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PETITIONER: D. S. REDDY

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: CHANCELLOR, OSMANIA UNIVERSITY & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/12/1966

BENCH: VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. BENCH: VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. RAO, K. SUBBA (CJ) SHAH, J.C. SIKRI, S.M. RAMASWAMI, V.

CITATION:  1967 AIR 1305            1967 SCR  (2) 214

ACT: Constitution of India, Article 14-Appellant appointed  Vice- Chancellor  under s. 12(1) of Osmania University  Act,  1959 for  5  years--Amending  Act  II of 1966  by  new  s.  13(1) reducing term of office of, Vice-chancellors to 3 years  and by new s. 12(2) providing procedure for their removal-Second Amending Act XI of 1966 introducing new s. 13A providing for appointment  of new Vice-Chancellor within 90 days in  place of appellant-Thus benefit of s. 12(2) and s. 13(1) denied to appellant-Whether classification of existing Vice-Chancellor and future appointees justified or discriminatory.

HEADNOTE: As a result of the Osmania University (Amendment) Act 11  of 1966, s.  12(1)  of the Osmania University Act,  1959,.  was amended  to  provide  for  the  appointment  of  the   Vice- Chancellor by the Chancellor alone; in  s. 12(2) a provision was introduced whereby he could only be removed  from office by  an order of the Chancellor passed on the ground of  mis- behaviour or incapacity after enquiry by a person who was or had  been a Judge of a High Court or the Supreme  Court  and after  the Vice-Chancellor had been given an opportunity  of making his representation against such removal Section 13(1) of the 1959 Act was also amended so as to reduce the term of office of the Vice-Chancellor from 5 to 3 years. The 1959 Act was again amended later in 1966 by the  Osmania University (Second Amendment) Act XI of 1966.  Section 5  of this amending Act introduced a new s. 13A into the 1959  Act whereby  it  was provided that the person then  holding  the office of Vice-Chancellor could only hold that office  until a  new  Vice-Chancellor  was appointed; and  that  such  new appointment must be made within 90 days of the  commencement of the Act whereupon the old Vice-Chancellor would cease  to hold office. The  appellant filed a writ petition claiming,  inter  alia, that s. 5 of the second amending Act introducing the new  s. 13A   was  discriminatory  as  against  him  and   therefore violative  of  Art.  14.   The  High  Court  dismissed   the petition.

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In  the  appeal to the Supreme Court, it  was  contended  on behalf  of  the respondents that as the term of  office  had been  reduced  to  3 years by the first  amending  Act,  the legislature., in order to give effect to this provision  and to  enable fresh appointments to be made under the Act,  had enacted s. 13A which had, necessarily, to apply to a  person like  the appellant who was in office at the time  when  the provisions  came into force.  Such provisions could not,  in the nature of things, apply to Vice-Chancellors who were  to be  appointed in future; the appellant was appointed from  a panel  submitted  by  a  committee  constituted  under   the unamended  s. 12(2) whereas future Vice-Chancellors were  to be  appointed  by  the Chancellor  alone;  furthermore,  the appellant  had been the Vice-Cancellor for 7 years.   Having regard to these circumstances the legislature had chosen  to treat   the  appellant  as  a  class  by  himself  and   had differentiated  him  from  persons  to  be  appointed  Vice- Chancellors in the 215 future;  that such classification was reasonable and  had  a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the second  amending Act i.e. bringing about uniformity  in  the tenure  of 3 years. of office fee all Vice-Chancellor;  that the  appellant was not entitled to the benefit of  s.  12(2) and  the legislature was competent to enact s. 13A so as  to give effect to the amended provisions as early as possible. HELD: Section  5  of  the second amending Act (XI  of  1966) introducing  s 13A into the 1959 Act was discriminatory  and therefore violative of Art. 14. [232 E]  There was no intelligible differentia on the basis of which a  classification  of Vice-Chancellors into  two  categories i.e. the appellant as the then existing Vice-Chancellor  and the future Vice-Chancellors to be appointed under the  Act,, could  be justified.  The term of office of three years  for the  Vice-Chancellor  had already been fixed  by  the  first amending  Act Therefore the differential  principal  adopted for  terminating  the appellant’s service under  s.  13A  in introduced  by  the   second amending Act  and  directed  as against the appellant alone could not be considered to  have a  rational relation to object sought to be achieved by  the second   amending  Act.  Budhan Choudhary v.  The  State  of Bihar,[1955]  1 S.C.R.1045, 1049; Ram Krishna Dalmia  v.Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar [1959]  S.CR. 279, 296; referred  to. [231 B-D] While  a  Vice-Chancellor  appointed under s.  12  could  be removed from office only by adopting the procedure under  s. 12(2), the services  of the appellant, who was also a  Vice- Chancellor and similarly situated  were sought to terminated by  enacting  s.  13A  of the  Act.   There  was  no  policy underelying the Act justifying this differential  treatment. There  was also no justification for the distinction whereby the  appellant would appointed under the Act would  continue in office for three  years [231E-G]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2313 of 1966. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated October  13, 1966 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court  in  Writ Petition No. 853 of 1966. M.C.  Setalvad.   D.  Narasaraju, Anwar Ullah  Pasha  R.  V. Pillai and M. M. Kashatriya, for the appellant. Niren  De,  Addl.   Solicitor-General,  P.  Ram  Reddy,   S. Ramachandra   Reddy   and  T.  V.R.   Tatachari,   for   the

