1    

REPORTABLE  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  

Civil Appeal No   1819  of 2020  (Arising out of SLP(C) No 18752 of 2014)  

Council of Architecture                 Appellant     

Versus  

Mr Mukesh Goyal & Ors                 Respondents  

WITH  

 Civil Appeal Nos 1820-1822 of 2020  

(Arising out of SLP(C) Nos 25524-25526 of 2014)    

J U D G M E N T  

Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud J.   

 1 The question before this Court is whether Section 37 of the Architects Act  

1972 1  merely prohibits the use of the title ―Architect‖ by individuals not registered  

                                           1  ―Architects Act‖  

2    

with the Council of Architecture 2  under Chapter 3 of the enactment or  

alternatively whether Section 37 actually prohibits unregistered individuals from  

carrying out the practice of architecture and its cognate activities. In other words,  

does Section 37 permit individuals not registered with the Council to continue  

practicing the profession of architecture in India? As a corollary to this question,  

this Court is also called upon to determine whether a government post titled or  

styled using the term ―Architect‖ can be held by individuals not registered with the  

Council of Architecture.  

2 The present appeals arise out of three writ petitions filed by the first  

respondent before the High Court of Allahabad. The first respondent has been  

working as an Architectural cum Planning Assistant in the service of the third  

respondent, the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority 3  since January  

1988 and claims to possess a degree in architecture from the Indian Institute of  

Architects. NOIDA is an authority created under Section 3 of the Uttar Pradesh  

Industrial Area Development Act 1976 4  to supervise and manage the  

development of various geographical zones of the state of Uttar Pradesh.   

3 Exercising its powers under Section 19 of the U.P. Industrial Area  

Development Act and with the approval of the state government, NOIDA framed  

the Service Regulations of 1981 for the recruitment and promotion of employees  

in its various departments. One of the departments under NOIDA‘s purview is the  

Department of Planning and Architecture where the first respondent is employed.  

                                           2  ―Council‖   

3  ―NOIDA‖  

4  ―U.P. Industrial Area Development Act‖  

3    

Regulation 16 of the Service Regulations 1981 sets out the ‗Sources of  

Recruitment‘. Under sub-clause (iv) of clause (2) of Regulation 16, NOIDA has  

been conferred with the power to modify the sources of recruitment or the  

percentage of candidates appointed through promotion and direct recruitment.  

Thus, under the Service Regulations 1981, NOIDA has the power to lay down the  

conditions and qualifications for promotion from the feeder cadre to various posts  

in the Department of Planning and Architecture.   

4 NOIDA spelt out the qualifications and conditions required for the  

promotion to various posts in the Recruitment and Promotion Policy 2005 5 . The  

Department of Planning and Architecture consists of two cadre streams, the  

Planning cadre stream and the Architecture cadre stream. The Planning cadre  

stream consists of the following posts (in ascending order of seniority): (i)  

Planning Assistant; (ii) Associate Town Planner; (iii) Town Planner; and (iv)  

Senior Town Planner. The Architecture cadre stream consists of the following  

posts (in ascending order of seniority): (i) Architecture Assistant; (ii) Associate  

Architect; (iii) Architect; and (iv) Senior Architect. In practice, the two cadres draw  

on a common pool of candidates, the only distinction being made when specific  

work orders are issued.   

5 The Promotion Policy 2005 provided that for the post of Associate Town  

Planner, 60 per cent of recruitment would take place by way of promotion, the  

eligibility criteria being fifteen years‘ experience as a Planning Assistant.  

                                           5  ―Promotion Policy 2005‖

4    

Similarly, for the post of Associate Architect, 60 per cent of the posts were to be  

filled through promotion, the eligibility criteria being fifteen years‘ experience as  

an Architecture Assistant. The remaining 40 per cent of posts were to be filled  

through direct recruitment, with a degree in Architecture and Town Planning and  

a degree in Architecture stipulated as essential qualifications for appointment as  

an Associate Town Planner and Associate Architect respectively.   

6 A meeting was held by NOIDA on 20 March 2006 to decide whether a  

degree in Architecture and Town Planning and a degree in Architecture was  

necessary for candidates who were to be promoted to the posts of Associate  

Town Planner and Associate Architect. An opinion was sought from the Mukhya  

Nagar Gram Niyojak, Uttar Pradesh (Town and Country Planning Department,  

Uttar Pradesh). In a letter dated 22 December 2008, the Mukhya Nagar Gram  

Niyojak recommended that a degree or diploma in the relevant subjects should  

be an essential qualification for candidates seeking promotion. NOIDA  

subsequently sought the opinion of the state government on the same question.  

During this period, promotions to the post of Associate Town Planner and  

Associate Architect have continued to remain in abeyance, resulting in a situation  

where employees who have served for as many as twenty-five years being  

denied consideration for promotion.   

7 Before the High Court of Allahabad, the first respondent filed three writ  

petitions. 6  In the writ petitions, the first respondent also impleaded the present  

                                           6  W.P. 57577 of 2008; W.P. 65973 of 2008; W.P. 22155 of 2011.  

5    

appellant, the Council of Architecture which is the regulatory body for the  

profession of architecture in India. By the writ petitions, the first respondent  

sought two reliefs:   

(i) A writ of mandamus directing NOIDA to enforce the provisions of the  

Architects Act by ensuring that only persons registered with the Council  

of Architecture are appointed to the post of Associate Town Planner /  

Associate Architect; and   

(ii) The post of Associate Town Planner / Associate Architect be filled  

entirely through promotion of the senior most Architect cum Planning  

Assistant holding the necessary qualifications.   

By an amendment to Writ Petition 22155 of 2011 made in 2013, the first  

respondent challenged the Promotion Policy 2005 in so far as it permitted the  

promotion of candidates to the post of Associate Town Planner / Associate  

Architect without requiring that such candidates should hold a degree in  

Architecture recognised under the Architects Act.   

8 The High Court of Allahabad observed that Regulation 16 of the Service  

Regulations 1981, conferred NOIDA with the power to lay down the conditions  

and qualifications for promotions in the authority‘s various departments. NOIDA  

had laid down these conditions and qualifications in the Promotion Policy 2005.  

The High Court noted that the sole ground for challenging the Promotion Policy  

2005 was that it allegedly fell foul of Sections 14 and 37 of the Architects Act.  

Relying extensively on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in  

6    

Mukesh Kumar Manhar v Sri Ram Singh Ahirwar (―Mukesh Kumar Manhar‖) 7   

the High Court held that Section 37 of the Architects Act does not create a bar on  

individuals not registered with the Council from carrying out the duties and  

functions of an Architect. The High Court held that Section 37 only prohibits  

unregistered individuals from using the title ―architect‖. As a necessary adjunct of  

this reasoning, the High Court held that the Promotion Policy 2005, which allowed  

for individuals not holding a degree in architecture being appointed to the Class II  

post of Associate Architect, did not contravene Section 37 of the Architects Act in  

so far as they would be carrying out the activities of an architect.   

