DEEP CHANDRA JENEJA Vs LAJWANTI KATHURIA
Bench: C.K. THAKKER,LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, , ,
Case number: SLP(C) No.-010516-010516 / 2004
Diary number: 8787 / 2004
Advocates: SATISH VIG Vs
ANIL KUMAR GUPTA-II
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REPORTABLE
IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No. 7300 OF 2005
Deep Chandra Juneja ..... Appellant
Versus
Smt. Lajwanti Kathuria (Dead) Through L.Rs. ..... Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Lokeshwar Singh Panta, J.
This appeal is directed against the judgment and order
dated 06.02.2004 passed by the learned Single Judge of the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dismissing the writ
petition filed by the appellant-tenant. Challenge in the writ
petition was to the order passed by the prescribed authority as
affirmed by the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 1,
Kanpur Nagar (Appellate Authority) allowing the release
application of Smt. Lajwanti Kathuria respondent-landlady.
Facts, in brief, leading to the origin of this case, are as
under:-
Smt. Lajwanti Kathuria, respondent–landlady was the
owner of house No. 251 Ghaoo Khera Post, Chakeri, Harjinder
Nagar, Kanpur. The appellant herein is the tenant on the
ground floor of the demised premises consisting of one room
with doo-chatti (store), courtyard, one bathroom, one toilet and
kitchen since the year 1972 on a monthly rent of Rs. 60/-.
The landlady filed release application No. 18 of 2001 under
Section 21(1)(a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of
Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 [for short ‘the Act’] for
the need of her sons, daughters-in-law and grand children. In
the release application, respondent-landlady stated that her
husband Shri Chaman Lal Kathuria, before his death, was
carrying on kiryana business in small portion of the premises.
She stated that she has a large family to support comprising
herself, two married sons and their children and one daughter
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and her children. According to the landlady, she urgently
needed additional accommodation to provide proper and
comfortable living rooms, kitchens and bathrooms for her
children who are facing tremendous inconvenience and
hardships on account of shortage of accommodation.
The release application was contested by the appellant-
tenant by filing written statement and denying the claim of the
landlady. He, inter alia, took the stand that the claim of the
landlady was not bona fide and genuine and the release
application has been moved with the mal-intention of
harassing him. It was also alleged that the sons of the
landlady were residing with her and the landlady did not need
more accommodation because other tenants who were living
in the building had vacated the accommodations, which were
again let out by her to new tenants on higher rent. He also
stated that the landlady was having one more house No. 377,
N-2 Road, Lal Bungalow, Harjinder Nagar, Kanpur.
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Both the parties were directed by the prescribed
authority to submit their affidavits in support of their claims
and counter-claims.
The prescribed authority vide order dated 05.03.2003
allowed the release application of the landlady and directed
the appellant-tenant to hand over vacant possession of the
rented accommodation to the landlady within one month.
Against the said order, Rent Appeal No.17 of 2003 was
filed by the appellant-tenant before the Appellate Authority,
which was dismissed on 05.01.2004.
Being aggrieved against and dissatisfied with the
judgment and order of the Appellate Authority, the appellant-
tenant preferred Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3132 of 2004
before the High Court of Allahabad, which was dismissed by
the learned Single Judge by impugned judgment. The
relevant paragraph of the judgment is extracted as under:-
“The courts below after taking into consideration the entire material on record, recorded finding of bona fide need and comparative hardship in favour of landlord. The impugned order requires no interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction.
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Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.
However, the petitioner is granted one year’s time to vacate the premises, provided that within one month from today, he files an undertaking before the Prescribed Authority that on or before expiry of aforesaid period of one year he will willingly vacate and handover the possession of the house in dispute to the landlord.”
Now, the appellant-tenant has preferred this appeal by
way of special leave challenging the correctness and validity of
the order of the High Court.
During the pendency of the appeal, the respondent-
landlady died and was substituted by her legal heirs.
