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PETITIONER: D.   S. GAREWAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/12/1958

BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ) DAS, S.K. GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. HIDAYATULLAH, M.

CITATION:  1959 AIR  512            1959 SCR  Supl. (1) 792  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1967 SC 212  (26)  R          1968 SC 754  (20)  RF         1970 SC 150  (11)  RF         1973 SC1461  (450,566)  RF         1975 SC 446  (6)  R          1982 SC1126  (9,11)  R          1983 SC 937  (32)  F          1985 SC 421  (26)

ACT:        All-India  Services-Act  passed by  provisional  Parliament-        Constitutional  validity-Presidents’  power  of  adaptation-        Parliament,  if  authorised  to delegate  power  to  Central        Government-Rules,   validity  of-Institution   of   enquiry-        Competence  of the State Government All-India  Services  Act        (LXI of 1951), ss. 3, 4-- All India Services (Discipline and        Appeal) Rules, r.5 --Constitution of India, Arts. 312, 392.

HEADNOTE: The  point for determination in this appeal was whether  the All  India  Services  Act, (LXI of  1951),  enacted  by  the provisional   Parliament,  was  a   constitutionally   valid legislation.   As  there  was  only  one  House  during  the transitional period, the President in exercise of his powers under  Art. 392 of the Constitution passed the  Constitution (Removal of Difficulties) Order No. II, on January 26, 1950, and  made,  amongst  others, an adaptation  of  Art.  312(1) omitting  the following therefrom,-" XXX if the  Council  of States has declared by resolution supported by not less than two-thirds  of  the members present and voting  that  it  is necessary or expedient in the national interest to do so XXX ".  The  appellant, who was appointed to the  Indian  Police Service  in 1949, held the post of Superintendent of  Police in  the  Punjab in 1957 when he was  reverted  as  Assistant Superintendent  of  Police  and  informed  that  action  was proposed to be taken against him under r. 5 of the All India Services  (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955, framed  under s. 3 Of the All India Services Act, (LXI of 1951).  He  was, thereafter,  placed  under  suspension and  an  Officer  was

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directed  to  hold a departmental enquiry against  him.   On receipt  of  notice of the said enquiry, he moved  the  High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution and challenged  the constitutional  validity of the Act and the legality of  the enquiry.   The  High Court held against him and  hence  this appeal.   It was contended on behalf of the  appellant,  (1) that the President had exceeded his power under Art. 392  in amending  Art.  312  in  the  way  he  did;  (2)  that   the provisional Parliament was incompetent to enact the impugned Act as there was no compliance with the condition  precedent to  such  an Act being passed under Art. 312; (3)  that  the Rules were repugnant to Art. 312 as they were made at a time when  the  adaptation was no longer in force; (4)  that  the Parliament  had no authority to delegate its function  under Art. 312 to the Central Government (5) that, at any rate, S. 3  Of the Act was vitiated by excessive delegation  and  (6) that the Punjab Government had no authority under the  Rules to institute the proceedings.                                793 Held,  that the contentions were all without  substance  and must be rejected. The  power  given to the President by Art. 392 Of  the  Con- stitution was wide enough to enable him to make any  adapta- tion  by  way  of  modification,  addition  or  omission  he considered   necessary  or  expedient  with  respect  to   a particular  Article and if he did so in one way and not  the other, it could not be said that he had exceeded his  power. As  the adaptation of Art. 312 by omission of the  condition precedent was thus valid, no question of any compliance with it  could  arise and the provisional  Parliament  was  quite competent, to pass the impugned Act. Sankari  Prasad  Singh Deo v. Union of India  and  State  of Bihar, [1952] S.C.R. 89, held inapplicable. The reappearance of the omitted part of Art. 312 before  the framing  of  the Rules by the Central Government  under  the Act,  could  in no way affect their validity since  the  Act itself  was  valid  and a permanent measure  and  the  Rules derived their force from the Act. It  was well settled that the Legislature was  competent  to delegate  to other authorities the power to frame  rules  to carry  out  the  purposes  of the  law  made  by  it.   Such delegation  could  also be made to  an  executive  authority within certain limits. Re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912, [1951] S.C.R. 747 and Rajnarain Singh  v.  The  Chairman,  Patna  Administration  Committee, Patna, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 290, relied on. Use of such expressions as " Parliament may by law provide " or " Parliament may by law confer " by the Constitution  did not  necessarily mean that delegation was  wholly  excluded. It would be a matter for determination in each case  whether the intention was that the entire provisions were to be made by law without recourse to any rules framed under the  power of   delegation.    The  numerous  and   varied   provisions contemplated  by  Art. 312 made it impossible to  hold  that they  were  all intended to be enacted as  statute  law  and nothing  was to be delegated to the  executive  authorities. It  was not correct to suggest that the Article laid down  a mandate prohibiting Parliament from delegating authority  to the  Central Government to frame rules for  the  recruitment and conditions of All-India Services. Nor  was there any substance in the contention that S. 3  Of the  Act was vitiated by excessive delegation of  power  and the  Act did not lay down any policy.  Section 4 of the  Act read  with  s.  3(2) Of the Act showed  that  there  was  no delegation of power to the Central Government under s.  3(1)