9 In disposing of the writ petitions, the High Court of Allahabad held that the  

―mere nomenclature of the particular post will not in any way be said to violate the  

provisions of the Architects Act 1971‖. Therefore, the High Court permitted  

NOIDA to continue referring to the Class II posts as Associate Town Planner and  

Associate Architect. The High Court further noted that as a central legislation, the  

requirements set out in the Architects Act could not be read into the Promotion  

Policy 2005 which is a regulation formulated under a state legislation, namely the  

U.P. Industrial Area Development Act.    

Submissions  

10 The Council of Architecture has challenged the decision of the High Court  

in holding that Section 37 of the Architects Act does not prohibit individuals not  

registered with the Council from practicing architecture in India. According to the  

                                           7  2006 (1) MPLJ 238

7    

Council, such an interpretation defeats the object and purpose of the Architects  

Act. It is submitted that:   

(i) The object of the Architects Act is to ensure that only qualified  

architects are permitted to provide architectural services for the  

purposes of construction and building activity in India;   

(ii) The Architects Act is a comprehensive legislation which regulates the  

qualifications, registration and disciplinary facets of architecture in India  

and therefore Section 37 cannot be read only as protecting against the  

use of the title ―Architect‖ but it must be read to prohibit unqualified  

individuals from practicing architecture;   

(iii) Under Section 37 of the Architects Act, only individuals registered with  

the appellant Council are permitted to render architectural services in  

India;   

(iv) The High Court has construed Section 37 narrowly and such an  

interpretation risks allowing unqualified individuals from practicing the  

profession of supervising buildings and construction; and   

(v) In its decision in Mukesh Kumar Manhar the High Court of Madhya  

Pradesh directed the state government to cease using the  

nomenclature of ―Assistant Architect‖ or ―Architect‖ in regard to posts  

where the eligibility criteria did not require appointees to hold a degree  

in architecture.   

8    

11  As the present controversy impacts all persons engaging in the practice of  

architecture in India, including thousands of individuals employed in various  

government departments holding posts titled ―Associate Architect‖ or ―Architect‖,  

this Court considered it fit to issue notice to the Union of India. During the course  

of the hearing, Mr K K Venugopal, learned Attorney General of India appeared for  

the Union and submitted that:   

(i) According to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Architects  

Act, the legislation aims to protect the title of architects but does not  

grant architects an exclusive right over the activities of designing,  

supervising and constructing buildings;   

(ii) Section 37 of the Architects Act is titled ―Prohibition against the use of  

title‖ and prohibits individuals from using the ―title and style of architect‖.  

The legal bar created is therefore limited to the use of ―title‖ and does  

not prohibit the ―practice‖ of architecture;  

(iii) The Architects Act does not contain a prohibition on the practice of  

architecture or the designing, supervising or construction of buildings by  

individuals not registered with the Council; and  

(iv) The definition of ―architect‖ provided by the Architects Act is a person  

whose name appears on the register of Architects maintained with the  

Council and not individuals engaged in the design, supervision or  

construction of buildings in India. Therefore, the Architects Act  

regulates individuals registered with the Council and does not control

9    

the practice of activities undertaken by individuals falling outside the  

regulatory regime applicable to registered Architects.  

 Scope of the present appeal  

12 In the writ petitions before the High Court of Allahabad, the question before  

the court was whether the 2005 Promotion Policy adopted by NOIDA permitting  

candidates who do not hold a degree in architecture to hold the post of Associate  

Architect violated the provisions of the Architects Act. The answer to that  

question substantially turned on an interpretation of the Architects Act. Primarily,  

the issue is whether the Architects Act prohibits individuals not registered with the  

Council from holding of the title of ―architect‖ or prohibits them from practicing the  

activities undertaken by architects. This is the question that we are called upon to  

answer. If Section 37 of the Architects Act prohibits individuals not registered with  

the Council from practicing the activities commonly undertaken by an architect,  

the 2005 Promotion Policy will violate Section 37 as it allows unregistered  

individuals to undertake the activities of an architect. However, if Section 37 only  

prohibits individuals not registered with the Council from holding the title of  

―architect‖, then the Promotion Policy 2005 is valid insofar as it permits  

unregistered individuals from practicing architecture and only the question of the  

nomenclature of the post remains to be decided. It is to this controversy that we  

now turn.   

10    

Decisions of the High Courts   

13  Since the adoption of the Architects Act in 1972, there have been several  

pronouncements by High Courts on whether Section 37 should be interpreted as  

prohibiting individuals not registered with the Council from undertaking the  

activities of designing, supervising and constructing buildings in India. In  

Municipal Corporation of Delhi v Ram Kumar Bhardwaj 8  the respondents  

challenged the power of the Delhi Municipal Corporation to stipulate who a  

―Licensed Architect‖ was. It was contended by the respondents that the adoption  

of the Architects Act represented a comprehensive regulatory framework and the  

Delhi Municipal Corporation could no longer impose restrictions on who a  

―Licensed Architect‖ was in a manner contrary to the provisions of the enactment.  

Justice V S Deshpande (as the learned Chief Justice then was) speaking for a  

Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi observed:   

―2. … The Architects Act, 1972 sets out the qualification to be  

possessed by the persons to be registered as architects  

under the said Act. It also prohibits persons who do not have  

such registration from describing themselves as architects  

and also deals with disciplinary action for misconduct of  

architects. It is, therefore, a complete enactment the effect of  

which is that a person cannot call himself an architect unless  

he is registered under the said Act. Of course, unlike the  

Advocates Act, which restricts the right to practice in  

courts only to the advocates qualified thereunder, the  

Architects Act does not restrict the practise by architects  

to persons registered under the said Act. Therefore,  

some persons who cannot call themselves architects  

may still be free to do the work which is ordinarily done  

by architects and they are not dealt with by the  

Architects Act. Whether the Corporation can deal with such  

persons is not a question which arises before us. Our  

consideration is limited to the question whether the  

Corporation can regulate the profession and the practice of  

architects registered under the Architects Act, 1972 by  

                                           8  (1980) 18 DLT 283  

11    

insisting that the architects practising in Delhi and submitting  

plans for construction of buildings for the approval of the  

Corporation must possess licences issued by the  

Corporation.‖    

(Emphasis supplied)  

 On the question of whether the Delhi Municipal Corporation could regulate  

architects already registered with the Council of Architecture, the Division Bench  

held:   

―The Architects Act, 1972 is a special law dealing with the  

qualifications to be possessed by persons for being registered  

as architects and restricting the term ―architect‖ or ―registered  

architects‖ to such persons only. Since the possession of a  

registration certificate under the Architects Act, 1972 is  

regarded by Parliament as sufficient qualification for the  

practice of architects and since all related questions have  

been dealt with in respect of architects by the said Act, it  

became unnecessary for the Corporation to do so thereafter.‖  

The question before the High Court of Delhi was whether the Delhi Municipal  

Corporation could require that architects submitting plans for the construction of  

new buildings must possess a license issued by it. While answering this in the  

negative, the Division Bench specifically observed that unlike the Advocates Act  

1961 9 , the Architects Act did not restrict the practice of architecture to persons  

registered under the Architects Act. The High Court observed that even after the  

adoption of the Architects Act, there continue to exist individuals who cannot call  

themselves architects but are free to carry out the work which is ordinarily done  

by architects.   

