REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICITION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.  6734-6735    OF 2010 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) Nos. 19478-19479 of 2009

D.V. Paul  …Appellant

Versus

Manisha Lalwani …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeals arise out of orders dated 17th June, 2009  

and 30th July,  2009 passed by the High Court  of  Madhya  

Pradesh  at  Jabalpur  whereby  an  application  seeking

extension of time for deposit of a sum of Rs.10,000/- by the  

appellant in terms of a judgment and decree dated 4th May,  

2006 passed by the High Court in FA No.108/2003 has been  

dismissed.      

3. The respondent Smt. Manisha Lalwani filed a suit  for  

eviction  of  the  appellant  under  the  M.P.  Accommodation  

Control Act, 1961 before the Additional District Judge, Fast  

Track Katni, alleging nuisance within the meaning of Section  

12(1)(c) of the Act, for default in payment of rent contrary  

to  Section  12(1)(a),  damage to  the  premises  contrary  to  

Section  12(1)(k)  and  material  alteration  of  the  

accommodation to the detriment of the landlord’s  interest  

diminishing the value  of  the  property  contrary  to  Section  

12(1)(m) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 as  

grounds for eviction. The suit was contested by the appellant  

and  eventually  dismissed  by  the  Trial  Court  holding  that  

none of the allegations made by the respondent had been  

proved  by  her.  Aggrieved  by  the  said  dismissal,  the  

respondent  appealed  to  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  

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Jabalpur.  The High Court  passed an order  dated 4th May,  

2006  holding  that  the  appellant  was  not  in  default  of  

payment  of  rent  so  as  to  justify  an  order  of  his  eviction  

under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act. The Court further held  

that the respondent had failed to prove that the appellant  

had caused any nuisance or that he had caused substantial  

damage to the premises owned by the landlord as envisaged  

under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act.  In so far as construction  

of a wall  by the tenant contrary to Section 12(1)(m) was  

concerned,  the  High  Court  held  that  the  additional  

construction raised by the tenant did not provide any cause  

of action for his eviction. The Court further held that in order  

to  warrant  eviction  the  construction  must  be  of  such  as  

materially alters the accommodation. The Court found that  

the  construction  made  in  the  instant  case  was  of  a  

temporary  character  and  that  such  construction  could  be  

removed at  any time without  causing any damage to the  

building. As regards demolition of a wall by the appellant-

tenant, the same was found to be detrimental to the interest  

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of  the  landlord  as  it  diminished  the  value  of  the  

accommodation substantially.  Relying upon Section 12(10)  

of the Act the Court held that it was lawful to determine and  

direct  payment  of  compensation  to  the  landlord  for  the  

damage could by him. The Court accordingly determined the  

damage at Rs.10,000/- and modified the decree passed by  

the Trial Court to the effect that the appellant shall deposit a  

sum of  Rs.10,000/-  by  way  of  compensation  in  the  Trial  

Court within four months from the date of the judgment of  

the  High  Court  for  payment  to  the  landlord.  In  case  the  

appellant failed to deposit  the amount so determined, the  

Trial Court was directed to pass a decree for eviction of the  

tenant  under  Section  12(1)(m)  of  the  Act.   In  case,  

however, the deposit was made within the specified period,  

the  suit  filed  by  the  respondent-landlady  was  to  stand  

dismissed.

4. The  appellant’s  case  is  that  aforementioned  order  of  

the High Court was communicated to him by his lawyer on  

telephone followed subsequently by the receipt of a copy of  

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the said order. The appellant’s further case is that due to  

inadvertence  he  did  not  notice  that  the  amount  of  

Rs.10,000/- had to be deposited before the Trial Court. The  

result was that instead of depositing the sum of Rs.10,000/-  

before  the  Trial  Court,  the  appellant  got  a  demand draft  

prepared in the name of the respondent from the Bank of  

Baroda at Katni Branch on 24th August, 2006. A copy of the  

deposit slip has been produced by the appellant in support of  

his version that a demand draft was indeed prepared in the  

name of the respondent for a sum of Rs.10,000/- from the  

Bank aforementioned.  The appellant’s  further  case is  that  

the  demand draft  was then sent  by Registered Post  A.D.  

