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PETITIONER: D. N. SANGHAVI & SONS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: AMBALAL TRIBHUWAN DAS

DATE OF JUDGMENT09/01/1974

BENCH: DWIVEDI, S.N. BENCH: DWIVEDI, S.N. GOSWAMI, P.K.

CITATION:  1974 AIR 1026            1974 SCR  (3)  55  1974 SCC  (1) 708  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1987 SC 857  (5)  RF         1987 SC2199  (2)  RF         1992 SC2166  (4)

ACT: Madhya  Pradesh Accommodation Control Act 1961, Sec. 12  (1) (f)--Its scope--The expression, ’His business’--Meaning of.

HEADNOTE: The  respondent  is  the owner of the  suit  premises.   The appellants  2 to 4 are carrying on the business in the  name of  the  first appellant, D. N. Sanghavi & Sons.   They  are tenants  of the Respondent and using a part of the  premises as  their residence.  The respondent sued the appellant  for eviction on the ground that he needed the accommodation  for continuing "his business" within the meaning of S.12 (1) (f) of  the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act 1961.   The questions for decision in the case are as follows :-(i) What is the meaning of the phrase "his business" in s. 12 (1) (f) and (ii) Whether in the circumstances of the case, the busi- ness  for which he required the accommodation could be  said to  be "his business." The first question arose  because  he wanted  the accommodation for continuing the business  of  a partnership  firm of which he was one partner and the  other two partners were his brothers. The  Trial Court held against the respondent  and  dismissed the  suit,  but the appeal court reversed the  judgment  and decreed  the  suit  for ejectment  of  the  appellants.   On appeal,  the  High Court upheld the judgment of  the  appeal Court and hence the appeal before this Court. Allowing the appeal, HELD  : (1) The meaning of the expression "his business"  in s.  12 (1) (f) of the Madhya Pradesh  Accommodation  Control Act 1961, is to be determined by examining the object of the Act and the setting of the phrase "his business." (2)  The direct and immediate object of the Act is to ensure occupation  of accommodation by them who are in need of  it. Broadly speaking, a. construction which fulfils this purpose should  be  preferred to the  alternate  construction  which frustrates it. (3)  A  review of the provisions of the Act would show  that the  Act  is more strict with respect to the eviction  of  a

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tenant  from  a  nonresidential accommodation  than  from  a residential  accommodation.   The landlord  cannot  sue  for eviction  of a tenant from a  non-residential  accommodation where  he  needs  it for continuing or  starting  his  major married  daughter’s  business  or  his  brother’s  business. Therefore,  section 12 (1) (b) is protective of  the  tenant and  should not receive a wide construction as to the  class of  persons  who may be included in the  possessive  pronoun ’his’ in the phrase ’his business’, for it would be  against legislative policy. (4)  The  words "for the purpose of continuing  or  starting his business" in Sec. 12 (i) (f) should be amplified to read as  "for  the  purpose  of his  own  occupation  by  way  of continuing or starting his business".  This amplification is necessarily  implied.   Therefore, it is necessary  for  the respondent  to  prove  that  the  accommodation  is   needed directly  and  substantially  for  his  occupation  for  the purpose  of continuing or starting his business.   From  the evidence, it is not clear whether the respondent was  merely a sleeping partner or an active partner.  In absence of  any proof   that  the  accommodation  is  exclusively   required directly  and  substantially  for  his  occupation  for  the purpose  of  continuing or starting his business,  the  suit must fail. Rajniklal and Co. v. Vithal Pandurang Kawade and another, A. 1.  R.  1952  Nagpur  312;  Tansukhdas  Chhaganlal  v.  Smt. Shambai,  A. 1. R. 1954 Nagpur 160, Commissioner of  Income- tax, West Bengal v. A. W. Figgies and Co., [1954] S.C.R. 56 171, Dulichand Lakshminarayan v. The Commissioner of Income- tax, Nagpur, [1956] S.C.R. 154, Karasandas Ramji v. Karsanji Kalyanji,  A.I.R.  1953  Saurashtra  113  and   Gundalapalli Rangamannar  Chetty  v. Desu Bangiah, A. I. R.  1954  Madras 182, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1643 of 1967 Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  Order  dated 4th September, 1967 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court (Indore Bench) at Indore in Second Appeal No. 288 of 1967. M.   V. Phadke a if A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellants. D .  V. Patel A. T.  M. Sampath, M. M. L. Srivastava and  E. C.,Agarwala, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DWIVEDI,  J.  The  facts of this case fall  within  a  short compass.   The  respondent, Amba Lal Tribhuwan Das,  is  the owner  of  the  suit  accommodation.   It  is  situated   in Siyaganj,  Indore.   The appellants 2 to 4 are  carrying  on business in the name of the first appellant, D. N.  Singhavi aid  S).13.  They  are the tennants  of  the  accommodation. Courts below have held that it was being used  predominantly as  a shop by them and that a part of it was being  used  by them  as their residence for the sake of more  of  efficient conduct  of the business they were carrying on in the  shop. The  respondent purchased the shop some time in  1953.   The appellant were then carrying on their business in the  shop. They  attorned to the respondent.  On October 10,  1964  the respondent give the requisite notice to them to vacate.   On November  16, 1964 he instituted a suit for their  ejectment from  the  accommodation.   It was alleged by  him  that  he needed  the  accommodation  for  continuing  "his  business" within  the meaning of s. 12 (1) (f) of the  Madhya  Pradesh Accommodation  Control  Act, 1961  (hereinafter  called  the