                                           9  ―Advocates Act‖

12    

14 In Om Prakash Mittal v Council of Architecture 10

Sections 35 and 37 of  

the Architects Act were challenged as ultra vires Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the  

Constitution of India before a single judge of the High Court of Delhi. It was  

contended that Section 37 restricted the use of the title of ―architect‖ to a certain  

category of qualified persons as distinct from other qualified persons, a distinction  

not supported by a rational nexus with the objects of the Architects Act. In  

dismissing the constitutional challenge, Justice S B Wad cited the Statement of  

Objects and Reasons of the Architects Act. The High Court of Delhi held:   

―Article 19(6) empowers State to make law relating to the  

professional or technical qualifications necessary for  

practising any profession laying down professional  

qualifications for the profession of architecture as done by the  

Act and prohibiting persons who do not fulfil the said  

qualifications from posing themselves as architects is  

constitutionally permissible. The restriction, if at all, is a  

reasonable restriction. There is no merit in the petitioner's  

contention that there is no nexus with the object of the  

Act. The object of the Act, as stated above, is to prevent  

unqualified persons calling themselves as architects and  

undertaking the construction of buildings which are  

uneconomical or unsafe and who are bringing the  

profession of architect into disrepute. The provision is  

essentially in the interest of the general public and it is  

meant for protecting the public from unqualified persons  

working as architects. The restriction imposed by Section  

37 does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution.   

(Emphasis supplied)  

In dismissing the constitutional challenge, the Single Judge of the High Court of  

Delhi held that one of the objects of the Architects Act was to prevent unqualified  

persons ―calling themselves as architects‖ which can result in untrained  

individuals being tasked with the critical work of construction. This may lead to  

unsafe buildings. Section 37 was enacted to protect citizens from being misled by  

                                           10

AIR 1983 Del 223  

13    

untrained persons and mistakenly entrusting them with the task of construction.  

Even though the Single Judge undoubtedly recognised the need for trained and  

qualified architects, Section 37 was interpreted as creating a bar on individuals  

representing themselves to be qualified architects and not as creating a bar on  

untrained individuals practicing the tasks undertaken by architects.   

15 The issue of using the nomenclature ―architect‖ in government services  

has also arisen before the High Courts. In Tulya Gogoi v Association of  

Architects 11

an order of the Government of Assam was challenged. The said  

order re-named the post of ―Architectural Draftsman P.W.D.‖ as ―Junior  

Architect‖. The individuals whose posts were to be renamed had at the time  

obtained a diploma certificate in Architectural Assistantship which was not  

recognised by either the Central Government or the Council of Architects. The  

order was challenged by the Association of Architects, Assam as violating  

Section 37 of the Architects Act as it would effectively allow the concerned  

individuals to hold the title of ―Architect‖ without holding a qualification recognised  

by the Council. In response, it was contended that Section 37 was intended to  

prevent private individuals from calling themselves ―Architects‖ and misleading  

the general public, but this rationale did not extend to government employees.  

Therefore, it was urged that the government was free to designate its posts  

howsoever it saw fit. In rejecting this distinction between private architects and  

employees of the government, Chief Justice Brijesh Kumar (as the learned judge  

                                           11

(1999) 3 Gau LR 179

14    

then was) speaking on behalf of a Division Bench of the High Court of Gauhati  

held:    

―12. It is no doubt that the argument as advanced on behalf of  

the appellants is attractive, but it hardly appeals us. It is true,  

looking into the sudden spurt in the activity of building,  

constructed for factories, industries, housing colonies, office  

complexes, etc., it was considered that the profession of  

architecture must be regulated. Only those who have proper  

education and training and are qualified to work as such may  

alone be permitted to work as architects. It is a legislation  

especially dealing with architects. Meaning of the word  

‗architect‘ has been statutorily provided under clause (a) of  

Section 2 where it has been provided that it means one  

whose name is entered in the register. … Conduct of an  

architect is effectively controlled by Section 30. As a  

Government servant may be punished under the  

Government rules, but still he may practice the  

profession of architecture. But check is placed by  

Section 30 under which the name of an architect is even  

liable to be removed from the register disentitling him to  

practice. Therefore, the argument that being in  

Government service an architect is accountable to his  

employer according to the rules does not hold good  

since mere punishment as a Government employee may  

not be enough to debar him from practising as an  

architect which is only controlled under Sections 22, 29  

and 30 of the Act, 1972.  

…  

―15. … Apart from the categories as indicated above, no  

other exception to the applicability of Section 37 has  

been provided much less on the ground that one is  

engaged in private profession or in Government  

employment….‖  

(Emphasis supplied)  

The High Court rejected the argument that the object of Section 37 to prevent  

misrepresentation by untrained individuals engaged in architectural activities only  

applied to private individuals and not government employees. The High Court  

observed that even where the rules of service stipulated by the government  

provided for the regulation of architects, the provisions of the Architects Act

15    

allowing for the registration and de-registration of architects provided an  

overarching regulatory framework to protect the integrity of the architectural  

profession. The Act ensures that individuals who did not possess a statutorily  

recognised qualification cannot refer to themselves as ―Architects‖. Crucially, the  

High Court observed that Section 37 did not carve out an exception for  

government employees, therefore the prohibition on the use and the ―title and  

style of architect‖ contained in Section 37 applied to both private individuals and  

government employees.   

16 Both the appellant and the Union of India have relied on the decision of the  

Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Mukesh Kumar Manhar  

and it would be pertinent at this juncture to discuss the judgement. The facts of  

that case were substantially similar to those before us. The petitioners before the  

High Court of Madhya Pradesh were employed as ―Draughtsman‖ and ―Head  

Draughtsman‖ and held architectural degrees recognised by the Architects Act.  

Their next promotional post was that of ―Assistant Architect – Class II‖. One of the  

pre-requisites for appointment as ―Assistant Architect – Class II‖ was the  

completion of a degree in architecture.  In 1991 the relevant recruitment rules  

were modified and the requirement of a degree in architecture was removed as a  

pre-requisite for appointment as ―Assistant Architect – Class II‖. The petitioners  

contended that the amendment to the recruitment rules violated the provisions of  

the Architects Act. According to the petitioners, the Act restricted the practice of  

architecture to persons possessing a degree in architecture and registered with  

the Council of Architects. In dismissing the petitioners‘ case, Chief Justice R V

16    

Raveendran (as the learned judge then was) speaking for a Division Bench of the  

High Court compared the provisions of the Architects Act to those of the  

Advocates Act and the Indian Medical Council Act 1956 12

. The court held:    

―10. There is a significant difference between the Architects  

Act 1972 dealing with the profession of Architects and  

enactments dealing with Medical and Legal professions.  

Section 15(2) of The Indian Medical Council Act, 1956  

bars any person other than medical practitioners enrolled  

on the State Medical Registers from practicing medicine  

or holding the office as „physician‟ or „surgeon‟ in any  

Government Institution or other Institution maintained by  

any local or other Authority. Similarly, section 29 of the  

Advocates Act, 1961, provides that only one class of  

persons are entitled to practice the profession of law,  

namely, advocates entered in the Roll of any Bar Council  

under the provisions of the Advocates Act. Thus there is a  

clear bar on persons who are not enrolled with the State  

Medical Council or State Bar Council from practising as a  

Medical Practitioner or an Advocate.   

