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PETITIONER: DEEPAK SIBAL & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: PUNJAB UNIVERSITY AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT14/02/1989

BENCH: DUTT, M.M. (J) BENCH: DUTT, M.M. (J) THOMMEN, T.K. (J)

CITATION:  1989 AIR  903            1989 SCR  (1) 689  1989 SCC  (2) 145        JT 1989  Supl.      2  1989 SCALE  (1)409  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1992 SC   1  (126)

ACT:     Constitution of India, 1950: Arts. 14 & 15(4)--Admission of    evening   classes   of   LL.B.   Degree   of    Punjab University--Rule restricting admission to regular  employees of  Government  and  semi-Government  institutions--Validity of--Classification should satisfy tests laid  down-Surround- ing circumstances--When relevant--Classification by  identi- fication  of sources should not be  arbitrary--Cent  percent reservation  of seats for certain classes of persons to  the exclusion of merit candidates-Whether valid.     Art.  13--Doctrine of severability--When part of a  rule held violative of Art. 14 and prima facie not severable from valid part--Whether entire rule to be struck down.     Professional  Colleges--Admission  to:  Punjab   Univer- sity-Admission  to evening class of LL.B. course--Rule  pro- viding  that admission open only to ’regular  employees’  of Government/Semi-Government  institutions--Employees of  pri- vate institutions excluded-Whether discriminatory and viola- tive  of  Art.  14--Cent percent reservation  of  seats  for certain  classes of persons only to the exclusion  of  merit candidates--Whether valid.

HEADNOTE:     The  prospectus for the year 1988/89, for  admission  in the  evening classes of the Three-Year LL.B.  Degree  Course conducted by the Department of Laws of the Punjab  Universi- ty,  prescribed that admission to evening classes  was  open only  to  regular employees of  Government/  Semi-Government institutions/affiliated Colleges/Statutory Corporations  and Government  Companies and that a candidate should attach  No Objection/Permission  letter  from  his  employer  with  his application for admission. Out of the 150 seats available in the evening classes, 64 were reserved for scheduled  castes, scheduled  tribes, backward classes, physically  handicapped persons, outstanding sportsmen and defence personnel and the remaining 86 were reserved for regular employees of  Govern- ment/Semi-Government institutions etc., as mentioned in  the aforesaid rule for admission.  690

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   The two appellants, one employed in a Limited Company, a joint  venture with an Undertaking of the  State  Government and  the  other working as a temporary employee in  a  State Government  office,  applied for admission  in  the  evening classes with ’No Objection Certificates’ from their  employ- ees. Both were interviewed but were not. selected,  although their positions in the merit list were 29 and 19 respective- ly,  on  the ground that wile one of the appellants  was  an employee of a Public Limited Company and did not fall within the exclusive categories as mentioned in the impugned  rule, the other was only a temporary employee.     Both  the  appellants filed writ petitions in  the  High Court, challenging the validity of the impugned rule.  Peti- tions  were also filed by five other refused candidates.  It was  contended that the impugned rule was violative of  Art. 14  of the Constitution. The High Court dismissed  the  writ petitions.  While  upholding the validity  of  the  impugned rule,  the  High Court held that  Government  employees  had protection of Art. 311 of the Constitution which non-Govern- ment  employees did not have and that the employees  of  the Semi-Government institutions were also on the same  footing. Hence the two appellants filed appeals in this Court.     In  the  counter affidavit filed in this Court  the  re- spondents sought to justify the exclusion of private employ- ees,  restricting admission to evening classes only  to  the Government  employees and similar other institutions on  the grounds  of production of bogus certificates  of  employment from  private employers and imparting of legal education  to the  employees of the Government/Semi-Government  and  other institutions  as in public interest. It was  also  contended that a candidate should have an assured tenure of employment likely  to  continue  for three years and that,  as  far  as possible,  there  should be no possibility of wastage  of  a seat. Allowing the appeals,     HELD:  1.1 Article 14 forbids legislation, but does  not forbid  reasonable classification. Whether a  classification is  a permissible classification under Art. 14 or  not,  two conditions must be satisfied, namely, (1) that the classifi- cation must be rounded on an intelligible differentia  which distinguishes  persons or things that are  grouped  together from others left out of the group, and (2) that the  differ- entia must have a rational nexus to the object sought to  be achieved by the statute in question. [697F] 691     1.2 In considering the reasonableness of  classification from  the point of view of Art. 14 of the Constitution,  the Court has to consider the objective for such classification. If the objective be illogical, unfair and unjust, necessari- ly the classification will have to be held as  unreasonable. [703C-D]     1.3  No  doubt, a classification need not be  made  with mathematical precision but, if there be little or no differ- ence  between the persons or things which have been  grouped together and those left out of the group, then the classifi- cation cannot be said to be a reasonable one. [700C]     1.4 Surrounding circumstances may be taken into  consid- eration  in support of the constitutionality of a law  which is  otherwise hostile or discriminatory in nature.  But  the circumstances must be such as to justify the  discriminatory treatment or the classification subserving the object sought to be achieved. [700G-H]     Ram  Krishna  Dalmia  v. Shri  Justice  S.R.  Tendolkar, [1959] SCR 279, relied on.     1.5  A classification by the identification  of  sources

