REPORTABLE

  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO._1766   OF 2009 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 3271 OF 2007)

D. VENKATASUBRAMANIAM & ORS. … APPELLANTS

VERSUS

M.K. MOHAN KRISHNAMACHARI & ANR. … RESPONDENTS

With

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1767_ OF 2009 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 3269 OF 2007)

ABINESH BABU & ORS. … APPELLANTS

VERSUS

M.K. MOHAN KRISHNAMACHARI & ANR. … RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.

A short  question  that  arises  for  our  consideration  in  

these  appeals  is  whether  it  is  open  to  the  High  Court  in  

exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of  

Criminal Procedure to interfere with the statutory power of

investigation by police into a cognizable offence? If such a  

power is available with the Court, what are the parameters  

for its interference?

2. It  is  well  settled  and  this  Court  time  and  again,  

reiterated that the police authorities have the statutory  

right and duty to investigate into a cognizable offence  

under the scheme of Code of Criminal Procedure (for  

short  ‘the  Code’).  This  Court,  on  more  than  one  

occasion,  decried  uncalled  for  interference  by  the  

Courts into domain of investigation of crimes by police  

in discharge of their statutory functions. The principle  

has  been succinctly  stated way back in  Emperor  V.  

Khwaja  Nazir  Ahmad1 and  the  same  has  been  

repeatedly quoted with respect and approval. The Privy  

Council observed that “just as it is essential that every  

one accused of a crime should have free access to a  

Court of justice so that he may be duly,  acquitted if  

found  not  guilty  of  the  offence  with  which  he  is  

charged,  so  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance  that  the  1 AIR 1945 PC 18

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judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters  

which are within their province and into which the law  

imposes upon them the duty of enquiry”.

3. The Privy Council further observed:

“In India as has been shown there is a statutory  right on the part of the police to investigate the  circumstances  of  an  alleged  cognizable  crime  without requiring any authority  from the judicial  authorities, and it would, as their Lordships think,  be an unfortunate result if it should be held  possible  to  interfere  with  those  statutory  rights  by  an  exercise  of  the  inherent  jurisdiction of the Court.  The functions of the  judiciary  and  the  police  are  complementary  not  overlapping  and  the  combination  of  individual  liberty with a due observance of law and order is  only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its  own  function,  always,  of  course,  subject  to  the  right of the Court to intervene in an appropriate  case  when  moved  under  Section  491,  Criminal  P.C.  to  give  directions  in  the  nature  of  habeas  corpus. In such a case as the present, however,  the  Court's  functions  begin  when  a  charge  is  preferred  before  it  and  not  until  then.  It  has  sometimes  been  thought  that  Section  561A has  given increased powers to the Court which it did  not possess before that section was enacted. But  this is not so. The section gives no new powers, it  only provides that those which the Court already  inherently  possess  shall  be  preserved  and  is  inserted, as their Lordships think, lest it should be  considered that the only powers possessed by the  Court  are  those  expressly  conferred  by  the  

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Criminal  Procedure  Code,  and  that  no  inherent  power had survived the passing of that Act.”

(emphasis supplied)

4. In State of West Bengal V. S. N. Basak2, a Division  

Bench of three Judges of this Court, while referring to  

the  observations  of  the  Privy  Council  referred  to  

hereinabove, observed:

"With this interpretation, which has been put on the  statutory duties and powers of the police and of the  powers of the Court, we are in accord."

and it was further held:

“The  powers  of  investigation  into  cognizable  offences are contained in Chapter XIV of the Code.  Section  154  which  is  in  that  Chapter  deals  with  information in cognizable offences and Section 156  with  investigation  into  such  offences  and  under  these sections the police has the statutory right to  investigate  into  the  circumstances  of  any  alleged  cognizable offence …and this statutory power of the  police to investigate cannot be interfered with by  the exercise of power under Section 439 or under  the inherent power of the court under Section 561A  of Criminal Procedure Code”.

This Court, having found that the High Court had exceeded  

its jurisdiction in interfering with the investigation, interfered  

2 (1963) 2 SCR 52

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with the orders  of  the High Court  by allowing the appeal  

preferred by the State.