11. In contrast, the Architects Act 1972 does not prohibit  

persons other than those who are registered as  

Architects from practising the profession. As noticed  

above, Section 37 only prohibits any person other than a  

registered architect using the title and style of Architect.  

It does not prohibit a person, who is not a registered as  

an Architect with the Council of Architecture from  

carrying on or discharging any function that can be  

carried on by a registered Architect. …‖   

(Emphasis supplied)  

The High Court noted that both the Indian Medical Council Act and the Advocates  

Act expressly restrict the practice of medicine and law to individuals registered  

under the two statutes respectively. When examined in juxtaposition to these two  

statutes, the choice of the legislature to restrict the ―title and style of architect‖ in  

Section 37 of the Architects Act as opposed to the very practice of the profession  

is significant. Relying on this distinction, the High Court ultimately held that:    

                                           12

―Indian Medical Council Act‖

17    

―13. … there can be no objection for a rule providing for non-

architects being promoted to a particular Class II post, which  

may involve planning, designing and supervision of Building  

constructions. What is prohibited and what is  

objectionable in law is calling the persons discharging  

such functions related to architecture, as „Architects‟  

when they are not registered as Architects. … Even  

Engineers, who do not have a degree in Architecture (and  

who are not registered Architects) but having  

qualifications in Engineering and experience in design  

and supervision, may perform the function which are  

normally performed by an Architect. But such Engineers  

who are not registered Architects and posted to the  

Class-I or II posts, dealing with architectural aspects and  

designs, cannot be called as „Architects‟ or „Assistant  

Architects‟ unless they are registered Architects under  

the Architects Act … A draughtsman who is a registered  

Architect, when promoted to Class II post, can however be  

called as ‗Assistant Architect‘.   

14. We recognise the freedom and choice, vested in the  

executive, to prescribe the qualifications for various posts. But  

the qualifications prescribed, should not violate any statutory  

provision, nor suffer from the vice of arbitrariness or mala  

fides. Statutory preferences should not be ignored.  

Architecture is a specialised technical field dealing with  

design and execution of buildings and structures. …‖  

(Emphasis supplied)  

The High Court held that the Architects Act merely prohibited individuals not  

registered with the Council of Architecture from referring to themselves as  

―Architects‖ but did not prohibit unregistered persons from carrying out the  

practice of architecture. Even engineers, who are not registered with the Council  

may perform the functions of designing and supervising construction.  

Significantly, the High Court held that it was not open for the government to refer  

to such unregistered engineers or other individuals as ―architects‖ unless they are  

registered under the Architects Act.   

18    

17 Similar observations were made by a single judge of the High Court of  

Delhi in Premendra Raj Mehta v National Building Construction Corporation  

Limited 13

. The dispute arose by way of a public interest litigation challenging the  

award of a consultancy service contract to a foreign firm not registered under the  

Architects Act and not having taken permission from the Central Government in  

accordance with the proviso to Section 37 of the Act. In response to the public  

interest litigation, it was contended that Section 37 only prohibits a person other  

than a registered architect from using the title of ―architect‖ and any firm can bid  

for tenders provided they have on their rolls an architect registered under the  

Architects Act. In dismissing the challenge to the grant of the consultancy service  

contract, Justice V K Jain observed that:    

―8. A plain reading of Section 37 of the Act which appears  

under the heading “Prohibition against the use of title”  

would show that though the aforesaid provision bars a  

person other than a registered architect or a firm of  

architects from using the title and style; it does not  

prohibit him from rendering architectural service so long  

as he does not use the expression architect and does not  

describe his firm, if any, as a firm of architects. Had the  

legislative intent been to prevent rendering of architectural  

services by any person other than a person registered under  

the provision of the Act, Section 37 of the Act would have  

been worded altogether differently. For instance, Section 29  

of the Advocates Act, 1961 prohibits a person unless he is  

enrolled as an advocate from practicing in any Court or before  

any authority or persons. …. Section 15(2) of the Medical  

Council Act, 1956 also expressly prohibits a person other  

than a medical practitioner registered in any State, signing or  

authenticating a medical or fitness certificate, giving evidence  

as an expert and hold office as Physician or Surgeon or any  

other office in the Government or any institution maintained  

by a local or other authority. No similar provision is, however  

found in the Architects Act. The learned counsel for the  

petitioners contended that in my view rightly too that  

such an interpretation may result in unqualified persons  

providing services such as supervision of construction  

                                           13

W.P. (C) 2106 / 2012  

19    

of buildings and the construction supervised by such  

persons may not be safe and economical, but, then, the  

remedy lies in the Parliament amending the provision of  

the Act so as to prohibit unqualified persons from  

rendering architectural services, and not in the Court  

taking an interpretation which a plain reading of Section  

37 does not suggest. Moreover such an unqualified person,  

after coming into force of the Act cannot represent  

themselves to be architects though they may continue to  

provide services such as supervision of construction of  

buildings.‖  

(Emphasis supplied)   

The Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi observed that a plain reading of  

Section 37 leads to the conclusion that Section 37 merely acts as a prohibition on  

the use of the title ―Architect‖ and does not prohibit individuals not registered  

under the Architects Act from undertaking the practice of architecture.  

Importantly, the Single Judge observed that although this may result in certain  

unregulated individuals engaging in the practice of architecture: (i) such untrained  

individuals cannot refer to themselves as ―architects‖ and are thus unlikely to be  

entrusted with tasks requiring specialised architectural knowledge; (ii) the court  

cannot construe a statutory provision in a manner contrary to its plain meaning  

merely to address a perceived societal harm; and (iii) if the legislature is of the  

opinion that the risk of untrained individuals who cannot refer to themselves as  

―architects‖ engaging in the business of designing and supervising construction is  

real, it can always amend Section 37 to prohibit the practice of such activities by  

unregistered individuals as the legislature has done in the cases of the Advocates  

Act and the Indian Medical Council Act.     

20    

18 In Sudhir Vohra v Registrar of Companies 14

three writ petitions were  

filed before a single judge of the Delhi High Court. The first writ petition sought a  

mandamus directing the Registrar of Companies and Ministry of Corporate Affairs  

to prohibit the registration of any company or limited liability partnership which  

stated that it provided architectural services. The second writ petition sought a  

direction cancelling the permission granted to an architecture firm from Singapore  

to set up a wholly owned subsidiary in India. The third writ petition sought the  

quashing of a Ministry of Corporate Affairs‘ circular which stipulated that if a  

company or limited liability partnership had as one of its stated objectives the  

providing of architectural services, such an entity could not be incorporated  

without a no-objection certificate from the Council of Architecture. Justice Rekha  

Palli summarised the issues raised by the three writ petitions:   

―6. Thus, what emerges is that the first two writ petitions seek  

(i) a direction that only architects registered under the Act can  

provide architectural services; and (ii) no company/LLP can  

use the title and style of ‗architect‘ or its derivatives.   

