http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 10  

PETITIONER: D.N. VENKATARAYAPPA & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       09/07/1997

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, D.P. WADHWA

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      Leave granted.      This appeal  by special  leave arises from the judgment of the  Division Bench  of the Karnataka High Court, made on February 21, 1997, in Writ Appeal No. 7345/96.      The petitioners, admittedly, had purchased the property in  the   years  1962-63   and  1963-64  from  the  original allottees. The  Government have  allotted those lands as per Saguvali Chit  containing prohibition  of alienation  of the land.  Subsequently,  the  Karnataka  Scheduled  Castes  and Scheduled Tribes  (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 197  was enacted  totally prohibiting the alienation up to a  particular  period.  The  proceedings  were  initiated against the  petitioners for  ejectment under  the said Act. All  the   authorities  have   concurrently  held  that  the alienation in  favour of the petitioners was in violation of the above  Rules and  the said  Act and  hence the sales are voidable. When  the case had come up before this Court, this Court while  upholding  the  constitutionality  of  the  Act directed the  authorities to go into the question of adverse possession raised  by the  petitioners. The  learned  Single Judge has  extracted the  pleadings on adverse possession of the petitioners.  Therein, the  High Court  had pointed  out that there  is no  express plea of adverse possession except stating that  after the  purchase of the lands made by them, they remained in possession and enjoyment of the lands. What requires to  be pleaded  and proved  is that  the  purchaser disclaimed his  title under  which he  came into possession, set up  adverse possession with necessary animus of aserting open and  hostile title  to the  knowledge of the true owner and the  later  allowed  the  former,  without  any  let  or hindrance, to  remain in  possession and  enjoyment  of  the property adverse to the interest of the true owner until the expiry of  the prescribed  period. The classical requirement of adverse possession is that it should be nec vi, clam, aut precario. After  considering the  entire case  law  in  that behalf, the learned Single Judge has held thus:      "The  contention   raised  by   the      petitioners    that    they    have      perfected their title in respect of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 10  

    the lands  in question  by  adverse      possession,  has  to  fail  on  two      counts. Firstly, the crucial facts,      which constitute adverse possession      have   not    been   pleaded.   The      pleadings extracted  above,  in  my      view,  will   not  constitute   the      crucial facts  necessary  to  claim      title by  adverse possession. It is      not stated  by the  petitioners  in      their    pleadings     that     the      petitioners at  any point  of  time      claimed  or  asserted  their  title      hostile or  adverse to the title of      the     original     grantees/their      vendors.   In    my   view,    mere      uninterrupted    and     continuous      possession without  the  animus  to      continue in  possession hostile  to      the rights  of the  real owner will      not constitute  adverse  possession      in law.      In case  of Lakshmi  Reddy  (supra)      relied upon  by Sri Narayana Rao at      Paragraph 7  of the  judgment,  the      Supreme   Court,    following   the      decision of  the Privy  Council  in      State for  India vs.  Debendra  Lal      Khan (AIR 1934 PC 23), has observed      that   the    ordinary    classical      requirement of  adverse  possession      is that  it should  be nec  vi  nec      clam   nec    precario   and    the      possession   required    must    be      adequate    in    continuity,    in      publicity and  in  extent  to  show      that it  is possession  adverse  to      the competitor.      In the case of State of West Bengal      vs.  Dalhousie   Institute  Society      (AIR 1970  SC  1778),  the  Supreme      Court,  on   the   basis   of   the      materials  on  record,  which  were      referred to by the High Court, took      the view that in the said case, the      respondent  had   established   his      title to  the site  in question  by      adverse  possession.  Further,  the      said decision proceeds on the basis      that  the   grant   made   by   the      Government was invalid in law. That      is not  the position in the present      case. The  alienation  in  question      was only  voidable. The petitioners      came into  possession of  the lands      in question  by virtue  of the sale      deeds which  are only  voidable  in      law. Therefore, they have come into      possession   by   virtue   of   the      derivative title as observed by the      Supreme  Court   in  the   case  of      Chandevarappa (supra).  Further, in      the  case   of   Kshitish   Chandra      (supra), the  observation  made  by      the Supreme Court at paragraph 8 of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 10  

