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PETITIONER: DASAUDHA SINGH & ORS.  ETC.  ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT16/11/1972

BENCH: GROVER, A.N. BENCH: GROVER, A.N. MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN MUKHERJEA, B.K.

CITATION:  1973 AIR  710            1973 SCR  (2)1006  1973 SCC  (2) 393  CITATOR INFO :  D          1974 SC1121  (4)

ACT: East  Punjab  Utilisation  of  Lands  Act  1949-Ss.  7   and 11--Scope  Whether after the expiry of the lease  the  owner can  get back his property Power of the Collector  under  S. 7(1)-Whether  eviction  possible only under  Punjab  Tenancy Act.

HEADNOTE: Section 7 of the East Punjab Utilisation of Lands Act  1949, provide  that  where  any land taken possession  of  by  the Collector under Section is, on the expiry of the lease to be returned  to  the owner, the Collector may,  after  enquiry, specify  by order in writing, the person to whom  possession of the land shall be given and that delivery of  possession of  land shall be a full discharge of the Collector  of  all liability  etc.,  Further where the right person  cannot  be found,  the  Collector  shall affix a  notice  on  the  land declaring  it to have been released.  After such  a  notice, the Collector or the Government shall not be liable for  any compensation Section II provides that the Collector may  use force for enforcing his order made under this Act. In the appeals, the main question for determination was  the scope  ambit and interpretation of S. 7 read with S. 1 1  of the  Act.  It was contended by the appellants that under  S. 7,  the Collector had no power to evict a lessee  after  the expiry  of the lease.  For that purpose Mort mug be  had  to the provisions of the Punjab Tenancy Act 1887, of the Genera Law. Dismissing the appeal, HELD  :  (1)  Section  7(1) of the Act  cannot  be  read  in isolation,  but  has to be interpreted in the light  of  the purpose  and scheme of the Act ,as also the  other  relevant provisions.  The sole purpose for which the Act was  enacted was  to ensure that such lands as were capable of  producing food or fodder but which owing to the neglect on the part of the  owners  were  not being cultivated,  are  utilised  for cultivation.  Under S. 3, the Collector is empowered to take possession of any cultivable land which remained fallow  for the last six or more harvests.  The Collector was to give  a

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lease for the minimum period of 7 years, but not, more  than 20 years.  The tenant, however, knew beforehand that on  the expiry  the period of the lease, he would have to  surrender possession to the owner. The  Act,  nowhere  contemplated that the  owner  should  be completely deprived of As ownership right.  The compensation to  which he was on titled under s. 4 was for the  temporary deprivation  of the exercise of his ownership rights.  [1011 HI (ii)Section  7(1)  when read in the context  clearly  shows that  it  was intended to empower the Collector to  make  an order  in writing after the expiry of the lease saying  that the  ’possession  of the land shall be given to  the  person named  or  specified  in the order.   The  words,  "to  whom possession  of  land shall be given’ contained  the  mandate under which the 1007 Collector derived powers of  that the possession of the land was  to be given by the tenant to the owner whose  name  was specified  in the Collector’s order.  If the tenant did  not comply  with  the  order or direction made under  &  7,  the Collector  could  use such steps or force as  was  necessary compliance with the order. [1013 C] (iii)The  answer  to the question that  eviction  could take  place only under the Tenancy Act or the  general  law, and  not  under Section 7(1) of the Act, is  that  the  East Punjab  Utilisation  of Lands Act 1949 was  intended  to  be exhaustive  for the purpose for which it was enacted. it  is hardly  possible to regard a tenant of the  Collector  under the Act as falling within the definition of a ’tenant’ under the  Tenancy  Act.  The whole purpose of the  Act  would  be defeated  if  the provisions of the Tenancy  Act  were  made applicable  to it.  If that were the intention, the  Tenancy Act were made applicable to it.  If that were the intention, the  legislature  would have provided for  it.   As  regards compensation,  no  provision has been made in  the  Act  for payment  of  any compensation for great  hardship  by  being asked  to  give  up all lands, but that  hardship  could  to alleviated,  or some relief given by the legislature  alone. [1016 H]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 825831  & 956 & 823/1972. Civil Appeals Nos. 825-831 & 956 of 1971. Appeals  by  certificate from the judgment and  order  dated February  23,  1972 of the Punjab & Haryana  High  Court  at Chandigarh in Civil Writ Nos. 2147, 2168-2172, 2200 and 2185 of 197 1. Civil Appeal No. 823 of 1972. Appeal  by  certificate from the judgment  and  order  dated February  23,  1972 of the Punjab & Haryana  High  Court  at Chandigarh in Civil Writ No. 2112 of 1971. L.N.  Singhvi,  B.  Datta  and S.  K.  Dhingra,  for  the appellant (in C. As.  Nos. 825 & 826/72). B. Datta  and S. K. Dhingra, for the appellants  (in  C,A. Nos. 828/72). B.Datta, for the appellants (in C.A. Nos. 827, 829-831  & 956/72). Bishan Narain and B. D. Sharma, for respondents Nos.  1 &  2 (in C.As. Nos. 825-829, 831 and 956/72 and respondent No.  1 in C.A. No. 830/72). N.   S. Das Bahi, for the respondent No. 52 Cm C.A. No.  826