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respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Vaidyalingam, J.    This  appeal, by special leave,  granted by this Court, is directed against the order dated  October, 13,   1966,  passed  by  the  Andhra  Pradesh  High   Court, dismissing  Writ  Petition  No 853 of  1966,  filed  by  the appellant, under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The  appellant  filed  the  said  writ  petition  under  the following  circumstances.   The  appellant  was  the   Vice- Chancellor of the Osmania University, having been appointed, as  such,  by  order dated April 30.  1964,  passed  by  the Governor of Andhra Pradesh, in 216 his  capacity  as Chancellor of the  said  University.   The appointment of the appellant, under the said order, as Vice- Chancellor, there is no controversy, was for a term of  five years  from the date of taking charge; and  the  appointment itself  was  made under sub-s. (1) of s. 12 of  the  Osmania University  Act, 1959 (Andhra Pradesh Act No. IX  of  1959). There  is,  again, no controversy that  the  appellant  took charge  as Vice-Chancellor, in terms of the said order,  on April  30,  1964 and, as such, he became  entitled  to  hold office for the full period of five years, which will  expire at the ,end of April 1969. The  Osmania University was established in 1918 and the  ad- ministration  of  the  University was  then  governed  by  a Charter  of  His Exalted Highness, the Nizam  of  Hyderabad, promulgated in 1947.  With effect from November 1, 1956, the State of Hyderabad ceased to exist, and the Telengana region of  that State became part of Andhra Pradesh.  In 1959,  the Andhra  Pradesh  Legislature passed the  Osmania  University Act, 1959, earlier referred to.  That Act itself was one  to amend  and  consolidate  the law  relating  to  the  Osmania University.   It  is only necessary to note at  this  stage, that  under s. 12(1) of the said Act, it was  provided  that the  Vice-Chancellor  shall be appointed by  the  Chancellor from  a panel of not less than three persons selected  by  a Committee,  as  constituted under sub-s. (2);  but,  if  the Chancellor does not approve any of the persons so  selected, he  may call for a fresh panel from the Committee.   Section 13,  again,  provided  for the term of  office,  salary  and allowances etc., of the Vice-Chancellor.  Under sub-s.  (1), the  term of office of the Vice-Chancellor was fixed  for  a term  of five years and there was also a further  provision to the effect that he shall be eligible for reappointment. By  s.  51 of the said Act, the Osmania  University  Revised Charter,-  of 1947 was repealed; but, nevertheless,  it  was provided  that the person holding office immediately  before the  commencement of the Act as Vice-Chancellor, was  to  be the  Vice-Chancellor on such ,commencement of the  Act,  and was  to continue to hold the said office,  in  circumstances mentioned therein. There is, again, no controversy that the appellant, who  was already  the Vice-Chancellor of the Osmania University  from 1957, was again appointed in 1959, as Vice-Chancellor for  a period  of five years under this Act; and he  was  similarly appointed  for  a further term of five years, on  April  30, 1964, as Vice-Chancellor, as mentioned earlier.  During  the middle  of  1965,  certain  amendments  were  sought  to  be introduced in the Act by providing for removal of the  Vice- Chancellor,  by  the Chancellor, from office  under  certain circumstances.  There was also a proposal to reduce the term of  office of the Vice-Chancellor from 5 years to  3  years, from  the date of his appointment, and for provisions  being made

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                           217 enabling the Government to give directions to the University relating to matters of policy to be followed by it. The amendments sought to be introduced in the Act, appear to have  come  in  for  considerable  criticism  from   several quarters, and these have been elaborately dealt with in  the order, under attack.  According to the appellant, he was one of   those  who  very  strenuously  opposed   the   proposed amendments on the ground that the autonomy of the University was  sought  to  be  interfered  with  by  the   Government. According  to the appellant, again, the  various  criticisms made  by  him and others, were taken note of by  the  Inter- University Board, by the Education Minister of the Union and others.  It is the further case of the appellant that it was felt  by  the  Government  of Andhra  Pradesh  that  he  was responsible  for the agitation that was being made,  against the  proposed  amendments.   But,  ultimately,  the   Andhra Pradesh   Legislature   passed   the   Osmania    University (Amendment) Act, 1966 (Act 11 of 1966), amending the Osmania University  Act  of 1959 in certain particulars.   The  said amendments are to the effect that the Vice-Chancellor  shall not  be  removed from office, except as provided for  in  s. 12(2) of the amended Act.  The term of office was also fixed at  3  years  under the amended s.  13.   Another  provision relating to the power of Government to give instructions  to the  University,  was  also introduced, as s.  7A;  but  the appellant continued as Vice-Chancellor. The Osmania University Act, was again amended by the Osmania University  (Second Amendment) Act, 1966 (Act XI  of  1966). Under  this amendment, s. 13A was enacted.  In  brief,  that section was to the effect that the person holding the office of  the ViceChancellor, immediately before the  commencement of the amending Act of 1966, was to hold office only until a new Vice-Chancellor was appointed under sub-s. (1) of s. 12, and  it  also provided that such appointment shall  be  made within 90 days after such commencement.  There was a further provision   that  on  the  appointment  of  such   new-Vice- Chancellor, and on his entering upon his office, the  person holding  the  office of Vice-Chancellor  immediately  before such appointment, shall cease to hold that office.   Section 7-A,  which  had  been introduced by Act  II  of  1966,  was deleted.  Section 33-A was enacted, making special provision as to the re-constitution of the Senate, Syndicate, Academic Council and Finance Committee of the University. The  appellant filed Writ Petition No. 853 of 1966,  in  the High  Court,  praying  for  the issue of  a  writ  or  order declaring s. 5 of the Osmania University (Second  Amendment) Act.  1966, which introduced s. 13A in the original Act,  as unconstitutional  and  void.   In  that  writ  petition,  he challenged  the  validity  of the new  Section,  s.  13A  on several grounds.  In brief, his plea was that by virtue 218 of  his appointment as Vice-Chancellor for 5 years on  April 30, 1964, he had acquired a vested right to hold that office for the full term and that such a vested right could not  be taken  away,  during  the currency of  the  period,  by  any legislative enactment.  The legislature had no competence to enact  the said provision inasmuch, as s. 13A could  not  be treated  as legislation in respect of University  education. The appellant had also pleaded that the provision  virtually amounted to removal of the appellant from his office without giving  him  any  opportunity to  show  cause  against  such removal.   According  to the appellant,  even  assuming  the Legislature   was  competent  to  enact  the  provision   in question, nevertheless, s. 13A is unconstitutional and void,

