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PETITIONER: DATTATRAYA GOVIND MAHAJAN & ORS. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT27/01/1977

BENCH: BHAGWATI, P.N. BENCH: BHAGWATI, P.N. RAY, A.N. (CJ) BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH KRISHNAIYER, V.R. SHINGAL, P.N.

CITATION:  1977 AIR  915            1977 SCR  (2) 790  1977 SCC  (2) 548  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1977 SC2328  (80)  RF         1980 SC1789  (82)  RF         1980 SC2097  (2)  E          1981 SC 271  (2A,3)  F          1985 SC 582  (51)  F          1988 SC1104  (7)  RF         1989 SC2227  (32)  E          1990 SC1771  (12)

ACT:         Maharashtra  ,Agricultural Lands (Ceiling of Holdings)  Act,         1961 as amended the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands   (Lower-         ing  of  Ceiling of  Holdings) Amendment Acts 1972 and  1975         (Maharashtra  Acts  21  of  1975 and 47 of  1975  and  2  of         1976)--Ss.  2(11A),  2(22),  3.4.5.(1) r/w  Schedule  I  and         Section  6-Principal  Act  and the  various  amending  Acts,         placed in the Ninth Schedule-Whether the Act as amended,  in         so  far as it creates an artificial family unit and fixes  a         ceiling  on holding of land by such family unit is void  and         violative  of the second proviso to clause (1) of  Art.  31A         and not saved  by  the  immunising provision enacted in Art.         31B.         Constitution of India, 1950--Art. 31B, interpretation of                 Constitution of India, 1950--Art. 31 (A) (1), Second         proviso--Whether confers a Fundamental Right.             Constitution of India 1950 (Seventeenth Amendment)  Act,         1964, S. 3--Explanation--Construction of.             Interpretation of Statutes--Construction of a  "proviso"         to a section or clause in an enactment.

HEADNOTE:             Punjab  Land Reforms Act, 1972  included in the  protec-         tive  umbrella  of  the Ninth Schedule,  subsequent  to  the         decision  of  the High Court  declaring  certain  provisions         thereof as unconstitutional  Art. 3lB being retrospective is         entitled to the immunity conferred by it.             U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act (Act No.         1)  1971  as amended by Act No. 18 of 1973 and Act No. 2  of         1975,  all  included in the, Ninth  Schedule--The  question,

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       whether s. 5(6) is violative of second proviso to clause (1)         of Art. 31A of the Constitution cannot be assailed by reason         immunity enacted in Art. 31B.             The Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling of Holdings)         Act, 1961 which was enacted in implementation of the  Direc-         tive Principles of State Policy contained in clauses (b) and         (c) of Art. 39 of the Constitution imposed a maximum ceiling         on  the holding of agricultural land in the State  of  Maha-         rashtra  and  provided for the acquisition of land  held  in         excess  of  the  ceiling and for the  distribution  of  such         excess  land  to landless and other persons with a  view  to         securing  the distribution of agricultural land in a  manner         which  would  best observe the common good  of  the  people.         Maharashtra Amendment Act 21 of 1975 effected radical amend-         ments in the principal Act by lowering the ceiling on  agri-         cultural holding and created a concept of artificial  family         unit  for fixing ceiling on holdings of  agricultural  land.         The person as defined in s.2(22) r/w. s.2(11) and his spouse         and  their  minor daughters were clubbed  together  for  the         purpose  of  constituting a family unit as  defined  in  the         Explanation  to  s.4 sub-section (1) and all lands  held  by         each member of the family unit whether jointly or separately         were aggregated together, and by a fiction of law deemed  to         be held by the family unit.             The  appellant  landlords in the  State  of  Maharashtra         preferred  writ petitions in the High Court of Bombay  chal-         lenging  the constitutional validity of the Principal  .Act,         as amended on various grounds since the effect of the provi-         sions of the principal Act as amended by the three Maharash-         tra  Acts, viz. 21 of 1975, 47 of 1975 and 2 of 1976 was  to         expropriate  a  part of the lands belonging  to  concept  of         family unit and fixed a ceiling ’on holding of land by  such         family  unit,  it  was violative of the  second  proviso  to         clause  (1)  Art. 31A and was not saved  by  the  immunising         provision  enacted  in Art. 3lB.  The High  Court  dismissed         them.   The  main contention was that in so far as  the  Act         created an artificial         791            the  petition  holding that Art.  3lB  afforded  complete         immunity to the provisions of the principal Act.            In  appeal by special leave to this Court, the  appellant         contended:  (1)  On a true construction of Art. 31B  a  post         constitution  enactment  such as the Act is  protected  from         invalidation only when it merely transgresses a  restriction         on  legislative competence imposed by any provision of  that         Part  and  is therefore inconsistent  with  such  provision.         The larger ground of validation curing generally any  incon-         sistency with any provision of Part III is available only in         case  of pre-constitution legislation.   (ii)    The  second         proviso to clause (1) of Art. 37A does not confer any Funda-         mental Right but merely imposes a limitation,on the legisla-         tive competence of the legislature and, therefore, Art.  3lB         does not   exonerate the Act from its obligation to  conform         with  the requirements of the  second proviso to clause  (1)         of  Art.  31.  (iii)   To interpret the  second  proviso  as         conferring  a  Fundamental Right would  convert  the  second         proviso  into  a  substantive provision and  that  would  be         contrary to the well-recognised canon of  construction  that         a  proviso  must be read so as to carve out  from  the  main         provision  something which would otherwise fall with it  and         (iv)   The Explanation   to s.3 of the Constitution  (Seven-         teenth Amendment) Act, 1964 shows that  an acquisition  made         in contravention of the second proviso to clause (i) of Act.         31A  is void and does not have the protection of  Art.  3lB.         even  if  the law under which such acquisition  is  made  is

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       included in the Ninth Schedule.                Dismissing the appeals, the Court,            Held:  Per Bhagwati J. (for himself and on behalf of Ray,         C.J., Beg and  Shinghal, JJ.)         (1) The Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling of Holdings)         Act,  1961 as amended by Maharashtra Acts 21 of 1975,  Maha-         rashtra  Act 47 of 1975 and Maharashtra Act 2 of 1976 in  so         far  as it creates an artificial concept of family unit  and         fixes a ceiling on holding of land by such family unit, does         not conflict   with the second proviso to clause (1) of Art.         31A.  [810 E]            (2)  It  would not be possible to say in the ease  of  an         individual member of the family unit that when any land held         by  him under his personal cultivation is taken over by  the         State  under  the  Act by reason of the land  deemed  to  be         held by the family unit being in excess of the ceiling limit         applicable   to  the family unit, the acquisition is of  any         land "within the ceiling limit applicable to him" and  hence         in  such a ease there would be no question of any  violation         of the provision enacted in the second proviso to clause (1)         of Art. 31A in so far as the land held by him is  concerned.         It  may be that by reason of the creation  of an  artificial         concept of a family unit, one or more members of the family         unit  may  lose the land held by them, but  that  cannot  be         helped,  because  having regard to the social  and  economic         realities  of our rural life and with a view to   nullifying         transfers  effected  in favour of close relations  for   the         purpose  of   avoiding the impact of ceiling legislation,  a         family  unit has been taken by the  State Legislature  as  a         unit  for  the applicability of the  limitation  of  ceiling         area. [809 H, 810 A-B]            (3) Even if the Act, in so far as it introduces an  arti-         ficial  concept  of  a family   unit and  fixes  ceiling  on         holding  of  agricultural  land  by  such  family  unit,  is         violative of the second proviso to clause (1) of Art. 31A it         is   protected by  Art. 31B, by reason of its  inclusion  in         the Ninth Schedule.  [808 F-G]         Hasmukhlal  Dayabhai  v. State of Gujarat [1977] 1  SCR  103         followed.               (4)  It is an elementary rule of construction  that  a         statutory  provision must always be interpreted in a  manner         which  would suppress  the mischief and advance  the  remedy         and carry out the object and purpose of the legislation. Our         Constitution  has a social purpose and an  economic  mission         and  every Article of the Constitution must,  therefore.  be         construed so as to advance the social purpose and fulfil the         economic mission it seeks to accomplish.  [803 F-G]               (5)  The aim and objective of Art. 3lB is to make  the         most  comprehensive  provision for  saving  agrarian  reform         legislation from invalidation on the ground of infraction of         any provision in Part III and it must therefore be so inter-         preted  as  to have the necessary sweep  and  coverage.   An         expansive  interpretation must be placed on the language  of         Art. 31B so to carry out the object and purpose of  enacting         that Article.  [803 F-H]         792             (6) Article 3lB is sufficiently wide to protect legisla-         tion  not  only where it takes away or abridges any  of  the         rights conferred by any provisions of Part but also where it         is inconsistent with any such provisions.  [803 H, 804 A]           (7) The words "such Act, Regulation or provision is incon-         sistent  with  or takes away or abridges any of  the  rights         conferred by any  provision  of  this Part" in Art. 31B  are         clearly  an echo of the language of clauses (1) and  (2)  of         Art.  13 and they have obviously been employed  because  the

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       enactments  Specified in the Ninth Schedule may be  pre-con-         stitution  as well as post-constitution laws.But,  it  would         not  be right to introduce an artificial dichotomy  in  Art.         3lB by         correlating  the  first part of the expression  namely,  "is         inconsistent  with  ......any provisions of this  Part"  and         confining its applicability to pre-constitution  legislation         and correlating and confining the applicability of the other         Part of the  expression  namely   "takes  away  or  abridges         any   of  the  rights conferred by; any provisions  of  this         Part"  to post constitution legislation.  Both the parts  of         the  expression,  on  a plain natural  construction  of  the         language  of  Art. 3lB apply  equally  to  post-constitution         legislation  as well as pre-constitution legislation.   [803         D-F]           (8)  The  Second Proviso to clause (1) of  Art.  31A  does         confer a Fundamental Right.   The second proviso to Art. 31A         confers a right higher than the one under clause (2) of Art.         31 on a person in respect of such portion of land under  his         personal cultivation as is within the ceiling limit applica-         ble to him and if the Act by creating an artificial  concept         of  a family unit and fixing ceiling on holding of  agricul-         tural  lands by such family unit enables land   within   the         ceiling limit to be acquired without payment of full  market         value,  it   would  be taking away or  abridging  the  right         conferred  by the second proviso, but it would be  protected         by Art. 31-B.  [804. B, 806 E]             (9) The second proviso to clause (1) of Art. 31A is also         couched in the negative language like clauses (1) and (2) of         Art.  31  and  it imposes a fetter on the  exercise  of  the         legislative  power of the State by providing that the  State         shall not be entitled to make a law authorising  acquisition         of  land  held by a person under  his  personal  cultivation         within  the ceiling limit applicable to him, unless the  law         provides  for  payment, of compensation at a rate  not  less         than  the market value.  This limitation on the  legislative         power  of the State is the measure of the fundamental  right         conferred on the owner of the land.  It is by imposing limi-         tation on the exercise of legislative power that  protection         is  given  to the owner in respect of the land held  by  him         under  his  personal cultivation within the  ceiling  limit.         [805 D-E]           State  of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh [1952] SCR 889 .@  986;         R.C. Cooper v. Union of India [1970] SCR 530 @ 569,  reiter-         ated.           (10) Restriction on legislative competence and  conferment         of right on the holder of land within the ceiling limit  are         complementary to each other.  They are merely two  different         facets  of  the  same provision.   What  is  limitation   of         legislative  power  from the point of view of the  State  is         conferment of right from the point of view of holder of land         within  the ceiling limit.  The former secures  the  latter.         The  second proviso in effect guarantees protection  to  the         holder  against  acquisition of that  portion  of  the  land         which  is within the ceiling limit except on payment of  the         market value of such land.  The second proviso clearly  con-         fers a right to property on a person holding land under his         personal cultivation. [805F-G]              (11)  The  Explanation  to s.  3  of  the  Constitution         (Seventeenth Amendment) Act 1964 does no ’more than  provide         that so far as the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 is concerned,         if any acquisition is made under it in contravention of  the         second proviso to clause (1) of ..Art. 31A, it shall, to the         extent of contravention be void. Obviously this  Explanation         was rendered necessary, because otherwise, acquisition under