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1972). S.   C. Manchandda and J. C. Talwar, for, respondents (in C. As.  Nos. 827, 828 & 856/72). G. S. Chatterjee, for respondents (in C.A. No. 829/72). 1008 Urmila Kapoor and Kamlesh Bansal, for respondents (in  C.As. Nos. 830, 831 & 956/72). D.   S. Golani and Kailash Mehta, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 823/72). B.   D. Sharma, for respondent No. 1 (in C.A. No. 823/72). S.   S.  Khanduja, for respondent Nos. 2-5 & 9-11  (in  C.A. Nos. 823/72). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GROVER, J.  In these appeals by certificate from a  judgment of  the  Punjab  &  Haryana High  Court  the  main  question required determination relates to the scope, ambit and  true interpret of  s.  7 read with s. 1 1 of  the  East  Punjab Utilization of Land Act, 1949, hereinafter called the ’Act’. We  need state the facts only in C.A. 825/72 (Dasau Singh  & Others  v. State of Haryana).  The Collector Karnal  out  an area of 1154 Acres in villages Pehowa and Murtzapur  jointly to Karnal Cooperative Society Ltd., Pehowa and Lyalpur Coop. Joint Famiing Society, Murtzapur under s. 5 the Act.   Owing to some dispute which arose subsequent to lease between  the two societies the Registrar gave an award the matter  having been  referred  to him for arbitration.  According  to  that award  the entire land in village Murtzapur and 17 Acres  of land in village Pehowa were given to the Lyalpur Society and the  remaining  357 Acres of land in village Pehowa  to  the Kamal  Society.   The  lease was originally  for  a  certain number  of years but it was extended for a period of  twenty which  is  the  maximum period for which a  lease  could  be granted  under the Act.  By a notice dated May 17, 1971  the signal  Officer,  Kaithal, issued a notice  to  the  lessees under  s.  of the Act.  In the notice it was  stated,  inter alia,  that the origin owners had applied for the return  of the  land  leased  out  as the period of  the  lease  had  I expired.  The lessees were required hand over possession  to the  original  owners.  On June 15, 197  the  Sub-Divisional Officer  passed  an  order  directing  the  Tehsil  to  take possession of the land and give actual possession the ,of to the  original owners.  These proceedings were challenged  in the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution.  The High Court disposed of the writ petition together with the  other writ petitions which had been filed on similar grounds by  a common judgment dismissing all the petitions. In  order  to  appreciate  the  points  in  controversy  the relevant  provisions of the Act may be referred to  as  also the  background  in  which  the  Act  came  to  be  enacted. According to the State- 1009 ment  of  Objects and Reasons in the Bill  large  tracts  of fertile land had remained uncultivated due to the negligence or  absence of displaced local landlord.  The policy of  the Government  was not to leave any cultivable land  unsown  as far  as  possible  which  was  necessary  to  attain   self- sufficiency in the matter of food.  If timely action was not taken  a large portion of the population would have to  face starvation  after  1950  when it was proposed  to  stop  all imports of foodgrains from abroad.  The Government had tried its  best to persuade the landlords to cultivate the  lands. There  was, however, likelihood of large tracts  of  fertile and  cultivable lands remaining unsown during Rabi  1949-50. The  Bill  which  was introduced was,  therefore,  aimed  at bringing  about all available land in,the East Punjab  under

