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PETITIONER: DAUD AHMED

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, ALLAHABAD & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT04/02/1972

BENCH: RAY, A.N. BENCH: RAY, A.N. SIKRI, S.M. (CJ) GROVER, A.N. PALEKAR, D.G. BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH

CITATION:  1972 AIR  896            1972 SCR  (3) 405  CITATOR INFO :  R          1972 SC2656  (12,13,14)  RF         1975 SC 596  (5)

ACT: U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, ss. 3, second proviso and 7--Scope of. Natural   Justice--Duty  of  inquire   whether   alternative accommodation exists before requisitioning premises.

HEADNOTE: The  petitioner owned premises which were in the  occupation of a tenant.  The tenant vacated the premises and  delivered possession   to  the  petitioner  who  moved   into   actual occupation  and informed the authorities.   Thereafter,  the District Magistrate passed an order of requisition of  these premises,  without any enquiry as to whether the  petitioner had any other alternative accommodation, and the  petitioner challenged the order. Allowing the petition, HELD  : (1) The petitioner was in actual residence  of  the requisitioned premises and his occupation was not  unlawful. Section 7 of the Act does not, contain any impediment or bar to the landlord taking possession of the premises after  the tenant has vacated. [408 EG] (2)  The  second  proviso  to s. 3 of  the  Act,  therefore, applies, and under that proviso, the District Magistrate had to  form an opinion that alternative accommodation  for  the person  in  occupation existed.   Alternative  accommodation will  have to be alternative to the  accommodation of  which the  person was in actual occupation.  The existence  of  an alternative  accommodation  is  a matter  of  fact  and  the opinion  is  to be formed on certain facts.   That  is,  the District Magistrate had to hold an inquiry to ascertain the facts  in order to arrive at the opinion that there  existed alternative  accommodation.  It will not be correct  to  say that   with-out  holding  such  an  inquiry  or  giving   an opportunity  to  the  person  in  occupation  the   District Magistrate  can  ascertain as to  whether  such  alternative accommodation exists. [409 A-C, G-H; 410 A-D] A.  K.  Kraipak  v. Union of India,  [1970]  1  S.C.R.  457,

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followed.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 244 of 1971. Under   article  32  of  the  Constitution  of   India   for enforcement of the Fundamental Rights. V.   M. Tarkunde, K. L. Hathi and P. C. Kapur, for the peti- tioner. G.   N. Dikshit and O. P. Rana, for respondents Nos. 1  and 2. 406 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by- Ray, J. This is a  writ petition challenging the order dated 11  July,  1971 made by the District  Magistrate,  Allahabad under  section  3  of  the  U.P.  (Temporary)  Accommodation Requisition  Act,  1947  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the Requisition  Act) whereby the petitioners premises 1-A  Beli Road,  Allahabad was requisitioned for the residence of  Mr. Justice D. S. Mathur for a period of "three years or earlier if the purpose is exhausted". The  order further recited "I am further satisfied that  the said  accommodation is not being occupied by any tenant  and the  owner  who is said to be in possession of the  same  is living  in  his  own  house  No.  101/108  Katra  Bakhtiari, Allahabad and so no alternative accommodation shall have  to be provided to him" The petitioner owns premises 1-A Beli Road, Allahabad  here- inafter  called  the  Beli  Road  premises.   Prior  to  the impeached  order  the  Beli Road premises had  been  in  the occupation  of Mr. Justice Oak of the Allahabad  High  Court since  the  year 1955 and prior thereto from the  year  1950 when he was the District Judge, Allahabad. The  petitioner  was  living  at  101/108  Katra  Bakhtiari, Allahabad.   That house is alleged to be situated in a  very congested  area and is unhygienic because of  its  situation near a municipal drain.  The petitioner further alleged that the  health  of  the  members  of  the  petitioner’s  family suffered  because of the condition of the house.   According to  The petitioner, the house also  required  reconstruction which would cost approximately Rs. 40,000. Mr.  Justice Oak retired as Chief Justice of Allahabad  High Court  in  the month of May, 1971.  The  petitioner  in  the month of November, 1970 made an application to the  District Magistrate  under the U.P. (Temporary) Control of  Rent  and Eviction Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Eviction Act) for release  of the Beli Road premises in his favour  after  the same  would be vacated by Mr. Justice Oak.  The  application was  under Rule 6 of the Rules under the Eviction  Act.   It was  made  in  view of the fact that the  Chief  Justice  of Allahabad High Court would retire in the month of May, 1971. The petitioner also gave an undertaking that he would vacate the  other house 101/108 Katra Bakhtiari and the same  could be allotted to any other person.  By an order dated 3 407 May,  1971 the District Magistrate rejected the  application of  the ’Petitioner.  It may be stated here that  the  Chief Justice  of  Allahabad  had  recommended  the   petitioner’s application for release of the accommodation. The  petitioner  thereafter  filed  a  representation  under section 7-F of the Eviction Act against the order of refusal to  release  the accommodation.  The State Government  on  6 May,  1971 further stayed all proceedings for  allotment  in respect  of Beli Road premises.  After the Chief Justice  of