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Of  the Act in excess of what was justified by  the  special circumstances of the case. There  was  no  basis for the contention  that  the  Central Government and not the Punjab Government could institute the enquiry.  Rule 5 Of the Rules showed that the enquiry was to be initiated in all cases by the Government under which  the 100 794 Officer   concerned  served,  although  the  punishment   as required by Rule 4(1) might have to be ultimately imposed by the Central Government.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE, JURISDICTiON: Civil Appeal No. 426 of 1958. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated July  30,  1958,  of the Punjab High  Court  in  Civil  Writ Application No. 732 of 1958. N.C. Chatterjee, I. M. Lal and B. P. Maheshwari, for  the appellant. S.M.  Sikri, Advocate-General for the State,  of  Punjab, Mohinder  Singh Pannum, Additional Advocate-General for  the State of Punjab and D. Gupta, for respondent No. 1. B. Sen and T. M. Sen, for the Intervener. 1958.  December 11.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by WANCHOO, J.-This appeal by special leave raises the question of the constitutionality of the All-India Services Act, (LXI of  1951) (hereinafter called the Act).  The  appellant  was appointed to the Indian Police Service on October 1.,  1949, and  posted  to  the State of Punjab.   He  held  charge  as Superintendent  of  Police  in  various  districts  but  was reverted  as  Assistant Superintendent of Police  in  August 1957, and was eventually Posted to Dharamsala in March 1958. In  the same month he was informed that it was  proposed  to take action against him under r. 5 of the All-India Services (Discipline  and Appeal) Rules, 1955, (herein. after  called the Rules), framed under s. 3 of the Act.  He was thereafter -placed  under  suspension under r. 7 of the  Rules  pending disciplinary  proceedings  against  him,  and  Shri  K.   L. Bhudiraja  S.  was  appointed enquiry officer  to  hold  the departmental enquiry against him.  Notice was issued to  him by   the  Enquiry  Officer  in  July  1958.   He   thereupon immediately  made  an  application under  Art.  226  of  the Constitution  before the Punjab High Court  challenging  the constitutionality of the Act and the legality of the enquiry against  him.   The application was dismissed  on  July  30, 1958, and his application for a certificate to appeal 795 to this Court was dismissed next day.  Thereupon he came  to this Court and was granted special leave. Shri  Chatterjee appearing for the appellant has raised  the following six points in support of the appeal : (1), The amendment made by the President in Art. 312 of  the Constitution  by virtue of his power under Art. 392  by  the Constitution (Removal of Difficulties) Order No. II of  26th January,  1950, was in excess of the power conferred on  him under Art. 392; (2)It  was  not within the competence of  the  provisional Parliament  to  enact  the  Act in 1951,  as  there  was  no compliance with the condition precedent to such an Act being passed under Art. 312; (3)The  Rules  when promulgated in 1955 were bad  as  they were  repugnant  to Art. 312 as the amendment  made  by  the