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fodder and foodgrain crops. The definitions of "land", "owner" and "tenant’ as given in s.   2 are as follows               (a)   "Land"  means  land which is  not  urban               land  and is not occupied as the site  of  any               building  in  a town or village but  does  not               include land which is leased by Government  or               Custodian under any law other than this Act".               (f)   "Owner"   means   a  person   having   a               proprietary right in the land and includes  an               allottee,   a  usufructuary  mortgagee  or   a               lessee".               (h)   "Tenant" means a person to whom land  is               leased  by the Collector under the  provisions               of this Act". By virtue of s. 3 the Collector could issue a notice to  the owner  of  any land which had not been  cultivated  for  the specified  period and if he did not find the explanation  of the  land owner to be satisfactory he could take  possession of the same for the purpose of the Act.  This the  Collector could do notwithstanding any law to the contrary.  Section 4 provided  for  payment of Compensation where  possession  of any land  had  been  taken under s.  3.  Under  s.  5  the Collector,  after taking possession under s. 3, could  lease out  the land to any person on such terms and conditions  as he  deemed  fit for the purpose of growing fodder  and  food crops. The Period of lease could not be less than 7  years or  more  than 20 years.  Section 6 conferred power  on  the Collector  to determine lease in certain cases.  It  may  be mentioned that s. 6 was omitted by Punjab Act 11 of 1951 but it was inserted by a later Act No. 24 of 1957.  According to sub-s.  (2)  where  a  lease  had  been  determined  by  the Collector  the lessee was not to be given any  compensation. Section 6 was further amended and substituted by Haryana Act 35  of  1971.   Owing to certain decision of  the  Punjab  & Haryana High Court it was 1010 provided  in  sub-s. (1) that the Collector shall  have  the power  to determine the lease after affording  a  reasonable opportunity to the tenant to show cause why his lease should not  be  determined and the possession of  the  land  taken. Sub-sections (3) and (4) were added in these terms :               Sub-s.(3)  "The  principles  embodied  in  the               various provisions of the Transfer of Property               Act, 1882, shall not apply to any  proceedings               under this Act.               Sub-s.(4) No civil or revenue Court shall have               jurisdiction   to   entertain  any   suit   or               proceedings in respect of the determination of               lease or eviction of a tenant".               Sections  7  and  II  are  material  for   our               purposes.  They are reproduced below --               S. 7(1)    "Where any land taken possession of               by  the Collector under s. 3 is on the  expiry               of the lease to be returned to the owner,  the               Collector  may after making such  inquiry,  if               any,  as  he considers necessary,  specify  by               order in writing the person to whom possession               of the land shall be given".               (2)   The  delivery of possession of  land  to               the  person specified in any order made  under               sub-s.  (1) shall be a full. discharge of               the Collector from all liability in respect of               such  delivery  but shall  not  prejudice  any               rights in respect of the land which any  other