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       the  Rajasthan Act, 1955, even if in contravention  of  thee         second  proviso to clause (.1) of Art. 31A would  have  been         valid under Art. 31B and that result the parliament did  not         wish  to produce.   It was manifestly not the  intention  of         Parliament  that  acquisition  made  under  any    enactment         included  in  the  Ninth Schedule should be  void  where  if         conflicts with the second proviso to clause (I) of Art.  31A         and   that Art.  3lB  should not protect it  from  invalida-         tion. [806 G, 807 F-H]         793             (12) It is true that the orthodox function of ’an expla-         nation  is  to explain the meaning and effect  of  the  main         provision to which it is an explanation and to clear up  any         doubt or ambiguity in it, but ultimately it is the intention         of  the  legislature which is paramount and mere  use  of  a         label cannot control or deflect such intention.  [807 D-E]             (13) It is true that the proper function of a proviso is         to  except or qualify something enacted in  the  substantive         clause,  which,  but for the proviso  would be  within  that         clause.    The  question  is one of  interpretation  of  the         proviso and there is no rule that the proviso must always be         restricted  to  the ambit of  the main  enactment.   [805-H,         806A]         Ishwarlal  Thakarlal Almania v. Motabhai Nagjibhai [1966]  1         SCR  367 @373, followed.         C.A. 1040/76.             (14) The inclusion of the Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972,         in    the    Ninth   Schedule   as   entry   78    by    the         Constitution.(Thirty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1974  subsequent         to the decision of the High Court entitles it to the immuni-         ty  conferred by Art. 3lB.  It does not suffer from  any  of         the constitutional infirmities alleged in the writ petition.         [814 C-E]          Hasmukhlal v. State of Gujarat (1977) 1 SCR 103, applied.         C.A. 1307/76.             (15) Section 5, sub-section (6)of the U.P. Imposition.of         Ceiling on Land Holdings Act is valid and its constitutional         validity cannot be assailed by reason of the immunity enact-         ed  in  Art.   3lB.   Section 5(6), even if  it  contravenes         second proviso to clause (1) of Art. 31A is validated  under         Art. 3lB by virtue of inclusion under the protective umbrel-         la of the Ninth Schedule.[812 C-E]         Per Krishna Iyer, J. (concurring)             (1)  The Maharashtra, the Punjab and the U.P.  Acts  are         not unconstitutional taking the constructive view that  Art.         31-B  vis-a-vis agrarian reforms, is a larger  testament  of         vision and values in action and a bridge between  individual         right and collective good.  [824 B-C]             (2)  The  purpose of Art. 31-B is  conferment  of  total         immunity  from challenge on the score of violation  of  Part         HI.    The words used are as comprehensive as  English  lan-         guage  permits.   No land reform law shall be narrowed  down         by use of Part III, once included in the Ninth Schedule.  No         matter  what the grounds are, if they are traceable to  Part         III in whatever form, they fail in the presence of Art. 3lB.         No  master  of  English legal diction could  have  used,  so         tersely,  such protean words which in their potent  totality         bang, bar and bolt the door against every possible invalida-         tory  sally based on Part III.  It is not correct  to  argue         that the phraseology of Art. 3lB must be correlated to  Art.         13 and read with a truncated connotation.  [817 H, 822  E-F,         G]             (3)  Every Fundamental Right, from the point of view  of         the  individual, gives a right and from the stand  point  of         the State is a restraint.   Whether the manner of expression

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       used is in positive terms or negatively, whether the  statu-         tory  technique  of a proviso, saving clause,  exception  or         explanation, is used of’ 1 direct interdict is imposed,  the         substantive content is what matters.   Many of the  Articles         in  Part III worded in a variety of ways, arm  the  affected         individual with a right and pro tanto prohibit the  legisla-         ture and the executive from enacting or acting contra.  [823         A-B]             (4) A great right is created in favour of owners to  get         compensation  at  not less than the market  value  if  lands         within  the  ceiling limit and in personal  cultivation  are         acquired by the State.   This is a fundamental right and  is         a creature of the 2nd proviso to Art. 31-A(1).  An independ-         ent provision may occasionally incarnate as a humble  provi-         so. [823 F-G]             (5)  It is absolutely plain that in the context  setting         and purpose of a provision even a proviso may function as an         independent clause.  [823 G]

JUDGMENT:         CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos:  1132-1164         1976         794             (Appeals  by Special Leave from the Judgment  and  Order         dated  13-8-76  of the Bombay High Court (Nagpur  Bench)  in         S.C.A.  Nos. 1758, 1481, 2130/75, 358, 359/76,  2089,  1456,         1818,  1823,  1824, 1950, 1951/75, 53/76,  803/76,  1440/75,         340/76,  1449, 1452, 1394/75, 40, 771, 1431, 1531,  1532/76,         1652, 1622/75, 120, 126, 428, 610, 1317, 1831/75 respective-         ly) and         Civil Appeal No. 1307 of 1976             (From  the  Judgment  and Order dated  2-9-1976  of  the         Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. Writ No. 9257/75) and         Civil Appeals Nos. 1040 of 1975 and 1220-1248 of 1976             (From  the Judgment and Order dated 14-2-74 and  1-11;73         of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Nos.  3150,         3145,  3210, 3254, 3287, 3288, 3293, 3456,  3457,   3458-63,         3469-3470,  3472,  3547-3550, 3564, 3565-3568,  3629/73  and         4004/74) and             Special  Leave  Petition (Civil  Nos.  3023-3027,  3894.         4026-4027,   3177-3197,  3203-3213,  3358-3359,   3392-3404,         3477-3483, 36613663, 3059-3060, 3487-3488, 4047,  3365-3377,         3406-3434, 34393464, 3495-3511, 3516-3517, 3519,  3529-3551,         3645-3660, 36803695, 3719-3782, 3787-3816, 3843-3846,  3853-         3864,   3867-3868,  3696-3703, 3199,  3467-3476,  3524-3537,         3597-3621, 3889-3893, & 3899-3902/76.’             V.M.  Tarkunde, (CAs. 1132 &  1147),  S. N.   Khardekar,         in CAs. 1132 & 1133 M/s. Vallabh Das Mohta, in CA.  1156/76,         Dr. N.M. Ghatate, S. Balakrishnan &A.M. Bapat, in CAs.  1132         & 1147 for the appellants in CAs. 1132-1136, 1147 & 1150-64.             S.B.  Wad & Mrs. Jayashree Wad, for the  Appellants   in         CAs. 1137-1146, 1148-49.             Niren  De,  Attorney General in CAs. 1132 &  1137,  M/s.         M.M. Kazi & M.N. Shroff for the Respondents             Niren  De,  Attorney  General, R.N.  Sachthey,  for  the         Attorney General in CAs. 1132, 1307 & 1040.             K. Rajendra Chowdhary, for the interveners M/s.  Shankar         Balaji Jagtap, Madan Lal Fakir Chand Dudheida and  Chandrab-         han Roopchand Dakale (in CA. 1132).             L.N. Sinha, Sol. Genl. O.P. Rana, CA. No. 1307 of  1976,         for the Appellants.             S. Markendaya, for the Respondents in CAs. Nos.  1040/75         & 12201248 of 1976 :--

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           L.N.  Sinha, Sol. Genl., (1. S. Wasu, Advocate  General,         Punjab) O.P. Sharma, Mrs. N. Uppal and Miss Musum Chaudhary,         for the Appellants.         795             V.M.  Tarkunde, in CA. 1223--(M/s, K.P.  Bhandari.  J.B.         Dadachanji and D.N. Mishra, For the Respondents in CAs. Nos.         1223 &1225/76.             Mr.  V.M.  Tarkunde, for Mrs.  Gita  Bhadur---M/s.  K.P.         Bhandari, J.B. Dadachanji, M.M. Ahuja & D.N. Mishra, for the         Interveners  Mrs. Gita Bhadur, Brij Bhushan  Shinghal,  Smt.         Led Amol Kaur, Mrs. Uma Shinghal in CA. 1220.         K.L.  Jagga,  D.D. Sharma, Sant Singh in  CAs.  1220-48  and         1040.         R.N. Sachthey, State of Haryana.         For the Petitioners in: S.L.Ps. (Civil) :--             Naunit  Lal and Miss Lalita Kohli, SLPs.  Nos.  3023-27,         3894 & 4026-27.             S.B.  Wad  and Mrs. Jayashree Wad, SLPs.  Nos.  3177-97,         3207-13, 3358-59, 3392-3404, 3477-3483, 3661-3663, 3059--69,         3487-88 & 4047/76 & 3199/76.             Vallabh Das Mohta,  N.M. Ghatate  and  S.  Balakrishnan,         SLPs.  Nos. 3365-77, 3406-34, 3439-64,  3495-3511,  3516-17,         3519,  3529-51,  3645-3660, 3680-95,  3719-82,  3787,  3816,         ’3843-46, 385364, 3867-68 of 1976.             K.B.  Rohtagi,  M.K. Garg and M.M. Kashyan,  SLPs.  Nos.         36963703/76.         A.G. Ratnaparkhi, SLPs. Nos. 3467-3476/76.         V.N. Ganpule, SLPs. (Civil) Nos. 3524-27/76.         M.S. Gupta & B.B. Marwal, SLPs. (Civil) Nos. 3597-3621/76.         R.A. Gupta, SLPs. (Civil) Nos. 3889-93/76.             Mrs.  S. Bhandare, M.S. Narasimhan, A.K. Mathur,  A.  K.         Sharma and K.C. Sharma, SLPs. (Civil) Nos. 3899-3902/76.             The Judgments of A.N. Ray, C.J., M.H. Beg, P.N. Bhagwati         and P.N. Shinghal, JJ. were delivered by Bhagwati, J.,  V.R.         Krishna Iyer, J. gave a separate Opinion.             BHAGWATI,  J.  This is a group of appeals  preferred  by         certain landholders in the State of Maharashtra against  the         judgment  of the Bombay High Court upholding  the  constitu-         tional  validity  of  the  Maharashtra  Agricultural   Lands         (Ceiling of Holdings) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to  as         the Principal Act) as amended by the Maharashtra Agricultur-         al Lands (Lowering of Ceiling of Holdings) (Amendment)  Act,         1972 (hereinafter referred to as the  Maharashtra Act 21 of         1975),  the  Maharashtra  Agricultural  Lands  (Lowering  of         Ceiling  of  Holdings) (Amendment) Act,  1975   (hereinafter         referred  to   as  "’Maharashtra Act 47 of 1975  )  and  the         Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling of Holdings) (Amend-         ment) Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred 10 as Maharashtra  Act         2 of 1976).  The Principal Act was enacted         3--206SCI/77         796         by  the  Maharashtra Legislature in  implementation  of  the         Directive  Principles of State Policy contained  in  clauses         (b)  and (c) of Art. 39 of the Constitution.  It  imposed  a         maximum  ceiling on the holding of agricultural land in  the         State  of  Maharashtra and provided for the  acquisition  of         land held in excess of the ceiling and for the  distribution         of  such excess land to landless and other persons.   During         the  subsequent years, various amendments were made  in  the         Principal  Act from time to time and the Principal  Act,  as         amended  upto that date, was included in the Ninth  Schedule         by  the  Constitution  (Seventeenth  Amendment)  Act,  1964.         Thereafter  certain   further  amendments were made  in  the         Principal  Act and the amending Acts were  also included  in         the Ninth Schedule as a result of the Constitution  (Thirty-

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       ninth Amendment) Act, 1975.  Then came three major  amending         Acts which, according to the appellants, introduced the vice         of  unconstitutionality in the Principal  Act.   Maharashtra         Act 21 of 1975 effected radical amendments in the  Principal         Act by lowering ceiling on agricultural holding and creating         an  artificial family unit for fixing ceiling on holding  of         agricultural land.  This amending Act was followed by  Maha-         rashtra  Act 47 of 1975 and Maharashtra Act 2 of 1976  which         affected  certain further changes in the Principal  Act  but         these  are not very material for the purpose of the  present         appeals. Since these three amending Acts were enacted  after         the  Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act,  1975,  they         were  included  in  the Ninth Schedule  along  with  certain         other  enactments by the Constitution  (Fortieth  Amendment)         Act, 1976.  The result was that the Principal Act, as amend-         ed by all the subsequent amending Acts including Maharashtra         Act  21 of 1975, Maharashtra Act 47 of 1975 and  Maharashtra         Act 2 of 1976 was protected against invalidation under  Art.         31-B.             The appellants are landholders in the State of Maharash-         tra and since the effect of the provisions of the  Principal         Act,  as amended by Maharashtra Act 21 of 1975,  Maharashtra         Act 47 of 1975  and Maharashtra Act 2 of 1976 was to  expro-         priate   a  part of the lands belonging to them,  they  pre-         ferred writ petitions in the High Court of Bombay  challeng-         ing  the  constitutional validity of the  Principal  Act  as         amended  by these amending Acts on various grounds.   It  is         not necessary for the purpose of the present appeals to  set         out the different grounds on which the constitutional  chal-         lenge  was  based,  since none of  these  grounds  has  been         pressed  before  us save one based on contravention  of  the         second proviso to cl. (1) of Art. 31A.  the only  contention         that has been urged before us on behalf of the appellants is         that the Principal Act, as it stands after its amendment  by         Maharashtra  Act 21 of 1975, Maharashtra Act 47 of 1975  and         Maharashtra  Act 2 of 1976 is void, in so far as it  creates         an artificial family unit and fixes a ceiling on holding  of         land  by  such  family unit, since it is  violative  of  the         second  proviso to. clause (1) of Art. 31A and is not  saved         by  the  immunising provision enacted in  Art.  31-B.   This         contention  was also urged before the High Court but it  was         negatived  on  the ground that Art.  3lB  afforded  complete         immunity  to  the provisions of the Principal Act.   We  may         make  it clear at this  stage that for the sake  of  conven-         ience,  when  we  hereafter refer to the Act,  we  mean  the         Principal  Act  as amended by Maharashtra Act  21  of  1975,         Maharashtra Act 47 of 1975 and Maharashtra Act 2 of 1976.         797         The appellants in the present appeals assail this view taken         by  the High Court and the only question which,  ’therefore,         arises for consideration is as to. whether the impugned Act,         in so far as it creates an artificial concept of family unit         for  fixing ceiling on holding of land by such family  unit,         is  in  conflict with the second proviso  to clause  (1)  of         Article  31A  and if it is, whether it  is  protected  under         Article  31-B  ?  Though logically the first  part  of  the.         question  as to infraction of the second proviso. to  clause         (1 ) of Article 31A should receive our consideration earlier         in  point of time, it would be convenient first  to  examine         the  second  part of the question,  for  if  we are  of  the         view  that Article 31-B immunises the Principal Act  against         attack  on the ground of violation of the second proviso  to         Article 31A, it would become unnecessary .to consider wheth-         er in fact there is any infraction of the second proviso  to         clause  (1) of Article 31A. But before we examine the  scope