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most  not be arbitrary but should be on a  reasonable  basis having  a  nexus  with the object  sought  to  be  achieved. [704H;705A4]     Chitra  Ghosh  v. Union of India, [1970] 1 SCR  413  and D.N.  Chanchala  v. State of Mysore, [1971]  Supp.  SCR  608 relied on.     1.6  In the instant case, the objective of starting  the evening  classes was to accommodate in the  evening  classes employees  in general including private employees  who  were unable  to attend morning classes because of  their  employ- ment. However, in framing the impugned rule, the respondents have  deviated from its objective for starting  the  evening classes. [699F-G]     The classification of the employees of  Government/Semi- Government  institutions etc. by the impugned rule  for  the purpose  of admission in the evening classes  of  Three-Year LL.B. Degree Course to the exclusion of all other employees, is unreasonable and unjust, as it does not subserve any fair and logical objective. [703D]     The  Government  and public sector employees  cannot  be equated  with  Government  undertaking  and  companies.  The classification of 692 Government  undertakings and companies may, in certain  cir- cumstances,  be a reasonable classification  satisfying  the tests laid down but the employees of Government/Semi-Govern- ment  institutions etc., as mentioned in the impugned  rule, cannot be held to constitute a valid classification for  the purpose of admission to evening classes of Three years LL.B. Degree Course. [703F-G]     Hindustan  Paper  Corpn. Ltd. v. Government  of  Kerala, [1986] 3 SCC 398, distinguished.     1.7  The Government employees or the employees of  Semi- Government and other institutions cannot stand on a  differ- ent footing from the employees of private concerns,  insofar as  the  question of admission to evening  classes  is  con- cerned. [699H]     Though  the service conditions of employees  of  Govern- ment/SemiGovernment  institutions  etc. are  different,  and they  may  have  greater security of  service,  that  hardly matters for the purpose of admission in the evening classes. The test is whether both the employees of private establish- ments and the employees of Government/Semi-Government insti- tutions  etc. are equally in a disadvantageous  position  in attending  morning classes. There can be no doubt that  both of them stand on an equal footing and there is no difference between  these two classes of employees in that  regard.  To exclude  the employees of private establishments  will  not, therefore, satisfy the test of intelligible differentia that distinguishes  the employees  of  Government/Semi-Government institutions  etc., grouped together from the  employees  of private establishments. [700A-C]     1.8  Though  an educational institution is  entitled  to identify  sources from which admission will be made in  such institution,  there is no difference between  identification of the sources and a classification. If any source is speci- fied,  such source must also satisfy the test of  reasonable classification  and also that it has a rational  nexus  with the object sought to be achieved. The sources must be  clas- sified  on  reasonable basis, that is to say, it  cannot  be classified  arbitrarily and unreasonably. The impugned  rule does  not satisfy the test laid down in this regard.  [704D, F]     Chitra  Ghosh  v. Union of India, [1970] 1 SCR  413  and D.N.  Chanchala  v. State of Mysore, [1971] Supp.  SCR  608,

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relied on. 1.9 The circumstances relied on by the respondents,  namely, the  693 possibility of production by the candidates of bogus certif- icates and insecurity of their services are not such circum- stances  as will justify the exclusion of the  employees  of private  establishments  from the  evening  classes.  [700H; 701A]     Ram  Krishna  Dalmia v. Shri Justice  S.  R.  Tendolkar, [1959] SCR 279, explained.     1.10  The exclusion of employees of  private  establish- ments  cannot also be justified on  administrative  grounds. The respondents have not placed any material before the High Court or in this Court as to in how many cases they had come across  bogus  certificates produced  by  private  employees during  the time the admission to evening classes  was  open also to private employees. It may be that there were one  or two  cases  of production of bogus  certificates,  but  that cannot be a ground for the exclusion of all private  employ- ees  from  the  benefit of getting legal  education  in  the evening classes. [701E-F] Pannalal  Binjraj v. Union of India, [1957] SCR 233  distin- guished-     1.11  There is no material to indicate that by  the  ex- pression "regular employees" it is intended to include  only those  employees who will have an assured tenure of  service for  three  years,  that is to say,  co-extensive  with  the period of the Three-Year LL.B. Degree Course. The expression "regular  employees",  normally means bona  fide  employees. Such bona fide employees may be permanent or temporary.  All that the University can insist is that one should be a  bona fide  employee  and  if there be materials to  show  that  a candidate  for  admission in the evening classes is  a  bona fide  employee, the University cannot further insist  on  an assured  tenure of service of such an employee for a  period of three years. The reason for exclusion of private  employ- ees on the ground that there may not be an assured tenure of employment  likely to continue for three  years,  therefore, not  only  does not stand scrutiny but is  also  unfair  and unjust  and  cannot  form the basis of  such  an  exclusion. [702A-C]     1.12 It is difficult to understand the logic of the rule restricting admission in the evening classes to employees of Government/SemiGovernment institutions etc. on the plea that such  employees require legal education in public  interest. It  may  be that certain sections  of  Government  employees require legal education hut, surely Government employees  in general  do  not require legal  education.  Certain  private sector  employees  may also require legal education  in  the interest of the  694 establishments  of  which  they are  employees.  It  cannot, therefore,  be  laid  down that  only  Government  employees require legal education and not private employees. [703B] Jolly v. State of Kerala, AIR 1974 Kerala 178, approved.     The  impugned rule, having made a  classification  which cannot be justified on any reasonable basis, must be held to be discriminatory and violative of Art. 14 of the  Constitu- tion. [705B]     2.  It  is not possible to bring the  impugned  rule  in conformity  with the provision of Art. 14 by putting a  full stop  after the words "regular employees" and striking  down remaining  part of the impugned rule, so as to read  "Admis- sion to evening classes is open only to regular  employees".

