“REPORTABLE”

  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1621 OF 2004

Dashrath Rao Kate …. Appellant

Versus

Brij Mohan Srivastava …. Respondent

J U D G M E N T

V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.

1. The judgment of the High Court, allowing the Second Appeal is in  

challenge by way of this Appeal.   The Second Appeal was filed by the  

respondent/defendant  challenging  the  judgment  of  the  Appellate  Court,  

whereby the Appellate Court had confirmed the decree passed by the Trial  

Court.   

The High Court framed two questions of law, they were:

“(1) Whether  the Court  below erred  in  law in  treating  the  finding recorded in the proceedings under Order  XXII  Rule 5, CPC to be binding and omitting to decide the  question in regard to the locus standi and entitlement of  the  plaintiff  on  merits  considering  the  specific  pleas  

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urged  by  the  defendant  in  the  written  statement  subsequent to the substitution of the new plaintiff? and;

(2) Whether  the  Court  below  erred  in  law  in  granting  a  decree on the basis of the ground contemplated under  Section 12 (1) (c) of the M.P. Accommodation Control  Act  even  though  the  alleged disclaimer  could  not  be  taken to be anterior to the filing of the suit?”

2. Two  other  substantial  questions  proposed  by  the  appellant  

(respondent herein) before the High Court by the respondent herein were:

“(1) Whether the defence contained in the written statement  did constitute a ground under Section 12 (1) (c) of the  M.P. Accommodation Control Act?

(2) Whether the ground under Section 12 (1) (c) is available  to a derivative title holder?”

3. The High Court, however, took into consideration the first question of  

law and held that if  that question of law was answered in favour of the  

appellant (respondent herein), then the Second Appeal would have to be  

allowed in favour of the tenant-respondent.  It is only on that ground that  

the appeal came to be allowed.  In paragraph 7 of the impunged judgment,  

the High Court expressed that the gist of the first question was whether the  

evidence  recorded  by  the  Court  below  before  allowing  the  application  

under Order 22 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred  

to as ‘CPC’, for short) could be looked into also for passing a final decree  

against  the  appellant-defendant  (respondent  herein).   It,  however,  

observed that  if  that  evidence was  ignored,  then the plaintiff  (appellant  

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herein)  had not  led  any evidence to  show that  he  had  locus standi to  

continue the suit.   

4. Few  facts  would  have  to  be  considered.   Sukhiabai  [sometimes  

referred to as Sankhyabai]  who was the sister of the grandfather of the  

appellant/plaintiff,  owned  the  house.   She  was  issueless  and  the  

appellant/plaintiff  was brought up by Sukhiabai  and was living with her.  

The house in dispute was let out to the respondent herein as a monthly  

tenant  and  a  written  rent  note  was  executed  for  that  purpose.   An  

application came to be filed initially in the year 1990 vide case No. 125/84-

85/90-7 before the Rent Control Authority for eviction against the present  

respondent.   That eviction application was allowed by the Rent Control  

Authority and hence a Revision came to be filed vide C.R.No.198/96 in the  

High Court.  It was during the pendency of this Revision that Sukhiabai  

died.   The  respondent  impleaded  one  Arun  and  Ramesh  claiming  

themselves to be class I heirs of Sukhiabai and eventually the Revision  

was allowed by the High Court and the High Court remanded the case to  

the Civil Court and directed that the questions as to whether intervention  

could be sought on the basis of the Will and as to whether the respondent  

was entitled to continue the suit, would have to be gone into by the Trial  

Court.  Upon remand, the suit was numbered as 119-A/96 before the Civil  

Judge,  Gwalior.   The  appellant/plaintiff  moved  an  application  for  

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amendment of the plaint and that amendment was allowed.  Against that,  

the present respondent filed Civil Revision No.91/97, while deciding which,  

the  High  Court  directed  that  the  question  of  legal  representative  of  

deceased Sukhiabai had to be determined first and after determining the  

rights of legal representative, a proper party has to be impleaded as the  

legal  representative and the party so impleaded as legal  representative  

would alone have the right to amend the plaint.   

