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CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  316 of 1998

PETITIONER: Daroga Singh & Ors.

RESPONDENT: B.K. Pandey  

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/04/2004

BENCH: R.C. Lahoti &  Bhan.

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

With

Criminal Appeal No. 317 of 1998, Criminal Appeal No.  318  of 1998, Criminal Appeal No. 332 of 1998 &  Criminal Appeal No. 396  of 1998

BHAN, J.

       The instant criminal appeals arising from a common judgment relating  to the same incident, depict a rare, unfortunate and condemnable act of the  police officials who contrary to the duty enjoined upon them to protect and  maintain law and order, indulged in the act of attacking in a pre-planned and  calculated manner Shri D.N. Barai, Ist Additional District and Sessions  Judge, in his court room and Chambers on 18th November, 1997 at  Bhagalpur in the State of Bihar.

       Facts of the present case:

       In Sessions trial No. 592 of 1992, the Investigating Officer (Jokhu  Singh) was examined as a witness on 7th May, 1997 in the Court of Shri  D.N. Barai, Ist Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur.  As the  cross-examination could not be concluded the case was adjourned to 26th  May, 1997.  Thereafter the case was adjourned to several dates but this  witness did not appear for the cross-examination.  A show cause notice was  issued against Jokhu Singh through Superintendent of Police, Madhepura,  requiring him to appear on 11th June, 1997.  In spite of that Jokhu Singh did  not appear.  On 14th July, 1997, a wireless message was sent to him through  Superintendent of Police to appear in the court on 5th August, 1997. Once  again the witness did not turn up.  The Court, therefore, having no other  option issued a notice to Jokhu Singh to show cause why proceedings under  the Contempt of Courts Act (hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’) be not  initiated against him.  Ultimately, on 27th August, 1997 the case was  adjourned to 20th September, 1997 and to procure his presence, non-bailable  warrant was issued.  On this date also the witness did not turn up.  He did  not file reply to the show cause notice either.  On 17th November, 1997,  Jokhu Singh appeared in the court in the afternoon.  Having regard to the  previous   order of non-bailable warrant of arrest, he was remanded to  judicial custody.  A petition for bail was filed on his behalf after the court  hours.  It was directed that the same be placed for hearing on the next date.    

       Shri K.D. Choudhary, one of the appellants who was an office bearer  of the Policemen’s Association at District Level and was posted as SHO of  the Police Station in the evening of the same day went to the Chambers of

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Shri Barai for release of Shri Jokhu Singh on execution of a personal bond.   Shri Barai did not agree.  Thereafter he approached the District Magistrate  and on the basis of his advice he met the District Judge and renewed  his  demand for release of Jokhu Singh, which was declined.

       On 18th November, 1997, when the bail petition of Jokhu Singh was  taken up, the learned counsel appearing on his behalf made a prayer seeking  withdrawal of the bail application.  Accordingly, the bail application was  dismissed as withdrawn.  Soon thereater, a large number of police officers  (without uniform), armed with lathis and other weapons and shouting  slogans against Shri Barai, barged into his court room.  The court peon Shri  Bishundeo Sharma who tried to shut the door was brutally assaulted.  Shri  Barai apprehending danger to his life, rushed to his Chambers and managed  to bolt the door. Unruly mob forcibly broke open the door, overpowered the  bodyguard and assaulted Shri Barai.  They reiterated their demand for  unconditional release of Jokhu Singh. Due to the manhandling Shri Barai  felt dizziness and became unconscious.  It was due to timely arrival of a  team of doctors that  his life was saved.

       The police personnel after assaulting Shri Barai and his court staff,  took away certain records and damaged the doors and grills of the gate.   They also assaulted some of the lawyers and damaged their furniture and  motor vehicles parked inside the court compound.  Since at the relevant time  the District & Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur had gone to Banka for holding  camp court and Shri Barai was not in a position to send any report, the 5th  Additional District & Sessions Judge sent a report to the High Court  narrating the incident.  On the next day, on return from Banka, District &  Sessions Judge also enquired into the matter and submitted a detailed report.   In the report the names of police officials who were identified by the court  staff, Shri Barai and the lawyers were also disclosed.  They are (i) A.  Natarajan, the then Superintendent of Police, Bhagalpur (ii) Harihar Prasad  Choudhary, the then Deputy Superintendent of Police, Bhagalpur, (iii) K.D.  Choudhary, the then Inspector of Police, Kotwali P.S., (iv) Ms. Shashi Lata  Singh, the then S.I., (v) Daroga singh, the then S.I. (vi) P.K. Singh, the then  S.I., (vii)Rajib Rajan Dayal alias Bhagat, the then S.I., (viii) Gurubachan  Singh, the then S.I., (ix) Krishna Ram, the then Inspector of Police, (x) C.D.  Jha,  the then A.S.I., (xi) K.N. Singh, the then Officer Incharge of Harijan  P.S. Bhagalpur and (xii) Ranjit Pandey, the then Sergeant Major, Police  Line, Bhagalpur.

       On 19th November, 1997, on the basis of the report sent by the 5th  Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur dated 18th November,  1997, Original Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 24 of 1997 was registered  and placed before a Bench of the High Court for admission.  Along with the  said case Civil Writ Petition C.W.J.C. No. 10625 of 1997 filed on behalf of  the Young Lawyers’ Association was also listed.  On perusal of the report  and after hearing the three Presidents of the High Court Associations and the  Advocate General, the Court arrived at the conclusion that a prima facie case  of criminal contempt was made out against the contemners.  Accordingly  proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act were initiated and a direction  was issued to the Registry to issue notices to the above referred persons  along with a copy of the report, containing allegations against the concerned  persons, calling upon them to show cause as to why suitable action be not  taken against them for the alleged misconduct.  The show cause was made  returnable by 25th November, 1997.  The Chief Secretary and the Director  General of Police were directed to affirm on affidavits regarding the steps  taken by the State Government in the matter relating to the incident.

       On 25th November, 1997, all the contemners appeared through their  respective advocates.  On a request made the hearing was postponed to 10th  December, 1997 to enable them to file their detailed replies to the show  cause notice.  Chief Secretary filed his affidavit indicating that the Director  General-cum-Inspector General of Police after holding a detailed inquiry,  had in his report, disclosed names of nine police officials namely (i) K.D.  Choudhary, the then Officer Incharge, Kotwali, (ii) Ranjit Pandey, the then

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Sergeant Major, Bhagalpur, (iii) Ms. Shashi Lata Singh, the then S.I., (iv)  K.B. Singh, the then Thana Incharge, Harijan P.S. Bhagalpur, (v)  Gurubachan singh, the then S.I., (vi) Daroga Singh, the then S.I., (vii) Prem  Kumar Singh, the then S.I. (Officer Incharge Kajraili), (viii) Rajeev Ranjan  Bhagar, the then S.I., and (ix) C.D. Jha, the then ASI Bhagalpur.   