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       and  ’applicability of Article 3lB in the present  case,  it         would be desirable to refer to a few relevant provisions  of         the Principal Act.             The  Preamble  and the long title of the  Principal  Act         show that it was enacted to impose a maximum ceiling on  the         holding of agricultural land in the State of Maharashtra and         to  provide  for the acquisition of land held in  excess  of         ceiling  and for the distribution of such land  to  landless         and other persons with a view to. securing the  distribution         of  agricultural land in a manner which would best  subserve         the common. good of the people.  Section 2 contains  various         definitions  of  which only one is  material,  namely   that         contained  in  subsection (11A).  That  sub-section  defines         family unit to mean a family unit as explained in section 4.         Section 3 imposes a prohibition on holding of land in excess         of ceiling area and so far as material, it reads as follows:               "3(1 ) Subject to the provisions of  this Chapter  and         Chapter III, no person or family unit shall, after the  com-         mencement date, hold land in excess of the ceiling area,  as         determined  in the manner hereinafter provided.               (2) All land held by a person, or as the case may  be,         a  family. unit whether in this State or any other part   of         India in excess of the ceiling area, shall,  notwithstanding         anything  contained in any  law for the time being in  force         or  usage, be deemed to.be surplus land, and shall be  dealt         with in the manner hereinafter provided for surplus land.             In  determining surplus land from the holding of a  per-         son, or as the case may be, of a family unit, the fact  that         the person or any member of the family unit has died  (on or         after  the commencement date or any date subsequent  to  the         date  on  which the holding exceeds the  ceiling  area,  but         before the declaration of surplus land is made in respect of         that holding) shall be ignored; and accordingly, the surplus         land  shall be determined as if that person, or as the  case         may be, the member of a family unit had not died."         798              What shall be regarded as land held by a family unit is         laid down in section 4, sub-section ( 1 ) which provides:                              "(4) All land held by each member of  a                       family  unit, whether jointly  or  separately,                       shall  for  the purposes  of  determining  the                       ceiling area of the family  unit be deemed  to                       be held by the family unit.                       Then  there  is an explanation to  this   sub-                       section   which  explains a ’family  unit’  to                       mean:                          "(a) a person and his spouse (or more  than                       one  spouse)   and  their   minor   sons   and                       minor unmarried daughters; if any; or                              (b)  where  any spouse  ’is  dead,  the                       surviving  spouse  or spouses, and  the  minor                       sons and minor unmarried daughters; or                             (c)  where  the spouses  are  dead,  the                       minor  sons and miner unmarried  daughters  of                       such deceased spouses."         Section  5,  sub-section (1) read with  the  First  Schedule         provides  for  different ceilings for different  classes  of         lands in the various districts and talukas of the State  and         sub-sections (2) and (3) lay down the method of  computation         of  the  ceiling area where different classes of  lands  are         held by a person or a family Unit.   Then follows section  6         which is in the following terms:                              "Where  a family unit consists of  mem-                       bers  which exceed five in number, the  family                       unit shall be entitled to hold land  exceeding

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                     the ceiling area to the extent of one-fifth of                       the ceiling area for each member in excess  of                       five, so however that the total holding  shall                       not exceed twice the ceiling area, and in such                       case,  in  relation  to the  holding  of  such                       family  unit, such area shall be deemed to  be                       the ceiling area."         This  is followed by sections 8 to 11A which deal  with  re-         strictions on transfers and acquisitions and consequences of         contraventions  and sections 12 to 21A which  provide  inter         alia  for holding an enquiry for determination of land  held         in excess of the ceiling area and making of a declaration by         the Collector stating his decision on the total area of land         which  is  in excess of the ceiling area and the  area,  de-         scription and full particulars of the land which is delimit-         ed as surplus land.  Sub-section (4) of section 21  provides         that us soon as may be after the announcement of the  decla-         ration,  the Collector shall take in the  prescribed  manner         possession of the land which is delimited as surplus and the         surplus  land  shall,  with effect from the  date  on  which         possession  is taken, be deemed to be acquired by the  State         Government for the purposes of the Act and shall accordingly         vest,  without  further assurance and free from  all  encum-         brances, in the State Government.  Sections 21 to 26 provide         for  determination and payment of compensation for the  sur-         plus  land  acquired by the State Government.   Then  follow         provisions in sections 27 to 29 in regard to distribution of         surplus land.  These provisions require the State         799         Government to distribute the surplus land. in certain  order         of priority with a view. to carrying out the purposes of the         legislation.   Sections 30 to 36 lay down the procedure  for         holding inquiries under the Act and also provide for  appeal         mechanism.   These  are followed  by  certain  miscellaneous         provisions  in sections 37 to 49 which are not material  for         the purpose of the present appeals.             It  will be seen from this brief resume of the  relevant         provisions of the Act that there are two units recognised by         the  Act  for the purpose of fixing ceiling  on  holding  of         agricultural  land.  One is ’person’ which by its definition         in section 2,  sub-section (22) includes a family and  ’fam-         ily’  by virtue of section 2, sub-section (11 )  includes  a         Hindu  Undivided family and in the case of other persons,  a         group  or unit the members of which by custom or usage,  are         joint  in estates of possession or residence, and the  other         is ’family unit  as defined in ,the Explanation to section 4         sub-section (1).  So far as the applicability of the Act to.         a ’person’ is concerned, there is no conceptual  difficulty,         for any person, natural or artificial, can  hold land and if         the  land  held by such person is in excess of  the  ceiling         laid down in section 5, sub-section (1 ) read with the First         Schedule,  the surplus land would vest in the State  Govern-         ment.   But the Act has created an artificial ’family  unit’         and  a person and his spouse and their minor sons and  minor         unmarried daughters are clubbed together for the purpose  of         constituting a family unit and all lands held by each member         of  the  family  unit, whether jointly  or  separately,  are         aggregated  together  and by a fiction of law deemed  to  be         held by the family unit.  We have described the family  unit         as contemplated in the Act as an artificial legal conception         because in quite a few cases it would be different from  the         family  as  known  in ordinary parlance:  the  latter  would         include  ’even major sons and unmarried daughters which  the         former  by its definition does not.  It is clear  from   the         scheme of the Act that for the purpose of determining wheth-

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       er land is held in excess of the ceiling area, a family unit         is  taken  as a unit and the limitation of ceiling  area  is         applied  in relation to the land deemed to be held  by  such         family  unit and in  such a case,  each individual member of         the  family unit is not treated as a separate unit  for  the         purpose of applicability of the limitation of ceiling.   The         land  held by each member of the family unit is  fictionally         treated as land held by the family unit and to the aggregate         of  such  land  which  is deemed to be held  by  the  family         unit,  the  limitation  of  the  ceiling  area  is  applied.         This  feature  of clubbing together the land  held  by  each         member of family unit for the purpose of applying the  limi-         tation of ceiling. area, it may be noted, was introduced  by         the  amendments made ’by Maharashtra Act 21 of  1976  almost         fourteen years after the Principal Act was enacted and it is         interesting to notice the reasons why it had to be done.             The  necessity for wide ranging radical land reforms  in         order  to  improve our rural economy  was  acutely  realised         when,  on  attaining independence, we became free  to  mould         our  destinies.  With  that end in view,  immediately  after         independence, the legislatures of the country started enact-         ing laws for bringing about agrarian reform as a part of the         process of socio-economic reconstruction.  The imposition of         ceiling  on agricultural holdings was found necessary  as  a         part         800         of  the scheme of agrarian reform because it was  calculated         to  remove undue balance in society resulting from  landless         class on the one hand and concentration of land in the hands         of  a  few  on the’ other.  The  concept  of  socio-economic         justice  embodied in the Constitution  in fact rendered  the         imposition of ceiling inevitable, as this step  was symbolic         of  new  social ideas.(1)  The growth of  monopolistic  ten-         dencies in land ownership had to be arrested, if the optimum         area  was  to  be made available to the  largest  number  of         people.   The  Panel on Land Reform set up by  the  Planning         Commission  in  1955, therefrom,  unanimously  accepted  the         principle  that  there should be an absolute  limit  to  the         amount of land which any individual might hold and .observed         that the policy of imposition of ceiling should be able  to.         make  contribution towards achieving the  following   objec-         tives:  (1) meeting the widespread desire to  possess  land;         (ii)  reducing glaring inequalities in ownership and use  of         land; (iii) reducing inequalities in agricultural income and         (iv)  enlarging the sphere of  selfemployment.   The  Second         Five Year Plan also pointed out:                             "In  the conditions of India large  dis-                       parities  in  the distribution of  wealth  and                       income are inconsistent with economic progress                       in  any  sector.  This  consideration  applies                       with  even  greater force land.  The  area  of                       land  available for cultivation is necessarily                       limited.  In the past rights in land were  the                       principal factor which determined both  social                       status and economic opportunity for  different                       groups in the rural population.                             For  building  up  a  progressive  rural                       economy, it is essential that  dissimilarities                       in  the  ownership of land should  be  greatly                       reduced.                          and  added that this step would go  a  long                       way                             "----to  afford opportunities to.  land-                       less sections of the rural population to  gain                       in  social  Status  and to  feel  a  sense  of

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                     opportunity  equally  with  other  sections of                       the community."         It is emphatic that in the conditions which prevail in rural         India,  the  possession of some land in itself would  be  an         immunity  against  abject poverty and would ensure  for  the         owner   some   minimum resources to fall back upon  and  his         economic and social condition would also improve on  account         of  his owning some land which he can call as his own.   The         Agricultural  Labour Enquiry conducted in the  1960s  showed         that the average of per capita  income  of  an  agricultural         labourer  with  land was much more than the average  or  per         capita  income  of an agricultural labourer  without   land.         The  policy   of imposing ceiling on  agricultural  holdings         was,  therefore,  initiated  in the country  with  the  twin         objectives  of changing the skewed distribution of  agricul-         tural  land  ownership in the country and making  some  land         available  for distribution among the landless.  It  was  in         implementation  of  this policy that the Principal  Act  was         passed by the Maharashtra Legislature in 1961.  The  ceiling         which was initially fixed was found to be rather high and it         had, therefore, to be lowered by         (1) India--Progress of Land Reforms 1955, p. 19.         801         subsequent amendments.  But until the enactment of Maharash-         tra  Act  21 of 1976, ceiling was made  applicable  only  to         holding  of agricultural at lands by individuals.   However,         it was felt that if the ceiling law was to be really  effec-         tive, it was necessary to take  the family as a unit for the         purpose  of applying the ceiling.  There were two main  rea-         sons  which inclined the legislature to this view.  One  was         that, in the context of the social and cultural realities of         Indian  rural  life, "family is the real operative  unit  in         land  ownership as in land management" and,  therefore,   in         the  fixing of  the ceiling, the aggregate area held by  all         the    numbers  of  the  family   should   be   taken   into         account"(1)  and the other was that taking the family  as  a         unit and imposing ceiling  on the aggregate land held by all         the members of the family acted as a disincentive to  effect         mala fide transfers in the names of close relations such  as         wife,  minor  sons and unmarried daughters with  a  view  to         bringing  the  holdings within the ceiling and  operated  to         nullify  such transfers where they had been effected with  a         view to circumventing the ceiling imposed on  land  holding.         Maharashtra  Act 21 of 1975, therefore, introduced the  con-         cept of family unit and fixed ceiling on holding of agricul-         tural land by the family unit.  The question is whether  the         Act,  in so far as it makes this radical provision, is  pro-         tected  under Article 31-B, even if it is found  to  violate         the second proviso to clause (1) of Article 31A.            The  determination  of this question turns  on  the  true         interpretation  of  Article 31-B and  its  applicability  in         relation  to  the second proviso to clause  (1)  of  Article         31A.  Article 31A,  clause (1) provides that,  notwithstand-         ing anything contained in Article 13, no law falling  within         any  of the categories specified in sub-clauses (a) to  (e),         shall be deemed to be void on  the ground that it is  incon-         sistent  with or takes away. or abridges any of  the  rights         conferred  by  Article  14, Article 19  or  Article  31.Then         follow two provisions which are in the following  terms:                             "Provided that where  such law is a  law                       made  by  the   Legislature of  a  State,  the                       provisions  of this Article  shall  not  apply                       thereto. unless such law, having been reserved                       for  the consideration of the  President,  has                       received his assent ;

