REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. 1233-1237 OF 2008

D.A.V. Boys Sr. Sec. School Etc.Etc.             .... Petitioner(s)

Versus

DAV College Managing Committee                .... Respondent(s)

WITH

TRANSFER PETITION (C) NOS. 243-244 OF 2009

AND

TRANSFER PETITION (C) NO. 667 OF 2009       

J U D G M E N T  

P. Sathasivam, J.

1) The petitioners in Transfer Petition (Civil) Nos. 1233-

1237 of 2008 and 243-244 of 2009 are schools run by the  

Tamil Nadu Arya Samaj Education Society (in short “the  

Society”)  which  is  registered  under  the  Societies  

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Registration Act, 1860.  According to the petitioners, the  

Society  was  registered  on  02.01.1975  and  has  been  

running and managing schools for the last more than 30  

years.  The schools are being run under a specific system  

of education propounded by “Swami Dayanand Saraswati”  

known  as  “Dayanand  Anglo  Vedic”  system  (in  short  

“DAV”).   The petitioners have been using the expression  

“DAV” with its schools for the last more than 30 years.  

The  respondent-Committee  is  running  about  700  

educational institutions.  On 16.01.2005, the respondent-

Committee  has  obtained  a  trademark  registration  in  

respect of the letters “DAV” and “Dayanand Anglo Vedic”  

under Class 41 which is a service mark.  On 04.08.2008,  

the  respondent-Committee  issued  a  notice  to  the  

petitioners of “cease and desist”,  namely, the petitioners  

should  not  use  the  words  “DAV”  for  its  schools.   On  

25.08.2008, the petitioners through their advocate replied  

to the said notice informing that the schools are being run  

by the Society for the last 38 years with the words “DAV”.  

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The respondent-Committee filed four suits under Section  

134  of  the  Trade  Marks  Act,  1999  before  the  District  

Court,  Tis Hazari,  Delhi  against various schools run by  

the  Society  at  Chennai  individually  without  making the  

Society as a party.   

2) Transfer Petition (Civil)  No.  667 of  2009 is filed by  

another petitioner from Chennai alleging that it is running  

and managing  a  school  using  the  expression  “DAV”  for  

more than 24 years.  It  also raised similar plea seeking  

transfer  of  suit  No.417  of  2008  titled  DAV  College  

Managing  Committee  vs.  Dayanand  Anglo  Vedic  School  

pending  in  Tis  Hazari  Court,  Delhi  to  the  original  side  

jurisdiction of the High Court of Madras.  

3) Opposing  the  transfer  petitions,  the  respondent-

Committee which has filed suits at Delhi has highlighted  

that it  is  a duly registered society with the Registrar of  

Societies  under  the  Societies  Registration  Act,  XXI  of  

1860.   Dayanand  Anglo  Vedic  College  Trust  and  

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Management Society  is  a charitable  Educational  Society  

founded  by  a  few  good  people  and  followers  of  His  

Holiness  Swami  Dayanand  Saraswati  to  spread  his  

teachings  and  Principals  of  Arya  Samaj  including  

Mahatma Hasraj and Master Sewaram.  At present, they  

are  managing  about  700  educational  institutions  

throughout  India.   The  defendant  which  is  a  school  

situated in Chennai in the State of Tamil Nadu without  

the consent and approval of the plaintiff dishonestly and  

with mala fide intention to earn goodwill and reputation of  

the  plaintiff-society,  started  running  an  educational  

institution under the name and style DAV by infringing  

the registered trade mark and passing off the copy right of  

the  plaintiff-society  by  using  its  acronym  DAV  in  the  

similar/deceptively similar manner as of the plaintiff.     

4) Heard Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior counsel for  

the  petitioners  in  T.P.  (C)  Nos.  1233-1237 of  2008 and  

243-244 of 2009, Ms. Gladys Daniel, learned counsel for  

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petitioner  in  T.P.  (C)  No.  667  of  2009  and  Mr.  Ranjit  

Kumar,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  respondent-

Committee.  

5) The petitioners have filed these petitions praying to  

transfer  the  suits  filed  by  the  respondent-Committee  

pending before Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi to the City Civil  

Court, Chennai, Tamil Nadu on the following grounds:

(i) That no cause of action has arisen at Delhi;  

(ii) That the petitioners do not have any school at  

Delhi;

(iii) That  there  are  large  number  of  students  

studying in these schools who have been made  

defendants by the Committee in the suits filed at  

Delhi and all of them are in Chennai;

(iv) The  Secretary  of  the  Society  since  the  very  

inception, Mr. S. Jaidev, who is of the age of 84  

years and being very old, it is difficult for him to  

come to Delhi.  

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(v) Most of the witnesses to be examined on the side  

of the petitioners/defendants are in Tamil Nadu  

and  they  are  conversant  with  the  language  of  

Tamil only. Likewise most of the documents are  

in Tamil and it is difficult to mark the same in  

the proceedings at Delhi.    

(vi) The  petitioner  in  Transfer  Petition  No.  667  of  

2009  also  contended  that  the  person  who  is  

managing  the  affairs  of  their  society  is  aged  

about  71  years  and  it  is  difficult  for  him  to  

attend the hearing at Delhi.    