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Prima facie, the part which is sought to be retained is  not severable  from the remaining part of the rule. The  invalid portion  is inextricably mixed up with the valid portion  of the  rule and, accordingly, the entire rule requires  to  be struck down. [705G-H]     R.M.D.  Chamarbaugwalla  v. Union of India,  [1957]  SCR 930, relied on.     B.  Prabhakar  Rao v. State of  Andhra  Pradesh,  [1985] Supp. SCC 432, distinguished.     3. Article 15(4) does not contemplate to reserve all the seats or the majority of the seats in an educational  insti- tution  at  the cost of the rest of the  society.  The  same principle should also apply with equal force in the case  of cent  percent reservation of seats in  educational  institu- tions  for  a certain class of persons to the  exclusion  of meritorious candidates. [707A-B]     M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, [1963] Supp. 1 SCR  439; Pradeep  Jain v. Union of India, [1984] 3 SCR 942 and  Nida- marti Maheshkumar v. State of Maharashtra, [1986] 2 SCC 534, relied on.     In  the instant case, the respondents have  reserved  64 seats  out  of  150 seats for  Scheduled  Castes,  Scheduled Tribes, backward classes etc. Out of the remaining 86 seats, reservation of seats for regular or bona fide employees  for admission to evening classes should, in no event, exceed the limit  of  50 per cent. The admission to  the  remaining  43 seats will be open to the general candidates on merit basis. Thus,  while the respondents will be at liberty  to  reserve seats for regular or bona fide 695 employees for admission to evening classes, such reservation should not exceed SO per cent after deducting the number  of seats  reserved  for  Scheduled  Castes,  Scheduled  Tribes, backward classes etc. [709B-C]     4. The impugned rule is discriminatory and violative  of Art.  14 of the Constitution and is accordingly struck  down as  invalid.  The refusal by the respondents  to  admit  the appellants  in the evening classes of the Three-Years  LL.B. degree  course was illegal. The appellants  are,  therefore, entitled to he admitted in the evening classes. However, the striking down of the impugned rule should not in any  manner whatsoever  disturb  the  admissions already  made  for  the session 1988-89. The respondents should admit the appellants in  the  second semester which has commenced  from  January, 1989 and allow them to complete the Three-Year LL.B.  degree course, if not otherwise ineligible an the ground of  unsat- isfactory  academic performance. The seats allocated to  the appellants  will  be  in addition to the  normal  intake  of students in the college. [710D-F] Ajay  Hasia  v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, [1981]  2  SCR  79, relied on.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 837  and 838 of 1989.     From the Judgment and Order dated 12.9.1988 of the  High Court of Punjab and Haryana in C.W.P. Nos. 6871 and 6485  of 1988 respectively.     Kapil Sibal, Rajiv Dhawan and Ms. Kamini Jaiswal for the Appellants.     P.P. Rao, R.K. Gupta, Janendra Lal, Ms. Purnima Bhat and E.C. Agarwala for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

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    DUTT,  J. Special leave is granted in both  these  mat- ters. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.      These  two appeals preferred by the appellants,  Deepak Sibal and Miss Ritu Khanna, are directed against the  common judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court whereby the High Court  dismissed the two writ petitions filed by the  appel- lants and also some other writ   696 petitions  challenging  the constitutional validity  of  the rule for admission in the evening classes of the Three-Years LL.B.  Degree Course conducted by the Department of Laws  of the Punjab University.     The  impugned rule that was published in the  prospectus for  the year 1988-89 relating to admission to 150 seats  in the evening classes in the Three-Year LL.B. Degree Course is extracted as follows:               "Admission to evening classes is open only  to               regular  employees of  Government/Semi-Govern-               ment institutions/ affiliated  colleges/Statu-               tory Corporations and Government Companies.  A               candidate   applying  for  admission  to   the               evening     classes    should    attach     No               Objection/Permission  letter from his  present               employer with his application for admission."     It  is  not  disputed that there are 150  seats  in  the morning classes and another 150 seats in the evening  class- es. In both the morning and evening classes reservation  has been  made for scheduled castes, scheduled tribes,  backward classes,  physically  handicapped persons,  outstanding  and defence personnel. In the morning classes out of 150  seats, 64  seats  are  reserved  for  scheduled  castes,  scheduled tribes, backward classes etc. and the remaining 86 seats are allotted to general students selected on merit basis.  Simi- larly  in  the evening classes, the remaining 86  seats  are also  reserved  for regular  employees  of  Government/Semi- Government  institutions etc., as mentioned in the  impugned rule for admission.     The  appellant,  Deepak Sibal, passed  the  Bachelor  of Commerce Examination from the University of Punjab in  June, 1981 securing 61.5 per cent marks in the aggregate. On  June 1, 1988, he was appointed to the post of Accountant in  Agro Chem Punjab Ltd. with effect from June 2, 1988 on  probation for a period of six months. Agro Chem Punjab Ltd. is  stated to  be  a joint venture with Punjab Agro  Corporation  Ltd., Chandigarh, an Undertaking of the Punjab Government.     On July, 18, 1988, the appellant, Deepak Sibal,  applied for admission in the evening classes of the Punjab Universi- ty for the Three-Year LL.B. Degree Course with a ’No  Objec- tion Certificate’ from his employer dated July 18, 1988.  He was  granted  an  interview sometime in the  first  week  of August,  1988, but he was not selected. On enquiry, he  came to know that although his position was 29 in the merit list, he was declared ineligible because he was an employee of a 697 Public Limited Company and did not fall within the exclusive categories,  as  mentioned in the impugned  rule,  to  which admission in the evening classes was restricted.     The other appellant, namely Miss Ritu Khanna, passed the Bachelor  of  Arts Examination from  the  Punjab  University securing  4 18 marks out of 650 marks. She  was  temporarily appointed to the post of Helper in the office of the  Direc- tor, Water Resources, Punjab. She also applied for admission in the evening classes of the Three-Year LL.B. Degree Course of  the University with all requisite certificates  on  July 18, 1988. She was granted an interview on July 30, 1988  and

