or (e)     of which the gross annual income is ten  thousand rupees or more.         

(2)     The State Government shall, as soon as may  be after the commencement of this chapter, publish  in the official Gazette a list of the public trusts to  which this Chapter applies and may by like  notification and in like manner add to or vary such  list.

53.     Management of public trusts  to which this  Chapter applies \026 (1)     As from such date as the State Government  may appoint in this behalf, the management of a  public trust to which this Chapter applies shall  notwithstanding any thing contained in any  provision of this Act or in any law, custom or  usage, vest in a committee of management to be  constituted by the State Government in the manner  hereinafter provided and the State Government  may appoint different dates for different public  trusts for the purpose of this section.

(2)     On or before the date fixed under sub- section (1) in respect of a public trust, the State  Government shall, subject to the provision  contained in section 54 constitute by notification in  the official Gazette a committee of management  thereof under such name as may be specified in the  notification; and such committee shall be deemed  to be the working trustee of the said public trust  and its endowment:

Provided that upon the combined request of the  trustees of, and persons interested in several public  trusts representing the same religion or persuasion,  the State Government may constitute a committee  of management for all of them, of their  endowments are situated in the same city, town or  locality.  

(3)     Every committee of management constituted  under sub-section (2) shall be a body corporate  having perpetual succession and a common seal,  with power to acquire, hold and dispose of  property subject to such conditions and restrictions  as may be prescribed and may by the name  specified in the notification under sub \026section (2)  sue and be sued.   

(4)     A committee of management shall consist of  a chairman and such even number of members, not  exceeding ten and not less than two as, the State  Government may determine.   

(5)     The Chairman and members of a committee  of management shall be appointed by the State  Government by notification in the  Official Gazette  from amongst-   

(a)     trustees of public trusts representing the  same religion or persuasion and having the same

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objects, and  

(b)     persons interested in such public trusts or in  the endowments   thereof or belonging to the  denomination for the purpose of  which  or for the  benefit of whom the trust was founded,   

in accordance with the general wishes of the  persons so interested so far as such wishes can be  ascertained in the prescribed manner :

Provided that in the case of a public trust having a  hereditary trustee, such trustee, and in the case of a  math, the head thereof, shall be the Chairman of  the committee of management, if he is willing to  serve as such."

       Section 77 provides for exemption from the application of the  provisions of the Act in the following terms:

"Exemption-(1) Nothing contained in this Act  shall apply to a public trust administered by any  agency acting under the control of the State  Government or by any local authority.

(2) The State Government may exempt, by  notification specifying the reasons for such  exemption, any public trust or class of public trusts  from all or any of the provisions of this Act,  subject to such conditions, if any, as the State  Government may deem fit to impose."

                Rule 36 of the said Rules reads as under:

"36. Manner of ascertaining the wishes of persons  interested \026  (1)     For the purpose of ascertaining the wishes  under sub-section (5) of Section 53, of the persons  interested, the State Government shall direct the  Assistant Commissioner to issue a public notice in  such manner as he may think proper, for inviting  suggestions for the constitution of the Committee  of management. (2)     The Assistant Commissioner shall forward  suggestions so received along with his comments,  to the State Government through the  Commissioner."

       The core question involved in these appeals is:

       Whether the State Government is obligated to constitute a committee  of management of a public trust to which Chapter X of the Act applies? Or  Whether the constitution of such a committee of management falls within  the discretionary jurisdiction of the State Government?

       Chapter X comprises of 14 sections beginning from Sections 52 to 65.   Section 52 contemplates fixation of a date.  Section 52(1) contemplates that  Chapter X shall apply inter alia to the public trusts \026 (i) which vests in the  State Government; (ii) which is managed directly by the State Government,  and (iii) of which the gross annual income is ten thousand rupees or more.   Once Chapter X applies in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 52, the State

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Government is obligated to publish a list of public trusts to which the said  Chapter applies.  Such publications have been made in two notifications,  viz., dated 25.06.1981 and 5.12.1997.  In the first notification, it had not  been stated that the same had been issued either in terms of Section 52 of the  Act or under Chapter X thereof.  In the notification dated 5.12.1997, not  only the provisions of the statute have been mentioned, it has specifically  been stated that the notification was issued in terms of the directions of the  Division Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan.   

       Section 53 of the Act provides for management of trusts to which  Chapter X applies.  Once application of Chapter X is conceptualized by  issuance of a notification in terms of Section 52 of the Act, indisputably  Section 53 would be attracted.  As indicated hereinbefore, whereas the  learned Single Judge was of the opinion that it is imperative on the part of  the State Government to issue an appropriate notification constituting a  committee of management in respect of the temple in question, the Division  Bench opined that some element of discretion exists in the State  Government.   

