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PETITIONER: D.K. SONI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: P.K. MUKERJEE AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT27/10/1987

BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) OZA, G.L. (J)

CITATION:  1988 AIR   30            1988 SCR  (1) 617  1988 SCC  (1)  29        JT 1987 (4)   225  1987 SCALE  (2)887  CITATOR INFO :  R          1988 SC  94  (6)

ACT:      Landlord-Tenant matter-order  of eviction of the tenant on grounds  of personal  need of  the  landlord  challenged- Provisions of  U. P. Act No. 3 of 1947 (Temporary Control of Rent  and   Eviction  Act)  and  the  U.P.  Urban  Buildings (Regulation  of  Letting,  Rent  and  Eviction)  Act,  1972- Proceedings thereunder.

HEADNOTE: %      Respondent  No.   1,  Shri   P.K.  Mukerjee,  filed  an application under  the U.P.  Act No.  3 of  1947  (Temporary Control  of  Rent  and  Eviction  Act)  (OLD  Act),  seeking permission to  file a  suit  for  eviction  of  his  tenant, Harbans Lal Soni, the father of the appellant, D.K. Soni, on the grounds  of his  bona fide  requirement for his personal need. The  Rent Control  and Eviction  officer rejected  the application, holding  that the  respondent’s requirement was not bona  fide. A revision was filed by the respondent No. 1 before the Commissioner who allowed the same.      The U.P.  Urban Buildings  (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)  Act, 1972  (new Act) came into effect on July 15, 1972.  On August  2, 1972, the State Government rejected the representation  of the  tenant (father of the appellant) filed under  section 7  of the  old Act against the order of the Commissioner  aforementioned. The  tenant then  moved  a writ petition  in the High Court. A Single Judge of the High Court allowed  the petition  and  set  aside  the  abovesaid orders of the Commissioner and the State Government. Upon an appeal being  filed by  the respondent  (No. 1)  against the order of  the Single  Judge, a  Division Bench  of the  High Court allowed  the same,  setting aside  the  order  of  the Single Judge  and upholding  the above-said  orders  of  the commissioner and the State Government, allowing the eviction of the tenant.      In September,  1978, the  respondent  No.  1  moved  an application under section 21, read with section 43(2)(rr) of the  new   Act.  Thereafter,   the  respondent  executed  an agreement as  vendor to  sell the  permises  in  dispute  in

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favour of  the vendee, the wife of the appellant, Smt. Madhu Soni-daughter-in-law  of   the  tenant,   Harbans  Lal.  The agreement was  dated November  7,  1978,  and  it  mentioned therein that  the landlord,  respondent No.  1 had  filed an application against the tenant above- 617 named. The  father-in-law of  the vendee-for  permission  to file a  suit for eviction of the tenant from the premises in dispute on  account of  the respondent’s  personal need, and that the  permission had been granted. The agreement recited that a  vacant portion of the land of the disputed premises, would be  in the  exclusive possession of the vendor and the rest of  the property-the disputed premises would be sold to the vendee,  Smt. Madhu  Soni. The agreement stipulated that the vendee  or the  other members of the family had no right over the portion of the land to be kept with the vendor, and that the  appellant had  given  up  his  tenancy  rights  in respect of  the same,  and also that premises would be built on the  said vacant  land with  the money  to be obtained by selling the  disputed house to Smt. Madhu Soni. The price of the house  was settled  at Rs.1,00,000 out of which a sum of Rs.5000 was  paid as  earnest money,  and it  was stipulated that the  rest of  the amount  would be  paid at the time of registration. It  was agreed that the parties would move the authorities for  permission to transfer as early as possible and the  saledeed would  be executed within one month of the grant of  permission and notice to the vendee. It was stated that if  the vendee  failed to  get the  sale-deed  executed within the  time stipulated,  the earnest  money of  Rs.5000 would be  forfeited and the property would stand released in favour of  the vendor.  It was also stipulated that the need of the  vendor for  the premises subsisted and the agreement had been  entered into to enable the vendor to get money out of the  sale to  construct a house for himself on the vacant piece of  land. On  December 12,  1978, the  father  of  the appellant, who was the tenant, died, leaving behind a widow, two sons,  including  the  appellant,  and  a  daughter.  On December 22,  1978, the  appellant informed  the  Prescribed Authority before whom the application under section 21(1)(a) of the  New Act,  read with  section 43(2)(rr), was pending, about the death of the tenant, Shri Harbans Lal Soni.      On March  23, 1979,  the  respondent  No.  1  filed  an application (in Case No. 53 of 1978) for substitution of the legal  heirs   of  the   deceased  tenant,   along  with  an application under  section 5  of  the  Limitation  Act.  The Prescribed   Authority    rejected   the   application   for substitution on  grounds of delay. On December 11, 1979, the respondent No.  1 moved  a second  application under section 21(1)(a), read with section 43(2)(rr) of the new Act (on the ground as  in his earlier application), which was registered as Case No. 68 of 1979.      On March  12, 1981,  the respondent  No. 1 executed two separate agreements  for sale of the property in dispute, in favour of R.P. Kanodia and P.K. Kanodia, respectively. 618      The Prescribed  Authority decided  the Case  No. 68  of 1979 abovementioned on July 7, 1981, directing the tenant to be evicted  from the  premises in  dispute.  The  Additional District Judge  dismissed the  appeal against  the order  of eviction passed by the Prescribed Authority.      On March  11, 1983,  the appellant’s  wife, Smt.  Madhu Soni filed a suit for injunction, restraining the respondent No. 1 from dispossessing her from the premises in dispute on the strength of the registered agreement, asserting that she resided in the premises in part performance of the agreement