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Act).   At the evidence stage he gave evidence that  it  was needed  for partnership business.  There arose  two  crucial questions in the case: (1)    What  is  the meaning  of  the phrase "his business" in s. 12(1)(f)? (2)    Whether in  the circumstances of the case the business for which he required the  accommodation could be said to be "his business".   The first question arose because he wanted the accommodation for continuing  the business of a partnership firm of  which  he was  one partner.  There were two other partners.  They  are his  brothers.  The trial court held against the  respondent on  the  second issue and dismissed the suit.  No  view  was expressed  on  this issue.  The respondent filed  an  appeal from  the judgment.  The appeal court reversed the  judgment and  decreed the suit for ejectment of the appellants.   The appeal  court recorded this filling of fact........  Ambalal (plaintiff)  has stated...... that the partnership shop  was previously run by his father.  It is now run by the brothers in partnership.  This business is thus of the family  alone. Their shop? is at Siyaganj itself where the premises in suit are  situate." On this finding the appeal court reached  the conclusion  that  the business of the partnership  firm,  of which he is one partner is "his business" 57 within  the meaning of s. 12(1)(f).  As the firm’s  business was  being  carried on in a rented premises,  his  need  was found to be genuine.  The appellants then filed an appeal in the  Madhya  Pradesh  High Court from the  judgment  of  the appeal  court.  The High Court has upheld, the  judgment  of the  appeal court.  It is noteworthy that the  appeal  court has  simply  assumed that the partnership business  is  "his business".   No  reasonings  are given  in  support  of  the conclusion.  The High Court   agreed  with the appeal  court that  the  firm’s business of which the respondent  was  one partner is "his business".  The reasoning of the High  Court in support of this conclusion is summed up in the  following passage  in the judgment: "In the present case what  we  are concerned  with is whether the landlord can be said to  have the  necessity when the need was for the  partnership  firm. It  cannot be doubted that when a person runs a business  in partnership with others he does it for himself and therefore his necessity is identified with the necessity of the  firm. ’Whether he wants to do business himself or he does it along with         others  still remains that he needs it for  his own purpose." It  is evident from this passage that the High  Court,  like the appeal court, has overlooked the words of s. 12(1)(f) in arriving at its conclusion.  The High Court considered  that it  is an elementary proposition  of law that a  partnership business  is the business of each and every partner so  that it will be "his business." It seems that the High Court  was misled  by the apparent meaning of this phrase so  that  the necessity of examining the scheme of the Act and the setting of clause (f)  of s. 12(1) to discover its real meaning  was not  felt at all. But this is the first thing on  which  the High  court should have fixed attention. After all, it is  a matter  of statutory construction. And  in such a  case  all attempts  at construction should converge on the statute  at hand,   lest  the  reasoning  should  become  abstract   and artificial,  having no contact with reality. The High  Court has  ought support from a decision of the  erstwhile  Nagpur High  Court. (Rajniklal and Co. vs. Vithal Pandurang  Kawade and  another)(1).  Here again, the High Court did  not  take care to Notice the similarities and dissimilarities  between the law which fell or consideration in that case and the law which falls for construction this appeal.

