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PETITIONER: CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NAGPUR CIVIL LINES, NAGPUR & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAMCHANDRA S/O GURUNATH MODAK & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT26/02/1981

BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA VARADARAJAN, A. (J) ERADI, V. BALAKRISHNA (J)

CITATION:  1984 AIR  626            1981 SCR  (3)  22  1981 SCC  (2) 714        1981 SCALE  (1)503

ACT:      City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948-Section 59(3) (b)- Municipal Commissioner is the competent authority to suspend municipal officers  and  servants,  pending  a  departmental inquiry-Words and  phrases "control" and "vests", explained- Criminal cases  to be  disposed off  to protect  the accused from  harassment-Departmental   inquiry,  whether   can   be continued after acquittal in a criminal case.

HEADNOTE:      During  the   construction  of  a  stadium  called  the Yeshwant Stadium,  which  was  being  looked  after  by  the respondents, two  accidents occurred  resulting in the death of seven  persons and  injuries to  eight persons. Pending a departmental inquiry  in the  said connection,  an order  of suspension was  passed by  the Municipal Commissioner on the 23rd  of   September,  1974   which  was  confirmed  by  the Corporation by  its order of the same date. According to the respondents the  later order  was not  communicated to them. Pursuant to a criminal complaint filed before it, the police filed a  charge-sheet under section 304-A Penal Code against the respondents  on the  25th of September, 1976. In view of the charge-sheet  submitted by  the police  another order of suspension was passed by the Municipal Commissioner on 13-1- 1977 with  effect from  8-10-76. The  respondents  filed  an appeal  to   departmental  appellate   authority  which  was dismissed  on   the  20th  of  July,  1977.  Thereafter  the respondents filed  a writ  petition in  the High Court which allowed the  petition taking  the view  that under the rules and byelaws  of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948, as amended upto date, the competent authority to pass orders of suspension  against  the  respondents  was  the  Corporation itself and  not the  Chief Executive Officer. The High Court quashed  the   orders  of   suspension  and   directed   the reinstatement of  the respondents  and payment of their full salary to them. Hence the appeal by special leave.      Allowing the appeal, the Court ^      HELD: 1:1.  Clause (b)  of Section 59(3) of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948 in express terms authorises and clothes  the   Municipal  Commissioner  with  the  power  to

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exercise supervision  and control over the acts of Municipal Officers and  servants and  hence he  is fully  competent to suspend the  Municipal  Officers  and  servants,  pending  a departmental inquiry. [24 H-25A: 26 F]      1: 2.  The term "control" is of a very wide connotation and amplitude  and includes  a large variety of powers which are incidental or consequential to achieve the powers vested in the authority concerned. Clause (b) of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act  is preceded  by the  Words  "vests  in  the commissioner". When the words "control" and "vests" are read together they are strong terms 23 which convey  an absolute  control in the authority in order to effectuate  the policy underlying the rules and makes the authority concerned  the sole  custodian of the servants and officers of the Municipal Corporation. [28 E, 25 A-B]      State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi, [1966] 1 SCR 771;  High Court  of Andhra  Pradesh and  Ors. v. V.V.S. Krishnamurthy and Ors., [1979] 1 SCR 26, followed.      2. Whether  or not  the  departmental  inquiry  pending against its  servants, if  he is  acquitted in  the criminal case, would  have to  continue is  a matter to be decided by the department  after considering the nature of the findings given by  the criminal  court. Normally where the accused is acquitted  honourably   and  completely  exonerated  of  the charges it would not be expedient to continue a departmental inquiry on the very same charges or grounds or evidence, but the  fact   remains  that  merely  because  the  accused  is acquitted, the  power of the authority concerned to continue the departmental  inquiry is  not  taken  away  nor  is  its direction in any way fettered. However, whether it is really worthwhile to continue the departmental inquiry in the event of the  acquittal after  the lapse  of number of years since the departmental inquiry has started is a relevant factor to be considered. [27 C-E]      Observation: Criminal  cases should  be disposed off as quickly as  possible so  as  to  protect  the  accused  from unnecessary harassment. [27 A]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal No. 396 of 1980. Appeal  by Special  Leave from  the Judgment and Order dated 3.10.  1979 of the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) in Special Civil Application No. 1501 of 1977.      G.S. Sanghi,  Mrs. Jayashri  Wad and  Mrs. Urmila Sirur for the Appellants.      P.V. Holay,  T.G. Narayana  Nair, M.S.  Gupta and  G.S. Sathe for Respondent No. 1 & 2.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      FAZAL ALI,  J. This appeal by special leave is directed against an  order of  the High  Court  of  Bombay  of  2/3rd October, 1979  by which  an order  passed suspending the two respondents was  quashed on  the ground  that the  order  of suspension pending  a departmental inquiry was passed by the Municipal Commissioner  who was not competent to suspend the respondents pending  a departmental  inquiry. The High Court was of  the view  that under  the Rules  and Bye-laws of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948(hereinafter referred to as the  ’Act’) as  amended uptodate, the competent authority to pass orders of suspension against the respondents was the Corporation itself  and not  the Chief Executive Officer. It appears that  originally the  order of suspension was passed by the Municipal Com-