The Director General of Police found the officers, named above,  guilty for the alleged incident and condemned the police officials for their  act.  It was also mentioned in the affidavit that the State Government, acting  on the basis of the report of the Director General of Police, had issued  different orders, suspending all such officials from service.  Keeping in view  the gravity of the situation, a Commission of Inquiry was also set up under  the provisions of the Commission of Inquiries Act, 1952.   

Besides the departmental proceedings, different criminal cases were  also lodged against them.

On behalf of some of the contemners a request was made to keep the  contempt matter in abeyance until the conclusion of the proceedings initiated  under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code, the departmental  proceedings and the report of the Commission constituted under the  Commission of Inquiry Act.  The request was declined by the High Court.  It  was held that the pendency of    a criminal case or judicial inquiry could not  constitute a bar to the continuation of the contempt proceedings.  But before  adjourning the proceedings to the next date and having noticed that all the  contemners and their advocates were present and every body was  condemning the occurrence, the Court expressed the desire that some of the  responsible officers like Superintendent of Police, Deputy Superintendent of  Police, Inspector of Police Kotwali Shri K.D. Choudhary and  Sub-Inspector  of Police Ms. Shashi Lata Singh and Sergeant Major of Police Line Ranjit  Pandey should disclose details of the occurrence which had taken place in  the court premises on 18th November, 1997  and if possible, identify more  names of such persons, who, according to them, had taken part  at the time  of occurrence.  On the adjourned date of hearing, the Court recorded the  statement of (i) A. Natarajan, the then S.P., (ii) Harihar Choudhary, the then  DSP, (iii) K.D. Choudhary, the then Inspector of Police, Kotwali P.S., (iv)  Ms. Shashi Lata Singh, the then S.I., and (v) Ranjit Pandey, the then Sergeat  Major, Bhagalpur.  The Superintendent of Police in his statement fairly  narrated a part of the incident and identified certain more names, like  Awadhesh Singh, Subodh Kumar Yadav and Aswan, Vice-President of the  Association who, according to him, had also taken part in the alleged assault.   The court issued notices to these three persons also calling upon them to  show cause why they be also not proceeded for the criminal contempt.  The  officials whose statements had been recorded were directed to file their  additional or supplementary replies to the show cause on the next date of  hearing.

On 10th December, 1997, all the contemners appeared and filed  additional or supplementary replies to show cause notice.  The  Superintendent of Police in his supplementary reply disclosed names of 14  more police officials and constables, who, as per his inquiry, had also taken  part along with the main persons named earlier.  They are (i) Ram suresh  Singh ’Nirala’, SI, (ii) Sriram Singh, ASI, (iii) Ram Rekha Pandey, SI, (iv)  Shivji Singh, SI, (v) B.N. Singh, ASI, Kotwali, (vi) Sukh Narain Sharma, SI,  (vii) D.D. Singh Officer Incharge, Tatarpur P.S., (viii) Gopalji Prasad, SI,  (ix) Madhusudhan Sharma O/c Sultanganj P.S., (x) Awadesh Singh,  Constable, (xi) Subodh Kumar Yadav, Constable, (xii) Ram Prakash  Paswan, Constable, (xiii) Dilip Ojha, Treasure, Policemen’s Association,  Bhagalpur, and (xiv) Anil Kumar Soren, General Secretary, Policemen’s  Association.     

Notices were issued to the above-named persons as well along with  copies of the report calling upon them to show cause by 8th January, 1998 as  to why they be also not proceeded with the criminal contempt.  On 9th  January, 1998 all the contemners including those fourteen against whom

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notices were issued on 10th December, 1997 appeared and filed their replies  to the show cause notice.

At the same time,  affidavits were also filed on behalf of Shri Barai,  Ist Additional District & Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur and his staff namely R.  Das and B.Sharma and some of the lawyers of the Bhagalpur Court namely  Shri M.P.Singh, President Bar Association, Bhagalpur, Shri Y.K. Rai,  Secretary, Advocate Assiciation and S/Shri N.K. Choudhary, J.K.,Gupta  (Secretary, Bar Association), B.N. Mishra and S.C.Pandey, Advocates.   Copies of the affidavits filed were served on their opposites on 16th January,  1998 all the learned advocates appearing for different parties fairly accepted  that copies of all the material brought on the record so far was properly  served on the advocates appearing for the contemners and those who were  appearing in support of the contempt proceedings.   

In response to the show cause all the contemners in their affidavits  condemned the incident of assault on Shri Barai and the lawlessness created  in the civil court campus, Bhagalpur.  It would be relevant to notice that  some of the contemners like Harihar Choudhary, DSP, K.D. Choudhary,  Inspector of Police and few others have tried to justify the act by saying that  there was a resentment amongst the police personnels for the arrest of Jokhu  Singh and removal of stars from his uniform in the court.  The reply of the  Superintendent of Police also indicated that because of such steps taken by  Shri Barai the Police Officers Association led by Shri K.D. Choudhary on  17th December, 1997 met the Inspector General (Prosecution) and the Zonal  I.G. and protested against the arrest of Jokhu Singh and the removal of stars.   After showing their resentment these contemners also criticised the  unfortunate incident and assault on Shri Barai, and his staff but they denied  their presence at the time of incident in the court premises on 18th  November, 1997.  Show cause notice had been issued to 26 persons.  Except  for one or two the remaining asserted that they were not involved in the  incident and were on duty elsewhere at the relevant time.  In proof of such  defence they attached their duty chart etc.

After considering the relevant evidence on the record, and after taking  due care and caution to see that innocent persons are not punished the High  Court dropped the proceedings against the contemners other than Shri K.D.  Choudhary, Ms. Shashi Lata Singh, Daroga Singh, P.K. Singh, Rajib Ranjan  Bhagat (Dayal), Gurubachan Singh, C.D. Jha, K.N. Singh and Ranjit  Pandey.  Shri K.D. Choudhary was found to be the ring leader of the  contemners and was imposed  with the punishment of undergoing simple  imprisonment for a period of three months and the remaining eight to  undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two months.  It was made clear  that the discharge of rule of contempt notice of the proceedings against the  other seventeen would not absolve them of  their misconduct and guilt for  their respective offences, if any.  In other words, the departmental  proceedings initiated by the State Government and the criminal cases  registered against them would not be affected by the disposal of the  proceedings in the criminal contempt.