No.6868 through the Katni Branch Post Office to the address  

of the respondent at Jabalpur. The registered envelop was  

received  at  the  respondent’s  house  by  her  maid  servant  

Durga who made an endorsement on the receiving slip, a  

true copy whereof has also been enclosed as Annexure P3 to  

the petition. According to the appellant even in the past he  

had sent demand drafts to the respondent for payment of  

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rent  due  to  her  which  drafts  were  received  by  her  maid  

servant.   

5. The appellant alleges that although the respondent had  

received  the  bank  draft  sent  to  her,  the  same  was  not  

encashed nor any acknowledgement sent to the appellant.  

He  did  not  even  receive  any  communication  from  the  

landlady pointing out that the amount had to be deposited in  

the Trial Court and not to be paid directly to her. The silence  

and inaction on the part of the respondent was according to  

the  appellant  deliberate  and  under  the  advice  of  her  

husband who is a practicing lawyer and also the power of  

attorney holder of the respondent.  

6. Four  months  after  the  demand  draft  was  sent  the  

respondent filed an application before the Trial Court praying  

for a decree under Section 12(1)(m) of the Act stating that  

the deposit of Rs.10,000/- directed by the High Court had  

not been made by the appellant. The error in the making of  

the deposit  thus  came to the  knowledge of  the appellant  

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only when he received a copy of the application moved by  

the respondent.  

7.   In the meantime, the respondent had challenged the  

order passed by the High Court in FA No.108 of 2003 before  

this  Court  by  way  of  Special  Leave  Petition  which  was  

dismissed by this Court on 16th March, 2007. Realising his  

mistake  the  appellant  appears  to  have  addressed  a  

communication to the Post Master, Jabalpur for verification  

whether letter sent by him under Registered A.D. No.6868,  

had been delivered to the respondent. A communication was  

also  addressed  to  the  Branch  Manager,  Bank  of  Baroda,  

Katni,  for  a  certificate  to  the  effect  that  bank  draft  

No.VG220839 dated 24th August,  2006 was issued by the  

said bank in favour of the respondent and whether or not  

the  said  draft  had  been  encashed.  Yet  another  

communication was addressed to the Bank Manager, Bank of  

Baroda  Napier  Town,  Jabalpur,  demanding  a  certificate  

whether the demand draft in question had been encashed.  

Simultaneously,  an  application  was  moved before  the  III,  

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Additional  District  Judge,  Katni,  praying  for  deposit  of  a  

fresh draft for an amount of Rs.10,000/- in the CCD account  

of the Court in terms of the order of the High Court.  A fresh  

bank draft was also enclosed with the said application. Not  

only that the appellant also moved MCC 1876 of 2007 under  

Section 151 Code of Civil Procedure before the High Court at  

Jabalpur setting out in detail the facts leading to the delay in  

submission of the demand draft before the Trial Court and  

steps that the appellant had taken in compliance with the  

order  passed  in  appeal.  In  the  said  application  the  High  

Court passed an order on 6th December, 2007 in which it  

noticed the denial of the respondent as to the receipt of the  

bank draft by her. The reply of the respondent, however,  

was  silent  as  to  whether  any  maid  servant  by the  name  

Durga  was  employed  by  her  and  whether  Durga  had  

received the bank draft in question. The Court in that view  

considered it necessary to direct an inquiry in to the matter  

particularly whether the maid servant of the respondent had  

received the bank draft on behalf of the decree holder and  

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whether the draft  is  being retained by the decree holder.  

The Executing Court was directed to record evidence to be  

led by the parties within a period of six weeks.