    the judgment  relied  upon  by  Sri      Narayana  Rao  in  support  of  his      contention    that     the     only      requirement of  law to  claim title      by adverse  possession is  that the      possession must be open and without      any attempt  at concealment  and it      is   not    necessary   that    the      possession must  be so effective so      as to  bring  it  to  the  specific      knowledge   of    the   owner    is      concerned, I  am of  the view  that      the  said   observation   must   be      understood with  reference  to  the      observations made in Paragraph-7 of      the judgment. At paragraph-7 of the      Judgment,  the  Supreme  Court  has      observed thus:      "7... For instance, one of the most      important   facts   which   clearly      proved adverse  possession was that      the plaintiff  had let out the land      for cultivatory  purposes and  used      it  himself   from  time   to  time      without  any   protest   from   the      defendant. During  the period of 45      years, no  serious attempt was made      by the  municipality to  evict  the      plaintiff knowing full well that he      was   asserting    hostile   titled      against the municipality in respect      of the land."      Further, this Court, in the case of      DANAPPA    REVAPPA     KOLLI    VS.      GURUPADAPPA KALLAPPA PATTANA SHETTI      (ILR  1990  Karnataka  610),  while      referring to  the decision  of  the      Supreme Court in Kshitish Chandra’s      case (supra),  relied upon  by  Sri      Narayana Rao in support of the plea      of adverse possession, has observed      that apart  from  that  actual  and      continuous  possession   which  are      among other  ingredients of adverse      possession,   there    should    be      necessary animus on the part of the      person who  intends to perfect this      title by  adverse  possession.  The      observations  made   in  the   said      decision reads thus:      "5.  ...   Apart  from  actual  and      continuous  possession   which  are      among other  ingredients of adverse      possession,   there    should    be      necessary animus on the part of the      person who  intends to  perfect his      title  by   adverse  possession.  A      person  who  under  the  bona  fide      belief  thinks  that  the  property      belongs to  him and  as such he has      been in possession, such possession      cannot   at    all   the    adverse      possession    because    it    lack      necessary  animus   for  perfecting      title by adverse possession."

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 10  

    Therefore, it  is clear that one of      the important  ingredients to claim      adverse  possession   is  that  the      person    who     claims    adverse      possession must  have set  up title      hostile to  the title  of the  true      owner. Therefore,  I am of the view      that none  of the  decisions relied      upon by Sri Narayana Rao in support      of the  plea of  adverse possession      set up  by the  petitioners, is  of      any assistance to the petitioners.      Further, admittedly,  there is  not      even a  whisper in  the evidence of      the first petitioner with regard to      the claim of adverse possession set      up by  the petitioners.  It is  not      stated by the petitioners that they      have   been   in   continuous   and      uninterrupted  possession   of  the      lands in  question. What  is stated      by the  petitioners, in  substance,      is that  they came  into possession      of the  lands in question by virtue      of the  sale deeds  executed by the      original  grantees.   The   Supreme      Court,  in   paragraph  11  of  the      decision  in  Chandevarappa’s  case      (supra), has observed thus:      "11. The  question then  is whether      the  appellant  has  perfected  his      title by  adverse possession. It is      seen that  is contention was raised      before the  Assistant  Commissioner      that the  appellant having remained      in   possession   from   1968,   he      perfected  his   title  by  adverse      possession. But,  the crucial facts      to  constitute  adverse  possession      have not  been pleaded. Admittedly,      the appellant  came into possession      by  a  derivative  title  from  the      original grantee.  It is  seen that      the original  grantee has  no right      to alienate  the  land.  Therefore,      having come  into possession  under      colour  of   title  from   original      grantee, if  the appellant  intends      to  plead   adverse  possession  as      against the State, he must disclaim      his title and plead his hostile and      that the  State had  not taken  any      action    thereon     within    the      prescribed  period.   Thereby,  the      appellant’s possession would become      adverse. No  such stand  was  taken      nor evidence  has been  adduced  in      this   behalf.   The   counsel   in      fairness, despite  his research, is      unable to  bring to  our notice any      such plea  having been taken by the      appellant."      Therefore,  in   the   absence   of      crucial pleadings, which constitute      adverse possession  and evidence to