Learned counsel appearing for the State of Bihar, has fairly stated that  neither the departmental proceedings nor the criminal cases nor the   Commission of Inquiry have been concluded so far. The plea taken is that  they are awaiting the result of the present appeals.

Appellants who were convicted under the Contempt of Courts Act and  visited with the punishment of simple imprisonment have filed five different  appeals.  S/Shri Daroga Singh, Chakradhar Jha, Shashi Lata Singh and P.K.  Singh have filed Criminal Appeal No. 316 of 1998, Shri K.D. Choudhary  has filed Criminal Appeal No. 332 of 1998, Shri Kedar Nath Singh has filed  Criminal Appeal No. 318 of 1998, Shri Ranjeet Pandey has filed Criminal  Appeal No. 317 of 1998 and Shri Gurbachan Singh  and Rajib Ranjan Dayal  have filed Criminal Appeal No. 396 of 1998.  Daroga Singh, P.K. Singh,  C.D. Jha have already retired from service.  The remaining are still in  service and posted at different places.

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Learned counsels appearing for the appellants in different appeals,  apart from the merits in individual appeals, which we shall deal with later,  have raised some common points challenging the correctness of the  impugned judgment.  The same are:   (i)     the alleged contempt is that of a  court subordinate to the High  Court and the allegations made constitute an offence under  Section 228 IPC, and therefore the jurisdiction of the High  Court to take cognizance of such a case is expressly barred  under proviso to Section 10 of the Act;  (ii)    that the High Court cannot take suo motu notice of the  contempt of a court subordinate to it.  The procedure given in  the High Court Rules and Orders for initiation of proceedings  for contempt of subordinate court having not been followed the  entire proceedings are vitiated and liable to be quashed;  (iii)   the standard of proof required in the criminal contempt is the  same as in a criminal charge and therefore the charge of  criminal contempt has to be proved by holding a trial as in a  criminal case. The appellants could not be convicted on the  basis of evidence by way of affidavits only.  The witnesses   should have been examined in Court and in any case the  appellants should have been given an opportunity to cross- examine the persons who had deposed against them on  affidavits to verify the version of the incident as according to  them there were conflicting versions of the incident;  (iv)    reasonable and adequate opportunity was not afforded to the  appellants either to defend themselves or put forward their case;  and  (v)     affidavits of independent witnesses which were on record have  not been dealt with by the High Court.

Answer to the first point would depend upon the interpretation to be  put on Section 10 of the Act.  Section 10 which deals with the power of the  High Court to punish for the contempt of subordinate courts reads:   

"10. Power of High Court to punish contempts  of subordinate courts.- Every High Court shall  have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers  and authority, in accordance with the same  procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of  courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in  respect of contempts of itself:

       Provided that no High Court shall take  cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been  committed in respect of a court subordinate to it  where such contempt is an offence punishable  under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)."  

       According to the learned counsels appearing for the appellants the  proviso to Section 10 means that if the act by which a party is alleged to  have committed  contempt of a subordinate court constitutes offence of any  description whatsoever punishable under the Indian Penal Code, the High  Court is precluded from taking cognizance of it.  According to them in the  present case the allegations made amounts to an offence under Section 228  of the Indian Penal Code and consequently the jurisdiction of the High Court  is barred.   We do not find any  force in this submission.  The point raised is  concluded against the appellants by a judgment of the Constitution Bench of  this Court in  Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy Vs. The State of Madras,   1952 SCR 425.  In that case, sub-section (3) of Section 2  of the Contempt of  Courts Act, 1926 which is similar to proviso to Section 10 of the Act was  under consideration.  Section  2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926  provided that no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to

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have been committed in respect of a court subordinate to it where such  contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code.  Interpreting  this Section, it was held that sub-section (3) excluded the jurisdiction of the  High Court to take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been  committed in respect of a court subordinate to it only in cases where the acts  alleged to constitute contempt are punishable as contempt under specific  provisions of the Indian Penal Code, but not where these acts merely amount  to offences of other description for which punishment has been provided  in  the Indian Penal Code.  

This judgment was analyzed and followed by a Bench of three Judges  of this Court in the State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Revashankar, 1959 SCR  1367.  In this case as well the point arose regarding the interpretation to be  put to a similar provision and it was held:

"The sub-section was considered in two decisions  of this Court, Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy v. The  State of Madras ([1952] S.C.R. 425) and Brahma  Prakash Sharma v. The State of Uttar Pradesh  ([1953] S.C.R. 1169). In the earlier case of  Ramakrishna Reddy ([1952] S.C.R. 425) the  appellant was the publisher and managing editor  of a Telugu Weekly known as "Praja Rajyam". In  an issue of the said paper dated February 10,  1949, an article appeared which contained  defamatory statements about the stationary Sub- Magistrate, Kovvur, and the point for  consideration was if the jurisdiction of the High  Court to take cognisance of such a case was  expressly barred under section 2(3) of the earlier  Contempt of Courts Act, when the allegations  made in the article in question constituted an  offence under section 499, Indian Penal Code. On  behalf of the appellant it was argued that what the  sub-section meant was that if the act by which the  party was alleged to have committed contempt of  a subordinate court constituted offence of any  description whatsoever punishable under the  Indian Penal Code, the High Court was precluded  from taking cognizance of it. This argument was  repelled and this Court said (at page 429) :-  "In our opinion, the sub-section referred to  above excludes the jurisdiction of High  Court only in cases where the acts alleged to  constitute contempt of a subordinate court  are punishable as contempt under specific  provisions of the Indian Penal Code but not  where these acts merely amount to offences  of other description for which punishment  has been provided for in the Indian Penal  Code. This would be clear from the  language of the sub-section which uses the  words "where such contempt is an offence"  and does not say "where the act alleged to  constitute such contempt is an offence."  On an examination of the decisions of several High  Courts in India it was laid down that the High  Court had the right to protect subordinate courts  against contempt but subject to this restriction, that  cases of contempt which have already been  provided for in the Indian Penal Code should not  be taken cognizance of by the High Court. This, it  was stated, was the principle underlying section  2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926. This  Court then observed that it was not necessary to