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although her position in the merit list was 19, she was  not selected  for  admission on the ground that she was  only  a temporary employee.     Both  the appellants, being aggrieved by the refusal  of the  University to admit them in the evening classes of  the Three-Year  LL.B.  Degree Course, filed  two  separate  writ petitions  in the Punjab & Haryana High  Court  challenging, inter  alia,  the constitutional validity  of  the  impugned rule.  Five  other  writ petitions were also  filed  by  the candidates who were refused admission in the evening classes in  view  of the impugned rule. At the hearing of  the  writ petitions before the High Court, it was contended on  behalf of  the petitioners including the appellants, that  the  im- pugned rule was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The  High  Court  overruled the contention  and,  as  stated already,  dismissed  the  writ petitions.  Hence  these  two appeals by the two appellants.     It  is  now well settled that Article 14  forbids  class legislation, but does not forbid reasonable  classification. Whether  a  classification is a  permissible  classification under  Article 14 or not, two conditions must be  satisfied, namely,  (1) that the classification must be rounded  on  an intelligible  differentia  which  distinguishes  persons  or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group,  and  (2) that the differentia must have  a  rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the statute  in question.     By the impugned rule, a classification has been made for the  purpose of admission to the evening classes. The  ques- tion is whether the classification is a reasonable classifi- cation within the meaning of Article 14 of the Constitution. In  order to consider the question as to the  reasonableness of the classification, it is necessary to take into  account the  objective for such classification. It has been  averred in  the written statement of Dr. Balram Kumar Gupta,  Chair- man, Depart-  698 ment of Laws, Punjab University, the respondent No. 2, filed in  the  High  Court, that the object  of  starting  evening classes was to provide education to bona fide employees  who could  not  attend the morning classes on account  of  their employment.  The object, therefore, was to accommodate  bona fide  employees in the evening classes, as they were  unable to  attend the morning classes on account of  their  employ- ment.  Admission to evening classes is not open to  the  em- ployees  in general including private sector employees,  but it  is restricted to regular employees  of  Government/Semi- Government  institutions etc., as mentioned in the  impugned rule.  In  other words, the  employees  of  Government/Semi- Government institutions etc. have been grouped together as a class  to the exclusion of employees of  private  establish- ments.     It appears that in or about the year 1986, admission  to evening  classes  was open to those who were  in  bona  fide employment including self-employed persons. In  supersession of that rule, the impugned rule was flamed excluding private sector employees and self-employed persons. In the  counter- affidavit  filed in this Court on behalf of the  respondents by  the Registrar of the Punjab University,  an  explanation has  been given why the University flamed the impugned  rule restricting  the  admission in the evening classes  open  to Government/SemiGovernment institutions etc. The explanation, as given in the counteraffidavit, is extracted below:               "It is submitted that since the morning class-               es are open to all, the merit is much  higher,

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             whereas  since  the admission to  the  evening               classes  is  only  for  regular  employees  of               Government/Semi-Government etc. the merit goes               lower.  It is in this view of the matter  that               in the past also, the Department of Law  found               that  various certificates by  employees  were               found  to be incorrect and obtained by  appli-               cants only with a view to get admission to the               evening  classes and, thereafter, applied  for               transfer to the morning classes. On account of               the  past  experience  it was  felt  that  the               admission to the Law Courses in the morning be               kept  open to all persons whether employed  or               unemployed  but the admission to  the  evening               classes  be restricted to only those who  will               be  genuine  and regular employee.  Since  the               Government/Semi-Government  and similar  other               institutions  as mentioned in  the  prospectus               are actually involved in lot of litigation, it               was felt that imparting legal education to the               employees  of  such institutions would  be  in               public                699               interest.  It is submitted that it is in  view               of this practice of issuing of certificates by               private employers in the past that the Depart-               ment  of  Law was compelled  to  restrict  the               admission  of students of evening  classes  as               has been done.     Thus, the respondents have sought to justify the  exclu- sion  of private employees restricting admission to  evening classes  only to the Government/Semi-Government and  similar other  institutions principally on two grounds, namely,  (1) production of bogus certificates of employment from  private employers,  and  (2)  imparting of legal  education  to  the employees of the Government/Semi-Government and other insti- tutions, as mentioned in the impugned rule, in public inter- est.  Besides the above two grounds, Mr. P.P.  Rao,  learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, has added two more grounds, namely, (1) a candidate should have an assured tenure of employment likely to continue for three years, and (2)  as far as possible, there should be no  possibility  of wastage  of a seat. It is submitted that employees  of  only Government/Semi-Government institutions etc. have an assured tenure  of  employment and if the admission in  the  evening classes  is restricted to such employees, there would be  no possibility of any wastage of a seat and the University will not  have to engage itself in finding out whether or  not  a certificate produced by an employee of a private  establish- ment is a bogus certificate and whether such employee has an assured  tenure of employment likely to continue  for  three years.  In upholding the validity of the impugned  rule,  it has  been  observed by the High Court  that  the  Government employees  have protection of Article 311 of  the  Constitu- tion,  which non-Government employees do not have  and  that employees  of  SemiGovernment institutions are also  on  the same footing.     It  is apparent that in framing the impugned  rule,  the respondents have deviated from its objective for the  start- ing of evening classes. The objective was to accommodate  in the  evening classes employees in general including  private employees who were unable to attend morning classes  because of  their employment. In this backdrop of facts, we  are  to consider the reasonableness of the classification as contem- plated by the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution.

