REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.      5882           OF 2010 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 20604 of 2009)

Dahyabhai Ranchhoddas Dhobi & Anr.          .... Appellant (s)

Versus

State of Gujarat & Ors.                  .... Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T  

P. Sathasivam, J.

1)  Leave granted.

2)  This appeal is directed against the judgment and order  

dated 12.01.2009 passed by the High Court of Gujarat at  

Ahmedabad in Special Civil Application No. 5663 of 1990  

with Civil Application No. 3458 of 2006 whereby the High  

Court dismissed the petition preferred by the appellants  

herein.  

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3)  Brief facts:

a) According to the appellants, they are owners of the  

land  in  question  measuring  848.66  sq.m.,  Nandh  No.  

2190/P, Ward No.4 of Surat City.  The State of Gujarat  

initiated  acquisition  proceedings  under  the  Land  

Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”)  

for construction of a school in the land in question under  

the Surat Municipal Corporation. The appellants objected  

to the said acquisition on the ground that:

(i)  this  is  the  only  land  for  them  for  carrying  on  the  

business of washermen and they are using this land for  

the purpose of their livelihood.   

(ii) There are vacant/open lands adjoining to the land in  

question.     

(iii)  Within  a  radius  of  1  km.,  number  of  schools  are  

available  particularly  being  run by  the  Surat  Municipal  

Corporation.   

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(iv)  While  acquiring  the  land,  the  respondents  have not  

followed the provisions of Sections 4, 5, 6 and 11A of the  

Act.  

b) On  the  other  hand,  it  is  the  stand  of  the  State  

Government that:

(i) the land is required for establishing a primary school by  

the Surat Municipal Corporation.   

(ii)  They  fully  complied  with  the  statutory  notices  and  

other requirements.   

(iii)  The  appellants  did  not  avail  the  opportunity  of  

participating in the 5A enquiry by filing objections.   

(iv)  The declaration made under Section 6 of  the Act is  

within time.   

(v) Award under Section 11A has been passed within the  

statutory period.  Since the establishment of school is for  

a  public  purpose  and  in  view  of  compliance  of  all  the  

statutory formalities, there is no merit in the appeal and  

prayed for dismissal of the same.   

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4) Heard Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel for  

the appellants and Mr. Prashant G. Desai, learned senior  

counsel  for  the  Surat  Municipal  Corporation  and  Ms.  

Hemantika Wahi, learned counsel for the State of Gujarat.  

5) Mr.  Ranjit  Kumar,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  

appellants has raised the following contentions:

a) there was no hearing/enquiry in terms of Section 5A  

of the Act which is mandatory;

b) the  locality  publication  was  not  effected  under  

Section 6(2);

c) the Award passed under Section 11A was not made  

within  two  years  from  the  date  of  last  publication  of  

notification under Section 6, therefore the acquisition is  

vitiated;

d) after change of classification of the land in question,  

namely, residential use, the respondents are not permitted  

to establish a primary school which is not permissible;

e) In view of the fact that the area being designated as  

residential congested by houses on either side, it is not a  

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fit  place  for  establishing  a  school  as  observed  by  this  

Court  in  Avinash  Mehrotra vs.  Union  of  India  and  

Others, (2009) 6 SCC 398.

6) On the other hand, Mr. Prashant G. Desai, learned  

senior  counsel  for  the  Surat  Municipal  Corporation has  

submitted that in view of Section 12 (2) (b) and Section 20  

(1)  of  the Gujarat Town Planning & Urban Development  

Act,  1976,  the  State  Government  is  well  within  their  

powers  in  establishing  a  primary  school  in  Surat.   He  

further  submitted that  all  the statutory provisions have  

been  strictly  complied  with  and  the  declaration  under  

Section 6 and Award under Section 11A were duly made  

within the prescribed time.  Ms. Hemantika Wahi, learned  

counsel appearing for the State, by drawing our attention  

to  specific  averments  in the  counter  affidavit  submitted  

that  the  appellants  having  not  filed  objections  in  the  

enquiry  under  Section  5A,  all  the  three  modes  of  

publication as  contemplated under  Section 6 were  duly  

published  and  made  and  Award  passed  within  the  

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prescribed period, there is no infirmity in the acquisition  

proceedings and prayed for dismissal of the appeal.  