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inasmuch as it offends Art. 14 of the Constitution. We do not think it necessary to advert, elaborately, to  the various  other  grounds  of  attack  levelled  against   the constitutional validity of the provision in question,  which have, no doubt, been dealt with by the High Court,  because, for the purpose of disposing of this appeal, in our opinion, it is enough to refer to the grounds of attack, taken by the appellant  regarding the constitutionality of s. 13A,  based upon Art. 14 of the Constitution. So  far  as  this  aspect is  concerned,  according  to  the appellant,  s. 9 of Act 11, of 1966 amended the Act of  1959 by  incorporating new sub-ss. (1) and (2) in s.  12.   Under sub-s.  (1) of s. 12, the ViceChancellor is to be  appointed by  the Chancellor.  Under sub-s. (2),  the  Vice-Chancellor shall not be removed from his office except by  an order of the Chancellor passed on the ground of  mis- behaviour  or incapacity; and it also provided for  such  an order being passed only after due enquiry by a person who Is or has been a Judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court, as may be appointed by the Chancellor, and the  Vice-Chancellor being  given  an opportunity of  making  his  representation against   the   removal.   Therefore,  in  view   of   these provisions, the Vice-Chancellor could not be removed by  the Chancellor  without  any  cause,  without  reason,   without enquiry  and  without an opportunity being given to  him  to show cause against removal.   This provision applied to  the appellant, who was in office, on the date of the passing  of Act 11 of 1966, as well as Act XI of 1966.  Nevertheless, s. 5 of Act XI of 1966 incorporated s.13A in the principal Act. Under  that section, not only has power been,  conferred  on the Chancellor, but also a duty imposed, so to say, on  him, to  remove  the  appellant,  who  was  the  Vice-Chancellor, without  any  reason  or justification  or  even  giving  an opportunity  to him to show cause against such removal.   No enquiry, before ordering such removal, is contemplated under this  section.   Further, while a  Vice-Chancellor,  who  is appointed  after  the passing of Act XI of 1966,  cannot  be removed   from  office,  except  in  accordance   with   the provisions  of sub-s. (2) of s. 12, the appellant,  who  was already in office, could be arbitrarily and 219 illegally  removed  under s. 13A of the Act.   There  is  no provi sion, again, similar to s. 13A, applicable to a  Vice- Chancellor,  appointed  after the coming into force  of  the amending  Act.  Therefore, according to the  appellant,  the provisions  contained  in s. 13A are clearly  directed  only against him,-as he was the person holding office, prior  to the  amending  Act,  and therefore it is  a  clear  case  of hostile discrimination. Further,  according to the appellant, persons  appointed  as Vice-Chancellors, constitute a group and must be  considered as  persons  similarly  situated and they  must  be  treated alike;  whereas, by virtue of s. 13A, a  differentiation  is made between the appellant, who was a Vice-Chancellor on the date  of  the  commencement of the Amending  Act  and  other persons   who  are  to  be  appointed  as   Vice-Chancellors thereafter.    This   differentiation,  according   to   the appellant,  is  again  without any basis;  nor  has  such  a classification,  any reasonable relation to the main  object of the legislation. The  appellant also relied on s. 33A, introduced by s. 6  of Act XI of 1966 relating to the reconstitution of the Senate, Syndicate,  Academic Council and the Finance  Committee  and pleaded  that whereas those academic bodies  or  authorities were  allowed  to  continue without any  time-limit  and  to

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function until they were reconstituted, regarding the  Vice- Chancellor alone, a period of 90 days had been fixed,  under the  Amending Act, within which the Chancellor was bound  to appoint  another Vice-Chancellor.  This, again, is  a  clear proof of discrimination against the appellant. The  respondents controverted the stand taken on  behalf  of the appellant.  Apart from supporting the competency of  the Legislature  to  enact the measure, in question,  they  urge that Art. 14 of the Constitution has no application at  all. According to the respondents, inasmuch as the term of office of the Vice- Chancellor had been reduced to three years,  as per Act 11 of 1966, it was thought fit by the Legislature to provide  for  the  termination of the office  of  the  Vice- Chancellor,  who was holding that post, at the  commencement of  Act  XI of 1966, as also for the appointment  of  a  new Vice-Chancellor.  It was, under those circumstances, that s. 13A was incorporated in the Act of 1959, by s. 5 of Act,  XI of  1966.  They also referred to similar  provisions,  which were incorporated in the two enactments relating to the  two other Universities in the State, viz., the Andhra University and Sri Venkateswara University. The  respondents further pleaded that Act 11 of 1966  placed the  Vice-Chancellor, who was already appointed and who  was functioning  prior to that Act, in the first category, as  a class  apart,  from  the Vice-Chancellors  who  were  to  be subsequently  appointed and who were to function, after  the passing  of the said Amending Act, in the  second  category, both  in the matter of the mode of appointment, as  well  as the term of appointment.  The Vice-Chancellor 220 viz.,  the appellant, who was in office, on the date of  the passing  of  Act XI of 1966, according to  the  respondents, therefore  fell  into a class all by himself and,  as  such, came under a third category; and the legislature thought fit to  take into account the special features relating  to  him and,  therefore,  made  separate  provisions  regarding  the termination of his office.  Therefore, a suitable  provision was  made,  by enacting s. 13A, in respect of  the  existing Vice-Chancellor, who was treated as a class, by himself. The  respondents  also  claimed  that  the  Legislature  was entitled  to  treat  the Vice-Chancellor, who  was  then  in office,  as a class by himself and make suitable  provisions with regard to the termination of his office, and  therefore a legislation made for that purpose, and on that basis,  was constitutionally valid.  The charge of hostility towards the appellant,  or  any attempt to  effect  discrimination,  was stoutly denied by the respondents.  The respondents,  there- fore,  urged that the classification of the appellant, as  a separate  class, was proper and such a classification had  a reasonable   nexus,   with  the  object  of   the   amending legislation. The respondents further pleaded that the curtailment of  the term of office of an existing Vice-Chancellor, by a statute, enacted  by  a  competent Legislature, does  not  amount  to ’removal’  of the Vice-Chancellor for sufficient and  proved cause.  The respondents also ‘ urged that academic bodies or authorities  like  the Senate, Syndicate  and  the  Academic Council are not similarly situated like the Vice-Chancellor, either  in the matter of appointment or constitution, or  in exercising  functions under the statute; and therefore,  the appellant, according to them, was not ’entitled to place any reliance.  on s. 33A, introduced by s. 7 of Act XI of  1966. For  all  these  reasons, they urged that  Art.  14  of  the Constitution was not violated by the Legislature in enacting s. 13A.