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President  by  the Constitution  (Removal  of  Difficulties) Order No. 11 had ceased to have force and Art. 312 stood  in 1955 as originally enacted in the Constitution ; (4)Art.  312  laid a mandate on Parliament to make  a  law regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of all- India  services  created under that Article  and  Parliament could not delegate this function to the Central  Government, and, therefore, s. 3 of the Act was invalid; (5)In  any event, the delegation made by s. 3 of  the  Act was  excessive  and, therefore, section 3 should  be  struck down; and (6)The  Punjab  Government has no authority  to  institute these proceedings under the Rules. Re. 1, 2 & 3. These  three  points  may conveniently  be  taken  together. Article  392-  provides  that "the President  may,  for  the purpose  of  removing  any  difficulties,  particularly   in relation  to  the  transition from  the  provisions  of  the Government  of  India Act, 1935, to the provisions  of  this Constitution, by order direct that this Constitution  shall, during  such period as may be specified in the  order,  have effect  subject  to  such adaptations,  whether  by  way  of modification, addition or 796 omission,  as  he may deem to be necessary  or  expedient  ; provided  that no such order shall be made after  the  first meeting  of Parliament duly constituted under Chapter 11  of Part V ". The purpose of this provision  is obvious from the very words in which it was made.  Further Art. 379  provided that  "  until  both Houses of  Parliament  have  been  duly constituted and summoned to meet for the first session under the provisions of this Constitution, the body functioning as the   Constituent   Assembly  of  the  Dominion   of   India immediately  before  the commencement of  this  Constitution shall  be the provisional Parliament and shall exercise  all the  powers  and  perform all the duties  conferred  by  the provisions  of this Constitution on Parliament ".  As  there was  only  one House during the transitional  period,  there were  bound  to be difficulties in the  application  of  the Constitution,  which  envisaged  a  bicameral   legislature. Consequently, the President passed the Constitution (Removal of Difficulties) Order No. II on January 26, 1950, by  which among  other adaptations, he made an adaptation in Art.  312 also, to this effect:- "In clause (1), omit ’if the Council of States has  declared by  resolution supported by not less than two-thirds of  the members present and voting that it is necessary or expedient in the national interest so to do". This  order  was  to  come into force at  once  and  was  to continue  until  both  Houses of Parliament  had  been  duly constituted and summoned to meet for the first session under the  provisions of the Constitution.  After removal  of  the omitted words, Art. 312 read as follows:- " (1) Notwithstanding anything in Part XI, Parliament may by law  provide  for  the creation of  one  or  more  all-India services common to the Union and the States, and subject  to the   other  provisions  of  this  Chapter,   regulate   the recruitment,  and  the  conditions  of  service  of  persons appointed, to any such service. (2)The   services  known  at  the  commencement  of   this Constitution as the Indian Administrative Service 797 and the Indian Police Service shall be deemed to be services created by Parliament under this article." It is urged that though the President undoubtedly had  power to  make adaptations, he exceeded that power inasmuch as  he