7) We  have  considered  the  rival  contentions  and  

perused the relevant materials.  

8) With regard to the first objection as to enquiry under  

Section 5A of the Act though the appellants have stated  

that they were not given an opportunity of being heard, in  

the counter affidavit filed by the Special Land Acquisition  

Officer,  Surat  before  the  High  Court  it  has  been  

specifically asserted that notification under Section 4 in  

the Official Gazette was published on 09.03.1989, public  

notice  displayed  at  the  office  of  Mamlatdar  of  the  

concerned Ward on 20.04.1989 and hearing of objections  

under Section 5A was fixed on 20.05.1989.  In para 4 of  

the  counter  affidavit,  the  Land  Acquisition  Officer  has  

specifically  stated  that  appellants  were  given  several  

opportunities  for  hearing  their  objections  from  time  to  

time.  The hearing was fixed on 29.05.1989, 05.06.1989,  

12.06.1989, 20.09.1989, 28.09.1989 and 16.10.1989 and  

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the  appellants  were  heard  through  their  lawyer  Mr.  

Kashyap  H.  Shukla.   In  view  of  the  above  specific  

information the contention contrary to the same is liable  

to be rejected.  

9) The second objection is that locality publication was  

not effected under Section 6(2) of the Act.  In the same  

counter  affidavit,  the  Land  Acquisition  Officer  has  

asserted that publication of notification under Section 6  

was published in the Gazette dated 21.03.1990.  Public  

Notice  displayed  at  the  office  of  Mamlatdar  of  the  

concerned Ward on 19.04.1990.  In the light of the said  

information, the claim that no publication of notice in the  

locality under Section 6(2) cannot be accepted.  

10)  The  third  and  the  important  objection  relates  to  

passing of Award under Section 11A.  It is the stand of the  

appellants  that  Award  was  not  made  within  two  years  

from  the  date  of  last  publication  of  Notification  under  

Section 6 hence the acquisition is vitiated.  Since heavy  

reliance was placed on the said objection, it is useful to  

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refer Section 6 and Section 11A of the Act which reads  

thus:    

“6.  Declaration  that  land  is  required  for  a  public  purpose.- (1) Subject to the provision of Part VII of this Act,  when  the  appropriate  Government  is  satisfied,  after  considering the report, if any, made under section 5A, sub- section (2), that any particular land is needed for a public  purpose, or for a Company, a declaration shall be made to  that  effect  under  the  signature  of  a  Secretary  to  such  Government or of some officer duly authorized to certify its  orders and different declarations may be made from time to  time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the  same  notification  under  section  4,  sub-section  (1)  irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or  have been made (wherever required) under section 5A, sub- section (2);

Provided that no  declaration in respect  of  any particular  land covered by a notification under section 4, sub-section  (1)-

(i)  published  after  the  commencement  of  the  Land  Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 (1  of  1967),  but  before  the  commencement  of  the  Land  Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 shall be made after the  expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the  notification; or

(ii)  published  after  the  commencement  of  the  Land  Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 shall be made after the  expiry of  one year from the date of  the publication of  the  notification:

Provided further that no such declaration shall  be made  unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is  to be paid by a Company, or wholly or partly out of public  revenues  or  some  fund controlled  or  managed  by  a  local  authority.

Explanation 1. - In computing any of the periods referred to  in the first proviso, the period during which any action or  proceeding  to  be  taken  in  pursuance  of  the  notification  issued under section 4, sub-section (1), is stayed by an order  

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of a Court shall be excluded.

Explanation 2. - Where the compensation to be awarded for  such property is to be paid out of the funds of a corporation  owned or controlled by the State, such compensation shall  be deemed to be compensation paid out of public revenues.

(2)  Every  declaration  shall  be  published  in  the  Official  Gazette,  and  in  two  daily  newspapers  circulating  in  the  locality in which the land is situated of which at least one  shall  be  in  the  regional  language,  and the  Collector  shall  cause public notice of the substance of such declaration to  be given at convenient places in the said locality (the last of  the dates of such publication and the giving of such public  notice,  being  hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  date  of  the  publication of  the declaration),  and such declaration shall  state  the  district  or  other  territorial  division in which the  land  is  situate,  the  purpose  for  which  it  is  needed,  its  approximate area, and, where a plan shall have been made  of the land, the place where such plan may be inspected.