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                       Provided  further than where any  law  makes                       any provision for the acquisition by the State                       of  any estate and where  any  land  comprised                       therein  is held by a person under his    per-                       sonal cultivation, it shall not be lawful  for                       the State to  acquire any portion of such land                       as is within the ceiling   limit applicable to                       him  under  any law for the  time  being    in                       force  or any building or structure  stranding                       thereon  or   appurtenant thereto, unless  the                       law  relating  to acquiring  of    such  land,                       building  or structure, provides for  payments                       of  compensation at a rate which shall  not be                       less than the  market value thereof."              Article  31A together with the first proviso was  added         in  the Constitution by the Constitution  (First  Amendment)         Act, 1951, while the (1) Report of the Committee on ’Size of         Holdings’ set up by the Panel on Land   Reforms.         802         second proviso was introduced by the  Constitution   (Seven-         teenth Amendment)  Act, 1964.  Article 31-B was .also intro-         duced  in the Constitution at the same time as  Article  31A         and it reads as follows:                              "31-B.    Without  prejudice  to.   the                       generality  of  the  provisions  contained  in                       article 31A, none of the Acts and  Regulations                       specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of the                       provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void,                       or  ever  to have become void, on  the  ground                       that  such  Act, Regulation  or  provision  is                       inconsistent with, or takes away of   abridges                       any of the rights conferred by, any provisions                       of  this Part, and notwithstanding  any  judg-                       ment, decree or order of any court or tribunal                       to  the  contrary, each of the said  Acts  and                       Regulations shall, subject to the power of any                       competent  Legislature to repeal or amend  it,                       continue in force."             The  argument of the appellants was that on a true  con-         struction  of the language of Article 31-B a  post-Constitu-         tion enactment such as the Act, is protected from  invalida-         tion  only when it rakes away or abridges any of the  rights         conferred  by  any  provision of Part III and  not  when  it         merely transgresses a restriction on legislative  competence         imposed  by  any provision of that part and  is,  therefore,         inconsistent with any provision.  The later ground of  vali-         dation  during curing generally any inconsistency  with  any         provision  of  Part III is available only in  case  of  pre-         Constitution legislation.  What is, therefore, to be seen in         the  present case is whether any right is conferred  by  the         second  proviso to clause (1) of Article 31A which has  been         taken  away or abridged by the Act, for then alone  can  the         Act which is a post-Constitution enactment, earn the immuni-         ty given by Article 31-B. The appellants contended that  the         second proviso to clause (1) of Article. 31A does not confer         any fundamental right but merely imposes a limitation on the         legislative  competence of the legislature  and,  therefore,         Article 31-B does not exonerate the Act from its  obligation         to  conform  with the requirement of the second  proviso  to         clause (1 ) of Article 31A. We do not think this  contention         is  well founded. It is plainly erroneous. It flies  in  the         face  of the express language of Article 31-B and  also  ig-         nores  the true meaning and effect of the second proviso  to         clause ( 1 ) of Article 31 A.             Whilst interpreting Article 31-B it is necessary to bear

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       in  mind  the object and purpose of the  enactment  of  that         Article  by  the Constitution (First Amendment)  Act,  1951.         This  article  was  introduced in  the  Constitution  within         almost eighteen months of the commencement of the  Constitu-         tion, because it was found that agrarian reform  legislation         was  running into rough weather and the policy  of  agrarian         reform  was being frustrated.  Without a  dynamic  programme         of  agrarian reform, it was not possible to change the  face         of rural India and to upgrade the standard of living of  the         large masses of people living in the  villages.  In fact the         promise of  agrarian reform  is implicit in the Preamble and         the  Directive Principles of State Policy and it is  one  of         the  economic  foundations  of the  Constitution.   It  was,         therefore felt that laws enacted for the purpose of bringing         about  agrarian reform in its widest  sense-agrarian  reform         which would be         803         directed  against  gross  inequalities  in  land  ownership,         disincentives  to production and desparate  backwardness  of         rural  life  and  which would cover not  only  abolition  of         intermediary tenures zamindaris and the like but restructur-         ing  of village life itself taking in its broad embrace  the         entire rural population--should be saved from  invalidation.         It  was with this end in view that Article 31-B  was  intro-         duced  in  the  Constitution along with  Article  31A.   The         object  ’and purpose  of introducing Articles 31A  and  31-B         was  to protect agrarian reform legislation  from  invalida-         tion.   We  shall consider the provisions of Article  31A  a         little later when we  examine  the  true  meaning and effect         of  the second proviso to clause (1) of that ,article.   But         so  far  as Article 31-B is concerned, it is  clear  on  its         plain  terms that it saves from  invalidation an   enactment         specified   in the  Ninth Schedule even if it happens to  be         "inconsistent  with  or takes away or abridges  any  of  the         rights  conferred  by, any provisions, of Part III".  It  is         immaterial  whether such enactment is inconsistent with  any         provisions of Part III or takes away or abridges any of  the         rights conferred by any such provisions, for  both  infirmi-         ties   are   cured. by Article 31-B.  The words  "such  Act,         Regulation or provision  is inconsistent with or takes  away         or  abridges any of the rights conferred by, any  provisions         of  this Part" in .Article 31-B are clearly an echo  of  the         language of clauses (1) and (2) of Article 13 and they  have         obviously been employed because the  enactment specified  in         the Ninth Schedule may be pre-Constitution as well as  post-         Constitution  laws.  But it would not be right to  introduce         an  artificial dichotomy in Article 31-B by correlating  the         first  part  of  the expression,  namely,  "is  inconsistent         with--any’  provisions,  of this Part"  and  confining   its         applicability to pre-Constitution legislation and  correlat-         ing and confining the applicability of the other part of the         expression,  namely,  "takes  away or abridges  any  of  the         rights  conferred by, any provisions of this Part  to  post-         Constitution legislation.  That would be a highly  unnatural         construction unjustified by the language of  Article   31-B.         Both  the parts of the expression, on a plain  natural  con-         struction  of the language of Article  31-B, apply   equally         to.  post-Constitution legislation as welt as  pre-Constitu-         tion  legislation.  It must be remembered that the  aim  and         objective of Article 31-B is to make the most  comprehensive         provision  for  saving  agrarian  reform  legislation   from         invalidation on the ground of infraction of any provision in         Part   111 and it must, therefore. be so interpreted  as  to         have   the  necessary sweep and coverage.  It is an  elemen-         tary  rule of construction that a statutory  provision  must

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       always  be interpreted in a manner which would suppress  the         mischief and advance the remedy and carry out the object and         purpose  of the legislation.  Moreover, we must not  forget.         as  pointed out by Mr. Justice Holmes, that it is the   Con-         stitution   that we are expanding.  Our Constitution  has  a         social purpose and an economic mission and every article  of         the  Constitution  must. therefore. be construed  so  as  to         advance the social purpose and  fulfil the economic  mission         it  seeks to accomplish.  The Court must place an  expansive         interpretation on the language of  Article  31-B  so  as  to         carry  out the object and purpose of enacting that  article.         We  must,  in the circumstances, hold that Article  31-B  is         sufficiently wide  to protect legislation not only where  it         takes  away  or  abridges any the fights  conferred  by  any         provisions of Part III, but also where it         804         is inconsistent with any such provisions.  It must follow  a         fortiori  that even if the second proviso to clause  (1)  of         Article  31A is construed as not conferring any  fundamental         right  but  merely  imposing a  restriction  on  legislative         competence,  the  Act,  in so far as it  contravenes  or  is         inconsistent with the second proviso to clause (1) of  arti-         cle  31A would still be saved from invalidation  by  Article         31-B.           But we are clearly of the view that the second proviso  to         clause(1)   of   Article   31A  does  confer  a  fundamental         right.   This  conclusion is inevitable if we  look  at  the         conspectus  of the provisions contained in Article  31   and         31A.   These  provisions  occur under the heading "Right  to         Property"  and  they  define and    delimit   the  right  to         property guarantied under Part III  of  the    Constitution.         Article 31, clause (1) protects property against deprivation         by  executive action which is not supported by law.   It  is         couched  in negative language, but, as pointed out  by  S.R.         Das,  J., in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh(1)’’ it  con-         fers  a fundamental right in so far as it  protects  private         property  from State action.  The only limitation  put  upon         the  State action is the requirement that the  authority  of         law  is pre-requisite for the exercise of its power  to  de-         prive  a person of his property.  This confers some  protec-         tion   on  the  owner,  in that, he will not be deprived  of         his property save by authority of law and this protection is         the  measure  of the fundamental right. It is  to  emphasise         this  immunity  from State action as  a   fundamental  right         that’    the   clause   has   been   worded   in    negative         language".Article  31,  clause (1) thus, by  giving  limited         immunity  from  State action, confers a  fundamental  right.         Clause (2) of Article 31 then proceeds to impose  limitation         on  the exercise of legislative power by providing  that  no         property  shall be compulsorily acquired  or   requisitioned         save for a public purpose and save by authority of law which         provides  for acquisition or requisitioning of property  for         an  amount  which may be fixed by such law or which  may  be         determined  in accordance with such principles and given  in         such manner as may be specified in such law.  This clause is         also  couched in negative language, but it confers a  funda-         mental right of property on an individual by declaring  that         his property shall not be liable to be compulsorily acquired         or  requisitioned  except for a public purpose and  the  law         which  authorises such acquisition or  requisitioning   must         provide for "payment of an amount which may be either  fixed         by  such law or which may be determined in  accordance  with         the  principles  and given in the manner specified  in  such         law".   The limitation imposed on the power of the  legisla-         ture to make a law authorising acquisition or requisitioning

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       of  property  is the measure of the fundamental  right  con-         ferred  by the clause.  It was for this reason pointed   out         by  this  Court in R.C. Copper v. Union of India(2):         "The  function  of the two clauses--clauses (1) and  (2)  of         Article  31  is to impose limitations on the  power  of  the         State  and  to declare the corresponding  guarantee  of  the         individual  to  his  right  to property.  Limitation on  the         power  of the State and the guarantee of right  are  plainly         complementary" (Emphasis supplied).  Article 31A         (1) [1952] S.C.R. 889 at 988.         2 ) [1970] 3 S.C.R. 530 at 569.         805         carves  out  an exception to the  applicability  of  Article         31--and   also  Articles 14 and  19--and  immunises  certain         categories  of  agrarian reform legislation from  attack  on         the  ground that they violate any, of these three  articles.         Even  if any agrarian reform legislation falling within  the         specified  categories infringes Articles 14, 19 and 31,   it         would  not be invalid.  Having regard to the high  objective         of bringing about agrarian reform in the country with a view         tO  improving  the life conditions of the common  man,  such         agrarian  reform  legislation is not required  to  meet  the         challenge  of any of  these  three articles.  But, in  order         to earn this immunity, the first proviso requires that  such         agrarian  reform legislation when made by a State  must  re-         ceive the assent of the President.  That is a condition  for         the  applicability of the exception contained in Article  31         A. Then follows the second proviso which enacts an exception         to this exception.  It says that even where a law makes  any         provision for acquisition  by  the State. of any estate  and         thus falls within one of the categories" specified in  Arti-         cle 31A, it would not qualify for immunity  under me  provi-         sions of that article, if it seeks to acquire any portion of         the  land  held by a person under his  personal  cultivation         which  is within the ceiling limit applicable to  him  under         any law for the time being in force and such a law, in order         to be valid, would have to provide for payment of  compensa-         tion at a rate which shall not be less than the market value         of  the land sought to be acquired. This provision  is  also         couched  in negative language like clauses (1) and  (2)   of         Article  31 and it imposes a fetter on the exercise of   the         legislative  power of the State by providing that the  State         shall not be entitled to make a law authorising  acquisition         of  land  held’ by a person under his  personal  cultivation         within the ceiling limit applicable to  him, unless the  law         provides for payment of compensation at a rate not less than         the market value.  This limitation on the legislative  power         of  the State is the measure of the fundamental  right  con-         ferred on the owner of the land.  It is by imposing  limita-         tion on the exercise of legislative power that protection is         given to the owner in respect of the land held by him  under         his personal cultivation within the ceiling limit.  Restric-         tion  on legislative competence and conferment of  right  on         the  holder of land within the ceiling limit are  complemen-         tary to each other. They are merely two different facets  of         the same provision. What is limitation of legislative  power         from  the point of view of the State is conferment of  right         from  the  point of view of the holder of  land  within  the         ceiling  limit.   The former  secures   the    latter.   The         second   proviso   in  effect   guarantees   protection   to         the  holder against acquisition of that portion of his  land         which   is  within  the ceiling limit except on  payment  of         the market value of such land.  It will, thus, be seen  that         the second proviso clearly confers a right of property on  a         person  holding  land under his personal  cultivation.  This