5. In  State  of  Bhihar  &  Anr.  V.  J.A.C.  Saldanha  &  

Ors.3, a three Judge Bench, speaking through Desai, J.,  

after referring the precedents including Khwaza Nazir  

Ahmad, held:

“There is a clear cut and well demarcated sphere  of  activity  in  the  field  of  crime  detection  and  crime punishment. Investigation of an offence is  the field  exclusively  reserved for  the  executive  through  the  police  department,  the  superintendence  over  which  vests  in  the  State  Government.  The  executive,  which  is  charged  with a duty to keep vigilance over law and order  situation  is  obliged to  prevent  crime and if  an  offence is alleged to have been committed it is  its bounden duty to investigate into the offence  and  bring  the  offender  to  book.  Once  it  investigates  and  finds  an  offence  having  been  committed it is its duty to collect evidence for the  purpose  of  proving  the  offence.  Once  that  is  completed and the investigating officer submits  report to the Court requesting the Court to take  cognizance of the offence under Section 190 of  the  Code  its  duty  comes  to  an  end.  On  a  cognizance  of  the  offence  being  taken  by  the  Court the police function of investigation comes  to an end subject to the provision contained in  Section  173(8),  there  commences  the  adjudicatory  function  of  the  judiciary  to  

3 (1980) 2 SCR 16

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determine  whether  an  offence  has  been  committed and if so, whether by the person or  persons charged with the crime by the police in  its report to the Court, and to award adequate  punishment  according  to  law  for  the  offence  proved to the satisfaction of the Court. There is  thus a well defined and well demarcated function  in the field of crime detection and its subsequent  adjudication  between  the  police  and  the  Magistrate. This has been recognised way back in  King  Emperor  v.  Khwaja  Nazir  Ahmad  [1944]  L.R. 71 IA 203.

… … … … …

This  view  of  the  Judicial  Committee  clearly  demarcates the functions of the executive and the  judiciary in the field of detection of crime and its  subsequent trial and it would appear that the power  of the police to investigate into a cognizable offence  is  ordinarily  not  to  be  interfered  with  by  the  judiciary.”

6. M.C. Mehta (Taj Corridor Scam) V. Union of India  

& Ors.4 was a public  interest  litigation in which this  

Court, after noticing the precedents, held that when a  

cognizable offence is reported to the police, they may  

after  investigation  take  action  under  Section  169  or  

Section 170 of the Code. If the officer-in-charge of the  

police  station  forms  an  opinion  that  there  is  no  

4 (2007) 1 SCC 110

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sufficient evidence against the accused, the officer-in-

charge may, under Section 169 of  the Code,  release  

the accused from custody  or,  if  the officer  forms an  

opinion that there is sufficient evidence, he may, under  

Section  170  of  the  Code,  forward  the  accused  to  a  

competent  Magistrate.  After  analyzing  the  earlier  

judgments, this Court observed:

…that  there  is  a  clear-cut  and  well-demarcated  sphere of activities in the field of crime detection  and crime punishment. Investigation of an offence  is the field reserved for the executive through the  police department, the superintendence over which  vests  in  the  State  Government.  The  executive  is  charged with a duty to keep vigilance over law and  order situation. It is obliged to prevent crime. If an  offence is committed allegedly, it is the State's duty  to  investigate  into  the  offence  and  bring  the  offender to book. Once it investigates through the  police department and finds an offence having been  committed, it is its duty to collect evidence for the  purposes  of  proving  the  offence.  Once  that  is  completed, the investigating officer submits report  to the court requesting the court to take cognizance  of  the  offence  under  Section  190  Cr.P.C  and  his  duty comes to an end.”

7. Now, we shall revert to the facts of the case in order to  

consider whether the High Court properly applied the  

settled legal position to the facts of the case.