(3) The said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the  land is needed for a public purpose or for a company, as the  case  may  be;  and,  after  making  such  declaration,  the  appropriate  Government  may  acquire  the  land  in  manner  hereinafter appearing.

 11A. Period within which an award shall be made.- (1) The  Collector  shall  make an award under  section 11 within  a  period of two years from the date of the publication of the  declaration and if no award is made within that period, the  entire proceeding for the acquisition of the land shall lapse:

Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been  published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition  (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a  period of two years from such commencement.

Explanation - In computing the period of two years referred  to  in  this  section,  the  period  during  which  any  action  or  proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration  is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded.”

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11) These  provisions  were  considered  by  this  Court  in  

various  decisions.   In  Krishi  Utpadan  Mandi  Samiti  

and Another vs.  Makrand Singh and Others, (1995) 2  

SCC 497, the question that was posed for consideration  

was whether the High Court was right in its conclusion  

that the declaration under Section 6 was published after  

three years and the last of the publications shall be the  

last date for the purpose of computing three years’ period  

envisaged in clause (i) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of  

Section  6  of  the  Act  as  amended  by  Land  Acquisition  

(Amendment) Act, 1984.  The discussion and conclusion  

in paras 4 and 5 are relevant:

“4.  The  question,  therefore,  is  that  which  date  of  the  publications in three  steps i.e.  publication in the Gazette,  two newspapers and local publication to be the last date for  the purpose of computing three years’ limitation prescribed  in clause (i) of the proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act. Prima  facie, it gives an impression that the last of any of the three  steps  puts  in  motion,  the  running  of  limitation  of  three  years. But on deeper probe, it does not appear to be so and  such a construction would easily defeat the public purpose  and  deflects  the  course  of  justice.  So  it  is  necessary  to  understand the scheme and policy of the Act to get the crux  of the question. It is seen that sub-section (1) of Section 4  gives power of eminent domain to the State to acquire the  land, whenever it  appears to it  that the land is needed or  likely  to  be  needed  for  any  public  purpose  or  for  any  company, by a notification published in the Official Gazette  

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and two daily  newspapers  circulating  in that  area  and at  least one of  them should be in the regional language and  also the Collector is enjoined to cause public notice of the  substance of notification to be given at convenient places in  the  said  locality  in  which  the  land  is  situated.  It  is  also  mentioned thereunder that the last date of such publication  and  the  giving  of  such  public  notice  “being  hereinafter  referred to” as the date of publication of the notification. It  would be seen that the purpose of notification under Section  4(1)  is  an  intimation  to  the  owner  or  person  having  an  interest in the land that Government exercised the power of  eminent  domain  in  relation  to  his  land  and  for  public  purpose his land is needed or likely to be needed; puts an  embargo  on  his  freedom  to  deal  with  the  land  as  an  unencumbered  land  and  also  pegs  the  price  of  the  land  prevailing as on that date. It also is a caveat to the Collector  to make the award under Section 11 as well as to determine  the market value prevailing as on the last of the dates to be  the  date  and  the  award  should  be  made  within  a  period  prescribed by Section 11-A, lest the entire acquisition shall  stand lapsed. The word ‘hereinafter’ is for such purposes as  well as for the purpose of determination of the compensation  under  Chapter  III  of  the  Act  as  well.  Therefore,  the  word  ‘hereinafter’ referred to as the last date of the publication of  the notification is the date from which the prevailing prices  of the land is to be computed etc.

