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PETITIONER: D. N. CHANCHALA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MYSORE AND ORS.  ETC.(with connected petitions)

DATE OF JUDGMENT03/05/1971

BENCH: SHELAT, J.M. BENCH: SHELAT, J.M. DUA, I.D. BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA

CITATION:  1971 AIR 1762            1971 SCR  608

ACT: Mysore  Medical  Colleges (Selection  for  Admission)  Rules 1970--Scope  of  Government’s  rule  making  power-Rules  in University Acts laying down qualifications for admission  do not deprive Government of power to regulate admission to its own   medical  colleges  affiliated  to   the   Universities Unive rsity-wise  distribution  of seats under r.  9(1)  not violative  of  Art.  14  of  Constitution-Setting  apart  of certain number of seats under r. 4 and reservation of  seats under r. 5 whether excessive-Whether violative of Art. 15(4) of  Constitution-Requirement of 10 years residence in  state under  r.  3-Intermittent residence does not  satisfy  rule- Classification  of children of political sufferers under  r. 4(h)  whether a reasonable  classification--Term  ’political sufferer’ whether vague. Constitution  of  India  1950-Rule 9(1)  of  Mysore  Medical Colleges  (Selection  for  Admission)  Rules  1970   whether violates  Art.  14-Rules  4 and  5  whether  make  excessive reservation-Whether violative of Art. 15(4)-Rule 4(h) making reservation  in favour of children of ’political  sufferers’ whether discriminatory.

HEADNOTE: The  Government  of  Mysore  State  conducts  four   medical colleges two of which are affiliated to the Universities  of Mysore  and  Bangalore, the other two  being  affiliated  to Karnatak  University.   C passed her  pre-university  course examination  from  Bangalore University with  67%  marks  in optional  subjects, namely Physics, Chemistry  and  Biology. She  then passed the, B.Sc. Part I examination  of  Karnatak University.    Under   the  Ordinances   of   the   Karnatak University, she was entitled to be admitted to the  M.B.B.S. course  of  Karnatak  University.   However  the   Selection Committee   formed   under  the  Mysore   Medical   Colleges (Selection for Admission) Rules 1970 did not select her  for admission to that course because of Rule 9 of the said Rules under  which preference for admission to a  medical  college run by a University was given to students who had passed the P.U.C.  Examination of the same University and only  20%  of the  seats  were  available  to  those  passing  the  P.U.C. Examination of other Universities.  C filed a writ  petition under   Art.  32  of  the  Constitution  on  the   following

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contentions:  (1) that once the petitioner was eligible  for admission  to a medical college affiliated to  the  Karnatak University  according to the Ordinances of that  University, the  State  Government could not make rules, the  effect  of which  was  to  deprive  her  of  admission;  (2)  that  the university-wise distribution of seats provided under r. 9(1) was  discriminatory  and being without  any  rational  basis violated   Art.  14  of  the  Constitution;  (3)  that   the reservation  of  seats  under  rr. 4 &  5  for  the  various categories of persons set out therein was far more excessive than  permitted  by the decisions of this Court and  was  in violation of Art. 15(4). V  passed her P.U.C. examination from a  government  college affiliated to Venkateshwar University in Andhra Pradesh with Physics,  Chemistry  and Biology as her  optional  subjects, securing  in those subjects 150 out of 200 marks  i.e.  75%. On July 1970 she made an application for selection 609 to  a seat in in any one of the medical colleges  affiliated to  Karnatak  University.  The Selection Committee  did  not include  her  in  the list of selected  candidates  and  the reason given was that she was not a resident of the State of Mysore  for not less than 10 years at any time prior to  the date  of the application for a seat as required by r.  3  of the Mysore Medical Colleges (Selection for Admission)  Rules 1970.  In this connection the petitioner filed a certificate from  the  Tahsildar, Bellary that she had  resided  in  the State  of  Mysore  for  a period  of  10  years  before  her application.   It  was  further stated on  her  behalf  that though  she had left the State of Mysore on the transfer  of her father to Andhra Pradesh before she was ten years  old, she had continued to come and reside at her family house  in the State of Mysore during her vacations. J.   challenged  the  validity of r. 4(h) of  the  aforesaid Rules  on  the ground that the reservation for  children  of ’political  sufferers’ made therein was not valid under  the Constitution. Held:     (i) So long as the rules for selection  applicable to the medical colleges run by Government do not suffer from any  constitutional  or  legal  infirmity,  they  cannot  be challenged  as the Government can regulate admission to  its own  institutions.   The objection that it  cannot  by  such rules,  provide for requirements over and above  those  laid down   by  the  universities  for  eligibility,  cannot   be sustained. [617D-E] (ii) Since  the universities are set up for  satisfying  the educational  needs of different areas where they are set  up and medical colleges are established in those areas, it  can safely be presumed that they also were so set up to  satisfy the  needs for medical training of those attached  to  those universities.   There is nothing undesirable in ensuring  as has  been  done under r. 9 (1) that those attached  to  such universities  have  their  ambitions  to  have  training  in specialised   subjects  like  medicine   satisfied   through colleges  attached to their own universities.  Such a  basis for  selection has not the disadvantage of district wise  or unit  wise  selection as any student from any  part  of  the state  can  pass the qualifying examination in  any  of  the three  universities  irrespective of his place of  birth  or residence.   Further  the rules confer a discretion  on  the selection committee to admit outsiders upto 20% of the total available seats in any one of these colleges i.e. those  who have  passed  the equivalent examination held by  any  other university  not  only  in the state but  also  elsewhere  in India.  It was therefore impossible to say that the basis of

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selection adopted in those rules would defeat the object  of the rules as was said in Rajendran’s case. [619E-620C] The  rules  lay  down a  valid  classification.   Candidates passing  through  the  qualifying  examination  held  by   a university form a class by themselves as distinguished  from those  passing through such examination from the  other  two universities.  Such a classification has a reasonable  nexus with the object of the rules, namely, to cater to the  needs of  candidates  who  would  naturally  look  to  their   own university  to advance their training in technical  studies, such as medical studies.  The rules therefore cannot  justly be  attached on the ground of hostile discrimination  or  as being otherwise in breach of Art. 14. [620G-621A] (iii)     Setting  apart  60  seats  under r.  4  is  not  a reservation   but   laying  down   sources   for   selection necessitated  by certain overriding considerations, such  as obligations  towards  those who serve the  interest  of  the country,s  security, certain reciprocal obligations and  the like.  The reservation under r.    5    though    apparently appearing  on  the  high  side, not  having  been  shown  as unreasonably  excessive the contention in regard to it  must fail. [622B] 39-1 S.C. India/71 610 (iv) The  residence  contemplated by r. 3 must  prima  facie have an element of continuity or regularity in residence and would  not  mean all intermittent stay such  as  during  the vacations.    It   would  thus  appear  that  V   did   not, withstanding  the  certificate of residence  issued  by  the Tehsildar, comply with the requirement of 10 years residence under r. 3. However the percentage of 750/, marks claimed by the  petitioner  was only in respect of  optional  subjects. Her  aggregate  marks  were only 65% as  compared  to  65.6% obtained  by the student last selected and on the  basis  of this  percentage her application was rightly  rejected.   It was therefore not necessary to go into the facts relating to the  petitioner’s residence in Mysore State or the  validity of r. 3. [624B-F, G-H] (v) Per Shelat & Bhargava, JJ. (Dua J. dissenting) The  definition  of ’political sufferer’ in r.  4(h)  is  in clear   and   unambiguous   language,   besides   containing sufficient  details  so  as to  distinctively  identify  the persons who would fall within it.  The person must have suf- fered  incarceration, whether as imprisonment or  detention, for a period of at least six months or been awarded  capital punishment, or must have died while actually in detention or undergoing   imprisonment,   or  killed   or   incapacitated permanently  by firing or lathi charge by the police  or  by the  military,  or must have lost employment,  property,  or means   of   livelihood.   These  should   have   been   the consequences  ’of  his having participated in  the  national movement  for the emancipation of India.  There was thus  no ambiguity  in  the definition of  political  sufferer  which would  result in discrimination in administering  the  rule. [626F-H] It is not unreasonable to extend the principle on which Art. 15  (4) is based to the children of political sufferers  who in  consequence of their participation in  the  emancipation struggle   became   unsettled  in  life,   in   some   cases economically ruined, and were therefore not in a position to make  available  to their children that class  of  education which would place them in fair competition with the children of those who did not suffer from that disadvantage.  If that be  so,  it must follow that the  definition  of  ’Political sufferer’  not  only makes the children  of  such  sufferers

