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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  9610 of 2003

PETITIONER: Delhi Transport Corporation

RESPONDENT: Shyam Lal

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/08/2004

BENCH: S.N. VARIAVA & ARIJIT PASAYAT

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J

       Delhi Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the  ’employer’) calls in question legality of the judgment rendered by a Division  Bench of the Delhi High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 298/2002 filed  by the respondent (hereinafter referred to as the ’workman’).  

       Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:         The respondent-workman was found to have committed misconduct  while working as a conductor. He had collected money but had not issued  tickets as was found during a checking done by the concerned officials.  Departmental proceedings were initiated against him and he was found  guilty. A charge sheet in this regard was issued to the workman on  22.12.1988 and he submitted his reply on 30.12.1988. Subsequently on  13.1.1989 and 24.2.1989, the workman admitted his guilt and pleaded for  leniency. Basing on his admission, he was found guilty in the departmental  proceedings and removed from service.  

       A reference was made to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 32 (2)  (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the ’Act’) for approval of  the order of removal. The Tribunal did not accord approval being of the  view that the admission was really of no consequence and the officer who  had conducted enquiry had no direct evidence and the statement made by the  person who had paid the amount in question before the officer conducting  the checking was in the nature of hearsay evidence and was not of any  consequence.  Accordingly, the approval sought for was rejected. The  employer challenged the order of the Tribunal before the Delhi High Court  and a learned Single Judge by judgment dated 21.12.2001 in CWP.  No.6934/2000 and connected CMs.  held that the Tribunal’s view was not  defensible. Accordingly, the writ petition was allowed and it was directed  that approval in terms of Section 33 (2)(b) of the Act was to be granted to  the employer to dismiss the respondent-workman.  

       The workman assailed the judgment of the learned Single Judge by  filing Letters Patent Appeal. By the impugned judgment by which several  LPAs and writ petitions were disposed of, the view of the Tribunal was  restored and that of learned Single Judge was set aside.  

       Learned counsel for the employer submitted that the High Court has  fallen in grave errors by considering the present case along with other cases  which stood on different footings.  They related to unauthorized absence and

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the consequence thereof. The present case stood on entirely different factual  background and, therefore, the High Court’s judgment is not in order.

       Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-workman submitted  that the Tribunal has analysed the factual and the legal position in its proper  perspective and its refusal to accord approval cannot be termed to be  arbitrary.         We find that the Tribunal’s conclusions are prima facie not correct.  The statement made by the passenger who had paid excess money to the  checking officer is not in the nature of hearsay evidence. Additionally, the  effect of the admission regarding guilt as contained in the letters dated  13.1.1989 and 24.2.1989 have not been considered in the proper perspective.  It is a fairly settled position in law that admission is the best piece of  evidence against the person making the admission. It is, however, open to  the person making the admission to show why the admission is not to be  acted upon.  

       Be that as it may, we find that the Division Bench while dealing with  Letters Patent Appeal filed by the workman based its conclusions on other  cases which related to unauthorized absence and where the factual  background was not similar to those involved in the present case. On that  short score alone, the order of the Division Bench is to be quashed. We set  aside impugned judgment of the High Court and remit the matter back to it  for consideration of the case on its own merits in accordance with law.  We  make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the  case. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above with no order as to  costs.