5.  Clause  (i)  of  the  proviso  to  Section  6(1)  mandates  the  publication of the declaration in the Official Gazette and it  should be within three years from the date of the publication  of the notification under Section 4(1) i.e. the last of the dates  referred to in Section 4(1). The word ‘publish’ emphasises the  act  accomplished i.e.  declaration under Section 6(1)  being  published in the Official Gazette. The last date under Section  6(2) shall be the date for the purposes “hereinafter referred  to”  would  be  not  for  computing the  period  of  three  years  prescribed in clause (i) of proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act as  it was already done, but purposes to be followed hereinafter.  Otherwise  language  would  have  been  “hereinbefore  done”.  Sub-section  (2)  as  such  did  not  prescribe  any  limitation  within  which  the  declaration  under  Section  6(1)  or  other  steps hereinafter to be taken, in other words, the steps to be  taken thereafter in making the award under Section 11 or in  computation of the period prescribed in Section 11-A. The  publication  of  the  declaration  in  two  daily  newspapers  having  circulation  in  the  locality  one  of  which  is  in  the  regional  language and the publication of  the substance of  

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the declaration in the locality are ministerial acts and is a  procedural  part.  It  appears  that  these  publications  are  required to be done to make the declaration published in the  manner,  to  be  conclusive  evidence  of  the  public  purpose  under Section 6(1) and also to provide limitation to make the  award under Section 11 by the Collector. In other words, the  limitation prescribed under Section 11-A is for the purpose  of making the award and if the Collector fails to do so, the  entire  proceeds  under  Sections  4(1)  and  6(1)  shall  stand  lapsed.  If  this  consistent  policy  of  the  Act  is  understood  giving teeth to the operational efficacy to the scheme of the  Act and public purpose the Act seeks to serve, we are of the  considered  view  that  publication  in  the  Official  Gazette  already made under clause (i) of proviso to sub-section (1) of  Section  6  is  complete,  as  soon  as  the  declaration  under  Section 6(1) was published in the Official Gazette. That will  be the date for the purpose of computation of three years’  period from the last of the dates of the publication of the  notification  under  Section  4(1).  The  procedural  ministerial  acts  prescribed  under  sub-section  (2)  are  only  for  the  purpose of the procedure to be followed ‘hereinafter’, in other  words, the steps to be taken subsequent to the publication of  the  declaration  under  Section  6(1)  of  the  Act.  We  cannot  agree with Shri Rana, the learned Senior Counsel, that the  date  of  making  the  declaration  by  the  Secretary  to  the  Government  or  the  authorised  officer  is  the  date  for  computing period of three years. Equally,  we cannot agree  with  the  learned  counsel  for  the  respondents,  Shri  Upadhyay, that publication of the substance being the last  date  from  which  the  period  of  three  years  needs  to  be  computed.  Acceptance  of  either  contention  would  easily  defeat the public policy under the Act by skilful manner of  management with the lower level officials.

12) In  Eugenio Misquita and Others vs.  State of Goa  

and  Others,  (1997)  8  SCC  47,  similar  issue  was  

considered by this Court.  K. Venkataswami, J. speaking  

for the Bench has concluded as follows:

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“9. Let us examine whether the learned counsel is right in  his submission. As seen from the above extracts of relevant  provisions,  while  Section  4(1)  commands  publication  of  notification  under  that  section,  Section  6  speaks  of  the  declaration being made to the effect that any particular land  is needed for public purpose or for  a company. There are  judicial decisions that have interpreted the word “made” to  mean “published” for the reasons stated in those decisions.  Therefore, strictly speaking, but for those judicial decisions  the date of making of the declaration under Section 6(1) will  be the relevant date for reckoning the period of limitation.  However,  in  the  interest  of  the  general  public,  the  courts  have  taken the  view that  the  declaration  made will  stand  accomplished  only  when  it  is  published.  This  publication  has, therefore, nothing to do with the publication referred to  in Section 6(2) of the Act which is for a different purpose,  inter  alia,  for  reckoning  the  limitation  prescribed  under  Section 11-A of the Act. This construction is supported by  the  language  employed  in  Section  6(2)  of  the  Act.  In  particular,  the word “hereinafter”  used in Section 6(2)  will  amply  prove  that  the  last  of  the  series  of  the  publication  referred to under Section 6(2) is relevant for the purposes  coming thereafter, namely, for making award under Section  11-A. The language employed in second proviso to Section  6(1)  also  supports  this  construction.  Therefore,  the  contention of learned counsel cannot be accepted. 10. This  is  also  the  view  taken  by  this  Court  in  Krishi   Utpadan Mandi Samiti case. The learned Judges framed the  question thus: (SCC p. 499, para 4) “4.  The  question,  therefore,  is  that  which  date  of  the  publications in three  steps i.e.  publication in the Gazette,  two newspapers and local publication to be the last date for  the purpose of computing three years’ limitation prescribed  in clause (i) of the proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act.” 11. It  may  be  noted  that  this  Court  in  that  case  was  considering a case which arose before the coming into force  of Amending Act 68 of 1984. The case on hand has arisen  after  Amending Act 68 of 1984. The only difference is the  period  of  limitation;  for  the  cases  arising  before  the  Amending Act it was three years and one year for the cases  arising after the Amending Act. Otherwise, the principle is  the same.  