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       interpretation  was, however, assailed by the appellants  on         the ground that it would convert the second proviso. into  a         substantive provision and that would be contrary to the well         recognised canon of construction that a proviso must be read         so. as to. carve out from the main provision something which         would  otherwise fall within it.  Now, it is true  that  the         proper  function of a proviso is to except or qualify  some-         thing enacted in the substantive clause, which, but for  the         provision  would  be within that clause but  ultimately,  as         pointed out by this         806         Court in Ishverlal Thakorelal  Almaula v.  Motibai   Naglib-         hai(1)  "--the  question is one of  interpretation  of’  the         proviso:  and there is no rule that the proviso must  always         be  restricted to the ambit of the main  enactment".   Here,         the  intention  of the legislature in  enacting  the  second         proviso is very clear and that is to ensure payment of  full         market value as compensation to a person in personal  culti-         vation  of his land where a portion of the land  within  the         ceiling  limit  applicable to him is acquired by  the  State         Government.   But  for  the second proviso, even  if  a  law         authorising acquisition of land within the ceiling limit did         not  provide for payment of compensation, it would  be  pro-         tected from invalidation under Article 31A.  That was not  a         result  which the Parliament favoured.  Parliament was  anx-         ious to protect the interest of the small holder, the common         man  who holds land within the ceiling limit  and  therefore         enacted  the   second  proviso requiring that  a  law  which         permits  acquisition of land within the ceiling  limit  must         provide for compensation at a rate not less than the  market         value.   The  second proviso in fact restores the  right  of         property  with  added vigour in case of  small  holdings  of         land.  it goes much further than Article 31, clause (2)  and         provides a larger protection, in that, clause (2) of Article         31.  merely  requires  that a  law  authorising  acquisition         should  fix  an  amount to be paid for  the  acquisition  or         specify  the principles in accordance with which the  amount         may  be  determined  and  the manner in  which  it  may.  be         given--and  this  may  be very much  less  than  the  market         value--while  the second proviso insists that at the  least,         full  market value must be paid for the acquisition.   Thus,         there  can  be no doubt that the second  proviso  confers  a         right--and  this right is higher than the one  under  clause         (2)  of Article 31---on a person in respect of such  portion         of   land  under his personal cultivation as is  within  the         ceiling limit applicable to him and if the Act, by  creating         an artificial concept of a family unit and fixing ceiling on         holding  of agricultural land by such family  unit,  enables         land  within  the’  ceiling limit to  be  acquired   without         payment  of  full market value, it would be taking  away  or         abridging  the  right conferred by the second  proviso.   In         that event too,  it would be protected by Article 31-B since         it is included in the Ninth Schedule.             Before  we  part with this contention based  on  Article         31-B, we must refer to one other argument advanced on behalf         of the appellants with a view to repelling the. applicabili-         ty  of Article 31-B.  The appellants leaned heavily  on  the         Explanation  to. section 3 of the Constitution  (Seventeenth         Amendment), Act, 1964 and urged that this Explanation  shows         that  an  acquisition made in contravention  of  the  second         proviso  to clause (1) of Article 31A is void and  does  not         have  the protection of Article 31-B, even if the law  under         which  such  acquisition is made is included  in  the  Ninth         Schedule.   We do not think this contention is well  rounded         and in fact not much argument is needed to negative it.  The

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       Constitution  (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964 was  enacted         by  the  Parliament with a view to. expanding the  scope  of         Article 31A by enlarging the meaning of the expression         (1) [1966] 1 S.C.R. 367 at 373.         807         ’estate’  ’and  while  doing so, the  parliament  added  the         second  proviso  to clause (1) of Article  31A.   The  Ninth         Schedule was also amended by including certain State  enact-         ments  relating  to agrarian reform in order to  remove  any         uncertainty  or  doubt  that may arise in  regard  to  their         validity.  One of the State enactments included in the Ninth         Schedule  by this amendment was the’ Rajasthan Tenancy  Act,         1955  which was added as Entry 55.  Section 3 which  amended         the Ninth Schedule carried the following Explanation:                             "Explanation.--Any   acquisition    made                       under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955  (Rajas-                       than Act 111 of 1955), in contravention of the                       second  proviso to clause (1) of  article  31A                       shall, to the extent of the contravention,  be                       void."             This  Explanation, contended the  appellants,  explained         the  scope and  effect of the inclusion of an  enactment  in         the  Ninth Schedule vis-a-vis  contravention of  the  second         proviso  to  clause  (1) of Article 31A  and  indicated  the         parliamentary intent that such inclusion is not intended  to         save the enactment from the invalidating consequence of  the         contravention.   It was urged that, by taking the  illustra-         tion  of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act., 1955,  the  Explanation         sought  to  explain  and clarify that Article  31-B  is  not         intended to be construed as validating contravention of  the         second  proviso  to  clause (1 ) of   Article   31A.    This         contention,  which seeks to treat the Explanation as  illus-         trative  in  character, is clearly fallacious.  It  is  true         that the orthodox function  of an explanation is to  explain         the meaning and effect of the main provision to which it  is         an  explanation and to Clear up any doubt  or  ambiguity  in         it.   But ultimately it is the intention of the  legislature         which is paramount and mere use of a label cannot control or         deflect  such  intention.  It must be  remembered  that  the         legislature  has different ways of expressing itself and  in         the  last analysis  the words used by the legislature  alone         are  the true repository of  the intent of  the  legislature         and they must be construed having regard to the context  and         setting  in which they occur.  Therefore, even  though   the         provision  in  question has been called an  Explanation,  we         must construe it according to its plain language and not  on         any  a priori considerations.  The Explanation does no  more         than provide that so far as the Rajasthan Tenancy Act,  1955         is   concerned,  if  any  acquisition  is  made   under   it         in  contravention  of  the  second  proviso to clause (1) of         Article  31A, it shall, to the extent of the  contravention,         be  void.  Obviously, this Explanation was  rendered  neces-         sary,  because  otherwise, acquisition under  the  Rajasthan         Tenancy  Act, 1955, even if in contravention of  the  second         proviso to clause (1) of Article 31A, would have been  valid         under  Article 31-B and  that result the Parliament did  not         wish  to produce.  It was manifestly  not the  intention  of         the  Parliament that acquisition made under  any   enactment         included  in  the  Ninth Schedule should be  void  where  it         conflicts  with the second proviso to clause (1) of  Article         31A and that  Article 31-B should not protect it from inval-         idation.  If such had been the intention of the  Parliament,         it would have been expressed in clear and unambiguous  terms         by  providing that an acquisition made under  any  enactment         included in the Ninth Schedule, in contraven-

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       808         tion  of  the second proviso to clause (1)  of  Article  31A         shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void.  Parlia-         ment  would not have resorted to the device of  picking  out         one  legislation from the enactments specified in the  Ninth         Schedule  and declared only in relation to that  legislation         that  any acquisition made under it in contravention of  the         second proviso to clause ( 1 ) of Article 31A shall be void.         The  Explanation, in our view, far from supporting the  con-         struction  contended for on behalf of the appellants,  mili-         tates  against it.  We may also in the passing refer to  the         view  taken  by  the  Allahabad High Court in regard to  the         true meaning and effect of  Article 31-B in relation to  the         second proviso to clause (1 ) of Article   31A.  The   Alla-         habad  High Court took the view in a decision given on  14th         November,  1975 which is the subject-matter of Civil  Appeal         No.  1307  of   1976  in  this   Court   that   the   second         proviso   to   clause (1) of Article 31A places  restriction         only on executive action  and not on legislative action  and         since  Article 31-B validates merely   enactments  specified         in the Ninth Schedule: and not the executive   action  taken         under  those  enactments,  the placing of  the  Act  in  the         Ninth  Schedule does not dispense with the requirement  that         executive  action taken by the State in the shape of  acqui-         sition under the Act  should conform to. the restriction set         out  in the second proviso to   clause (1) of  Article  31A.         This  view taken by the Allahabad High   Court is  a  little         difficult  to understand.  The protection afforded by    the         second  proviso to clause (1) of Article 31A is  undoubtedly         against  acquisition  by the. State but this  protection  is         secured  by   imposing limitation on exercise of legislative         power  and it is the law   under the authority of which  the         acquisition is made which has to  conform to the requirement         of this proviso.  If the law authorising   acquisition  does         not  conform with this requirement, it would be  void    and         the  acquisition  made under it would be unlawful,  but  for         Article    31-B.  It is indeed difficult to see how the  law         authorising  acquisition  can be valid and  yet  acquisition         mane under it can be void as offending the second proviso to         clause (1) of Article 31A.  The view  taken by the Allahabad         High Court is plainly erroneous and must be   rejected.                We are, therefore, of the view that even if the  Act,         in  so  far  as it  introduces an artificial  concept  of  a         family  unit and fixes ceiling on   holding of  agricultural         land  by  such  family unit, is violative  of  the    second         proviso  to  clause (1) of Article 31A, it is  protected  by         Article    31-B  by  reason of its inclusion  in  the  Ninth         Schedule.   We   may point out that the same view  has  been         taken  by this Court in a decision   given in regard to  the         constitutional  validity  of the Gujarat  Agricultural  Land         Ceiling Act (27 of 1961) in Hasmukhlal Dayabhai v. State  of         Gujarat(1).             This view taken by us in regard to the applicability  of         Article  31-B renders it unnecessary to consider whether  in         fact  the Act is violative of the second proviso, to  clause         (1) of Article 31A.  But         (1) (1977) 1 S.C.R. 103.         809         since full and detailed arguments were advanced before us on         this  question,  we  do not think it would be  right  if  we         refrain from expressing our opinion upon it.  We fail to see         how any violation of  the seconded proviso. to clause (1) of         Article 31A is at all involved in so far as the Act  creates         an artificial concept of a family unit and fixes ceiling  on         holding  of  agricultural land by such  family   unit.   The

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       inhibition  imposed by the second proviso. to clause (1)  of         Article  31A  is against acquisition by the.  State  of  any         portion of land held by a person under his personal cultiva-         tion  which is within the ceiling limit applicable to;  him,         unless  the  law relating to such acquisition  provides  for         payment of full market value as compensation.  There are two         basic conditions which must exist before this inhibition  is         attracted. One is that land must be. held by a person  under         his personal cultivation and the other is that there must be         a ceiling limit applicable to such person.  Where these  two         conditions  are  satisfied,  the State  is  prohibited  from         acquiring  any portion of the land within the ceiling  limit         unless  the  law authorising such acquisition  provides  for         payment  of compensation at a rate not less than the  market         value.   Now   in the present case, the Act has  created  an         artificial concept of a family unit and aggregated the  land         held  by each member of the family unit for the  purpose  of         applying  the limitation of ceiling areas.  It could not  be         disputed  by the appellants that the State Legislature   had         legislative competence to do so.  The only argument advanced         on behalf of the appellants was that this device adopted  by         the State Legislature of clubbing together the land held  by         each member of the family unit and supplying the  limitation         of  ceiling area to the aggregation of such land,  would  in         many cases have the effect of taking away without payment of         full  market  value as  compensation  the land held  by  the         wife  or minor son minor unmarried daughter, even though  it         is  within the ceiling area applicable to the wife or  minor         son  or minor was married daughter and hence the Act, in  so         far  as  it adopted this device, falls foul  of  the  second         proviso  to  clause (1) of Article 31A.  But  this  argument         ignores  the  scheme  determination of ceiling area  adopted         in  the Act.  There are, as already pointed out by  us,  two         units recognised by the Act for the purpose of fixing  ceil-         ing  on holding of agricultural land.  One is  ’person’  and         the other is ’family unit’.  Where there is a family unit as         defined in the Explanation to clauses (1) to section 4.,  it         has  to  be taken as a unit for the purpose  of  determining         whether  land is held in excess of the ceiling area and  for         this  purpose  all land held by each member  of  the  family         unit,  whether  jointly  or separately, is  required  to  be         aggregated  and it is deemed to be held by the family  unit.         There,  an individual member of the family unit is  not  re-         garded as a unit for the purposes of applying the limitation         of  ceiling area.  The ceiling limit in such a case  is  ap-         plicable  only to the family unit and not to  an  individual         member  of  the family unit.  It would  not,  therefore,  be         possible to. say in the case of an individual member of  the         family  unit that, when any land held by him under his  per-         sonal  cultivation is taken over by the State under the  Act         by  reason of the land deemed to be held by the family  unit         being  in  excess of the ceiling limit  applicable   to  the         family  unit,  the acquisition is of any  land  "within  the         ceiling limit         810         applicable  to him" and hence in such a case there would  be         no question of any violation of the provision enacted in the         second  proviso to clause (1) of Articles 31A in so far’  as         the land held by him is concerned.  It may be that by reason         of  the creation of an artificial concept of a  family  unit         and the clubbing together of the land held by each member of         the  family unit, one or more of the members of  the  family         unit  may  lose the land held by them, but  that  cannot  be         helped  because,  having regard to the social  and  economic         realities of our rural life and with a view  to   nullifying