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determine exhaustively what were the cases of  contempt which had been already provided for in  the Indian Penal Code; it was pointed out,  however, that some light was thrown on the matter  by the provision of section 480 of the Code of  Criminal Procedure which empowers any civil,  criminal or revenue court to punish summarily a  person who is found guilty of committing any  offence under sections 175, 178, 179, 180 or  section 228 of the Indian Penal Code in the view or  presence of the court. The later decision of Brahma  Prakash Sharma ([1953] S.C.R. 1169) explained  the true object of contempt proceedings.  Mukherjea J. who delivered the judgment of the  Court said (at page 1176) :  "It would be only repeating what has been  said so often by various Judges that the  object of contempt proceedings is not to  afford protection to Judges personally from  imputations to which they may be exposed  as individuals; it is intended to be a  protection to the public whose interests  would be very much affected if by the act or  conduct of any party, the authority of the  court is lowered and the sense of confidence  which people have in the administration of  justice by it is weakened."  It was also pointed out that there were innumerable  ways by which attempts could be made to hinder  or obstruct the due administration of justice in  courts and one type of such interference was found  in cases where there was an act which amounted to  "scandalising the court itself" : this scandalising  might manifest itself in various ways but in  substance it was an attack on individual Judges or  the court as a whole with or without reference to  particular cases, causing unwarranted and  defamatory aspersions upon the character and  ability of the Judges. Such conduct is punished as  contempt for the reason that it tends to create  distrust in the popular mind and impair the  confidence of the people in the courts which are of  prime importance to the litigants in the protection  of their rights and liberties."  

       These two judgments have been followed recently in Arun Paswan,  S.I. vs.  State of Bihar & Others [2003 (10) SCALE 658].   We  respectfully agree with the reasoning  and the conclusions arrived at in these  cases.   

"Criminal contempt"  is defined in Section 2 (c) of the Act, to mean:

"(c) "criminal contempt" means the publication   (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs,  or by visible representation, or otherwise) of any  matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever  which -

(i)     scandalises or tends to scandalise, or  lowers or tends to lower the authority  of, any court; or  (ii)    prejudices, or interferes or tends to  interfere with, the due course of any  judicial proceeding; or (iii)   interferes or tends to interfere with,

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or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the  administration of justice in any other  manner;"  

Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code provides:

"228. Intentional insult or interruption to  public servant sitting in judicial proceeding.-   Whoever intentionally offers any insult, or causes  any interruption to any public servant, while such  public servant is sitting in any stage of a judicial  proceeding, shall be punished with simple  imprisonment for a term which may extend to six  months, or with fine which may extend to one  thousand rupees, or with both."

       What is made publishable under Section 228, IPC is the offence of  intentional insult to a Judge or interruption of court proceedings but not as a  contempt of Court.  The definition of criminal contempt is wide enough to  include any act by a person which would either scandalize the court or which  would tend to interfere with the administration of justice.  It would also  include any act which lowers the authority of the Court or prejudices or  interferes with the due course of any judicial proceedings.  It is  not limited  to the offering of intentional insult to the Judge or interruption of the judicial  proceedings. This Court  observed in Delhi Judicial Service Association  Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. , 1991 (4) SCC 406:

"...The public have a vital stake in effective and  orderly administration of justice.  The Court has  the duty of protecting the interest of the  community in the due administration of justice  and, so, it is entrusted with the power to commit  for contempt of court, not to protect the dignity of  the Court against insult or injury, but, to protect  and vindicate the right of the public so that the  administration of justice is not perverted,  prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with.  The  power to punish for contempt is thus for the  protection of public justice, whose interest requires  that decency and decorum is preserved in Courts of  Justice.  Those who have to discharge duty in a  Court of Justice are protected by the law, and  shielded in the discharge of their duties.  Any  deliberate interference with the discharge of such  duties either in court or outside the court by  attacking the presiding officers of the court, would  amount to criminal contempt and the courts must  take serious cognizance of such conduct."

       In the present case, a judicial officer of the rank of District Judge was  attacked in a pre-planned and calculated manner in his court room and when  he tried to protect himself from physical harm by retiring to his chambers,  by chasing him there and causing injuries to him.  The raising of slogans and  demanding unconditional bail for Jokhu Singh  further compounded the  offence.  The Courts cannot be compelled to give "command orders".  The  act committed amounts to deliberate interference with the discharge of duty  of a judicial officer by intimidation apart from scandalizing and lowering the  dignity of the Court  and interference with the administration of justice.The  effect of such an act is not confined to a particular court or a district, or the  State, it has the tendency to effect the entire judiciary in the country.  It is a  dangerous trend.  Such a trend has to be curbed.  If for passing judicial  orders to the annoyance of the police the presiding officers of the Courts are  to be assaulted and humiliated the judicial system in the country would  collapse.  

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       The second contention raised on behalf of the appellants is that the  High Court cannot on its own motion take action of a criminal contempt of a  subordinate court.  According to the learned counsels the High Court can  take cognizance of a criminal contempt under Section 15 (2) of the Act of a  subordinate court only on a reference made to it by the subordinate court or  on a motion made by the Advocate General.  Since the procedure as laid  down in the High Court Rules and Orders had not been followed the very  initiation of  proceedings for contempt was vitiated and therefore liable to be  quashed. We do not find any force in this submission as well.  This point  also stands concluded against the appellants by a decision of this Court in  S.K. Sarkar, Member, Board of Revenue, U.P. Lucknow, Vs. Vinay  Chandra Misra, [1981 (1) SCC 436].  In this case an advocate filed a  petition before the High Court under the Contempt of Courts Act alleging  that the appellant therein as a Member of Revenue Board made certain  contemptuous remarks, viz., nalayak gadhe saale ko jail bhijwa dunga;  kis idiot ne advocate bana diya hai and acted in a manner which amounted  to criminal contempt of the Court of Revenue Board, in which he (the  advocate) was the counsel for one of the parties.  The advocate requested the  High Court to take suo motu action under the Contempt of Court Act against  the member of the Revenue Board or pass such orders as it deemed fit.  The  question for determination was whether the High Court was competent to  take cognizance of contempt of a subordinate court when it was moved by a  private petitioner and not in accordance with either of the two motions  mentioned in Section 15 (2).  Analyzing Section 15 (2) of the Act and in  reading it in harmony with Section 10 of the Act it was held:

"16. Section 2(c) of the Act defines "criminal  contempt". Section 9 emphasizes that "nothing  contained in this Act shall be construed as  implying that any disobedience, breach,  publication or other act is punishable as contempt  of court which would not be so punishable apart  from this Act". Section 10 runs as under :  

Every High Court shall have and exercise  the same jurisdiction, powers and authority,  in accordance with the same procedure and  practice, in respect of contempts of courts  subordinate to it as it has and exercises in  respect of contempts of itself :  

Then, there is a proviso which is not material for  our purpose. The provision in Section 10 is but a  replica of Section 3 of the 1952 Act. The phrase  "courts subordinate to it" used in Section 10 is  wide enough to include all courts which are  judicially subordinate to the High Court, even  though administrative control over them under  Article 235 of the Constitution does not vest in the  High Court. Under Article 227 of the Constitution  the High Court has the power of superintendence  over all courts and tribunals throughout the  territories in relation to which it exercises  jurisdiction. The Court of Revenue Board,  therefore, in the instant case, is a court  "subordinate to the High Court" within the  contemplation of Section 10 of the Act.  