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omitted the words mentioned above from Art. 312  altogether. It is suggested that the adaptation would have been  proper, if in Art. 312, as it originally stood in the  Constitution, the words " Council of States " had been substituted by  the words  "  provisional  Parliament ", so that  instead  of  a resolution  of  the Council of States a  resolution  of  the provisional  Parliament  would have been necessary  for  the creation  and  regulation of recruitment and  conditions  of service of an all-India service common to the Union and  the States.   Reliance in this connection is placed  on  Sankari Prasad  Singh Deo v. Union of India and State of Bihar  (1), where  dealing with an adaptation made in Art. 368,  by  the same order, this Court observed that " the adaptation leaves the  requirement  of a special majority untouched ".  It  is urged  that if the President had made the adaptation in  the way  suggested by learned counsel that would have  left  the requirement of a resolution supported by requisite  majority untouched  and  would  have been within  the  power  of  the President;  but inasmuch as the entire portion  was  omitted the  President had exceeded his power.  It is enough to  say that Sankari Prasad Singh’s case (1) does not lay down  that if  the adaptation in Art. 368 had been made in  some  other manner  it  would have been  invalid  and  unconstitutional. Reference  to the fact that adaptation left the  requirement of  a special majority untouched was made obviously for  the purpose  of  emphasising that there was no  real  ground  of grievance and not for indicating that in the absence of  the retention  of that provision the adaptation would have  been bad.  Indeed, it was pointed out in that ’case that Art. 392 was  widely expressed and an order could be made under  that Article  for the purpose of removing any difficulties.   The nature  of the adaptation to be made is also equally  widely expressed and it may be by way of (1)[1952] S.C.R. 89. 798 modification, addition or omission.  In the case of Art. 368 the  President  thought it necessary or expedient  that  the adaptation  should be by modification.  In the case of  Art. 312, however, he thought it necessary or expedient that  the adaptation  should  be by way of omission of  certain  words from  that Article.  The power given to the President  under Art. 392 was very wide and it-cannot be said that he  -could make  the adaptation in one way and not in another.  It  was left to him to consider whether the adaptation should be  by way of modification, addition or omission; and if he thought it  necessary  or  expedient with respect  to  a  particular Article  that  adaptation should be by way  of  omission  it cannot  be  said that he had exceeded his  power.   We  are, therefore,  of  opinion  that the  Act  cannot  be  declared unconstitutional  on  the  ground  that  the  President  had exceeded  his  power under Art. 392 and that if he  had  not done  so  a resolution of the provisional  Parliament  would have  been necessary with the requisite majority before  any law could be undertaken to regulate the recruitment and  the conditions of service of an all-India service. Once it is held that the adaptation made by the President in Art. 312 was within his power, there is very little left  in the  other two points raised by Mr. Chatterjee.  It is  said that  the provisional Parliament was not competent  to  pass the Act in 1951, because the condition precedent for passing such  a law had not been, as required by Art. 312,  complied with.  This means in other words that a resolution with  the requisite  majority had Dot been passed by  the  provisional Parliament; but this condition would not be there once those words  were  validly removed by the order of  the  President

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under  Art. 392, and the provisional Parliament  would  have power  to pass the Act without any resolution  being  passed before the law was made. The further argument that the Rules were promulgated in 1955 when  the  words  omitted by the  Constitution  (Removal  of Difficulties)  Order No. II had reappeared in Art.  312  and were, therefore, repugnant to Art. 312 inasmuch as there was no resolution of the 799 Council  of States, as required by that Article, is, in  our opinion,  completely  baseless.  The reappearance  of  these words  in Art. 312 has nothing to do with the vires  of  the Rules.   The rules were framed under the power given to  the Central Government by the Act, and if the Act was valid when it  was passed, the Central Government would have  power  to frame  rules  under it, as it is a permanent  measure.   The Rules framed in 1955, therefore, cannot be challenged on the ground  that the omitted words reappeared in Art. 312.   The Rules derive their force from the Act and the form in  which Art.  312  emerged,  after  the  Constitution  (Removal   of Difficulties) Order No. 11 came to an end in 1952, would not have any effect on the Rules.  There is no force, therefore, in any of these three points, and we reject them.  Re. 4. It  is  contended  that  Art. 312 lays  down  a  mandate  on Parliament to make the law itself regulating the recruitment and  the  conditions of service of all-India  services,  and therefore,  it  was not open to Parliament to  delegate  any part of the work relating to such regulation to the  Central Government  by  framing Rules for the purpose.  Now,  it  is well  settled that it is competent for, the  legislature  to delegate  to other authorities the power to frame  rules  to carry out the purposes of the law made by it was so held  by the  majority of Judges in Re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912  (1). The Delhi Laws case was, further examined in Rajnarain Singh v. The Chairman.  Patna Administration Committee, Patna (2), and  the  delegation  was  held  to  go  to  the  extent  of authorising  an executive authority to modify the  law  made but not in any essential feature.  It was also observed that what  constitutes essential feature cannot be enunciated  in general  terms.  It is, therefore, clear that delegation  of legislative  functions can be made to executive  authorities within  certain limits.  In this case s. 3 of the  Act  lays down  that  the Central Government may,  after  consultation with the Governments of the States concerned, make rules for the regulation of (1) [1951] S.C.R. 747. (2) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 290. 800 recruitment  and conditions of service of persons  appointed to  an all-India service.  It also lays down that all  rules made  under  this section shall be laid for  not  less  than fourteen  days before Parliament as soon as  possible  after they  are made, and shall be subject to such  modifications, whether  by  way of repeal or amendment, as  Parliament  may make  on a motion made during the session in which they  are so  said.   Mr.  Chatterjee  contends  that  no   delegation whatsoever  was  possible  under  Art.  312  and  that   the Constitution  required that Parliament should  itself  frame the entire law relating to the regulation of recruitment and the  conditions of service of all-India services.  We  have, therefore, to see whether there is anything in the words  of Art.  312  which takes away the usual power  of  delegation, which ordinarily resides in the legislature.  Stress in this connection  has been laid on the words " Parliament  may  by