8. The  above  order  was  challenged  by  the  respondent  

before this Court in C.A. Nos.3234-35 of 2009 which were  

disposed of by order dated 5th May, 2009. This Court held  

that execution of the decree passed by the Trial Court need  

not be held up only because of the inquiry which the High  

Court  had  directed  into  the  question  of  deposit  of  the  

amount  by  the  appellant.  This  Court  felt  that  since  no  

deposit had been made in terms of the decree passed by the  

High  Court,  the  Executing  Court  could  proceed  with  the  

execution of decree passed on 4th May, 2006.  At the same  

time this Court left it open to the Executing Court to proceed  

with the inquiry as directed by the High Court. The operative  

portion of the order passed by this Court reads as under:

“We  have  heard  Mr.  Ravindra  Shrivastava,  learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of  the  appellant-decree  holder  and  Mr.  Rohit  Arya,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  

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respondent  and  have  also  considered  the  conditional  decree  and  the  application  for  extension  of  time  and  other  materials  on  record.  In  our  view,  for  the  purpose  of  executing  the  decree,  whether  money  has  been deposited or not, it was not necessary  to hold an inquiry whether in fact Smt. Durga  had received the bank draft or not because in  the conditional  decree of the High Court,  it  was made clear that such amount must be  deposited  in  the  trial  Court  which  was  not  done by the respondent.  In this view of the  matter, we are of the view that there is no  reason  why  the  Executing  Court  shall  not  proceed with execution of the decree passed  on 4th May, 2006, and accordingly, we direct  the  Executing  Court  to  proceed  with  the  execution  case  passed  on  4th May,  2006.  However, it would be open to the Executing  Court to proceed with the inquiry as directed  by the High Court.

With  these  observations  and/or  modification, these appeals are disposed of.  There will be no order as to costs.”        

9. When MCC No.1876 of 2007 came up for orders before  

the  High  Court  the  same  was  disposed  of  by  the  order  

impugned in this appeal holding that since an inquiry into  

the question whether the bank draft sent by the appellant  

has  been  received  by  the  respondent  through  her  maid  

servant has been declared to be unnecessary by this Court  

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and since  this  Court  has  directed  the  Executing  Court  to  

proceed  with  the  execution  case,  no  further  action  or  

direction  was  necessary  in  the  said  application.  What  is  

noteworthy  is  that  the  High  Court  did  not  examine  the  

question  whether  the  prayer  made  by  the  appellant  for  

extension of time for making the deposit could be considered  

and granted. It simply disposed of the application seeking  

extension of time only because this Court had not favoured  

the conduct of an inquiry into the question whether the bank  

draft  had  been  sent  to  the  respondent  and  had  been  

received by her through her maid servant.  

10. When the matter was taken up for hearing before the  

Executing Court two applications came up for consideration,  

one filed by the appellant and the other by the respondent.  

The application made by the appellant,  sought  an inquiry  

into  the  question  whether  the  bank  draft  sent  by  the  

appellant had been received by the respondent. The decree  

holder’s application on the other had pointed out that since  

the High Court had disposed of MCC No.1876 of 2007 by its  

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order  dated  17th June,  2009,  there  was  no  need  for  

conducting  any  inquiry.  Both  these  applications  were  

disposed of by the Executing Court on 7th July, 2009. The  

Executing Court held that since there was no need for any  

inquiry for the execution of the decree, it was unnecessary  

to go on with any such inquiry especially when the decree  

holder was no longer demanding any such inquiry.  All the  

applications  filed  before  the  Executing  Court  were  

accordingly disposed of.

11. Aggrieved by the above order, the appellant preferred  

MCC No.7148 of  2009,  which  was  dismissed  by the High  

Court on 30th July, 2009, relying upon the order passed by  

this Court on 5th May, 2009 and that passed by the High  

Court on 17th June, 2009.  The present appeals assail  the  

correctness of the said two orders.