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   It  is difficult to accept the contention that the  Gov- ernment  employees or the employees of  Semi-Government  and other institutions, as mentioned in the impugned rule, stand on  a different footing from the employees of  private  con- cerns,  in  so far as the question of admission  to  evening classes is concerned. It is true that the service condi-  700 tions  of employees of  Government/Semi-Government  institu- tions etc, are different, and they may have greater security of  service,  but  that hardly matters for  the  purpose  of admission  in the evening classes. The test is  whether  the employees of private establishments are equally in a  disad- vantageous  position like the employees of  Government/Semi- Government  institutions etc. in attending morning  classes. There  can be no doubt and it is not disputed that  both  of them  stand on an equal footing and there is  no  difference between  these two classes of employees in that  regard.  To exclude  the employees of private establishments  will  not, therefore, satisfy the test of intelligible differentia that distinguishes  the employees  of  Government/Semi-Government institutions  etc.  grouped together from the  employees  of private  establishments.  It is true that  a  classification need  not be made with mathematical precision but, if  there be  little  or no difference between the persons  or  things which  have been grouped together and those left out of  the group, in that case, the classification cannot be said to be a reasonable one.     It  is, however, submitted on behalf of the  respondents that the employees of private establishments have been  left out as it is difficult for the University to verify  whether or  not a particular candidate is really a regular  employee and  whether he will have a tenure for at least three  years during  which  he  will be prosecuting his  studies  in  the Three-Year  LL.B.  Degree Course. It is  submitted  that  in making the classification, the surrounding circumstances may be taken into account. In support’ of that contention,  much reliance  has been placed on the decision of this  Court  in Ram  Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R.  Tendolkar,  [1959] SCR  279.  In that case, it has been observed by  Das,  C.J. that  while good faith and knowledge of the existing  condi- tions  on the part of a legislature are to be  presumed,  if there  is nothing on the face of the law or the  surrounding circumstances  brought to the notice of the court  on  which the classification may reasonably be regarded as based,  the presumption  of constitutionality cannot be carried  to  the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and  unknown reasons for subjecting certain  individuals  or corporations  to hostile or discriminating  legislation.  It follows from the observation that surrounding  circumstances may be taken into consideration in support of the  constitu- tionality of a law which is otherwise hostile or discrimina- tory  in  nature. But the circumstances must be such  as  to justify  the discriminatory treatment or the  classification subserving the object sought to be achieved. In the  instant case,  the  circumstances which have been relied on  by  the respondents,  namely, the possibility of production by  them of bogus  701 certificates  and insecurity of their services are  not,  in our  opinion, such circumstances as will justify the  exclu- sion  of  the employees of private establishments  from  the evening classes.     We  are  also  unable to accept the  contention  of  the respondents that such exclusion of the employees of  private establishments is justified on the ground of  administrative

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convenience.  The decision in Pannalal Binjraj v.  Union  of India, [1957] SCR 233 relied on by the respondents does not, in  our  opinion, lay down any such proposition of  law.  In that case, the provision of section 5(7)A of the Income  Tax Act 1982 was, inter alia, challenged as ultra vires  Article 14  of the Constitution inasmuch as it  was  discriminatory. Section  5(7A) confers power on the Commissioner  of  Income Tax and the Central Board of Revenue, inter alia, to  trans- fer any case from one Income Tax Officer to another. It  has been  observed by this Court that in order to  minimise  the inconvenience  of the assessee, the authority concerned  may transfer the case of such assessee to the Income Tax Officer who is nearest to the area where it would be convenient  for the assessee to attend and if, on account of  administrative exigencies,  this is not possible and the assessee  requests that  the  examination of accounts or evidence to  be  taken should  be  in  a place convenient to him,  the  Income  Tax Officer  comply with the request of the assessee by  holding the  hearing at the place requested. It is manifestly  clear from  the  observation  that the power of  transfer  is  not exercised  for administrative convenience, but for the  con- venience  of the assessee. In the instant case, there is  no question  of any administrative inconvenience. The  respond- ents  have not placed any material before the High Court  or in  this Court as to in how many cases they had come  across such bogus certificates produced by private employees during the  time the admission to evening classes was open also  to private  employees.  It may be that there were  one  or  two cases  of production of bogus certificates, but that  cannot be a ground for the exclusion of all private employees  from the benefit of getting legal education in the evening class- es.     In  the circumstances, we are not at all impressed  with the  contention that in order to avoid production  of  bogus certificates  of employment from the private  employers  and having    regard   to   the   fact   that    employees    of Government/Semi-Government institutions etc. have an assured tenure of employment likely to continue for three years, the private employees were excluded for the purpose of admission to  the evening classes. By the impugned rule, admission  to evening  classes is restricted to regular employees of  Gov- ernment/Semi-Government  702 institutions  etc. There is no material to indicate that  by the expression "regular employees" it is intended to include only  those  employees who will have an  assured  tenure  of service  for three years, that is to say, co-extensive  with the  period of the Three-Year LL.B. Degree Course.  The  ex- pression "regular employees", in our opinion, normally means bona fide employees. Such bona fide employees may be  perma- nent  or  temporary. All that the University can  insist  is that  one  should be a bona fide employee and  if  there  be materials  for  show that a candidate for admission  in  the evening  classes is a bona fide employee the University,  in our  opinion, cannot further insist on an assured tenure  of service of such an employee for a period of three years.  Be that as it may, the reason for exclusion of private  employ- ees on the ground that there may not be an assured tenure of employment likely to continue for three years, not only does not stand scrutiny but also is unfair and unjust and  cannot form the basis of such an exclusion.     In  this connection, we may also examine another  ground restricting  the  admission in the evening  classes  to  the employees  of Government/Semi-Government and other  institu- tions, as mentioned in the impugned rule, namely,  imparting

