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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  3126 of 2002

PETITIONER: Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors.

RESPONDENT: United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Baroda

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/03/2004

BENCH: CJI, S.B. Sinha &  S.H. Kapadia.

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

with C.A. No. 3127 of 2002, R.P.  (C) No. 160 of 2002 in C.A. No.  2573 of 2001, R.P. (C) No. 161 of  2002 in C.A. No. 2572 of 2001 and  C.A. No.1680/2004 (arising out of  S.L.P. (C) No. 708 of 2003)

S.B. SINHA, J :

       Leave granted in S.L.P. (C) No. 708 of 2003.

Reference to this Bench :  

        A Division Bench of this Court by an order dated  19.04.2002 doubting the correctness of 2-Judge Bench  decision in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Hansrajbhai V.  Kodala and Others [(2001) 5 SCC 175] (Kodala) has referred  the matter to a 3-Judge Bench whereby and whereunder the  proceedings under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act,  1988 (hereinafter referred to and called for the sake of  brevity as "the Act") has been held to be a final  proceeding as a result whereof the claimants had been  debarred from proceeding with their further claims made on  the basis of fault liability in terms of Section 165  thereof.

Subject matter :          The appeals arise out of judgment and order dated  9.11.2000 passed by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad  in First Appeal No. 2272 of 2000 whereby and whereunder the  claims of the appellants have been calculated   limiting     the income of the deceased at Rs.40,000/-  per  annum..  Two  review applications have also been filed seeking review of  the judgment and order passed in Kodala’s case (supra).   

       An application under Article 136 of the Constitution of  India has also been filed marked as S.L.P. (C) No. 708 of  2003 arising out of the judgment and order dated 28.8.2002  passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in F.A.O. [MVA]  No. 181 of 2001.

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Background Fact :          The fact of the matter may be noticed from C.A. No.  3126 of 2002.   The parents of the appellants herein met  with an untimely death in an accident arising out of use of  a motor vehicle on or about 4.9.1998.  The appellant No. 1  was at the relevant time a major and the other three  appellants were minors.

       The appellants filed two claim petitions; one under  Section 163-A of the Act and the other under Section 166  thereof claiming compensation for a sum of Rs. 4,97,800/-  for the death of their mother, Ms. Prabhaben as also a sum  of Rs. 17, 30,900/-  for the death of their father, Shri  Girishbhai Soni.  Proceeding on the basis that in terms of  Section 163-A of the Act, merely an interim relief was to be  granted, the Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal in MAC Petition  No. 2133/1998 and  M.A.C. Petition No. 2134/1998 vide its  order dated 24.3.2000 awarded a sum of Rs. 4,20,500/- and  Rs. 11,74,500/- respectively with interest at the rate of  12% per annum from the date of the application till  realisation.  It is not in dispute that although while  passing the said order the learned Tribunal considered the  matter also on their own merits but directed that the  applications filed by the appellants herein purported to be  under Section 166 of the Act would be  determined  separately.         The respondent - Insurance Company being aggrieved by  and dissatisfied with the said order dated 24.3.2000  preferred appeals before the High Court of Gujarat at  Ahmedabad.  By reason of the impugned judgment, the High  Court having regard to the concession made at the bar to the  effect that in view of the cap of annual income of Rs.  40,000/- as contained in the Second Schedule appended to the  Act, the  awarded amount should be reduced to Rs. 3,24,500/-  from Rs. 4,20,500/- and to Rs. 3,78,500 from Rs. 11,74,500/-  respectively.

        While modifying the order of the Tribunal in each of  the said appeals, the High Court clarified that the said sum  would be paid to the appellants herein by way of interim  compensation observing:

"It is also observed that as has been  agreed between the parties this whole  amount as indicated above shall be  disbursed to the respondents at this  stage itself as per the apportionment  ordered by the Tribunal for respective  respondents and there is no need to  invest 70% of the amount in the fixed  deposit etc., as has been ordered by the  Tribunal and 100% of this amount i.e.,  Rs. 3,24,500/- in First Appeal No. 2272  of 2000 and Rs. 3,78,500 in First Appeal  No. 2273 of 2000, shall be disbursed to  the respondents in each of these two  matters respectively.  It may also be  made very clear that in view of the  agreed position between the parties, we  have not embarked upon the question of  interpreting Section 163-A and the  Schedule and without entering into the  exercise of interpreting the relevant

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provisions we have passed this order  only because both the sides have shown a  good gesture before us.  At the time of  awarding of compensation under section  166 of the Act all the contentions  factual and legal as may be available to  the respective parties are open to be  agitated when the main petitions are  considered by the Tribunal."

Submissions :

        Mr. Gaurab Banerjee, learned senior counsel appearing  on behalf of the appellants and Mr. G.L. Sanghi, learned  senior counsel appearing on behalf of the review petitioners  would take  us through the legislative history leading to  enactment of Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act and  submit that the same is indicative of the fact that an order  passed thereunder is interim in nature.

       The learned counsel would urge that the said Act being  a beneficent legislation deserves liberal construction and  in that view of the matter the remedy available to a  claimant against a tort feasor for obtaining a ’just’  compensation in terms of Section 166 of the Act cannot be  taken away only because an interim award has been made in  terms of Section 163-A of the Act as in the said proceeding  actual loss suffered by the victim is not adjudicated upon  and merely ’adequate compensation’ on a structured formula  is to be paid thereunder.

       The learned counsel would point out that the said Act  provides for exercise of an option limited only to filing of  a claim application under Section 140 and Section 163-A,  and, thus, the remedy under Section 166 is not barred.