12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length  

and  perused  the  record.  An  inadvertent  mistake  in  the  

deposit of the amount directed by the High Court has turned  

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out to be a fertile ground for time consuming and expensive  

litigation  before  this  Court  and  the  Courts  below.  The  

essence of the matter is that the High Court had directed  

deposit of Rs.10,000/- towards compensation payable to the  

respondent  landlady  for  the  damages  caused  to  the  

premises  in  the  occupation  of  the  tenant-appellant.  The  

appellant’s case was that instead of the deposit of the said  

amount before the Trial Court as directed by the High Court,  

he had committed a bonafide mistake in getting the bank  

draft  for  the  said  amount  prepared  in  the  name  of  the  

respondent and sending the same to her under Registered  

A.D.  In  support  of  that  submission,  the  appellant  had  

produced  material  to  show that  a  bank  draft  had  indeed  

been  prepared  in  the  name  of  the  respondent  and  

dispatched to her at her Jabalpur address.

13.  Since  the  respondent  denied  the  receipt  of  such  a  

draft, the question whether or not the draft had been sent  

and  if  so  received  by  the  respondent  through  her  maid  

servant fell in issue for purposes of determining whether the  

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appellant had complied with the directions contained in the  

decree. The High Court directed an inquiry into the matter  

by its interim order dated 6th December, 2007.  This Court in  

appeal against the said order considered such an inquiry to  

be  unnecessary.  This  Court  proceeded  on  the  basis  that  

since the deposit was directed to be made in the Trial Court,  

any other form of deposit would necessarily stand excluded  

including a direct payment to the landlady by way of a draft.  

This Court held that since the deposit had not been made,  

the execution could go on without waiting for the result of  

the  inquiry,  as  a  condition  precedent.  Those observations  

made by this Court were understood by the High Court to  

mean as though the question whether time for making of  

the deposit could be extended stood foreclosed that was not  

in our opinion a correct appreciation of the order passed by  

this  Court.  MCC  No.1876  of  2007  made  a  prayer  for  

extension of time for making of the deposit. Even assuming  

that  an  inquiry  into  the  making  of  the  payment  by  the  

appellant directly to the respondent was not necessary, the  

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question that was still required to be answered was whether  

time  for  deposit  of  the  amount  in  accordance  with  the  

directions  issued  by  the  High  Court  could  be  extended.  

Unfortunately,  the  High  Court  did  not  advert  to  that  

question. It appears to have proceeded on the assumption  

that since an inquiry into the payment of the amount directly  

to the respondent was not favoured by this Court and the  

Executing Court was directed to go on with the execution,  

nothing really survived for consideration in MCC No.7148 of  

2007.  That  was,  in  our  opinion,  not  wholly  correct.  This  

Court was only dealing with the interim order passed in MCC  

7148 of 2007 on 30th July, 2007. Even if the said order was  

set aside, the question whether the appellant was entitled to  

extension  of  time  for  making  of  the  deposit  would  have  

continued to remain relevant and had to be answered by the  

High Court on its own merits. The High Court failed to do so  

while  disposing  of  MCC No.1876  of  2007,  which  was  not  

correct.        

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14. The Trial Court was, however, correct in holding that it  

could not extend time for making the deposit as the same  

had  been  stipulated  by  the  High  Court  nor  could  the  

Executing Court go behind the decree.  Holding of an inquiry  

into  the  question  whether  the  appellant  had  made  the  

payment directly to the respondent was also correctly found  

to be unnecessary by the Trial Court, no matter this Court  

had left the conduct of such an inquiry open to the Executing  

Court. The fact of the matter was that the appellant had not  

made  the  deposit  in  the  manner  required  in  the  decree.  