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distinguishable from the rest but such classification has  a reasonable  nexus with the object of the rules which can  be nothing  else  than a fair and just distribution  of  seats. [629G-630C] Per  Dua,  J. The object of selection for admission  to  the medical  colleges, considered in the light of the  directive principles  of  State policy contained in  our  Constitution appears  to be to select the best material from amongst  the candidates  in order not only to provide them with  adequate means  of  livelihood, but also to provide the  much  needed medical  aid  to  the people and to  improve  public  health generally.   It cannot be confidently said that there  is  a reasonable  nexus  between  the differential  on  which  the children of political sufferers are classified as a distinct group  and the object of admission to the Medical  Colleges. In view however of the admitted fact that the marks obtained by J were lower than the marks secured by the last candidate admitted  from  the category of the  children  of  political sufferers,   the  petitioner  was  not  entitled  to   claim admission, even if the children of political sufferers  were not  given any priority.  On this ground alone the  petition of   J  deserved  to  be  dismissed.   Accordingly  it   was unnecessary to go into the question of the invalidity of  r. 4(h) in this case. [632F-H] In  view  of the above findings the writ petitions  must  be dismissed. Rajendran  v. Madras, [1968] 2 S.C.R. 786, Periakaruppan  v. Tamil  Nadu, W.P. 285 and 314 of 1970, decided on Sept.  23, 1970  and  Balaji  v. Mysore, [1963]  Supp.  1  S.C.R.  439, distinguished. 611 Andhra Pradesh v. Lavu Narendranath, C.As. 2161-A and  2161B of 1970, decided on Feb. 11, 1971 and Chitra Ghosh v.  Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 413, applied. Surendrakumar v. State, A.I.R. 1969 Raj. 182, Umesh  Chandra v. V. N. Singh, [1967] I.L.R. 46 Pat. 616, Kerala v.  Jacob, A.I.R. 1964  3 6, Ramchandra v. State, A.I.R. 1961 M.P. 247, Subhashini  v. State, A.I.R. 1966 Mys. 40 and Anil Kumar  v. Mysore, (1969) 17 L.R. (Mysore) 110, referred to.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL  JURISDICTION : Writ Petitions Nos. 618 to  622  of 1970. Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India  for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Lakshminarasu,  Vineet  Kumar  and Bindra  Thakur,  for  the petitioners (in W. P. Nos. 618 and 620 to 622 of 1970). S.   K.  Venkataranga,  Shyamala  Pappu,  Vineet  Kumar  and Bindra  Thakur,  for the, petitioner (in W. P.  No.  619  of 1970). Niren De, Attorney-General, R. C.  Mahindra and S. P. Nayar, for  respondent Nos.  I and 2 (in W. P. Nos. 618 and 620  to 622 ,of 1970). Sunder  Swami, Advocate-General, Mysore and S. P. Nayar  for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 (in W. P. No. 619 of 1970). R.   B. Datar, for intervener (in W. P. No. 621 of 1970). The  Judgment  of  J. M. SHELAT and  V.  BHARGAVA,  JJ.  was delivered  by  SHELAT,  J.  I. D.  DuA,  J.  gave  a  partly dissenting Opinion. Shelat,   J.-These  five  petitions  have  been   filed   by candidates  who  failed  to be  selected  for  admission  in Government  Medical  colleges  in the State  of  Mysore  and challenge the validity of the Selection Rules framed by  the

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Government.   Since  they  raise  common  questions,  it  is expedient to deal with them together and dispose them of  by a  common judgment.  Writ petition No. 619 of 1970, we  were told  by counsel, is the most comprehensive of them all  and therefore we shall deal with it first and as typical of  the rest.   As  the  rest  of  the  petitions  raise  the   same questions,  it  is not necessary to deal with each  of  them separately.  Writ petitions Nos. 621 and 622. however, raise certain  additional  questions which will be dealt  with  to that extent separately.                Writ Petition No. 619 of 1970 The  petitioner in this Writ Petition passed  the  Secondary School  Leaving  examination in March 1968  obtaining  first class marks.  In March 1969, she passed the   Pre-University Course 612 Examination  held by the Bangalore University  securing  67% marks  in optional subjects, namely, Physics, Chemistry  and Biology, and 71% marks in the aggregate.  Her father  having retired  at Dharwar, she prosecuted her further studies  for B.Sc.  Part I examination in the Karnatak  Science  College, Dharwar,  a college affiliated to the  Karnatak  University. She  passed  the  B.Sc.  Part I  examination  held  by  that University securing once again a first class. Under Ordinance 144(c) of the Karnatak University, a student having  passed  the B.Sc. Part I examination  with  Physics, Chemistry  and Biology as his optional subjects would  be  a eligible  for admission to a medical course provided he  has obtained the minimum marks prescribed for admission to  that course  from time to time.  The petitioner  having  obtained first  class  marks  in the B.Sc. Part  I  examination  was, therefore,  eligible for admission to the medical course  in the medical colleges affiliated to that University. There  are three universities in Mysore State, namely,  Kar- natak,  Mysore  and Bangalore universities.  All  the  three universities  hold  pre-university course  examination,  the passing  of which makes a student eligible for admission  to courses  leading  to university degrees.  But,  whereas  the Karnatak.   University requires the passing of B.Sc. Part  I examination leading to M.B.B.S. as the minimum qualification for  being  eligible  for  medical  course,  the  other  two universities require the passing of what is called the  Pre- Professional examination, which is equivalent to B.Sc.  Part I leading to M.B.B.S. degree of the Kamatak University. The  State  of Mysore conducts four  medical  colleges,  the Government Medical College at Mysore, which is affiliated to the  Mysore  University, the Government Medical  College  at Bangalore, which is affiliated to the Bangalore  University, and the Karnatak Medical College at Hubli and the Government Medical  College  at Bellary, which are  affiliated  to  the Karnatak University.  All the four medical colleges together have  765  seats  in  the  aggregate.   Besides  these  four institutions,   there  are  also  private  managed   medical colleges  at Manipal, Davangere, Belgaum and  Gulbarga  with 120 seats in each of them, admission upto 10% therein  being under the control of the Government. The  State  Government has framed rules, called  the  Mysore Medical  Colleges.(Selection  for  Admission)  Rules,   1970 regulating admission to Government medical colleges and  for a  certain number of seats specified therein in each of  the said  private  medical  colleges.  Under  these  rules,  the selection  for admission to the Government medical  colleges as also for the seats under the control of the Government in other  colleges  is  entrusted  to  a  selection   committee constituted by the Government.