       The learned counsel would contend that a ceiling has  been provided in the Second Scheduled so far as income of  the victim is concerned to the extent of Rs. 40,000/- per  annum is also indicative of the fact that the compensation   payable thereunder is only interim in nature and the sum  awarded in the said proceeding is to be adjusted as and when  a final award is passed in terms of Section 168 of the Act.   The learned counsel would submit that it is judicially  accepted that the Second Schedule appended to the Act  contains a large number of anomalies and in that view of the  matter a proceeding under Section 163-A should not be held  to be a final one.

       Mr. Banerjee would urge that upon a proper analysis of  the scheme of the Act it would appear that the concept of  ’no fault liability’ is envisaged both under Section 140 of  the Act and Section 163-A thereof and the proceeding  thereunder being alternative to each other providing for  identical rights and liabilities, an order under Section 140  being not final;  there is no reason as to why an  award  made under Section 163-A thereof should  be treated to be  final.          The learned counsel would contend that the Bench in  deciding Kodala (supra) not only failed to take into  consideration the legislative history of the Act but also  mis-interpreted the scheme and structure thereof.  The Bench

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in Kodala (supra), the learned counsel would argue,  furthermore failed to consider the effect of the Act which  is beneficent in nature and, thus, was required to be  construed liberally.  Right to prosecute a remedy under  common law must be barred either expressly or by necessary  implication and such a bar having not been provided as  regard a proceeding under Section 163-A of the Act, it is  inconceivable, the learned counsel would submit, that a  remedy provided for under the statute would not be made  available to the suitor.   

       The learned counsel would contend that the Bench  deciding Kodala (supra) misinterpreted and misconstrued the  expression "any other law" appearing in Sub-Section (5) of  Section 140 to mean "any other law for the time being in  force as, for example, the Workmen’s Compensation Act,  1923".  The said expression, the learned counsel would  contend, would embrace also the other provisions of the said  Act.  According to the learned counsel, the expressions  "any other law" would by necessary implication include the  other provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act having regard to  the fact that the remedies provided for under Sections 163-A  and 166 are distinct and separate and are based on   different legal regimes.  It was pointed out that whereas  under the former "adequate and rational compensation" is  provided for, the latter provides for "just compensation".   

       Mr. Jitendra Sharma, learned senior counsel appearing  on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, would  submit that Section 163-A which was introduced by the  Parliament in the year 1994 carries absolutely a different  scheme vis-‘-vis ’no-fault liability’ introduced in the year  1982 in Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 which was in pari materia  with Section 140 in the 1988 Act.  By enacting Section 163- A, Mr. Sharma would contend, an exception to the provisions  of Section 166 was made out for the purpose of implementing  the principles of social justice.

       Drawing our attention to the Second Schedule appended  to the Act, the learned counsel would submit that the very  fact that in terms thereof, one-third of the total income is  to be excluded from the total amount of compensation and  further certain provisions relevant for computation of total  amount of compensation payable thereunder have been provided  for, is not itself suggestive of the fact that thereby the  payment directed thereunder is not by way of an interim or  on account payment but is a final one.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

       A claim for damages owing to injuries suffered by  reason of negligence on the part of the driver of a motor  vehicle used to be governed only by law of tort.  The Indian  Motor Vehicles Act, 1914 is the first enactment relating to  motor vehicles.  The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 which replaced  the 1914 Act consolidated and amended the law relating to  motor vehicles in India.  Under the 1939 Act as also the  Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 compensation was solely based on  law of tort.  The civil courts had the jurisdiction to try a  suit claiming compensation by the plaintiffs for injuries or  damages suffered by them by a party whose action had  inflicted the injury.  In the year 1956, the Motor Vehicle  Accidents Claims Tribunals were established to deal with

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such claims purported to be for providing speedy trial.   However, proof of negligence was a condition precedent for  grant of compensation under the 1939 Act.   

       The 85th Law Commission in its report submitted in  May, 1980, proposed two new measures, i.e. (i) introduction  of Section 92-A in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 by which the  doctrine of liability without fault was to be introduced  and, (ii) the imposition of strict liability as regard death  or bodily injury caused by the accident or nature specified  in Section 110(1) thereof.  Recommendations were also made  by the Law Commission to the effect that claim on fault  basis should be barred but the same had not been accepted by  the Parliament.

       While making the aforementioned recommendations, the  Commission referred to the following observations made by  this Court in Bishan Devi and others Vs. Sirbaksh Singh and  Anr. [(1980) 1 SCC 273]:

"the law as it stands requires that the  claimant should prove that the driver of  the vehicle was guilty of rash and  negligent driving."

       By reason of Section 92-A, 92-B in Motor Vehicles Act,  1939 inserted in the year 1982, a sum of Rs. 15,000/- was to  be provided in case of death and a sum of Rs. 75,000/- in  respect of permanent disablement by introducing the concept  of "no-fault liability".  The amount of compensation,  however, had been revised from time to time.

       The Law Commission furthermore recommended for laying  of a scheme in terms whereof the victims of ’hit and run  accident’ could claim compensation where the identity of the  vehicle involved in the accident was unknown.  Yet again,  the 199th Law Commission in its report submitted in 1987  stated the law as it stood then in the following terms:

"the law as it stands present, save the  provisions in chapter VIIA inserted by  the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act,  1982, enables the victim or the  dependants of the victim in the event of  death to recover compensation on proof  of fault of the person liable to pay the  compensation and which fault caused the  harm."

       The present Act came into force thereafter in terms  whereof inter alia Sections 92-A to 92-E of the 1939 Act  were replaced by Sections 140 to 144 whereby and whereunder  the amount of compensation in case of death was raised to  Rs. 50,000/- and for permanent disablement to Rs.25,000/-.   However, having regard to number of representations received  from various quarters, a review committee was constituted by  the Government of India in the year 1990 to examine the same  and review such provisions of the said Act, as may be found  necessary.  In terms of the recommendations of the Review  Committee as also the Transport Development Council, the Act  was thereafter amended in the year 1994 in terms whereof a

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new pre-determined formula in the form of Section 163-A for   payment of compensation to road accident victims on the  basis of age and income on a no-fault basis was provided.   