16. The above view of this Court lends support to the view  that for the purpose of calculating the limitation prescribed  under clause (ii) of the first proviso to Section 6(1), it is not  

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the last of the publication in the series that should be taken  into account, but the publication that was made in the first  instance under Section 6. 17. In the light of the law laid down by this Court, we have  no hesitation to hold that the declaration published under  Section  6  of  the  Act  was  well  within  one  year  and  the  challenge to the same has been rightly rejected by the High  Court. However, the view taken in the judgment of the High  Court under appeal that the relevant date for reckoning the  period  of  limitation  will  be  the  date  of  making  of  the  declaration under Section 6, may not be correct. As held in  Krishi  Utpadan  Mandi  Samiti  case mere  making  of  declaration is not enough. The making of declaration under  Section 6 is complete for the purpose of clauses (i) and (ii) of  the first proviso to Section 6(1) when it is published in the  Official Gazette.”

After  holding  so,  since  the  Notification  under  Section 4  

was lastly published on 06.08.1992 in the Official Gazette  

and  declaration  under  Section  6  was  published  in  the  

Gazette on 05.08.1993, this Court found that the same is  

well within one year and accordingly dismissed the appeal  

of the landowners.   

13) In  S.H.  Rangappa vs.  State  of  Karnataka  and  

Another, (2002) 1 SCC 538, a three-Judge Bench of this  

Court speaking through Kirpal, J. has observed thus:

7. Declaration under Section 6 is preceded by issuance of a  notification under Section 4 which indicates the intention of  the  Government  to  inter  alia  acquire  land  for  a  public  purpose. Pursuant to the issuance of the same, objections  can be filed and after hearing the same, Section 6(1) enables  the appropriate authority if it is satisfied, after considering  

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the report made under Section 5-A of the Act,  that if  any  particular  land  is  needed  for  a  public  purpose,  then  a  declaration  is  to  be  made  under  the  signature  of  an  appropriate  officer.  Where  notification  under  Section  4  is  published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition  Amendment Act,  1984, as in the present  case,  proviso (ii)  requires that such a declaration shall not be made after the  expiry of one year from the date of the publication of Section  4 notification.  8. We wish to clarify that the words “publish” and “from the  date of publication of the notification” occurring in proviso  (ii)  to  Section  6(1)  refer  to  the  publication  of  Section  4  notification and have no reference to the publication of any  notification under Section 6. Under Section 6(1), it is only a  declaration  which  is  required  to  be  made,  the  time-limit  being  within  one  year  of  the  publication  of  Section  4  notification.  The  main  purpose  for  the  issuance  of  a  declaration under Section 6 is provided by sub-section (3),  namely, that the declaration is conclusive evidence that the  land is needed inter alia for a public purpose and after the  making of the declaration the appropriate Government may  acquire the land in the manner provided by the Act. Sub- section (2) requires the declaration to be published in the  Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating in  the  locality  in  which  the  land  is  situate  and  in  addition  thereto the Collector is also required to cause public notice  of  the  substance  of  the  declaration  to  be  given  in  the  convenient places in the said locality.  9. It  is  pertinent to note that sub-section (2) of Section 6  does  not  prescribe  any  time-limit  within  which  the  declaration made under Section 6(1) is to be published. It is  well known that after an order or declaration is made there  can be a  time gap between the making  of  the order  or  a  declaration  and  its  publication  in  the  Official  Gazette.  Whereas the time-limit for the making of an order is provided  under Section 6(1), the legislature advisedly did not provide  for any time-limit in respect of the steps required to be taken  under sub-section (2) of Section 6. If the contention of Mr  G.L. Sanghi, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant is  correct,  the  effect  would  be  that  not  only  the  declaration  would have to be published within the time prescribed under  the  proviso  to  Section  6(1)  but  all  other  steps,  like  publication in the daily newspaper and the Collector causing  public  notice  of  the  declaration  to  be  given  at  convenient  places in the locality, must also be completed within a period  of one year of Section 4 notification. This could certainly not  be  a  consequence  contemplated  by  the  legislature.  As  