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       transfers   affected  in favour of close relations  for  the         purpose  of  avoiding the impact of ceiling  legislation,  a         family  unit  has been taken by the State Legislature  as  a         unit  for  the applicability of the  limitation  of  ceiling         area.  It is possible that by reason of this provision  some         genuine  holders of land may suffer, some women  and  minors         may  lose the land legitimately belonging to them, but  that         is  inevitable  when major schemes of  agrarian  reform  are         adopted  for wiping out  socio-economic injustice.  It  must         be  remembered that the legislature can only deal  with  the         generality  of cases and it cannot possibly  make  provision         for every kind of exceptional situation.  Otherwise the  law         would  be as loaded with qualifications and exceptions  that         it  will  cases  to be intelligible and  become  of  fertile         source of mischief.  Moreover, it is entirely for the legis-         lature  to  decide what policy to adopt for the  purpose  of         restructuring  the  agrarian  system and  the  Court  cannot         assume  the role of an economic adviser or censor  competent         to pronounce upon the wisdom of such policy.  That would  be         a matter outside the orbit of judicial review, being a blend         of  policy,  politics and economics  ordinarily  beyond  the         expertise and proper function of the Court.  We must accord-         ingly  hold that the Act does not conflict with  the  second         proviso  to clause (1) of Article 31A and cannot be held  to         be bad on that account.             The  result is that the appeals fail and  are  dismissed         with  costs. There is to be only one set of costs. There  is         also a batch of special leave petitions before us and  since         they  raise only one question, namely that relating  to  the         constitutional validity of the Act, they too must be reject-         ed.         C.A. 1307 of 1976.             BHAGWATI,  J. This appeal by the State of Uttar  Pradesh         is directed against a judgment delivered bY a Division Bench         of  the  High Court of Allahabad  answering  four  questions         referred  to  it for its opinion by a Single Judge  of  that         High  Court in Civil  Miscellaneous  Writ Petition No.  9257         of 1975.  These four questions  arise  out  of challenge  to         the  constitutional validity of certain provisions  of  U.P.         Act No. 1 of 1971 as amended by U.P. Act No. 18 of 1973  and         U.P.  Act  No. 2 of 1975 (hereinafter referred  to.  as  the         amended U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act) and         they are in the following terms:                          "1.  Whether the acquisition of land  under                       personal cultivation as surplus after ignoring                       sale   deed   under section 5(6) of  the  U.P.                       Imposition  of  Ceiling  on Land Holdings  Act                       is  violative of second Proviso to Article  31                       -A( 1 ) of the Constitution ?                       811                           2.  Whether ignoring transfer  made  after                       24th January, 1971, other than those excepted:                       under  Proviso to section 5(6) of the both  in                       relation  to the determination of ceiling  and                       surplus  area, would amount to  acquiring  any                       portion  of  land under  personal  cultivation                       within  the  ceiling  limit  applicable  to  a                       person  under  the ceiling law  for  the  time                       being in force ?                          3.  Whether,  in spite  of  the  protection                       afforded  by Article 31-B of the  Constitution                       by  virtue of inclusion of U.P. Act 1 of  1971                       and the two  amending  Acts, namely, U.P.  Act                       No. 18 of 1973 and U.P. Act No. 2 of 1975,  in                       the  IX SCHEDULE to the Constitution,  compli-

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                     ance  would still be necessary of  the  provi-                       sions of second proviso to Article 31-A(1)  of                       the Constitution ?                          4.  Whether, in spite of protection  having                       been  given under Article 31-C of the  Consti-                       tution to U.P. Act No. 18 of 1973 and U.P. No.                       2 of 1975  by  virtue of a declaration made in                       section  2 of each  of  these Acts that  these                       Acts  are for giving effect to the  policy  of                       the  State  towards  securing  the  principles                       specified in clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39                       of the Constitution, is it still necessary  to                       comply  with  the  provisions  of  the  second                       proviso to Article 31-A( 1 ) of the  Constitu-                       tion ?         The  first two questions were answered by the   High   Court         against  the  State by holding that section  5,  sub-section         (6.)  of  the  amended U.P. Imposition of  Ceiling  of  Land         Holdings Act is violative of the second proviso to clause (1         )  of  Article  31A of  the  Constitution,  inasmuch  as  it         provides for ignoring all transfers of land made after  24th         January,  1971  save those excepted under  the   proviso  to         that sub-section and thereby authorises acquisition of  land         held   by   a person under personal cultivation  within  the         ceiling  limit applicable to him.  The High Court  also  an-         swered  the  third .question against the State on  the  view         that Art.  31-B does not dispense with the requirement  that         an  acquisition  made by the State even if it  be  under  an         enactment  specified in the Ninth Schedule,  should  conform         with the second proviso to clause (1) of Article 31A and  if         the  acquisition is violative of that proviso, it  would  be         void,  notwithstanding that the enactment under which it  is         made  is  included   in  the  Ninth  Schedule.   The  fourth         question  was also answered in the same way by holding  that         the  protection given under Article 31C of the  Constitution         does not extend to violation of the second proviso to clause         (1)  of Article 31A.  The answer given by the High Court  to         the fourth question is not challenged in the present  appeal         but   the  correctness of the answers given to   the   first         three   questions   is seriously assailed before us  by  the         State.             We will first deal with the third question since  it  is         obvious that if the answer to that question is in favour  of         the State and it is          4--206SCI/77         812         held  that Act.  31-B protects an enactment included in  the         Ninth  Schedule even from attack on the ground of  violation         of  the second proviso to clause (1) of Art.  31A, it  would         become unnecessary to consider the first two questions which         raise  the  issue  whether section 5, subsection (6) of  the         amended  U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act  is         violative  of that proviso, for even if it is, it  would  be         protected  by Art.  31-B in view of the fact that  U.P.  Act         No.  1 of 1971 as also. the two subsequent  amending   Acts,         namely, U.P. Act No. 18 of 1973 and U.P. Act No. 2 of  1975,         are  ’.included in the Ninth Schedule to  the  Constitution.         Now,  so  far as the third question is concerned,   we  have         already held, in a judgment delivered today in Civil Appeals         1132-1164 of 1976 arising under the Maharashtra Agricultural         Lands  (Ceiling  of  Holdings) Act, 1961,  that  Art.   31-B         affords  complete immunity to an enactment included  in  the         Ninth Schedule against violation of the second  proviso   to         clause  (1) of Art. 31A and such an enactment is   protected         from  invalidation on that ground.  Having regard  to   this

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       decision,  the answer to the third question must be given in         favour  of  the State and it must be held  that  section  5,         sub-section (6) of the amended U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on         Land Holdings Act, even if it contravenes the second proviso         to  clause (1) of Article 31A--a matter on which we  do  not         wish  to express any opinion since it is unnecessary  to  do         so-in validated. under Article 31-B.             We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order  of         the  High  Court  in so far as it answers  the  first  three         questions  against the State and hold that section  5,  sub-         section (6) of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land  Hold-         ings  Act  iS valid and  its   constitutionality  cannot  be         assailed by reason of the immunity enacted  in  Article  31-         B.   The respondent will pay the costs of the appeal to  the         State.         C.As. 1040 of 1975 etc.             BHAGWATI,.  J.   These  appeals   by    the   State   of         Punjab  are directed against a judgment of the High Court of         Punjab  and  Haryana  declaring certain  provisions  of  the         Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972 unconstitutional on the ground         that  they  violate  the second proviso to clause  (1  )  of         Article 31A of the Constitution.  The constitutional validi-         ty  of  the whole Act was challenged in the  writ  petitions         giving  rise to these two appeals, but the High Court  nega-         tived  the challenge and upheld the constitutional  validity         of  the Act save in regard to those provisions which  create         an  artificial concept of a family and provide for  clubbing         together  of land held by each member of the family for  the         purpose  of applying the limitation of permissible area.  We         will  briefly  refer  to these provisions  which  have  been         struck  down  by the  High  Court as   constitutionally  in-         valid.  Section 3 is the definition section and clause  (10)         of  that  section define ’person’ to include  inter  alia  a         family.    The expression ’family’  is  defined   in  clause         (4)  of section 3 by saying that ’family’ in relation  to  a         person  means the person, the wife or husband, as  the  case         may be, of such person and his or her minor children,  other         than  a married minor daughter.  It is obviously an  artifi-         cial definition of family because family, as known in  ordi-         nary  parlance,  would include not only minor  children  but         also major sons  and  unmarried  daughters,  whereas         813         ’Family’  as   defined   here  excludes   major   sons   and         unmarried  daughters.  Section 4, sub-section  (1)  provides         that subject to the provisions of section 5, no person shall         own  or hold land as landowner or tenant or partly as  land-         owner and partly as tenant in excess of the permissible area         and sub-section (2) of that section lays down what shall  be         the  permissible  area in respect of  different  classes  of         land.  There is proviso. (ii) to sub-section (2) of  section         4  which says that where the number of members of  a  family         exceeds  five,  the permissible area shah  be  increased  by         one-fifth of the permissible area for each member in  excess         of five, subject to the condition that additional land shall         be  allowed for not more than three such members.   Sub-sec-         tion  4 of Sec. 4 has  two  clauses  which  reads   as  fol-         lows:                          "(a)  Where  a  person is  a  member  of  a                       registered   cooperative farming society,  his                       share in the land held by such society togeth-                       er  with  his other land, if any, or  if  such                       person is a member of a family, together  with                       the land held by every member of  the   family                       shall  be taken into account  for  determining                       the permissible area;

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                         (b) where a person is a member of a  fami-                       ly, the land held by such person together with                       the  land  held by every other member  of  the                       family, whether individually or jointly, shall                       be  taken into  account  for  determining  the                       permissible area."         It  will thus be seen that under the provisions of  the  Act         the  land  held  by each member of a family  as  defined  in         section  3, clause (4), whether individually or jointly,  is         required  to be pooled together and taken into  account  for         determining the applicability of the permissible area.   The         argument  of  the respondents, which found favour  with  the         High ’Court, was that these provisions are violative of  the         second proviso to clause (1) of  Article  31A  inasmuch   as         they   permit  acquisition  of land held by a  member  of  a         family  under his personal cultivation, though it  might  be         within  the  permissible  area for  an  individual,  without         payment of full market value as compensation and. hence they         are  constitutionally  invalid.  This view  taken   by   the         High  Court is assailed. in the present appeals before  this         Court.             Now,  it may be pointed out straightaway that when   the         High  Court  delivered its judgment on 14th  February,  1974         the   Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972 was not included in  the         Ninth  Schedule and hence it was not possible for the  State         to invoke the protection of Article 31-B.  But  subsequently         the Act has been included in the Ninth Schedule as Entry  78         by   the  Constitution  (Thirty-fourth Amendment) Act,  1974         and  hence it is now entitled to the immunity  conferred  by         Article  31-B.  We had occasion to consider a similar  ques-         tion  arising  under  the  Maharashtra  Agricultural  Lands’         (Ceiling  of  Holdings) Act, 1961 where also  an  artificial         concept  of a family unit is created and lands held by  each         member  of the family unit are aggregated together  for  the         purpose of applying the limitation of         814         ceiling  area.  The relevant provisions of the   Maharashtra         Agricultural  Lands (Ceiling of Holdings) Act, 1961 are   in         fact   almost identical with the impugned provisions of  the         Punjab  Land  Reforms  Act, 1972   While  dealing  with  the         constitutional  validity  of  the  Maharashtra  Agricultural         Lands (Ceiling of Holdings) Act, 1961 in Civil Appeals  Nos.         1132-1164  of  1976,  we have pointed out   in   a  judgment         delivered  today that these provisions introducing the  con-         cept  of a family unit and clubbing together lands  held  by         each  member of the family unit and applying the  limitation         of  ceiling  area in reference to the  aggregation  of  such         lands are not violative of the second proviso to clause  (1)         of Article 31A and even if they were, they are protected  by         Article 31-B.  The reasoning which has prevailed with us for         sustaining the validity of the provisions  of  the Maharash-         tra  Agricultural  Lands (Ceiling of Holdings)   Act,   1961         must  apply equally in the present cases arising under   the         Punjab  Land  Reforms Act, 1972 and we must  hold  that  the         impugned provisions of the Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972 are         not   in  conflict with the second proviso to clause (1)  of         Article 31A and in any event, they are protected from inval-         idation under Article 31-B.             We  may point out that the same view has been  taken  by         this  Court in regard to the constitutional validity of  the         relevant  provisions of the Gujarat Agricultural Land  Ceil-         ing Act (27 of 1961) in Hansmukhlal v. State of  Gujarat.(1)         The relevant provisions of the Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972         are  almost  the same as those of the  Gujarat  Agricultural         Land Ceiling Act (27 of 1961) which were upheld as constitu-

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       tionally valid in Hansmukhlal’s case (supra).             We  accordingly negative the challenge to the  constitu-         tional  validity  of the Punjab Land Reforms Act,  1972  and         hold that it does not suffer from any of the  constitutional         infirmities  alleged  in  the writ petitions.   The  appeals         are  accordingly allowed with costs in favour of the  appel-         lant.  There will be only one set of costs.             KRISHNA IYER, J.--Legal  challenges to the constitution-         ality   of agrarian transformation through  legislation  die         hard  in our divided society, as is evidenced by  this  ava-         lanche of appeals, by special leave, from the High Courts of         Maharashtra,  Punjab  and Allahabad. The  naive  expectation         that  new incarnations in court of dead  confrontations  be-         tween  land legislation and the Constitution may be  finally         laid to rest by a larger-than-legal discussion has pressured         me into writing a separate opinion where concurrence with my         learned  brethren should have spared this  seemingly  otiose         exercise.             Although  the majuscule argumentation, which has  marked         the  formidable  forensics of this litigation  at  the  High         Court  level,  has ranged over large issues, Shri  Tarkunde,         who led the main arguments for one side, has discriminating-         ly dwindled down his submissions before us to two  minuscule         issues which, nevertheless, arm of lethal moment, if accept-         ed.   The recurrence of attacks on the vires of land  reform         laws, even.after being impregnably barricaded by the Ninth         (1) [1977] 1 S.C.R. 103         815         Schedule, constrains me to set out at some length the  broad         perspective which courts must possess in such  confrontation         situations.  Our Constitution is tryst with destiny,  pream-         bled with  Inscent  solemnity in the words ’Justice--social,         economic  and political’.  The three great branches of  Gov-         ernment,  as  creatures of the Constitution,  must  remember         this promise in their functional role and forget it at their         peril, for to do so will be a betrayal of those high  values         and goals which this nation set for itself in its objectives         Resolution  and whose elaborate summation is in Part  IV  of         the  paramount  parchment.   The history  of  our  country’s         struggle for independence was the story  of a battle between         the forces of socio-economic exploitation and  the masses of         deprived people of varying degrees and the Constitution sets         the new sights of the nation.  To miss the burning economics         and imperative politics of the Fundamental Law and to  focus         fatuously     on legal logomachy and pettifogging  casuistry         is  to play truant with its messiahnism and to  defeat   the         sweep  of  its  humanism.  Once we grasp the dharma  of  the         Constitution, the new orientation for the karma of adjudica-         tion  becomes  clear.  Our rounding fathers,  aware  of  our         social realities and the inner workings of history and human         relations, forged our fighting faith, integrating justice in         its  social, economic and political aspects.  While  contem-         plating the meaning of the Articles of the Organic law,  the         Supreme Court shall not disown Social Justice.             We must realise the vital role in Indian economic  inde-         pendence  that  the land question plays  before  approaching         the   constitutional  issues  urged before  us.   The  caste         system  and  religious bigotry seek sanctuary  in  the  land         system.   Social status syndrome, resisting the  egalitarian         recipe of the Constitution, is the result of the  hierarchi-         cal  agrarian organisation.  The harijan serfdom  or   dalit         proletarianism  can  never be dissolved  without  a  radical         redistribution  of land ownership.  Development  strategies,         income diffusion  programmes  and employment  opportunities,         why,  even the full realisation of the social  and  economic