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Allahabad vacated the premises in the month of May, 1971  he delivered  possession to the petitioner who moved  into  the premises and was then in actual occupation of the Beli  Road premises.   The petitioner informed the Rent Controller  and Eviction  Officer,  Allahabad  that  the  Chief  Justice  of Allahabad  had  vacated  the Beli Road  premises  and  given possession thereof to the petitioner and the petitioner  was in occupation of the same. On  8 July, 1971 the District Magistrate passed an order  of requisition  of  the  Beli Road  premises.   This  order  is challenged  on these grounds.  First , no notice of  enquiry was given to the petitioner nor was any enquiry made whether suitable alternative accommodation existed for the needs  of the  petitioner.   Secondly,  no  provision  was  made   for suitable alternative accommodation of the petitioner because the petitioner had stated that the accommodation at  101/108 Katra  Bakhtiari was not fit for habitation and that is  why the  petitioner’s whole family was residing at  1-A,  Beli Road,  Allahabad.  Thirdly, it was said that the  petitioner had a fundamental right to hold property and he was deprived of  it  without  being  heard and  without  being  given  an opportunity of redressing his grievances before the property was requisitioned. The  entire  controversy in this case turns  on  the  second proviso  ,to  section 3 of the Requisition Act.   The  first proviso  is  not set out because it is  not  material.   The relevant provisions in section 3 are as follows :-               "Power  of requisition :-If in the opinion  of               the  District  Magistrate it is  necessary  to               requisition  any accommodation for any  public               purpose   he   may,  by  order   in   writing,               requisition such accommodation and may  direct               that the possession thereof shall be delivered               to him within such period as may be  specified               in the order;               408               Provided  that the period so  specified  shall               not be less than 15 days from the date of  the               service of the order;               Provided  further that no accommodation  which               is  in  the actual occupation  of  any  person               shall  be  requisitioned unless  the  District               Magistrate  is  further of  the  opinion  that               suitable alternative accommodation exists  for               his needs or has been provided to him". Counsel  on behalf of the State contended that  the  proviso was  not applicable inasmuch as the  requisitioned  premises was  not in the actual occupation of the  petitioner.   That submission  is unacceptable.  The affidavit evidence of  the petitioner  is that the petitioner was in occupation of  the Beli  Road premises after Chief Justice Oak had vacated  the premises.  The State did not deny ’he fact of occupation  of the  Beli Road premises by the petitioner.  The  imp,--ached order  of requisition also recited that the  petitioner  was said  to  be in possession of the Beli Road  premises.   The State however contended it to be unlawful occupation.  It is indisputable  that the petitioner was in possession  of  the Beli Road premises.  Chief Justice Oak vacated the  premises in  the month of May, 1971.  The petitioner was  the  owner. Chief  Justice Oak therefore surrendered possession  to  the owner  who  accepted it.  The petitioner  went  into  actual residence at the Beli Road premises. Counsel  on behalf of the State relied on section 7  of  the Eviction Act in support of the contention that the  District Magistrate was to control letting of premises and unless  an