17. Section 14 provides for the procedure where  contempts is committed in the face of the Supreme  Court or a High Court. Section 15 is very material  for our purpose. It provides in regard to  cognizance of "criminal contempt" in cases other  than those falling under Section 14. The material  portion of Section 15 reads thus :

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15. (1) In the case of a criminal contempt,  other than a contempt referred to in Section  14, the Supreme Court or the High Court  may take action on its own motion or on a  motion made by -  (a) the Advocate General, or  (b) any other person, with the consent in  writing of the Advocate General.  (2) In the case of any criminal contempt of a  subordinate court, the High Court may take  action on a reference made to it by the  subordinate court or on a motion made by  the Advocate General or, in relation to a  union territory, by such law officer as the  Central Government may, by notification in  the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf ...  The operation of sub-section (1) appears to  be confined to cases of "criminal contempt"  of the Supreme Court or the High Court,  itself. Criminal contempt of a subordinate  court is dealt with in sub-section (2).  18. A comparison between the two sub-sections  would show that whereas in sub-section (1) one of  the three alternative modes for taking cognizance,  mentioned is "on its own motion", no such mode is  expressly provided in sub-section (2). The only  two modes of taking cognizance by the High Court  mentioned in sub-section (2) are : (i) on a  reference made to it by a subordinate court; or (ii)  on a motion made by the Advocate General, or in  relation to a union territory by the notified Law  Officer. Does the omission in Section 15(2) of the  mode of taking suo motu cognizance indicate a  legislative intention to debar the High Court from  taking congnizance in that mode of any criminal  contempt of a subordinate court ? If this question  is answered in the affirmative, then, such a  construction of sub-section (2) will be inconsistent  with Section 10 which makes the powers of the  High court to punish for contempt of a subordinate  court, coextensive and congruent with its power to  punish for its own contempt not only in regard to  quantum or prerequisites for punishment, but also  in the matter of procedure and practice. Such a  construction which will bring Section 15(2) in  conflict with Section 10, has to be avoided, and the  other interpretation which will be in harmony with  Section 10 is to be accepted. Harmoniously  construed, sub-section (2) of Section 15 does not  deprive the High Court of the power of taking  cognizance of criminal contempt of a subordinate  court, on its own motion, also. If the intention of  the legislature was to take away the power of the  High Court to take suo motu cognizance of such  contempt, there was no difficulty in saying so in  unequivocal language, or by wording the sub- section in a negative form. We have, therefore, no  hesitation in holding in agreement with the High  Court, that sub-section (2) of Section 15, properly  construed, does not restrict the power of the High  Court to take cognizance of and punish contempt  of a subordinate court, on its own motion."                                                  [Emphasis supplied]     

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We respectfully agree with the view taken in this judgment and hold  that the High Court could initiate proceedings on its own motion under the  Contempt of Courts Act against the appellants.  On the facts of this case  apart from the report sent by the 5th Additional District & Sessions Judge of  the incident, Young Lawyers Association had also filed a writ petition.  The  Presidents of the three Bar Associations and the Advocate General were  present and heard before initiating the  proceedings for the criminal  contempt.  It has been noted by the High Court that "all the three Presidents  of the High Court Associations and the Advocate General arrived at the  conclusion that a prima facie case of criminal contempt was made out  against the contemners".  This shows that the Advocate General of the State  was also of the opinion that prima facie a case for initiation of proceedings  for criminal contempt was made out and he was a consenting party to the  initiation of the proceedings.   

       The third contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is  that the standard of proof  required in the criminal contempt is the same as in  a criminal charge and therefore the charge of criminal contempt has to be  proved beyond reasonable doubt.  That the appellants could not be convicted  on the basis of the affidavits filed.  That the witnesses should have been  examined in Court and in any case the appellants should have been given an  opportunity to cross-examine the persons who  had deposed against them on  affidavits to verify the version of the incident as according to them there  were conflicting versions of the incident.   It was emphasized that justice  must not only be done, but must be seen to be done by all concerned to  establish confidence that the contemners will receive a fair, just and  impartial trial.  We do not find any substance in this submission as well.   High Court in its order has noted that the learned counsels appearing for  both the parties have taken a stand that all possible fair and proper  opportunities were extended to them.  In view of the statements made by the  counsels for the parties it will not be open to the counsels for the parties at  this stage to take the stand that in the absence of cross-examination of the  concerned persons, reliance could not be placed on the statements which  were made on oath.  Learned counsel who had appeared for the contemners  before the High Court did not claim the right of cross-examination.  Only at  the stage of arguments a submission was made that opportunity to cross- examine the concerned persons was not given which vitiated the trial.  High  Court rejected this contention by holding that such a stand could not be  taken at that stage of the proceedings.  It has been held in Arun Paswan  case (supra)  that a party which fails to avail of the opportunity to cross- examine at the appropriate stage is precluded from taking the plea of non- observance of principles of natural justice at a later stage.  Such a plea would  not be tenable.   

It has repeatedly been held by this Court (Ref: 1995 (2) SCC 584) that  the procedure prescribed either under the Code of Criminal Procedure or  under the Evidence Act is not attracted to the proceedings initiated under  Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act.  The High Court can deal with  such matters summarily and adopt its own procedure. The only caution that  has to be observed by the Court in exercising this inherent power of  summary procedure is that the procedure followed must be fair and the  contemners are made aware of the charges levelled against them and given a  fair and reasonable opportunity.  Having regard to the fact that contempt  proceedings are to be decided expeditiously in a summary manner the  convictions have been recorded without extending the opportunity to the  contemners to cross examine those who had deposed against them on  affidavits.  Though the procedure adopted in this case was summary but  adequate safeguards were taken to protect the contemners’ interest.  The  contemners were issued notices apprising them of the specific allegations  made against them.  They were given an opportunity to counter the  allegations by filing their counter affidavits and additional  counter/supplementary affidavits as per their request.  They were also given  opportunity to file affidavits of any other persons which they did.  They  were given opportunities to produce any other material in their defence

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which they did not do.  Most of the contemners had taken the plea that at the  relevant time they were on duty in their respective Police Stations though in  the same town.  They also attached copies of station diaries and duty chart in  support of their alibi.  The High Court did not accept the plea of alibi as all  these papers had been prepared by the contemners themselves and none of  the superior officer had supported such a plea.  The evidence produced by  the respondents was rejected in the face of the reports made by the  Additional District and Sessions Judge, Director General of Police  coupled  with affidavits of Mr. Barasi, the Additional District and Sessions Judge,  two court’s officials and affidavits of some of the lawyers who had  witnessed the occurrence.     