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under section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. The trial Court dismissed  the suit. The High Court was then moved for relief  by  a  writ  petition  against  the  orders  of  the Prescribed Authority  for eviction  and  the  order  of  the Additional District  Judge. The writ petition was dismissed, followed  by   the  dismissal  of  a  Review  Petition  too. Aggrieved thereby  the appellant  has appealed to this Court by special leave.      Dismissing the appeal, the Court, ^      HELD:  The   questions  involved  in  the  appeal  are: Firstly, in view of the provisions of section 43(2)(rr), was the High  Court right  in its  decision, in  the  facts  and circumstances of the case, specially the factum of the death of the  (original) tenant  being alleged, and in view of the fact that the execution of the order for eviction had become final before  the new Act came into operation? Secondly, how far do  the subsequent events, namely, the agreements by the respondent No.  1 with  the wife  of one  of the sons of the tenant and  with  the  Kanodias  to  sell  the  property  in dispute, demolish or destroy the case of a bona fide need of the landlord? [622G-H; 623A]      In substance,  the need  was there  of the landlord for his occupation of his premises as he wanted to reside in his house after  his retirement from Government service, and for this purpose  he had  sought eviction and obtained the order of eviction  prior to  the coming  into operation of the new Act. The  object of  the landlord  was not  defeated by  the provisions of the New Act. [626G-H]      Considering the  subsequent events, namely, the refusal of  permission   by  the   Urban  Ceiling  Authorities,  the escalation of building cost (upto 1987), failure on the part of the  vendee to  register and  execute the document, it is not possible  to hold  that the  subsequent events  have  so materially altered  the position  as to  defeat the original order for  possession passed  in favour of the landlord. The subsequent events do not in 619 any way affect the existence of the need of the landlord for possession of premises in question. [627C-E]      There was  no failure  on the  part of  the landlord to take steps  for the  substitution. Nothing was proved before the Court  that the  agreements with  R.P. Kanodia  and P.K. Kanodia were  valid today  or given effect to in view of the provision of  the Land ceiling Act. It was not proved to the satisfaction of  the authorities below that any agreement to sell the  premises to  Kanodias had been given effect to and acted upon  and in  that view of the matter, the need of the landlord indubitably  succeeds, and  any allegations made do not merit  any revision of the order which had become final. Finality of  the judicial  decisions is one of the essential ingredients upon  which the  administration of  justice must rest. In  that view  of the  matter, even if the contentions advanced  on  behalf  of  the  respondents  are  taken  into consideration and  a  new  look  is  taken  because  of  the subsequent events,  which cannot  be done  in  view  of  the specific provisions  in clause  (rr) of section 43(2) of the new Act, the appellant has no case. The High Court was right in  not   interfering  with  the  order  of  the  Prescribed Authority. Finality  of the  decisions  of  the  authorities under the Act has to be given due reverence and place in the judicial administration. [629A-C]      The appeal  fails. As the appellant had been staying in the premises  for quite  some time, time till April 30, 1988 granted to  him to deliver vacant possession of the house to