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law provide " appearing in Art. 312.  It is urged that these words  should  be read to mean that there is  no  scope  for delegation  in a law made under Art. 312.  Our attention  in this  connection was drawn to words used in Art. 245,  which are " Parliament may make laws ". It is said that the  words used  in Art. 312 are in a special form, which  import  that Parliament must provide by law for regulation of recruitment and  the conditions of service and cannot delegate any  part of it to other authorities.  Reference was also made to  the words  used in Art. 138 (1), (namely, Parliament may by  law confer);  Art.  138  (2), (namely,  Parliament  may  by  law provide); Art. 139, (namely, Parliament may by law  confer); and  Art.  148  (3),  (namely,  as  may  be  determined   by Parliament  by  law).  In contrast to  these  Articles,  our attention  was drawn to the words of Art. 173 (c),  (namely, by  or under any law made by Parliament), and Art. 293  (2), (namely,  by  or under any law made by Parliament).   It  is urged that when the Constitution uses the words " may by law confer " or " may by law provide ", no delegation whatsoever is  possible.   We are of opinion that these  words  do  not necessarily  exclude delegation and it will have to be  seen in  each case how far the intention of the Constitution  was that 801 the entire provision should be made by law without  recourse to any rules framed under the power of delegation.  Let  us, therefore, examine Art. 312 from this angle, and see if  the intention  of  the  Constitution  was  that  regulation   of recruitment  and  conditions  of  service  to  an  all-India service  should  only  be  by law and  there  should  be  no delegation  of  any  power to frame  rules.   Regulation  of recruitment and conditions of service requires numerous  and varied rules, which may have to be changed from time to time as the exigencies of public service require.  This could not be unknown to the Constitution makers and it is not possible to  hold  that the intention of the  Constitution  was  that these  numerous  and  varied  rules  should  be  framed   by Parliament  itself  and that any amendment  of  these  rules which may be required to meet the difficulties of day-to-day administration  should also be made by Parliament only  with all  the  attending  delay  which  passing  of   legislation entails.   We  are,  therefore,  of  opinion  that  in   the circumstances  of  Art.  312  it could  not  have  been  the intention  of the Constitution that the numerous and  varied provisions  that  have to be made in order to  regulate  the recruitment  and  the  conditions of  service  of  all-India services  should all be enacted as statute law  and  nothing should  be delegated to the executive authorities.   In  the circumstances we are of opinion that the words used in  Art. 312  in the context in which they have been used do not  ex- clude the delegation of power to frame rules for  regulation of  recruitment  and  the conditions of  service  of  -India services.  We cannot read Art. 312 as laying down a  mandate prohibiting  Parliament  from delegating  authority  to  the Central  Government to frame rules for the  recruitment  and the  conditions  of  service  of  all-India  services.   We, therefore, reject this contention. Re. 5. The  argument in this connection is that even if  delegation is  possible, there was excessive delegation in  this  case, and, therefore, the Act should be struck down.  The Act is a short, Act of four sections.  The 101 802 first section deals with the short title, the second section