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                           613 In accordance with the said rules, the petitioner applied to the  selection  committee for admission to any  one  of  the medical colleges affiliated to the Karnatak University.  She was,  however, not selected.  For appreciating  the  reasons why  the  committee could not select her, one has  first  to examine the said rules framed by   the Government. These rules are annexure ’3’ to the writ petition.  Under r. 1(2),  these rules are to apply for selection for  admission to  the  Pre-Professional/B.Sc.  Part I  Course  leading  to M.B.B.S.  in the said Government medical colleges and to  59 seats in the aggregate in the four private medical  colleges mentioned    therein.     The    expression    "the     Pre- Professional/B.Sc.  Part I Course leading to  M.B.B.S."  has been  used  in sub-r. (2) of r. 1 to  mean  Pre-Professional course in Bangalore and Mysore universities, and B.Sc.  Part I  course  leading to M.B.B.S. in the  Karnatak  University. The  scheme  under  the rules is that on  passing  the  Pre- University  Course examination a pupil becomes  eligible  to apply  for  admission  to  the  Pre-Professional  Course  in Bangalore  and Mysore universities and to the B.Sc.  Part  I Course  leading to M.B.B.S. in the Karnatak University,  the common  qualification  for  eligibility  to  both  the  said courses  in the three universities being the passing of  the P.U.C. examination.  Rule 2 prescribes the qualification for eligibility.  Under this rule the candidate must have passed the  P.U.C.  examination or the XI standard  of  the  Higher Secondary Schools examination of any university  established by  law  in India or of any institution  recognized  by  the State  Government,  or an equivalent  examination  with  (i) Physics,  Chemistry and Biology, or (ii)  Chemistry,  Botany and  Zoology  as optional subjects, or, as provided  by  cl. (b),  who is a graduate of any university with (i)  Physics, Chemistry and Biology, or (ii) Chemistry, Botany and Zoology as  optional subjects.  Such a candidate must have  obtained specified  percentage  of marks and must be within  the  age limit, prescribed by the three universities.  Under rule  2, therefore,  there are two categories of candidates who  only are  eligible for selection; (1) those who have  passed  the P.U.C.  examination  or an equivalent examination,  and  (2) those who are graduates, having graduated with the  optional subjects  specified  therein.  The petitioner, not  being  a graduate,  fell  under  the first  category,  of  candidates eligible for selection. Rule  2(2)  provides  that out of the  available  number  of seats,  after deducting the number of seats set apart  under r.  4,  80% of the seats shall be open for  those  who  have passed  the  P.U.C. "examination and 20% for those  who  are graduates.  Rule 4 sets apart in all 60 seats for  different categories   of   persons,  namely,  students   from   Union territories and States where there are no medical  colleges, students   from  relatively  less   developed   Commonwealth countries,  cultural scholars and students under  T.C.S.  of the 614 Colombo Plan and special Commonwealth Assistance Plan,  stu- dents   from   Nepal.  repatriates   from   Burma,   Ceylon, Mozambique,  children  of Defence Personnel  and  Ex-Defence Personnel,  students who have passed L.A.M.S. and  L.U.M.S., lady students taking family planning programme, children  of political sufferers, and lastly, students from Goa.  Rule  5 provides  that  out  of the number of  seats  available  for allotment,  after  deducting the number of seats  set  apart under  r. 4, 15% shall be reserved for persons belonging  to the  Scheduled  Castes,  3% shall be  reserved  for  persons

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belonging to the Scheduled Tribes and 30% shall be  reserved for persons belonging to socially and educationally backward classes.   Rule  7(1) provides for the constitution  of  the Selection  Committee,  and Cl. (2) thereof entrusts  to  the Committee  the  duty  to select  candidates  possessing  the requisite  qualification  for  admission to  the  said  Pre- Professional/B.Sc. Part I Course leading to M.B.B.S. Rules 9 deals with distribution of seats among the several colleges. Cl.  (1)  thereof provides that seats in  the  general  pool shall  be  distributed university-wise, that  is,  seats  in colleges  affiliated  to the Karnatak  University  shall  be allotted to persons passing from colleges affiliated to that university,  and seats in colleges affiliated  to  Bangalore and  Mysore Universities shall respectively be  allotted  to persons  passing  from  colleges  affiliated  to  each  such university, provided that not more than 20% of the seats  in the  colleges  affiliated  to any  university  may,  in  the discretion  of  the  Selection  Committee,  be  allotted  to students  passing  from  colleges affiliated  to  any  Other university in the State or elsewhere in India.  The rest  of the   rules  do  not  affect  the  petitioner’s  case,   and therefore, need not be cited. Briefly, the effect of these rules is that the qualification for selection to the Pre-Professional Course, as it is known in Mysore and Bangalore universities, or B.Sc. Part I Course leading to M.B.B.S. in the Karnatak University, is that  the candidate has either passed the P.U.C. examination, or is  a graduate  having had the aforesaid optional  subjects.   The selection is to be made by the-selection committee under  r. 7(2)  for  admission to the  Pre-Professional/B.Sc.  Part  I leading  to  M.B.B.S.  A student getting  admission  to  the aforesaid  course  has  thus to  pass  the  Pre-Professional examination  held by the Mysore and Bangalore  universities, or B.Sc. Part I leading to M.B.B.S. examination held by  the Karnatak   University.   It  is  only  after  passing   this examination  that  a  candidate can  prosecute  the  regular M.B.B.S.   course.   The  common  qualification  for   being selected  for the Pre-Professional or B.Sc. Part- I  leading to   M.B.B.S.  degree  being  the  passing  of  the   P.U.C. examination or of being a graduate, passing of B.Sc. Part  I examination by a student is irrelevant, as the marks counted for  selection  are those obtained by him either  in  P.U.C. examination or the B.Sc. examination.  As already stated, r. 2(2) sets 615 apart  upto  20% of the seats for those who  are  graduates, i.e.,  those  who  have obtained B.Sc.  degree.   A  student passing the P.U.C. examination or an examination  equivalent to  that  examination  can branch off  either  to  (1)  Pre- Professional/B.Sc. Part I leading to M.B.B.S., or (2)  B.Sc. degree  course.   Under  the rules no  direct  admission  to M.B.B.S. course is possible because every student wishing to take  up that course. has first to be selected for the  Pre- Professional/B.Sc.  Part  I leading to M.B.B.S.  course  and pass the requisite examination in that course. Though, for the purposes of selection, marks obtained at the P.U.C.  examination  or at the B.Sc.  examination  only  are taken  into  account  and the passing of the  B.Sc.  Part  I examination is for that purpose not relevant, there  appears to be one advantage to a candidate who has passed B.Sc. Part I examination with the prescribed optional subjects held  by the Karnatak University.  That advantage, as appearing  from the  additional affidavit filed by the  petitioner’s  father and  the  correspondence  between  him  and  the  University authorities, is that such a candidate, if selected, would be

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directly  admitted  to  the M.B.B.S. degree  course  in  the medical colleges affiliated to the Karnatak University.   It is  not necessary to say anything about what happens in  the other  universities  since  we  are  for  the  present   not concerned with such a question. The  second effect of these rules is that if a  student  has passed   the  P.U.C.  examination  held  by   a   particular university,  such  a  student  is, by  virtue  of  r.  9(1), eligible  for admission in the medical college  or  colleges affiliated  to  that university.  The  Selection  Committee, however, has the discretion to allot seats, upto 20% of  the seats  in  the  colleges  affiliated  to  a  university,  to students  passing  from  colleges affiliated  to  any  other university in the State or even elsewhere in India. Consequently,  the petitioner having passed her P.U.C.  exa- mination from Bangalore University could apply for admission in a medical college affiliated to that university.  If  she were to apply for admission in a medical college  affiliated to  the Karnatak University she could only be selected to  a seat from among seats upto the maximum of 20 % of seats left in the discretion of the Selection Committee as provided  by r. 9(1).  It is true that she had got 67% marks in  optional subjects in the P.U.C. examination and students with  lesser number of marks, but passing from colleges affiliated to the Karnatak  University, got admission.  But that  was  because she had passed the P.U.C. examination held by the  Bangalore University and wanted admission in a medical                             616 college  affiliated  to  another  university.  namely,   the Karnatak University. In view of this consequence, counsel for the petitioner made three submissions: (1) that once the petitioner was eligible for  admission  to  a  medical  college  affiliated  to  the Karnatak  University  according to the  Ordinances  of  that university,  the State Government could not make rules,  the effect of which was to deprive her of admission (2) that the university-wise distribution of seats provided under r. 9(1) was  discriminatory  and being without  any  rational  basis violated  Art.  14  of the Constitution; and  (3)  that  the reservation of seats under rr. 4 and 5 for the various cate- gories  of  persons set out therein was far  more  excessive than  permitted  by the decisions of this Court and  was  in violation  of Art. 15(4).  Consequently, rr. 4 and 5  laying down such reservation should be held invalid. We  propose to deal with these submissions in the  order  in which  they  were  placed before us  by  counsel.   As  seen earlier,  there are two sets of provisions dealing with  the teaching   of  medical  courses.   The  first  consists   of Ordinances  of the universities, and the second consists  of the  rules  framed  by  the  Government  for  selection   of candidates for admission to the Pre-Professional/ B.Sc. Part I leading to M.B.B.S. degree,.  The Ordinances framed by the three universities are made under the different Universities Acts  setting  up those universities and  under  the  powers reserved to them under them.  These Ordinances are made  for the  purposes  set out in those Acts and  for  carrying  out those   purposes.   One  of  such  purposes  would  be   the maintenance  of  certain academic standards in  the  various faculties   taught   in  the  college  affiliated   to   the universities.    For  the  purposes  of   maintaining   such standards   the  universities  lay  down   certain   minimum qualifications   for  eligibility  for  entrance  in   those faculties.  These Ordinances and regulations made under  the Acts  lay  down  the  minimum  qualifications  required  for eligibility  and  are  not to be  confused  with  rules  for