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Before  we  refer to the findings recorded  by  the  learned Judges  of ’the High Court, this will be a convenient  stage to  refer  to  the  material  provisions  of  the  statutes, concerned.  We have already mentioned that the appellant was functioning   as   the  Vice-Chancellor   of   the   Osmania University,  even from 1957, i.e., even before  the  Osmania University  Act, 1959, was passed.  We have  also  indicated that the administration of the University was then  governed by  a Charter promulgated in 1947.  The  Osmania  University Act,  1959 (Act IX of 1959), (hereinafter called  the  Act), was  passed  in 1959 and published in the State  Gazette  on February  2, 1959.  Section 3 of the Act provided  that  the University,  established by the Revised Charter  promulgated by  H.E.H. the Nizam of Hyderabad, on December 8, 1947,  and functioning at Hyderabad immediately before the commencement of the Act, be reconstituted and declared to be a University by the name of ’Osmania University’.  The said section  also provided that the University would be a                             221 residential, teaching and affiliating University  consisting of  a  Chancellor, a Pro-Chancellor,  a  Vice-Chancellor,  a Senate, a Syndicate and an Academic Council.  Section  12(1)  provided for the appointment of  the  Vice- Chancellor, by the Chancellor, from a panel of not less than three persons selected by a committee, as constituted  under sub-s.  (2) thereof But, if the Chancellor did  not  approve any  of the persons so selected, he could call for  a  fresh panel from the committee.  Sub-section (2)   provided    for the constitution of the committee. Section   13  provided  for  the  term  of  office   salary, allowances etc., of the Vice-Chancellor.  Under sub-s.  (1), the Vice-Chancellor was to hold office for a term of 5 years and he was eligible for reappointment.  There was a  proviso to the effect that the ViceChancellor shall continue to hold office  after the expiry of his term of appointment,  for  a period  not exceeding six months, or until Ms  successor  is appointed and enters upon his office, whichever is  earlier. Sub-s.  (6) provided for the filling up of the  vacancy,  in the  post of the Vice-Chancellor, when it  fell  permanently vacant;  and a Vice-Chancellor so appointed as  per  sub-ss. (1) and (2) of s. 12, was to hold office for a full term  of 5 years. Section  51  (I)  repealed the  Osmania  University  Revised Charter, 1947; but sub-s. (2) provided that  notwithstanding such  repeal, the person holding office  immediately  before the  commencement of the Act, as Vice-Chancellor, shall,  on such commencement, be the Vice-Chancellor of the University, and  he was entitled to hold office until a  Vice-Chancellor is appointed in accordance with the Act. It  will be noticed, by the above reference to the  material provisions  of  the  Act, that there was  no  provision  for removal  of a ViceChancellor; and that the appointment of  a Vice-Chancellor was to be by the Chancellor, as provided for in  s. 12.  The term of office of the Vice-Chancellor was  5 years and he was eligible for reappointment.  The appellant, who  was  already a Vice-Chancellor, functioning  under  the Charter of 1947, was entitled to continue, and did continue, as  the Vice-Chancellor, by virtue of s. 51 of the Act.   He was  also,  as already mentioned,  originally  appointed  as ViceChancellor  for  a period of 5 years under the  Act,  in 1959. The  Act was amended in certain particulars by  the  Osmania University   (Amendment)   Act,  1966  (Act  II   of   1966) (hereinafter  called  the First Amendment Act).   The  First Amendment Act received the assent of the Governor on January

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29, 1966.  Section 6 of the First Amendment Act,  introduced s. 7A, which we set out 222                "7A.   Instructions  by  the  Government.-The               Government  may, after consultation  with  the               University,    give   to    the    University,               instructions  relating  to  matters  of  major               educational   policy   such  as   pattern   of               University  education, medium  of  instruction               and establishment of post-graduate centres, to               be followed by it.                (2)  In  the  exercise  of  its  powers   and               performance  of its functions under this  Act,               the   University   shall   comply   with   the               instructions issued under sub-section (1)."                Similarly, s. 9 incorporated new sub-ss.  (1)               and (2) in s. 12 of the Act, as follows                12.  (1)   The   Vice-Chancellor   shall   be               appointed by the Chancellor.                (2)  The Vice-Chancellor shall not be removed               from  his  office except by an  order  of  the               Chancellor    passed   on   the   ground    of               misbehaviour  or  incapacity  and  after   due               inquiry  by such person who is or has  been  a               Judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court  as               may  be appointed by the Chancellor, in  which               the Vice-Chancellor shall have an  opportunity               of  making  his  representation  against  such               removal." Section  10, while effecting certain other amendments to  s. 13. the Act, incorporated a new sub-s. (1), as follows :                "13.  (1) Subject to the provisions  of  sub-               section (2) of section 12, the Vice-Chancellor               shall  hold office for a term of  three  years               from the date of his appointment and shall  be               eligible for re-appointment to that office for               another term of three years only;                Provided   that  the  Vice-Chancellor   shall               continue  to hold office after the  expiry  of               his  term  of  appointment for  a  period  not               exceeding six months or until his successor is               appointed   and   enters  upon   his   office,               whichever is earlier." It  was this Amendment Act, when it was in the  Bill  stage, that  appears  to have been severely criticised  by  various authorities   on  the  ground  that  the  autonomy  of   the University   was  sought  to  be  interfered  with  by   the Government.  In that connection, the appellant also  appears to  have made several statements criticising the  provisions sought to be incorporated in the Act.  It is also on  record that   counter-statements  were  made  on  behalf   of   the Government  meeting these criticisms regarding the  proposed amendments.   They  have been dealt with by the  High  Court rather elaborately; but, we do not propose to go into  those matters, for the purpose of this appeal. 223 By virtue of the amendments effected and referred to  above, it  will  be  seen  that the term of  office  of  the  Vice- Chancellor  has been reduced from 5 years to 3  years.   The manner  of appointment of the Vice-Chancellor has also  been changed  and  a provision is contained for  removal  of  the Vice-Chancellor  from his office, but that can be done  only in  accordance with the provisions contained in s. 12(2)  of the  Act.  Section 7A gives power to the Government to  give instructions to the University relating to matters of  major