7. The third writ petition essentially seeks directions to the  

contrary. The main thrust of the third writ petition is that the  

Act only restricts the use of the title and style of ‗architect‘,  

and it neither precludes companies/LLPs from rendering  

architectural services nor prevents them from mentioning the  

same as one of their objects in their MOA.‖   

In answering the questions raised by the writ petitions, the High Court of Delhi  

was essentially asked to consider whether the Architects Act precludes  

unregistered architects (including legal entities) from providing architectural  

services, or alternatively whether the Act merely prohibits unregistered architects  

                                           14

W.P. (C) 934/2012 and C.M. No. 18315/2014  

21    

and entities from using the ―title and style of architect‖. After examining the  

provisions of the Architects Act, the Single Judge held:   

―40. On a careful examination of the aforesaid provisions of  the Advocates Act and CA Act viz-a-viz the provisions of the  

Architects Act, it is apparent that the latter does not contain  

any prohibitory provisions similar to the ones in the former  

two. The Architects Act neither prescribes that only  

registered architects can provide architectural services,  

nor contains any clause prohibiting companies and LLPs  

from providing architectural services. In fact, what  

emerges from the entire scheme of the Architects Act is  

that it neither defines as to who can provide architectural  

services nor puts any fetters on persons who wish to  

provide architectural services. It merely defines an  

architect to mean a person whose name is entered in the  

register maintained by the COA and lays down the  

mandatory qualifications for an entry in the said register.  

On the other hand, the Advocates Act and CA Act include  

specific provisions laying down as to who can practice as an  

advocate or accountant.   

41. Thus, the Act, while clearly prescribing that unregistered  

persons, including juristic entities, cannot describe or style  

themselves as architects, does not preclude any one from  

providing architectural services. Merely because the Act  

includes a specific provision prescribing that only a  

registered architect can use the title of an „architect‟ or  

style himself/herself as an „architect‟, it cannot be  

concluded that the Act in any manner envisages that  

architectural services can be rendered only by those to  

whom the Act applies.‖   

(Emphasis supplied)   

The Single Judge concluded that the scheme of the Architects Act does not  

define a set of individuals who can provide architectural services. Merely because  

the statute stipulates that nobody other than individuals who are registered with  

the Council of Architects can use the title of ―Architect‖ cannot mean that the Act  

restricts the practice of architecture as a whole to those registered with the  

Council.

22    

Controversy at the Supreme Court   

19 During the course of the present proceedings, the Learned Attorney  

General has placed before us a compilation of relevant material including an  

order dated 14 February 2017 of a two-judge bench of this Court in Council of  

Architecture v Manohar Krishnaji Ranade 15

(―Manohar Ranade‖). We have  

extracted the relevant portion of the order below:   

―While we find no reason to interfere with the impugned  

judgement and order dated 29 th  November, 2004 passed by  

the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No. 1830 of 1988 and  

connected matters, we are of the view that the High Court  

was in error in rejecting the contention of the appellant that  

practice under the Architects Act, 1972 is not restricted only  

to the architects. It is not correct to say that any one can  

practice as an architect even if he is not registered under the  

Architects Act, 1972.‖   

Placing reliance on this order, the appellant contended that the question of  

whether Section 37 prohibits the practice of architecture by unregistered  

individuals is no longer res integra. It was urged that this Court has already held  

that the practice of architecture is limited to architects registered under the  

Architects Act. The order arising out of Manohar Ranade has been followed by a  

three-judge bench of this Court in an order dated 11 September 2017 in Council  

of Architecture v Indian Institute of Architects. 16

The order of the three-judge  

bench states that:   

―Having heard learned counsel for the parties and keeping in  

view the order dated 14 th  February, 2017, passed in Civil  

Appeal Nos. 3346-3348 of 2005, we dispose of the present  

appeal in similar terms. To have clarity, we reproduce the  

relevant passage as under: -   

                                           15

C.A. Nos 3346-3348 of 2005  16

C.A. No 12649 of 2017

23    

―While we find no reason to interfere with the impugned  

judgement and order dated 29 th  November, 2004 passed  

by the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No. 1830 of  

1988 and connected matters, we are of the view that the  

High Court was in error in rejecting the contention of the  

appellant that practice under the Architects Act, 1972 is  

not restricted only to the architects. It is not correct to say  

that any one can practice as an architect even if he is not  

registered under the Architects Act, 1972.‖  

The appeal is disposed of in the above terms…‖   

20 The controversy in Manohar Ranade concerned whether the Municipal  

Corporation could issue licenses to individuals not registered under the Architects  

Act for the completion of certain tasks that are otherwise undertaken by  

architects. In answering this question, Justice A P Shah (sitting as a judge of the  

High Court of Bombay) and Justice Dharmadhikari stated:   

―7. The next issue is whether the engineers or surveyors  

possessing necessary qualifications can discharge functions  

which are also discharged by an architect under the  

Architects Act, 1972?   

,,,   

8. In the above circumstances we are not inclined to accept  

the case of the petitioners that the Architects Act  

restricts practice of architecture to persons registered  

under the said Act. Therefore qualified engineers who  

cannot themselves call on Architects may still be free to  

do the work which is ordinarily done by the Architects  

and it would be open for the Corporations to regulate  

licensing in favour of such qualified engineers.‖  

(Emphasis supplied)   

The High Court of Bombay rejected the contention that the practice of  

architecture is restricted to registered architects under the Architects Act. The  

High Court of Bombay held that the practice of architecture is not restricted to

24    

architects registered under the Architects Act, and even qualified engineers are  

free to carry out the work ordinarily done by architects.   

21 The order of this Court dated 14 February 2017 states that ―the High Court  

was in error in rejecting the contention of the appellant that practice under the  

Architects Act, 1972 is not restricted only to the architects.‖  The appellant was  

the Council of Architecture. The order is based on the premise that the contention  

of the Council of Architecture before the High Court of Bombay was that the  

―practice under the Architects Act, 1972 is not restricted only to architects.‖ The  

order stated that the High Court was wrong in rejecting this contention. Therefore,  

the order of this Court dated 14 February 2017 clearly sought to lay down the  

proposition that the ―practice under the Architects Act, 1972 is not restricted only  

to architects.‖ Having laid down this proposition, it would appear that the use of  

the word ―not‖ in the next line is inadvertent. In the previous sentence the court  

expounded the position that the practice of architecture cannot be restricted to  

registered architects under the Architects Act. Hence, it would be an incorrect  

interpretation of the order to hold that in the very next line, the court would have  

laid down a contrary proposition. Therefore, the effect of the order as a whole is  

to lay down the principle that individuals can practice as architects even if they  

are not registered under the Architects Act. The subsequent order of this Court  

dated 11 September 2017 which quotes and follows the earlier order should also  

be read in this light. Therefore, the two orders of this Court do not further the  

case urged by the appellant but support the position set out by the Union of India,  

succinctly advanced in the submissions of the learned Attorney General.   