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admission.   A candidate may have the minimum  qualification so  as  to make him eligible for entrance  in  a  particular faculty.   That  does  not  mean  that  his  being  eligible necessarily makes him entitled to admission in that faculty, for,  admission can only be commensurate with the number  of available seats in such a faculty. The medical colleges in question are not university colleges but  have been set up and are being maintained by the  State Government  from  out  of  public  funds.   Since  they  are affiliated  to one or the other of the  three  universities, the Government cannot frame rules or act inconsistently with the ordinances or the regulations of the universities laying down standards of eligibility.  It is nobody’s case that the Government has made rules which are 617 in any way inconsistent with the rules for eligibility  laid down in such ordinances and regulations. Since the Government has set up these colleges and maintains them, it has prima facie the power to regulate admission  in its  own institutions.  Counsel for the  petitioner  pointed out  to  us  no provision from  the  University  Acts  which deprives  the  Government of the power of making  rules  for admission in its own colleges.  That being so, it cannot  be said that the Government has no power to regulate  admission in  its own colleges or that because a student  is  eligible for   admission   under  the   University   ordinances,   he automatically gets a right to admission which he can enforce in a court of law. The rules are limited to admission to the  Pre-Professional/ B.Sc.  Part  I  Course leading to  M.B.B.S.  degree  in  the Government  medical colleges and in respect of 59  seats  in the  aggregate  in the  medical  colleges  run-by  private management.  The control for admission in respect of the  59 seats  in the private colleges must .have been  acquired  by the  Government with the consent of or under some  agreement with those colleges by reason of their getting financial and other  aid  from the Government.  So long as the  rules  for selection  applicable to the colleges run by the  Government do  not suffer from any constitutional or  legal  infirmity, they cannot be challenged as the Government can regulate ad- mission  to  its own institutions.  The  objection  that  it cannot,  by  such rules, provide for requirements  over  and above  those laid down by the universities for  eligibility cannot   be   sustained.  (See  Andhra   Pradesh   v.   Lavu Narendranath  (1)  wherein  the earlier  decisions  on  this subject have been examined and followed.) The next contention was that r. 9(1), which prescribes  uni- versity-wise distribution of seats results in discrimination for it lays down a classification which is neither based  on any intelligible differentia, nor has a rational nexus  with the  object of the rules.  The argument was  that  although there  is  one selection committee for  all  the  Government medical  colleges in all the three universities and for  the said  59  seats in private colleges, students  passing  from colleges  affiliated  to a particular university  are  first admitted  in Government medical colleges affiliated to  that university  and only seats upto 20% in each of such  medical colleges  can be allotted to outsiders in the discretion  of the  committee.  The result is that a student having  higher marks than the last admitted student is deprived of a  seat only   for  the  reason  that  he  had  passed  his   P.U.C. examination from a college affiliated to another university. According to counsel, such a classification has no  rational basis and has no reasonable nexus with and (1)  C.  As.  2161-A and 2161-B of 1970, dec.  on  Feb.  11,

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1971. 618 is   in   fact  inconsistent  with  the   very   object   of establishment  of  Government medical colleges,  namely,  to train   in  medicine  the.  most  meritorious  amongst   the candidates seeking admission. In support of this contention counsel relied on Rajendran v. Madras  (1)  where rule 8 of the selection rules  framed  by the, Madras Government was struck down on the ground of  its being violative of Art. 14.  Rule 8 provided that the  seats available  in the general pool, as also those  reserved  for the  socially  and educationally backward classes  would  be allotted amongst various districts on the basis of the ratio of  the population of each district to the total  population of the State.  The contention was that distribution of seats districtwise  would result in denial of’  better  candidates from  being  selected  and candidates  of  inferior  calibre getting  selected only because they were born in  that  dis- trict where there were fewer candidates of good calibre.  In defence  of such a classification, two reasons  were  urged: (1)  that if districtwise classification was  not  provided, candidates  from  Madras city would get a larger  number  of seats in proportion to the population of the State, elbowing out candidates from the districts, and (2) if selection  was made  districtwise,  those  selected from  a  district  were likely to settle down as practitioners in that district,  so that  the  districts  were  likely  to  benefit  from  their training.    It   was  conceded  that  Art.   14   permitted classification.   But this Court rejected the  justification for the aforesaid classifications urged by the State on  the ground  that  the  first  meant  that  candidates  from  the districts,   admitted  to  be  of  inferior   calibre   than candidates from Madras city, would stand a better chance of’ selection, a result defeating the very object of  selection, namely,  to get the best candidates, and the second  on  the ground that it was neither pleaded in the  counter-affidavit of the State, nor had the State placed any facts or  figures justifying  the  plea that  students  selected  districtwise would settle down as medical practitioners in the respective districts  where  they resided.  In Periakaruppan  v.  Tamil Nadu  (2), a rule which provided for distribution  of  seats unitwise and which set up different selection committees for each  unit was held to be bad on the ground that it did  not differ  much from the districtwise distribution struck  down in Rajendran’s case (1).  Whereas formerly the  distribution was  districtwise, the system under attack  established  six units  where, medical colleges were situate, namely,  Madras city,   Madurai,  Chingleput,  Coimbatore,   Thanjavur   and Tirunelveli.   Though  in  theory  the  candidates  had  the liberty  to apply for any one or more of those  units,  they were  advised  to  apply  to  the  unit  nearest  to,  their residence and were also informed that even if they were to. (1)  [1968]2 S.C.R. 786. (2)  W. Ps. 285 & 314 of 1970, dec. on Sept. 23, 1970. 619 apply to other units, their applications would be  forwarded to the selection committee of that unit which was nearest to their  residence.   The consequence of the unit  system  was clearly  to  confine the candidates to the unit  nearest  to their residence. It will be easily seen that the university-wise distribution of  seats in the Government medical colleges has nothing  in common  with the districtwise or unitwise  selection  struck down  in Rajendran’s case (1) and Periakaruppan’s case  (2). In  both the cases what was mainly objected to was that  the

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selection  would have to be made on the basis either of  the place  of birth or residence and the candidate was  confined to the medical college at or nearest to such, a place.  Such a  basis for selection was held to have no reasonable  nexus with  the  object of the rules, namely, to select  the  most meritorious amongst the candidates to have the advantage  of such  education.   In Periakaruppan’s case (1) there  was  a further  infirmity, in that, there were  several  committees for selection resulting in varying standards, thus defeating the  very object of screening the candidates with a view  to give  chance to the best of them.  Both these decisions  are distinguishable  as  the  basis on which  the  selection  of candidates  is sought to be made under the present rules  is quite  different  in  that it is  neither  districtwise  nor unitwise,  but  is  university-wise.   Therefore,  the   in, firmaties  found in the selection rules in those  two  cases and  for which they were struck down cannot be  relevant  in any  scrutiny  of the present rules, much less can  they  be relied upon for an attack on them. The three universities were set up in three different places presumably  for the purpose of catering to  the  educational and academic needs of those areas.  Obviously one university for the whole of the State could neither have been  adequate nor feaseable to satisfy those needs.  Since it would not be possible to admit all candidates in the medical colleges run by  the Government, some basis for screening the  candidates had  to be set up.  There can be no manner of doubt, and  it is  now fairly well settled, that the Government,  as.  also other  private agencies, who found such centres for  medical training,  have  the right to frame rules for  admission  so long   as  those  rules  are  not  ’inconsistent  with   the university  statutes and regulations and do not suffer  from infirmities,   constitutional  or  otherwise.    Since   the universities are set up for satisfying-the educational needs of  different  areas  where  they are  set  up  and  medical colleges  are established in those areas, it can  safely  be presumed that they also were so set up to satisfy the  needs for  medical  training of those attached  to  those  univer- sities.   In  our  view, there  is  nothing  undesirable  in ensuring that those attached to such universities have their ambitions to have (1)  [1968] 2 S.C.R. 786. (2)  W. Ps. 285 & 314 of 1970, dec. on Sept. 23, 1970. 620 training  in specialised subjects, like medicine,  satisfied through colleges affiliated to their own universities.  Such a   basis  for  selection  has  not  the   disadvantage   of districtwise  or unitwise selection as any student from  any part of the state can pass the qualifying examination in any of  the three universities irrespective of the place of  his birth or residence.  Further, the rules confer a  discretion on  the selection committee to admit outsiders upto  20%  of the  total  available seats in any one  of  these  colleges, i.e., those who have passed the equivalent examination  held by  any  other  university not only in the  State  but  also elsewhere  in  India.  It is, therefore, impossible  to  say that  the  basis of selection adopted in these  rules  would defeat  the object of the rules as was said  in  Rajendran’s case   (1)  or  make  possible  less  meritorious   students obtaining  admission at the cost of the  better  candidates. The  fact that a candidate having lesser marks might  obtain admission  at the cost of another having higher  marks  from another  university  does not necessarily mean that  a  less meritorious candidate gets advantage over a more meritorious one.    As  is  well  known,  different  universities   have