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With  these  preliminary comments, we pass on  to  the  real issue  What  does "his business" mean in  s.  12(1)(f)?  The meaning is to  be determined by examining the object of  the Act  and the setting of the phrase "his business".  The  Act deals   with   the   difficult  problem   of   scarcity   of accommodation  and  seeks to distribute accommodation  in  a fair way amongst those who need. The   Act   professes  to  control  letting  and   rent   of accommodation  and  the eviction of tenants  therefrom.  The Act restricts the power of the landlord to let and to  rack- rent  at  will.  It also restricts his power  to  eject  the tenant at will. Thus the direct and immediate object of  the Act is to ensure occupation of accommodation by them who are in  need  of  it. Broadly  speaking,  a  construction  which fulfils this purpose should be preferred to the  alternative construction which furstrates it. 1.A.I.R. 1952 Nagpur 312. 58 Chapter III controls eviction of tenants.  Section 12 is the first  provision  in this Chapter.  We are now  reading  the material portions of s. 12 :               "Section 12(1)(e) : that the accommodation let               for residential purposes is required  bonafide               by the landlord for occupation as a  residence               for-himself  or for any member of his  family,                             it  he is the owner thereof, or for an y  person               for  whose benefit the accommodation  is  held               and  that the landlord or such person  has  no               other    reasonably    suitable    residential               accommodation of his own in his occupation  in               the city or town concerned               (f)   that  the  accommodation  let  for  non-               residential  purposes is required bonafide  by               the landlord for the purpose of continuing  or               starting  his business or that of any  of  his               major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the               owner  thereof  or  of any  person  for  whose               benefit the accommodation is held and that the               landlord   or   such  person  has   no   other               reasonably      suitable       non-residential               accommodation of his own in his occupation  in               the city or town concerned;               (4)   where   a  landlord  has  acquired   any               accommodation  by  transfer, no suit  for  the               eviction of tenant shall be maintainable under               sub-s.  (1) on the ground specified in  clause               (e) or clause (f) thereof, unless a period  of               one  year  has elapsed from the  date  of  the               acquisition.               (5)   where  an  order for the eviction  of  a               tenant  is  made on the  ground  specified  in               clause  (e) of sub-section (1),  the  landlord               shall  not  be entitled to  obtain  possession               thereof  before the expiration of a period  of               two months from the date of the order.               (6)   where  an  order for the eviction  of  a               tenant is made on the ground specified in  cl.               (f) of sub-section (1), the landlord shall not               be entitled to obtain possession thereof-               (a)   before the expiration of a period of two               months from the date of the order : and               (b)   if the accommodation is situated in ....               Indore....  unless  the landlord pays  to  the               tenant  such amount by way of compensation  as

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             may be equal to......               (i)   double the amount of the annual standard               rent  of  the accommodation in  the  following               cases:               (a)   where the accommodation has for a period               of ten complete years immediatly preceding the               date  on which the landlord :files a suit  for               possession  thereof,  been used  for  business               purposes  or for any other purpose along  with               such  purposes,  by the tenant  who  is  being               evicted.               59               (b)   where during the aforesaid period of ten               years, the tenant carrying on any  business in               the  accommodation has left it and the  tenant                             immediatly succeeding has acquired the  business               of his predecessor either through transfer  or               inheritance.               (ii)  the  amount of the annual standard  rent               in other cases." Section  17 provides that where, after ejecting the  tenant, the  landlord does not occupy the accommodation  within  two months  of obtaining possession, or transfers or  relets  it within  two  years thereof, the rent  Controlling  Authority may,  on an application made in this behalf by  the  evicted tenant, direct the landlord to put him in possession of  the accommodation  or to pay him such compensation as  the  Rent Controlling  Authority  may think  fit.   This  compensation shall  be over and above the compensation which has  already been  paid to the tenant under s. 12(6).  In a similar  way, section 18 provides that where the landlord has ejected  the tenant  for  the  purpose of  repairing  of  rebuilding  the accommodation and does not commence the work of repairing or rebuilding  within  one month of the date specified  in  the order  for  ejectment  or fails to complete the  work  in  a reasonable time or having completed the work fails to  place the  tenant  in occupation of the accommodation,  the  court may,  on an application made in this behalf by the  tenant,. direct  the landlord to give possession to the tenant or  to pay  to  him such compensation as the court may  think  fit. Section 39(1) requires the landlord to inform the  Collector whenever any accommodation has fallen vacant or is likely to fall vacant The Collector may then direct him to let or  not to  let  it in accordance with the provisions  of  the  Act. Section  39(2) gives preference to certain class of  persons in  the matter of letting.  It is not necessary  to  mention them  here.  But the first proviso to s. 39(2) is  important for  this case.  It reads : "Provided that if  the  landlord has in the information given...... under s. (1) stated  that he  needs  the  accommodation for his  own  occupation,  the Collector.....  shall, if satisfied after due  inquiry  that the  accommodation so needed is proper, direct the  landlord to.. occupy the same under the proviso the accommodation may be  allotted to the landlord if he makes out a case that  he needs the accommodation for "his own occupation". A review of these provisions would show that the Act is more strict  with respect to the eviction of tenant from  a  non- residential   accommodation   than   from   a    residential accommodation.  In the case of a residential  accommodation, section  12(1)  (e) provides for the eviction  of  a  tenant where it is needed for the residence of the landlord or  for any member of his family.  But he cannot sue for eviction of a tenant from a non-residential accommodation where he needs it  for continuing or starting his major married  daughter’s