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       potential of the ’green revolution’ demand agrarian reform.             Michael  Cepede, Professor and Independent  Chairman  of         the  FAO Council, after studying the link between the  green         revolution and land reforms has concluded:                             "   ....  land reform, far  from   being                       incompatible   with the Green  Revolution,  is                       essential to its successful continuation.   In                       any  case,  unless  the  new  techniques   are                       quickly made available to peasant farmers, the                       social  situation  will  before.  long  become                       explosive.   If land workers are  thwarted  in                       their  expectation  of jobs  under  the  Green                       Revolution, they will have no alternative  but                       to  migrate  to a  hopeless existence  in  the                       suburban shanty towns.                             As  an  Indian friend once said  to  me,                       unless  the peasant is allowed to  participate                       fairly  soon in the Green Revolution, it  will                       quickly  change  colour.  If it is  to  remain                       green,                       816                       workers on the land must no longer be exploit-                       ed as they are now; there must be a structural                       reform,  which means first and  foremost  land                       reform."             (The Green Revolution and Employment--by Michael  CEPEDE         -- International Labour Review, Vol. 105, 1972--P. 1)         The intimate bond between poverty and hierarchy in  agrarian         societies, the impact of the social framework of agriculture         on the castesystem, the inhibition of feudal tenures on  the         productive  energies  of the peasantry, are  subjects  which         have been studied by cultural anthropologists,  sociologists         and  economists and, in  consequence, the  Constitution  has         included  agrarian reform as a crucial component of the  New         Order.              In  a recent publication by the Institute  of  Economic         Growth,  the  inter-connection between  land  reform,  class         structure and the powerelite has been high-lighted:                              "The  significance  of land  reform  is                       obvious if one keeps in view the predominantly                       agrarian  character of most  Asian  Countries.                       The  majority  of  populations  in  the  Asian                       region live in villages where land constitutes                       not  only  the main source of  livelihood  but                       also the basis of social stratification  power                       ’structure,  family  organisation  and  belief                       systems.  Land  reform which  is  intended  to                       promote  changes  in  inland   relations    is                       bound  to  exercise a  far-reaching  influence                       not only on the pattern of agricultural trans-                       formation  but  of rural transformation  as  a                       whole.                             It should be borne in mind that  changes                       in  land relations are not only propellers  of                       socio-economic change, they are also  recipro-                       cally influenced by changes in  the  economic,                       technological, social, political and ideologi-                       cal  spheres. Analysis of the impact  of  land                       reforms,  therefore, has to be attempted  with                       an  awareness  of development in   the   total                       social situation.   Further, countries in Asia                       exihibit many points of similarity as well  as                       of  divergence in respect of land reform  pro-                       grammes  and  their impact  on  socio-economic                       changes."

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                         (Studies       in       Asian       Social                       Development--McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., Ltd.,                       p. 5).             Small  wonder that the framers of the Constitution  were         stirred  by  the proposition that freedom in  village  India         become’s ’free’ only when the agrarian community comes  into         its own and this necessitates radically re-drawing the rural         real  estate map.  A sensitied awareness of this  background         is essential while assessing the legal merit of the  submis-         sions  made  by  Shri Tarkunde  which  has  fatal  potential         vis-a-vis the three impugned legislations in question.             We  are directly concerned, in considering the crowd  of         appeals  from the three High Courts, with Arts. 31A(1)*  and         31-B which         *  In its present shape, it was recast by  the  Constitution         (Fourth) Amendment Act.         817         came  into  the Constitution shortly after and as  the  very         First Amendment to the Constitution.  The relevance of  land         reforms  and their forensic inviolability was then  stressed         in  Parliament by the  Prime Minister who moved the Bill  in         this behalf.  He explained the quintessential aspect of  the         problem.  I quote it here  because  the  voice of Parliament         belights,  when  played back, the words of the  Articles  to         better appreciate their import and amplitude:                             "Shri Jawaharlal Nehru :.. When I  think                       of this Article. (Art. 31) the whole gamut  of                       pictures comes up before my mind, because this                       article  deals with the abolition of  the  za-                       mindari  system, with land laws  and  agrarian                       reform  .....                             Now, ... a survey of the world today,  a                       survey of Asia today will lead any intelligent                       person  to see that the basic and the  primary                       problem is the land .problem today in Asia, as                       in India.  And every day of delay adds to  the                       difficulties  and dangers apart from being  an                       injustice in itself  ......                             I  am  not  going into  the  justice  or                       injustice of but  am looking at it purely from                       the point of view of stability. Of course,  it                       you go into the justice or injustice, you have                       to  take  a longer view, not  the  justice  of                       today, but the justice of yesterday also.                             We do not, want anyone to suffer.   But,                       inevitably  in big social changes some  people                       have to suffer.  We have to think in term’s of                       large schemes of social engineering, not petty                       reforms  but of big schemes. like that   .....                       Even  in the last three years or so some  very                       important measures passed by State  Assemblies                       and the rest have been held up. No doubt, as I                       said, the interpretation of the Court must  be                       accepted  as right but you, I and the  country                       has  to wait with social and  economic  condi-                       tions--sOcial  and economic  upheavals-and  we                       are responsible for them.  How are we to  meet                       them  ?  How are we to meet this challenge  of                       the  times ?  Therefore, we have to  think  in                       terms  of these big changes, land changes  and                       the  like and therefore we thought it best  to                       propose  additional articles 31A and 3lB  and’                       in  addition to that there is a  Schedule  at-                       tached  of  a number of Acts passed  by  State                       Legislatures,  same of which have  been  chal-

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                     lenged  or might be challenged and we  thought                       it  best  to save them from  long  delays  and                       these  difficulties, so that this  process  of                       change  which   has  been   initiated  by  the                       States should go ahead."                       (Constitution  First Amendment  Bill  Debates,                       d/16-5-51).             We  now know the high seriousness and wide sweep of  the         constitutional  provisions  falling for  construction.   The         purpose  of  Art. 3lB is conferment of total  immunity  from         challenge on the score of violation of Part III.  The  words         used are as comprehensive as English         818         language permits.  And there is no justification. to  narrow         down  the  pervasive operation of the  protection,  once  we         agree that the legislation relates to agrarian reforms.             I have, right at the outset, hammered home the strategic         significance of land reforms in the planned development  .of         our  resources, the restoration of the dignity and  equality         of  the  individual and the consolidation  of  our  economic         freedom.   No land reforms, no social justice.  And so,  the         framers of the Constitution, finding the fearful prospect of         agrarian  re-structuring  being  threatened  by  fundamental         rights’  archery, decided to armour such  reform  programmes         with the sheath of invulnerability viz., the Ninth  Schedule         plus   Art.   3lB. Once included in this Schedule,  no  land         reform  law  shah  be arrowed down by use of  Part  III.   A         complete protection was the object of the 1st Amendment, and         to blunt the edge of this purpose by interpretative  tinker-         ing  with legalistic skills is to cave in or  assist  unwit-         tingly  the slowing down of the process which is the key  to         social transformation.  The listening posts of the constitu-         tional  court  are  located, not in little  grammar  nor  in         lexicography  nor even in pedantic reading of  Provisos  and         Explanations  based  on vintage rules but  in  the  profound         forces  which have led to the provision and in  the  compre-         hensive concern expressed in the wide language used.   While         any  argument in Court has .to be decided on a study of  the         meaning of the words of the statute vis-a-vis the  constitu-         tional  provisions, the very great stakes of the country  in         agrarian   legislation,   which  we have been  at  pains  to         emphasize,  enjoin  upon the Judges the need to  bestow  the         closest  circumspection in evaluating  invalidatory  conten-         tions.   Every presumption in favour  of  validity,   seman-         tics   permitting,  every  interpretation  upholding  vires,         possibility  existing,  must meet with the approval  of  the         Court.   Of  course, if any of the provisions  of  the  Act,         tested by the relevant constitutional clause, admits of   no         reconciliation,   the Act must fail though, since the  Court         has its functional limitation in rescuing a legislature  out         of its linguistic folly.             I  may  here  briefly set out  the  circumstances  which         account for these appeals.  Maybe, I may also state  pithily         the nature of  the attempted constitutional invasion on  the         legislative  provisions.   The appellants  have  arrived  in         three  batches.   The first set of appeals is  by  landlords         from Maharashtra whose challenge of the Maharashtra Agricul-         tural  Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 (Act No. 27  of         1961 ) as amended, (especially ss. 4 and 5)  proved ineffec-         tual  in  the  High Court and they seek  better  fortune  by         urging  some  of  the same arguments more  sharply  in  this         Court.  The next bunch  of appeals is by the State of Punjab         which  complains   about  the  High  Court’s  conclusion  of         unconstitutionality  of s. 5(1) of the Punjab  Land  Reforms         Act, 1972.  The third group is by the State of U.P. some  of

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       the provision’s of whose land. reform law have been declared         ultra  vires  by  the High Court, and  the  aggrieved  State         contests that ratiocination as horrendously wrong.  For easy         reference hereafter, I will abbreviate the three statutes as         the  Maharashtra Act, the Punjab Act and the U.P. Act.   The         provisions under attack are substantially         819         similar in nature, and the arguments before us likewise have         been more or less identical.  One common feature of all  the         three  enactments  is  that they are all  included  in   the         Ninth  Schedule  to  the Constitution, although it  must  be         stated  that  the  Punjab Act, at the time  the  High  Court         decided the case, had not been so included. Since the  three         Acts  enjoy the immunity ensured by Art. 31-B, the  examina-         tion by this Court of the questions mooted has to be on that         footing.   That  Chinese Wall of protection   still   leaves         vulnerable chinks, according to Shri Tarkunde, and his major         offensive  is based on the second proviso to  Art.  31-A(1).         He  derives from the proviso thereto a legislative  incompe-         tency  if some mandated conditions implied therein  are  not         fulfilled and the failure to comply with this requirement by         all three Acts spells their invalidity.             The  broad-spectrum attack in the High Courts, based  on         many  grounds, having been given up, we may focus  first  on         the  relevant portions of Arts. 31-A and 31-B and the  Ninth         schedule, before coming to the specific sections of the Acts         which  allegedly violate, with fatal impact,  the  constitu-         tional prescriptions or prohibitions. Shri Tarkunde  himself         followed this line in his argument.             Speaking  generally, the gravamen of the charge, in  all         the  three instances, is in creating an ersatz  ’person’  or         artificial family for the purposes of the Acts, contrary  to         the implicit requirement of the 2nd proviso to Art.  31A(1),         and in presenting a curious ceiling limit for such a  ’fami-         ly’  regarding lands in personal cultivation.  We will  con-         sider this principal argument closely.                       Article 31-B reads thus:                       "31-B. Validation of certain Acts and  Regula-                       tions                             Without  prejudice tO the generality  of                       the provisions contained in Article 31’A, none                       of the Acts and  Regulations specified in  the                       Ninth  Schedule  nor  any  of  the  provisions                       thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever to                       have become void, on the ground that such Act,                       Regulation  or provision is inconsistent  with                       or  takes away or abridges any of  the  rights                       conferred by, any provisions  of  this   Part,                       and  notwithstanding any judgment,  decree  or                       order  of  any court or tribunal to  the  con-                       trary,  each of the said Acts and  Regulations                       shall, subject to the power of  any  competent                       Legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in                       force."         Its  obvious object is to save land reform laws  from  being         shot  down  by  the constitutional  missiles  of  Part  III.         Conceding  this,  counsel argues that what  is  repulsed  is         attack based on rights under Part III but other  infirmities         are not cured by Art. 3lB.  One  such infirmity, legislative         incompetency, is the  foundation  of hiss  argument.  Before         critically appraising a contention, one must sympathise with         the  submission.  So we may read Art. 31A(1) to  the  extent         relevant:         820                       "31A. Saving of laws providing for acquisition

