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PETITIONER: DEB SADHAN ROY

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF WEST BENGAL

DATE OF JUDGMENT07/12/1971

BENCH: REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN BENCH: REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN PALEKAR, D.G.

CITATION:  1973 AIR 1331            1973 SCR  (3) 691  CITATOR INFO :  D          1974 SC2337  (15)

ACT: West   Bengal  (Prevention  of  Unlawful   Activities)   Act 1970--confirmation  of Advisory Board’s  recommendation  for detention   beyond  three  months  under  s.  12  by   State Government--Confirmation  must  be within  three  months  of detention--Must  be  in  writing--Must  be  communicated  to detenu within reasonable time--Grounds of detention  whether vague  because they did not mention names of  associates  of petitioner  in the acts alleged against him--Disturbance  of public order in s. 3(2)(c)---What amounts to.

HEADNOTE: The   petitioner  was  arrested  on  January  29,  1971   in pursuance--of a detention order dated January 16, 1971 under the West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act 1970. The  State  Government’s  order  under  s.  12  of  the  Act confirming  the  report of the Advisory  Board  recommending detention of the petitioner for more than three months  ’was passed  on  April  4, 1971 The order  of  configuration  was communicate  to the petitioner on August 26. 1971.   In  his petition  under Art. 32 of the Constitution the  petitioner urged; (i) that the order of confirmation under s. 12 should not only have been passed within three months of the  deten- tion  but  also communicated to the petitioner  within  that period; (ii) the grounds of detention were vague; (iii) that the  facts alleged did not amount to disturbance  of  public order. HELD  :  (i)(a)  The confirmation. of  the  opinion  of  the Advisor Board to continue the detention beyond three  months must  be within threes months from the date of detention  in conformity  with  the mandate in el. (4) of Art. 22  of  the Constitution (Reasons discussed. [794 D] Dattatraya  Moreshwar Pangarkar v. The State of  Bombay,.  & Ors., [1952] S.C.R. 612, distinguished. Kaur  Singh  v. The State, A.I.R. 1952, Pepsu  134,  Dhadhal Kanthad  Valeg  v. Saurashtra State A.I.R.  1953  Sau.   Umd Singh  Narubho  v.  Stale, A.I.R. 1953,  San.  51,  Sangapua Mallappa  Kodi & Ors. v. The State of Mysore & Ors.,  A.I.R. 1959, Mysore 7, Aswini Kumar Banerjee, v. The State &  Ors., 1970-71 (Col.  LXXV) Calcutta Weekly Notes-866, approved and applied.

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(b)The  confirmation  cannot  purely be a  mental  act.  a subjective  one  but  must result in  an  objective  action, namely, that it should be recorded in writing [795 C-D] Further, though there is no provision in the Act an order of confirmation,  which has the effect of extending the  period of  detention beyond the mandatory period of  three  months, must  be made known to the detenu.  There is no  warrant  or justification  for such an order remaining in the  files  of the  executive  without the same being communicated  to  the person  most  concerned-the detenu-whose freedom.  has  been objected to jeopardy.  He is entitled to know that the Board have considered his representation, as well as his  personal submissions  if he has chosen to appear before it. and  that it  had been found that there was sufficient cause  for  his detention and that the State Government had agreed with  it. The cow- 788 within a reasonable time.  The effect of  non-communication, however,  may  be an irregularity which does  not  make  the detention otherwise legal, illegal [795 D-796 C] Mohammad  Afzal  Khan v. State of Jammu  &  Kashmir,  [1957] S.C.R.  63, Achhar Singh v. State of Punjab, Petn.  No.  359 of  1951-decided on 22-11-1951, Biren Dutta & Ois. v.  Chief Commissioner  of  Tripura & Another, [1964]  8  S.C.R.  295, referred to. In  the present case the order of confirmation by the  State Government  was  made within three months of  the  order  of detention.   Although  the communication to the  detenu  was after three months he was not shown to have been  prejudiced by it. [796 D] (ii)  There was no validity in the  petitioner’s  contention that the  grounds of detention were vague because  the names of  his associates were not supplied.  It was not  necessary for  the petitioner to make an effective  representation  to specify his associates because they may not have been  known [797 E] (iii) In this case what is said to have been defiled by  the petitioner and his associates is the statute of Rabindranath Tagore, a poet and sage Venerated by all in this country and affords sufficient ground for detention.  The other  grounds also  directly  connected the act with  the  disturbance  of public  order within the meaning of s. 3(2)(c) of  the  Act. [798 F] State   of  West  Bengal v. Ashok Dey and  Ors.  etc.,  Crl. Appeal  Nos. 217 to 233 of 1971-decided     on   19-11-1971, Madhu Limaye v. Sub Divisional Magistrate Monghyr and others [1970] 3 S.C.R. 764  Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar and Ors,. [1966] 1 S.C.R 709, referred to.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 218 of 1971.. Under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus) S. K. Mehta, for the petitioner. D.N.  Mukherjee, G. S. Chatterjee and Sukumar  Basu,  for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by P.Jaganmhan  Reddy  J.  This petition  under  Article  32 challenges  the detention under the West Bengal  (Prevention of  Violent Activities) Act, 1970 (hereinafter  called  ’the Act’)’.   It  may  be mentioned that  this  and  other  Writ Petitions were adjourned till the decision of this Court  on the validity and vires of the Act which has now been decided