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 10  

    show that the petitioners have been      in  continuous   and  uninterrupted      possession of the lands in question      claiming right,  title and interest      in the lands in question hostile to      the right,  title and  interest  of      the    original    grantees,    the      petitioners cannot  claim that they      have  perfected   their  title   by      adverse possession  and, therefore,      the Act does not apply as laid down      by    the    Supreme    Court    in      Manchegowda’s case (supra).      The law  laid down  by the  Supreme      Court   in   Chandevarappa’s   case      (supra) fully  applies to the facts      of the  present case.  In the  said      case, while  considering the  claim      of adverse possession the purchaser      of a granted land from the original      grantee,  the   Supreme  Court  has      observed that the person, who comes      into  possession  under  colour  of      title from  the original grantee if      he   intends   to   claim   adverse      possession as  against State,  must      disclaim his  title and  plead  his      hostile claim  to the  knowledge of      the State  and the  State  had  not      taken any action thereon within the      prescribed  period.   It  is   also      relevant to  point  out  that  sub-      section (3) of Section 5 of the Act      provides that  where a granted land      is in possession of a person, other      than the  original grantee  of  his      legal heir,  it shall  be presumed,      until the  contrary is proved, that      such person  has acquired  the land      by a  transfer, which  is null  and      void under  the provisions  of sub-      section (1)  of Section  4. Since I      have negativated  the contention of      Sri Narayana  Rao that the original      grantees are  not Scheduled Castes,      it  follows   that  the   lands  in      question are  granted lands  within      the meaning  of clause  (b) of sub-      section (1)  of Section  3  of  the      Act. Therefore,  the burden  is  on      the petitioners, who had admittedly      come into  possession of  the lands      in question, to establish that they      have acquired title to the lands in      question by  a transfer,  which  is      not  null   and  void   under   the      provisions of  sub-section (21)  of      Section  4   of  the  Act.  In  the      instant case,  the petitioners have      failed  to   discharge   the   said      burden. On  this ground  also,  the      petition should fail. Secondly, the      grants  made   in  favour   of  the      original  grantees  are  admittedly      free grants. The Rule governing the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 10  

    grant prohibited  alienation of the      lands in  question permanently. The      lands in  question were  granted to      Scheduled Caste  person taking into      account their  social  backgrounds,      poverty,   illiteracy   and   their      inherent   weakness    from   being      exploited by  the affluent  section      of   the   society.   Under   these      circumstances, the  conditions were      imposed that  the  grantees  should      not alienate  the lands  granted to      them, Sections  66A and  66B of the      Land  Revenue  Code  authorise  the      State  of   resume  the   land  for      violation  of   the  terms  of  the      grant. Therefore,  if the  terms of      the grants,  which are  hedged with      conditions,  and   the   class   of      persons  to   whom  the  lands  are      granted, are taken into account and      considered, it  is not  possible to      accept  the   contention   of   the      learned Counsel for the petitioners      that the  title in  the  lands  had      passed absolutely  to the grantees.      I am  of the view that the title to      the lands  continued to  remain  in      the  State   and  what   has   been      transferred tot  he grantees is the      right  to   continue   to   be   in      possession of  the lands granted to      them  and   enjoy   the   same   in      perpetuity subject to the condition      that  they   do  not   violate  the      conditions of  the grant. This view      of  mine   is  supported   by   the      Division  Bench  decision  of  this      Court in  the case  of Rudrappa vs.      Special Deputy  Commissioner  (Writ      Appeal  No.  1210/1987  decided  on      17.6.1996), wherein  in Paragraph-3      of the judgment, the Division Bench      of this  Court,  while  considering      similar grants,  has taken the view      that  the  grantee  was  not  given      absolute title  in respect  of  the      land granted.  The relevant portion      of  the  judgment  at  Paragraph-8,      reads as follows:      "8. ...It  is clear  from the terms      of the  grant that  the appellant’s      predecessor in  title, the  grantee      could not  alienate  the  land  for      certain period  and if the land was      alienated,  it   was  open  to  the      Government to  cancel the grant and      resume the land in question. If the      grant was  hedged in  with  several      conditions of this nature, the same      cannot  be   said  to  be  absolute      moreover, it  must be  noticed that      the grant  was  made  at  an  upset      price.   In    the   circumstances,      proceedings   initiated    by   the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 10  