       The contempt proceedings have to be decided in a summary manner.   The Judge has to remain in full control of the hearing of the case and  immediate action is required to be taken to make it effective and deterrent.    Immediate steps are required to be taken to  restore order as early and  quickly as possible.  Dragging the proceedings unnecessarily would impede  the speed and efficiency with which justice has to be administered. This  Court while considering all these aspects held in In re: Vinay Chandra  Mishra (the alleged contemner), 1995 (2) SCC 584, that the criminal  contempt no doubt amounts to an offence but it is an offence sui generis and  hence for such offence, the procedure adopted both under the common law  and the statute law in the country has always been summary.  It was  observed that the need was for taking speedy action and to put  the Judge in  full control of the hearing.  It was emphasised that immediate steps were  required to be taken to restore order in the court proceedings as quickly as  possible.  To quote from the above-referred to case

"However, the fact that the process is summary  does not mean that the procedural requirement,  viz., that an opportunity of meeting the charge, is  denied to the contemner. The degree of precision  with which the charge may be stated depends upon  the circumstances. So long as the gist of the  specific allegations is made clear or otherwise the  contemner is aware of the specific allegation, it is  not always necessary to formulate the charge in a  specific allegation. The consensus of opinion  among the judiciary and the jurists alike is that  despite the objection that the Judge deals with the  contempt himself and the contemner has little  opportunity to defend himself, there is a residue of  cases where not only it is justifiable to punish on  the spot but it is the only realistic way of dealing  with certain offenders. This procedure does not  offend against the principle of natural justice, viz.,  nemo judex in sua causa since the prosecution is  not aimed at protecting the Judge personally but  protecting the administration of justice. The threat  of immediate punishment is the most effective  deterrent against misconduct. The Judge has to  remain in full control of the hearing of the case and  he must be able to take steps to restore order as  early and quickly as possible. The time factor is  crucial. Dragging out the contempt proceedings  means a lengthy interruption to the main  proceedings which paralyses the court for a time  and indirectly impedes the speed and efficiency  with which justice is administered. Instant justice  can never be completely satisfactory yet it does  provide the simplest, most effective and least  unsatisfactory method of dealing with disruptive  conduct in court. So long as the contemner’s  interests are adequately safeguarded by giving him

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an opportunity of being heard in his defence, even  summary procedure in the case of contempt in the  face of the court is commended and not faulted."   

In the present case the High Court had decided to proceed with the  contempt proceedings  in a summary manner.  Due opportunity was afforded  to all the contemners and after verifying and cross checking  the material  available before it, coming from different reliable sources the High Court  convicted only nine persons out of twenty six persons arrayed as contemners  before it.  The High Court took due care to ascertain the identity of the  contemners by cross-checking with the affidavits filed by the different  persons.  It is also based on the independent reports submitted by the  Director General of Police and Superintendent of Police.  We do not find  any fault in the procedure adopted by the High Court in conducting the  proceedings in the present case.  For the survival of the rule of law the  orders of the courts have to be obeyed and continue to be obeyed unless  overturned, modified or stayed by the appellate or revisional courts.  The  court does not have any agency of its own to enforce its orders.  The  executive authority of the State has to come to the aid of the party seeking  implementation of the court orders.  The might of the State must stand  behind the Court orders for the survival of the rule of the court in the  country.  Incidents which undermine the dignity of the courts should be  condemned and dealt with swiftly.   When a judge is attacked and assaulted  in his court room and chambers by persons on whose shoulders lay the  obligation of maintaining law and order and protecting the citizen against  any unlawful act needs to be condemned in the severest of terms.  If  judiciary has to perform its duties and functions in a fair and free manner,  the dignity and the authority of the courts has to be respected and maintained  at all stages and by all concerned failing which the very constitutional  scheme and public faith in the judiciary runs the risk of being lost.

       It was urged with some vehemence that principles of natural justice  were not observed in as much as opportunity to cross examine the witnesses  who had deposed on affidavits is concerned it may be stated that no such  opportunity was asked for in the High Court at trial stage.  It was for them to  ask for such an opportunity to cross examine the parties who had deposed  against them on affidavit.  Since the contemners did not avail of the  opportunity at the trial stage the plea of non-observations of principles of  natural justice is not tenable.  Appellants were made aware of the procedure  which was adopted by  the High Court.  They were given full opportunity to  put forth their point of view.  Each of them filed detailed affidavits along  with evidence in support thereof.  They had attached their duty charts  showing that they could not have been present at the place of occurrence as  they were on duty  somewhere else.  High Court has considered and  discussed the entire evidence present on the record before recording the  conviction.  The contention that the affidavits of independent witnesses were  not considered cannot be accepted.  Only those were convicted against  whom corroboration of the fact of their presence and participation in the  incident was confirmed from more than one source.

Plea that reasonable and adequate opportunity was not afforded to the  appellants is equally untenable.  We find from the record that all the material  (affidavits, show cause notice etc.) which were brought on record was  properly served on the learned advocates appearing for the contemners.  The  reports submitted by the 5th Additional Sessions Judge, District Judge  affidavit of Shri Barai and his staff, namely, R. Dass  and B. Sharma and the  other affidavits of the advocates who had seen the occurrence and the reports  submitted by the Director General of Police and the Superintendent of Police  were given to the learned advocates who were appearing in the  contemners  in the High Court.  Statements of A. Natarajan, the then S.P., Harihar  Chaudhary, the then Deputy Superintendent of Police, Ranjeet Pandey, the  then Sergeant Major and Shashilata Singh, the then S.I. were recorded by the  High Court in the presence of all the lawyers.  The Registry of the High