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business.  Nor he can evict a tenant from such accommodation for  continuing  or starting his brother’s  business.   Thus while 60 Cl.  (e)  of s. 12(1) is more hospitable  to  the  landlord, cl.(f)  thereof  is  more protective of  the  tenant.   Sub- section  (4),  (5)  and  (6) of s. 12  also  point  to  this contrast.   While  the  tenant evicted  from  a  residential accommodation  gets  a  respite of  14  months,  the  tenant evicted  from a non-residential accommodation gets not  only the  said respite but also the prescribed compensation.   In many cases the burden of compensation may act as a deterrent to  eviction.  Having regard to the rigour of cl.(f)  of  s. 12(1)  we  think that the phrase"his  business"  should  not receive a wide, construction as to the class of persons  who may  be  included  in the possessive pronoun  ’his’  in  the phrase, for it would be against legislative policy. Section  39  controls  the  letting  of  an   accommodation, residential  as  well as non-residential, which  has  fallen vacant  or is likely to fall vacant.  The first  proviso  to sub-section (2) of s. 39 provides that at the request of the landlord  such  accommodation may be allotted to him  if  he needs it "for his own occupation." As section 39 deals  with a  residential as well as a  non-residential  accommodation. the  expression  "his own occupation" in the  first  proviso should be amplified to read as "his own occupation by way of residence or business".  Clauses (e) and (f) of s. 12(1) are complementary  to the first proviso to s. 39(2).  While  the first proviso enables the landlord to obtain possession of a vacant  accommodation  for  his own  occupation  by  way  of residence  or  business, section 12(1) (e)  enables  him  to obtain  a  residential  by  accommodation  for  his  or  his family’s  residence  by ejecting a  tenant.   Similarly,  s. 12(1)   (f)   enables  him  to   obtain   a   nonresidential accommodation  for continuing or starting "his business"  by ejecting  the tenant.  Considering the complimentary  nature of  s. 12(1) (f), we have little doubt in our mind that  the words  "for  the  purpose  of  continuing  or  starting  his business" in the section should be amplified to read as "for the  purpose of his own occupation by way of  continuing  or starting his business." It cannot be legitimately complained that  we are trying to redraft cl. (f).  This  amplification is  necessarily implied, for we think that  the  legislature intended to use the phrase "for the purpose of continuing or starting his business." as a synonym for the phrase "for his own  occupation"  in  the  first  proviso  to  s.  39(2)  as explained earlier.  The words "in his occupation" at the end of cl. (f) fortify our construction.  Again, the word  "own" in  the phrase "his own occupation" should not be  discarded as  redundant.   It  seems to us that  the  Legislature  has deliberately used it to add emphasis to the possessive force of  the pronoun "his". (see the  Shorter  Oxford-Dictionary, 3rd   Edn.   P.  1409)  it  connotes  the  idea   that   the accommodation  is needed directly and substantially for  his occupation. On this construction of cl. (f) of S. 12(1), it is necessary for the respondent to prove that the accommodation is needed directly  and  substantially  for  his  occupation  for  the purpose of continuing or starting his business. The  respondent has stated in his evidence that he  and  his two  brothers  are carrying on a partnership business  in  a rented shop in 61 Siyaganj.   He  has  further said that  he  needs  the  suit accommodation  for  that  purpose.   The  appeal  court  has