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in the State of West Betir gal v Ashok Dey & Ors. etc.etc(1) In  that case it, has been held that the provisions  of  the Act   do  not  contravene  any  of  the  mandates   of   the Constitution, as such this Petition and the others which had stood over till that decision have come up for consideration as to whether the detention ire legal. 789 In this and other petitions three main contentions have been urged on behalf of the respective petitioners by Shri S.  K. Mehta who is assisting us as Amicus Curiae.  They are :  (i) Whether  the  mandatory  provisions of the,  Act  have  been complied  with; (ii) whether the grounds are  irrelevant  or vague  and (iii) whether the State Government has  confirmed the opinion of the Advisory Board that there was  sufficient cause  for detaining them within three months from the  date of  the  detention  and whether  the  communication  to  the detenue has been made within that period. We  shall give the dates of relevant steps taken in  respect of  each  of  the detenues but before we do so  it  will  be convenient  to deal with the legal submissions in the  light of which the facts of each case can be better appreciated. The mandatory requirements under the Act are that the  order of detention must be passed by the detaining authority, that it  should be forthwith communicated under sub-sec.  (4)  of Section 1 to the State Government together with the  grounds of detention.  It is provided by Section 8 that the  grounds of  detention  must be served on the detenue within  5  days from  the date of detention, that these must be approved  by the  State  Government  within 12 days from  that  date  and thereafter as soon as may be a report of this fact  together with  grounds and other particulars on which the  order  has been  made  should be made to the Central  Government  under clause (5) of Section 3 and that under Section 10 the  State Government is required to place within 30 days from the date of  detention before the Advisory Board (hereinafter  called ’the  Board’)  constituted under Section 9, the  grounds  of detention, the representation of the detenue, if any,  along with  the report made in case of a detention by  an  officer specified  in  sub-sec. (3) of Section 3. Thereafter  it  is incumbent on the Advisory Board after hearing the detenue in person,  if  he so desires, to report the  State  Government under Section 11 its opinion within ten weeks from the  date of detention, as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned.  Under Section 12 where the Board is of opinion that there is sufficient cause for detention of a person, the State Government may  confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned  for  such period as it thinks fit.  In  case  the opinion  of the Board is that there is no  sufficient  cause for   detention  the  State  Government  shall  revoke   the detention  order  and  cause  the  person  to  be   released forthwith.   The maximum period for which any person may  be detained- in pursuance of any detention order which has been confirmed shall under Section 13, be twelve months from  the date of detention, but the State Government can within  that period  notwithstanding that the order has been made  by  an officer specified in sub-section (3) of 790 Section  3  revoke or modify the order of  detention,  which however,  does  not preclude it from making  a  fresh  order under  Section  3 against the same person in  a  case  where fresh facts come into existence after the date of revocation or  expiry  provided  either the  State  Government  or  the officer specified in subSection (3) of Section 3 as the case may be considers that such an order should be made.