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Court was directed to keep their statements in a sealed cover.  The  contemners were permitted to file affidavits and produced any other material  in support of the same.  They were also permitted to file affidavits of any  other person supporting their version.  They were all taken on record. After  affording due  opportunity of hearing to the counsels appearing for the  contemners  the  High  Court  recorded  the  order  of   conviction.  Thus the  appellants were given the evidence which had come on the record.  They  were given an opportunity to controvert the allegations made against them  and produce evidence in support thereof.  Counsel appearing for the  contemners were satisfied with the opportunity provided to them by the High  Court. Plea that reasonable opportunity was not afforded to the contemners  was not raised before the High Court.  We are of the opinion that due  reasonable and adequate opportunity was afforded to the appellants to  defend themselves and put forth their point of view.         The High Court has taken into consideration the entire evidence and  material available on the record including the evidence produced by the  contemners.  It was not necessary for the High Court to discuss each and  every affidavit individually.  Out of 26 persons named only 9 have been  convicted by the High Court.  Since the procedure adopted was summary the  High Court has taken care not to convict a person unless direct evidence  and/or circumstances with sufficient corroborative material doubtless  fastening guilt on the contemners who have been punished was available.   The High Court found only those contemners guilty against whom the  element of doubt was completely eliminated.  Affidavit evidence if based on  hearsay has been excluded.  Contemners against whom there was single  identification were also given the benefit of doubt.  The version put forth by  the appellants was not accepted as it fell short of proof.  High Court has  considered the entire evidence on the record while recording a finding of  guilt against the appellants.  Thus the plea that the High Court did not take  into consideration the affidavits of independent witnesses is not tenable.

Learned counsel for the appellants tried to point out that the appellants  were not present at the scene of incident as the appellants were on duty  elsewhere.  He made reference to their duty charts which had been placed on  record.  We find that the presence of S/Shri K.D. Choudhary, Ranjit Pandey,  Ms. Shashi Lata Singh, K.B. Singh,   Gurubachan Singh, Daroga Singh,  Prem Kumar Singh, Rajeev Ranjan Bhagar and C.D.Jha, appellants herein  has been confirmed by several persons. The plea of ali bi taken by the  appellants has been negatived by the High Court as the duty charts had been  prepared by these officers themselves.  None of the superior officers  supported their versions. Presence of most of the appellants had been  confirmed by the 5th Additional Sessions Judge, Shri Barai, the other two  Court officials, advocates, the reports  of Director General of Police and the  Superintendent of Police.  None of these  has any interest in falsely  implicating any of the appellants.           It is unfortunate that neither the criminal proceedings nor  the  disciplinary proceedings or the inquiry under the Commission of Inquiry Act  have been concluded.  No doubt the appellants had been suspended initially  but in due course they have been reinstated.  Some of them have retired as  well.  Inaction on the part of the authorities resulted in emboldening others  to commit similar  acts.  In Arun Paswan (supra), proceedings for criminal  contempt were initiated against the appellant therein pursuant to the  complaint lodged by the District & Sessions Judge, Sasaram addressed to the  Registrar General of the High Court of Patna.  In the report it was stated,  inter alia, that S.I. Arun Paswan  (contemner) was directed to produce the  case diary in case No. 2000/2001 under Sections 302 and 201/34 I.P.C.   As  the investigation officer did not appear in the case on the date fixed the  District & Sessions Judge issued notice requesting the investigation officer  to appear personally to show cause as why he should not be prosecuted  under Section 349 Criminal Procedure Code.  The investigation officer  produced the case diary and replied to the show cause notice.  The court was  not satisfied with the cause shown for absence and rejected the explanation.   Contemnor was directed to remain present in the court till the rising of the  court at 4.30 P.M..    A group  of persons in plain clothes as also in police

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uniforms came on the road in front of the court room of the District &  Sessions Judge and started raising the abusive slogans against the District &  Sessions Judge.   One of the slogans raised was "District Judge  Murdabad,  Bhagalpur Dohrana Hai".  Proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act  were initiated.  They were convicted under the Contempt of Courts Act and  their conviction was upheld by this Court.  What is being emphasised is that  had timely action been taken by the authorities and the criminal proceedings  concluded in time, incident, as referred to above, where slogans were raised  "District Judge  Murdabad, Bhagalpur Dohrana Hai" could have been  avoided.         The incident with which we are dealing with took place on 18th  November 1997.   The incident which has been dealt with in the case of  Arun Paswan, S.I. (supra) is dated 20th January, 2002.  Both the incidents  have taken place in the State of Bihar, one in Bhagalpur and the other in  Sasaram.  The manner in which the police personnel belonging to middle  level of police administration and entrusted with such responsibilities as  require theirs coming into contact with public day to day persuades us to  make observation that there is something basically wrong with the police in  Bihar.  Misconduct amounting to gross violation of discipline committed not  by a single individual but by so many collectively and that too by those who  have formed an association consisting of members of a disciplined force in  uniform was not promptly and sternly dealt with by the State or its senior  officials so as to take care to see that such incident, even if happened,  remains solitary incident.  Faced with the initiation of contempt proceedings,  the persons proceeded against did not have the courtesy of admitting their  guilt and tendering an apology which if done could have been dealt with  mercy.  They decided to contest, of course the justice administration system  

allows them the liberty of doing  so ____ and they had every right of doing so  ____ but at the end it has been found that their pleas were false and their  denial of charges was aimed at prolonging the hearing as much as they  could.  We are shocked to learn that the criminal courts seized of trial of the  accused persons on substantive charges for offences under the penal law of  the land are awaiting the decision of this appeal?  Why for?  Neither the  High Court nor this Court has ever directed the proceedings before the  criminal Courts to remain stayed.   The criminal Court shall have to decide  on the charges framed against the accused persons on the basis of the  evidence adduced in those cases and not on the basis of this judgment.

Though we have found no merit in any of the pleas raised on behalf of  the appellants and we have formed an opinion without hesitation that the  appeals are to be dismissed, this is a case the facts whereof persuade us to  place on record certain observations of ours.

In the constitutional scheme the judiciary is entrusted with the task of  upholding the Constitution and the laws.  Apart from interpreting the  Constitution  and the laws, the judiciary discharges the function of securing  maintenance of law and order by deciding the disputes in a manner  acceptable to civilised and peace loving society.  In order to maintain the  faith of the society in the rule of law the role of the judiciary cannot be  undermined. In a number of cases this Court has observed that foundation of  the judiciary is the trust and confidence of the people of the nation and when  such foundation or trust is rudely shaken by means of any disrespect by the  very persons who are required to enforce the orders of the court and  maintain law and order the people’s perception of efficacy of the systems  gets eroded.

The Judges are ___ as a jurist calls ___ ’paper tigers’.  They do not have  any machinery of their own for implementing their orders.  People, while  approaching the Court of law which they regard as temple of justice, feel  safe and secure whilst they are in the Court.  The police personnel is  deployed in the Court campus for the purpose of maintaining order and to  see that not only the Judges can work fearlessly in a calm, cool and serene  atmosphere but also to see that anyone coming to the Court too feels safe  and secure thereat.   Every participant in court proceedings is either a seeker

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of justice or one who comes to assist in administration of justice.  So is the  expectation of the members of the Bar who are treated as officers of the  Court.  We shudder to feel what would happen if the police personnel itself,  and that too in an organised manner, is found to be responsible for disturbing  the peace and order in the Court campus, for causing assault on the Judges  and thus sullying the temple of justice apart from bringing a bad name to an  indispensable organ of the executive wing of the State.