    respondents cannot  be stated to be      barred  by   limitation  or  is  it      possible to  sustain  the  plea  of      adverse possession raised on behalf      of the appellant."      In that view, it was held that the title of the land in question has not been absolutely granted to the petitioners. Their title  by adverse  possession against  State was for a period over  30 years prior to the date of coming into force of the  Act. The petitioners failed to prove their claim for adverse possession.  This finding was upheld by the Division Bench in paragraph 3 of its judgment thus:      "It is  no doubt true that when the      grant of land is made, depending on      the terms  thereof,  the  land  may      vest  in   the  grantee  with  full      right, but  if  the  terms  of  the      terms of  grant itself  spells  out      certain conditions  which  restrict      the rights  that are  available  in      respect of  the land which had been      granted, the  fine-tuned  arguments      addressed by  the  learned  counsel      for the  appellants would pale into      in significance  for admittedly the      title   is    clogged   with    the      resumption of  land in the event of      violation of the terms of grant and      would  necessarily  mean  that  the      grantee cannot  give a better title      than what  he had  to be  purchaser      and that  title has  the burden  of      non-alienation   either    for    a      particular period or for all period      to come.  If any  sale is  effected      contrary to  those  provision,  the      same would  enable the  authorities      to resume  the lands  in  question.      Thus, the  terms  of  grant  itself      cannot be understood to be absolute      right. Such  title necessarily cuts      down the  capacity or  the power to      alienate the  lands. Therefore,  it      is  unnecessary  to  refer  to  the      various decisions  relied  upon  by      the   learned   counsel   for   the      appellants in  this regard for this      aspect   did    not    arise    for      consideration much  less considered      in  the   foresaid  decisions.  The      context in  which those  provisions      were interpreted were only cases of      simple  grants  unhindered  by  the      enactment like  the one  with which      we are concerned presently. In such      cases what  rights  would  flow  or      arise are  entirely different.  The      Act  clearly   sets  out  that  any      transfer  or  grant  of  land  made      either before  or the  commencement      of the  Act in contravention of the      terms of  grant of such land, would      be null,  void and  no right, title      or interest  in such  land shall be      conveyed nor  deemed to  have  ever