Whether  or  not  the  alternative  mode  for  payment  was  

equally good, may not have called for any consideration, if  

the parties had agreed to accept the alternative mode, as a  

satisfactory compliance with the decree to give quietus to  

the controversy. Where alternative mode is not accepted as  

a satisfactory solution by the parties, as in the present case  

the only remedy left to the party required to do an act like  

making of a deposit  was to do so in accordance with the  

terms of the decree and in case there was a delay in the  

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doing of  the act,  seek extension of  time on grounds that  

would justify such extension. Since the High Court has failed  

to consider the request made by the appellant on merits we  

would have in the ordinary course remitted the matter to the  

High Court for consideration of the application afresh and for  

appropriate orders.  We, however, feel that multiple rounds  

of litigation on the subject, not only in the Courts below but  

in  this  Court  have  already  proved  expensive,  time  

consuming and cumbersome for the parties. We, therefore,  

consider it unnecessary to remit the matter back to the High  

Court only for consideration of the application for extension  

of time.  In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case,  

we  are  ourselves  inclined  to  intervene  and  pass  suitable  

orders on the subject.

15. Two aspects need to be examined on the question of  

extension  of  time.  The  first  is  whether  extension  can  be  

legally granted in a case like the one at hand where non  

making of the deposit  would result  in a civil  consequence  

like a decree of eviction against the appellant.  The second is  

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whether  in  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case,  

extension of time is justified for making of the deposit, and  

if so, on what terms.   

16. In so far as the first aspect is concerned Section 148 of  

the CPC, in our  opinion,  clearly  reserves in favour of  the  

Court the power to enlarge the time required for doing an  

act  prescribed or  allowed by the Code of  Civil  Procedure.  

Section 148 of the Code may at this stage be extracted:-

“148. Enlargement of time.

Where any period is fixed or granted by  the Court for the doing of any act prescribed  or allowed by this Code, the Court may, in its  discretion,  from time to time,  enlarge  such  period  [not  exceeding  thirty  days  in  total],  even  though  the  period  originally  fixed  or  granted may have expired.”

17. A plain reading of the above would show that when any  

period or time is granted by the Court for doing any act, the  

Court has the discretion from time to time to enlarge such  

period even if  the time originally  fixed or  granted by the  

Court has expired. It is evident from the language employed  

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in  the  provision  that  the  power  given  to  the  Court  is  

discretionary and intended to be exercised only to meet the  

ends  of  justice.  Several  decisions  of  this  Court  have  

explained  the  ambit  and scope  of  the  powers  exercisable  

under Section 148 of the CPC.  In  Mahanth Ram Das v.  

Ganga Das, 1961 (3) SCR 763, this Court observed:

“Section  148 of  the  Code,  in  terms,  allows  extension of time, even if the original period  fixed has expired, and Section 149 is equally  liberal.  A  fortiori,  those  sections  could  be  invoked by the applicant, when the time had  not  actually  expired.   That  the  application  was  filed  in  the  vacation  when  a  Division  Bench  was  not  sitting  should  have  been  considered  in  dealing  with  it  even  on  13.7.1954, when it was actually heard.  The  order, though passed after the expiry of the  time fixed  by  the  original  judgment,  would  have  operated  from  8.7.1954.   How  undesirable it is to fix time peremptorily for a  future  happening  which  leaves  the  Court  powerless  to  deal  with  events  that  might  arise in between, it is not necessary to decide  in this appeal. These orders turn out, often  enough  to  be  inexpedient.  Such  procedural  orders,  though  peremptory  (conditional  decrees apart)  are in essence,  in terrorem,  so  that  dilatory  litigants  might  put  themselves in order and avoid delay.  They  do not,  however,  completely  estop a  Court  from taking note of events and circumstances  

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which  happen  within  the  time  fixed.   For  example,  it  cannot  be  said  that,  if  the  appellant  had  started  with  the  full  money  ordered to be paid and came well in time but  set  upon  and  robbed  by  thieves  the  day  previous, he could not ask for extension of  time,  or  that  the  Court  was  powerless  to  extend it.  Such orders are not like the law of  the  Medes  and  the  Persians.   Cases  are  known in  which  Courts  have moulded their  practice to meet a situation such as this and  to have restored a suit or proceeding, even  though a final order had been passed.”