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The  learned Advocate for the Petitioner contends  that  the State Government must confirm the opinion of the Board  that there  is  sufficient cause for the detention  within  three months  from  the  date of detention  and  the  confirmation should  also  be  communicated to  the  detenu  within  that period.   This  submission is based on the  analogy  of  the requirement  of sub. sec. (2) of Section 12 where the  State Government  on  receipt of the opinion from the  Board  that there is no sufficient cause for the detention has to revoke the  order and direct the release of the detenue  forthwith, which  implies  that the State Government should  apply  its mind  immediately as soon as a report is received  from  the Board  irrespective  of  whether in  its  opinion  there  is sufficient  cause  or  not for  the  detention.   The  State Government  he  says has therefore to make up  its  mind  to confirm  the  opinion  and extend the  period  of  detention immediately  after the receipt of the report from the  Board which  under the provisions of the Act has to be  within  10 weeks  from the date of detention and in any case not  later than  three  months.  On behalf of the State however  it  is strenuously  contended  that there is no  warrant  for  this submission  as neither the Act nor clause (4) of Article  22 of the Constitution enjoins on the State Government the duty to confirm the Board’s report within three months much  less the  duty to communicate such confirmation to  the  detenue. Relying  on  the  decision  of  this  Court  in   Dattatraya Moreshwar  Pangarkar  v. The State of Bombay  &  Ors.(1)  he submits that all that is required is for the Board to submit its  report  within three months and  thereafter  the  State Government  may  confirm the opinion and extend  the  period within a reasonable time. It may be pertinent to refer to clause (4) of Article 22  of the Constitution under which no law providing for Preventive Detention  shall authorise the detention of a person  for  a longer period than three months unless a Board consisting of persons  who  have  or  have been or  are  qualified  to  be appointed as Judges of the High Court, as referred to above, has  reported  within  three months that  there  is  in  its opinion sufficient cause for such detention.  It is  evident from this provision that a law for Preventive Detention upto three  months  can be made under clause (4) subject  to  the limitation contained in clauses (5) to (7) of the (1)  [1952] S.C.R. 612. 791 Article.  If a longer period of detention is to be  provided for  the  law  must  subject to  clauses  (5)  to  (7)  make provision  for a reference to a Board as provided in  clause (4) and for it to report on the sufficiency or otherwise  of the  detention which should be within three months from  the date  of  determined.   This  requirement  however  is   not insisted upon in cases where a law is made under  sub-clause (a)  of clause (7) of the said Article.  In cases where  the law provides for a reference to the Board or the receipt  of its  affirmative opinion the initial detention is only  ten- tative for three months and only when the Board reports that there  is  sufficient  cause  for  the  detention  that  the question of confinnation and extension of the period  beyond three  months will arise. The mere fact that the  provision of a law under Article 22(4) requires a reference to be made to the Board within a particular period or for the Board  to make  its  report by a specified time is  not  enough.   The State  Government has to take action only after a report  is received  from  the Board expressing its opinion as  to  the sufficiency  or otherwise of the detention.  If the  opinion of  the  Board that there is sufficient  cause  is  received