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believed this evidence and has recorded the finding that the respondent  bonafide  requires  the  accommodation  for  his partnership business.  But this finding does not fulfil  the conditions  of  cl.  (f) of s. 12(1)  as  construed  by  us. Unfortunately  for  him,  the respondent did  not  lead  any evidence to show that the accommodation was needed  directly and substantially for his occupation by way of business.  He filed   the  registration  certificate  showing   that   the partnership was registered with the Registrar of Firms.  The certificate    will only prove as to who are the partners of the firm. nothing more   The  respondent  did not  file  the deed of partnership’ It would have disclosed   whether   the respondent  is a mere sleeping partner or a partner  who  is entitled to manage the business either solely or with  other partners, or that they are the sole managing partners. In his examination he has said that he was a partner in  the firm, He, has also said : "There is no proper  accommodation for  carrying  on business in Indore by the members  of  his family " In Cross-examination he has said : "In the  members of  my family there are two of my brothers Nand Kishore  and Mani  Lal  their  wives  and children,  and  my  mother  are included For our residence and running the shop we need  the disputed  shop."  No doubt he has stated that he  needs  the suit  accommodation  for his residence also. but  the  lower courts  did not examine the need for residence.  Before  the appeal  court  counsel for the parties had stated  that  the suit  for eviction of the tenant should be disposed of  only on  the  basis  of ’ s. 12(1)  (f).   The  respondent  thus. abandoned  his case based on s. 12 (1) (e) which deals  with residential,  accommodation.  So we are concerned  with  his need  for  business,  accommodation.   The  passage  in  his statement, earlier reproduced would seem to suggest that his notion  of  ’his  business’ is inclusive  of  his  brothers’ business  in  which he may have no concern at  all,  So  the possibility of his brothers’ separate business being set  up in the suit accommodation is not ruled out.  However, we  do not ground our judgment on this statement.  In his  evidence he  has said : "’Ale, the three brothers and father are  the partners  in  the shop.  There is no  person  from  outside. Before the partnership my father used to run the shop.  (The father  died during pendency of the suit)".  He also said  : "We  deal in bidi, cigarettes, matches, tobacco and  soap.,_ WC  also  want  to have the same business  in  the  disputed shop." In_, neither of these two passages nor anywhere  else in  the  evidence  he  has  stated  that  on  the  terms  of partnership  he,  is  entitled to  manage,  the  partnership business  or  even  that  he  would  also  occupy  the  suit accommodation   along   with  his  partners   on   obtaining possession  from the appellants.  He has also not said  that the other partners have agreed to shift the business. if  the deed of partnership I has excluded him expressly  or impliedly  from  the management of firm’s business  and  has made  him  a sleeping partner, it cannot be  held  that  the accommodation  is needed directly and substantially for  his occupation by way of business.  Nor he has 62 power  to  shift the business.  To sum up, for  the  reasons already given, his suit should fail. Counsel  have  referred us to a large number  of  decisions. Such  of  them as appear to us to be relevant in  this  case will alone be noticed by us.  We shall make no reference  to the others. In  Rajniklal  and Co. (supra) the decision  turned  on  the meaning  of  the  phrase  "business  of  his  own"  in   cl. 13(3)(vi)(c)  of  the C.P. and Berar Letting of  Houses  and