5. The present appellant then filed an application to bring himself as  

the  legal  representative  on  record  on  the  basis  of  the  Will  which  was  

executed by Sukhiabai in his favour on 26.03.1990.  The appellant/plaintiff  

examined one Prabhakar Rao as PW-2 on 01.09.1997.  After due inquiry,  

the application of the present appellant was allowed by the Trial Court and  

that  is  how  the  present  appellant  was  brought  on  record  in  place  of  

Sukhiabai.  This order was not challenged and it became final.   

6. The parties thereafter led evidence and on that basis the Trial Court  

decreed the suit by its judgment dated 22.01.1998.   That was challenged  

by way of an appeal  before the Additional  District  Judge,  Gwalior,  who  

dismissed the appeal by judgment dated 15.05.1998.  These concurrent  

findings thereafter were challenged before the High Court and the High  

Court has upset the concurrent findings and has proceeded to dismiss the  

suit.  It is this judgment which has fallen for our consideration.   

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7. It is clear from the findings of the Trial Court and Appellate Court that  

the suit has been allowed on the ground of Sections 12 (1) (c) and 12 (1)  

(e) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act.  The High Court has accepted  

the arguments of the respondent herein that in spite of the fact that the  

appellant/plaintiff  was  brought  on  record  as  legal  representative  of  

Sukhiabai on the basis of the Will, yet he should have led more evidence  

to prove the Will in order to prove that he had become owner on the basis  

of the testamentary succession of the concerned house.  In short, the High  

Court came to the conclusion that since the inquiry under Order 22 Rule 5,  

CPC was of the summary nature and was limited only to the determination  

of  the  right  of  the  appellant  herein  to  be  impleaded  as  the  legal  

representative of Sukhiabai, any finding given in that inquiry would not be  

binding on the defendant (respondent herein) at the final stage of the suit  

and the plaintiff (appellant herein) would have to again prove the Will in  

order to establish his ownership vis-à-vis the concerned premises.  The  

High  Court  went  on  to  hold  that  since  the  title  of  the  plaintiff  (present  

appellant)  was based on the Will  and it  was disputed by the defendant  

(present respondent), therefore, the appellant/plaintiff had to independently  

prove his title.  For that purpose the evidence led at the time of inquiry  

under Order  22 Rule 5,  CPC would  be of  no consequence.   The High  

Court then relied upon on the law laid down in  Suraj Mani & Anr. Vs.  

Kishori Lal [AIR 1976 HP 74], wherein it was observed that the evidence  

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recorded during the inquiry  under  Order  22 Rule  5,  CPC could not  be  

equated  with  the  evidence recorded  at  the  time of  decision  on  merits.  

Another judgment relied upon was Kalyanmal Mills Ltd., Indore Vs. Voli   

Mohammed [AIR 1965 MP 72].  The third decision relied and followed by  

the High Court was Raghnath Singh Anar Singh Vs. Gangabai (D) thr.   

L.R.  Bhuwan  Singh [AIR  1961  MPLJ  398].  The  High  Court  then  

proceeded to reject the argument on behalf of the appellant/plaintiff  that  

this  was  only  a  suit  for  the  ejectment  under  the  M.P.  Accommodation  

Control  Act  and  the  respondent/defendant  being  an  outsider  could  not  

have  challenged  the  validity  of  the  partition.   On  merits,  all  that  was  

required  to  be seen was  as to whether  the appellant  herein  had been  

properly brought on record as legal representative of Sukhiabai and if that  

was so, there was no question of non-suiting the appellant/plaintiff on the  

basis that the Will was not proved independently.  The High Court also  

went  on to  record a  finding that  the appellant  herein  was  not  a  family  

member of Sukhiabai as she was not survived by any class I heir.  In short,  

the High Court held that the Will was not proved independently, though on  

its  basis,  the  appellant/plaintiff  was  allowed  to  be  brought  as  a  legal  

representative of Sukhiabai, and proceeded to dismiss the suit.