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the landlord, subject to his filing usual undertaking within four weeks. [629E-F]      Pasupuleti  Venkateswarlu  v.  The  motor  and  general Traders, [1975]  3 SCR  958; Pattersion v. State of Alabama, 294 U.S.  600 at  607; Ramji  Dayawala and  Sons(P) Ltd.  v. Invest Import,  [1981] 1  SCR 899;  Hasmat Rai  and Anr.  v. Raghunath Prasad,  [1981] 3 SCR 605; Syed Asadullah Kazmi v. The Addl.  District Judge,  Allahabad and Ors., [1982] 1 SCR 77; Sher Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab, [1983] 2 SCR 582; Bansilal  Sahu v.  The Prescribed  Authority  and  Anr, [1980]  All   L.J.  331;   Smt.  Sarju  Devi  v.  Prescribed Authority, Kanpur,  [1977]  All  L.J.  251  and  Tara  Chand Khandelwal v.  Prescribed Authority,  Agra, [1976]  All L.J. 708, referred to. G

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6626 of 1983.      From the  Judgment and  order dated  18.5.1983  of  the Allahabad High Court in C.M.W.P. No. 13741 of 1982. H 620      S.N. Kacker and R.B. Mehrotra for the Appellant.      B.D. Agarwala and Miss Asha Rani for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. This is an appeal by the tenant against an order upholding the order of eviction. The ground of eviction  was  on  the  landlord’s  bona  fide  need  and requirement. The appeal arises out of the judgment and order of the  High Court  of Allahabad dated 18th of May, 1983 and also against  the order dated 23rd of May, 1983 dismissing a review  application  by  the  said  High  Court.  Shri  P.K. Mukerjee, respondent  No. 1  herein had filed an application under section  3 of  the U.P.  Act No.  3 of 1947 (Temporary Control of  Rent and  Eviction Act), hereinafter referred to as the  old Act,  seeking permission  to file  the suit  for eviction of  the tenant, the father of the appellant herein, on the  ground that  accommodation in  dispute was bona fide required  by   the  landlord   for  his  personal  need.  In September,  1971  the  Rent  Control  and  Eviction  officer rejected the  application of  the landlord and held that his requirement was not bona fide. On 12th of November, 1971 the Commissioner allowed  the revision filed by respondent No. 1 against the  order of  the Rent Control and Eviction officer dated 5th  of September,  1971. It  may be mentioned that on 15th of  July, 1972  the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent  and Eviction)  Act, 1972 hereinafter referred to as  the new  Act came into effect. On 2nd of August, 1972 the State  Government rejected  the  representation  of  the tenant namely,  the father  of  the  appellant  filed  under section  7   of  the  old  Act  against  the  order  of  the Commissioner dated 2nd of November, 1971. On or about 7th of February, 1975 the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Allahabad allowed  the writ  petition of  the tenant and set aside  the   orders  of   the  Commissioner  and  the  State Government hereinbefore  mentioned. On 3rd of August, 1978 a Division Bench  of the  High Court  of Allahabad allowed the appeal of respondent No. 1 and set aside the judgment of the learned  Single  Judge  of  the  High  Court  dated  7th  of February, 1975 and upheld the orders of the Commissioner and the State Government allowing the eviction of the tenant. In September, 1978  respondent No. 1 moved an application under section 21  read with  section 43(2)(rr)  of  the  new  Act. Thereafter it  is alleged that respondent No. 1 had executed