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after three months from the detention the detention will  be illegal as it is a contravention of the mandatory  provision of clause (4).  In cases where the report is received within three months that there is no sufficient cause for detention but  no action is taken thereon by the State  Government  to release  the detenue or where its opinion is that  there  is sufficient  cause,  the  detenue  is  neither  automatically released nor is the period of his detention extended.  It is therefore  a  crucial  requirement  of  the   Constitutional provision that the appropriate Government has to take action on  the  report  of the Board, because as we  said  on  that action  would  depend the revocation of the  order  and  his release  or  the continuance of the detention  beyond  three months.   In other words even where the Board is of  opinion that  there is sufficient cause the State Government is  not bound to confirm that opinion.  It can notwithstanding  that opinion  revoke  the order.  No doubt such a  power  can  be exercised even after the confirmation of the order but  that is not to deny the State Government the power to revoke  the order  even before confirming it.  Viewed from any angle  it is  essential  that the appropriate Government  should  take positive-  action  on the report of the Board  which  action alone  determines whether the detention is to be  terminated or  continued.  It would therefore prima facie  appear  that action should be taken immediately after the receipt of  the opinion of the Board or at any rate within three months from the date a person is detained.  It is for this reason  after the  Constitution every legislation dealing with  Preventive Detention  has made specific provision for confirmation  and continuance  of  detention  in view  of  the  Constitutional mandate contained in Article 22(4).  A period 792 within  which  the  appropriate Government  has  to  make  a reference  to the Board, the period within which  the  Board has  to make a report on the sufficiency of the  ground  for detention  is  provided for, which has  been  uniformly  one month and ten weeks respectively-.  The period of ten  weeks for the submission of the report by the Board where  Article 22(4) provides for twelve weeks is designedly fixed  because that  would  give the appropriate Governments two  weeks  to confirm and extend the period or not to confirm.  of  course the  opinion of the Board need not necessarily be  given  on the  last day of the expiry of the ten weeks.  It  is  quite possible  that  this  information may be  submitted  to  the appropriate Government well within ten weeks.  In such cases a question whether the confirmation and extension has to be made  by  the  appropriate Government  within  a  reasonable period may arise for consideration, but in any case  failure to  confirm and extend the period within three  months  will result  in  the detention becoming illegal  the  moment  the three  months period has elapsed without such  confirmation. Any  subsequent action by the appropriate  Government  after the  three  months cannot have the effect of  extending  the period of detention.  This view of ours is further fortified by Section 13 of the Act where the maximum period for  which any  person  may be detained in pursuance of  any  detention order which has been confirmed under Section 12 shall be  12 months  from the date of detention.  This requirement  would suggest that the extension of the period of detention beyond three months upto a maximum of 12 months is from the date of confirmation   of  the  opinion  of  the  Board   which   if unconfirmed would not extend the period beyond three months. If  so at what point of time should that be confirmed  ?  It would be meaningless to suggest that the confirmation of the Board’s opinion can take place beyond three months when  the

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period  of  detention has come to an end and  has  not  been extended  by the want of it.  Looking at it in  a  different way what these provisions amount to is that no person can be detained  for  any  period beyond three months  or  for  any period thereafter upto 12 months unless the Board’s  opinion is confirmed within three months. A similar view has been taken by the several Courts in  this country right from 1952 onwards on Section 11 and 11 (A)  of the  Preventive Detention Act which is analogous to  Section 12  and  Section  13  of the Act.  See  Kaur  Singh  v.  The State(1), Dhadhal Kanthad Valeg v. Saurashtra State(2), Umed Singh Narubha v. State(3).  A Bench of the Mysore High Court in  Sangappa Mallappa Kodli & Ors. v. The State of Mysore  & Ors. (4). referred to these decisions.  The learned Advocate General in (1)  AIR 1952 Pepsu 134. (2)  AIR 1953 Sau. 138. (3)  AIR 1953 San. 51. (4)  AIR 1959 Mysore 7. 793 that  case  had  contended on behalf of  the  State  as  was contended  in the case before us on behalf of the  State  of West Bengal that the confirmation mentioned in Section 11 of the Preventive Detention Act was a mere formality and became redundant  in  view  of the fact  that  the  Government  had already approved of the order of detention, because the word ’may’  in Section 11 does not make the confirmation  of  the detention  mandatory.  It was further argued that there  was nothing illegal in confirming the order of detention  beyond the period of three months from the date of detention either under the Constitution or under the Act itself, because what the Constitution lays down is that unless the Board has made a  report to the effect that there is sufficient  cause  for such  detention within three months from the date of  deten- tion,  there can be no detention of a person under  any  law for a longer period than three months and nothing more,  but it  does not however say that the order of confirmation  has to be within three months from the date of detention.  S. R. Das, C.J. rejecting this contention observed at page 9 :               "In my opinion having regard to the  different               provisions  of the Preventive  Detention  Act,               the order of confirmation which the Government               is  required to make under Section 11  of  the               Act  has to be made within a period  of  three               months  from  the date of  detention.   In  my               opinion  the contention of the petitioners  on               this part of their case finds support from the               very sections of the Preventive Detention  Act               and  particularly  from the  wording  of  sub-               section  (1) of Section 11 itself.  That  sub-               section,  to my mind, makes it clear that  the               confirmation order in question has to be  made               if the Government after receipt of the  report               from  the Advisory Board decides  to  continue               the detention and in view of the provisions of               clause  (4) of Article 22 of the  Constitution               such confirmation has to, be made within three               months from the date of detention". The  Calcutta High Court has recently construed  the  provi- sions of the Act Ashvini Kumar Banerjee v. The State &  Ors. (1)  1, which we are now construing on the question  whether the  confirmation under Section 12(1) should be made  within three months from the date of detention.  It considered  the several  cases  to which we have earlier referred  and  held that where there is a specified time provided for in  clause