Mr. Z. M. Naiyer, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellant-tenant, contended that the approach of the High
Court in dismissing the Writ Petition in slip-shod manner
without recording reasons is erroneous. He submitted that
the courts below have committed manifest error of law and
jurisdiction in entertaining and allowing second application for
release of the demised premises as her first application for the
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same relief was already allowed by the Appellate Authority in
Appeal No.4 of 1983 and two release orders in respect of the
same accommodation, one conditional and other blanket,
cannot co-exist and that being the position, the impugned
orders are vitiated in law. He next contended that the second
application for the release of the demised premises filed by the
landlady was an abuse of process of law and the courts below
should not have entertained the second release application of
the landlady to perpetrate a fraud in judicial proceedings to
achieve her nefarious designs. It was also contended that the
landlady before her death had possessed 11 cozy rooms with
other allied accommodation for the need of her 5 adults and 4
minor members of the family, which are quite sufficient for
their peaceful living, but while determining the bona fide need
of the landlady the courts below have ignored the comparative
hardship of the appellant-tenant.
Mr. Anil Kumar Gupta-II, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondents-legal representative of landlady, on
the other hand, contended that the prescribed authority on
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proper and careful consideration of the evidence led by the
parties before it, passed a reasoned order of eviction against
the appellant-tenant, the said order has been affirmed by the
Appellate Authority and also by the High Court. He submitted
that this Court ordinarily should not interfere with the
concurrent findings of facts recorded by the competent
courts/authorities in exercise of its power and jurisdiction
under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
We have duly considered the respective contentions of
the learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire
material on record.
The facts narrated hereinbefore are not in dispute to the
extent that the landlady rented the demised premises to the
appellant-tenant for residential purpose. It appears from the
record that on 26.11.1982/27.11.1982 an application bearing
R.C. No.67 of 1982 was filed by late Smt. Lajwanti Kathuria –
landlady against the appellant-tenant for release of the
demised premises. The said application was dismissed by the
prescribed authority pre-dominantly on the ground that the
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premises earlier vacated by some tenants were not utilised by
the landlady for the use and occupation of her family
members, but in fact those were let out to new tenants.
However, the appeal filed by the landlady against the
impugned order of the prescribed authority was allowed by the
Appellate Authority on 21.05.1983, whereby the appellant-
tenant was directed to vacate the demised premises and shift
to an alternate accommodation being offered by the landlady.
It was also ordered that in case the appellant-tenant failed to
vacate the premises in question within the stipulated period,
the landlady would get possession of the accommodation
through Court proceedings. The appellant-tenant submitted
that the landlady did not provide the alternative
accommodation in terms of the order of the Appellate
Authority and allowed the stalemate to continue. The
landlady filed second release application which was registered
Rent Case No.18 of 2001 on the file of the prescribed
authority, Kanpur Nagar. From the pleadings of the parties,
both the prescribed authority and the Appellate Authority
have noted that the landlady at the time of filing of the release
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application in the year 2001 was residing in the same house
with her elder son, Satish Kathuria, his educated wife Smt.
Namita and her grandsons Abhishek, Rajat and grand-
daughter Karishma and younger son Joginder Kathuria, his
educated wife Smt. Rajani, grand-daughter Tanu; her married
daughter Smt. Neelam Khanna, son-in-law Manish Khanna
and their daughters Kum. Kirti and Kum. Neha. She filed
affidavit in support of her release application stating inter alia
that her elder son is a Contractor/Builder, and he needs
separate room for his educated wife and children who are
studying in convent school; she needed room for her second
son Joginder Kathuria, an Advocate and his educated wife and
daughter and separate accommodation for her married
daughter, son-in-law and their children who have frequently
been paying visits to her house because of her old age. She
also stated that she needed one room for her old lady friends,
one room for prayer purpose and one room to be used as a
Museum to preserve some articles of her late husband. She
stated that the appellant-tenant took the demised premises on
rent in July 1972 with clear understanding that being a
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member of Indian Air Force, he would be transferred from his
place of posting within a period of 3 to 4 years and then he
would vacate the premises forthwith. The appellant-tenant
retired in the year 1984 and thereafter he started running a
small provision store in the name and style of ‘Juneja
Provision Store’. Rajiv Juneja, the elder son of the appellant-
tenant, is doing construction work in the name of M/s Juneja
Engineering and also doing the business of chemical sale and
purchase in one portion of House No.229 Patel Nagar,
Shanker Nagar. He is living in rented accommodation along
with his wife and children at 140-C Ramgali, Harjinder Nagar,
Kanpur, where he is in occupation of three rooms, one
bathroom, latrine, kitchen and verandah. He is also doing
travel agency business in the name of Juneja Travels at
Pardemanpura, Harjinder Nagar, Kanpur. It was stated that
Ajay Juneja, the second son of the appellant-tenant, is a
teacher in Virendra Swaroop Education Centre and his wife is
doing some business and they are living in House No.