STATUTORY PROVISIONS:

       Chapter X of the said Act provides for liability  without fault in certain cases.  Section 140 provides for  liability upon the owner of the vehicle to pay compensation  on the principle of no fault.  The said provision reads  thus:

"140. Liability to pay compensation in  certain cases on the principle of no  fault. - (1) Where death or permanent  disablement of any person has resulted  from an accident arising out of the use  of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles,  the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as  the case may be, the owners of the  vehicles shall, jointly and severally,  be liable to pay compensation in respect  of such death or disablement in  accordance with the provisions of this  section.  (2) The amount of compensation which  shall be payable under sub-section (1)  in respect of the death of any person  shall be a fixed sum of fifty thousand  rupees and the amount of compensation  payable under that sub-section in  respect of the permanent disablement of  any person shall be a fixed sum of  twenty-five thousand rupees.  (3) In any claim for compensation under  sub-section (1), the claimant shall not  be required to plead and establish that  the death or permanent disablement in  respect of which the claim has been made  was due to any wrongful act, neglect or  default of the owner or owners of the  vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any  other person.  (4) A claim for compensation under sub- section (1) shall not be defeated by  reason of any wrongful act, neglect or  default of the person in respect of  whose death or permanent disablement the  claim has been made nor shall the  quantum of compensation recoverable in  respect of such death or permanent  disablement be reduced on the basis of  the share of such person in the  responsibility for such death or  permanent disablement.  (5) Notwithstanding anything contained  in sub-section (2) regarding death or  bodily injury to any person, for which  the owner of the vehicle is liable to  give compensation for relief, he is also  liable to pay compensation under any  other law for the time being in force :  Provided that the amount of such  compensation to be given under any other

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law shall be reduced from the amount of  compensation payable under this section  or under Section 163-A."  

       Sections 141 and 142 of the said Act read as under: "141. Provisions as to other right to  claim compensation for death or  permanent disablement. - (1) The right  to claim compensation under Section 140  in respect of death or permanent  disablement of any person shall be in  addition to any other right, except the  right to claim under the scheme referred  to in Section 163-A (such other right  hereafter in this section referred to as  the right on the principle of fault) to  claim compensation in respect thereof  under any other provision of this Act or  of any other law for the time being in  force.  (2) A claim for compensation under  Section 140 in respect of death or  permanent disablement of any person  shall be disposed of as expeditiously as  possible and where compensation is  claimed in respect of such death or  permanent disablement under Section 140  and also in pursuance of any right on  the principle of fault, the claim for  compensation under Section 140 shall be  disposed of as aforesaid in the first  place.  (3) Notwithstanding anything contained  in sub-section (1), where in respect of  the death or permanent disablement of  any person, the person liable to pay  compensation under Section 140 is also  liable to pay compensation in accordance  with the right on the principle of  fault, the person so liable shall pay  the first-mentioned compensation and -  (a) if the amount of the first-mentioned  compensation is less than the amount of  the second-mentioned compensation, he  shall be liable to pay (in addition to  the first-mentioned compensation) only  so much of the second-mentioned  compensation as is equal to the amount  by which it exceeds the first-mentioned  compensation;  (b) if the amount of the first-mentioned  compensation is equal to or more than  the amount of the second-mentioned  compensation, he shall not be liable to  pay the second-mentioned compensation.  142. Permanent disablement. -For the  purposes of this Chapter, permanent  disablement of a person shall be deemed  to have resulted from an accident of the  nature referred to in sub-section (1) of  section 140 if such person has suffered  by reason of the accident, any injury or  injuries involving:-   (a) permanent privation of the sight

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of either eye or the hearing of  either ear, or privation of any   member or joint; or   (b) destruction or permanent  impairing of the powers of any  member or joint; or   (c) permanent disfiguration of the  head or face."

       Section 144 provides for a non-obstante clause.   

       Section 163-A was inserted by Act 54 of 1994 which came  into force from 14.11.1994.  The said provision has been  inserted to provide for a new pre-determined structured  formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims  on the basis of age/ income of the deceased or the person  suffering permanent disablement.

       Sections 163-A and 163-B read thus: "163-A. Special provisions as to  payment of compensation on structured- formula basis. - (1) Notwithstanding  anything contained in this Act or in any  other law for the time being in force or  instrument having the force of law, the  owner of the motor vehicle or the  authorised insurer shall be liable to  pay in the case of death or permanent  disablement due to accident arising out  of the use of motor vehicle,  compensation, as indicated in the Second  Schedule, to the legal heirs or the  victim, as the case may be.  Explanation. - For the purposes of this  sub-section, ’permanent disability’  shall have the same meaning and extent  as in the Workmen’s Compensation Act,  1923 (8 of 1923).  (2) In any claim for compensation under  sub-section (1), the claimant shall not  be required to plead or establish that  the death or permanent disablement in  respect of which the claim has been made  was due to any wrongful act or neglect  or default of the owner of the vehicle  or vehicles concerned or of any other  person.  (3) The Central Government may, keeping  in view the cost of living by  notification in the Official Gazette,  from time to time amend the Second  Schedule.  163-B. Option to file claim in certain  cases. - Where a person is entitled to  claim compensation under Section 140 and  Section 163-A, he shall file the claim  under either of the said sections and  not under both."