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different  standards  in the examinations held by  them.   A preference  to  one attached to one university  in  its  own institutions for post-graduate or technical training is  not uncommon.  Rules giving such a preference are to be found in various  universities.  Such a system for that reason  alone is not to be condemned as discriminatory, particularly  when admission  to  such  a university by  passing  a  qualifying examination  held by it is not precluded by any  restrictive qualifications,  such  as birth or residence, or  any  other similar  restrictions.  In our view, it is not  possible  to equate the present basis for selection with these which were held  invalid in the aforesaid two decisions.  Further,  the Government  which bears the financial burden of running  the Government  colleges  is entitled to lay down  criteria  for admis sion  in  its own colleges and to decide  the  sources from which admission would be made, provided of course, such classification is not arbitrary and has a rational basis and a  reasonable connection with the object of the  rules.   So long  as  there  is no discrimination within  each  of  such sources, the validity of the rules laying down such  sources cannot be successfully challenged. (See   Chitra  Ghosh   v. Union  of  India (2)).  In our view, the rules  lay  down  a valid   classification.   Candidates  passing  through   the qualifying examination held by a university form a class  by themselves as distinguished from those passing through  such examination from the other two universities.  Such a classi- fication  has  a  reasonable nexus with the  object  of  the rules, namely, to cater to the needs of candidates who would naturally  look  to their own university  to  advance  their training in technical (1)  [1968] 2 S.C.R. 786. (2)  [1970] 1 S.C.R. 413, at 418.                             621 studies, such as medical studies.  In our opinion, the rules cannot   justly  be  attacked  on  the  ground  of   hostile discrimination being otherwise in breach of Art. 14. The last challenge to the validity of these rules was  based on  the allegation that they lay down excessive  reservation for  certain categories of candidates.  As  already  stated, under  cls.  (a) to (i) of r. 4, sixty, out of  the  present aggregate  of 765 seats at the disposal of  the  Government, are set apart for the various categories of persons  therein mentioned.  As aforesaid, the Government is entitled to  lay down  sources  from which selection for admission  would  be made.   A  provision laying down such  sources  is  strictly speaking  not  a reservation.  It is not  a  reservation  as understood  by Art. 15 against which objection can be  taken on  the  ground that It is excessive.  The  reservation,  as contemplated  by Art. 15, is the one which is made under  r. 5.  Under  that  rule,  15  %  reservation  is  for  persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes, 3 % for Scheduled  Tribes and  30 % for socially and educationally  backward  classes, that  is  to say, 48 % in all against  690  available  seats after deducting 60 seats set apart under r. 4. But,  setting apart  15  seats under r. 4(g) for candidates  who  take  up family planning programme does not constitute a  reservation as  any  one  of  the  lady  candidates  can  take  up  that programme.  Therefore, the seats available for  distribution would  be  720, 48 % of which are reserved under r.  5.  The question  is  whether  such a  reservation  is  unreasonably excessive. It was not disputed that under Art. 15(4) the State was  en- titled  to  make special provisions for the  advancement  of socially and educationally backward classes.  It has to  be remembered  that the object of Art. 15(4) is to advance  the

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interests  of  the society as a whole by looking  after  the interests  of its weaker sections.  But as stated in  Balaji v. Mysore (1), while making such a provision the rights  and interests  of  the  rest  of  the  society  are  not  to  be absolutely  ignored.   Consideration  for the  rest  of  the society  and those who are its weaker elements have both  to be kept in mind and taking the prevailing circumstances as a whole  have  to  be adjusted.   The  impugned  provision  in Balaji’s  case (1) made reservation of 68% of the seats  for the  socially and educationally backward classes in  medical and  engineering colleges.  Such a high percentage was  held to  amount  almost  to an exclusion  of  the  deserving  and qualified candidates from other communities, which also  was not  in the interests of the society as a whole.  The  Court there  observed  that  in adjusting the claim  of  both  the weaker  and  the stronger elements the reservation  for  the former  should  ordinarily  be less than  50%,  although  no inflexible   percentage  could  be  fixed  and  the   actual reservation   must  depend  upon  the  relevant   prevailing circumstances in each case.  In (1)  [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 439. 622 Periakaruppan’s  case (1) 41 % reservation for the  socially and  educationally  backward  classes was  held  not  to  be excessive.   No materials have been placed before  us  which would  show that in the circumstances prevailing  in  Mysore State reservation made under r. 5 is unreasonably excessive. Setting apart 60 seats under r. 4 is as already stated,  not a   reservation  but  laying  down  sources  for   selection necessitated  by certain overriding considerations, such  as obligations  towards  those who serve the interests  of  the country’s  security, certain reciprocal obligations and  the like.   The  reservation,  under  r.  5,  though  apparently appearing  on  the  high  side, not  having  been  shown  as unreasonably excessive, the contention in regard to it  must fail. These were the only three heads under which the validity  of the  rules was challenged.  For the reasons set  opt  above, none of them can be upheld.  The writ petition,,  therefore, fails and has to be rejected. Writ Petition No. 621 of 1970 The  petitioner here was born on August 2, 1954 at  Bellary. Bellary had become part of the State of Mysore on October 1, 1953  in  consequence of the reorganization of  States.   In April  1954,  her  father, who was till then  serving  as  a Government  servant in the State of Mysore, was  transferred to  Andhra  Pradesh where he continued to  serve  until  his retirement from service on June 11, 1970.  According to para (2)  of the petition, the petitioner was during this  period with her father at Cuddappah in Andhra Pradesh where he  was serving.   In 11968-69, the petitioner passed  her  S.S.L.C. examination  at, Cuddappah obtaining first class marks.   In 1969-70, she passed her P.U.C. examination from a Government college  affiliated  to Venkateswara  University  in  Andhra Pradesh with Physics, Chemistry and Biology as her  optional subjects,  securing in those subjects 150 out of 200  marks, i.e., 75%. On July 22, 1970, she made an application for selection to a seat  in any one of the medical colleges affiliated  to  the Karnatak  University.  An interview card was issued  to  her which  bore  No.  K-20,  which  signified  that  she  was  a candidate  for selection for admission in a medical  college affiliated  to the Karnatak University. on October 6,  1970, the  Selection  Committee  published  a  list  of   selected candidates, but her name was not included in the said list.