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On  18th September,  2006,  M/s  IVR  Prime  Urban  

Developers Ltd. (‘IVR’ for short) entered into a Memorandum  

of Understanding (MOU) with the respondent herein wherein  

it  was  agreed  upon  by  the  respondent  that  he  would  

facilitate  the  sale  of  about  600  acres  of  land  situated  at  

Sandavellor village of Kancheepuram District, Tamilnadu in  

favour of IVR for a valuable consideration of Rs.28 lakhs per  

acre. It was mutually agreed upon between the parties that  

IVR would retain an amount of Rs.2 lakh per acre towards  

security  for  timely  performance  of  respondent’s  obligation  

under the MOU. The completion of the sale of the said land  

was to be done in two phases. The first phase for an extent  

of  450  acres  was  required  to  be  completed  before  31st  

November,  2006 and the second phase of  remaining 150  

acres  on  or  before  28th February,  2007.  The  respondent  

agreed to arrange and facilitate registration of sale deeds of  

a  minimum of  75  acres  per  week  in  favour  of  IVR.  The  

respondent had also undertaken the obligation to collect and  

deliver all  the relevant documents and records concerning  

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the said lands as required by IVR for registration of the sale  

deeds. It was further agreed upon that the retention amount  

accumulated to be forfeited by IVR on failure to comply with  

the terms of the MOU by the respondent. The MOU further  

provided that the same shall be cancelled by IVR if it was  

convinced that  the respondent  was unable  to perform his  

part of the obligation under the MOU.

8. On  realizing  that  the  respondent  could  facilitate  the  

transfer of only 64 acres of land in favour of IVR out of  

the huge chunk of the land, IVR got issued legal notice  

to  the  respondent  on  15th November,  2006,  calling  

upon him to  facilitate  and  complete  the  sale  of  450  

acres of land within the agreed timeframe. Since there  

was no response to the legal notice, IVR terminated the  

MOU on 30th November,  2006  and  also  forfeited  the  

retention amount in terms of the MOU.

9. Thereafter, IVR entered into two MOUs with the owners  

of the land and M/s Altirven Steels Limited for purchase  

of 330 acres and 200 acres of land respectively. This is  

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the  same  land  which  the  first  respondent  had  

undertaken to facilitate the sale in favour of IVR. It is  

stated  that  pursuant  to  the  said  MOUs,  IVR  has  

completed purchase of 346 acres of land by paying a  

total sale consideration of Rs.121.35 crores.

10. On 12th January,  2007, the respondent herein lodged  

first  information  with  the  Sub  Inspector  of  Police,  

Central Crime Branch, Tamilnadu against the appellants  

alleging  commission  of  offences  under  Sections  406  

and 420 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the same  

was registered on 26th February, 2007 in FIR No. 93 of  

2007. It is not necessary for the purpose of disposal of  

these appeals to notice the details of allegations leveled  

in the said First Information Report as we propose not  

to  make  any  comment  or  observation  which  may  

hamper  further  pending  proceedings.  The  police,  

having registered the case against the appellants had  

commenced  its  investigation.  Even  while  the  

investigation  was  in  progress,  for  some  inexplicable  

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reasons, the respondent moved the High Court under  

Section 482 of the Code, in Criminal Original Petition  

No. 6194 of  2007 seeking directions to the police to  

seize  an  amount  of  Rs.2,28,00,000/-  from  the  

appellants claiming that he was entitled for an amount  

of  Rs.1,28,00,000/-  for  facilitating  the registration  of  

64  acres  of  land  under  the  MOU  which  amount  is  

alleged  to  have  been  withheld  by  the  appellants  

together with a sum of Rs.1 crore which is stated to  

have been paid by him to the appellants. The petition  

filed in the High Court makes an interesting reading in  

which it was stated that the following questions arise  

for the consideration of the High Court:

A. Whether  the  accused  have  not  committed  serious  

cognizable offences?

B. Whether  the termination  of  MOU is  legally  and morally  

correct?

C. Whether  the  petitioner  had  not  sustained  a  huge  

monetary loss of Rs.5 crores, which was invested in the  

said project?

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D. Is it not the duty of the respondent police to seize the  

petitioner’s money of Rs.1,28,00,000/- from accused Nos.  

1 to 3?

E. Is it not the duty of the respondent police to seize the  

petitioner’s money of Rs.1,00,00,000/- from accused Nos.  

4 to 6?