       The second schedule referred to in Section 140 of the  Act provides for a structured formula for the purpose of  grant of compensation to a third party involved in fatal

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accident/injury.  By reason thereof a multiplier system is  introduced pursuant whereto and in furtherance whereof the  amount of compensation is required to be calculated having  regard to the age of the victim and his annual income.   However, in terms of the note appended to the said Schedule  the amount of compensation so arrived at in the case of  fatal accident, the claims is to be reduced by one-third, in  consideration of the expenses which the victim would have  incurred towards maintaining himself, had he been alive.

       Clause (2) of the said Second Schedule provides that  the amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs.  50,000/-.  It also provides for grant of compensation under  several heads, namely, (3) General Damages in case of death,  (4). General Damages in case of injuries and disabilities,  (5). Disability in non-fatal accidents and (6) notional  income for compensation to those who had no income prior to  accident.  However, the maximum amount which is to be paid  under the different heads had also been specified.

       Chapter XII deals with constitution of claims  tribunals, application for compensation, option regarding  claims for compensation in certain cases, award of the  claims tribunal etc.  Sections 166, 167 and 168 read thus: "166. Application for compensation. - (1) An application for compensation  arising out of an accident of the nature  specified in sub-section (1) of section  165 may be made- (a) by the person who has sustained the  injury; or   (b) by the owner of the property; or   (c) where death has resulted from the  accident, by all or any of the legal  representatives of the deceased; or   (d) by any agent duly authorised by the  person injured or all or any of the  legal representatives of the  deceased, as the case may be: Provided that where all the legal  representatives of the deceased have not  joined in any such application for  compensation, the application shall be  made on behalf of or for the benefit of  all the legal representatives of the  deceased and the legal representatives  who have not so joined, shall be  impleaded as respondents to the  application.  (2) Every application under sub-section  (1) shall be made, at the option of the  claimant, either to the Claims Tribunal  having jurisdiction over the area in  which the accident occurred or to the  Claims Tribunal within the local limits  of whose jurisdiction the claimant  resides or carries on business or within  the local limits of whose jurisdiction  the defendant resides, and shall be in  such form and contain such particulars  as may be prescribed:  Provided that where no claim for

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compensation under section 140 is made  in such application, the application  shall contain a separate statement to  that effect immediately before the  signature of the applicant. (3)     *** (4) The Claims Tribunal shall treat any  report of accidents forwarded to it  under sub-section (6) of section 158 as  an application for compensation under  this Act. 167. Option regarding claims for  compensation in certain cases. - Notwithstanding anything contained in  the Workmen’s Compensation Act,  1923 (8  of 1923) where the death of, or bodily  injury to, any person gives rise to a  claim for compensation under this Act  and also under the Workmen’s  Compensation Act, 1923, the person  entitled to compensation may without  prejudice to the provisions of Chapter X  claim such compensation under either of  those Acts but not under both. 168. Award of the Claims Tribunal. -On  receipt of an application for  compensation made under section 166, the  Claims Tribunal shall, after giving  notice of the application to the insurer  and after giving the parties (including  the insurer) an opportunity of being  heard, hold an inquiry into the claim  or, as the case may be, each of the  claims and, subject to the provisions of  section 162 may make an award  determining the amount of compensation  which appears to it to be just and  specifying the person or persons to whom  compensation shall be paid and in making  the award the Claims Tribunal shall  specify the amount which shall be paid  by the insurer or owner or driver of the  vehicle involved in the accident or by  all or any of them, as the case may be: Provided that where such application  makes a claim for compensation under  section 140 in respect of the death or  permanent disablement of any person,  such claim and any other claim (whether  made in such application or otherwise)  for compensation in respect of such  death or permanent disablement shall be  disposed of in accordance with the  provisions of Chapter X.  (2) The Claims Tribunal shall arrange  to deliver copies of the award to the  parties concerned expeditiously and in  any case within a period of fifteen days  from the date of the award.  (3) When an award is made under this  section, the person who is required to  pay any amount in terms of such award  shall, within thirty days of the date of  announcing the award by the Claims  Tribunal, deposit the entire amount

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awarded in such manner as the Claims  Tribunal may direct."           Section 176 provides for the rule making power.  The  State of Gujarat in exercise of the said power made rules  known as Gujarat Motor Vehicle Rules.  Rule 211 provides for  the procedure regarding compensation arising out of  accident.  Sub-rule (1) of the said rule reads thus:

"(1) An application for compensation  under sub-section (1) of section 166  shall be made to the Claims Tribunal in  Form Comp. A, and shall contain the  particulars specified in that form."

       The rules framed by the State of Gujarat also provide  for the forms in terms whereof the applications for claim  are required to be filed.  Form Comp. A is the format for  filing application for compensation arising out of the use  of motor vehicles.  The following columns inter alia are  required to be filled up:

"10. Brief particulars of the  accident... ... ... ... 11. Quantum of compensation claimed and  basis    thereof ... ... ..."

       However, Rule 231 provides for procedure regarding  compensation on the principle of no-fault which is in the  following terms:

"231. Procedure regarding compensation  on the principal of no fault:-  Notwithstanding anything contained in  rules 211 to 230 and 232 in the case of  a claim for compensation under Chapter X  of the Act, the procedure shall be as  follows, namely:-

(1) An application for compensation  shall be made to the Claims Tribunal in  Form CWF, in triplicate, and shall  contain the particulars specified in  that form.

(2) The application shall be accompanied  by a fee of ten rupees in the form of  Court fee stamps, and the following  documents, namely:

(i)     First Information Report; (ii)    Injury certificate or Post- mortem report in case of death; (iii)   Heirship certificate in case of  death; (iv)    Certificate from the registering  authority regarding ownership of  the vehicle involved in the  accident; (v)     Particulars of insurance of the  vehicle involved in the  accident.

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(3) No fees shall be charged for process  of application for compensation made  under this rule.

(4) The Claims Tribunal shall dispose of  the application for compensation within  six weeks from the date of receipt of  such application.