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defines the expression " all-India Service ", and the  third section gives power to the Central Government to frame rules for regulation of recruitment and ,the conditions of service after  consultation  with  the  Governments  of  the  States concerned,  and lays down that all rules so framed shall  be laid  before  Parliament  and  shall  be  subject  to   such modifications  as Parliament may make.  Section 4  which  is important is in these terms- " All rules in force immediately before the commencement  of this  Act  and  applicable to  an  all-India  service  shall continue to be in force and shall be deemed to be rules made under this Act." It is urged that this Act lays down no legislative policy or standard  at  all  and everything is  left  to  the  Central Government.   In this connection reference was made  to  the following observations of Mukherjea, J. (as he was then), in Re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912 (1)at p. 982 "  The  essential  legislative  function  consists  in   the determination  or choosing of the legislative policy and  of formally  enacting  that  policy  into  a  binding  rule  of conduct.   It  is open to the legislature to  formulate  the policy  as broadly and with as little or as much details  as it  thinks  proper  and  it may delegate  the  rest  of  the legislative  work to a subordinate authority who  will  work out  the details within the framework of that policy.  I  So long as a policy is laid down and a standard established  by statute no constitutional delegation of legislative power is involved in leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of  subordinate  rules  within  prescribed  limits  and  the determination  of  facts  to which  the  legislation  is  to apply’." It  is  said  that  in this case  Parliament  did  not  even exercise  the essential legislative function inasmuch as  it did  not  determine  or choose the  legislative  policy  and formally  enact that policy into a binding rule of  conduct. Apparently, if one looks at the Act, there seems to be  some force  in this contention.  But a close reading of s.  4  of the Act and its scope, purpose and (1)  [1951] S.C.R. 747. 803 effect  will show that this is not a case where  the  legis- lature  has  failed to lay down the legislative  policy  and formally  to enact that policy into a binding rule  of  con- duct.   What does s. 4 in fact provide ?  Undoubtedly  there were  rules in force immediately before the Commencement  of the Act which governed the two all India services covered by it and the legislature adopted those rules and said in s.  4 that  they shall continue to be in force.  Thus though s.  4 appears  on  the  face of it as one short  section  of  four lines,  it is in effect a statutory provision  adopting  all the  rules  which were in force at the commencement  of  the Act, governing the recruitment and the conditions of service of  the two all-India services.  The section certainly  lays down  that the rules already in force shall be taken  to  be rules  under  the Act; but that was necessary  in  order  to enable  the Central Government under s. 3 to add to,  alter, vary  and  amend those rules.  There is no  doubt,  however, that  s. 4 did lay down that the existing rules will  govern the  two all-India services in the matter of  regulation  of recruitment  and conditions of service, and in so far as  it did  so  it determined the legislative policy and set  up  a standard  for the Central Government to follow and  formally enacted it into a binding rule of conduct.  Further, by s. 3 the Central Government was given the power to frame rules in future  which  may have the effect of adding  to,  altering,