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(4)  of Article 22 of the Constitution of India the  concept of reasonable time cannot be introduced in interpreting  the provisions  of  sub-sec. (1) to Sec. 12 of  the  Act. ’The absence  of  a time limit in express terms in  the  body  of Section 12(1) of the Act does not render it to be (1)  1970-71 (Col.  LXXV) Calcutta Weekly Notes-866. 794 ambiguous  and  that the Board cannot be  equated  with  the State  Government because it can only advise and not act  by way  of  passing  an order of  detention  or  continuing  it thereafter.   This is left to the over-riding discretion  of the State Government. We agree with the views expressed in these cases. The case of Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar(1) does not  deal with  this aspect.  There the two questions which were  con- sidered were (1) whether the order of confirmation was to be in  writing and should be expressed in the form required  by Article   166(1)   of  the  Constitution,  and  (2)   if   a confirmation  order is made by the,  appropriate  Government what  is  the  period  for which the  detention  has  to  be extended,  that is does it have the effect of extending  the period  and  if so for what period.  That was a  case  under Section  11  (  1 ) of the Preventive  Detention  Act.   The majority Mahajan J, dissenting, decided that the omission to state  the period of further detention while confirming  the detention  order  under  Section 11 (1)  of  the  Preventive Detention  Act could not render the detention  illegal.   In our  view therefore the confirmation of the opinion  of  the Advisory Board to continue the detention beyond three months must  be within three months from the date of  detention  in conformity with the mandate in clause (4) of Article 22. The next submission is that the confirmation should not only be in writing but it should be communicated to the determine within  the  period  of  three  months  from  the  date   of detention.   While we consider the former submission  to  be valid the latter has no justification.  No doubt in Mohammed Afzal Khan v. State of Jammu & Kashmir(1), this Court had on the  construction  of  Section 14 of  the  Jammu  &  Kashmir Preventive Detention Act had held that the Section does  not in  terms provide for the making of a formal order but  that was  on  the  construction of a provision which  is  not  in parimutuel of the provisions of the Act.  Section 14 of  the Jammu  & Kashmir Preventive Detention Act does  not  provide for the confirmation of the Board’s opinion because that was a provision made under clause 7 of Article 22 where it  pro- vide  for  the detention or continuation in detention  of  a person  without obtinig the opinion of a Board for a  period longer  than three months but not exceeding any  years  from the date of detention, where such a person is detained  with a   view  to  preventing  hint  from  acting  in  a   manner prejudicial  to  (i) the security of tile  State,  (ii)  the maintenance  of  public  order.  on  the  question  of   the communication  to detenue  of the decision to  continue  his detention beyond three months, Das, C. j. said that there is no   warrant  for the proposition that the decision  of  the Government (1)  [1952] S.C.R. 612. (2) (1957) S.C.R. 63. 795 must  be communicated to the detenue nor has it  been  shown how  the  communication  of this decision  would  have  been beneficial  to  the  detenue.  He referred to  the  case  of Achhar  Singh  v. State of Punjab(1), where this  Court  had said that ’the omission to convey the order under Section  1 1  of the Indian Preventive Detention Act does not make  the