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order  was  made by the District Magistrate  the  petitioner could  not get into possession.  That is totally  misreading section  7  of the Eviction Act.  Section 7  indicates  that both  the landlord and the tenant shall give notice  of  the vacancy  of the premises after accommodation becomes  vacant by the tenant ceasing to occupy or the tenant vacating it or when  there  is  release from requisition.   Section  7  (2) states I hat the District Magistrate may require a  landlord to allot or not to allot to any person any occupation  which is  or  has fallen vacant.  Section 7 does not  contain  any impediment and bar to the landlord taking possession of  the premises  after  the  tenant has  vacated.   The  petitioner informed the District Magistrate that the premises had  been vacated  and  that the petitioner moved  into  the  premises particularly  because the other house where  the  petitioner had  been  staying  with his family  was  unhygenic  and  in dilapidated  condition.   It  is also  noticeable  that  the petitioner made an application under rule 6 of the  Eviction Act to the District Magistrate to pen-nit the petitioner  to occupy the premises for his personal occupation inasmuch  as it  was needed by the petitioner.  Therefore the  petitioner could not be said to be in unlawful occupation. 409 The  petitioner  was in actual occupation of  the  premises. The  question  therefore is whether the  second  proviso  to section 3 of the Requisition Act required that any notice of enquiry  was  to  be given to the  petitioner  or  that  any enquiry  was  to be made by the District  Magistrate  as  to whether  suitable alternative accommodation existed for  the petitioner  or whether alternative accommodation  should  be provided.  On behalf of the State it was submitted that the opinion   of  the  District  Magistrate   that   alternative accommodations   existed  or  had  been  provided  was   the subjective opinion of the District Magistrate.  The District Magistrate  could  not  form  an  opinion  by   imagination. Opinion is to be formed on certain facts.  The existence  of an  alternative  accommodation  is a matter  of  fact.   The District Magistrate had to form an opinion that  alternative accommodation  existed.   This  could not  be  done  without ascertainment of facts and investigation into the question. The  application of the doctrine of audi altarem  partem  to the exercise of any statutory power depends primarily on the purpose  and  provisions of the Act.  This Court  in  A.  K. Kraipak  &  Ors.  etc. v. Union of India &  Ors.,  [1970]  1 S.C.R.  457 in dealing with the preparation of  a  selection list  for  appointment  of officers  to  the  Indian  Forest Service said that one of the purposes of the rule of natural justice   was  to  prevent  miscarriage  of  justice.    The principle   of  natural  justice  has  been  applicable   to administrative enquiries or quasi judicial enquiries.  It is the nature of the power and the circumstances and conditions under  which  it  is  exercised  that  will  occasion   ,the invocation of the principle of natural justice.  Deprivation of property  affects  rights of a  person,  If  under  the Requisition  Act  the petitioner was to be deprived  of  the occupation  of the premises the District Magistrate  had  to hold an enquiry in order to arrive at an opinion that  there existed alternative accommodation  for the petitioner or the District    Magistrate    was   to    provide    alternative accommodation.  The petitioner had made specific request’ to remain in occupation of the Beli Road premises on the ground that  the  other house was inadequate and  insanitary.   The District Magistrate could decide only after due enquiry  and investigation   on   materials   whether   any   alternative accommodation existed.

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Alternative,  accommodation will have to be  alternative  to the  accommodation  of  which the petitioner  is  in  actual occupation.  It, is incomprehensible as to how the  District Magistrate could in the order of requisition state the  fact that because the petitioner was living in the other house no alternative accommodation was to be provided. The existence of alternative accommodation is something  the having of which can be ascertained.  It will not be  correct to  say  that  without  holding an  enquiry  and  giving  an opportunity to the- 410 Petitioner in that behalf the District Magistrate win be  in a   position   to  ascertain  as  to   whether   alternative accommodation  for the petitioner exists.  The existence  of an  alternative accommodation is a controversy which has  to be determined by the District Magistrate.  The determination is  necessary for correcting or contradicting  any  relevant statement  prejudicial to the view expressed either  by  the District  Magistrate  or the petitioner.  That  is  why  the principle of audi altarem partem is attracted.  The  opinion as  to  alternative  accommodation  is  not  an   impersonal obligation.  It is a determination of a fact.  The  District Magistrate has to arrive at the opinion on the existence  of facts  by  holding an enquiry and not on  turning  the  idea within himself without giving the petitioner any say in the matter.   The District Magistrate did not hold  an  ,enquiry and failed to comply with the principles of natural  justice by  finding out the requisite condition to the  exercise  of his  powers that alternative accommodation existed  for  +he petitioner.   The  order  of  requisition  is  illegal   and unwarranted. For  these reasons, the petitioner is entitled  to  succeed. There ,Will be an order quashing the order of requisition of the  Beli  Road  premises.  The petitioner  is  entitled  to costs. V.P.S.                                              Petition allowed. 411