124A/272, Block 11, Govind Nagar, Kanpur, having five
rooms, latrine, bathroom, kitchen, verandah and courtyard.
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One more son of the appellant-tenant, namely, Vijay
Juneja, is working as a T.V. Engineer in Thomson Co. and his
educated wife is a teacher. They are occupying two rooms,
latrine, bathroom, kitchen and verandah as tenants in
premises No. 1-A Ghaoo Khera Post Chakeri, Kanpur. The
landlady also contended that the appellant-tenant had sub-let
the rented accommodation to one R. N. Singh on monthly rent
of Rs.300/-, in respect of which Civil Suit No. 1112 of 2000
titled R. N. Singh v. D.C. Juneja is pending in the Court of
Civil Judge (J/D), Kanpur Nagar. The landlady also stated
that she filed Civil Suit No.397 of 1997 against the appellant-
tenant in the Court of J.S.C.C., Kanpur Nagar, for ejectment of
the appellant-tenant inter alia on the grounds of default in
payment of rent, sub-tenancy and damage to the demised
house and the said suit is still pending. It was also stated
that the appellant-tenant has constructed a house over one
plot at Gandhi Gram and the appellant-tenant and his family
members are financially very sound. The daughter of the
appellant-tenant is married and she is residing at Lucknow.
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The appellant-tenant denied the genuine requirement of
the landlady. However, he submitted that in fact there are
only nine family members of the landlady and not ten to
thirteen members as alleged by her. He stated that in the past
over several years, the landlady had evicted many tenants and
thereafter she let out the accommodations to other persons
during the pendency of the present eviction application.
Looking to the strength of the family members of the landlady
and accommodation available with them, the landlady did not
need any additional accommodation as per the version of the
appellant-tenant. He stated that he is living in the demised
premises with his wife, son Rajiv and his wife Gayatri,
grandson Nikhil and his second son Vijay and his wife Rinku,
whereas his third son Ajay Juneja is living in a separate house
No.124A/272, Block 11, Govind Nagar, Kanpur, which was
owned by Ajay’s grandfather late Shri Sant Ram Juneja. He
stated that he has no other accommodation in the city of
Kanpur. He denied the allegation of sub-letting the rented
accommodation to one R.N. Singh at the rate of Rs.300/- per
month and stated that the landlady got false suit instituted
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against him through R.N. Singh. He submitted that as the
landlady refused to accept the rent he, therefore, has been
regularly depositing the settled rent under Section 30(1) of the
Act in the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Kanpur
Nagar. He pleaded that if he is ordered to be evicted from the
demised premises, he will suffer irreparable injury and
hardship as compared to the landlady.
The prescribed authority, on assessment of the entire
evidence on record, came to the conclusion that the appellant-
tenant has failed to establish that the landlady had let out
some portions of the house to the new tenants on higher rent.
The prescribed authority stated in its order that the landlady
has filed on record Paper No.28 in which residential address of
the appellant-tenant is mentioned as 1A, Ghaoo Khera, and
other Paper Nos.29, 30, 31 and 32 also reveal the same
address of the appellant-tenant. On the basis of the oral as
well as documentary evidence on record, the prescribed
authority came to the conclusion that the appellant-tenant is
residing with his son Vijay Juneja and his family members.