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detention   illegal  or  result  in  infringement   of   the petitioner’s  fundamental rights’.  After referring to  this decision  this  Court however, pointed out, if that  be  the position under Section 11 of the Indian Preventive Detention Act which provides for the making of a formal order all  the more  must the position be the same under Section 14 of  the Jammu  & Kashmir Preventive Detention Act which does not  in terms require any formal order to be made.  Whatever may  be the  position  under the Jammu & Kashmir Act under  the  Act which  we are considering as pointed out earlier  the  State Government  has  to confirm the opinion of  the  Board  that there  is  cause for the detention of the  person  concerned which  confirmation  cannot  purely  be  a  mental  act,   a subjective one but must result in an objective action namely that  it should be recorded in writing.  Though there is  no provision in the Act an order of confirmation which has  the effect  of  extending  the period of  detention  beyond  the mandatory  period of three months must be made known to  the detenue,  in our view there is no warrant  or  justification for an order confirming the detention on the opinion of  the Board  which  has  the effect of  extending  the  period  of detention  remaining in the files of the  executive  without the same being communicated to the person most concerned-the detenue-whose freedom has been subjected to jeopardy, He  is entitled   to  know  that  the  Board  had  considered   his representation as well as his personal submissions if he has chosen  to appear before it and that it had been found  that there  was sufficient cause for his detention and  that  the State Government had agreed with it.  In Biren Dutta &  Ors. v.  Chief  Commissioner of Tripura &  Another  (2),  another Constitution  Bench  of this Court had  to  consider  this matter  on the provisions of Rule 30(1) (b) and Rule  30A(8) :of  the  Defence of India Rules 1962.   Gajendragadkar,  J. speaking  for  the  Court held that  even  those  rules  the authority  exercising  the power under  rule  30A(8)  should regard its decision clearly and unambiguously extending  the Period  of detention beyond six months which was  the  limit under those rules, for he observed, "After all, the  liberty of  the citizen is in question and if the detention  of  the detenue is intended to IV continued as a result of the deci- sion  reached by the appropriate authority it should say  so in clear and unambiguous terms".  While the decision of  the Government  to  confirm  the  opinion  of  the  Board  which according to (1)  Petn.   No.  359 of 1951-decided  on  22-11-1951.   (2) [1964] 8 S.C.R. 295. 796 the  decision in Dattatraya Moreshwar Pangarkar(1), has  the effect  of  extending the period of detention  beyond  three months is in consonance with the tenor of the Act as well as the  provisions  of the Constitution, there  is  nothing  to warrant  the submission that the order of  confirmation  and extension  of  the period of his detention  should  also  be within three months from the date of detention.  Nonetheless the communication must be within a reasonable time.  What is a   reasonable  time  must  necessarily  depend   upon   the circumstances of each case.  The effect of noncommunication, however,  may  be an irregularity which does  not  make  the detention  otherwise  legal,  illegal.   In  Biren   Dutta’s case(1)  the  Court was of the view that though  under  Rule 30A(8)  there  is nothing to indicate that  the  appropriate authority should communicate to the detenue the decision  to extend the period beyond three months, "it is desirable  and it  would  be fair and just that such a decision  should  in every  case be communicated to the detenue".  In  this  case

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there  is  no  allegation  that  the  detenue  suffered  any prejudice  by  the  delay  and in the  absence  of  such  an allegation  the  State is justified in its  submission  that there  may  be  sufficient  grounds for  the  delay  in  not communicating  it  within  a  reasonable  time  should   the communication  itself  be  considered by this  Court  to  be unduly delayed. We  will  now examine the merits of the  case  to  determine whether  the confirmation was made within three months  from the  date  of  the  detention and  whether  the  grounds  of detention  are irrelevant or vague.  The order of  detention was made by the District Magistrate, Bankura on 16-1-71  and petitioner was arrested on 20-1-71.  On the same day he  was served  with  the order and the grounds of  detention.   The District Magistrate made a report to the Government also  on the  same day which was approved by the State Government  on 27-1-71 so that the mandatory provisions of the Act both  in respect  of  the report to be made to the  State  Government within 5 days from the date of the order and the approval of the detention within 12 days from the date of detention were satisfied.   On  the 27th itself a report was  made  to  the Central Government as required under section 13.  The  State Government  placed the detention order, the grounds and  the report  etc. before the Advisory Board on the 18th  February 1971 which is also within 30 days from the date of detention as required under section 10.  The State Government rejected the   representation  made  by  the  detenue  on  the   15th March’1971 and the Advisory Board submitted its report  that there  was  sufficient cause.for his detention on  the  23rd March 1971 which was confirmed on 8-4-71.  In the note  file of the Government which we (1) [1952] S.C.R. 612. (2) [1964] S.C.R.205. 797 perused,  though  confirmation  was  recorded  within  three months, the communication was made later on the 26th  August 1971.   The  mandatory  provisions,  therefore,  are   fully complied with. The  next  question  is whether the grounds  are  vague  and irrelevant. These are as follows:-               (i)   that  on  7-1-71  night  you  and   your               associates   including  Somesh   Chandra   Deb               mutilated  the  statue of the  eminent  Indian               Poet  Rabindra  Nath  Tagore  installed  in  a               public  place at Boilapara in  Bishnupur  town               and  thereby  caused insult to  an  object  of               public veneration.               (ii)That on 11-1-71 at about 01.45 hrs.  you               and your associates broke into the Post Office               situated  at Rashikguni in Bishnupur town  and               caused  mischief to it by fire  by  destroying               its official records by burning. It was contended that the associates of the petitioner  have not  been specified and therefore it will be  difficult  for the  petitioner to make effective representation in  respect thereof.  We think there is no validity in this  submission. Not only the dates and the time in each of the grounds  have been  mentioned  but the acts of the  petitioner  have  been specified  in  detail  to enable him to  make  an  effective representation.   In  our view it is not necessary  for  the petitioner  to make an effective representation  to  specify all  his  associates because they may not have  been  known. The petitioner is being detained in respect of his acts  and if  in  association  with others he has acted  in  a  manner prejudicial  to  the maintenance of the  public  order,  his