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                     of estates,                       etc :--                             (1)  Notwithstanding anything  contained                       in article 13, no law providing for--                          (a)  the  acquisition by the State  of  any                       estate or of any rights therein or the  extin-                       guishment or modification of any such  rights,                       or                          (b)-  the taking over of the management  of                       any property by the State for a limited period                       either  in the public interest or in order  to                       secure the proper management of the  property,                       or                          (c) the amalgamation of two or more  corpo-                       rations  either in the public interest  or  in                       order  to secure the proper management of  any                       of the corporation, or                          (d)  the extinguishment or modification  of                       any rights of managing agents, secretaries and                       treasurers,  managing directors, directors  or                       managers  of  corporations, or of  any  voting                       fights of shareholders  thereof, or                          (e) the extinguishment or modifications  of                       any   rights accruing by virtue of any  agree-                       ment,  lease  or licence for  the  purpose  of                       searching  for,  or winning,  any  mineral  or                       mineral  oil, or the premature termination  or                       cancellation of any such agreement,  lease  or                       licence,                             shall be deemed to be void on the ground                       that it is inconsistent with, or taken away or                       abridges any of the rights conferred by  Arti-                       cle 14, Article 19 or Article 31;                             Provided  that where ’such law is a  law                       made  by   the  Legislature of  a  State,  the                       provisions  of  this article shall  not  apply                       thereto unless such law, having been  reserved                       for  the consideration of the  President,  has                       received his assent:                             Provided  further  that  where  any  law                       ,makes  any provision for the  acquisition  by                       the  State  of any estate and where  any  land                       comprised  therein is held by a  person  under                       his  personal  cultivation, it  shall  not  be                       lawful for the State to acquire any portion of                       such  land  as  is within  the  ceiling  limit                       applicable  to him under any law for the  time                       being  in force or any building  or  structure                       standing   thereon  or  appurtenant   thereto,                       unless the law relating to the acquisition  of                       such land, building or structure, provides for                       payment of compensation at a rate which  shall                       not be less than  the market value thereof."             All  the Acts relate to the acquisition by the State  of         estates,  in the sense that surplus lands above the  ceiling         limit are taken away         821         by  the State.  While this is  permissible,  notwithstanding         any violation of Arts.  14, 19 and 31, the second proviso to         Art. 31A(1) by a negative prescription, imposes  legislative         incompetence  in certain circumstances.  Shri Tarkunde reads         the proviso in a manner not so easy to follow.  Even so,  to         understand the argument one has to follow counsel’s chain of         reasoning.  Firstly, he persuades us that where any land  is         held  by  a person in hi’s actual  cultivation,   the  State

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       cannot  acquire any portion of such land as. is within   the         ceiling limit applicable to him under any law unless the law         relating  to the acquisition of such land provides for  pay-         ment  of  compensation at a rate not less than  the  ,market         value thereof. He is right.             In  none  of these Acts is compensation  on  that  scale         payable.  The  next question is whether the  acquisition  of         land is below the ceiling limit.  To make good this part  of         his  argument, he calls in aid Art. 367.  That  Article  im-         ports  the application of  the  General Clauses  Act,  1897,         for  the interpretation of the words used in  the  Constitu-         tion  and so the  expression  ’person’  used in   Art.   31A         (Second Proviso) must bear the meaning assigned to it by  s.         2(12)  of the General Clauses Act. Counsel states  that  the         Acts  in   question define ’family’ and ’family unit’  in  a         bizarre  manner, by providing for ceiling limit for  ’family         unit’  incongruously with the natural concept of family  but         fabricated  in  the foundry of the statutes, the  laws  have         violated  the  ceiling for the individuals  comprising   the         family.   By reading ss. 4(1) and 5 of the  Maharashtra  Act         and  s. 4(1) and s. 5 read with r. 5(4) of the  Punjab  Act,         counsel  tried to make good his contention that there was  a         flagrant  departure from the concept of ’person’ as  defined         in s. 2(12) of the General Clauses Act.  By doing this,  the         legislature   treated  one  person’s  separate land as  land         of the family unit and deprived  the  wife  and  minor child         of  the  right to hold lands within the ceiling  limit.   By         this  recondite  reasoning, Shri Tarkunde  urged   that  the         legislature  had transgressed the limits of their competency         which rendered the legislations void, not because any funda-         mental  right in Part III had been flouted but  because  the         limitation on legislative competency written into the second         proviso to Art. 31 A had been breached.             Counsel  fought shy of reading into the 2nd  proviso  to         Art. 31A(1) a fundamental right conferred on persons holding         lands  below   the ceiling limit  in  personal  cultivation.         This  legalist dexterity became necessary because Art.  3lB,         on  its  plain  and plenary terms, was  a  sovereign  remedy         against all abridgement of or inconsistencies with fundamen-         tal rights under Part III.  The sweep of this provision, the         paramount  purpose it was designed to serve and the.  ampli-         tude  of its language versus the narrowness of the construc-         tion  put,  the desperate interpretative  crevices  created,         frustrative  of  its main object, and the  reliance  on  the         structure  of  Art.  13 to understand the  anatomy  of  Art.         31B--this  was  the gut issue on which most  of  the  debate         centred.   Equally importantly, whether the prescription  in         the  said  2nd proviso was a  guaranteed  fundamental  right         expressed   in  emphatic negative and as an exception to  an         exception or was it solely a limitation on legislative power         without  creating a corresponding right in any  person--this         too occupied the centre of the stage.         822             The  Punjab  and  Haryana High Court,  in  the  judgment         under  appeal,  has  ventured the view  that  the  provision         relating  to ’family’ and fixation of land ceiling for  such         units is not agrarian reform. This extreme dictum  discloses         the  easy possibility of judicial solecism when courts  wear         legal  blinkers  while adjudging  questions  of  agronomics,         national reconstruction arid sociological programmes in  the         setting of developing countries.  Professional innocence  of         current  economics,  anthropology and sociology,  in  essen-         tials,  while rendering constitutional verdicts on  develop-         mental law’s, is forensic guilt.             In  State of Kerala & Anr. v. Silk Manufacturing  (Wvg.)

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       Co.  Ltd.  etc.(1) the considerable  amplitude  of  agrarian         reform  in  developing countries  has  been  explained.   If         India  lives  in  her  villages, if a huge majority  of  its         people  live  or  starve  on  agriculture and under agrestic         sub-culture, every thing that  promotes  rural  regeneration         and  the welfare of the agricultural community  is  agrarian         reform.  This being the conceptual sweep of the  expression,         all reasonable strategies for the limitation of holdings and         maximization of surplus lands for distribution to the  land-         less  and  designing a hopeful rural future  obviously  fall         within the expanding projects of agrarian reform.  To  argue         more is to  labour the obvious and to interpret liberally is         an obligation to the Constitution.             Assuming that the legislations in question are  measures         of  agrarian  reform--and they are-We have  to  dissect  and         discover the nature of the objection based on the 2nd provi-         so to Art. 31 (1) and decide whether the protective wings of         Art. 3lB are  wide  enough to take in these legislations and         repel the imputed infirmity.             Art.  3lB  categorically states that’ none of  the  Acts         specified  in the Ninth Schedule nor any of  the  provisions         thereof,  shall  be  deemed to be void  on  any  conceivable         ground rooted in Part III.  Even if such Act or provision is         inconsistent with any provision of Part 111 it shall not  be         invalidated.   Even if such Act or provision takes  away  or         abridges  any of the rights conferred by any  provisions  of         Part  III  it shah continue in force.  In short,  no  matter         what  the grounds are, if they are traceable to Part Iii  in         whatever  form, they fail in the presence of Art.  3lB.   No         master of English legal diction could have used, so tersely,         such protean words which in their potent totality bang,  bar         and bolt the door against every possible invalidatory  sally         based  on Part III.  And Article 31A(1) being in  Part  III,         Shri Tarkunde’s ’2nd proviso’ bullet cannot hit the  target.         Nor are we impressed with the cute argument that the phrase-         ology  of  Art. 3lB must be correlated to Art. 13  and  read         with  a  truncated connotation. Legal legerdemain is  of  no         avail where larger constitutional interests are at stake.             Shri  Tarkunde concedes that if we read the 2nd  proviso         to  Art. 31A(1) as conferring a fundamental right  on  every         person  in  personal cultivation of land below  the  ceiling         limit.   Art. 3lB is an effective answer to his  contention.         And  so he has striven to make the point that what the  said         proviso  does is not to confer a right but to clamp  down  a         limitation on legislative competence.  The proviso,         (1) [1974] 1 S.C.R.67|.         823         according to counsel, imposes an embargo. on the legislature         against enacting for acquisition of lands below the  ceiling         limit  without  providing for payment of compensation  at  a         rate which shall not be less than the market value  thereof.         The  fallacy  of this submission lies in its being  a  half-         truth  confounded  for the whole truth.   Every  fundamental         right, from the view point of the individual, gives a  right         and  from  the  Standpoint of the  State,  is  a  restraint.         Whether  the manner of expression used is in positive  terms         or negatively, whether the statutory technique of a proviso,         saving  clause,  exception   or explanation, is  used  or  a         direct interdict is imposed, the substantive content is what         matters.   So  studied, many of the Articles  in  Part  III,         worded  in  a variety of ways, arm the  affected  individual         with   a right and, pro tanto, prohibit the legislature  and         the  executive from enacting or acting contra.  Every  right         of A is a limitation on B, in a universe of law and order.             The learned Attorney General expanded on the  functional

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       plurality  of a proviso and on what is a  fundamental  right         from the individual’s angle being a limitation on power from         the  legislative  angle.  Cases were  cited,  passages  were         blue-pencilled  and text books were relied on.   Even  self-         evident  propositions wear perplexingly  erudite looks  when         learned  precedents  and excerpts from classics  play  ’upon         them.  It is Simple enough to say that there may be singular         situations where legislative incompetence may exist  without         a   corresponding individual right but in the generality  of         cases it is otherwise.  Jurisprudential possibilities apart,         in the concrete case before us there is a clearly enunciated         fundamental right, garbed as an exception to an exception or         as  a proviso carved cut of a general saving  provision.  It         needs  no  subtlety to see that under the rubric  ’Right  to         Property’  a skein of rights and limitations on  rights  has         been wound in Arts. 31 to 31C.  Together they are the  meas-         ure  of the fundamental right to property in its macro  form         and  micro  notes.  So understood, the scheme is  plain.   A         large  right to property protected by law  against  depriva-         tion,  compulsory acquisition only on constitutional  condi-         tions, saving of agrarian and some other  laws  from   these         constitutional constraints, followed by creation, through  a         proviso,   of  an  oasis where acquisition can be made  only         by payment of compensation at or above market value-such  is         the pattern woven by the complex of clauses.  A great  right         is  created in favour of owners to get compensation  at  not         less than the market value if lands within the ceiling limit         and in personal cultivation are acquired by the State.  This         is a fundamental right and is a creature of the  2nd  provi-         so to  Art. 31A(1).  An independent provision may  occasion-         ally incarnate as a humble proviso.             I am not, therefore, inclined to pursue Shri  Tarkunde’s         trail in reading the rulings which set out the proper office         of  a proviso, although it is absolutely plain that  in  the         context, setting and purpose of a provision, even a  proviso         may function as an independent clause.             Likewise, the artificiality imputed to ’family unit’ and         ’family’  in the two statutes and the anomalies  and  injus-         tices  which may possibly flow from them also do  not  arise         for consideration since we have         824         taken the scope of Art. 3lB to be Wider than contended  for.         Moreover,  in  any land reform measure,  where  the  maximum         surplus  pool  of land for social distribution is  the  aim,         drastic interference with  the existing rights and room  for         real  individual  grievances are inevitable. The  new  order         claims  a .high price from the old and pragmatic  strategies         to organise land reforms may involve  definitional  unortho-         doxy  if the target group is to be reached.   Socio-economic         legislation is social realism in action, not bookish perfec-         tion, as social scientists will attest.             I  hold  that the Maharashtra, the Punjab and  the  U.P.         Acts are not unconstitutional, taking the constructive  view         that  Art.  31-B, vis-a-vis agrarian reforms,  is  a  larger         testament  of vision and values in action and a  bridge  be-         tween individual right and collective good.             The Nagpur Bench has spurred with counsel’s many submis-         sions most of which have been wisely abandoned here and  has         ultimately  upheld the legislation.  The Punjab  High  Court         has ventured to hold that the law is bad for reasons repeat-         ed  before us and repelled by us unanimously. The  Allahabad         judgment  has  shown  noetic  naivete and novel legal  logic         in  condemning the provisions to death on grounds which  the         counsel  cared  to espouse before us.  The reason  for  this         lies  in the womb of obvious surmise.  While  interpretative

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       opportunities  are still open for courts in the  application         of land legislation. the requiem of the  unconstitutionality         of agrarian reform laws has, by now, been sung.             Nevertheless, the crowing event of egalitarian  legisla-         tion  is   not so much constitutional success  as  effective         emacation.   The distance between the statute book  and  the         landless tiller is tantalisingly long and for this implemen-         tation hiatus the executive, not the  judicative, wing  will         hold itself socially accountable hereafter.  May be it  will         be  spurred  with  responsible  spread  trasucending  reform         rhetoric.             I  agree that the Maharashtra appeals be dismissed,  and         the other two batches be allowed.         S.R.   Maharashtra appeals dismissed, U.P. & Punjab  appeals         allowed.         825