25    

Regulatory Scheme of the Architects Act  

22 Before embarking on our analysis of whether the Architects Act prohibits  

the practice of architecture by individuals not registered with the Council of  

Architects, it is pertinent to examine the scheme of the Architects Act in its  

entirety. The Architects Act is a special legislation creating an exhaustive  

regulatory regime applicable to the profession of architecture. Clause (a) of  

Section 2 of the Architects Act defines an architect as follows:   

―(a) ―architect‖ means a person whose name is for the time  

being entered in the register;‖   

The ―register‖ is further defined as:   

―(e) ―register‖ means the register of architects maintained  

under section 23;‖   

Section 3 of the Architects Act brings into existence the Council of Architecture.  

Under Section 14 of the Act, only qualifications included in the Schedule to the  

Act or notified under Section 15 of the Act shall be recognised as valid  

qualifications for the purposes of enrolling in the register under the Architects Act.  

Clause (2) of Section 14 permits any authority in India which grants architectural  

qualifications not already included in the Schedule of the Act to apply to the  

Central Government to have such qualification recognised as a valid architectural  

qualification for the purposes of registration under the Architects Act. Section 17  

of the Architects Act states that:   

―17. Effect of recognition.— Notwithstanding anything  

contained in any other law, but subject to the provisions of  

this Act, any recognised qualification shall be a sufficient  

qualification for enrolment in the register.‖  

26    

The import of Sections 14, 15 and 17 is that if an individual wishes to be a  

registered architect under the Architects Act, they must receive an educational  

qualification that is recognised as a valid qualification by virtue of its inclusion in  

the Schedule to the Architects Act or a notification under Section 15. The  

Schedule to the Architects Act contains a list of qualifications that are recognised  

in law as sufficient to warrant the holder of the qualification being enrolled as a  

registered architect. Thus, by creating a system of statutorily recognised  

educational qualifications, the Architects Act regulates those individuals who are  

eligible to be registered architects under the Act.    

23 Section 23 of the Architects Act provides that:   

―23. Preparation and maintenance of register.—(1) The  

Central Government shall, as soon as may be, cause to be  

prepared in the manner hereinafter provided a register of  

architects for India.   

(2) The Council shall upon its constitution assume the duty of  

maintaining the register in accordance with the provisions of  

this Act.   

(3) The register shall include the following particulars,  

namely:—   

(a) the full name with date of birth, nationality and  

residential address of the architect;   

(b) his qualification for registration, and the date on which  

he obtained that qualification and the authority which  

conferred it;   

(c) the date of his first admission to the register;   

(d) his professional address; and   

(e) such further particulars as may be prescribed by rules.‖  

27    

Section 23 provides for the maintenance of a register of architects in India. As the  

term ―architect‖ itself is defined to mean an individual registered under the  

Architects Act, the effect of registration of an individual under the Act is firstly to  

maintain a list of individuals who have a statutorily recognised educational  

qualification in the field of architecture and secondly to bring such individuals  

within the regulatory regime of the Architects Act. Section 29 sets out the  

procedure for the removal of individuals from the register, including on the ground  

of such individuals having misrepresented material facts at the time of  

registration, being undischarged insolvents, or having been convicted of offences  

involving moral turpitude. Section 30 provides the procedure for inquiries into  

misconduct by architects and Section 31 provides for the surrender of certificates  

by registered architects. Section 35 of the Architects Act stipulates that:   

―35. Effect of registration.—(1) Any reference in any law for  

the time being in force to an architect shall be deemed to be a  

reference to an architect registered under this Act.   

(2) After the expiry of two years from the date appointed  

under sub-section (2) of section 24, a person who is  

registered in the register shall get preference for appointment  

as an architect under the Central or State Government or in  

any other local body or institution which is supported or aided  

from the public or local funds or in any institution recognised  

by the Central or State Government.‖  

The consequence of Section 35 is that, where a statute refers to an ―architect‖  

such reference shall be deemed to mean a registered architect under the  

Architects Act. Clause (2) of Section 35 creates a statutory preference in favour  

of registered architects with respect to the appointment of candidates by the  

Central or state governments or local bodies or institutions which receive state  

aid.    

28    

24 Lastly, we may refer to the provision at the heart of the present  

controversy, Section 37 of the Architects Act which states:   

―37. Prohibition against use of title.—(1) After the expiry of  

one year from the date appointed under sub-section (2) of  

section 24, no person other than a registered architect, or  

a firm of architects shall use the title and style of  

architect:  

Provided that the provisions of this section shall not apply  

to—   

(a) practice of the profession of an architect by a person  

designated as a ―landscape architect‖ or ―naval architect‖;   

(b) a person who, carrying on the profession of an  

architect in any country outside India, undertakes the  

function as a consultant or designer in India for a specific  

project with the prior permission of the Central  

Government.  

Explanation.—For the purposes of clause (a),—  

(i) ―landscape architect‖ means a person who deals with  

the design of open spaces relating to plants, trees and  

landscape;   

(ii) ―naval architect‖ means an architect who deals with  

design and construction of ships.‖   

(Emphasis supplied)  

Clause (2) of Section 37 states that any person who contravenes the prohibition  

created in clause (1) of Section 37 shall be punishable on first conviction with a  

fine that may extend to five hundred rupees and on subsequent convictions with  

imprisonment which may extend up to six months or a fine not exceeding one  

thousand rupees or both.   

29    

Questions before this Court  

25  The present case raises two questions that this Court must answer:   

(i) Question 1: Does Section 37 of the Architects Act prohibit individuals  

not registered as architects under the Architects Act from practicing the  

activities undertaken by architects, including the design, supervision  

and construction of buildings; and  

(ii) Question 2: Whether a post titled ―Architect‖, ―Associate architect‖ or  

any other similar title using the term or style of ―Architect‖ can be held  

by a person not registered as an architect under the Architects Act.   

Question 1  

26 In answering the first question we must begin with the text of Section 37.  

The provision uses the phrase ―no person shall … use the title and style of  

architect‖. Therefore, on a plain reading of the section, the legal prohibition  

created is on the use of the ―title and style of architect‖. Title and style are distinct  

from practice. While a prohibition on the use of a title merely restricts an  

individual from attaching the said title to their name in referring to or representing  

themselves to others, a prohibition on practice creates a bar on the actual  

undertaking of specific actions. The most compelling evidence that the two  

concepts are materially distinct is the varied usage of the two phrases by the  

legislature. For example, clause (2) of Section 15 of the Indian Medical Council  

Act states:

30    

―(2) Save as provided in section 25, no person other than a  

medical practitioner enrolled on a State Medical Register,—  

(a) shall hold office as physician or surgeon or any other  

office (by whatever designation called) in Government or in  

any institution maintained by a local or other authority.  

(b) shall practice medicine in any State; …‖   

(Emphasis supplied)  

In setting out the legal bar applicable to individuals not registered on the State  

Medical Register, the Indian Medical Council Act clearly uses the term ―practice‖  

as distinct from ―hold office‖ or ―style and title‖. Similarly, Section 29 of the  

Advocates Act provides that:   

―29. Advocates to be the only recognised class of  

persons entitled to practise law.―Subject to the provisions  

of this Act and any rules made thereunder, there shall, as  

from the appointed day, be only one class of persons entitled  

to practice the profession of law, namely, advocates‖  

(Emphasis supplied)  

In making a distinction between individuals registered under the statute and those  

not registered, the Advocates Act clearly stipulates that unregistered individuals  

cannot ―practice‖ the profession of law. This stands in stark contrast to the text of  

the Architects Act which merely states that unregistered individuals cannot ―use  

the title and style of architect‖. Therefore, a plain reading of Section 37 clearly  

supports the proposition that the Architects Act prohibits individuals not registered  

with the Council of Architecture from using the title and style of ―Architect‖ and  

does not prohibit unregistered individuals from practicing the activities undertaken  

by architects such as the design, supervision and construction of buildings.     