(5) For the purpose of adjudicating and  awarding the claim, the Claims Tribunal  shall follow the procedure of summary  trial as contained in Chapter XXI of the  Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

(6) The Claims Tribunal shall not reject  any application made under this rule on  the ground of any technical defect, but  shall give notice to the applicant and  get the defect rectified.

(7) For the purpose of adjudicating and  awarding the claim, the Claims Tribunal  shall obtain whatever information and  document considered necessary by it from  the police, medical and other  authorities.

(8) On receipt of the application for  compensation, the Claims Tribunal shall  give notice to the owner, and the  insurer, if any, of the vehicle involved  in the accident, directing them to  appear on a date not later than ten days  from the date of issue of such notice.   The date so fixed for such appearance  shall also be not later than fifteen  days from the receipt of the application  for compensation.  The Claims Tribunal  shall state in such notice that, in case  they fail to appear on such appointed  date, the Tribunal shall proceed exparte  on the presumption that they have no  contention to make against the award of  compensation.

(9) The Claims Tribunal shall proceed  with the application for compensation,  on the basis of -  

(i)     First Information Report; (ii)    Injury certificate or Post- mortem report in case of death; (iii)   Registration certificate of the  motor vehicle involved in the  accident; (iv)    Cover note, certificate of  insurance or the policy,  relating to the insurance of the  vehicle against third party  risks; (v)     The nature of the treatment  given by the medical officer who  has treated the victim.

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(10) The Claims Tribunal, in passing the  orders, shall make an award of  compensation of twenty five thousand  rupees in respect of the death, and of  twelve thousand rupees in respect of the  permanent disablement, to be paid by the  owner or insurer, of the vehicle  involved in the accident.

(11) Where compensation is awarded to  two or more persons, the Claims Tribunal  shall also specify the amount payable to  each of them.

(12) The Claims Tribunal, in passing the  orders, shall also direct the owner or  insurer, of the vehicle involved in the  accident, to pay the amount of  compensation to the claimant within  thirty days from the date of the said  orders.

(13) Where the Claims Tribunal thinks  that the actual payment to the claimant  is likely to take time because of the  identification and the fixation of the  legal heirs of the deceased, the Claims  Tribunal may call for the amount of  compensation awarded, to be deposited  with the Tribunal and then proceed with  the identification of the legal heirs  for deciding the payment of compensation  to each of the legal heirs."

       In terms of the aforementioned rule, an application for  compensation in respect of liability without fault is  required to be filed without any particular as regard the  accident having regard to the fact that by reason thereof,   fault on the part of the driver of the motor vehicle is  required to be pleaded or proved.   

ANALYSIS OF THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS:

       The relevant provisions of the Act are beneficial in  nature.  The Act indisputably is in the nature of a social  welfare legislation.   

       The provisions as regard no fault liability evidently  were inserted having regard to the fact that the road  accidents in India had touched a new height and at least in  some of the cases it was found that rash or negligent  driving causing death or injury to the innocent persons  could not be proved.  Whereas in terms of Section 140 of the  Act a statutory liability has been cast upon the owner in  case of death or permanent disablement; both under Section  163-A as also Section 166 of the Act, the insurer had been  made responsible.

       It is true that in terms of Section 163-B of the Act an  option had been provided for so as to enable a person to lay  a claim for compensation either under Section 140 or Section  163-A and not under both but having regard to the scheme of  the Act, the same was not necessary.

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       Section 163-A was introduced in the Act by way of a  social security scheme.  It is a code by itself.  It appears  from the Objects and Reasons of the Motor Vehicles  (Amendment) Act, 1994 that after enactment of the 1988 Act  several representations and suggestions were made from the  State Governments, transport operators and members of public  in relation to certain provisions thereof.  Taking note of  the observations made by the various Courts and the  difficulties experienced in implementing the various  provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Government of  India appointed a Review Committee.  The Review Committee in  its report made the following recommendations:

"The 1988 Act provides for enhanced  compensation for hit and run cases as  well as for no fault liability cases.   It also provides for payment of  compensation on proof-of-fault basis to  the extent of actual liability incurred  which ultimately means an unlimited  liability in accident cases.  It is  found that the determination of  compensation takes a long time.   According to information available, in  Delhi alone there are 11214 claims  pending before the Motor Vehicle  Accidents Tribunals, as on 31.3.1990.   Proposals have been made from time to  time that the finalisation of  compensation claims would be greatly  facilitated to the advantage of the  claimant, the vehicle owner as well as  the Insurance Company if a system of  structured compensation can be  introduced.  Under such a system of  structured compensation that is payable  for different clauses of cases depending  upon the age of the deceased, the  monthly income at the time of death, the  earning potential in the case of the  minor, loss of income on account of loss  of limb etc., can be notified.  The  affected party can then have the option  of either accepting the lump sum  compensation as is notified in that  scheme of structured compensation or of  pursuing his claim through the normal  channels.

       The General Insurance Company with  whom the matter was taken up, is  agreeable in principle to a scheme of  structured compensation for settlement  of claims on "fault liability" in  respect of third party liability under  Chapter XI of M.V. Act, 1988.  They have  suggested that the claimants should  first file their Claims with Motor  Accident Claims Tribunals and then the  insurers may be allowed six months time  to confirm their prima facie liability  subject to the defences available under  Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.  After such  confirmations of prima facie liability

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by the insurers the claimants should be  required to exercise their option for  conciliation under structured  compensation formula within a stipulated  time."

       The recommendations of the Review Committee and  representations from public were placed before the Transport  Development Council for seeking their views pursuant whereto  several sections were amended.  Section 163-A was inserted  in the Act to provide for payment of compensation in motor  accident cases in accordance with the Second Schedule  providing for the structured formula which may be amended by  the Central Government from time to time.