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of  legal  education  to such employees.  According  to  the respondents,  imparting of legal education to the  employees of  Government/Semi-Government  and other  institutions,  as mentioned in the impugned rule, would be in public interest. Indeed,  in  the counter-affidavit filed in  this  Court  on behalf of the respondents by the Registrar of the  Universi- ty,  that  is also the objective for  framing  the  impugned rule.  The counter-affidavit is, however, silent as  to  why imparting   of   legal  education  to   the   employees   of Government/Semi-Government  institutions  etc. would  be  in public    interest.   It   is   not    understandable    why Government/SemiGovernment  employees  in general  should  be imparted  legal education and what sort of  public  interest would  be  served by such legal education. It  may  be  that certain  sections  of  Government  employees  require  legal education  but, surely, Government employees in  general  do not require legal education.     A  similar rule, which was framed by the  Government  of Kerala  reserving  100  per cent  seats  to  Government  and quasi-Government  employees irrespective of their  category, came  to be considered by the Kerala High Court in Jolly  v. State  of Kerala, AIR 1974 Kerala 178. In that case, it  has been  observed by the Kerala ’High Court that there  may  be some posts in Government service, some even in public corpo- rations  which  may require incumbents who may  be  able  to perform their functions very efficiently with a legal  back- ground provided to  703 them,  but this cannot be said of all employees  whether  of the State Government or Central Government or of the  public corporations or Government owned companies. In our  opinion, there  is much force in the observation of the  Kerala  High Court. It cannot be laid down that only Government employees require  legal education and not private employees.  Certain private sector employees may require legal education in  the interest of the establishments of which they are  employees. It  is  difficult to understand the logic of  the  rule  re- stricting  admission in the evening classes to employees  of Government/Semi-Government  institutions  etc. on  the  plea that such employees require legal education in public inter- est.     In considering the reasonableness of classification from the  point  of view of Article 14 of the  Constitution,  the Court has also to consider the objective for such  classifi- cation.  If the objective be illogical, unfair  and  unjust, necessarily  the  classification  will have to  be  held  as unreasonable. In the instant case, the foregoing  discussion reveals that the classification of the employees of  Govern- ment/Semi-Government institutions etc. by the impugned  rule for  the  purpose  of admission in the  evening  classes  or Three-Year LL.B. Degree Course to the exclusion of all other employees,  is unreasonable and unjust, as it does not  sub- serve  any fair and logical objective. it is, however,  sub- mitted  that  classification  in favour  of  Government  and public  sector is a reasonable and valid classification.  In support of that contention, the decision in Hindustan  Paper Corpn.  Ltd. v. Government of Kerala, [1986] 3 SCC  398  has been  relied on by the learned Counsel for the  respondents. In that case, it has been observed that as far as Government undertakings and companies are concerned, it has to be  held that they form a class by themselves, since any project that they may make would in the end result in the benefit to  the members  of  the general public. The Government  and  public sector employees cannot be equated with Government undertak- ings and companies. The classification of Government  under-

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takings  and companies may, in certain circumstances,  be  a reasonably classification satisfying the two tests mentioned above,  but  it is difficult to hold that the  employees  of Government/Semi-Government  institutions etc., as  mentioned in the impugned rule, would also constitute a valid  classi- fication for the purpose of admission to evening classes  of Three-Year  LL.B.  Degree  Course. The  contention  in  this regard, in our opinion, is without any substance.     The  next  contention  of the respondents  is  that  the University, being an educational institution, is entitled to identify the sources for  704 admission  to the evening classes and that has been done  by the  University  by  the impugned rule and  that  cannot  be challenged  as violative of Article 14 of the  Constitution. In support of this contention, much reliance has been placed on behalf of the respondents on a decision of this Court  in Chitra Ghosh v. Union of India, [1970] 1 SCR 413 relating to reservation of seats in a medical college. In upholding such reservation  of seats it has been observed by this Court  as follows:               "It is the Central Government which bears  the               financial  burden of running the medical  col-               lege.  It is for it to lay down  the  criteria               for  eligibility.  From  the  very  nature  of               things it is not possible to throw the  admis-               sion open to students from all over the  coun-               try. The Government cannot be denied right  to               decide from what sources the admission will be               made."     This  observation in Chitra Ghosh’s case has  also  been relied  on by the High Court. It has been contended  by  the learned  Counsel  for the respondents that the  question  of reasonable classification has nothing to do with the identi- fication of sources for admission by an educational institu- tion.  We  are unable to accept the contention. It  is  true that  an  educational institution is  entitled  to  identify sources  from which admission will be made to such  institu- tion, but we do not find any difference between  identifica- tion  of  a source and a classification. If  any  source  is specified, such source must also satisfy the test of reason- able classification and also that it has a rational nexus to the  object sought to be achieved. Indeed in Chitra  Ghosh’s case,  it  has also been observed that if  the  sources  are properly classified whether on territorial, geographical  or other  reasonable basis, it is not for the courts to  inter- fere  with the manner and method of making  the  classifica- tion.  It  is  very clear from  this  observation  that  the sources  must be classified on reasonable basis, that is  to say, it cannot be classified arbitrarily and unreasonably.     The principle laid down in Chitra Ghosh’s case has  been reiterated  by this Court in a later decision in D.N.  Chan- chala v. State of Mysore, [1971] Supp. SCR 608. It has  been very  clearly laid down by this Court that  Government  col- leges are entitled to lay down criteria for admission in its own colleges and to decide the sources from which  admission would  be made, provided of course, such  classification  is not  arbitrary  and has a rational basis  and  a  reasonable connection  with  the object of the rules. Thus, it  is  now well established that a classification by the identification of a source must not be arbitrary, but should 705 be  on  a reasonable basis having a nexus  with  the  object sought to be achieved by the rules for such admission.     It  follows from the above discussion that the  impugned