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             person  may be entitled by due process of  law               to   enforce  against  the  person   to   whom               possession of the land is so delivered.               (3)   Where  the person to whom possession  of               any  land is to be given cannot be  found  and               has  no  agent or other  person  empowered  to               accept  delivery on his behalf, the  Collector               shall  cause a notice declaring that the  land               is released to be affixed on some  conspicuous               part of the land.               (4)   On  issue of the notice referred  to  in               sub-s.  (3) the, land specified in the  notice               shall be deemed to have been delivered to  the               person entitled to the possession thereof, and               the  Government or the Collector shall not  be               liable for any compensation or other claim  in               respect  of the land for any period after  the               said date".               S.    1 1 "The Collector may take or cause  to               be taken such               steps  and use or cause to be used such  force               as may in his opinion be reasonably  necessary               for securing               1011               compliance  with any order made by  him  under               this Act". Section  14 provided for appeal and revision by  any  person aggrieved  by an order passed by the Collector.  Section  16 empowered  the State Government to make rules  for  carrying out  the provisions of the Act.  The Punjab  Utilization  of Land  Rules 1950 were framed in exercise of that  power  but the,  Rules dealt only with matters which are not  relevant. By  Ordinance  No.  8 published in  the  Haryana  Government Gazette  Extraordinary  dated  September  18,  1970  a   new section,  s. 14A was inserted.  This section was as  follows :-               "Bar of jurisdiction-No civil court shall have               jurisdiction   to   entertain  any   suit   or               proceedings in respect of the eviction of  any               person  to whom land ha-,. been  leased  under               Section 5". The  aforesaid  section  has been  subsequently  omitted  by another amendment but it is admitted that during the  period under consideration it was in force. The main point which was agitated before the High Court  and has  been agitated before us on behalf of the  appellant  is that  even on the expiry of the term of the lease  no  power has  been  conferred on the Collector under s.  7  to  order restoration  of possession to the owners.  It  is  submitted that  all that s. 7(1) provides is to empower the  Collector to  make an inquiry and then specify by an order in  writing the  persons to whom possession of the land is to be  given. In  other words he can only declare who is to be treated  as owner  for  the purpose of restoration  of  possession.   He cannot  further order that there should be a restoration  of possession either to him or to the owner.  For that  purpose resort  must be had to the provisions of the Punjab  Tenancy Act 1887 or the general law under which a tenant or a lessee can  be evicted after the term of his lease has come  to  an end.   The procedure which is prescribed, according to  this argument  by  sub-s.  (1) of s. 7, does not  relate  to  the process by which the eviction of the tenant can be  effected There   is  no  question  of  any  automatic  or   voluntary ejectment. Now  sub-s. (1) of s. 7 is somewhat unhappily worded.  On  a

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cursory  reading  of  it an impression  is  created-that  it confers a limited power on the, Collector to make an inquiry and declare who the person is to whom the possession of  the land  is to be restored.  But this provision cannot be  read in  isolation and has to be interpreted in the light of  the purpose  and  scheme of the Act as also the  other  relevant provisions.   There can be no manner of doubt that the  sole purpose  for  which the Act was enacted was to  ensure  that such lands as were capable of producing 13-L521 Sup.  CI/73 1012 food or fodder but which owing to the neglect on the  part of  the owners were not being cultivated should be  utilised for  cultivated cultivation and for growing food and  fodder crops.   The  condition precedent for applying  s.  3  under which the Collector could take possession was that the  land should  have remained uncultivate for the last six  or  more harvests.   The Collector was to give lease which was to  be for  a minimum period of 7 years but which could be  upto  a maximum  period  of  20 years.  This  period  was  obviously prescribed because it was considered that the tenant  should have  enough period for investing money, putting in  hi  own effort and derive the maximum benefit by cultivating the Ian leased  to  him.   That  served  two  purposes;  firstly  it provided  a incentive to him to work hard and make full  use of  cultivation of that land so as to reap as many crops  as he  could  out  of it The second purpose  was  that  by  his efforts  the  land  was bound to improve if he  was  to  get benefit  out of it.  Normally it would b expected  that  the tenant  would  not only spend some money of his own  on  the improvement   of   the  land  but  he  might   also   effect improvements of a substantial nature, particularly, when the leas was to be for a period of 20 years.  He, however,  knew before  hand that on the expiry of the period of the  lease, which  in all the present cases was for 20 years,  he  would have  to surrender possession to the owner.  A printed  copy of  the  lease  has bee produced before us.   It  is  common ground that all the leases in the present cases were on  the same  terms  as  are  to be found  in  this  printed  lease. According  to clause 7 of the lease the lessee was  enjoined to  use  the land only for the purpose of  sowing  food  and fodder crops and for no other purpose.  Clause 8 shows  that the  lessee  was tinder an obligation to reclaim  and  bring under  cultivation  50% of the land leased by  a  particular date  and the remaining half by another date.  Under  clause 10 he could erect buildings, sink wells, install tube  wells etc.  but  it wag made quite clear that he had no  right  to claim compensation for the improvements effected by him  nor was  he entitled to remove without the previous  consent  in writing of the Collector any material equipment or machinery attached  by  him  to the land.   Clause  11  empowered  the Collector to determine the lease and take possession of  the land  in  case  of  any breach by the lessee  of  a  of  the conditions  of  the lease.  Under clause 8  the  lessee  was bound on the determination of the lease by affluent of  time or  otherwise to peaceably vacate and give up possession  of the  land.   Clause  15  made  the  lease  subject  to   the provisions of the Act as amended from time to time. Apart  from the terms of the lease, s. 6 conferred power  on the  Collector  to  determine the  lease,  even  before  its expiration  if the lessee committed a breach of any  of  the term or conditions thereof.  Section 8 provided for levy  of a penalty in case 1013 the  tenant failed to grow food or fodder crops on the  land