F. Whether  the  claim  of  accused  Nos.  1  to  3  that  the  

petitioner has to pay a sum of Rs.2 crores as liquidated  

damages is justified?

11. Be it noted, that there is no allegation of dereliction of  

any duty on the part of the investigating agency. There  

is  also  no  allegation  of  any  collusion  and  deliberate  

delay  on the part  of  the  investigating  agency in  the  

matter  of  investigation  into  the  case  that  has  been  

promptly registered on the information lodged by the  

respondent. The petition almost reads like a civil  suit  

for recovery of the money. As noted hereinabove, the  

petition has been filed within one week of registration  

of  the  crime  by  which  time  the  police  had  already  

started  serious  investigation  as  is  evident  from  the  

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material  available  on  record.  It  is  also  required  to  

notice that none of the appellants have been impleaded  

as party respondents to the petition filed under Section  

482  of  the  Code.  The  State  represented  by  its  Sub  

Inspector  of  Police,  Central  Crime  Branch,  Egmore,  

Chennai alone was impleaded as the respondent. The  

investigating  agency  in  its  counter  filed  in  the  High  

Court  stated  that  after  obtaining  necessary  legal  

opinion,  a  case  was  registered  and  ‘commenced  the  

investigation’. It is also stated in categorical terms that  

the police  had “inquired all  the connected witnesses,  

recorded  their  statements  and  also  collected  the  

material  documents  and  confirmed  commission  of  

cognizable  offences  by  all  the  accused”.  The  High  

Court, within a period of one month from the date of  

filing  of  the  petition,  finally  disposed  of  the  same  

observing  that  “it  is  obligatory  on  the  part  of  the  

respondent  police  to  conduct  investigation  in  

accordance with law, including recording of statements  

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from witnesses, arrest, seizure of property, perusal of  

various  documents,  filing  of  charge  sheet.  It  is  also  

needless to state that if any account is available with  

the  accused  persons,  or  any  amount  is  in  their  

possession  and  any  account  is  maintained  in  

Natinoalised Bank, it  is  obligatory on the part  of  the  

respondent  police  to  take  all  necessary  steps  to  

safeguard the interest of the aggrieved persons in this  

case.”  The  Court  accordingly  directed  the  police  to  

expedite  and  complete  the  investigation  within  six  

months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order.  

The said order of the High Court is impugned in these  

appeals.

12. Shri Uday U. Lalit, learned senior advocate appearing  

for the appellants, submitted that the impugned order  

suffers from serious and incurable infirmities requiring  

interference  of  this  Court.  The  respondent  virtually  

sought to recover the amounts from the appellants in a  

proceeding filed under Section 482 of the Code which is  

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impermissible in law. It was further submitted that the  

High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing directions  

to  the  investigating  agency  to  act  in  a  particular  

manner which is unsustainable.

13. Mr.  K.V.  Mohan,  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

respondent,  on  the  other  hand,  supported  the  order  

and submitted that the High Court rightly interfered in  

the matter in the interest of justice.

14. The  question  that  arises  for  our  consideration  is  

whether the contents of the petition submitted by the  

respondent  reveal  any  cause  for  issuing  directions  

guiding  the  Investigating  Officer  in  the  matter  of  

exercise of statutory power and duty to investigate into  

crime  that  had  already  been  registered  and  

investigation was actually in progress? Whether such a  

direction could have been issued by the High Court in  

exercise  of  its  jurisdiction  under  Section  482  of  the  

Code?

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15. It is too fairly well settled and needs no restatement at  

our hands that the saving of the High Court’s inherent  

power is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose  

which  is  that  a  Court  proceeding  ought  not  to  be  

permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment  

or persecution. It is unfortunate that it is the exercise  

of the inherent power by the High Court in this case  

that  had  ultimately  resulted  in  harassment  of  the  

appellants as is  evident from the subsequent events.  

