27 October 2010
Supreme Court
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D. HANUMANTH SA Vs STATE OF KARNATAKA .

Bench: MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA,ANIL R. DAVE, , ,
Case number: C.A. No.-000017-000020 / 2005
Diary number: 17498 / 2003


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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 17-20 OF 2005

D. HANUMANTH SA & ORS.             ……. Appellants

Versus

STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.              ......Respondents   

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 22 OF 2005

JUDGMENT

Dr. Mukundakam Sharma, J.

1. By  filing  the  present  appeals  the  appellants   have  

challenged  the   validity  of  the  notification  issued under  

Section  4  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894  [hereinafter

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referred  to  as  “the  Act”)  and  also  the  notification  issued  

under Section 6 of the Act whereby the respondents sought  

to acquire land admeasuring 3 acres 34 guntas situated in  

Kengeri Village and Hobli, Bangalore, Karnataka.  

2. Initially  appellants  filed  writ  petitions  registered  as  Writ  

Petition  Nos.  20083-20085 of  1993 before  the  Karnataka  

High Court challenging the validity of the notification issued  

under Section 4 invoking the emergency clause. The High  

Court  of  Karnataka,  while  issuing  notice,  granted  stay.  

Subsequently, an order dated 30.08.1993 was passed in the  

writ petition regarding the statement/submission on behalf  

of the State Government that they would not proceed with  

the  acquisition  proceeding  of  invoking  the  emergency  

provision  under  the  Act.  Consequent  to  the  same,  the  

appellants herein were given opportunity to file objections.  

3. The  appellants  thereafter  filed  detailed  objections  

contending  inter  alia that  the  vast  extent  of  land that  is  

already possessed by the Karnataka State Road Transport  

Corporation  [for  short  ‘KSRTC’]  and  some  of  the  State-

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owned land is still laying vacant and, therefore, the purpose  

of acquiring the land of the appellants for formation of link  

road is unjustified and that the same cannot be said to be  

required  for  formation  of  link  road.  The  appellants  also  

contended that despite the aforesaid objection filed and a  

report submitted by the Land Acquisition Officer in favour  

of  the  claimants,  the  State  Government  issued  a  final  

notification under Section 6(1) of the Act by holding that the  

land  belonging  to  the  appellants  are  required  for  the  

purpose of workshop and providing residential quarters to  

its employees.   

4. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid action on the part of the  

State Government in issuing a notification under Section 6  

of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  the  appellants  filed  Writ  

Petition  Nos.  25361-25364  of  1994  and  25264  of  1994  

before  the  Karnataka  High  Court  challenging  the  legality  

and the validity of the preliminary and final notifications.  

5. The  Single  Judge  of  the  Karnataka  High  Court,  by  his  

judgment and order dated 01.02.2000, allowed the said writ  

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petitions holding that in the proceedings prepared by the  

State Government, the purpose of acquisition was stated to  

have a link road and in the final notification under Section  

6 of the Act, the purpose of acquisition having been shown  

as completely different, the entire purpose was not justified  

and tenable. The said fact was also stated to be so, and had  

been held as unjustified by the Land Acquisition Officer. By so  

holding  the  learned  Single  Judge  of  the  Karnataka  High  

Court  allowed  the  writ  petitions  and  quashed  the  said  

notifications issued under Section 4 and Section 6 of the  

Land Acquisition Act.  

6. Being  aggrieved  by  the  said  judgment  and  order  the  

respondent  filed  a  writ  appeal  before  the  High  Court  of  

Karnataka.  By judgment and order dated 02.07.2003 the  

Division Bench of  the  Karnataka High Court  allowed the  

appeal  filed  by  the  State  Government  and  set  aside  the  

judgment  and  order  of  the  learned  Single  Judge  holding  

that the acquisition for the land was for a public purpose  

and that there was no ambiguity  in the two notifications  

issued under Sections 4 and  6 of the Act.  

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7. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and order passed by  

the Division Bench of the High Court the present appeals  

have been filed by the claimants-appellants on which we  

have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties.

8. In  the  light  of  the  submissions  made  before  us  we  now  

proceed to decide the contentions raised before us by the  

counsel appearing for the parties. Counsel appearing for the  

appellants  submitted  that  the  notification  issued  by  the  

respondent under Section 4 was vague and the purpose for  

which the land was sought to be acquired as disclosed from  

the entire records of the proposed acquisition including the  

said notification was different than what was sought to be  

stated  in  the  notification  under  Section  6.  It  was  also  

submitted that the Government had failed to give detailed  

reasons for issuing the said notifications to satisfy that the  

land was required for public purpose, particularly when the  

Land Acquisition Officer had given his reasons to indicate  

that the purpose for which the land is sought to be acquired  

was not justified in the facts and circumstances of the case.  

In order to appreciate the aforesaid contentions raised, we  

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have considered all  the notifications relevant to the  facts  

and circumstances  of  the  case  and also  relevant  records  

useful for our purpose.

9. In the notification issued under Section 4(1) which is dated  

14.10.1992,  it  is  specifically  stated  that  the  State  of  

Karnataka required the land under acquisition for a specific  

public purpose, viz., for the benefit of Karnataka State Road  

Transport Corporation. The part of the notification invoking  

the provisions of  Section 17(4),  i.e.,  applying the urgency  

requirement of the Government was set aside by the writ  

court  which  became  final  and  binding  and  we  are  not  

required to address the aforesaid issue. But, so far as the  

requirement of the land for public purpose is concerned, the  

same  was  necessarily  for  a  public  purpose,  viz.,  for  the  

benefit of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation.  