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leased  to  him.  It is thus clear that  the  Collector  was empowered  to  take possession from the owner only  after  a maximum  period of 20 years for which he could lease it  out to  a tenant.  It was thus clearly contemplated that on  the expiry of that period the Collector would restore possession to the owner.  The Act no-where contemplated that the  owner should be completely deprived of his ownership rights.   The compensation  to which he was entitled Linder s. 4  was  for the  temporary  deprivation  of the  exercise  of  ownership rights  for  the period during which the possession  of  the land had been taken over by the Collector and given on lease to a tenant.  Section 7(1) when read in this context clearly shows that it was intended to empower the Collector to  make an  order  in writing after the expiry of the  lease  saying that the possession of the land shall be given to the person named  or  specified  in  the order.   The  words  "to  whom possession of the land shall be given" contained the mandate under. which the Collector derived powers of directing  that the possession of the land was to be given by the tenant  to the owner whose name was specified in the Collector’s order. The  compulsory and the summary process by which that  order could  be enforced is to be found in s. II.  If  the  tenant did  not comply with the order or direction made under s.  7 the Collector could take or cause to be taken such steps  or use or cause to be used such force as was    s.  7(1).  Sub- ss. (2), (3) and (4) reinforce theabove inter    predation of sub-s. ( 1 ) of s. 7. Once delivery of  possession of the land to the person specified in the order madeunder sub-s.(1)had  been effected the Collector  stood  discharged from all liability in respect of such delivery.  Sub-ss. (3) and  (4) were meant for a similar purpose when a  person  to whom possession of land was to be given could not be  found. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention raised on behalf  of the appellants that S. 7 read with s. 1 1 of  the Act  did  not empower the Collector to make an  order  which would involve the eviction of the tenant in case he  refused to deliver possession to the person specified therein. The  contention raised that s. 7 of the Act is violative  of Art.  14 of the Constitution because there would be  two  or more remedies available to the authorities to which they can resort  is  wholly  untenable.   Section  14-A  contained  a complete  bar to the civil court having any jurisdiction  to entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of the eviction of any person to whom land had been leased out under S. 5 of the  Act  Sub-s.  4  of  s.  6  as  amended  also  bars  the jurisdiction of any civil of revenue. court to entertain any proceedings,  in  respect of the determination of  lease  or eviction of a tenant.  It has been suggested ’.that sub-s. 1014 (4) of s. 6 is confined only to a case where a lease has bee determined  by  the Collector before its  expiry  under  the provision  of sub-s. (1) of s. 6. Sub-s. (4) is  in  general terms and we a unable to see how it can be confined only  to a  lease  determined under sub-s. (1) of that  section.   It appears  that it was primarily for this reason that  s.  14A has now been deleted as already mentioned. The  next question which has been vehemently argued  whether the provisions of the Tenancy Act are applicable an  whether the  eviction could take place only under that Act  Reliance has  also been placed on the provisions of the  Tenance  Act for  sustaining  the argument that no  eviction  could  take place of the tenant unless compensation had been awarded him under  the provisions of that Act.  "Land" has been  defined by  the  Tenancy Act by s. 4(1) to mean, land which  is  not occupied as the site of any building in town or village  and