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an agreement  to sell the disputed premises in favour of the appellant’s wife  namely, Smt. Madhu Soni. It is material to refer to the said agreement in brief. The agreement is dated as mentioned hereinbefore 7th of November, 1978 621 and  was  entered  into  between  Shri  P.K.  Mukerjee,  the landlord and  Smt. Madhu Soni wife of Shri D.K. Soni (son of Shri Harbans  Lal Soni)  the then tenant. It was stated that the landlord had filed an application against Shri H.L. Soni the father-in-law  of vendee  for permission  to file a suit for eviction against him on account of his personal need for the aforesaid  premises and  permission had been granted. It also recited  that a  portion of  the said  land  which  was demarcated in the site plan measuring about 121’ x 101.5’ of the vendor  which would  be for  the construction of a house would be  in exclusive possession of the vendor and the rest of the  property at  8, Panna  Lal Road, Allahabad being the disputed premises  would be  sold  to  Smt.  Soni.  It  also recited that  the vendee or his family members would have no right of  whatsoever nature  and the vendee, that is to say, the appellant  had given  up his tenancy right in respect of the same,  that is  to say,  the portion to be kept with the vendor and  the premises  will be  built on  the vacant land with the  money  that  would  be  obtained  by  selling  the property to  Smt. Madhu  Soni. The property was sold for Rs. 1,00,000 out of which Rs.5,000 was paid as earnest money and it was  stipulated that  the rest of the money would be paid at the  time of the registration. It was further agreed that the parties  would move  the proper  authorities as early as possible for  permission to transfer and the sale deed would be executed  within one month of the grant of the permission and notice  to the vendee. It was further stated that if the vendee failed  to get the sale deed executed after one month from the  date of permission and notice to the vendee by the vendor, the earnest money of Rs.5,000 would be forfeited and the right  of the  vendor would  be as it subsisted prior to the agreement.  It was further provided that in the event of non-execution of  the sale  deed on  account of  any act  or failure on  the part  of the  vendee  in  pursuance  of  the agreement to  sell, the  property would  stand  released  in favour of the vendor and the earnest money of Rs.5,000 would be forfeited. It was clearly stipulated that the need of the vendor for  the premises  still subsisted and this agreement was being  entered into  since it  would be possible for the vendor to  construct a  house for  himself on  the land  not agreed to  be transferred measuring 121’ x 101.5 ’ . On that basis the  parties had  signed agreement  on  7th  November, 1978.      On 12th  of December,  1978 the  father of  the present appellant Shri  H.L. Soni  who was  the original tenant died leaving  behind   his  widow  and  two  sons  including  the appellant and  one daughter.  It was alleged that on 18th of December, 1978  respondent No. l sent a letter of condolence to the appellant on the death of appellant’s father. On 622 22nd of  December, 1978  appellant informed  the  Prescribed Authority  before  whom  the  application  under  section  2 1(1)(a) of  the new  Act  red  with  section  43(2)(rr)  was pending about  the death of Shri H.L Soni. On 23rd of March, 1979 respondent  No. 1 moved an application for substitution in Case  No. 53  of 1978 for bringing on record the heirs of deceased Shri H.L. Soni along with application under section 5 of  the Limitation  Act. On  10th of  November, 1979,  the Prescribed Authority  rejected the  petitioners  application for substitution  and held  that respondent  No. 1  had full