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educational  policy;  and  it  is  made  obligatory  on  the University  to comply with such instructions issued  by  the Government. As we have already stated, the appellant was again appointed as  Vice-Chancellor  for a period of 5 years  on  April  30, 1964;  and  he  was  continuing in  office  when  the  First Amendment Act was passed.  One of the claims that is made by the appellant, in these proceedings, is that he is  entitled to the protection conferred by s. 12(2) of the Act  referred to above.  There does not appear to be any controversy  that any  appointment  of a Vice-Chancellor was made,  after  the passing of the First Amendment Act . The  Act  was  further amended  by  the  Osmania  University (Second  Amendment)  Act,  1966  (Act XI  of  1966)  (to  be referred  to as the Second Amendment Act).  It received  the assent  of the Governor on May 16, 1966.  Section 2  of  the Second  Amendment Act, omitted s. 7A of the Act.  Section  5 of the Second Amendment Act, which introduced new s. 13A  in the  Act,  and which provision is the subject of  attack  in these proceedings, is as follows :                "13A.    Special   provision   as   to    the               appointment   of   a   new   Vice-Chancellor.-               Notwithstanding  anything  in  this  Act,  the               person   holding  the  office  of  the   Vice-               Chancellor immediately before the commencement               of  the Osmania University (Second  Amendment)               Act, 1966, shall continue to hold that  office               only until a new Vice-Chancellor is  appointed               by  the  Chancellor under sub-section  (1)  of               section  12  and enters upon his  office;  and               such  appointment shall be made within  ninety               days   after   such  commencement.    On   the               appointment  of such new Vice-Chancellor,  and               on  his entering upon his office,  the  person               holding  the  office  of  the  Vice-Chancellor               immediately  before  such  appointment   shall               cease to hold that office." Again,  s. 6 of the Second Amendment Act.,  incorporated  s. 33A in the Act, which is as follows :                "33A.    Special   provision   as   to    the               reconstitution       of      the       Senate,               Syndicate, .Academic Council and Finance  Com-               mittee.  Notwithstanding anything in this Act,               the members of the Senate, the Syndicate,  the               Academic  Council  and the  Finance  Committee               constituted and functioning 224                before   the  commencement  of  the   Osmania               University   (Amendment)  Act,   1966,   shall               continue to be such members and function  only               until   a  new  Senate,  Syndicate,   Academic               Council or Finance Committee, as the case  may               be,  is reconstituted under this Act.  On  the               reconstitution of such new Senate,  Syndicate,               Academic  Council  or Finance  Committee,  the               members  of  the Senate other  than  the  life               members thereof, the members of the Syndicate,               Academic Council or Finance Committee, as  the               case may be, holding office immediately before               such reconstitution, shall cease to hold  that               office." Even  according to the respondents, s. 13A was  incorporated for the purpose of terminating the services of the appellant as Vice-Chancellor, so as to enable the Chancellor to make a fresh appointment of a Vice-Chancellor.  We have referred to

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s. 33A of the Act, because the appellant’s case was also  to the  effect  that  with regard  to  the  Senate,  Syndicate, Academic  Council etc., there is no provision similar to  s. 13A of the Act, though they are also similarly situated like him. The  findings of the learned Judges of the.  High Court  may now be briefly summarised :-                1.   The   Andhra  Pradesh  Legislature   was               competent   to  enact  s.  5  of  the   Second               Amendment  Act.   The said  section  does  not               contravene art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.                2.   The appellant was holding the office  of               the  ViceChancellor  when the  Act  came  into               force and continued under S. 51(2) thereof  as               Vice-Chancellor until the Chancellor passed an               order, in 1959 appointing him once again               under the Act.                3.   Section  13(1),  as  introduced  by  the               First Amendment Act, is not retrospective  and               the  right  of the appellant  to  continue  as               Vice-Chancellor  for the full term of 5  years               stood unaffected and the new S. 13(1) does not               apply to him.                4.   The  new S. 12(2), as introduced by  the               First Amendment Act, is not applicable to  the               appellant.                5.   Sections  12(2) and 13A of the  Act,  do               not  cover  the  same  field.   Section  12(2)               provides for removal by way of punishment  and               its  operation  is on a different  field  from               that  of s. 13A where the cessation of  office               is due to a curtailment of the term.   Section               12(2)   applies  only  to  the  future   Vice-               Chancellors and S. 13A is solely applicable to               the existing Vice-Chancellor, the appellant.                             225               .lm0 Regarding  the attack on s. 13A, on the basis of Art. 14  of the    Constitution   that   there   is   an    unreasonable discrimination, the learned Judges were of the view that the said  section did not suffer from any such  infirmity.   The learned  Judges  held  that  the  impugned  legislation  had resulted   in   classifying   Vice-Chancellors   under   two categories,  (a)  the  appellant,  as  the  existing   Vice- Chancellor, falling under the first category; and (b) future Vice-Chancellor,  to be appointed under the Act,  who  falls under the second category.  According to the High Court, the object  sought  to be achieved by  such  classification,  as could  be  seen from the objects and reasons of  the  Second Amendment Act, 1966, was to give effect to the reduced  term               of  3  years fixed under s. 13(1) of  the  Act                             after  the  First Amendment.   The  Hi gh  Court               further  held that the classification  adopted               by  s. 13A, of putting the appellant,  as  the               existing   ViceChancellor,  in  a   class   by               himself,   is  founded  on   an   intelligible               differentia, which distinguishes the appellant               from  future  ViceChancellors, and  that  this               differentia  has  a rational relation  to  the               object  sought  to be achieved by  the  Second               Amendment   Act.   In  this  connection,   the               learned  Judges  also advert  to  the  similar               provisions enacted, at about the same time, in               the  Andhra University Act, 1925, and the  Sri