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According to the petition, the last student admitted to  the Bellary Medical College in the general pool of seats,  (that is from the balance of seats, after deducting from the total number  of  seats reserved under rr. 4 and 5)  had  obtained less marks in the P.U.C. examination than marks obtained  by her,  that is, 295 out 450 marks which would be  65.6%.  The last student ad- (1)  W. P.S. 285 & 314 of 1970, decd. on Sep. 23, 1970. 623 mitted  to  the  Karnatak Medical College,  Hubli  had  also obtained 295  out  of 450 marks, i.e.  65.6%.  Both  these students  had  passed  the P.U.C. examination  held  by  the Karnatak University. The reason for non-inclusion of the petitioner’s name in the said list given by the Selection Committee was that she  was not  "  a resident in the State of Mysore for not less  than 10  years at any time prior to the date of the  application for a seat" as required by r. 3 of, the said Rules.  Rule  3 requires that to be eligible for selection, a candidate must be  (a) a citizen of India, (b) a per-son domiciled  in  the State  of  Mysore, and (c) a resident of the  State  for  at least  10 years at any time before the date of  application. Rule  9(1)  provides that seats other  than  those  reserved under r. 4 shall be distributed university-wise, i.e., seats in  colleges affiliated to the Karnatak University shall  be allotted to persons passing from colleges affiliated to that university,  and seats in colleges affiliated  to  Bangalore and  Mysore universities shall respectively be  allotted  to persons  passing  from  colleges  affiliated  to  each  such university.   That rule, however, has a proviso  which  lays down  that  not  more  than 20% of  the  seats  in  colleges affiliated  to any university ’may in the discretion of  the Selection  Committee  be allotted to students  passing  from colleges  affiliated to. :any other university in the  State or  elsewhere  in  India.   Thus,  candidates  applying  for selection fall into two categories: (1) those having  passed the  P.U.C.  examination from colleges  affiliated  to  that university to which a medical college in which admission  is sought is affiliated, and (2) those having passed the P.U.C. examination  or  an  equivalent examination  held  by  other universities  in  Mysore  State  or  even  elsewhere.    The petitioner,  therefore,  belonged to  the  second  category- inasmuch  as she was a candidate who had passed  her  P.U.C. examination not through a college affiliated to the Karnatak University,  but one who had passed the  P.U.C.  examination from  a university to which none of the medical colleges  in Karnatak was affiliated.  Therefore, the proviso to r.  9(1) would  be applicable to her and she would be  ,eligible  for selection only from out of the 20% of the seats at the  most left in the discretion of the selection committee. No  question  relating to r. 9, however,  was  raised.   The case, placed before us on behalf of the petitioner, was that she was a person who had a domicile in Mysore State and  had resided  in the State during the period prescribed by  r.  3 and was, therefore, entitled to be considered along with the rest  of the candidates.  Even assuming that to be  so,  the question is whether she satisfied the conditions ’of r. 3 as regards residence. Annexed  to  her application for selection, dated  July  22, 1970,  was  a  certificate  from  the  Tehsildar,   Bellary, certifying  that  she had not only her  domicile  in  Mysore State  but  that  she had also resided in the  State  for  a period of 10 years prior to the date of 624 her  application.   In column 13 of the  application,  where

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particulars of institutions where the candidate had  studied had  to  be  given, it was stated that  the  petitioner  had studied  in  Bellary  during the years  1959  to  1963,  and thereafter, from 1963-64 to 196869 in different institutions in Andhra Pradesh.  We will assume, though her father was in Andhra Pradesh where he served from 1954 to June 1970,  that she was kept in her infancy in Bellary, the total period  of her  residence would prima facie come to little less than  9 years,  i.e.,  from August 2, 1954, her date  of  birth,  to 1963.    Therefore,  the  certificate  obtained   from   the Tehsildar, certifying that she had resided in Mysore for  10 years  at  any time prior to the date  of  her  application, would appear not to be factually correct. This  difficulty, however, was sought to be got over by  the affidavit  in rejoinder filed by her father in which it  was stated  that  though  the petitioner had  been  studying  in Andhra  Pradesh after 1963, she used to come to  the  family house  in Bellary during her vacations, and  therefore,  she must  be deemed to have resided all throughout  at  Bellary. Such an explanation, however, suffers from two defects : (1) that  such  a  plea  was made for  the  first  time  in  the affidavit  in rejoinder in answer to the  counter  affidavit filed  by  the respondents, and (2) that residence  as  con- templated  by  r.  3 must prima facie  have  an  element  of continuity or regularity in residence and would not mean  an intermittent  stay such as during the vacations.   It  would thus appear that the petitioner did not, notwithstanding the certificate  of  residence issued by the  Tehsildar,  comply with  the  requirement of 10 years’ residence  under  r.  3. However,  for  the  reasons  stated  hereafter  it  is   not necessary  to go into these questions either as regards  the facts  relating to her residence In Bellary or the  validity of r. 3 sought to be challenged in this petition. It  is  true  that the petitioner  obtained  in  the  P.U.C. examination held by Venkateswara University, 150 out of  200 marks  in  optional  subjects  taken  by  her,  but  as  her application itself shows, the total number of marks  secured by her in that examination were 3 89 out of 600 marks, i.e., 65  %. Even according to her, the last student  who  secured selection  for the Bellary Medical College had  secured  295 out of, 450 marks, i.e., 65.6%. The same percentage of marks was  also  secured  by  the last  student  admitted  to  the Karnatak Medical College, Hubli, both these students  having passed   the  P.U.C.  examination  held  by   the   Karnatak University.   Therefore,  even  irrespective  of  the   fact whether  she  had qualified herself or not under r.  3,  she could  not  have  been  selected for  either  of  these  two colleges in Karnatak. The argument that she had been discriminated against in  the sense that though she had secured 75 % marks she was not                             625 selected and others, with lesser number of marks than  those secured by her were selected for medical colleges affiliated to  the Karnatak University was founded on a wrong  premise. For  comparison between herself and the said two  candidates she took her marks in optional subjects only and  apparently compared them with the total marks obtained by the said  two students in the whole of the P.U.C. examination.  There  was thus  no comparison between person equally situated even  as regards the number of marks secured by them.  But apart from that,  the  result obtained by a student in  an  examination held by one university cannot be regarded as comparable with the  result obtained by another candidate in an  examination held by another university.  Even assuming that a  conscious effort is made to equalise standards obtaining in  different

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universities,   such  standards  depend  on  several   human factors, methods of teaching and examining, the syllabus  in such  universities etc. even though the subjects taught  and examined  were  to be the same.  It is well settled  that  a question  of  discrimination can only arise in the  case  of persons  equally  situated.  That the petitioner  and  those whom the Selection Committee selected were equally  situated cannot,   from   the  facts  above   stated,   be   assumed. Consequently, the argument that r. 3. by prescribing the  10 years’  residence  in Mysore State as  a  qualification  for eligibility,   is  arbitrary  and   discriminatory   becomes academic  and  need  not be gone into in  the  present  writ petition  as the petitioner, even without insisting on  that qualification, was not entitled to be selected. In  this  view the petition cannot succeeded and has  to  be dismissed.              Writ Petition No. 622 of 1970 The  petitioner is a science graduate having passed  her  B. Sc.  examination held by the Bangalore University  in  1969. In that examined, she secured 505 out of 1000 marks, i.  e., 50.5%.  On July 23, 1970, she applied for being admitted  to the  Pre-Professional Course in Medicine.  Her name did  not appear  in  the list of selected candidates  issued  by  the Selection  Committee  under  the  Rules  for  Selection   of Candidates   for  Admission,  1970  framed  by   the   State Government.  Aggrieved by the non-inclusion of her name, the petitioner filed this writ petition. Besides  raising several disputes which are common to  other writ   petitions  in  the  present  batch,  she  raised   an additional issue. challenging the validity of r. 4(h) of the said  Rules.   As  already stated,  the  rule  provides  for reservation of seats for different categories of  candidates applying for selection and cl. (h) reserves 4 seats each  in the  medical colleges at Bangalore, Mysore and Hubli, and  3 seats in the Medical College at Bellary, 40- 1 S.C. India/71 626 in all 15 seats, for the "Children of Political  Sufferers". The  petitioner did not challenge the reservation  of  seats made  in this rule for other categories of persons, such  as children of Defence Personnel and Ex-Defence Personnel, etc. The  challenge to the validity of cl. (h) was two fold.   It was firstly, said that the expressions "political  sufferer" and "the national movement for the emancipation of India" in the  definition  of  a "political  sufferer"  are  so  vague ambiguous  that  it  would be  impossible  to  identify  the category  of persons for whose benefit cl. (h)  was  framed, and  consequently,  there  would be  ample  room  for  those administering   these   rules  to  resort   to   partiality, discrimination  and favouritism.  The second  objection  was that  the  category of children of political  sufferers  was merely  fanciful,  politically  oriented  and  without   any intelligible differentia, and as such the classification had no  reasonable  nexus  with the object of  these  rules.   A number  of decisions of different High Courts  dealing  with similar  admission  rules  were cited  for  reinforcing  the argument against the validity of cl. (h) of r. 4.  So  far as the first part of the argument is concerned,  it is  difficult to envisage the danger apprehended by  counsel or  to see the kind of vagueness or ambiguity complained  of by  him.  The rule contains the definition of  a  "political sufferer"   as   meaning  a  person  who  "on   account   of participation in the national movement for the  emancipation of  India"  had  suffered imprisonment or  detention  for  a period  of at least six months, or had been awarded  capital