8. We are unable to agree with the reasoning of the High Court.

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9. It is an admitted position that when the Civil Revision was pending  

before the High Court at the instance of the tenant-respondent, it was filed  

initially  only  against  one  Ramesh and  Arun  Kate,  since  Sukhiabai  had  

already died after the order passed in her favour.  That Civil Revision was  

allowed  by  the  High  Court  and the  High  Court  directed  to  convert  the  

matter into a suit under M.P. Accommodation Control Act.  That is how the  

original  application  for  conviction  was  transferred  to  the  Civil  Court  for  

hearing.  It was before the Civil Court that the present appellant filed an  

application for being impleaded and the same was allowed without  any  

investigation.  The said impleadment was claimed on the basis of a will by  

Sukhiabai  in  favour  of  the  appellant.   In  the  Revision  No.  91  of  1997  

against this impleadment, the High Court directed the Trial Court to decide  

as to who is the legal heir of Sukhiabai and to substitute such a person as  

legal heir.  In pursuance of that, a full fledged inquiry was conducted by the  

Trial Court, wherein three witnesses came to be examined by the present  

appellant to establish the will.   In that enquiry, the Trial Court framed a  

question whether will was written by Sukhiabai and whether on the basis of  

the said will, appellant Dashrath Rao was her legal representative in this  

case.  One Prabhakar Rao (PW-2) and Ganpat Rao were witnesses on the  

original will (Exhibit P-1).  Ganpat Rao has expired.  Besides himself, the  

appellant/plaintiff  examined said Prabhakar Rao (PW-2) and got the will  

proved.  Prabhakar Rao (PW-2) fully supported the case of the appellant in  

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respect of the will.  It is noteworthy that both, appellant and said Prabhakar  

Rao, were extensively cross-examined.  Not only this, but the other person  

Ramesh Kate, who was joined as the legal representative of Sukhiabai in  

the first Revision, was also got examined by the appellant, who claimed  

clearly that he had no interest in the property and in fact, the suit house  

was bequeathed by Sukhiabai in favour of the appellant.

10. The respondent/defendant also examined himself and according to  

him, the signatures on the will was not that of Sukhiabai.  After considering  

the  evidence  fully  and  in  details,  the  Trial  Court,  by  its  order  dated  

9.9.1997, gave a declaration that present appellant Dashrath Rao was the  

legal representative of Sukhiabai in the case.  The Trial Court also clarified  

that the order was only for the purpose of bringing legal representatives on  

record.  Obviously it was under Order 22 Rule 5, CPC.  It is noteworthy  

that this order is not further challenged by the tenant-respondent.

11. It was thereafter that the appellant/plaintiff made amendments and  

claimed himself to be the owner of the house in question.  He also pointed  

out  that  the  respondent/defendant  was  a  tenant  at  a  monthly  rent  of  

Rs.170/- of the whole house, but later on, the respondent/defendant had  

vacated one room of his tenancy and handed over it  to Sukhiabai  and  

retained 2 rooms and bathroom and the rent  was fixed at Rs.130/-  per  

month.   He  also  pointed  out  that  tenant  had  not  paid  any  rent  from  

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1.1.1994.  He also reiterated his relationship with Sukhiabai and the facts  

regarding  the  will,  as  also  his  bonafide  personal  need  of  the  rented  

premises.

12. In his written statement, the tenant-respondent admitted Sukhiabai  

to be his landlady and also accepted about the rent note dated 10.2.1980.  

He also again denied that the appellant/plaintiff  had become owner and  

also denied his need.  On that basis, issues came to be framed, which are  

as under:-

(i) Whether  there  is  relation  of  land  lord  and  tenant  between  plaintiff and the defendant?

(ii) Whether the defendant has not paid/cleared outstanding rent  from 1.1.1984 to the plaintiff?

(iii) Whether  the  plaintiff  is  in  genuine  need  of  the  suit  accommodation for his own residential purpose?

(iv) Relief and Costs?

13. The evidence was again led by the appellant, wherein he asserted  

that the respondent/defendant was the tenant of Sukhiabai and that he had  

become his tenant now as per the will, since he has become owner on the  

basis of the will.  He also reiterated the will (Exhibit P-1), regarding which  

Court had given decision in the enquiry under Order 22 Rule 5 CPC.  He  

then deposed about his need.  We have seen the cross-examination of this  

witness by the respondent/defendant, which is lengthy cross-examination  

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and very strangely, we find not a single relevant question asked to him  

about the will.   He was cross-examined mainly as regards his need.  In  

para 18, a stray suggestion was given that Sukhiabai had not executed the  

will  in his favour and that he had manipulated to prepare fraudulent will.  

The appellant reiterated that the will was not only executed, but the Court  

has accepted it.  Beyond this, there is nothing in the cross-examination.  