Pursuant  to  the  impugned  order,  the  investigating  

authorities  have  approached  the  appellant  No.1  (in  

S.L.P (Crl) No. 3269 of 2007), took him into custody  

and  exhibited  him  on  television  channel.  The  police  

have demanded to pay an amount of Rs.2,28,00,000/-  

and threatened that he would be arrested if he fails to  

comply with their demand. Accordingly, the appellants  

have paid Rs.10 lakhs in cash in the police station itself  

and issued a cheque for an amount of Rs.2.18 cores  

drawn  on  Tamilnadu  Mercantile  Bank.  However,  the  

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cheque was not encashed on account of the instructions  

to the bank to stop the payment in view of the interim  

order  dated  4th May,  2007  of  this  Court.  The  police  

offered explanation stating that the matter was settled  

voluntarily  between  the  parties  and  therefore,  the  

accused were not arrested and remanded to custody. It  

is difficult to buy this idea that there was a settlement  

between  the  parties  in  the  police  station.  It  is  not  

difficult  to  discern  as  to  how  and  under  what  

circumstances the appellants may have agreed to pay  

the amounts and also issued a cheque. It is not known  

as to how and under what authority the police could  

intervene and settle any disputes between the parties.  

It is needless to observe that the police have no such  

authority or duty of settling disputes.

16. It is the statutory obligation and duty of the police to  

investigate  into  the  crime  and  the  Courts  normally  

ought  not  to  interfere  and  guide  the  investigating  

agency as to in what manner the investigation has to  

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proceed.  In  M.C.  Abraham  &  Anr.  V.  State  of  

Maharashtra & Ors.5, this Court observed:

“Section  41  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  provides  for  arrest  by  a police  officer  without  an  order from a Magistrate and without a warrant. The  section  gives  discretion  to  the  police  officer  who  may, without an order from a Magistrate and even  without  a  warrant,  arrest  any  person  in  the  situations enumerated in that section. It is open to  him, in the course of  investigation,  to arrest  any  person  who  has  been  concerned  with  any  cognizable  offence  or  against  whom  reasonable  complaint  has  been made or  credible  information  has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists  of his having been so concerned. Obviously, he is  not expected to act in a mechanical manner and in  all cases to arrest the accused as soon as the report  is  lodged.  In  appropriate  cases,  after  some  investigation, the investigating officer may make up  his mind as to whether it is necessary to arrest the  accused person. At that stage the court has no role  to play. Since the power is discretionary, a police  officer  is  not  always  bound to  arrest  an  accused  even  if  the  allegation  against  him  is  of  having  committed a cognizable offence. Since an arrest is  in the nature of an encroachment on the liberty of  the  subject  and  does  affect  the  reputation  and  status of the citizen, the power has to be cautiously  exercised. It depends inter alia upon the nature of  the offence alleged and the type of persons who are  accused  of  having  committed  the  cognizable  offence. Obviously, the power has to be exercised  with caution and circumspection.”

17. It is further observed: 5 (2003) 2 SCC 649

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“The principle, therefore, is well settled that it is for  the investigating agency to submit a report to the  Magistrate after full and complete investigation. The  investigating  agency may submit  a  report  finding  the allegations substantiated. It is also open to the  investigating agency to submit a report finding no  material to support the allegations made in the first  information  report.  It  is  open  to  the  Magistrate  concerned to accept the report or to order further  enquiry.  But  what  is  clear  is  that  the  Magistrate  cannot direct the investigating agency to submit a  report that is in accord with his views. Even in a  case  where  a  report  is  submitted  by  the  investigating agency finding that no case is made  out for prosecution, it is open to the Magistrate to  disagree with  the report  and to take cognizance,  but what he cannot do is to direct the investigating  agency to  submit  a  report  to  the effect  that  the  allegations  have  been  supported  by  the  material  collected during the course of investigation.”

18. This Court while observing that it was not appropriate  

for the High Court to issue a direction that the case  

should  not  only  be  investigated  but  a  charge  sheet  

must be submitted, held:

“In  our  view  the  High  Court  exceeded  its  jurisdiction in making this direction which deserves  to  be  set  aside.  While  it  is  open to  the  High  Court, in appropriate cases, to give directions  for  prompt investigation etc.  the High Court  cannot  direct  the  investigating  agency  to  submit a report that is in accord with its views  as  that  would  amount  to  unwarranted  interference with the investigation of the case  

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by inhibiting the exercise of statutory power  by the investigating agency.”