6) The  respondent-Committee,  while  denying  all  the  

claims of the petitioners, highlighted that in view of the  

fact that about 700 institutions have been spread all over  

India if the suits filed at Delhi are transferred to Chennai  

as  claimed,  there  is  likelihood  of  similar  petitions  by  

others particularly from other States and as on date 50  

other  suits  are  pending  in  different  States.   It  is  also  

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stated  that  the  President  who  is  running  the  Trust  at  

Delhi is aged about 95 years.  It is also contended that  

considering the relief prayed for and the suits having been  

filed under Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 on  

the  jurisdiction  point  the  Court  at  Delhi  alone  is  

competent  to  try  the  same.   The  allegation  relating  to  

inconvenience  due  to  language  is  applicable  to  the  

respondent  also  and  prayed  for  dismissal  of  all  the  

transfer petitions.   

7) In  order  to  appreciate  the  rival  contentions,  it  is  

useful  to  refer  Section  25  of  the  Civil  Procedure  Code  

which  gives  power  to  this  Court  to  transfer  suits  etc.  

which reads thus:  

“25.  Power of Supreme Court to transfer suits, etc. –  (1) On the application of a party, and after notice to the  parties, and after hearing such of them as desire to be  heard, the Supreme Court may, at any stage, if satisfied  that  an order  under  this  section  is  expedient  for  the  ends  of  justice,  direct  that  any  suit,  appeal  or  other  proceeding be transferred from a High Court or other  Civil Court in one State to a High Court or other Civil  Court in any other State.”

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8) Transfer of suits under Sections 24 and 25 have been  

considered by this Court in various decisions.  In Maneka  

Sanjay Gandhi v. Rani Jethmalani, (1979) 4 SCC 167,  

this Court stated: (SCC p. 169, para 2)

“2. Assurance of a fair trial is the first imperative of the  dispensation of justice and the central criterion for the  court to consider when a motion for transfer is made is  not  the  hypersensitivity  or  relative  convenience  of  a  party or easy availability of legal services or like mini  grievances.  Something  more  substantial,  more  compelling, more imperilling, from the point of view of  public  justice  and  its  attendant  environment,  is  necessitous  if  the  Court  is  to  exercise  its  power  of  transfer.  This  is  the  cardinal  principle  although  the   circumstances  may  be  myriad  and  vary  from case  to   case.”                                             (Emphasis supplied)

9) Similarly  in  Subramaniam  Swamy  (Dr.) V.  

Ramakrishna Hegde, (1990) 1 SCC 4 dealing with power  

of this Court to transfer a case under Section 25 of the  

Code, A.M. Ahmadi, J. (as His Lordship then was) stated:  

(SCC p. 9, para 8)

“8.  Under  the  old  section  the  State  Government  was  empowered  to  transfer  a  suit,  appeal  or  other  proceeding pending in the High Court of that State to  any other High Court on receipt  of  a report  from the  Judge  trying  or  hearing  the  suit  that  there  existed  reasonable grounds for such transfer provided that the  State Government of the State in which the other High  Court had its principal seat consented to the transfer.  The present Section 25 confers the power of transfer on  

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the Supreme Court and is of wider amplitude. Under the  present provision the Supreme Court is empowered at  any  stage  to  transfer  any  suit,  appeal  or  other  proceeding from a High Court or other civil court in one  State  to  a  High Court  or  other  civil  court  of  another  State if it is satisfied that such an order is expedient for  the  ends  of  justice.  The  cardinal  principle  for  the  exercise of power under this section is that the ends of  justice demand the transfer of the suit, appeal or other  proceeding.  The question of  expediency would depend  on the facts  and circumstances of  each case but the  paramount consideration for the exercise of power must  be to meet the ends of justice. It  is true that if  more  than one court has jurisdiction under the Code to try  the  suit,  the  plaintiff  as  dominus  litis has  a  right  to  choose the court and the defendant cannot demand that  the suit be tried in any particular court convenient to  him. The mere convenience of the parties or any one of  them may not be enough for the exercise of power but it  must also be shown that trial in the chosen forum will  result in denial of justice. Cases are not unknown where  a  party  seeking  justice  chooses  a  forum  most  inconvenient to the adversary with a view to depriving  that  party  of  a  fair  trial.  Parliament  has,  therefore,  invested this Court with the discretion to transfer the  case  from one  court  to  another  if  that  is  considered  expedient  to  meet  the  ends  of  justice.  Words of  wide  amplitude—for the ends of justice—have been advisedly  used to leave the matter to the discretion of the Apex  Court as it is not possible to conceive of all situations  requiring  or  justifying  the  exercise  of  power.  But  the  paramount  consideration  must  be  to  see  that  justice   according to  law is done; if  for achieving that  objective   the transfer of the case is imperative, there should be no  hesitation to transfer the case even if it is likely to cause   some inconvenience to the plaintiff.  The petitioner’s plea  for  the  transfer  of  the  case  must  be  tested  on  this   touchstone.”                        (Emphasis supplied)