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             Venkateswara University Act, 1954. The High Court is also of the view that the Legislature must have  taken  into account the fact that  the  appellant  has already  put  in  more  than 6 years  of  service  as  Vice- Chancellor,  for  treating  him as a class  by  himself,  as distinct  from  future  Vice-Chancellors,  who  are  to   be appointed and, as such, have not put in any service at  all. The learned Judges have, no doubt, adverted to the fact that the  appellant  has  got an  eventful  record  of  efficient service,  full  of  recognition and  appreciation,  but  the appellant cannot plead those circumstances when a  competent legislature  has passed a valid legislative  measure,  under which he has to lose his office. Ultimately,  on these findings, the High Court came  to  the conclusion   that  s.  5  of  the  Second   Amendment   Act, introducing  s.  13A  in the Act, is  not  vitiated  by  any infirmity,  as  alleged  by  the  appellant,  and,  finally, dismissed the appellant’s writ petition. The  appellant  has  again raised, no  doubt,  most  of  the contentions that were taken before the High Court.  But  the main  ground of attack that has been pressed before  us,  by learned  counsel  for the appellant, is the one  based  upon Art. 14 of the Constitution.  The findings recorded, and the views  expressed,  by  the  High  Court  are  sought  to  be sustained  by  the  learned  Additional   Solicitor-General, appearing  for  the respondents.  But, we do  not  think  it necessary  to go into the larger controversy that  has  been raised by the appellant, before the High Court, in the  view that we take, that the appellant must succeed in respect  of the attack levelled against the impugned 226 provision,  based upon Art. 14 of the Constitution.   As  to whether  the  criticism, made by the  appellant,  about  the proposals  to amend the Act, was or-was not responsible  for the passing of the legislation in question, does not  assume much  of  an  importance; because, the  simple  question  is whether  the provision, s. 13A, as it now stands n the  Act, is violative, in any manner, of Art. 14 of the Constitution. If  the  answer is ’yes’, it is needless to state  that  the provision  will have to be struck down.  Therefore,  we  are confining  our attention only to the provisions of  the  Act and we will refer to any other circumstance that is  brought to  our notice only for the limited purpose  of  considering the   grounds   of  attack  based  upon  Art.  14   of   the Constitution. According to Mr. Setalvad, the appellant is entitled to take advantage of the provisions of s. 12(2) of the Act.  On  the date  of  the  passing  of  the  First  Amendment  Act,  the appellant was, admittedly, a Vice-Chancellor and he had been continuing  as such.  He cannot be removed from his  office, except in accordance with the provisions of s. 12(2) of  the Act.   But, in view of s. 13A of the Act, introduced by  the Second  Amendment  Act, the appellant is forced out  of  his office,  within 90 days of the passing of the Second  Amend- ment Act.  The creation of two classes of  Vice-Chancellors, viz.,  Of Vice-Chancellors appointed under the Act  and  the Vice-Chancellor who was in office at the commencement of the Second  Amendment Act, is not on any rational basis.  Person               is appointed as ViceChancellors, constitute  a               group, and the impugned provision makes  a differentiation between the person who is  a  Vice- Chancellor  then and other persons who are to  be  appointed Vice-Chancellors  thereafter,  for  which   differentiation, there  is absolutely no basis.  Further, even if it  can  be stated that there is any basis for the said  classification,

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nevertheless  there should be a nexus or connection  between the  basis  of  the classification and  the  object  of  the legislation, which again, is lacking in this case. Mr.  Setalvad  further urged that while the  services  of  a ViceChancellor, appointed under the Act, could be terminated only in accordance with the provisions contained in s. 12(2) of  the  Act, the appellant’s services could  be  terminated under s. 13A, without adopting the procedure laid down in s. 12(2)  of the Act.  There was also no provision in the  Act, Mr.  Setalvad  pointed out, making s.  13(2)  applicable  to Vice-Chancellors to be appointed in future.  Though the term of  office  for a Vice-Chancellor has been fixed  under  the Act, even after the amendments, as three years, and that may apply  to all the Vice-Chancellors, so far as the  appellant is concerned, his term has been reduced or restricted to  90 days under s.  13A of the Act. Mr. Setalvad again urges that even assuming that it is  open to  the  Legislature,  in  an  appropriate  case,  to   make provisions applicable 227 to   only  one  individual  or  a  group   of   individuals, nevertheless,  it is well-established, by this  Court,  that the classification that is effected ,by the statute must  be a classification founded on an intelligible differentia  and that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought  to be achieved by the statute.  Applying  these  two tests, learned counsel urges, that the impugned  legislation must  be.  considered  to be violative of  Art.  14  of  the Constitution. The learned Additional Solicitor-General has urged that the, term  of office of the Vice-Chancellor has been  reduced  to three;  years by the First Amendment Act.  The  Legislature, in  order  to give effect to this provision  and  to  enable fresh appointments to be made under the Act, has enacted  s. 13A.   That  section  has, necessarily,  to  apply  only  to persons  like the appellant who are holding. office  at  the time  when  these  provisions  came  into  force.   Such   a provision,  in the nature of things, cannot apply  to  Vice- Chancellors who are to be appointed in future under the Act. Therefore  it is wrong to state that all  Vice-Chancellors,. irrespective  of  the manner’ or mode under which  they  are appointed,  in  present or in future, fall  under  the  same category.  Further, the appellant has been a Vice-Chancellor for nearly 7 years.  The legislature, the learned  Solicitor points out, having regard to these circumstances, has chosen to  treat the appellant, the Vice-Chancellor holding  office on  the  date  of the Second Amendment Act, as  a  class  by himself  and  has  differentiated him  from  persons  to  be appointed  ViceChancellor  for  the  first  time.   Such   a classification,  is  reasonable and it has  got  a  rational relation  to the object sought to be achieved by the  Second Amendment Act, viz., bringing about uniformity in the tenure of  three  years of office for  all  Vice-Chancellors.   The learned  Solicitor points out further that the appellant  is not  entitled  to the benefit of s. 12(2) of the  Act.   The Legislature  was competent to enact the Measure in  question and the object of the Legislature was to give effect to  the amendment provisions as early as. possible.  He pointed  out that  similar  provisions  were  also  made  in  two   other enactments  at  about  the same time, viz.,  in  the  Andhra University  Act, 1925, and the Sri  Venkateswara  University Act,  1954.   It  may be that  the  Legislature  could  have adopted  another  method  for replacing  the  present  Vice- Chancellor, but that is a matter of policy, which cannot  be reviewed  by the Courts, so long as the Legislature had  the