       Section 140 of the Act dealt with interim compensation  but by inserting Section 163-A, the Parliament intended to  provide for making of an award consisting of a pre- determined sum without insisting on a long-drawn trial or  without proof of negligence in causing the accident.  The  Amendment was, thus, a deviation from the common law  liability under the Law of Torts and was also in derogation  of the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act.  The Act and  the Rules framed by the State in no uncertain terms suggest  that a new device was sought to be evolved so as to grant a  quick and efficacious relief to the victims falling within  the specified category.  The heirs of the deceased or the  victim in terms of the said provisions were assured of a  speedy and effective remedy which was not available to the  claimants under Section 166 of the Act.

       Chapter XI was, thus, enacted for grant of immediate  relief to a section of people whose annual income is not  more than Rs. 40,000/- having regard to the fact that in  terms of Section 163-A of the Act read with the Second  Schedule appended thereto; compensation is to be paid on a  structured formula not only having regard to the age of the  victim and his income but also the other factors relevant  therefor.  An award made thereunder, therefore, shall be in  full and final settlement of the claim as would appear from  the different columns contained in the Second Schedule  appended to the Act.  The same is not interim in nature.   The note appended to column 1 which deals with fatal  accidents makes the position furthermore clear stating that  from the total amount of compensation one-third thereof is  to be reduced in consideration of the expenses which the  victim would have incurred towards maintaining himself had  he been alive.  This together with the other heads of  compensation as contained in column Nos. 2 to 6 thereof  leaves no manner of doubt that the Parliament intended to  lay a comprehensive scheme for the purpose of grant of  adequate compensation to a section of victims who would  require the amount of compensation without fighting any  protracted litigation for proving that the accident occurred  owing to negligence on the part of the driver of the motor  vehicle or any other fault arising out of use of a motor  vehicle.

       The submission of learned counsel appearing on behalf  of the appellants to the effect that Sections 140 and 163-A  provide for similar scheme cannot be accepted for more than  one reason.  Payment of the amount in terms of Section 140  of the Act is ad hoc in nature.  A claim made thereunder, as

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has been noticed hereinbefore, is in addition to any other  claim which may be made under any other law for the time  being in force.  Section 163-A of the Act does not contain  any such provision.   

       Section 163-A of the Act is interlinked with several  sections of Chapters XI and XII thereof.  Section 140  imposes a liability upon the owner of the vehicle to pay  compensation where death or permanent disablement of any  person has resulted from accident arising out of the use of  a motor vehicle.  By reason of the said provision a fixed  sum is to be paid.

       Sub-Section (4) of Section 140 provides that the claim  for compensation under sub-section (1) thereof shall not be  defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default  of the person in respect of whose death or permanent  disablement the claim has been made nor the quantum of  compensation recoverable in respect of such death or  permanent disablement be reduced on the basis of the share  of such person in the responsibility for such death or  permanent disablement.  Sub-section (5) of Section 140 of  the Act categorically provides that the obligation of the  owner of the vehicle shall not be in derogation of any  statutory law cast upon the owner of the vehicle to pay  compensation under any other law for the time being in force  subject, however, to the condition as has been laid down in  the proviso appended thereto that the amount of such  compensation to be given under any other law should be  reduced from the amount of compensation payable thereunder  or Section 163-A.

       Section 163-A which has an overriding effect provides  for special provisions as to payment of compensation on  structured formula basis.  Sub-Section (1) of Section 163-A  contains non-obstante clause in terms whereof the owner of  the motor vehicle or the authorised insurer is liable to pay  in the case of death or permanent disablement due to  accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle,  compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule, to the  legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be.  Sub-Section  (2) of Section 163-A is in pari materia with Sub-Section (3)  of Section 140 of the Act.

       Section 163-A does not contain any provision identical  to Sub-Section (5) of Section 140 which is also indicative  of the fact that whereas in terms of the latter, the  liability of the owner of the vehicle to give compensation  or relief under any other law for the time being in force  continues subject of course to the effect that the amount  paid thereunder shall be reduced from the amount of  compensation  payable  under the said Section or Section  163-A.

       By reason of the Section 163-A, therefore, the  compensation is required to be determined on the basis of a  structured formula whereas in terms of Section 140 only a  fixed amount is to be given.  A provision of law providing  for compensation is presumed to be final in nature unless a  contra indication therefor is found to be in the statute  either expressly or by necessary implication.  While  granting compensation, the Tribunal is required to  adjudicate upon the disputed question as regard age and  income of the deceased or the victim, as the case may be.   Unlike Section 140 of the Act, adjudication on several

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issues arising between the parties is necessary in a  proceeding under Section 163-A of the Act.

       Decisions rendered by this Court are galore where  computation as regard the amount of compensation has been  related to multiplier method involving ascertainment of loss  of dependency and capitalizing the same by appropriate  multiplier. (See General Manager, Kerala State Road  Transport Corporation, Trivandurm Vs. Mrs. Susamma Thomas  and others, (1994) 2 SCC 176).  The structured formula  provided for in the Second Schedule also provides for  similar concept as regard determination of the amount of  compensation.

       Apart from the fact that compensation is to be paid by  applying multiplier method under the Second Schedule other  relevant factors, namely, reduction of one-third in  consideration of the expenses which the victim would have  incurred towards maintaining himself, general damages in  case of death as also in the case of injuries and  disabilities as also the disability in non-fatal accidents,  a notional income for compensation to those who had no  income prior to accident are provided for, are required to  be considered which is also a clear pointer to the fact that  thereby the Parliament intended to provide for a final  amount of compensation and not an interim one.