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is occupied or has been let for agricultural purposes or for purposes  subservient  to agriculture, or  for  pasture  and includes  the sites buildings and other structures  on  such land.   "Tennat" has be defined by s. 4(5) to mean a  person who  holds  land  under other person and is, or  but  for  a special contract would be, liable to pay Tent for that  land to that other person.  Certain categories of persons are not included  but  we  are not concerned  with  the  Sub-s.  (6) defines "Landlord" to mean a person under whom tenant  holds land and to whom he is, or but for a special contract  would be,  liable  to pay rent for that land.   Section  40  gives grounds  of ejectment of tenants for a fixed term and s.  42 places certain restrictions on the ejectment of the  tenant. He shall be ejected otherwise than in execution of a  decree for  ejectment except in cases mentioned in clauses (a)  and (b)  of that section Under s. 48 relief  against  forfeiture can  be  given  in  cases mentioned  therein  to  a  tenant. Chapter VI deals with improvements by landlords and tenants. Under  s.  64 a tenant not having a right of  occupancy  can make  improvements  on his tenancy with the  assent  of  his landlord.   Where improvements are begun in anticipation  of ejectment the tenant cannot claim any compensation by virtue of  s. 66.  Under s. 67 if a landlord tenders to a tenant  a lease  of his tenancy for a term of not less than  20  years from  the  date of the tender at the rent then paid  by  the tenant at such other rent as may be agreed on the tender  if accepted the tenant the claim to compensation in respect  of improvement  previously made on the tenancy  stands  barred. Section 68 s that a tenant who has made improvements on  his tenancy   shall  not  be  ejected  until  he  has   received compensation  for  their provements made by him.   This  is, however, subject to other sections. 1015 As  has been noticed already, in the Act the  word  "tenant" has been defined to mean a person to whom the land is leased by  the  Collector  under the provisions of  the  Act.   The definition of "land" is also different from the one given in the Tenancy Act.  There is no definition of landlord at  all in  the Act.  The entire scheme of the Act establishes  that it  was intended to be exhaustive for the purpose for  which it was enacted.  It is hardly possible to regard a tenant of the Collector under the Act as falling within the definition of  a "tenant" under the Tenancy Act.  The whole purpose  of the  Act would be defeated if the provisions of the  Tenancy Act  were made applicable to it.  If that had been  intended there  was  nothing to stop the legislature  from  making  a provision  in the Act itself about the applicability of  the Tenancy  Act.  The High Court appears to be right in  coming to  the  conclusion that from the provisions of the  Act  no intention can be attributed to the legislature of creating a relationship  of landlord and tenant between ’the  Collector and  the tenant as defined by the Act of the same nature  as was provided for by the Tenancy Act. Once  the above conclusion is reached the argument based  on the   provisions   of  the  Tenancy  Act  with   regard   to compensation for improvements is bound to fail.  As  regards the  general submission that a person cannot be deprived  of his  property  without payment of compensation  it  must  be remembered  that no provision has been made for  payment  of any  compensation  ’;or  such  improvements.   The  tenants, namely,  the appellants had agreed to the term in the  lease by  which  they  were bound that they would  not  claim  any compensation  for the improvements made by them eluding  the currency  of the lease.  Moreover when the tenant knew  that the lease was for as long a period as 20 years, improvements

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must  have  been made with the full knowledge  that  on  the expiry   of  that  period  possession  would  have   to   be surrendered.  The tenants had also reaped all the  advantage that  they could by having a lease for such a  long  period. It is true that in the Act itself s. 4 provides for  payment of  compensation  to onwards and s. 6  contains  a  specific clause  that  where  a  lease has  been  determined  by  the Collector   the  lessee  shall  not  be  entitled   to   any compensation.  Section 7 does not contain ,in,, such provi- sion.  It is significant that although where the legislature in-tended to provide for compensation it did so and where it did  ,not intend to. do so it was clearly provided that  the tenant shall ,not be entitled to any compensation.   Section 7   is  silent  on  the  question  of   compensation.    The legislature being fully alive to the matter of  compensation it  would be legitimate to assume that it did not intend  to make any provision when possession was to be handed over  by the tenant to the original owner pursuant to      1016 an  order  made under s. 7. The reason  apparently  for  not making  any provision for compensation one way or the  other was  that  it IN as clearly contemplated  that  the  tenant would  have to give up possession on the expiry of the  term of the lease which was for a long period and during which he was  expected, as has been observed before, to  derive,  the maximum  benefit  by  means  of  cultivation  of  food   and foodgrain crops.Since the provisions of the Tenancy Act have been, held to beinapplicable to the tenant as defined by the Act we are unable toehold that he was entitled to     any compensation before giving possession in compliance with the order made under s. 7 of the Act. Before  the  High Court it had beenurged on  behalf  of  the appellants that they could be ejectedonly in accordance with the  provisions of the Punjab Security of Land  Tenures  Act 1953.   The High Court held that owing to s.  21(1)  nothing contained in that Act shall affect any land held by a tenant or  lessee under the Government.  Mr. Dutta who  represented some of the appellant-, before us did not press any argument relating to the applicability of the provisions of the  Land Tenures Act to the case of the appellants.  At any rate, and this  position has been rightly conceded by the counsel  for the  respondents,  the appellants cannot  be  debarred  from taking benefit of or seeking protection under any  enactment if  they  can  establish  that  they  are  governed  by  its provisions. Dr.  Singhvi who argued Civil Appeal No. 825/72  has  raised some  other points in addition to those already disposed  of According   to  him  after  the  Registrar  of   Cooperative Societies had settled the dispute between the Kamal  Society and the Lyallpur Society the latter took no interest in  175 acres  of  land  situate in village Pehowa  which  had  been allotted  to it and which were brought under cultivation  by the appellants Dasuadha Singh and others.  This. it is said, was  done with the tacit approval of the Collector.  It  is, however,  admitted  that  the lease was  in  favour  of  the aforesaid  societies and the allegation that the  appellants brought this land under cultivation with the tacit  approval of  the Collector contained in para 5 of the  writ  petition was  denied in the written statement filed on behalf of  the respondents.  In the Jamabandi entries of 1963-64 the  entry was as follows               "The   Collector,   Karnal,   Lessor,   Karnal               Cooperative    Farmers,    Karnal,    Lyallpur               Cooperative  Farmers, Karnal in equal  shares,               lessees.   Cultivation  Lyallpur   Cooperative