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knowledge of the death of Shri H.L. Soni and he did not move the application  within time.  On  11th  of  December,  1979 respondent No.  1 moved a second application under section 2 1(1)(a) read  with section  43(2)(rr) of  the new Act on the same   ground on which the first application was moved. The second application was registered as Case No. 68 of 1979. It is alleged  further that  on 12th  of March, 1981 respondent No. 1  executed two separate agreements to sell the property in dispute  in favour  of  R.P.  Kanodia  and  P.K.  Kanodia respectively. The Prescribed Authority on 7th of July, 198 1 held that  the second  application under  section 2  1(1)(a) read with section 43(2)(rr) of the new Act being Case No. 68 of 1979  was within  time and  directed  the  tenant  to  be evicted  from   the  premises  in  dispute.  The  Additional District Judge, Allahabad on 25th of October, 1982 dismissed the appeal  of the  tenant filed  against the  order of  the Prescribed Authority  dated 7th  of July,  1981. On  11th of March, 1983  the appellant’s  wife Smt.  Madhu Soni  filed a suit  for  injunction  restraining  Respondent  No.  1  from dispossessing her  from  the  premises  in  dispute  on  the strength of  registered agreement  and she asserted that she resided in the accommodation as a result of part performance under section  53A of  the Transfer  of Property  Act, 1882. Initially injunction was granted ex parte by the Trial Court and thereafter  it was  vacated after hearing respondent No. 1. Aggrieved  thereby an  appeal }  was filed  by Smt. Madhu Soni in  which the  High Court had stayed dispossession. The High Court  thereafter dismissed  the writ  petition of  the tenant against  the orders  of the  Prescribed Authority for eviction and  the order  of the Additional District Judge. A review petition  was filed by the appellant and the same was dismissed. This  appeal by  special leave  is  against  that decision of the High Court dated 18th of May, 1983      Behind this  long tale  of dates the questions involved in this  appeal are  short, namely,  firstly in  view of the provisions of section 43(2)(rr) was the High Court right, in the facts  and circumstances of the case specially the death of original  tenant being  alleged, and  in view of the fact that the execution of the order passed for eviction had 623 become final before coming into operation of the new Act the order was  proper  and  secondly,  how  far  the  subsequent events, namely,  the A agreement with the wife of one of the sons of  the original tenant to purchase property as well as the  agreement  with  the  Kanodias  mentioned  hereinbefore demolish or  destroy the  case of  a bona  fide need  of the landlord. In other words are these not sufficient subsequent events which  destroy the  landlord’s bona  fide need and as such should  be taken  note of  by the appropriate courts in ordering eviction.  In this  appeal, therefore,  we have  to keep in  mind two aspects of law namely, the finality of the decisions  and   secondly,  how   far  and  to  what  extent subsequent events  should be  taken note  of in  order to do justice between the parties.      Before we  refer to  the judgment of the High Court and the submissions  made before  us, it  is necessary for us to bear in  mind certain  decisions  of  this  Court  on  these aspects  on   which  reliance  was  placed.  This  Court  in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu  v. The  Motor &  General  Traders, [1975]  3   S.C.R.  958  dealing  with  the  Andhra  Pradesh Buildings (Lease,  Rent and  Eviction)  Control  Act,  1960, dealt with  the question as to how far the subsequent events can be  taken note  of. This  Court held that for making the right or  remedy, claimed by a party justly and meaningfully as also legally and factually in accordance with the current

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realities, the  court can,  and in  many  cases  must,  take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution  of the  proceeding provided  the  rules  of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed. In the facts of that  case, this Court said that the High Court was right in taking into consideration the facts which came into being subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings. Therefore the fact that in determining what justice required the Court was bound  to consider any change, either in fact or in law, which had supervened since the judgment was given. F      This general  principle and  proposition of  law was of ancient vintage.  See the  observations of  the U.S. Supreme Court in  Pattersion v.  State of  Alabama, (294 U.S. 600 at page 607).  The actual  facts, however,  of this  case  were entirely different,  and so it was not necessary to refer to those facts.  In Ramji  Dayawala &  Sons (P)  Ltd. v. Invest Import, [1981]  1  S.C.R.  899,  this  principle  was  again reiterated entirely under different context. This Court also reiterated the  same principle  in Hasmat Rai and another v. Raghunath Prasad,  [1981] 3  S.C.R. 605  where referring  to Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu  v. The  Motor and  General Traders (supra), this  Court held that when an action was brought by the landlord  under Rent Restriction Act for eviction on the H 624 ground of  personal requirement,  his need  must not only be shown to  A exist at the date of the suit, but must exist on the date  of appellate  decree, or  the date  when a  higher court dealt with the matter. It was emphasised by this Court that if  during the  progress and passage of proceeding from court to  court subsequent  events  had  occurred  which  if noticed would  non-suit the  plaintiff,  the  court  had  to examine  and   evaluate  the   same  and  mould  the  decree accordingly. The  tenant was  entitled to show that the need or  requirement   no  more  existed  by  pointing  out  such subsequent events,  to the  court  including  the  appellate court.  Otherwise   the  landlord  would  derive  an  unfair advantage, and  it would be against the spirit or intendment of Rent  Restriction Act  which was  enacted to  fetter  the unfettered right  of re-entry.  In such  a situation, it was reiterated that,  it would  be incorrect  to say that as the decree or  order for  eviction was passed against the tenant he could  not invite  the court  to take  into consideration subsequent events. But the tenant could be precluded from so contending when  decree or  order for  eviction  had  become final. (Emphasis  supplied-see the observations of Desai, J. at page  617(G.H) of the report). In Syed Asadullah Kazmi v. The Addl.  District Judge,  Allahabad and  others, [1982]  1 S.C.R. 77,  this Court  was concerned  with a  residence  at Allahabad. It  was held  by this  Court that the order dated 25th March,  1977 of  the appellate  authority  releasing  a portion of  the premises  in favour  of the third respondent therein and  leaving the remaining portion in the tenancy of the appellant therein acquired finality when the proceedings taken against it by the appellant had failed. The Prescribed Authority was  bound to  give effect to that final order and was not  acting outside  its jurisdiction or contrary to law where he ordered eviction. This Court reiterated that it was true that  subsequent events had to be taken into account by a statutory  authority or  court when considering proceeding arising out  of a  landlord’s petition  for ejectment  of  a tenant on the ground of the landlord’s personal need. But in that case  the  order  for  release  of  a  portion  of  the accommodation had  acquired finality before the death of the landlord and  the controversy  concluded by  it could not be