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The averments of the landlady in her eviction application that
the appellant-tenant has got House No.140-C Ramgali,
Harjinder Nagar, 220, Patel Nagar, 1/382 N-2 Road, Harjinder
Nagar, has been supported by Ashok Kumar and Rakesh
Kumar in their affidavits. On comparative scrutiny of the
statements pleaded by both the parties in their pleadings and
supported by their evidence, the prescribed authority has
noticed that in the Voter List Paper Nos. 45 and 46 for the
year 1995-99 name of Ajay Juneja, son of the appellant-
tenant, has not been shown as occupant of premises
No.124A/272, Block 11, Govind Nagar, as contended by the
appellant-tenant in his written statement and deposition in
the affidavit. In fact, Ajay Juneja at the relevant time, was
residing at house No. 251 and later on he shifted to premises
No. 124A/272. The appellant-tenant, during the pendency of
the eviction proceedings, has not made any attempt to secure
alternate accommodation and he has been found living with
other members of the family in some other house and the
prescribed authority as also the Appellate Authority on
scrutiny of the evidence have concluded that House
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No.124A/272 was owned by the father of the appellant-tenant,
which was transferred in the name of Ajay Juneja, son of the
appellant-tenant, by executing a collusive Will with clear
intention to show that the appellant-tenant does not own any
house in Kanpur City and in order to frustrate the need of the
landlady. Both the courts below recorded concurrent findings
of facts that the appellant-tenant and his family members
have got separate accommodation in Kanpur City and on the
basis of the evidence on record, the requirement of the
accommodation of the landlady is bona fide and genuine and
the comparative hardship also is more pressing to the
landlady in comparison to the appellant-tenant. In that view
of the matter, the High Court in its jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution has rightly dismissed the writ petition
of the appellant-tenant on the premises of concurrent findings
of facts.
In the backdrop of the facts, indisputably, the landlady
could file an application before the prescribed authority for the
eviction of the appellant-tenant from the premises under
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tenancy or any specified portion thereof and the prescribed
authority after satisfying itself that the ground as stipulated in
Section 21 of the Act does exist, the eviction order has been
validly passed against the appellant-tenant.
Rule 16 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of
Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972, prescribes certain
factors which have also to be taken into account by the
prescribed authority while considering the application for
eviction of a tenant on the ground of bona fide need. Sub-rule
(1) of Rule 16 relates to the cases of eviction from an
accommodation for the purpose of residence by the landlord
or any members of his family. Considering the facts in the
light of Rule 16 pressed into service on behalf of the appellant-
tenant that taking into consideration the length of the period
of tenancy, the eviction of the appellant-tenant from the
premises in question is in violation of the provision of Rule 16,
in our opinion, cannot be accepted.
In Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava [(2001) 2 SCC
604, this Court held that the need of the landlord is to be seen
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on the date of application for release. In Prativa Devi v. T.V.
Krishnan [(1996) 5 SCC 353], it was held that the landlord is
the best judge of his requirement and courts have no concern
to dictate the landlord as to how and in what manner he
should live. In Rishi Kumar Govil v. Maqsoodan & Ors.
[(2007) 4 SCC 465], this Court while dealing with the
provisions of Section 21(1)(a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings
(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 and Rule
16 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent
and Eviction) Rules, 1972, held that the bona fide personal
need of the landlord is a question of fact and should not be
normally interfered with.
Having regard to the well-reasoned concurrent findings
and reasoning recorded by the prescribed authority and the
Appellate Authority, which are affirmed by the High Court in
writ petition, we are of the opinion that the impugned
judgment warrants no interference inasmuch as no illegality,
infirmity or error of jurisdiction could be shown before us by
the appellant-tenant.
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In the result, for the above-stated reasons, we find no
merit in this appeal and it is dismissed, accordingly.
However, considering the period for which the premises
in question was in the occupation of the appellant-tenant,
time is granted till 31.06.2009 to vacate the premises, subject
to filing of an affidavit by way of usual undertaking before the
prescribed authority within a period of four weeks to deliver
the vacant possession on or before the stipulated date. There
will be no order as to costs.
........................................J. (C. K. Thakker)
........................................J. (Lokeshwar Singh Panta) New Delhi, July 10, 2008.
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