31    

27 It has been contended that one of the objects and purposes of the  

Architects Act is to prevent untrained individuals from designing, supervising and  

constructing buildings. It has further been contended that registration under the  

Architects Act forms an essential part of the regulatory regime for architects as it  

ensures that architects possess adequate educational qualifications. Therefore, it  

is urged that Section 37 must be read in a manner which prohibits unregistered  

individuals from practicing the profession of architecture and cognate activities in  

order to prevent the harms arising from unqualified individuals providing critical  

architectural services. These submissions are ultimately premised on the  

argument that even if a plain reading of Section 37 does not support the  

argument of a prohibition on ―practice‖ this Court must nonetheless read the  

provision to include a prohibition on practice in order to avoid defeating the object  

and purpose of the Architects Act.   

28 It is well settled that the first and best method of determining the intention  

of the legislature is the very words chosen by the legislature to have the force of  

law. In other words, the intention of the legislature is best evidenced by the text of  

the statute itself. However, where a plain reading of the text of the statute leads  

to an absurd or unreasonable meaning, the text of the statute must be construed  

in light of the object and purpose with which the legislature enacted the statute as  

a whole. Where it is contended that a particular interpretation would lead to  

defeating the very object of a legislation, such an interpretative outcome would  

clearly be absurd or unreasonable. To determine whether the interpretation  

arrived at on a plain reading of the provision truly defeats the object of the statute

32    

as a whole, we may briefly delve into the legislative history of the Architects Act.  

To answer the question whether reading Section 37 as a prohibition merely on  

the use of the title and style of ―Architect‖ by unregistered individuals would in  

truth defeat the object and purpose of the Architects Act this Court may examine  

the reasons behind the enactment as a whole.   

29 The ―Statement of Objects and Reasons‖ given by the legislature in  

passing the Architects Act have been extracted below:   

―Since independence and more particularly with the  

implementation of the Five-Year Plans, the building  

construction activity in our country has expanded almost on a  

phenomenal scale. A large variety of buildings, many of  

extreme complexity and magnitude like multi-storeyed office  

buildings, factory buildings, residential houses, are being  

constructed each year. With this increase in the building  

activity, many unqualified persons calling themselves as  

Architects are undertaking the construction of buildings  

which are uneconomical and quite frequently are unsafe,  

thus bringing into disrepute the profession of architects.  

Various organisations, including the Indian Institute of  

Architects, have repeatedly emphasised the need for  

statutory regulation to protect the general public from  

unqualified persons working as architects. With the passing  

of this legislation, it will be unlawful for any person to  

designate himself as „architect‟ unless he has the  

requisite qualifications and experience and is registered  

under the Act.  

…  

3. The legislation protects the title “architects” but does  

not make the design, supervision and construction of  

buildings as an exclusive responsibility of architects.  

Other professions like engineers will be free to engage  

themselves in their normal vocation in respect of  

building construction work provided that they do not  

style themselves as architects.‖    

(Emphasis supplied)   

33    

The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Architects Act makes it evident  

that the legislature was undoubtedly concerned with the risk of unqualified  

persons undertaking the construction of buildings leading to costly and  

dangerous buildings. In guarding against this risk, the legislature first set out a  

minimum standard of statutorily recognised qualifications to be met before an  

individual is designated as an architect under the Architects Act. This is done by  

Sections 14, 15 and 17 of the Act. Next, the legislature created two classes of  

individuals: the first class consisted of registered architects satisfying these  

minimum qualifications and a second class of unregistered individuals who did  

not satisfy these minimum qualifications. This is the effect of Sections 2(a), 17, 23  

and 35 of the Architects Act. Crucially, the legislature chose to define an  

―architect‖ as an individual registered under the Architects Act and not as an  

individual practicing architecture or any cognate activities. Thus, the legislature  

limited the regulatory regime created by the Architects Act to the first class of  

individuals. In protecting the public from the risk of the second class, untrained  

individuals, the legislature had two options: first it could bar this second class of  

individuals from engaging in the profession altogether (as it had done with  

physicians and advocates); or alternatively it could prevent this second class of  

individuals from calling themselves ―Architects‖. The Statement of Objects and  

Reasons makes it clear that the legislature chose the second option and in fact  

went to great lengths to clarify that choice. The legislature stated that with the  

passing of the legislation, it shall be unlawful for an unregistered individual to  

―designate himself‖ as an architect. Further, it is expressly stated that the  

legislation protects the ―title‖ of architect but does not grant registered architects

34    

an exclusive right to undertake the design, supervision and construction of  

buildings. Other cognate professions or unregistered individuals may continue to  

carry out these activities provided that they do not refer to themselves as  

―Architects‖.   

30 It is evident that the legislature did not intend to create a prohibition on the  

practice of architecture and associated activities by unregistered individuals. As  

opposed to the case of physicians or surgeons under the Indian Medical Council  

Act or advocates under the Advocates Act, the legislature consciously chose to  

employ a less stringent measure in the case of architects, merely prohibiting  

unregistered individuals from using the ―title and style‖ of architect. It is not for  

this Court to delve into why the legislature made this choice. However, during the  

course of these proceedings a cogent and pragmatic reason for this choice has  

been placed before this Court, by the learned Attorney General of India and by  

way of the erudite opinion of Chief Justice Raveendran in the decision in  

Mukhesh Kumar Manhar to which we may briefly advert.   

31 The profession of architecture involves a wide range of activities including  

inter alia:   

(i) Taking instructions from clients and preparing designs;   

(ii) Site evaluation and analysis;   

(iii) Site design and development;   

(iv) Structural design;  

35    

(v) Design of sanitary, plumbing, sewage, drainage, and water supply  

structures;   

(vi) Design and structural integration of electrical and communications  

systems;   

(vii) Incorporation of heating, air-conditioning, ventilation and other  

mechanical systems including fire detection and prevention systems;  

and  

(viii) Periodic inspection and evaluation of construction work.    

These activities are undertaken by architects but are also carried out by  

architects in concert with a range of other actors including draughtspersons,  

builders, engineers, and designers. If the legislature were to impose an absolute  

prohibition against unregistered individuals from ‗practicing architecture‘ there  

would be considerable confusion as to what activities formed the practice of  

architecture and what did not. It may have resulted in a host of other legitimate  

professionals being barred from engaging in the design, supervision and  

construction of buildings merely because they were not registered under the  

Architects Act. Further, as the learned Attorney General of India brought to our  

attention, these varied professions form essential cogs in the overall machinery of  

construction in India and the design, supervision and construction of new  

structures cannot be done by architects alone. It would be unreasonable from a  

regulatory perspective to ask all professions touching upon the construction of  

new structures to obtain a degree in architecture.  