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Rent  Control Order, 1947.  The Nagpur High  Court  confined itself to that single phrase and did not refer to the object and setting of the order.  In our case the conditions of  s. 12(1)(f), as construed by us, are apparently different  from those  of  cl.  13(3)(vi)(c) of the order.   So  it  is  not helpful in this case. In  Tansukhdas Chhaganlal vs.  Smt.  Shambai(1), the  Nagpur High   Court  has  held  that where  a  tenant  carrying  on business  in the demised shop converts the business  into  a partnership  business and allows the latter business  to  be carried on in the demised premises, it would amount to  sub- letting  because the partnership "was clearly a  personality in  law distinct from that of the petitioner himself"  There also,  the  High  Court was concerned with  cl.  13  of  the aforesaid  Order.  This statement of law does not appear  to be universally true.  However, as   pointed out earlier,  in respect  of Rajniklal (supra) it is sufficient for us to  my that this case also is not helpful in this appeal. Commissioner  of Income-tax, West Bengal vs.  A. W.  Figgies and   Co.   (2)  and  Dulichand  Lakshminarayan   vs.    The Commissioner of Income-tax Nagpur(3) are concerned with  the legal character of a firm in the Income-tax Act.  It is held that a firm is a distinct entity different from its partners for  purposes of assessment.  These decisions are  based  on particular  provisions  of  that  Act  which  are  radically different  from the provisions of the Act.  So  these  cases are also not helpful in deciding the present appeal. Karsandas  Ramji vs.  Karsanji Kalyanji(4) and  Gundalapalli Rangamannar  Chetty  vs.  Desu Rangiah(5) discuss  the  very question which fell  consideration in Tansukhdas  Chhaganlal (supra).   It was held on the facts of these cases that  the tenant could not be held to have sublet the rented  premises to  the  partnership firm because they  retained  possession over the premises.  These cases thus apply the test of occu- pation  by the tenant in finding out whether he has  or  has not sub-let.  These are all the relevant Indians cases cited before  us.   Sri  Patel has also relied  on  three  English cases:  (1) Clift. v. Taylor,(6) Tunstall v. Steigamann(  7) and Gian Singh & Co. vs.  Devraj Narar and Others. (8) Clift takes  the  same view as Rajniklal  (supra).   The  decision turned  on  the  meaning of  the  expression  "required  the premises  for  his own occupation" in s. 5(3)(b)(i)  of  the Landlord  and Tenant Act, 1927.  There the landlord  carried on a business in a part of the building in (1) A.I.R. 1954 Nagpur 160.(2) [1954] S.C.R. 171. (3) [1956] S.C. R. 154. (4) A.I.R. 1953 Saurashtra 113. (5) A.I.R. 1954 Madras 182.(6) [1948] 2 A.E.R. 11 3. (7) [1962] 2 A.E.R. 417.(8) [1965] 1 A.E.R. 768. 63 dispute;  in  another part of it the tenant carried  on  her business.   On  the  eve of the expiry  of  her  lease,  she applied for a new lease.  Her application was opposed by the landlord  on  the ground, inter alia, that he  required  the premises for his own occupation.  The facts found were  that he  had  converted  his  own  business  into  a  partnership business.   There were six partners including himself.   The partnership business had extended considerably so that there was  scarcity  of  accommodation.   It  appeared  that   the landlord needed the demised premises for the purpose of  his partnership  business.  So the issue was whether  he  needed the premises "for his own occupation." The finding was: "The firm  and he himself, as its senior partner, had great  need for less cramped .head office premises, and, in  particular, for  the  free and full use of the ground  floor  on  street level  as  essential  to convenience  of  office  work,  for

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clients, and for display of notice etc., and indeed, it  was necessary  for  the prosperity of the greatly  enlarged  and still  growing  business with its  ramifications  into  many allied  or  compatible  departments or  activities."  It  is evident  from this finding that the landlord was a  managing partner  and  that  he himself along with the  firm  was  to occupy the demised premises after getting possession.   This decision,  far from helping Sri Patel, helps the  appellants in view of the construction placed by us on clause (f) of s. 12(1).   Tunstall (supra) deals with an  entirely  different set of facts.  There the landlord was carrying on  business. She  gave  notice to the tenant that she wanted  the  rented shop  for her own business.  The notice was given under  the Landlord  and  Tenant  Act.  1954.   In  the  meantime   she transferred  her business to an incorporated  company.   The relevant words of s. 31(g) of that Act are : "to occupy  the holding for the purpose.... of the business to be carried on by  the  landlord."  It was held that  the  business  of  an incorporated  company was not the business of  the  landlord the company being a distinct legal person different from the landlord.   Gian  Singh  (supra)  was  concerned  with   the construction of a particular clause in a covenant forbidding the tenant from assigning his tenancy to a third person.  It is claimed by the landlord that the tenant has assigned  the premises  to a partnership firm of which he was  a  partner. On  the  facts of the case, it was held that  there  was  no assignment.   We fail   to appreciate how these  cases  help Sri Patel. In  some  of the cases cited by Sri Patel,  ’own’  has  been interpreted virtually as otiose.  Nevertheless what it means in  the Act would depend on its own context, for a word  may take a colour from its context. In view of our decision against the respondent on the  basis of the   construction of s. 12(1)(f) it is not necessary for us to decide several other points raised by Sri Phadke. The  appeal  is  allowed with costs  (one  set  only).   The decision  of the courts below are set aside and the suit  of the respondent is dismissed. S.C. Appeal allowed. 64