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competence  to  enact  the measure and  the  provisions,  so enacted, do not suffer from any other legal infirmities. We  have given due consideration to the various  contentions placed  before us by Mr. Setalvad, learned  counsel,for  the appellant, and the learned Additional Solicitor-General,  on behalf of the respondents; but we are not inclined to  agree with  the contentions of the learned  Additional  Solicitor- General. 228 The  principles to be borne in mind, when a  question  arise under  Art. 14 of the Constitution, have been laid  down  in several ,decisions, by this Court,on a number of  occasions. In  Budhan  Choudhry  v.  The State  of  Bihar(1),  Das  J., speaking for the Court said :                "It   is  now  well-established  that   while               article 14 forbids class ’legislation, it does               not  forbid reasonable classification for  the               purposes  of legislation.  In order,  however,               to pass the test of permissible classification               two conditions must be fulfilled, namely,  (i)               that the, classification must be founded on an               intelligible  differentia which  distinguishes               persons  or things that are  grouped  together               from  others  left out of the group  and  (ii)               that  that  differentia must have  a  rational               relation  to the object sought to be  achieved               by the statute in question." Therefore,  it  will  be  seen that in  order  to  accept  a classification  as permissible and not hit by Art.  14,  the measure  in  question will have to pass the two  tests  laid down  in  the above decision.  The  observations,  extracted above, have been quoted by Das C. J., in .Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar(2).  It is no doubt true, as pointed out by the learned Additional SolicitorGeneral, that a  statute may direct its provisions against one  individual person  or thing, or against several individual  persons  or things.   But,  before such a provision can be  accepted  as valid,  the  Court  must  be  satisfied  that  there  is   a reasonable basis of classification which appears on the face of the statute itself, or is deducible from the  surrounding circumstances  or matters of common knowledge.  If  no  such reasonable  basis of classification appears on the  face  of the   statute,   or  is  deducible  from   the   surrounding circumstances,  the  law will have to be struck down  as  an instance of naked discrimination. It  should  also  be borne in mind that there  is  always  a presumption  in  favour  of  the  constitutionality  of   an enactment  and the burden is upon the party who attacks  the same  as  unconstitutional, to ,Show that there is  a  clear transgression  of  the constitutional  principles;  but,  as observed by Das C.J., in Ram Krishna Dalmia’s case(2), at p. 297,                "while  good  faith  and  knowledge  of   the               existing   conditions   on  the  part   of   a               legislature  are to be presumed, if  there  is               nothing  on  the  face  of  the  law  or   the               surrounding   circumstances  brought  to   the               notice    of   the   court   on   which    the               classification  may reasonably be regarded  as               based,  the presumption  of  constitutionality               cannot be carried (1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1045,1049. (2) [1959] S.C.R 279, 296. 229                to  the extent of always holding  that  there

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             must  be some undisclosed and unknown  reasons               for   subjecting   certain   individuals    or               corporations  to  hostile  or   discriminating               legislation." Having  due regard to the principles referred to  above,  we now proceed to consider as to whether the appellant has been able  to  establish that s. 5 of the Second  Amendment  Act, introducing  s.13A  in the Act, is  discriminatory  and,  as such, violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. We  have  already stated that the appellant  was  appointed, under  the  Act,  for a further term of 5  years,  as  Vice- Chancellor,  on  April 30, 1964, and he  was  continuing  in office, as such, at the time when the two Amending Acts were passed; and, normally,. he, would be entitled to continue in that  post for the full term, which will expire only at  the end of April 1969.  The First Amendment Act provided, in  s. 12  of the Act, that the Vice-Chancellor is to be  appointed by  the Chancellor; but s. 12(2) specifically provided  that the  Vice-Chancellor  shall not be removed from  his  office-excep t  by an order of the Chancellor passed on the  ground of misbehaviour or incapacity and, after due inquiry by such person  who is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court or  the Supreme  Court, as may be appointed by the  Chancellor.   It was  also  provided that the ViceChancellor was to  have  an opportunity  of  making  his  representation  against   such removal.   Prima facie; the provisions contained  in  sub-s. (2)  of  s. 12, must also apply to the  appellant,  who  did continue  in  office  even after the passing  of  the  First Amendment  Act.   No doubt the term of office of  the  Vice- Chancellor  was fixed at 3 years under S. 13(1) of the  Act. But  no  provisions, were made in the  First  Amendment  Act regarding  the  termination of the tenure of office  of  the Vice-Chancellor who was then holding that post. There can be no controversy that s. 13A, introduced by s.  5 of the Second Amendment Act, deals only with the  appellant. In fact, the stand taken on behalf of the respondents in the counteraffidavit  filed  before the High Court, was  to  the effect  that the Legislature had chosen to treat  the  Vice- Chancellor holding office at the time of the commencement of the  Second Amendment Act, as a class by himself and with  a view to enable the Chancellor to make fresh appointments, s. 13A of the Act was enacted. Therefore,  it  is  clear that s. 13A applies  only  to  the appellant.  Though, no doubt, it has been stated, on  behalf of   the  respondents,,,,  that  similar   provisions   were incorporated,  at  about the same time, in two  other  Acts, relating  to  two  other  Universities,  viz.,  the   Andhra University  and the Sri Venkateswara University, and  though this  circumstance has also been taken into account  by  the learned  Judges  of the High Court, in  our  opinion,  those provisions 230 have  no bearing in considering the attack levelled  by  the appellant on s. 13A of the Act. This  is a clear case where the statute itself  directs  its provisions by enacting s. 13A, against one individual, viz., the appellant; and before it can be sustained as valid, this Court must be satisfied that there is a reasonable basis for grouping  the appellant as a class by himself and that  such reasonable basis must appear either in the statute itself or must  be  deducible  from  other  surrounding  circumstances According  to learned counsel for the appellant,  all  Vice- Chancellors  of the Osmania University come under one  group and  can  be  classified  only as  one  unit  and  there  is absolutely no justification for grouping the appellant under