18. To  the  same  effect  is  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  

Chinnamarkathian v. Ayyavoo, 1982 (1) SCC 159, where  

this  Court  declared  that  the  scope  and  exercise  of  the  

jurisdiction to grant time to do a thing, in the absence of a  

specific  provision  to  the  contrary  curtailing,  denying  or  

withholding such jurisdiction, the jurisdiction to grant time  

would  inhere  in  its  ambit  the  jurisdiction  to  extend  time  

initially fixed by it.  The Court also called in the principle of  

equity when circumstances are to be taken into account for  

fixing a length of time within which a certain action is to be  

taken, the Court retains itself the jurisdiction to re-examine  

the  alteration  or  modification  which  may  necessitate  

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extension of time.  The following passage from the decision  

is apposite:

“It is well accepted principle statutorily  recognized in Section 148 of the Code of Civil  Procedure  that  where  a  period  is  fixed  or  granted  by  the  Court  for  doing  any  act  prescribed or allowed by the Code, the Court  may  in  its  discretion  from  time  to  time  enlarge such period even though the period  originally fixed or granted may expire.  If a  Court in exercise of the jurisdiction can grant  time  to  do  a  thing,  in  the  absence  of  a  specific  provision  to  the contrary curtailing,  denying or withholding such jurisdiction, the  jurisdiction to grant time would inhere in its  ambit the jurisdiction to extend time initially  fixed by it.  Passing a composite order would  be acting in disregard of  the jurisdiction in  that while granting time simultaneously the  Court  denies  to  itself  the  jurisdiction  to  extend time.  The principle of equity is that  when  some  circumstances  are  to  be  taken  into account for fixing a length of time within  which  a  certain  action  is  to  be  taken,  the  Court retains to itself the jurisdiction to re- examine  the  alteration  or  modification  of  circumstances  which  may  necessitate  extension of time. If the Court by its own act  denies itself the jurisdiction to do so, it would  be denying to itself the jurisdiction which in  the  absence  of  a  negative  provision,  it  undoubtedly enjoys.”

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19. Reference may also be made to the decisions of this  

Court in Jogdhayan v. Babu Ram, 1983 (1) SCC 26, Johri  

Singh v. Sukh Pal Singh, 1989 (4) SCC 403 and Ganesh  

Prasad Sah Kesari v. Lakshmi Narayan Gupta, 1985 (3)  

SCC 53.  

20. In  Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N.  v.  Union  

of India, 2005 (6) SCC 344, this Court had an occasion to  

examine whether the restriction placed by the amendment  

of Section 148 on the power of the Court to grant extension  

of time beyond 30 days was reasonable.  This Court held  

that a power that is inherent in the Court to pass orders that  

it considers necessary for meeting the ends of justice and  

preventing  abuse  of  the  process  of  the  Court  cannot  be  

taken away by putting an upper limit on the period for which  

an  extension  can  be  granted.  Extension  beyond  the  

maximum  period  of  30  days  was  accordingly  held  

permissible in the following words:

“The amendment made in Section 148  affects  the  power  of  the  Court  to  enlarge  

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time that may have been fixed or granted by  the Court for the doing of any act prescribed  or  allowed  by  the  Code.   The  amendment  provides that the period shall not exceed 30  days in total.  Before amendment, there was  no  such  restriction  of  time.   Whether  the  Court  has no inherent power to extend the  time beyond 30 days  is  the  question.   We  have no doubt that the upper limit fixed in  Section 148 cannot take away the inherent  power of the Court to pass orders as may be  necessary  for  the  ends  of  justice  or  to  prevent abuse of process of the Court. The  rigid operation of the section would lead to  absurdity.  Section 151 has, therefore, to be  allowed to operate fully.   Extension beyond  maximum of 30 days, thus, can be permitted  if the act could not be performed within 30  days for  reasons beyond the control  of  the  party.  We are not dealing with a case where  time  for  doing  an  act  has  been  prescribed  under  the  provisions  of  the  Limitation  Act  which  cannot  be  extended  either  under  Section 148 or Section 151.  We are dealing  with  a  case  where  the  time  is  fixed  or  granted by the court for performance of an  act prescribed or allowed by the court.”