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punishment,  or  had died while undergoing  imprisonment  or detention or was killed or became permanently  incapacitated by  police or military firing or lathi charge, or  lost  his "job,   property  or  other  means  of   livelihood".    The definition  is  couched in clear and  unambiguous  language, besides   containing   sufficient   details,   so   as    to distinctively identify the persons who would fall within it. The  person  must have suffered  incarceration,  whether  as imprisonment  or  detention, for a period of  at  least  six months or been awarded capital punishment, or must have died while  actually in detention or undergoing imprisonment,  or killed  or  incapacitated  permanently by  firing  or  lathi charge  by the police or by the military, or must have  lost employment,  property or other means of livelihood.   ’These should have been the consequences of his having participated in the national movement for the emancipation of India.  The "national  movement" must obviously mean the  late  struggle for the freedom of the country from the alien British  rule. The ambiguity, counsel complained of, in these words in  the definition  is  difficult to comprehend.   There  are  ample details  in  the  definition  not to  leave  any  scope  for arbitrariness  or  discrimination in its  application  to  a candidate 627 who claims to be a child of the political sufferer envisaged by  cl. (h) of the rule.  We, therefore, turn to the  second part  of  the  .argument  without  detaining  ourselves  any further on the grievance of ambiguity in the definition. The  argument is that the category of children of  political sufferers  is  arbitrary in the sense that  it  is  entirely politically  oriented, is without any  rational  differentia and  has no nexus with the object of the rules.  In  support of  the  argument  against  such a  category,  the  case  of Surendrakumar  v.  State (1) was cited  as  an  illustration where  a similar category had been struck down.   The  State Government  there  had made reservation of seats  which  was incorporated  in the prospectus issued by each of  the  five medical colleges run by the Government.  The reservation was ,challenged  on the ground of its infringing Art.  14.   The reservation  was in respect of 5 categories  of  candidates, namely, (1) for foreign private students, cultural scholars’ and private students of .Indian origin domiciled abroad, (2) students migrating from Burma ;(3) candidates from Scheduled Castes  and Tribes belonging to Rajasthan, (4)  children  of Defence  personnel belonging to Rajasthan, and (5)  children of  political sufferers who are or were bona fide  residents of Rajasthan and who had been to jail in any part ,of India. Among   other  things,  the  reservation  for  children   of political  sufferers was made the target of  the  challenge. The High Court upheld the challenge on the grounds (1)  that if  the  ,object  was  to  afford  facilities  to  political sufferers,   there  was  no  reason  why  the  benefit   was restricted to the residents of Rajasthan only, (2) that  the expression  ’political  sufferer’ not being a term  of  art, opinions  might honestly differ as to what sacrifices  would be  sufficient  to  clothe  a  person  with  the  status  of political sufferer, (3) that the independence movement  came to  an  end  several  years  ago,  and  therefore,  if   any facilities were to be afforded to these who had suffered  by their participation in it they could be given once only, and (4)   that   there   was  no  justification   for   such   a classification as the only valid classification could be for obtaining the best material for medical profession and  such a  reservation could not achieve but on the contrary  defeat that object.

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In two other decisions, Umesh Chandra v. V. N. Singh(2)  and Kerala  v.  Jacob,  (3)  a  provision  authorising   special preference   to  the  children  of  the  employees  of   the University  who  had  rendered meritorious  service  to  the University, and a provision for reservation for children  of registered  medical  practitioners in  modem  medicine  were struck  down, the first on the ground that it would lead  to favouritism and patronage, and the second on (1) A. I. R. 1969 Raj. 182. (2) [1967] 1  L. R. 46 Put. 616. (3)  A. I. R. 1964 Ker. 316. 628 the  ground that the classification was not a rational  one. Ram chandra v. State (1) is yet another case where the  High Court, dealing with rules providing for 3% of the seats  for children  of bona fide political sufferers as defined in  M. P. Freedom Fighters Pension Rules, 1959, observed, though it declined  to  set  them aside on other  grounds,  that  "the preferential  treatment  accorded to them (the  children  of political  sufferers)  is based upon irrelevant  and  wholly extraneous  considerations  because  there  is  no  rational relation between the political suffering of a person and the education  imparted to his descendants in a medical  college with  the  object  of promoting efficiency  in  the  medical profession". On account of paucity of institutions imparting training  in technical  studies and the increasing number  of  candidates seeking  admission therein, there is obviously the need  for classification to enable fair and equitable distribution  of available  seats.  The very decisions relied on  by  counsel for  the  petitioner  implicitly  recognise  the  need   for classification   and  the  power  of  those  who  run   such institutions to lay down classification. In Rajendran’s case (5 this Court impliedly accepted two sources of  recruitment made  under  the rules there challenged, namely,  (1)  those competing for seats in the general pool, and (2) those  from the  socially  and educationally backward classes  for  whom reservation  permitted under Art. 15(4) was made.  What  was struck down there was the districtwise distribution based on sheer residence as that would defeat the very object of  the rules,  namely,  the  selection of the  best  and  the  most meritorious from the two sources of recruitment.  The  power to  lay down sources from which selection would be made  was expressly  conceded  to the Government in  Chitra  Ghosh  v. Union of India, (3) this Court observing in that  connection at  pp.  418  and 419 of the report that since  it  was  the Government  which bore the financial burden of  running  the medical  college,  it  could  lay  down  the  criteria   for eligibility  and that from the very nature of things it  was not  possible to throw the admission open to  students  from all  over the country.  Consequently, the  Government  could not  be  denied  the  right  to  decide  from  what  sources admissions  would  be  made.  The Court  at  the  same  time emphasised  that  if the sources were  properly  classified, whether  on  territorial, geographical or  other  reasonable basis,  the Court would refuse to interfere with the  manner and method of making the classification.  The classification there  made  were  in  relation  to  candidates  from  Union territories other than Delhi, children of Central Government servants posted in Indian missions abroad, candidates  under the  Colombo  Plan  and  other  international  arrangements, scholars  from Jammu & Kashmir, etc.  These  classifications were found justifiable on one (1)  A. I. R. 1961 M.P. 247. (3) [1970] 1 S.C.R. 413- (2) [1968] 2 S.C.R. 786.

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629 ground or the other and as based on intelligible differentia which distinguished candidates falling within them from  the rest.   The  Mysore High Court, in Subhashini v.  State  (1) similarly recognized that there could be valid reservations, apart  from those permissible under Art. 15 (4),  that  such reservations  did  not  necessarily  infringe  the  equality protection under Art. 14 and held that classification  based on a lawful State policy was-not violative of that  Article. It upheld on this principle the reservation for children  of Defence Personnel, Ex-Defence personnel as being clearly  in national interest. (See also Anil Kumar v. Mysore (2): Once the power to lay down classifications or categories  of persons  from whom admission is to be given is granted,  the only question which would remain for consideration would  be whether such categorisation has an intelligible criteria and whether  it  has a reasonable relation with the  object  for which the Rules for admission are made.  Rules for admission are  inevitable  so long as the demand  of  every  candidate seeking  admission  cannot be complied with in view  of  the paucity of institutions imparting training in such  subjects as medicine.  The definition of a ’political sufferer’ being a  detailed  one and in certain terms, it  would  be  easily possible to distinguish children of such political sufferers from  the rest as possessing the criteria laid down  by  the definition.   The  object  of the rules  for  admission  can obviously be to secure a fair and equitable distribution  of seats  amongst those seeking admission and who are  eligible under the University Regulations.  Such distribution can  be on  the principle that admission should be available to  the best  and  the most meritorious.  But an  equally  fair  and equitable  principle  would also be that which  secures  ad- mission  in a just proportion to those who  are  handicapped and  who, but for the preferential treatment given to  them, would  not  stand  a chance against those  who  are  not  so handicapped and are, therefore, in a superior position.  The principle  underlying  Art. 15 (4) is  that  a  preferential treatment  can  validly be given because  the  socially  and educationally backward classes need it, so that in course of time  they  stand in equal position with the  more  advanced sections of the society.  It would not in any way be  impro- per  if that principle were also to be applied to those  who are handicapped but do not fall under Art. 15(4).  It is  on such  a principle that reservation for children  of  Defence personnel  and  Ex-Defence personnel appears  to  have  been upheld.   The  criteria for such reservation is  that  those serving in the Defence forces or those who had so served are and  were  at a disadvantage in giving ,education  to  their children  since  they had to live, while  discharging  their duties, in difficult places where normal facilities avail- (1)  A. I. R. 1966 Mys. 40. (2) 1969 17 L. R. (Mysore) 110. 630 able  elsewhere are and were not available.  In our view  it is not unreasonable to extend that principle to the children of   political  sufferers  who  in  consequence   of   their participation in the emancipation struggle became  unsettled in  life;  in  some  cases  economically  ruined,  and  were therefore,  not  in a position to make  available  to  their children  that class of education which would place them  in fair  competition  with the children of those  who  did  not suffer  from  that  disadvantage.  If that be  so,  it  must follow that the definition of ’political sufferer’ not  only makes  the children of such sufferers  distinguishable  from the  rest but such a classification has a  reasonable  nexus