10) In  Kulwinder  Kaur  alias  Kulwinder  Gurcharan  

Singh vs. Kandi Friends Education Trust and Others,  

(2008) 3 SCC 659, this Court considered various tests to  

be applied in respect of transfer of suits under Sections 24  

and 25 of the Code and in para 23 observed thus:  

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23. Reading Sections 24 and 25 of  the Code together  and keeping in view various judicial  pronouncements,  certain broad propositions as to what may constitute a  ground for transfer have been laid down by courts. They  are  balance  of  convenience  or  inconvenience  to  the  plaintiff or the defendant or witnesses; convenience or  inconvenience of a particular place of trial having regard  to the nature of evidence on the points involved in the  suit;  issues  raised  by  the  parties;  reasonable  apprehension in the mind of the litigant that he might  not get justice in the court in which the suit is pending;  important  questions of  law involved or a considerable  section of public interested in the litigation; “interest of  justice” demanding for transfer of suit, appeal or other  proceeding, etc. Above are some of the instances which  are germane in considering the question of transfer of a  suit,  appeal  or  other  proceeding.  They  are,  however,  illustrative  in  nature  and by no means be  treated as  exhaustive.  If  on  the  above  or  other  relevant  considerations, the court feels that the plaintiff or the  defendant is not likely to have a “fair trial” in the court  from which he seeks to transfer a case, it is not only the  power, but the duty of the court to make such order.

11) Section 25 of the Code itself makes it clear that if any  

application is made for transfer, after notice to the parties,  

if  the  Court  is  satisfied  that  an  order  of  transfer  is  

expedient for the ends of justice necessary direction may  

be  issued  for  transfer  of  any  suit,  appeal  or  other  

proceedings from a High Court or other Civil Court in one  

State to another High Court or other Civil Court in any  

other State.  In order to maintain fair trial, this Court can  

exercise  this  power  and  transfer  the  proceedings  to  an  

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appropriate Court.  The mere convenience of the parties  

may not be enough for the exercise of power but it must  

also be shown that trial in the chosen forum will result in  

denial  of  justice.   Further  illustrations  are,  balance  of  

convenience  or  inconvenience  to  the  plaintiff  or  the  

defendant  or  witnesses  and reasonable  apprehension in  

the mind of the litigant that he might not get justice in the  

Court  in which suit  is  pending.    The above-mentioned  

instances are only illustrative in nature. In the interest of  

justice and to adherence of fair trial, this Court exercises  

its  discretion  and order  transfer  in  a  suit  or  appeal  or  

other proceedings.  

12)  In the light of the above principles, let us consider  

the claim of the parties.  We have already referred to the  

fact that the respondent-Committee has instituted various  

suits at Delhi under Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act  

impleading  the  petitioners  herein  as  defendants.   The  

respondent has also pointed out that more than 50 suits  

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have been pending all over India.  Though the petitioners  

have raised the problem of distance, language and age of  

the President/Secretary of their respective Trust, we are of  

the  view  that  same  hurdles  are  applicable  to  the  

respondent also if their suits are being transferred outside  

Delhi.  It is true that the petitioners who are defendants in  

order  to  defend  their  case  necessarily  have  to  spend  

sometime at Delhi.  However, in view of the amendment  

made in the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of recording  

evidence and of the fact that Delhi being a Capital of this  

country and the petitioners who are running educational  

institutions have to visit this place for their official work,  

we are satisfied that balance of convenience and all other  

attended circumstances are not in favour of the petitioners  

transferring the suit to their place.  As rightly pointed out  

by  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  respondent,  if  the  

request of  the petitioners are acceded to,  taking note of  

the fact that their institutions numbering more than 700  

have  been  spread  over  India  and  50  other  suits  are  

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pending in various places, it  would be more difficult for  

the respondent/plaintiff to continue with their suits and  

in  that  event  their  sufferings  would  be  more  than  the  

inconvenience to be caused by the petitioners/defendants.  

13) We  are  also  satisfied  that  it  would  be  far  more  

practical and in the best interest of the parties that the  

proceedings  are  conducted  in  Delhi.   Further,  if  the  

petitioners’ claim is accepted, it would open floodgates for  

similarly placed persons infringing registered trade marks  

to  approach  this  Court  to  transfer  their  suits  to  the  

locations  convenient  to  themselves  all  over  India  and  

defeat the purpose of Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act  

which confers a jurisdiction with respect to a registered  

trade  mark.   Since  the  issue  relating  to  jurisdiction  

particularly whether Court at Delhi has jurisdiction or not  

is to be decided by the Trial Court, we are not expressing  

anything on the merits of their claims.  

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14)  In the light of what has been stated above, we do not  

find any valid ground for transfer of the suits as claimed  

by the petitioners.  Consequently, all the transfer petitions  

are dismissed.  However, we make it clear that we have  

not expressed anything on the merits of either parties and  

it is for them to plead and establish their respective case.  

No order as to costs.              

....…………………………………J.                   (P. SATHASIVAM)  

...…………………………………J.           (ANIL R. DAVE)  

NEW DELHI; JULY 23, 2010.          

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