       A plain reading of the provisions of Section 53 of the Act would show  that it contemplates vesting of public trust in the State Government.   Different dates may be appointed for different purposes.  Once Chapter X is  found to be applicable, subject to fixation of an appointed date, the  management vests in a committee.  Such a committee of management is to  be constituted by the State Government in the manner provided therein.  The  said provision contains a non-obstante clause and, therefore, the same would  prevail over anything contained in any provision of the Act or in any law,  custom or usage in force.

       The State Government, in our opinion, does not have any  discretionary jurisdiction to exercise in the matter of appointment of a  committee of management.  It is imperative in nature.  The expression  "shall" used in Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 53 of the Act indicates  that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used by the legislature  require that a committee of management must be constituted.  The  expression "shall" ordinarily implies the imperative character of the law.   

       Even if the expression "shall" is read as "may" although there does  not exist any reason therefor, the statute provides for a power coupled with a  duty.  It is a well-settled principle of interpretation of statutes that where  discretion is conferred upon a public authority coupled with discretion, the  word "may" which denotes discretion, should be construed to mean a  command.   

       In Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji [1952  SCR 135], it is stated:

"We have held that the Commissioner did not in  fact exercise his discretion in this case and did not  cancel the license he granted. He merely forwarded  to the respondent an order of cancellation which  another authority had purported to pass. It is  evident from these facts that the Commissioner  had before him objections which called for the  exercise of the discretion regarding cancellation  specifically vested in him by Rule 250. He was  therefore bound to exercise it and bring to bear on  the matter his own independent and unfettered  judgment and decide for himself whether to cancel  the license or reject the objections. That duty he  can now be ordered to perform under section 45."

       In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jogendra Singh [(1964) 2 SCR 197], this  Court observed:

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"Rule 4(2) deals with the class of gazetted  government servants and gives them the right to  make a request to the Governor that their cases  should be referred to the Tribunal in respect of  matters specified in clauses (a) to (d) of sub-rule  (1). The question for our decision is whether like  the word "may" in rule 4(1) which confers the  discretion on the Governor, the word "may" in sub- rule (2) confers discretion on him, or does the  word "may" in sub-rule (2) really mean "shall" or  "must"? There is no doubt that the word "may"  generally does not mean "must" or "shall". But it is  well-settled that the word "may" is capable of  meaning "must" or "shall" in the light of the  context. It is also clear that where a discretion is  conferred upon a public authority coupled with an  obligation, the word "may" which denotes  discretion should be construed to mean a  command. Sometimes, the legislature uses the  word "may" out of deference to the high status of  the authority on whom the power and the  obligation are intended to be conferred and  imposed. In the present case, it is the context  which is decisive. The whole purpose of rule 4(2)  would be frustrated if the word "may" in the said  rule receives the same construction as in the sub- rule (1). It is because in regard to gazetted  government servants the discretion had already  been given to the Governor to refer their cases to  the Tribunal that the rule-making authority wanted  to make a special provision in respect of them as  distinguished from other government servants  falling under rule 4(1) and rule 4(2) has been  prescribed, otherwise rule 4(2) would be wholly  redundant. In other words, the plain and  unambiguous object of enacting rule 4(2) is to  provide an option to the gazetted government  servants to request the Governor that their cases  should be tried by a Tribunal and not otherwise.  The rule-making authority presumably thought that  having regard to the status of the gazetted  government servants, it would be legitimate to give  such an opinion to them\005"

       In State (Delhi Admn.) v. I.K. Nangia and Another [(1980) 1 SCC  258], this Court opined: "We are clear that the Explanation to Section  17(2), although in terms permissive, imposes a  duty upon such a company to nominate a person in  relation to different establishments or branches or  units.  There can be no doubt that this implies the  performance of a public duty, as otherwise, the  scheme underlying the section would be  unworkable. The case, in our opinion, comes  within the dictum of Lord Cairns in Julius v. Lord  Bishop of Oxford: There may be something in the nature of the thing  empowered to be done, something in the object for  which it is to be done, something in the conditions  under which it is to be done, something in the title  of the person or persons for whose benefit the  power is to be exercised, which may couple the  power with a duty, and make it the duty of the  person in whom the power is reposed to exercise