Police is the executive force of the State to which is entrusted the duty  of maintaining law and order and of enforcing regulations for the prevention  and detection of crime. (Encyclopaedia Britanica, Vol.58, p.158).  The  police force is considered by the society as an organised force of civil  officers under the command of the State engaged in the preservation of law   and order in the society and maintaining peace by enforcement of laws and  prevention and detection of crime.  One who is entrusted with the task  of  maintaining discipline in the society must first itself be disciplined.  Police is  an agency to which social control belongs and therefore the police has to  come up to the expectations of the society.

We have not been able to forget the policing role of the police of  British Raj wherein an attitude of hostility between the police and the  policed under the colonial rule was understandable.  It is unfortunate that in  one of the largest constitutional democracies of the world the police has not  been able to change its that trait of hostility.          Long back Sardar Patel had said, after achieving independence, ____  "the police have inherited a legacy of suspicion and dislike.  For this reason,  there is insufficient respect for the police today.  But, now that the country is  free, both the public and the police must change their attitude."   Shri S.V.M.  Tripathi, former Director General of Police has, in his evaluation    ’Indian  Police After Fifty Years of Independence’, said ____ "A sensitive police  officer can ensure justice and fair-play as no other public servant can.  The  least he should  do is to prevent injustices on the poor in the society and  other areas of administration, specially a police station.  Upholding human  rights, and protection of life and property of citizens should be a matter of  habit with the police rather than that of display.  The sooner we accept this  premise as imperative and honestly work towards achieving it, the better it  would be for the society and the nation.  The police leadership will have to  push the limits of feasibility for this purpose." (The Indian Police Journal -  Vol.XLV - Nos.1 & 2, at p.5). Citizens of democratic India expect the  police as humane and efficient, professional and disciplined.  It must be  remembered that the task entrusted to police is onerous and the police cannot  succeed in fulfilling their functions without people’s cooperation and public  approval.  Professor R. Deb, a scholar in Indian Police Service said - "If law  represents the collective conscience of Society, the Policeman, its principal  law enforcing agent ought to be the staunchest protagonist, defender and  keeper of that conscience." (Police and Law Enforcement, published by S.C.  Sarkar & Sons in 1988, p.1).  He quotes Shri B.N. Mallick ___ an eminent  policeman of his times, as saying, that a modern policeman ought to be an  ideal citizen  from every point of view.  "He must be on the side of good  everywhere, and at all times.  But to do good the policeman must himself be  good.  To be able to induce others to obey the laws of society, he must obey  them first. With his example set before them, people will flock to his banner  not only to seek his help and protection but also to assist him in  his noble  task.  He must be the leader amongst men.  This leadership  he must earn by  his integrity, kindness, character, steadfastness, dignity, ability and self- sacrifice.  He must always set the right example". Professor R.Deb’s  description of an ideal police is ___ "He should never forget that, like every  other citizen he too is subject to the Rule of Law, and is legally responsible   for his actions in carrying out his duties, for he who enforces law must live  by the law.  In discharging his onerous duties and responsibilities under the  law the policeman must eschew all temptations to have recourse to short- cuts and extra-legal methods.  He must also be absolutely honest, impartial  and fair even to the worst legal transgressor.  In fine he must be the ideal  citizen and a true servant of the people in the performance of his duties

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under the law." (ibid, p.9)

       After all, what the learned Addl. Sessions Judge had done.  Jokhu  Singh had appeared as a witness.  His cross-examination was not concluded  without which his testimony was liable to be excluded from being read in  evidence.  The learned Judge had exhausted practically all means for  securing the presence of the witness.  He would neither attend nor make any  communication to the Court. Even the threat of initiation of proceedings  under the Contempt of Courts Act did not deter him from abstaining.  To  secure his presence a non-bailable warrant had to be issued.  He avoided the  service of non-bailable warrant of arrest and appeared in the Court in the late  hours.  He was not apologetic and felt that he was above the process of the  Court.  It cannot be said that the higher authorities of police were not aware  of the behaviour of Jokhu Singh.  Either they knew about it or they should  have known about it.  Instead of offering the bail, Jokhu Singh was busy  managing for the Judge being approached or influenced by extra legal  methods.  Jokhu Singh and his confederate decided to take the law in their  own hands and assault the Judge and anyone who came in their way.  We do  not think that any of the appellants deserve any sympathy or mercy.  

We trust and hope that this case would set in motion the thinking  process of the persons occupying higher echelons in police administration  specially in Bihar and take care to ensure that such incidents do not recur in  future.

We direct the disciplinary authorities before whom the disciplinary  proceedings are pending and the criminal Courts before whom the  prosecutions are pending against the appellants to conclude the proceedings  and the trial at the earliest.  The Commission holding the enquiry under the  Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1952 would also do well to conclude its  proceedings at the earliest.  We request Hon’ble the Chief Justice of the  High Court of Patna to watch and if necessary monitor the proceedings of  the Commission of Inquiry and issue directions to the criminal courts to  expeditiously conclude the pending criminal cases.  If the commission of  enquiry faces non-cooperation or any obstruction in its progress, the  Secretary of the Commission may send a communication to the Registrar  General of this Court pointing out the difficulties, if any, faced by the  Commission and contributing to the delay in proceedings and any  communication so received shall be placed by the Registrar General before  the Court for directions on judicial side.  The result of disciplinary  proceedings, the judgment of the criminal Courts and the findings of  Commission of Enquiry shall be communicated forthwith to the Registrar  General of this Court and in any case before expiry of a period of six months  from today.  Copies of this judgment shall be circulated to the Registrar  General, High Court of Patna and the Chief Secretary of the State of Bihar  for being brought to the notice of all concerned.  Non-compliance with the  directions given herein may be treated as disobedience of the order of this  Court liable to be dealt with accordingly.

The appeals are dismissed.  The appellants who are on bail shall  forthwith surrender to their bail bonds and taken into custody to serve out  the sentences as passed by the High Court of Patna. The Director General of  Police, Bihar is directed to ensure compliance with this order by securing  presence of all the appellants to serve out the sentences passed on them by  the High Court.         We place on record our appreciation for the invaluable assistance  rendered to the Court by Ms. Meenakshi Arora, who appeared as Amicus  Curiae at our request.