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reopened thereafter.  This  Court  further  reiterated  that inasmuch as  the question  which arose before the Prescribed Authority on  the application  of the  appellant  after  the proceedings for  release had  acquired finality,  it was not open even  for this  Court  to  reopen  the  proceeding  for release. Not  quite relevant  to  the  present  controversy, there is,  however, just an observation in Sher Singh & Ors. v. The  State of  Punjab, [1983]  2 S.C.R.  582.  It  was  a decision dealing  with Article 21 of the Constitution. There is an  observation that traditionally, subsequent events had to be  taken into  account in  the area  of civil law. It is necessary, however, to refer to a 625 decision of the special bench of the Allahabad high Court in Bansilal Sahu  v. The  Prescribed Authority  and another,  [ 19801 ALL.  L.J. 331  which arose  under the new Act. It was held therein  that the  question whether the eviction of the tenant had  to be  ordered from  any specified  part of  the building under  tenancy was  not within  the jurisdiction of the Prescribed  Authority, while acting under clause (rr) of section 43(2),  irrespective of the occurrence of subsequent events which  might make  it improper  to order the eviction from the  entire building  or which  might tend to establish that the  need set  up by the landlord could be satisfied by ordering eviction of the tenant from a specified part of the building under  tenancy. It  was held that subsequent events or facts  could not  be considered so as to defeat the final order and  the  Prescribed  Authority  was  bound  to  order eviction. The  Special Bench  of the  Allahabad  High  Court overruled another Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in the  case of  Smt. Sarju  Devi v.  Prescribed  Authority, Kanpur, [19771  All. L.J.  251 and  accepted the proposition laid down  in Tara Chand Khandelwal v. Prescribed Authority, Agra, [1976] All L.J. 708. Satish Chandra, C.J. speaking for the Allahabad High Court observed that the opening clause of this provision entitled the Prescribed Authority to find out whether permission  under section  3 of the old Act had been obtained on  any ground  specified in subsection (1) or sub- section (2)  of section  21 of  the present Act and that the same had  become final.  It was, therefore, according to the Chief Justice,  the beginning  as well  as the  end  of  his jurisdiction to  record findings.  If the  conclusion was in the affirmative  the Prescribed  Authority had no discretion but to  order the  eviction of  the tenant from the building under tenancy.  It was further held that the jurisdiction of the Prescribed  Authority was  to order  the eviction of the tenant from the building under tenancy. It had not expressly been conferred any power to order eviction from a portion or part of the building under tenancy. It was further held that the jurisdiction  of the Prescribed Authority while deciding an application  under section  2 1  of the present Act could not  be   equated  with  the  jurisdiction  which  had  been conferred for  giving effect to the permission granted under section 3 of the old Act. The two situations were different. Clause (rr) of section 43(2) of the present Act specifically prohibited the  Prescribed Authority  from satisfying itself afresh that  the grounds existed. We are of the opinion that this is the correct state of law and if that is the position the so-called  subsequent events  are  not  germane  to  the question to be decided by the High Court.      In the aforesaid light, in our opinion, in the facts of this case the High Court was right. 626      It may  be mentioned  that clause (rr) of section 43(2) of the new Act provides as follows:

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         "where any  permission referred to in Section 3 of           the old  Act  has  been  obtained  on  any  ground           specified in sub section (1) or sub-section (2) of           section 21 and has become final, either before the           commencement of this Act or in accordance with the           provisions   of   this   sub-section   after   the           commencement of  this Act  (whether or  not a suit           for  the   eviction  of   the  tenant   has   been           instituted),  the   landlord  may   apply  to  the           prescribed  authority   for  his   eviction  under           section 21, and thereupon the prescribed authority           shall order  the eviction  of the  tenant from the           building  under  tenancy,  and  it  shall  not  be           necessary  for  prescribed  authority  to  satisfy           itself afresh as to the existence of any ground as           aforesaid, and such order shall be final and shall           not be open to appeal under section 22:           Provided that  no application  under  this  clause           shall be maintainable on the basis of a permission           granted under section 3 of the old Act, where such           permission became  final  more  than  three  years           before the commencement of this Act:           Provided further  that in  computing the period of           three years,  the time  during which the applicant           has been  prosecuting with due diligence any civil           proceeding whether in a court of first instance or           appeal or revision shall be excluded"      All these aspects were considered by the High Court. We recognise that  unless the statute expressly prohibits as it did in  the instant  case, by the aforesaid clause, cautious recognition of  subsequent events to mould the relief should be taken  note of. In the instant case in substance the need was there  of the  landlord for  his occupation  of his  own premises. The  landlord was  a Government servant and wanted to reside  in Allahabad  and  for  this  purpose  he  sought eviction and  had obtained  an order  of eviction  prior  to coming into  operation of  the new  Act.  The  hope  of  the landlord to  come back to his origin was not defeated by the provisions of  the new  Act. In  vain he moved from court to court and  in the  meantime there  has  been  escalation  of prices and  restrictions on  alienation of land and in order to save  himself from  this situation  the landlord tried to sell part of the premises in question 627 subsequent to  the decree  to the wife of one of the sons of the tenant.  This is not material. The agreement in question further stipulated  that the  present need  of the  landlord subsisted, and  out of  this  agreement  only  Rs.5,000  was advanced in  1978  and  nothing  was  paid  thereafter.  The agreement for sale to Smt. Madhu Soni reads as follows:           "That it is made clear that the need of the vendor           for the premises still subsists and this agreement           is being  entered into  since it  will be possible           for the vendor to construct a house for himself on           the land  not agreed  to be  transferred measuring           121’ x 101.5’. The parties, therefore, have signed           this Deed on the 7th day of November, 1978 In view  of the subsequent events, namely, non-permission of the Urban  Ceiling  Authorities,  failure  to  register  and execute the  document, delay  for permission  on the part of the vendee  and the escalation of prices, that is to say, if in 1979  perhaps it  was possible  to  build  some  kind  of accommodation with  the amount  of sale price to be obtained from the  execution of the document which it is not possible in 1987  and further there is no readiness or willingness on