       The scheme envisaged under Section 163-A, in our  opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof  the rights and obligations of the parties are to be  determined finally.  The amount of compensation payable  under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or  varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any  provision providing for set off against a higher  compensation unlike Section 140.  In terms of the said  provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens,  namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000/- or  less is covered thereunder whereas Sections 140 and 166  cater to all sections of society.

       It may be true that Section 163-B provides for an  option to a claimant to either go for a claim under Section  140 or Section 163-A of the Act, as the case may be, but the  same was inserted ’ex-abundanti cautela’ so as to remove any  misconception in the mind of the parties to the lis having  regard to the fact that both relate to the claim on the  basis of no-fault liability.  Having regard to the fact that  Section 166 of the Act provides for a complete machinery for  laying a claim on fault liability, the question of giving an  option to the claimant to pursue their claims either under  Section 163-A or Section 166 does not arise.  If the  submission of the learned counsel is accepted the same would  lead to an incongruity.   

       Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus,  deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing  the legislative intent but it is trite that where such  beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is  no vagueness or doubt therein, the court would not travel  beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the  pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those  who are  not covered thereby.  (See Regional Director, Employees’  State Insurance Corporation, Trichur Vs. Ramanuja Match  Industries, [AIR 1985 SC 278 : (1985) 1 SCC 218].

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       The decision of this Court in Kunal Singh Vs. Union of  India and Another [(2003) 4 SCC 524] relied upon by Mr.  Banerjee cannot be said to have any application whatsoever  in the instant case as therein this Court while considering  the provisions of Section 47 of the Persons with  Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and  Full Participation) Act, 1995 held that the language thereof  is plain and certain statutory obligation on the employer  was cast to protect an employee acquiring disability during  service and only in that situation, it was observed:

"9...In construing a provision of a  social beneficial enactment that too  dealing with disabled persons intended  to give them equal opportunities,  protection of rights and full  participation, the view that advances  the object of the Act and serves its  purpose must be preferred to the one  which obstructs the object and paralyses  the purpose of the Act..."

       It is also not a case where an exception or exclusion  clause in a beneficial legislation has been provided for  and, therefore, the decision of this Court in State of  Tripura and Another Vs. Roopchand Das and Others [(2003) 1  SCC 421] cannot also be said to have any application.   

       It is now well-settled that for the purpose of  interpretation of statute, same is to be read in its  entirety.  The purport and object of the Act must be given  its full effect.  [See High Court of Gujarat & Anr. Vs.  Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat & Ors. [JT 2003 (3) SC 50],  Indian Handicrafts Emporium and Others vs. Union of India  and Others [(2003) 7 SCC 589], Ameer Trading Corporation  Ltd. vs. Shapoorji Data Processing Ltd. [JT 2003 (9) SC 109  = 2003 (9) SCALE 713 and Ashok Leyland Vs. State of Tamil  Nadu and Anr. [2004 (1) SCALE 224].  The object underlying  the statute is required to be given effect to by applying  the principles of purposive construction.   

       We, therefore, are of the opinion that remedy for  payment of compensation both under Sections 163-A and 166  being final and independent of each other as statutorily  provided, a claimant cannot pursue his remedies thereunder  simultaneously.  One, thus, must opt/elect to go either for  a proceeding under Section 163-A or under Section 166 of the  Act, but not under both.

       In Kodala (supra) the contention of the claimant that  right to get compensation is in addition to the no-fault  liability was, thus, rightly rejected.  In agreement with  Kodala (supra) we are also of the opinion that unlike  Sections 140 and 141 of the Act the Parliament did not want  to provide additional compensation in terms of Section 163-A  of the Act.

       The question may be considered from different angles.   As for example, if in the proceedings under Section 166 of  the Act, after obtaining compensation under Section 163-A,  the awardee fails to prove that the accident took place  owing to negligence on the part of the driver or if it is  found as of fact that the deceased or the victim himself was

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responsible therefor as a consequence whereto the Tribunal  refuses to grant any compensation; would it be within its  jurisdiction to direct refund either in whole or in part the  amount of compensation already paid on the basis of  structured formula?  Furthermore, if in a case the Tribunal  upon considering the relevant materials comes to the  conclusion that no case has been made out for awarding the  compensation under Section 166 of the Act, would it  be at  liberty to award compensation in terms of Section 163-A  thereof.

       The answer to both the aforementioned questions must be  rendered in the negative.  In other words, the question of  adjustment or refund will invariably arise in the event if  it is held that the amount of compensation paid in the  proceedings under Section 163-A of the Act is interim in  nature.

       It is, therefore, evident that whenever the Parliament  intended to provide for adjustment or refund of the  compensation payable on the basis of no-fault liability, as  for example, Sections 140 and 161 in case of hit and run  motor accident, from the amount of compensation payable  under the award on the basis of fault liability under  Section 168 of the Act, the same has expressly been provided  for and having regard to the fact that no such procedure for  refund or adjustment of compensation has been provided for  in relation to the proceedings under Section 163-A of the  Act, it must be held that the scheme of the provisions under  Sections 163-A and 166 are distinct and separate in nature.

       It is also not of much relevance that in terms of  Section 140 of the Act, the owner of the vehicle has been  fastened with the statutory liability and in Section 163-A  thereof both the owner as also his authorised insurer has  been made so liable.