21. It is not in the light of the above decisions open to the  

respondent to argue that a Court can fix time for the doing  

of an act like making of a deposit, in the instant case, but  

has no jurisdiction to extend the said period even when a  

case for such extension is clearly made out. The power to fix  

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the time for doing of an act must in our opinion carry with it  

the power to extend such period, depending upon whether  

the party in default makes out a case to the satisfaction of  

the  Court  who  has  fixed  the  time.   There  is  nothing  in  

Section 148 of the CPC or in any other provisions of the code  

to suggest that such a power of extension of time cannot be  

exercised in a case like the one at hand.  The argument that  

the power to extend time cannot be exercised where the act  

in  question  is  stipulated  in  a  conditional  decree  has  not  

impressed  us.  We  see  no  reason  to  draw  a  distinction  

depending on whether the prayer for extension is in regard  

to a conditional order or a conditional decree.  The heart of  

the matter is that where the Court has the power to fix time  

and that power is not regulated by any statutory limits, it  

has in appropriate cases the power to extend the time fixed  

by it.  It  is  common ground that  neither  the CPC nor  the  

provisions  of  M.P.  Accommodation  Control  Act  places  any  

limitation on the power of the Court in case like the one in  

hand.   

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22. Coming then to the  second aspect,  namely,  whether  

the appellant has made out a case for extension, our answer  

is in the affirmative. That the appellant had misunderstood  

the order of the High Court leading to the preparation of the  

bank draft of Rs.10,000/- in the name of the respondent and  

its dispatch under Registered AD cover to the respondent  

has not been seriously disputed before us. We are satisfied  

that  the  appellant  did  get  a  bank  draft  prepared  and  

dispatched to the address of the respondent.  This may not  

have been a strict compliance with the direction issued by  

the High Court regarding the deposit before the Trial Court  

but this certainly establishes the bonafides of the appellant,  

which  is  a  weighty  consideration  while  examining  the  

request for extension of time.  It is true that the respondent  

denied the receipt of the bank draft but that is not of much  

significance. What is important is whether the appellant has  

made out a case for extension based on what he had done in  

discharge  of  his  obligation  -  no  matter  on  an  erroneous  

understanding of the direction of the Court.  

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23.   That apart the fact that the appellant had offered to  

deposit the amount of Rs.10,000/- afresh also shows that  

there  was  no  deliberate  inaction  on  his  part  so  as  to  

disentitle him to the relief of extension of time.  

24.  In  the  totality  of  the  circumstances,  therefore,  we  

consider  it  to  be  a  fit  case  where  extension  of  time  for  

making  of  the  deposit  by  the  Trial  Court  ought  to  be  

granted.  We accordingly allow the prayer for extension of  

time to  make  the  deposit  of  Rs.10,000/-  by  eight  weeks  

from today.  The extension is, however, subject to payment  

of cost of Rs.10,000/-. We make is clear, that in case the  

appellant  deposits  a  total  sum of  Rs.20,000/-  within  two  

months  from today the suit  filed  by the respondent  shall  

stand dismissed as directed by the High Court in the appeal  

mentioned  above  failing  which  the  decree  passed  by  the  

Trial Court shall revive and be executed in accordance with  

law.  

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25. These appeals are, with the above direction, disposed  

of.

……………………………J. (AFTAB ALAM)

……………………………J. (T.S. THAKUR)

New Delhi August 18, 2010

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