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 10  

    been  conveyed  by  such  transfer.      When  the  provisions  of  the  Act      clearly spell  out to  destroy such      transactions  to   argue  that  the      parties concerned  had clear  title      fully in  respect of the same would      not stand to reason.      5. The  learned counsel,  submitted      that in view of the decision in ILR      1994   Kar.    1839    (SC)    K.T.      HUTCHEGOWDA VS. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER      for  the   purpose  of  determining      whether the period of limitation is      12 years or 30 years, each case has      to be examined on its merits and if      the grant had been made in absolute      terms, the  land would  vest in the      transferer  and   he   would   have      perfected his  title by  principles      of   adverse    possession.    But,      subsequently, the  Supreme Court in      a    later     decision    in    R.      CHANDEVARAPPA & OTHERS VS. STATE OF      KARNATAKA & OTHERS - 1995 (7) JT 93      (SC)  -   have  explained  that  in      claiming adverse possession certain      pleas have  to be made such as when      there is  a derivative  title as in      the present case, if the appellants      intend to  plead adverse possession      as against  the  State,  they  must      disclaim their title and plead this      hostile claim  to the  knowledge of      the State  and that  the State  had      not taken  any  action  within  the      prescribed period.  It is  only  in      those circumstances the appellants’      possession  would  become  adverse.      There is no material to that effect      in the  present case. Therefore, we      are of  the view  that there  is no      substance in any of the contentions      advanced   on    behalf   of    the      appellants."      Here, in  the  present  case,  when      alienation      is       altogether      prohibited, question  of  obtaining      permission for alienation is not at      all contemplated.  When  under  the      law alienation  cannot be  effected      at all  during the relevant period,      it was  impossible for  the alienor      to  alienate  the  same.  Thus  the      alienee will  not derive any title.      If at  all be  holds the  land,  he      holds  the   same  adverse  to  the      alienor and  not with  reference to      the State.  That was  the  position      considered by  the Supreme Court in      Chandeveerappa’s case as well as in      Civil  Appeal   No.  11933/1996   -      Papaiah vs.  State of  Karnataka  &      Others.  The   Supreme   Court   in      Papaiah’s case noticed the scope of      the enactment  and found  that  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 10  

    same has  been enacted  in terms of      the preamble of the Constitution to      provide  economic  justice  to  the      Scheduled  Castes/Scheduled  Tribes      and other  weaker sections  of  the      society  and   to   prevent   their      exploitation in  terms of  Articles      46 of  the Constitution. It is also      noticed that under Article 39(b) of      the  Constitution,   the  State  is      enjoined to distribute its largesse      - in the present case the land - to      sub-serve  the   public  good.  The      assignment of land having been made      in furtherance  of this  objective,      any alienation in its contravention      would not only be in violation of a      Constitutional  Policy   but   also      opposed  to   public  policy  under      Section 23  of  the  Contract  Act.      Therefore,   the    Supreme   Court      pointed  out  that  any  alienation      made in  violation of  the terms of      grant is  void an  the alieness  do      not get any valid title or interest      thereunder. In  Papaiah’s case  the      contention was  that the alinee had      obtained the land by way of sale in      1958 long  prior to  the Act coming      into  force   and  thereby  he  had      perfected  his   title  by  adverse      possession.   The   Supreme   Court      noticing    the     decision     in      CHANDEVEERAPPA’S case  to which  we      have  already  adverted,  has  held      that such  a contention  cannot  be      counternanced at all. A distinction      was also  sought to  be made in the      light of  the ratio  laid  down  in      K.T.  HUCHEGOWDA’S  case  in  which      neither this  question  was  raised      nor considered  and this  Court was      directed to examine the question of      adverse possession  as against  the      seller,  but  not  as  against  the      State. If the purchaser remained to      be in  possession in  his own right      de horse  the tile,  necessarily he      has to  plead and  prove  the  date      from which  he disclaimed the title      and asserted  possessory  title  as      against the State and perfected his      possession to  the knowledge of the      real owner  viz., the State, Such a      plea  not   having  been  taken  or      argued nor  any evidence adduced in      that regard,  the plea  of  adverse      possession against the State cannot      be accepted  at all  at this stage.      The question of adverse possession,      therefore,  does   not  arise   and      examining whether  he has  been  in      possession for 30 years or 12 years      will not be of any relevant in this      case. In  that view  of the matter,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 10  

    we  find   no  force  in  the  said      contention."      The plea  of adverse  possession is not proved. In view of the  concurrent finding  after elaborate consideration of the law  laid down  by this Court on the factual aspects, in our  opinion,   no  substantive   question  of   law  arises warranting interference with the impugned decision.      The Civil Appeal is accordingly dismissed.