The respondent/defendant also examined himself and in his evidence also,  

in para 4, he reiterated that the will shown was forged.  He was specifically  

asked in his cross-examination and he had to admit that he had filed no  

Revision against  the order dated 9.9.1997,  by which the Will  was  held  

proved, though he asserted that he was going to file the same.  It was on  

this basis that the Trial Court held all the issues in favour of the appellant.

14. Before the first Appellate Court, again it was reiterated by the tenant-

respondent (appellant therein) that the Trial Court had committed an error  

in holding the appellant/plaintiff  to be the heir  of the suit  house.  Some  

judgments were cited in support of this contention, they being Mahendra  

Dhapu  &  Ors.  Vs.  Ram  Avtar  &  Ors.  [1923  AIR  Nagpur  209],   

Kalyanmal Mills Ltd.,  Indore Vs.  Voli  Mohammad & Ors.  [1965 AIR  

M.P.  72],  Raghunath  Singh  Vs.  Ganga  Basai  [1961  M.P.L.J.  398],   

Surajmal  & Ors.  Vs.  Kishori  Lal  [1976 AIR H.P.  74].   The Appellate  

Court distinguished all these decisions on the factual aspects and held that  

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the Will (Exhibit P-1) was proved by the evidence of the appellant/plaintiff,  

as also the attesting witness.  It was also pointed out that the Will was not  

disputed by anybody else, muchless even the interested persons.  On the  

other hand, they had supported the Will.  The Appellate Court came to the  

conclusion  that  in  that  view,  the  tenant  could  not  be  allowed  to  raise  

question on the legality of the title of the appellant herein.  The Appellate  

Court thereafter considered the matter on merits regarding the bonafide  

need of the appellant and held it to be proved.  The Appellate Court further  

went  on  to  hold  that  since  the  tenant  had  challenged  the  title  of  the  

landlord, i.e., the appellant during the pendency of the eviction petition, the  

landlord  became  entitled  under  Section  12(1)(c)  to  get  the  decree  of  

eviction.  It is on this basis that the appeal came to be dismissed.

15. The  High  Court,  however,  took  the  view that  the  Will  had  to  be  

proved all  over  again,  though it  was  held proved earlier  in  the enquiry  

under Order  22 Rule 5,  CPC.  We have already earlier  referred to the  

findings of the High Court.  In our view, the view of the High Court that the  

Will had to be proved again, is incorrect.

16. As a legal position, it cannot be disputed that normally, an enquiry  

under Order 22 Rule 5, CPC is of a summary nature and findings therein  

cannot amount to res judicata,  however, that legal position is true only in  

respect of those parties, who set up a rival claim against the legatee.  For  

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example,  here,  there  were  two  other  persons,  they being Ramesh and  

Arun  Kate,  who  were  joined  in  the  Civil  Revision  as  the  legal  

representatives of Sukhiabai.  The finding on the Will in the order dated  

9.9.1997 passed by the Trial Court could not become final as against them  

or for that matter, anybody else, claiming a rival title to the property, vis-à-

vis, the appellant herein, and, therefore, to that extent, the observations of  

the High Court are correct.  However, it could not be expected that when  

the question regarding the Will was gone into in a detailed enquiry, where  

the  evidence  was  recorded  not  only  of  the  appellant,  but  also  of  the  

attesting witness of the Will and where these witnesses were thoroughly  

cross-examined and where the defendant also examined himself and tried  

to prove that the Will was a false document and it was held that he had  

utterly failed in proving that the document was false, particularly because  

the document was fully proved by the appellant and his attesting witness, it  

would be futile to expect the witness to lead that evidence again in the  

main  suit.   It  was  at  the  instance  of  the  High  Court  in  the  revisional  

jurisdiction  that  the direction was  given that  the Trial  Court  should first  

decide as to whether who could be the legal representative of Sukhiabai  

and after complete enquiry, the Trial Court held the Will to be proved.  The  

Will was not only attacked by the appellant on its proof, but also on merits,  

inasmuch as the respondent/defendant went on to contend before the Trial  

Court  during  that  enquiry  that  the  Will  was  unnatural,  unfair  and  was  

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executed in doubtful circumstances.  The respondent/defendant had also  

relied  on  the  reported  decision  of  this  Court  in  Girja  Dutt  Singh  Vs.  