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that power when called upon to do so.  The Explanation lays down the mode in which the  requirements of Section 17 (2) should be complied  with. Normally, the word ’may’ implies what is  optional, but for the reasons stated, it should in the  context in which it appears, mean ’must’. There is  an element of compulsion. It is power coupled  with a duty. In Maxwell on Interpretation of  Statutes, llth Edn. at p. 231, the principle is stated  thus: Statutes which authorise persons to do acts for the  benefit of others, or, as it is sometimes said, for the  public good or the advancement of justice, have  often given rise to controversy when conferring the  authority in terms simply enabling and not  mandatory.  In enacting that they "may" or "shall,  if they think fit", or, "shall have power", or that "it  shall be lawful" for them to do such acts, a statute  appears to use the language of mere permission,  but it has been so often decided as to have become  an axiom that in such cases such expressions may  have-to say the least-a compulsory force, and so  could seem to be modified by judicial exposition.  (Emphasis supplied) Though the company is not a body or authority,  there is no reason-why the same principle should  not apply. It is thus wrong to suggest that the  Explanation is only an enabling provision, when its  breach entails in the consequences indicated  above. It is not left to one’s choice, but the law  makes it imperative. Admittedly, M/s. Ahmed  Oomer Bhoy had not at the material time,  nominated any person, in relation to their Delhi  branch. The matter is, therefore, squarely covered  by Section 17 (1) (a) (ii)."

       Although there is no ambiguity, even if there be any, the marginal  note may be taken into consideration for the purpose of proper construction  of the provision. [See N.C. Dhoundial v. Union of India, (2004) 2 SCC 579]

       Once it is held that Chapter X of the Act applies, the court must bear  in mind that the provisions contained in the said Chapter provide for a set of  provisions in regard to the management of trust.  There does not exist any  other provisions providing for the same.

       Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the  State of Rajasthan, however, would submit that in view of the fact that the  management of the temple is vested in the Devasthan Commissioner, the  provisions of the Act, far less Chapter X, will apply to the temple in  question.   

       An exemption provision, as is well-known, must be strictly construed.   Sub-section (1) of Section 77 of the Act exempts only those trusts which are  administered by any agency under the control of the State Government or by  any local authority.  Whether the Devasthan Commissioner would be the  agency of the State is, therefore, the question.  Devasthan Commissioner is a  statutory authority.  He is an officer of the State.  He exercises various  functions under the Act.  The Act postulates constitution of Advisory Boards  and Advisory Committee.  Their duties and functions are prescribed.  In  regard to various provisions of the Act, Devasthan Commissioner  indisputably has statutory duties to perform.  The Act does not provide that  he may be put in charge of the management of any trust falling under  Section 52 of the Act.  As indicated hereinbefore, Section 53 of the Act  contains a non-obstante clause.  It is of wide import.  

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       A statutory authority, as is well-known, must act within the four  corners of the statute.  [See Taylor v. Taylor, (1875) 1 Ch D 426]  Any  action by a statutory authority contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions  of the statute, thus, would be void.  In the matter of construction of a statute,  therefore, the court shall not take recourse to a principle which would render  the acts of a statutory authority void in law.

       A statutory authority cannot, in absence of the provisions of a statute,  be treated to be an agency of the State.  It is one thing to say that the State  exercises statutory control over the functions of a statute but it is another  thing to say that thereby an agency is created which would be separate in  entity over which the State exercises control.  Agency of a State would  ordinarily mean an instrumentality of a State.  It must be a separate legal  entity.  A statutory authority does not answer the description of an agency  under the control of the State.

       The expression agency in the context of the statutory scheme would  not mean that there would exist a relationship of principal and agent between  it and the State.  Agency of a State would mean a body which exercises  public functions.  It would itself be a ’State’ within the meaning of Article  12 of the Constitution of India.  The concept of an agency in the context of  Section 77 of the Act must be considered having regard to the fact that the  statute contemplates grant of exemption to a public trust, management  whereof vests inter alia in a local authority.  A "local authority" is defined in  Section 3(31) of the General Clauses Act to mean "a municipal committee,  district board, body of port commissioners or other authority legally entitled  to, or entrusted by the Government with, the control or management of a  municipal or local fund."   It, thus, ordinarily would be a statutory authority.   

       Although golden rule of interpretation, viz., literal rule should be  given effect to, if it is to be held that the Devasthan Commissioner appointed  under Section 7 of the Act would be an agency of the State, the same would  lead to an absurdity or anomaly.  It is a well-known principle of law that  where literal interpretation shall give rise to an anomaly or absurdity, the  same should be avoided.  [See Ashok Lanka v. Rishi Dixit, (2005) 5 SCC  598 and M.P. Gopalakrishnan Nair v. State of Kerala,(2005) 11 SCC 45]

       It is also well-settled that the entire statute must be first read as a  whole then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word  by word.  [See Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and  Investment Co. Ltd. and Others, (1987) 1 SCC 424]  The relevant provisions  of the statute must, thus, be read harmoniously.  [See Bombay Dyeing  (supra) and Secretary, Department of Excise & Commercial Taxes and  Others v. Sun Bright Marketing (P) Ltd., Chhattisgarh and Another [(2004)  3 SCC 185].  It would, therefore, not be possible to give literal interpretation  to Section 77 of the Act.   