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one class and the Vice-Chancellors to be appointed in future under a separate class.  In any event, it is also urged that the  said  classification has no relation or  nexus  to  the object of the enactment. Our attention has been drawn to the Statement of Objects and Reasons to the Second Amendment Bill, the material  part of which is as follows                "The  term of office of  the  Vice-Chancellor               has been reduced to three years under  section               13(1) of the Osmania University Act as amended               by  section  10  of  the  Osmania   University               (Amendment) Act, 1966.                Section  13-A,  proposed to  be  inserted  by               clause   5   of   the   Bill,   enjoins   that               notwithstanding  anything  in  the  Act,   the               person   holding  the  office  of  the   Vice-               Chancellor immediately before the commencement               of  the Osmania University (Second  Amendment)               Act,  1966 shall continue to hold that  office               only until a new Vice-Chancellor is  appointed               by  the  Chancellor  under  section  12(1)  as               amended  and enters upon his office, and  such               appointment  shall be made within ninety  days               after such commencement." We  are inclined to accept the contention of  Mr.  Setalvad, that there is no justification for the impugned  legislation resulting  in a classification of the Vice-Chancellors  into two  categories,  viz., the appellant as the  then  existing Vice-Chancellor  and  the future Vice.   Chancellors  to  be appointed under the Act. In our view, the Vice-Chancellor, who is appointed under the Act, or the Vice-Chancellor who was holding that post on the date ,of the commencement of the Second Amendment Act,  form one   single  group  or  class.   Even  assuming  that   the classification of these two types of persons as coming under two  different  groups  can  be  made  nevertheless,  it  is essential  that such a classification must be founded on  an intelligible differentia which distinguishes the appel-                             231 lant from the Vice-Chancellor appointed under the Act. .  We are  not able to find any such intelligible  differentia  on the basis of which the classification can be justified. It is also essential that the classification or  differentia effected by the statute must have a rational relation to the object  sought to be achieved by the statute.  We have  gone through  the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the  Second Amendment  Bill,  which  became law later, as  well  as  the entire  Act itself, as it now stands.  In the  Statement  of Objects and Reasons for the Second Amendment Bill, extracted above,  it is seen that except stating a fact that the  term of office of the Vice-Chancellor has been reduced to 3 years under s. 13(1) and that s.13A was intended to be enacted, no other   policy   his  indicated  which  will   justify   the differentiation.   The term of office fixing the  period  of three  years  for  the  Vice-Chancellor,  has  been  already effected  by  the First Amendment Act  and,  therefore,  the differential principle adopted for terminating the  services of  the  appellant by enacting s. 13A of the Act, cannot  be considered to be justified.  In other words, the differentia adopted in s. 13A and directed as against the  appellant-and the  appellant  alone not be considered to have  a  rational relation  to the object sought to be achieved by the  Second Amendment Act. While a Vice-Chancellor appointed under s. 12 of the Act can be removed from office only by adopting the procedure  under

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s.  12(2),  the services of the appellant, who  was  also  a Vice.   Chancellor and similarly situated, is sought  to  be terminated by enacting s. 13A of the Act.  We do not see any policy  underlying  the  Act  justifying  this  differential treatment accorded to the appellant.  The term of office  of the  Vice-Chancellors  has been no doubt reduced  under  the First Amendment Act and fixed for 3 years for all the  Vice- Chancellors.  But, so far as the appellant is concerned,  by virtue  of s. 13A of the Act, he can continue to  hold  that office only until a new Vice-Chancellor is appointed by  the Chancellor,  and  that appointment is to be made  within  90 days.  While all other Vice-Chancellors, appointed under the Act,  can  continue to be in office for a  period  of  three years,  the appellant is literally forced out of his  office on  the expiry of 90 days from the date of  commencement  of the Second Amendment Act.  There is also no provision in the statute providing for the termination of the services of the ViceChancellors,  who  are appointed under the Act,  in  the manner  provided  under s. 13A of the Act.  By s.  13A,  the appellant is even denied the benefits which may be available under  the proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 13 of the Act,  which benefit is available to all other ViceChancellors. The appointment of the appellant in 1959 and, again in 1964, under  s.  12(1) of the Act, as it stood prior  to  the  two amendments,  by  the Chancellor, must have been,  no  doubt, from a panel of 232 names  submitted by a committee constituted under s.  12(2). The  appointment of a Vice-Chancellor after the  passing  of the  First Amendment Act, is to be made exclusively  by  the Chancellor under s. 12(1), as the section now stands.   That is  a  circumstance,  relied  on  by  the  respondent,   for differentiating the appellant as an existing Vice-Chancellor from  a  Vice-Chancellor to be appointed under the  Act,  as amended.   Another  circumstance  relied  on  is  that   the appellant  has been a Vice-Chancellor for 7 years.   In  our opinion,  these are not such vital or crucial factors  which will  justify treating the appellant as a class by  himself, because   the  powers  and  duties  of  a              Vice- Chancellor, either under ’the Act, prior to the amendment, or under the Act, after amendment, continue to be the  same. To conclude, the classification of the appellant, as a class by himself, is not founded on any intelligible  differentia, which  distinguishes him from other Vice-Chancellors and  it has  no rational relation to the object of the statute,  and so s. 13A is hit by Art. 14. The  appellant  has  attacked  s.  13A,  as  discriminatory, relying  upon a different provision, made under s.  33A,  in respect  of the Senate, Syndicate, Academic Council and  the Finance  Committee.   We have, however, not  considered  the question  as  to  whether the appellant can  be  treated  as falling  under  the  same class, as  the  other  authorities mentioned  in  s. 33A, as we have accepted  the  appellant’s contention, based upon Art. 14, on other grounds. For  the  above reasons, we accept the  contentions  of  the learned counsel for the appellant, and hold that s. 5 of the Second Amendment Act (Act XI of 1966), introducing s. 13A in the  Act, is discriminatory and violative of Art. 14 of  the Constitution  and,  as  such,  has  to  be  struck  down  as unconstitutional.  The result is that the appeal is allowed, and  the  appellant  will be entitled to his  costs  in  the appeal,  payable  by the respondents, here and in  the  High Court. R.K.P.S.                   Appeal allowed. M19Sup.  C.I./66-2,500-18-7-67-GIPF.

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