    (emphasis is of  ours)

19. It is worthwhile to notice that the directions in the said  

case were issued by the High Court of Bombay in writ  

petition filed in public interest in which a grievance has  

been  made  that  though  the  Provident  Fund  

Commissioner has lodged a complaint against several  

Directors, the investigation has made no progress on  

account of the fact that the Directors were Government  

servants and enjoying considerable influence. The High  

Court issued series of directions which were challenged  

in  this  Court  contending  that  the  High  Court  was  in  

error in exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the  

Constitution resulting in unjustified interference of the  

investigation of the case. It is, therefore, clear that if  

the High Court, in exercise of its power under Article  

226  of  the  Constitution  of  India,  cannot  direct  the  

investigating agency to investigate the case in accord  

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with its  views as that  would amount  to unwarranted  

interference, equally no such directions could be issued  

in exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of  

the Code.

20. Tested  in  the  light  of  the  principles  aforesaid,  the  

impugned  order,  in  our  considered  opinion,  must  be  

held to be an order passed overstepping the limits of  

judicial interference. It was observed by this Court on  

more than one occasion, that even in Public  Interest  

Litigation  proceedings,  appropriate  directions  may be  

issued  and  the  purpose  in  issuing  such  directions  is  

essentially to ensure performance of statutory duty by  

the investigating agency. The duty of the Court in such  

proceedings  is  to  ensure  that  the  agencies  do  their  

duties in compliance with law. The inherent power of  

the  High  Court  is  saved  to  interfere  with  the  

proceedings  pending before  a  Criminal  Court  if  such  

interference is required to secure the ends of justice or  

where  the  continuance  of  the  proceedings  before  a  

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Court amounts to abuse of the process of Court. Such a  

power  under  Section  482  of  the  Code  is  always  

available  to  the  High  Court  in  relation  to  a  matter  

pending before a criminal Court.

21. The High Court, in the instant case, did not even advert  

to the relevant facts. As stated in the order itself, it was  

more guided by the arguments made across the Bar  

that the police has not taken any steps to arrest the  

persons and seize  the amounts  involved in this  case  

from the  appellants  though  there  is  no  such  factual  

foundation as such laid in the petition. It has altogether  

ignored the counter filed by the police that the police  

had  already  examined  ten  witnesses  within  a  short  

span  of  time  after  the  registration  of  crime  and  

recorded  their  statements.  The  High  Court,  without  

recording any reason whatsoever,  directed the police  

that it is obligatory on their part to record statements  

from witnesses, arrest, seizure of property and filing of  

charge sheet. It is difficult to discern as to how such  

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directions resulting in far reaching consequences could  

have been issued by the High Court in exercise of its  

jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. The High  

Court interfered with the investigation of crime which is  

within the exclusive domain of the police by virtually  

directing  the  police  to  investigate  the  case  from  a  

particular angle and take certain steps which the police  

depending  upon  the  evidence  collected  and  host  of  

other circumstances may or may not have attempted to  

take any such steps in its discretion. It is not necessary  

that every investigation should result in arrest, seizure  

of  the property and ultimately in filing of the charge  

sheet.  The  police,  in  exercise  of  its  statutory  power  

coupled with duty, upon investigation of a case, may  

find that a case is made out requiring it to file charge  

sheet or may find that no case as such is made out. It  

needs no reiteration that the jurisdiction under Section  

482 of the Code conferred on the High Court has to be  

exercised  sparingly,  carefully  and  with  caution  only  

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where such exercise is justified by the test laid down in  

the provision itself.