36    

32 Architecture undoubtedly constitutes a highly specialised profession  

requiring the possession of minimum educational qualifications. However,  

architects are by and large engaged by means of a contract for services. In other  

words, architects provide a set of specialised services towards the larger goal of  

construction. Architects are not embarking on construction independently of other  

actors. By virtue of the Architects Act, anybody engaging the services of an  

individual calling themselves an ―Architect‖ is assured that such an individual  

possesses statutorily recognised educational qualifications and is competent to  

complete the task at hand. It is in this manner that the legislature protects the  

common person from untrained individuals.   

33 For the above reasons, we affirm the decision of the High Court of  

Allahabad on the first question and hold that Section 37 of the Architects Act  

does not prohibit individuals not registered under the Architects Act from  

undertaking the practice of architecture and its cognate activities.   

Question 2   

34 The second question before this Court is whether a post titled ―Architect‖,  

―Associate architect‖ or any other similar title using the term or style of ―Architect‖  

can be held by a person not registered as an architect under the Architects Act.  

On this question, the High Court of Allahabad held that the ―mere nomenclature‖  

of a particular post will not violate the prohibition on the use of ―title and style‖ of  

architect under Section 37. In other words, even an individual not registered as  

an architect under the Architects Act can hold a post titled ―Architect‖ or

37    

―Associate Architect‖ because the name of the post amounted to ―mere  

nomenclature‖.   

35 While we have held that Section 37 does not prohibit the practice of  

architecture by unregistered individuals, it certainly does prohibit unregistered  

individuals from using the ―title and style‖ of architect. Under the scheme of the  

Architects Act, only individuals possessing the statutorily recognised minimum  

educational qualifications can apply for registration as an ―Architect‖ under the  

Act. Registration as an architect under the statute is thus a guarantee of  

possessing certain minimum educational qualifications. Section 37 prohibits  

unregistered individuals from designating themselves or referring to themselves  

as ―architects‖. The consequence of this regulatory regime is that when an  

individual is called an ―Architect‖ a reasonable person would assume that they  

are a registered architect under the Architects Act and as a consequence  

possess the requisite educational qualifications and specialised knowledge  

associated with architects.   

36 If an individual is appointed to a post titled ―Associate Architect‖, ―Architect‖  

or ―Senior Architect‖, they undoubtedly refer to themselves and are referred to by  

others as ―Architects‖. Holding a post using the term ―Architect‖ has the real-world  

consequence of being referred to as an architect. This is not a matter of mere  

nomenclature. As noted above, architecture is a specialised field of study.  

Crucially, the scheme of the Architects Act provides a direct nexus between the  

minimum educational qualifications required to be obtained, registration as an

38    

architect under the Act and the prohibition against the use of the title of  

―Architect‖ by those not registered under the Act. If a government post is titled  

―Architect‖ or ―Associate Architect‖, such a person certainly uses the title and  

style of ―architect‖ and consequently there is a reasonable assumption that such  

a person is registered under the Architects Act and holds a degree in architecture  

recognised by the Act. This assumption finds statutory backing in Section 35 of  

the Architects Act which provides that any reference to an architect in any other  

law shall be deemed to mean an architect registered under the Architects Act. To  

promote an individual who does not possess a degree in architecture recognised  

by the Act to a post titled ―Architect‖, ―Associate Architect‖ or of a similar style  

using the title or style of ―architect‖ would effectively violate the prohibition on the  

use of title contained in Section 37 of the Architects Act.  

37 In the present case, we recognise the power of NOIDA to provide and  

modify the minimum eligibility criteria for promotion of candidates to the posts of  

Associate Town Planner and Associate Architect. We further recognise that the  

authority has significant discretion in how it chooses to title the various posts  

under its supervision. However, to permit NOIDA to continue to title a post that  

includes individuals who are not registered architects under the Architects Act as  

―Associate Architect‖ would result in a violation of Section 37 of the Architects  

Act. In the case of Tulya Gogoi the High Court of Gauhati expressly held that the  

prohibition on the use of title and style of architect contained in Section 37 of the  

Architects Act applies to both private individuals and government employees. The  

reasoning of the High Court on this issue commends itself for our acceptance.

39    

The text of Section 37 makes no distinction between government employees and  

private individuals.   

38 The U.P. Industrial Area Development Act provides NOIDA with the power  

to make rules for the management of its internal affairs. In exercise of this power,  

NOIDA formulated the Service Regulations of 1981. Rule 16 of the Service  

Regulations sets out the ‗Sources of Recruitment‘ for posts under NOIDA‘s  

authority. By clause (iv) of Rule 16 NOIDA has the power to modify the sources  

of recruitment for posts under its supervision. It is in exercise of this power that  

NOIDA formulated the Promotion Policy of 2005 which sets out the sources and  

qualifications for recruitment in its various departments. It is well established that  

delegated legislation is susceptible to invalidity on the grounds of being ultra vires  

its parent legislation but also ultra vires other primary legislation. Where the  

provisions of a primary legislation (the Architects Act) are contradictory to the  

provisions of a delegated legislation (the Promotion Policy 2005), the provisions  

of the primary legislation must prevail. This principle is well established and has  

received articulation by this Court on several occasions. In Indian Express  

Newspapers v Union of India 17

Justice Venkataramiah speaking for a three-

judge Bench of this Court stated:   

―75. A piece of subordinate legislation does not carry the  

same degree of immunity which is enjoyed by a statute  

passed by a competent Legislature. Subordinate legislation  

may be questioned on any of the grounds on which plenary  

legislation is questioned. In addition, it may also be  

questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the  

statute under which it is made. It may further be questioned  

on the ground that it is contrary to some other statute.  

                                           17

(1985) 1 SCC 641

40    

This is because subordinate legislation must yield to  

plenary legislation. It may also be question on the ground  

that it is unreasonable, unreasonable not in the sense of not  

being reasonable, but in the sense that it is manifestly  

arbitrary. …‖    

(Emphasis supplied)   

The distinction made by the Allahabad High Court, that the Promotion Policy  

2005 was passed under a state legislation, namely the U.P. Industrial Area  

Development Act, and thus did not need to comport with the terms of the  

Architects Act as a central legislation is incorrect.   

39 For the reasons stated above, in response to the first question we affirm  

the decision of the High Court of Allahabad and hold that Section 37 of the  

Architects Act does not prohibit individuals not registered under the Architects Act  

from undertaking the practice of architecture and its cognate activities. In  

response to the second question we disapprove of the view of the High Court of  

Allahabad and hold that NOIDA cannot promote or recruit individuals who do not  

hold a degree in architecture recognised by the Architects Act to a post that uses  

the title or style of ―architect‖. However, the authority is free to change the  

nomenclature of the post to any alternative as long as it does not violate the  

provisions of the Architects Act by using the style and title of ―architect‖ in its  

name.   

41    

40 The appeals are partly allowed in the above terms. There shall be no order  

as to costs.   

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.   

…………...…...….......………………........J.                  [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]      

…..…..…....…........……………….…........J.                                                               [Ajay Rastogi]   New Delhi;  March 17, 2020.