       Different provisions contained in different Chapters of the Act must,  as far as possible, receive harmonious construction.  With a view to give  harmonious construction, the effect of an exemption clause must be borne in  mind.  It has not been denied or disputed that keeping in view the different  clauses contained in Section 52 of the Act, public trusts which had vested in  the State would come within the purview of the Chapter X.  Once it is held  that all those trusts would also go out of the statute, the provisions of  Chapter X would become otiose in a large number of cases.  Application of  such principle of interpretation is not permissible.

       It is, therefore, incumbent for us to take recourse to harmonious  construction.  If principle of harmonious construction is applied, in a case of  this nature, particularly, when the State itself has acted upon the directions  of the court and had issued notifications in terms of Section 52 of the Act,  the State cannot now be permitted to contend that Chapter X shall not apply.   It could not approbate and reprobate at the same time.

       There is another aspect of the matter which cannot also be lost sight

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of.  The State not only in the earlier round of litigation but also before the  High Court had taken a categorical stand that it had all along been ready and  willing to act in terms of the provisions of Chapter X of the Act and appoint  a Committee; it cannot take a different stand now.

       In Karamshi Jethabhai Somayya v. State of Bombay (now  Maharashtra) [AIR 1964 SC 1714], this Court stated the law, thus:

"\005 Apart from the fact that the appellant asked for  the production of all the relevant documents, the  Government, being the defendant in this case,  should have produced the documents relevant to  the question raised. While it is the duty of a private  party to a litigation to place all the relevant matters  before the Court, a higher responsibility rests upon  the Government not to withhold such documents  from the court..."

       In Cooke v. Rickman [(1911) 2 KB 1125] , it was held that the rule of  estoppel could not be restricted to a matter in issue, stating :

"\005The rule laid down in Hawlett v. Tarte (10 C.B.  (N.S.) 813 \026 was that  if the defendant in a second action  attempts to put on the, record a plea which is inconsistent  with any traversable allegation in a former action  between the same parties there is an estoppel\005"  

       [See also Humphries v. Humphries  1910 (2) KB 531]          

       In Jai Narain Parasrampura (Dead) and Others v. Pushpa Devi Saraf  and Others [(2006) 7 SCC 756], this Court held :

"While applying the procedural law like principle  of estoppel or acquiescence, the court would be  concerned with the conduct of a party for determination  as to whether he can be permitted to take a different stand  in a subsequent proceeding, unless there exists a statutory  interdict."

       It was further held :

                        "The doctrine of estoppel by acquiescence was not  restricted to cases where the representor was aware both  of what his strict rights were and that the representee was  acting on the belief that those rights would not be  enforced against him.  Instead, the court was required to  ascertain whether in the particular circumstances, it  would be unconscionable for a party to be permitted to  deny that which, knowingly or unknowingly, he had  allowed or encouraged another to assume to his  detriment.  Accordingly, the principle would apply if at  the time the expectation was encouraged."                  

       The stand of the State in the earlier round of ligitation was that the  temple in question was a Hindu temple.  This Court categorically opined that  it is a Jain temple.  The principles of res judicata, thus, would come into  play.  The State, therefore, cannot still contend that the temple in question is

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a Hindu temple.  Before us, the Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 in Civil Appeal No.  4086-4089 of 2002 have raised a contention that it is a Hindu temple but we  cannot permit the State or the said respondents to raise such a contention  before us.  We are bound by the earlier judgment.  The issue cannot be  permitted to be reopened nor we have any jurisdiction in these matters to do  so.

       We must, however, observe that the question as to whether the temple  in question is Swetambers’ or Digambers’ does not fall for our  consideration.  Both parties have staked their own claims.  It is for the State  to act in terms of the statute.  While doing so, it indisputably would have to  give effect to the directions issued by the High Court.

       While implementing the said directions, the incidental or ancillary  questions which may arise for consideration before the State Government  must also be determined in accordance with law.

       For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the  modifications made by the Division Bench of the High Court are not  sustainable.  They are set aside accordingly.  The judgment of the learned  Single Judge is upheld.  The judgment of the High Court may be complied  within four months from date.  Civil Appeal Nos. 4092-4095, 4086-4089  and 4076-4079 of 2002 are allowed and Civil Appeal Nos. 4081-4084 of  2002 are dismissed with costs.  Counsel’s fee is assessed at Rs. 50,000/- for  each set of appeals.