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rule, with which we are concerned, having made a classifica- tion which cannot be justified on any reasonable basis, must be held to be discriminatory and violative of Article 14  of the Constitution. It is, however, submitted by Mr. P.P.  Rao that  in  case the Court holds  against  the  constitutional validity  of the impugned rule, the entire rule may  not  be quashed,  but only such portion of it which is found  to  be discriminatory  in nature and, as such, invalid. It is  con- tended  that  if the impugned rule had  not  restricted  the admission   to   evening  classes  to   the   employees   of Government/Semi-Government institutions etc. but had provid- ed for admission to regular employees including employees of private  sectors, the classification would have been a  rea- sonable one and having a rational nexus to the object sought to  be  achieved  by the rule, namely,  to  accommodate  the regular  employees in the evening classes, as they would  be unable  to  attend the morning classes. Accordingly,  it  is submitted  that  instead of striking down the whole  of  the impugned  rule,  a  full stop may be  put  after  the  words "regular  employees" in the impugned rule and the  remaining part of the rule after the said words can be struck down  as discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the  Constitu- tion.  If that be done, the rule will be read as  "Admission to evening classes is open only to regular employees". Prima facie  it  appears  that this part, which is  sought  to  be retained,  is not severable from the remaining part  of  the rule.  In R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of  India,  [1957] SCR  930  it has been laid down by this Court  that  if  the valid  and invalid provisions are so inextricably  mixed  up that  they  cannot be separated from one  another  then  the invalidity  of the portion must result in the invalidity  in its  entirety. In the instant case, the invalid  portion  is inextricably  mixed  up with the valid portion of  the  rule and,  accordingly,  the entire rule requires  to  be  struck down.  Our  attention has, however, been drawn  to  a  later decision  of  this  Court in B. Prabhakar Rao  v.  State  of Andhra Pradesh, [1985] Supp. SCC 432. In this case, a  Bench of Three-Judges of this Court struck out the word ’not’ from the  provisions of clause 3(1) of Ordinance 24 of  1984  and section  4(1)  of  the Act 3 of 1984 so as  to  bring  those provisions  to conform to the requirements of Article 14  of the Constitution. We do not think we should try to bring the impugned rule in conformity with the provision of Article 14 of  the constitution by putting a full stop after the  words "regular employees" and striking down the remaining part  of the  impugned rule on the basis of the same principle as  in Prabhakar Rao’s case (supra). For, it has  706 been  stated  by Mr. P.P. Rao, learned Counsel for  the  re- spondents; that the respondents will frame a fresh rule  for admission  in the evening classes in conformity with and  in the light of the decision of this Court in the instant case.     But, the next important question is even if the restric- tion from the impugned rule is removed and the admission  to evening classes is made open to regular or bona fide employ- ees  including  Government  and  non-Government   employees, whether  reservation  of cent percent seats in  the  evening classes for the employees will be justified and  reasonable. It  has been urged by Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned  Counsel  ap- pearing on behalf of the appellants, that reservation of 100 per cent seats in an educational institution for a specified class of persons is not at all permissible. The  University, being  an  autonomous  body, must be  accessible,  and  such access must be based on the principle that those who are the most  meritorious  must be preferred to those who  are  less

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meritorious.  This  principle is, however,  subject  to  the provision  of Article 15 of the Constitution of India  which allows positive discrimination, despite the merit principle, on the basis that the equality clause will not be meaningful unless equal opportunity is given to such classes enumerated by  Article 15 by giving them preferential treatment.  Apart from the provision of Article 15, reservation may be made on the  basis of doctrine of source only with a view to  giving equal  opportunity to some disadvantaged classes  for  their education but, learned Counsel submits, whether the reserva- tion  is  made under Article 15(4) of  the  Constitution  or otherwise on the theory of identification of source, in  any event,  such reservation cannot be 100 per cent at the  cost of merit.     In  our  opinion, the above contention  is  not  without force.  In  this connection, we may refer to a  decision  of this Court in M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, [1963] Supp. 1 SCR  439. In that case, the State of Mysore passed an  order reserving 68 per cent of seats in the engineering and  medi- cal colleges and other technical institutions for the educa- tionally and socially backward classes and Scheduled  Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and left only 32 per cent of seats for the  merit pool. In striking down such reservation,  it  was observed by this Court that it would be extremely unreasona- ble  to  assume that in enacting Article  15(4),  Parliament intended to provide that where the advancement of the  back- ward  classes or the Scheduled Castes and  Scheduled  Tribes was  concerned, the fundamental rights of the citizens  con- stituting the rest of the society were to be completely  and absolutely  ignored. Speaking generally and in a broad  way, it was observed by this Court  707 that a special provision should be less than 50 per cent and the actual percentage must depend upon the relevant prevail- ing  circumstances  in  each case. Thus,  the  provision  of Article 15(4) does not contemplate to reserve all the  seats or  the majority of the seats in an educational  institution at  the cost of the rest of the society. The same  principle should  also  apply  with equal force in the  case  of  cent percent reservation of seats in educational institutions for a  certain class of persons to the exclusion of  meritorious candidates.     In Pradeep Jain v. Union of India, [1984] 3 SCR 942, the question  of  reservation of seats in medical  colleges  for MBBS  and  ’postgraduate  medical courses on  the  basis  of domicile  or  residential  qualification  and  institutional preference,  came to be considered by this Court.  Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court observed that the effort must always be to select the best and most  meritori- ous  students  for admission to technical  institutions  and medical  colleges  by  providing equal  opportunity  to  all citizens  in the country and expressed an opinion that  such reservation  should, in no event, exceed the outer limit  of 70 per cent which again needs to be reduced.     In  Pradeep  Jain’s case (supra), no reason  appears  to have been given for the observation relating to the reserva- tion  of 70 per cent of seats. In a later decision  of  this Court  in  Nidamarti Maheshkumar v.  State  of  Maharashtra, [1986]  2 SCC 534 a more or less similar question  regarding regionwise  reservation  of seats in  medical  colleges  for admission  to  MBBS Course also came to be  considered,  and this  time Bhagwati, C.J., speaking for the Court, gave  the reason  for  reservation  of 70 per cent of  seats.  It  was observed by the learned Chief Justice as follows:               "In the first place it would cause a consider-