Gangotri  Datt  Singh  [AIR  1955  SC 346].   The  Trial  Court,  however,  

rejected  this  contention.   On the  other  hand,  the  Trial  Court  found on  

merits  that  the  appellant  was  living  with  Sukhiabai  and  Sukhiabai  had  

adopted him orally.   

17. Evidence of Ramesh Kate was also referred to, who asserted about  

this fact.  Reference was also made to the evidence of Sukihabai herself in  

the Rent Control Case No. 14/90-91 that she had adopted Dashrath Rao  

(appellant herein) and that Dashrath Rao lived with her.  Clear cut findings  

were given by the High Court in these proceedings that from the evidence  

of Prabhakar Rao (PW-2), the attesting witness, it was clear that Sukhiabai  

had signed in his presence and he had also signed in present of Sukhiabai  

and had also seen the other attesting witness signing the Will and attesting  

the same.  Not only this, but the Trial Court also wrote a finding that the  

objection raised by the defendant (respondent herein) that Sukhiabai was  

not in a position to understand the Will on account of her poor physical  

condition, was also rejected by the Trial Court.  It was also noted that the  

Will was executed six years prior to her death and as such, there was no  

question of Sukhiabai being suffered with any mental or physical disability  

for executing the Will.  Therefore, it is on this basis that the Will was held to  

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be proved.  Once this was the position and in the same suit, the further  

evidence was led, there was no point on the part of the appellant/plaintiff to  

repeat all this evidence all over again.  We have closely seen the relied  

upon ruling of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Suraj Mani & Anr. Vs.  

Kishori Lal (cited supra).  The ruling undoubtedly correctly holds that the  

finding  in  an  enquiry  under  Order  22  Rule  5  cannot  operate  as  res  

judicata,  provided the very question needs to  be decided.   The factual  

situation,  however,  differs  substantially.   The case before the Himachal  

Pradesh High Court only pertained to the correctness of the order passed  

in the enquiry under Order 22 Rule 5, CPC.  That was not a case where  

the question, as in the present case, fell  for consideration.   In fact,  the  

Himachal Pradesh High Court also observed and, in our view, correctly,  

that it was still open to the petitioner (therein) during the trial of the suit to  

establish that the Will was competent and confered no right, title or interest  

on the respondent and, therefore, the respondent was not entitled to any  

relief  in  the  suit.   Unfortunately,  on  evidence  in  this  case,  the  

respondent/defendant did not do anything and did not even challenge the  

evidence of the appellant that he had become owner of the Will.  Merely  

because the evidence of respondent/defendant and Prabhakar Rao (PW-

2)  was  not  repeated  all  over  again,  it  cannot  be  held  that  the  

appellant/plaintiff could be non-suited on this ground.

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18. Dr. Kailash Chand, Learned Counsel, appearing for the respondent  

also relied on ruling in Vijayalakshmi Jayaram Vs. M.R. Parasuram [AIR  

1995 A.P. 351].  It is correctly held by the Andhra Pradesh High Court that  

the  Order  22  Rule  5  is  only  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  legal  

representatives on record for conducting of proceedings in which they are  

to be brought on record and it does not operate as res judicata.  However,  

the High Court further correctly reiterated the legal position that the inter se  

dispute between the rival  legal representatives has to be independently  

tried and decided in separate proceedings.  Here, there was no question of  

any rivalry between the legal representatives or anybody claiming any rival  

title against the appellant/plaintiff.  Therefore, there was no question of the  

appellant/plaintiff  proving the Will  all  over again in  the same suit.   The  

other judgment relied upon is Full Bench Judgment of Punjab & Haryana  

High Court in Mohinder Kaur & Anr. Vs. Piara Singh & Ors. [AIR 1931  

Punjab & Haryana 130].   The same view was reiterated.  As we have  

already  pointed  out,  there  is  no  question  of  finding  fault  with  the  view  

expressed.  However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case,  

there will  be no question of non-suiting the appellant/plaintiff, particularly  

because in the same suit,  there would be no question of  repeating the  

evidence, particularly when he had asserted that he had become owner on  

the basis of the Will (Exhibit P-1).  In a case in Shaligram Bhagoo Kunbi  

& Anr. Vs. Mt. Dhurpati W/o Shamrao Kunbi [AIR 1939 Nagpur 147],   

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the Division Bench of that Court consisting Hon’ble Stone C.J. and Hon’ble  

Vivian  Bose,  J.,  considered  the  question.   The  Division  Bench,  firstly,  

quoted from Tarachand Vs. Mt. Janki [AIR 1916 Nag. 89].  The quotation  

relied on was as follows:-

“It  is  no longer open to the Court  to stay the suit  until  the  dispute as to who is the legal representative of a deceased  plaintiff has been determined in a separate suit.  The question  as to who was the representative of  a deceased defendant  could not be left open for decision in another suit, even under  the old Code, but had to be decided by the Court itself.  Under  the present Code, all such questions have to be decided by  the Court.”