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with the object of the rules which can be nothing else  than a fair and just distribution of seats.  In our view, neither of the two contentions raised by counsel for the  petitioner can   be   accepted,   with  the  result   that   the   writ petition .fails and is dismissed. Writ  petitions  Nos. 618 and 620 of  1970  raise  questions similar  to  those dealt with hereinbefore.   In  accordance with  the  reasons  hereinbefore given, they  fail  and  are dismissed. The result is that all the five petitions are dismissed.  In the  circumstances of the case we make no order as to  costs in any one of them. Dua,  J.-I  have read the judgment prepared  by  my  learned brother Shelat, J., and I agree that all the writ  petitions should  be dismissed with no order as to costs.   I  should, however,  like,  as  at present  advised,  to  refrain  from expressing any considered opinion on the validity of r. 4(h) of  the  Mysore Medical Colleges (Selection  for  Admission) Rules, 1970.  The category of persons in whose favour  seats in  the  Medical  Colleges mentioned in  this  sub-rule  are reserved are described as "children of political sufferers". The  expression  "political sufferer" is defined  in  Expla- nation (ii) to mean:               "a  person who on account of participation  in               the national movement for the emancipation  of               India-               (a)   has  suffered imprisonment or  detention               for a period of not less than six months,  the               said  period  being  calculated  taking   into               account  the  period  of  remission,  if  any,               granted  for  good  conduct  and  other   like               reasons,   or   had   been   awarded   capital               punishment   or  had  died  while   undergoing               imprisonment or detention; or               (b)   was   killed   or   became   permanently               incapacitated by police or military firing  or               lath charge or               631               (c)   lost his job, property or other means of               livelihood." The petitioner’s learned counsed relied on several decisions in support of his challenge to the validity of this sub-rule on  the ground that this reservation has no  rational  nexus with  the  object  of  selecting  the  most  meritorious  or suitable  candidates for medical education so that they  may be  able  both  to  serve the people  as  doctors  with  the requisite   efficiency  and  to  find  adequate   means   of livelihood  for themselves.  According to  the  petitioner’s argument  the mere fact that the parents of such  candidates had  before  1947,  as a result of  their  participation  in national  movement  for the emancipation of India  from  the foreign rule, suffered imprisonment, detention, disablement, or loss of property or job, does not necessarily clothe them with  an intelligible differentia distinguishing them  as  a separate  class  in  1970  for  admission  to  the   Medical Colleges.  It was contended that what may have happened more than 23 years ago (as no question of the national  movement. for the emancipation of India could arise after Indian inde- pendence) is far too remote in point of time for serving  as a   rational   differentia  for   sustaining   the   present classification in favorite of the children of such political sufferers.  It was not denied that the Government could  and should extend all help needed to rehabilitate such sufferers in order, so far as reasonably possible, to undo or minimise the  effect of, or to compensate them for,  their  suffering

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during  the national movement.  But that is quite  different from giving their children preference over other  candidates otherwise  equally  placed  in the matter  of  admission  to Medical  Colleges in 1970, unless there are  cogent  grounds for  holding that because of their parents’ suffering  prior to 1947 the children have been so handicapped as to  require a  favoured  treatment  in this respect.  The  case  of  the children of defence personnel, it was urged, clearly  stands on  a  different  footing, as in their case  from  the  very nature of the duties of the defence personnel their children are  generally  speaking  likely to  suffer  from  handicaps justifying  preferential treatment.  Minor P.  Rajendran  v. State  of Madras (1) was cited in support of the  submission that the fact that classification by itself is reasonable is not  enough to support it, unless there is a  nexus  between the  classification and object to be achieved and also  that the  object  to be achieved in a case of  admission  to  the Medical Colleges is to get the best talent for admission  to professional colleges. The learned Attorney-General, however, drew our attention to Chitra Ghosh v. Union of India (2) in which after  approving the  view  taken in Minor P. Rajendran’s case  (1),  it  was added  that  the  object  of  selecting  the  best  possible material can be (2)  [1970] 1 S. C. R. 413. (1) [1968]2 S.C.R. 786. 632 achieved by making proper rules for admission.   Permissible classification, according to the petitioner’s argument, must be  founded  on an intelligible  differentia  distinguishing persons grouped together from others left out of the  group, and  the  differentia must have a rational relation  to  the object  sought to be achieved by the provision in  question. It  was  emphasized  that  what  has  to  be  seen  is   the distinguishing feature existing at the time of the admission and the fact that the parents of the candidates had suffered by their patriotic activities admittedly more than 23  years ago  does not reasonably lead to an inference that  in  1970 also the children of such political sufferers constituted  a class  by itself requiring preference over other  candidates seeking admission to the Medical Colleges. The learned Attorney-General apart from relying on the  case of  Chitra Ghosh (1) submitted that the petitioner  in  Writ Peti-No.  622 of 1970 (R.  Jayashree), in which  case  alone this sub-rule was challenged, had obtained marks which  were lower than the last candidate admitted from the category  of the children of political sufferers.  On this ground it  was submitted  that,  even assuming r. 4(h) to be  invalid,  the petitioner could not claim admission, because her marks were admittedly  lower than those of the last candidate  admitted from  the category of the children of  political  sufferers. Those  children, even ignoring r. 4(h), had  a  preferential right  as  against  the petitioner R.  Jayashree.   In  that situation  the learned Attorney-General contended the  ques- tion  of the invalidity of r. 4(h) loses all importance  and would hardly be material. I  must confess that from the very beginning it  entertained some doubt about the validity of r. 4(h), and that doubt has not   been  dispelled  even  after  hearing  the   arguments addressed at the Bar.  The object of selection for admission to the Medical Colleges, considered in the background of the directive  principles  of  State  policy  contained  in  our Constitution, appears to be to select the best material from amongst  the  candidates in order not only to  provide  them with  adequate means of livelihood, but also to provide  the

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much needed medical aid to the people and to improve  public health generally.  As already observed, I am not quite  sure if  it  can be confidently said that there is  a  reasonable nexus  between  the  differentia on which  the  children  of political  sufferers are classified as a distinct group  and the  object of admission to the Medical Colleges.  In  view, however, of the admitted fact that the marks secured by  the petitioner R. Jayashree were lower than the marks secured by the  last  candidate  admitted  from  the  category  of  the children  of  political sufferers, the  petitioner  was  not entitled  to  claim  admission,  even  if  the  children  of political  sufferers were not given any priority.   On  this ground alone the (1) [1970] 1 S.C.R. 413. 633 present  Writ  Petition  (No. 622 of 1970)  deserves  to  be dismissed.   I according consider it unnecessary to go  into the  question of the invalidity of r. 4(h) in this case.   I would  thus confine the order of dismissal of Writ  Petition No.  622 of 1970 only on this ground without expressing  any considered  opinion  on the question of the validity  of  r. 4(h).  Except for my reservation on this point, I am      in respectful  agreement  with  all that has been  said  by  my learned brother Shelat, J. G.C.                                  Petition dismissed. 634