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             able  amount of hardship and inconvenience  if               students residing in the region of a  particu-               lar  university are compelled to move  to  the               region  of  another  university  for   medical               education  which  they  might have  to  do  if               selection  for admission to the  medical  col-               leges in the entire State were to be based  on               merit  without any reservation  or  preference               regionwise.  It must be remembered that  there               would  be a large number of students  who,  if               they  do  not  get admission  in  the  medical               college near their residence and are  assigned               admission  in a college in another  region  on               the  basis of relative merit, may not be  able               to go to such other medical college on account               of lack of resources and facilities and in the               result, they                708               would be effectively deprived of a real oppor-               tunity  for pursuing the medical  course  even               though on paper they would have got  admission               in  the medical college. The  opportunity  for               medical  education provided to them  would  be               illusory  and not real because they would  not               be  able to avail of it. Moreover some  diffi-               culty  would also arise in case of  girls  be-               cause if they are not able to get admission in               the medical college near the place where  they               reside they might find it difficult to  pursue               medical education in a medical college situat-               ed  in another region where hostel  facilities               may not be available and even if hostel facil-               ities are available, the parents may  hesitate               to send them to the hostels. We are  therefore               of the view that reservation or preference  in               respect  of a certain percentage of seats  may               legitimately  be made in favour of  those  who               have studied in schools or colleges within the               region of a particular university, in order to               equalise  opportunities for medical  admission               on a broader basis and to bring about real and               not  formal,  actual  and  not  merely  legal,               equality.  The  only question is  as  to  what               should  be the extent of such  reservation  or               preference.  But  on this question  we  derive               considerable  light from the decision in  Pra-               deep Jain case [1984] 3 SCC 654 where we  held               that  reservation based on residence  require-               ment  or institutional preference  should  not               exceed  the  other limit of 70% of  the  total               number of open seats after taking into account               other  kinds of reservations validly made  and               that  the remaining 30% of the open  seats  at               the least should be made available for  admis-               sion to students on all-India basis  irrespec-               tive of the State or the university from which               they  come. We would adopt the same  principle               in  case of regionwise reservation or  prefer-               ence  and hold that not more than 70%  of  the               total  number  of open seats  in  the  medical               college or colleges situate within the area of               jurisdiction of a particular university, after               taking  into account other kinds  of  reserva-               tions  validly  made, shall  be  reserved  for               students  who have studied in schools or  col-

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             leges  situate within the region and at  least               30%  of the open seats shall be available  for               admission  to  students who  have  studied  in               schools  or colleges in other  regions  within               the State."     In  Pradeep Jain’s case (supra), although it was  stated that  the outer limit of such reservation should not  exceed 70 per cent of the 709 total  number of open seats after taking into account  other kinds of reservations validly made, yet the Court  expressed the  view  that  this outer limit 70 per cent  needs  to  be reduced. In the instant case, the respondents have  reserved 64  seats out of 150 seats for Scheduled  Castes,  Scheduled Tribes,  backward classes, etc. In our opinion, out  of  the remaining 86 seats, reservation of seats for regular or bona fide employees for admission to evening classes shall, in no event, exceed the limit of 50 per cent. The admission to the remaining  43  seats will be open to general  candidates  on merit basis. Thus, while the respondents will be at  liberty to  reserve  seats for regular or bona  fide  employees  for admission  to  evening classes, such reservation  shall  not exceed  50  per  cent after deducting the  number  of  seats reserved  for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled  Tribes,  backward classes, etc.     The  only  question which remains to  be  considered  is whether  the appellants are entitled to any relief.  It  has been  already noticed that the appellant, Deppak Sibal,  was refused admission on the ground that he was an employee of a Public Limited Company which did not fall within the  exclu- sive categories, as mentioned in the impugned rule, to which admission to the evening classes was restricted. The  appel- lant  was appointed on probation for a period of six  months in  Agro Chem Punjab Ltd. with effect from June 2, 1988.  In proof of his appointment, the appellant produced before  the respondents  a certificate of employment dated June 1,  1988 issued by the Director of Agro Chem Punjab Ltd. According to the  respondents, the certificate of employment produced  by the appellant is not a genuine one inasmuch as the appellant was  admitted to the first semester in the LL.B.  Course  of the  Himachal Pradesh University at Simla on July 12,  1988. We  fail to understand how it can be said that the  certifi- cate of employment of the appellant in Agro Chem Punjab Ltd. was not a genuine certificate, simply because the  appellant was  admitted in the first semester of the LL.B.  Course  of the  Himachal  Pradesh University on July 12,  1983.  It  is common knowledge that a candidate very often seeks admission in  more than one college or university. The appellant  also made  an  application for admission to the LL.B.  Course  in Himachal  Pradesh University and he was admitted. It may  be that after the respondents refused to admit the appellant in the evening classes, the appellant had to join LL.B.  Course of  the  Himachal  Pradesh University after  giving  up  his service  in  Agro Chem Punjab Ltd. But, when  the  appellant made the application for admission in the evening classes of the  Law  Department  of the Punjab University,  he  was  in employment  of  Agro  Chem Punjab Ltd. We do  not  find  any reason  to doubt the genuineness of the certificate  of  em- ployment in Agro Chem Punjab Ltd. It is  710 the  case of the appellant that to prosecute his studies  in LL.B. Course in Himachal Pradesh University will put him  to great  hardship and inconvenience and it will be  convenient for  him to prosecute his studies in the University of  Pun- jab.  Similarly the other appellant, Miss Ritu  Khanna,  was

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refused admission by the respondents on the ground that  her appointment was purely temporary, although her position  was 19 in the merit list.     It  has  been already found that the  impugned  rule  is discriminatory and is violative of Article 14 of the Consti- tution and, as such, invalid. The refusal by the respondents to  admit  the  appellants in the  evening  classes  of  the Three-Year  LL.B. Degree Course was illegal. The  appellants are,  therefore,  entitled  to be admitted  in  the  evening classes. It is, however, submitted on behalf of the respond- ents that all the seats have been filled up and,  according- ly, the appellants cannot be admitted. As injustice was done to the appellants, it will be no answer to say that all  the seats are filled up. For the reasons aforesaid, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the impugned rule for admission in the evening classes  is struck down as discriminatory and  violative  of Article 14 of the Constitution and accordingly, invalid. We, however,  make  it clear that the striking down of  the  im- pugned rule shall not, in any manner whatsoever, disturb the admissions  already  made for the session 1988-89.  The  re- spondents  are directed to admit both the appellants in  the second  semester which has commenced from January, 1989  and shall  allow  them to complete the Three-Year  LL.B.  Degree Course, if not otherwise ineligible on, the ground of unsat- isfactory  academic  performance. As was  directed  by  this Court in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, [1981] 2 SCR 79,  the seats allocated to the appellants will be in  addi- tion to the normal intake of students in the college.     Both the appeals are allowed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. N.P.V                                                 Appeal allowed. 711