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             Farmers,     Karnal,     through      Dasaudha               Singh ................ tenants-at-will". It is difficult to understand how the Jamabandi entry  helps the  appellants  at  all.  It seems  to  indicate  that  the persons who were 1017 shown  as  tenants  at-will were cultivating  it  under  the societies   which  were  the  lessees.   They   could   not, therefore, claim any better rights than the societies  which were  the  tenants  of the Collector  and  amenable  to  his jurisdiction under the Act.  It may be mentioned that in the High  Court this point does not appear to have  been  argued and we do not have the benefit of any finding of that  court on that point.  It has, further, been submitted on behalf of the  appellants that before any orders were made under s.  7 of  the Act the tenants or the persons in occupation of  the lands  in question should have been given an opportunity  of being  heard  to satisfy the well settled  rule  of  natural justice.   Under s. 7 the Collector has to decide  and  name the  owners to whom possession shall be given.   The  tenant can  have no locus standi in that matter in which  if  there are any rival claimants they alone would be interested.  The scheme of s. 7 is such that it is not possible to read  into it  any requirement of a notice being issued to the  tenants before  any  order  is  made by  the  Collector  under  that section. Before the High Court only in one case i.e. C.W. 2171/71  it was pointed out that the petitioners therein had purchased 6 acres,  of  from  the original land owner and  as  such  the Collector  could  not  legally  dispossess  them  from  that portion  of  the  land.   The  Additional  Advocate  General conceded  that in case that area had been purchased  by  the petitioners  in  that  writ  petition  they  would  not   be dispossessed and the possession would be restored to them if dispossession  had  taken place.  On behalf of a  number  of appellants  it has been contended that several  portions  of lands  in  dispute  have been purchased  from  the  original owners and the purchasers are actually in possession.  It is not disputed by the counsel for the respondents that if  any person has acquired the ownership rights in any of the lands which  were the subject matter of the writ petition  he  can approach the Collector who will consider his case fully  and if  it  is  proved  that he has become  an  owner  then  his possession will not be disturbed and no orders will be  made with  regard  to the area in his  occupation  or  possession under s. 7. This will fully safeguard the interest of  those persons who have acquired ownership rights either before  or during the pendency of the proceedings in the High Court% or even in this Court. 1018 Lastly we cannot help observing that the appellants will  be put to a good deal of hardship by being asked to give up all lands which they had been cultivating for so many years  and which probably are the main source of their livelihood.  But that  hardship could be alleviated or some relief  given  by legislation  alone.  The court is unable to do  anything  in the matter. In  the result the appeals fail and they are  dismissed  but there will be no order as to costs. S.C.                            Appeals dismissed. 10 19