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detention cannot be said to be illegal. It  is again contended relying on Madhu Limaye v.  Sub-Divi- sional Magistrate, Monghyr and others(1) and Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar and Ors.(2) that the acts  specified in  each  of  the grounds do not amount  to  disturbance  of public  order  though they may affect law and  order.   This contention is equally untenable because section 3(2) of  the Act defines the expression "acting in any manner prejudicial to  the security of the State or the maintenance  of  public order"  as given in sub-clauses (a) to (e) of the said  sub- section.   We  are  here in this  case  concerned  with  the definition  given in section 3 (2) (c) which makes  any  act ’causing insult to the Indian National Flag or to any  other object of public veneration whether by mutilating, damaging, burning,  defiling, destroying or otherwise, or  instigating any  person  to do so.  The explanation to  this  sub-clause includes in the (1) [1970] 3 S.C.R. 746. (2) [1966] 1 S.C.R. 709. 798 causing  of insult to any object of public  veneration,  any portrait  or  statue of an eminent Indian,  installed  in  a public  place as a mark of respect to him or to his  memory. The  validity of subsection (2) of section 3 of the Act  was challenged  recently in the case of State of West Bengal  v. Ashok  Dey  and others(3), but this Court held that  it  was valid.   The  challenge  to clauses (a), (b),  (d)  and  (e) dealing with disturbance of a public order in the State with respect  to which it was said there can be no  two  opinions about  the  acts covered by these being likely  to  be  pre- judicial  to the maintenance of public order.  In regard  to clause (c) the argument that insulting the object of  public veneration  in privacy without the act causing insult  being noticed by anyone who holds them in veneration could have no rational  nexus  with  the disturbance of  public  order  or security  of  State,  was  in  the  abstract  described   as attractive.  In the light of the circumstances in which  the Act  was passed the mischief intended to be removed by  this enactment  and the object and purpose of enacting  it,  this Court  held that clause (c) of subsection (2) considered  in the  background  of  sub-section (1) of section  3  can  "be construed  to  mean, causing insult to the  Indian  National Flag  or  any other object of public veneration  in  such  a situation as reasonably exposes the act, causing such insult to the view of those who hold these objects in veneration or to  the public view and it would not cover cases  where  the Indian National Flag or other object of public veneration is mutilated, damaged, burned, defiled or destroyed  completely unseen  or  when  incapable of being seen  by  anyone  whose feelings  are  likely to be hurt thereby.  The  act  causing insult  referred to in clause (c) must be such as  would  be capable  of arousing the feelings of indignation in  someone and that can only be the case when in cult is caused in  the circumstances   just   explained",   and   was   accordingly restricted  to  such  situation.  The  challenge  there  was negatived.   In this case what is said to have been  defiled by  the  petitioner  and his associates  is  the  statue  of Rabindra  Nath Tagore, a Poet and sage venerated by  all  in this country and affords a sufficient ground for  detention. The  other  grounds also directly connect the act  with  the disturbance of public order. Having regard to the various references the detention of the petitioner  in  our view is not illegal and  accordingly  we dismiss this petition. G.C.                          Petition dismissed.

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(1)  Cr.  App.  Nos. 217 to 233 of 1971 decided on 19-11-71. 799