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the part  of the  vendee to  execute the document, after the existence of  the basic  need of  the  landlord,  for  which originally the  proceedings were  taken and finalised, we do not find  it possible to hold that subsequent events have so materially altered  as to  defeat  the  original  order  for possession passed in favour of the respondents.      We do  not find perusing the records that there was any failure for substitution on the part of the landlord to take steps. The  other son  of the deceased was not residing with the deceased  in the  premises in question, therefore, there was no need to substitute him.      The other  agreements to  which reference had been made was the alleged agreement with R.P. Kanodia and P.K. Kanodia respectively. Nothing was proved before us that agreement is valid today  or given effect to in view of the provisions of the Land Ceiling Act.      It may  be mentioned that the Competent Authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 by the order dated 20th  of April,  1979 refused  permission to  sell  in favour of Smt. Madhu Soni. On 7th November, 1978 the wife of the appellant and the landlord had entered into an agreement to sell  a portion  of the  land as  well as  the  house  in dispute to  the appellant’s wife, and for that purpose a sum of 628 Rs.5,000  had  been  paid  as  earnest  money  as  mentioned hereinbefore, A  and in the agreement, it was clearly stated that the  parties would move the proper authorities as early as possible  for permission to transfer the property and the sale deed would be executed within one month of the grant of such permission  and notice  to the  vendee. Clause 6 of the agreement further  stipulated that  if the  vendee failed to get the  agreement executed after one month from the date of permission and  notice to  the vendee  the earnest  money of Rs.5,000 would be forfeited and the right of the vendor will be as  it subsisted  prior to  the agreement.  The requisite permission in  terms of  the agreement  was obtained  by the landlord  in   the  year   1979  and   a  registered  notice consequently was also sent to the appellant’s wife requiring her to  get the  sale deed  executed in  accordance with the agreement. Thereafter  a reply  dated 2  1st September, 1979 was also  received by the landlord. However, the appellant’s wife failed  to get  the sale deed executed and consequently the agreement  itself became  infructuous  and  the  earnest money stood forefeited.      The need  as it has been reiterated in the agreement of the landlord  for his own purpose still subsisted. There was no delay  in bringing  the heirs  of the  deceased tenant on record. In  the aforesaid  view of  the matter  there was no substance in  the objection  filed against  the execution of the order  of eviction  in terms  of clause  (rr) of section 43(2) of  the  new  Act.  In  any  event  such  events  were frivolous after  the order  had become final. The subsequent events which  we have  examined do not in any way effect the decision of  need for possession of the premises in question of the  respondent-landlord. It  may be mentioned that there was an  application by  the respondent  for the review. This was heard  and no order was made on that application. It was reiterated in  the counter affidavit filed by the respondent that since  1st of  December, 1978 till todate the appellant had not  paid any  money to  the landlord  nor deposited the damages in  the court.  At the  time of  his death late H.L. Soni was  residing in  the house  in dispute with his eldest son Shri D.K. Soni, the appellant, his wife, Smt. Madhu Soni and Mrs.  Kailash Soni,  the widow. Other son Shri A.K. Soni

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and daughter  Mrs. Kangan Khanna were not residing with Late Shri H.L.  Soni at  the time  of his  death and as such they were not  heirs as  contemplated by  section 3(g) of the new Act. The landlord was a Government servant and was posted at Lucknow and  as such  during his  tenure he had to reside at Lucknow but after his retirement he wanted to settle down at his ancestral  house at Allahabad and it was for this reason that the proceedings for eviction were taken. 629      It  was   not  proved   to  the   satisfaction  of  the authorities below that any agreement to sell the premises to Kanodias has been given effect to and had been acted upon or can be  acted upon.  It that  view of  the matter  the  need indubitably succeeds  and even  if the  allegations made are taken into  consideration do  not merit  any revision of the order which  had become  final.  Finality  of  the  judicial decisions is one of the essential ingredients upon which the administration of  justice must  rest. In  that view  of the matter we  are of  the  opinion,  even  if  the  contentions advanced  on  behalf  of  the  respondents  are  taken  into consideration and  a  new  look  is  taken  because  of  the subsequent events,  which in  our opinion  cannot be done in view of  the specific  prohibition in clause (rr) of section 43(2) of the new Act, the appellant hac no case.      In the  aforesaid view  of the  matter we  are  of  the opinion that  the High  Court was  right in  not interfering with the  order  of  the  Prescribed  Authority.  After  all finality of  the decisions  of the authorities under the Act has to  be given  due reverence  and place  in the  judicial administration.  Taking   cautious  note   of  the  relevant subsequent events,  we find  no  merit  in  the  appellant’s contentions inasmuch  as there  is nothing on record to show that the  landlord’s bona  fide need  for his  residence  in Allahabad has been met or can be met in the state of affairs except by the order which is impugned in this appeal.      In  the   premises,  the   appeal  must   fail  and  is accordingly dismissed  without any order as to costs. Since, however, the  appellant has  been staying  in  the  disputed premises for  quite some  time, we  grant time  till 30th of April, 1988  to deliver  vacant possession  of the  premises subject to  filing usual  undertaking within four weeks from today. In  default in  filing undertaking  the  order  would become executable forthwith. S.L.                                       Appeal dismissed. 630