22. Yet another aspect of the matter, the appellants have  

not  been  impleaded  as  party  respondents  in  the  

criminal petition in which the whole of the allegations  

are  levelled  against  them.  The  High  Court  never  

thought  it  fit  to  put  the  appellants  on  notice  before  

issuing appropriate  directions  to the police  to arrest,  

seize the property and file charge sheet. This Court in  

Divine Retreat Centre  V.  State of Kerala & Ors.6  

observed:

“We are concerned with the question as to  whether  the  High  Court  could  have  passed  a judicial order directing investigation against  the  appellant  and  its  activities  without  providing  an  opportunity  of  being  heard  to  it.  The  case  on  hand  is  a  case  where  the  criminal law is directed to be set in motion  on  the  basis  of  the  allegations  made  in  anonymous  petition  filed  in  the  High  Court.  No  judicial  order  can  ever  be  passed by any court without providing a  reasonable  opportunity  of  being  heard  to  the  person  likely  to  be  affected  by  such  order  and  particularly  when such  

6 (2008) 3 SCC 542

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order results in drastic consequences of  affecting one’s own reputation.”

                             (emphasis is  of ours)

23. The High Court in the present case, without realizing  

the  consequences,  issued  directions  in  a  casual  and  

mechanical manner without hearing the appellants. The  

impugned order is a nullity and liable to be set aside  

only on that score.

24. We are not impressed by the submission made by the  

learned counsel for the respondent that the High Court  

did not issue any directions but merely disposed of the  

petition with the observations reminding the police of  

its duty. The question that arises for consideration is  

whether there was any occasion or necessity to make  

those “observations” even if they are to be considered  

to  be  observations  and  not  any  directions.  It  is  not  

even remotely suggested that there was any deliberate  

inaction or failure in the matter of discharge of duties  

by  the  police.  There  was  no  allegation  of  any  

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subversion of processes of law facilitating the accused  

to  go  scot-free  nor  there  is  any  finding  as  such  

recorded  by  the  High  Court  in  its  order.  The  power  

under Section 482 of the Code can be exercised by the  

High Court either suo motu or on an application (i) to  

secure  the  ends  of  justice;  (ii)  the  High  Court  may  

make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to  

any order under the Code; (iii) to prevent abuse of the  

process  of  any  Court.  There  is  no  other  ground  on  

which the High Court may exercise its inherent power.  

In the present case, the High Court did not record any  

reasons  whatsoever  why  and  for  what  reasons,  the  

matter required its interference. The High Court is not  

expected  to  make  any  casual  observations  without  

having any regard to the possible  consequences that  

may  ensue  from  such  observations.  Observations  

coming  from the  higher  Courts  may  have  their  own  

effect of influencing the course of events and process of  

law. For that reason, no uncalled for observations are  

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to be made while disposing of the matters and that too  

without hearing the persons likely to be affected. The  

case on hand is itself  a classic illustration as to how  

such  observations  could  result  in  drastic  and  

consequences of far reaching in nature. We wish to say  

no more.

25. Learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on  

the decision of  this  Court  in  D.K. Basu  V.  State of  

West Bengal7 in  support  of  his  submission that  the  

police  is  entitled  to  arrest  and  seize  property  in  

exercise  of  their  power  under  the  Code.  We  fail  to  

appreciate the relevancy of that decision to decide the  

case on hand. We are equally unable to appreciate the  

relevancy of the decisions in  Inder Mohan Goswami  

& Anr. V. State of Uttaranchal & Ors.8 and Central  

Bureau of Investigation V. A. Ravishankar Prasad  

& Ors.9. Those are not the cases where any directions  

were  issued  in  exercise  of  jurisdiction  under  Section  

7 (1997) 1 SCC 416 8 (2007) 12 SCC 1 9 (2009) 6 SCC 351

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482 of the Code to the police in the manner in which  

the High Court did in this case. We find that none of the  

decisions upon which reliance has been placed by the  

learned counsel for the respondent has any bearing on  

the questions that had arisen for our consideration in  

these appeals.

26. Before  parting  with  the  case,  we  may,  however,  

observe that the observations made in this order and  

the  order  passed  by  the  High  Court  shall  have  no  

bearing whatsoever on the pending proceedings which  

shall go on in accordance with law.

27. For the aforesaid reasons, we find it difficult to sustain  

the impugned judgment of the High Court.

Leave  granted.  The  appeals  are  accordingly  allowed  

and the impugned order is set aside.

    ………………………………J.      (R.V. RAVEENDRAN)

NEW DELHI,          ……………………………..J.

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SEPTEMBER 14, 2009.          (B. SUDERSHAN REDDY)

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