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varying  or  amending  the  rules accepted  under  s.  4  as binding.   Seeing that the rules would govern the  all-India services  common  to the Central Government  and  the  State Government  provision was made by s. 3 that rules should  be framed only after consulting the State Governments.  At  the same time Parliament took care to see that these rules  were laid  on  the table of Parliament for fourteen  days  before they  were  to  come into force and  they  were  subject  to modification,  whether  by way of repeal or amendment  on  a motion  made by Parliament during the session in which  they are so laid.  This makes it perfectly clear that  Parliament has in no way abdicated its authority, but is keeping strict vigilance and control over its delegate.  Therefore, reading s. 4 along with 804 s.   3(2)  of the Act it cannot be said in the special  cir- cumstances of this case that there was excessive  delegation to the Central Government by s. 3(1).  We are, therefore, of opinion that the Act cannot be struck down on the ground  of excessive delegation. Re. 6. The  last  contention is that the Punjab Government  has  no authority  to institute these proceedings under  the  Rules. It  would  be necessary in this connection to refer  to  the Rules.   Rule 3 provides for penalties, which are  seven  in number.  Rule 4 provides for the authorities, who can impose the   penalties,  and  three  of  the   penalties,   namely, dismissal,  removal  or compulsory retirement, can  only  be imposed  by  the Central Government, while  the  other  four penalties  can be imposed by the State Government.   Rule  5 provides the procedure for imposing penalties.  The argument is that as in this case the charge against the appellant  is serious,  he  is  likely  to  be  dismissed  or  removed  or compulsorily retired, and therefore, the Central  Government should  have  instituted enquiry in this case.   We  are  of opinion  that there is no force in this contention.  In  the first  place, it cannot be postulated at the very outset  of the  enquiry whether there would be any punishment  At  all, and even if there is going to be punishment, what particular punishment  out  of  the seven mentioned in r.  3  would  be imposed.   Therefore,  even  on  the  assumption  that   the Government  which  has to impose the  punishment  must  also institute the enquiry, it cannot be said at this stage  that the Punjab Government which can impose at least four out  of seven  penalties is not the proper Government  to  institute the  enquiry.  In the second place, a perusal of r. 5  shows that  the intention is that the enquiry would be  instituted by the Government under which the officer is serving even in cases  where  the penalty is to be imposed  by  the  Central Government.   Rule  4(2)  shows  that so  far  as  the  four penalties which could be imposed by the State Government are concerned,  the  institution  of  the  enquiry  is  by   the Government  under whom such officer was serving at the  time of  commission  of such act or omission  which  renders  him liable 805 to  punishment.   Rule 2(b) defines  ,Government",  and  the third clause thereof lays down that in the case of a  member of  service  serving  in connection with the  affairs  of  a State, the Government would be the Government of that State. The appellant was serving in connection with the affairs  of the  State  of  Punjab,  and  in  his  case  therefore   the Government for the purpose of r. 5 which provides  procedure for  imposing penalties would be the Punjab Government.   It is  the Punjab Government, therefore, which could  take  the

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steps  provided  in  r. 5. Rules 5(1) to  5(8)  provide  the procedure  for  such enquiries and the word "  government  " used  in  these  sub-rules means in the  present  case,  the Punjab   Government,  for  the  appellant   was-serving   in connection  with the affairs of the State of  Punjab.   Rule 5(9)  provides  for what is to happen after the  enquiry  is over,  and  it  lays down that after the  enquiry  has  been completed and after the punishing authority has arrived at a provisional  conclusion  in  regard to  the  penalty  to  be imposed,  if  the penalty proposed  is  dismissal,  removal, compulsory  retirement or reduction in rank, the  member  of the  service  charged shall be supplied with a copy  of  the report of enquiry and be given a further opportunity to show cause  why  the proposed penalty should not  be  imposed  on him.,  The very fact that in this rule the word  Government’ is not used and instead the words punishing authority ’  are used shows that the question Of punishment arises after  the enquiry  is  over  and the relevant  Government  would  then consider  that question; and if punishment is to be  one  of the  three  provided in r. 4(1) the report  of  the  enquiry officer would have to be forwarded to the Central Government so  that  it may determine the  provisional  punishment  and communicate  it  to  the officer concerned  along  with  the report of the enquiry officer to comply with the  provisions of Art. 311(2).  So far as the institution of the enquiry is concerned,  r. 5 contemplates that it will be instituted  by the  Government of the State in connection with the  affairs of which the officer is serving.  In this case the appellant was  serving in connection with the affairs of the State  of Punjab, and, therefore, 806 the Punjab Government would have authority to institute  the enquiry against him.  The Central Government would only come into the picture after the enquiry is concluded and if it is decided to impose one of the three punishments mentioned  in r. 4(1).  This contention must also be rejected. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs to the State of Punjab.                                      Appeal dismissed.