10.Counsel  appearing  for  the  appellants  however  drew  our  

attention to the proceedings regarding acquisition of 7 acres  

15 guntas of land. We have perused the said copies of the  

proceedings also. In the said proceedings, it was stated that  

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in order to meet the increasing traffic in the surrounding  

area of Bangalore city, and also with a view to provide better  

transport  service  to  the  public,  it  is  proposed  by  the  

Government  to  establish  a  large  workshop  and  city  bus  

depot  in  the  said  land  and  also  for  establishment  of  

residences to workers, training centre and others are also  

proposed to be undertaken and in order to construct/form  

the road the said land is required. The said proceedings on  

careful analysis would also indicate that the land which was  

sought to be acquired also figured in a comprehensive plan  

for construction of a road as also workshop and residential  

building of the staff of KSRTC. The said fact also came to be  

reiterated  by  the  State  Government  by  filing  an  affidavit  

wherein it is stated that the entire land in dispute is in fact  

required not only for making an approach road but also for  

building a workshop and staff residential quarters.  

11.The aforesaid reasons and the purpose for which the land  

was sought to be acquired is definitely of a public character  

and  therefore,  the  respondent-State  Government,  in  our  

considered  opinion,  is  fully  competent  to  issue  such  a  

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notification under Section 4 as also under Section 6 of the  

Land Acquisition Act. Counsel appearing for the appellant  

at  one  stage  also  drew  our  attention  to  the  fact  that  

subsequently, another notification came to be issued by the  

Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board stating that  

the land as mentioned in the letter dated 16.12.2004 which  

is  annexed  as  Annexure  R-5  is  being  acquired  by  the  

Karnataka Industrial  Areas  Development  Board.  The said  

land  was  sought  to  be  acquired  by  issuing  notification  

under the State Act, viz., under Section 28(1) and Section  

28(4) of the State Act.

12.A preliminary notification was issued by the said authority,  

viz.,  Development  Board,  including  land  admeasuring  39  

guntas from Survey No. 128/1 and 34 guntas from Survey  

No.  128/2.  The  said  letter  itself  also  indicates  that  

subsequently, a final notification came to be issued under  

Section 28(4) of the State Act only for 34 guntas covered by  

Survey  No.  128/2.  Incidentally,  the  land  falling  under  

Survey No. 128/2 was not notified either under Section 4 or  

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under Section 6 under the notifications dated 14.10.1992  

and 28.03.1994, respectively.  

13.So  far  as  39  guntas  covered  by  Survey  No.  128/1  is  

concerned, which is sought to be acquired as indicated from  

letter  dated  10.12.2004,  we  find  that  the  same  is  not  

included  in  the  final  notification.  A  bare  perusal  of  the  

notifications issued under Sections 4(1)  and 6 of  the Act  

would indicate that the land covered by Survey No. 128/1  

was a part of the said notification but since the same came  

to be excluded in the final notification under Section 28(4),  

the  contentions  raised  by  the  counsel  appearing  for  the  

appellants that the said land stood acquired for a different  

purpose and, therefore, the purpose for which the land was  

sought  to  be  acquired  under  Section  4  and  6  was  

unjustified, is not tenable.

14.Even  otherwise,  if  land  already  stands  acquired  by  the  

Government  and  if  the  same  stands  vested  in  the  

Government there is no question of acquisition of such a  

land by issuing a second notification, for the Government  

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cannot acquire its own land. The same is by now settled by  

various decision of this Court in a catena of cases. In State  

of Orissa v. Brundaban Sharma,  reported at  1995 Supp  

(3) SCC 249, this Court has held that the Land Acquisition  

Act does not contemplate or provide for the acquisition of  

any interest  belonging to the Government in the land on  

acquisition; This  position  was reiterated in  a  subsequent  

decision of  this  Court  in  Meher Rusi  Dalal  v.  Union of  

India,  reported at  (2004) 7 SCC 362.   In paragraphs 15  

and 16 of the said judgment, this Court has held that the  

High Court clearly erred in setting aside the order of the  

Special Land Acquisition Officer declining a reference since  

it  is  settled  law that  in  land acquisition  proceedings  the  

Government cannot and does not acquire its own interest.  

While laying down the aforesaid law, this Court has referred  

to its earlier decision in the case of Collector of Bombay v.  

Nusserwanji  Rattanji  Mistri reported  at  (1955)  1  SCR  

1311.

15.However, on a close scrutiny of the records we find that  

same is not the case in the present case at hand. It cannot  

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be  said  that  the  land  which  stood  acquired  under  the  

notification issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act are in  

any  manner  connected  with  the  notifications  issued  by  

State  Government  for   Karnataka  Industrial  Areas  

Development  Board  for  Bangalore  Mysore  Infrastructure  

Corridor Project and even assuming a part of the said land  

is now sought to be acquired for a different purpose to that  

extent, the same cannot be said to be a proper acquisition  

as  the  land  already  stands  acquired  under  a  different  

notification issued by a separate authority under separate  

provisions of law.

16.In that view of the matter, we find no merit in these appeals  

and the same are  disposed of  by this  common judgment  

and order. Parties are left to bear their own costs.

...........………………………J. [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma]

…...............………………..J.       [ Swatanter Kumar ]

New Delhi, October 27, 2010

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