The Bench then proceeded to refer to Bombay High Court decision  

in  Raoji  Bhikaji  Vs.  Anant  Laxman  [1918  (5)  AIR  Bom  175]  and  

Allahabad  High  Court  decisions  in  Raj  Bahadur  Vs.  Narayan  Prasad  

[1926 (13) AIR All. 439]  and  Antu Rai Vs. Ram Kinkar Rai [1936 (23)   

AIR All. 412] and went on to record that order under Order 22 Rule 5 was  

not a res judicata.  After referring to these rulings, the Bench held:-

“But there is an important qualification to this.  It  is true the  order is not res judicata, but for all that, the decision is final so  far as the suit in which it  is made is concerned, not on the  ground  of  res  judicata  but  because  of  Section  47.   No  subsequent decision in a separate suit can be used to affect  the  rights  of  the parties  so far  as  questions  relating to  the  ‘execution,  discharge  or  satisfaction’  of  the  decree  in  connection with which the order was made is concerned.”

The Bench further observed:-

“Once a person is joined as a legal representative under Order  22 Rule 5, and once it is accepted that that is final  so far as  

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that litigation is concerned, then it follows to the decree, and,  thereafter, all matters relating to the ‘execution, discharge or  satisfaction’ of that decree must be decided under Section 47  and not in a separate suit.”  (Emphasis supplied)

Ultimately, the Bench came to the conclusion:-  

“All  that,  in  our  opinion,  is  not  res  judicata  is  the  question  whether or not the person joined as the legal representative  really  occupies  that  character.   That  question  is  not  finally  concluded by a decision under Order 22 Rule 5 except in so  far as it concerns the suit in which the decision is made.  To  that extent, we overrule the judgment in Mt. Laxmi Vs. Ganpat  reported in 17 NLR 45.  The appeal is dismissed with costs.”   

      (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, it is clear that at least insofar as the suit in the present  

case is concerned, the question regarding the appellant’s right to represent  

was closed.  There could be a second suit, questioning his entitlement on  

the basis of Will, but admittedly, there is no such challenge by anybody to  

his status as a legatee of Sukhiabai.  Insofar as the suit in the present case  

is  concerned,  the question was  finally  decided under Order  22 Rule 5,  

CPC and in the same suit,  it  could not  be re-agitated.   Obviously,  the  

impugned judgment is incorrect when it  holds that  the appellant/plaintiff  

had to lead fresh evidence all over again to prove his status on the basis of  

the Will, which was held to be proved in the enquiry under Order 22 Rule  

5, CPC.

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19. All this is apart from the fact that the tenant in this case could not  

have challenged the Will  at  all.   He was an utter  outsider  and had no  

interest  in  the  property  as  owner.   Indeed,  from  the  pleadings  and  

evidence, it is clear that tenant-respondent has not even ventured to claim  

any rival interest against the appellant/plaintiff.

20. For all  these reasons, we are unable to agree with the impugned  

judgment and we would choose to set aside the same and restore the two  

judgments of the Trial Court and Appellate Court.  The appellant/plaintiff,  

therefore, succeeds with costs of Rs.25,000/-.

    …………………………………….J.      (Markandey Katju)

    ………………………………….J.      (V.S. Sirpurkar)

New Delhi November 3, 2009

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Digital  Performa

Case No.  : Civil Appeal No. 1621 of 2004

Date of Decision : 3.11.2009

Cause Title : Dashrath Rao Kate   Versus

Brij Mohan Srivastava

Coram : Hon’ble Mr. Justice Markandey Katju    Hon’ble Mr. Justice V.S. Sirpurkar      

C.A.V. On : 6.8.2009

Judgment  delivered by :  Hon’ble Mr. Justice V.S. Sirpurkar

Nature of Judgment : Reportable

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