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already observed, the purpose of Section 6 notification being  to give a final declaration with regard to the need of the land  for  public  purpose,  the  interest  of  the  landowners  was  sufficiently safeguarded with the requirement of the making  of  the  declaration  under  Section  6(1)  within  a  prescribed  period. It is difficult for us to read into sub-section (2) the  provisions of the proviso to Section 6(1) which relate to the  time-limit for issuance of the notification under Section 6(1).  10. This  view which we have expressed hereinabove finds  support from a decision of a Bench of four Judges of this  Court in the case of Khadim Hussain v. State of U.P.”

14) In  General  Manager,  Department  of  

Telecommunications, Thiruvananthapuram vs.  Jacob  

S/o Kochuvarkey Kalliath (Dead) By LRs. and others,  

(2003) 9 SCC 662, this Court again reiterated that period  

of two years from the date of publication of the declaration  

prescribed under Section 11A for passing the Award, must  

be calculated from the last of the series of the publications  

referred  to  under  Section  6(2).   After  holding  so,  

Doraiswamy Raju, J. speaking for the Bench has held that  

last of the series of publications being publication in daily  

newspapers, the period of two years must be calculated  

from the date of such publication.  

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15) In  Bihar State Housing Board vs.  State of Bihar  

and Others,  (2003)  10  SCC 1,  Arijit  Pasayat,  J.  while  

considering  the  rival  contentions  with  reference  to  

Sections 4 (1), 6(1), 6(2) and 11A of the Act has held thus:  

“9. If  one takes note of  the  parenthesis  appearing in  sub-section (2) of Section 6, it is clear that reference to  the  subsequent  provisions  of  the  Act  to  the  date  of  publication of declaration has to be determined as the  last  of  the  dates  of  the  publication  and the giving  of  public  notice.  As  the  date  of  publication  by  local  publication was the last at that point of time i.e. 15-3- 1991,  the  award  on  25-3-1992  was  not  beyond  the  prescribed period of limitation.”

16) In  Kunwar Pal Singh (dead) by LRs vs.  State of  

U.P. and Others, (2007) 5 SCC 85, Panta, J. speaking for  

the Bench held:

“17. The  provisions  of  Section  11-A  are  intended  to  benefit  the  landowner  and  ensure  that  the  award  is  made within a period of two years from the date of the  declaration  under  Section  6.  In  ordinary  course,  therefore, when the Government fails to make an award  within two years of the declaration under Section 6, the  land has still not vested in the Government and its title  remains with the owner, the acquisition proceedings are  still pending and, by virtue of the provisions of Section  11-A, the proceedings will lapse. The period of two years  referred  to  in  Section  11-A  shall  be  computed  by  counting from the last of the publication dates, as per  the prescribed modes of publication.

25. Again, in Bihar State Housing Board v. State of Bihar  this  Court  reiterating  the proposition of  law has held  that  modes  of  publication  of  declaration  prescribed  under Section 6(2) are conjoint and cumulative and all  of them must be resorted to and completed. Sub-section  (2)  of  Section  6  of  the  Act  necessarily  makes  it  

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abundantly  clear  that  the  last  of  the  dates  of  the  publication  and  giving  of  such  public  notice  shall  “hereinafter” be referred to as the date of publication of  the  declaration  and limitation period of  two years  for  making award under Section 11-A has to be counted as  the  last  of  the  dates  out  of  the  three  modes  of  publication specified in Section 6 of the Act.”