       In Sub-Section (5) of Section 140 of the Act the  expression "also" has been used which is indicative of the  fact that the owner of the vehicle would be additionally  liable to pay compensation under any other law for the time  being in force.  Proviso appended to Sub-Section (5) of  Section 140 states that the amount of compensation payable  under any other law for the time being in force is to be  reduced from the amount of the compensation payable under  Sub-Section (2) thereof or under Section 163-A of the Act.   Right to claim compensation under Section 140, having regard  to the provisions contained in Section 141 is in addition to  any other right to claim compensation on the principle of  fault liability.  Such a provision does not exist in Section  163-A.  If no amount is payable under the fault liability or  the compensation which may be received from any other law,  no refund of the amount received by the claimant under  Section 140 is postulated in the Scheme.  Section 163-A, on  the other hand, nowhere provides that the payment of  compensation of no-fault liability in terms of the  structured formula is in addition to the liability to pay  compensation in accordance with the right to get  compensation on the principle of fault liability.  It is  also not correct to contend that the expression "any other  law for the time being in force" used in Section 140(5)  would include any other provisions of the Motor Vehicles  Act.  Had the intention of the Parliament been to include  the other provisions of Motor Vehicles Act within the  meaning of the expression "any other law for the time being

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in force", it could have said so expressly.  The very fact  that the Parliament has chosen to use the expression "any  other law", the same, in our considered opinion, would mean  a law other than the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act.   The proviso appended to Sub-Section (5) of Section 140 of  the Act is required to be given a purposive meaning.

       It is not in dispute that the claim of compensation  irrespective of the death or bodily injury may arise under  other statutes as, for example, Workmen’s Compensation Act,  Factories Act, Fatal Accidents Act and other acts governing  various industries including hazardous industries.

       In the event, the motor vehicle in question is insured,  ultimately the liability would also be fastened upon the  insurer having regard to the provision laid down in Chapter  XII of the Act.  We may also notice that  Rule 211(1) of  Gujarat Motor Vehicle Rules provides for the application for  compensation in terms of Sub-Section (1) of Section 166 of  the Act.  A claim application is to be filed in Form Comp.  A.  Rule 231 thereof provides for an application for  compensation in respect of liability without fault and for  the said purpose the claim application prescribed therefor  is to be filed in Form No. CWF.  The very fact that  different forms had been prescribed as regard determination  of the final compensation is also suggestive of the fact  that both proceedings are meant to be final in nature.   Column No. 10 in Form Comp. A requires the claimant to give  brief particulars of the accident which would include the  nature and extent of fault on the part of the driver of the  vehicle, but no such column is provided for in Form CWF.   Subject to the said distinction, all other particulars  required to be furnished are almost identical.   

       We may notice that Section 167 of the Act provides that  where death of, or bodily injury to, any person gives rise  to claim of compensation under the Act and also under the  Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, he cannot claim  compensation under both the Acts.  The Motor Vehicles Act  contains different expressions as, for example, "under the  provision of the Act", "provisions of this Act", "under  any other provisions of this Act" or "any other law or  otherwise". In Section 163-A, the expression  "notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any  other law for the time being in force" has been used, which  goes to show that the Parliament intended to insert a non- obstante clause of wide nature which would mean that the  provisions of Section 163-A would apply despite the contrary  provisions existing in the said Act or any other law for the  time being in force.  Section 163-A of the Act covers cases  where even negligence is on the part of the victim.  It is  by way of an exception to Section 166 and the concept of  social justice has been duly taken care of.

Conclusion :         We, therefore, are of the opinion that Kodala (supra)  has correctly been decided.  However, we do not agree with  the findings in Kodala (supra) that if a person invokes  provisions of Section 163-A, the annual income of Rs.  40,000/- per annual shall be treated as a cap.  In our  opinion, the proceeding under Section 163-A being a social  security provision, providing for a distinct scheme, only  those whose annual income is upto Rs. 40,000/- can take the  benefit thereof.  All other claims are required to be  determined in terms of Chapter XII of the Act.

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       However, in this case, we may notice that the parties  have proceeded to file two applications - one, under Section  163-A and another under Section 166 of the Act.  Both have  been entertained.  Both the Tribunal as also the High Court  have proceeded on the basis that the amount of compensation  under Section 163-A is by way of an interim award and the  same would not preclude the claimants to proceed with his  claim made in terms of Section 166 of the Act.  It is  submitted at the Bar that the appellants have withdrawn 50%  of the amount and rest of the amount has been invested.  The  appellants have lost both of their parents in the accident.   Only one of the appellants at the relevant time was a major.   It appears that 70% of the amount permitted to be withdrawn  has been deposited in the Fixed Deposit.  We agree with the  submission of Mr. Banerjee that the claim of the appellants  made under Section 163-A be treated to be one under Section  140 of the Act and upon adjusting the amounts provided for  thereunder, the appellants may refund the rest thereof to  the insurer.   

       Keeping in view of the limited questions posed before  us, in our opinion, it is not necessary to go into the  purported discrepancies existing in the Second Schedule of  the Act.

       We, for the reasons aforementioned, do not find any  merit in the review applications which are dismissed.  

So far as Civil Appeal Nos. 3126/2002 and 3127/2002 are  concerned, we in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article  142 of the Constitution direct that the claim applications  of the appellants under Section 163-A of the Act be treated  to be applications under Section 140 thereof.  The amount  invested by the Tribunal may be allowed to be withdrawn by  the respondent - Insurance Company.  The appellants shall  refund the excess amount withdrawn by them after adjusting  the amount payable in terms of Section 140 of the Act and  the interest which would have accrued thereon shall be  adjusted towards the compensation received by the claimant  within four weeks from the date of communication of this  order whereafter, the Motor Vehicles Accident Claims  Tribunal shall proceed to determine their claim petitions  filed under Section 166 of the Act in accordance with law.   This order shall not be treated as a precedent.

       Section 163-A was introduced in the year 1994.  The  executive authority of the Central Government has the  requisite jurisdiction to amend the Second Schedule from  time to time.  Having regard to the inflation and fall in  the rate of bank interest; it is desirable that the Central  Government bestows serious consideration to this aspect of  the matter.

       Subject to the aforementioned directions, the appeals  and the review petitions are dismissed. No Costs.