17) In  the  case  on hand,  it  is  clearly  indicated  in  the  

reply affidavit filed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer  

that the notification under Section 6 was last published  

on 19.04.1990, by affixing a copy of the Notification on the  

notice board of  the office of  City Mamlatdar,  Surat and  

also  by  affixing  the  same  in  ward  No.4  of  Surat  city.  

Hence the period of two years stipulated in Section 11A  

would begin to run from 19.04.1990 and, therefore, the  

publication of the Award under Section 11 of the Act on  

18.04.1992  was  within  the  stipulated  time  limit  of  two  

years.   In  such  circumstances,  this  contention  also  is  

liable to be rejected as devoid of any merit.  

18) Learned senior counsel for the appellants submitted  

that inasmuch as the respondents, by a notification, has  

changed  the  classification  of  the  land  in  question  and  

designated as “residential use” at this moment, they are  

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not permitted to set up a school in the land in question.  

In the counter affidavit filed by the Director of Planning,  

Surat Municipal Corporation has highlighted that the land  

in question has been reserved for school purpose in the  

development  plan  sanctioned  by  the  State  Government  

under the provisions of Gujarat Town Planning and Urban  

Development Act, 1976.  As per Section 20 of the said Act,  

the acquiring body, namely, Surat Municipal Corporation  

is required to acquire the land under the Land Acquisition  

Act as the impugned land is reserved for school purpose.  

Further, inasmuch as the land in question is kept under  

reservation for school in the sanctioned development plan  

for the State Government under Section 17 of the Gujarat  

Town Planning & Urban Development Act, it is the duty of  

the Corporation to acquire the land for implementing the  

provisions  of  the  same.   In  view  of  the  same,  this  

contention is also liable to be rejected.  

19) Mr.  Ranjit  Kumar,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  

appellants has also submitted that in view of existence of  

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many schools in and around the vicinity, there is no need  

to  establish a  school  in  the  land of  the  appellants.   In  

respect of the said claim, the Director of Planning, Surat  

Municipal Corporation, in the counter affidavit has stated  

that there is no municipal school near the site in question  

and that the schools of the Corporation which are located  

in  Begampura,  Moti  Talkies,  Mumbaivad,  Shetranjivad,  

Viramgami  Maholla  are  very  far  from  the  land  under  

acquisition and due to increase in population in the city of  

Surat,  they  are  justified  in  establishing  a  school  for  

providing primary education to  the children in the said  

area.   In  respect  of  ‘need’  and  ‘necessity’,  it  is  for  the  

Government  and  their  authorities  to  take  a  decision  

considering various aspects.  If such a decision is taken  

based on materials it is not for the Court to doubt their  

claim.   It  is  also  stated  that  the  Surat  Municipal  

Corporation  is  required  to  pay  the  amount  of  

compensation to the tune of Rs.10,54,901.95 and the said  

amount has already been deposited with the Government  

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Treasury on 27.05.1992.  In view of the above information,  

the contention of learned senior counsel for the appellants  

is to be rejected.  

20) Finally, learned senior counsel for the appellants, by  

drawing our attention to the recent decision of this Court  

in  Avinash Mehrotra vs.  Union of  India and Others,  

(2009)  6  SCC 398  submitted  that  in  view  of  the  strict  

conditions issued by this Court for establishing a school  

particularly  in  a  crowded  city,  the  respondents  cannot  

fulfill  those  conditions  and  on  this  ground  also  the  

acquisition proceeding is liable to be dropped.  It is true  

that in view of what had happened in Lord Krishna Middle  

School in Kumbakonam in the State of Tamil Nadu, this  

Court  issued  several  directions  and  conditions,  safety  

measures and standards for establishing a school.  In our  

view,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  State  and  their  educational  

authorities  to  adhere  to  all  those  conditions  before  

commencing a school in the land in question.   

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21) In the light of the above discussion, we are unable to  

sustain any of the objections raised by the appellants.  On  

the other hand, we are in entire agreement with the stand  

taken by the State as well as the conclusion arrived at by  

the High Court.  Consequently, the appeal fails and the  

same is dismissed, however, with no order as to costs.  

...…………………………………J.                   (P. SATHASIVAM)  

...…………………………………J.           (ANIL R. DAVE)  

NEW DELHI; JULY 23, 2010.          

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