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24 missioner on the 23rd September, 1974 which was confirmed by the Corporation  by its order dated 23rd September, 1974. It is alleged  by the  respondents that  latter order  was  not communicated  to   them.  The   suspension  was  ordered  in connection with  a  departmental  inquiry  relating  to  two accidents  which  occurred  during  the  construction  of  a stadium called  the Yeshwant Stadium, which was being looked after by  the respondents and which resulted in the death of seven persons  and injuries to eight others. A complaint was also filed  before the police as a result of which a charge- sheet  under   s.  304-A   I.P.C.  was   filed  against  the respondents, on  the 25th  September, 1976.  In view  of the charge-sheet  submitted  by  the  police  another  order  of suspension was  passed  by  the  Municipal  Commissioner  on 13.1.77 with  effect from  8.10.76. The respondents filed an appeal  to   departmental  appellate   authority  which  was dismissed  on   the  20th   July,  1977.   Thereafter,   the respondents filed  a writ  petition in  the High Court which allowed the petition and quashed the order of suspension and directed the  respondent to  be paid  their full  salary and further directed the reinstatement of the respondents. Hence this appeal.      The short  point taken  by Mr. Sanghi was that under s. 59 (3)  of  the  Act,  the  Municipal  Commissioner  is  the competent authority  to suspend  the respondents  pending  a departmental inquiry.  On a  perusal of  s. 59 (3) we are of the opinion  that the  contention is  well-founded and  must prevail. Section 59 (3) may be extracted thus:           "Section 59  (3) : Subject, whenever it is in this      Act expressly  so directed  to the approval or sanction      of the  Corporation or  of the  Standing Committee, and      subject also to all other restrictions, limitations and      conditions imposed  by this  Act, the  entire executive      power for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of      this Act vests in the Commissioner who shall also-           (a)........           (b) exercise supervision and control over the acts      and proceedings  of all municipal officers and servants      and subject to the rules or bye-laws for the time being      in force,  dispose of  all questions  relating  to  the      services of  the said  officers and  servants and their      pay, privileges and allowances. "(Emphasis ours)"      Thus clause (b) of s. 59(3) in express terms authorises and clothes  the Municipal  Commissioner with  the power  to exercise supervision 25 and  control   over  the  acts  of  Municipal  officers  and servants. It  may be  noticed that  the said  clause (b)  is preceded by  the words  ’vest in the Commissioner’. When the words ’control’  and ’vests’  are  read  together  they  are strong  terms  which  convey  an  absolute  control  in  the authority in  order to  effectuate the policy underlying the rules and  makes the  authority concerned the sole custodian of the control of the servants and officers of the Municipal Corporation.  In  the  case  of  State  of  West  Bengal  v. Nripendra  Nath   Bagchi(1)  while  interpreting  a  similar language employed  in Art.  235 of the Constitution of India which confers  control  by  the  High  Court  over  District courts, this  Court  held  that  the  word  ’control’  would include the  power to take disciplinary action and all other incidental or consequential steps to effectuate this end and made the following observations:           "The word "control", as we have seen, was used for      the  first   time  in   the  Constitution   and  it  is

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    accompanied by  the word "vest" which is a strong word.      It shows that the High Court is made the sole custodian      of the  control over the judiciary. Control, therefore,      is not  merely the  power to  arrange the  day  to  day      working of  the  court  but  contemplates  disciplinary      jurisdiction over the presiding Judge,"      ...                 ...                     ...           "In our  Judgment, the  control which is vested in      the High  Court is  a complete  control subject only to      the power  of the Governor in the matter of appointment      (including  dismissal  and  removal)  and  posting  and      promotion of  District Judges.  Within the  exercise of      the control  vested in  the High  Court, the High Court      can  hold  enquiries,  impose  punishments  other  than      dismissal or removal." This view  was reiterated  in High Court of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v.  V.V.S. Krishnamurhty  & Ors.(2)  where  this  Court clearly held that ’control’ included the passing of an order of  suspension   and  that   the  power   of   control   was comprehensive  and   effective   in   operation.   In   this connection, Sarkaria, J. speaking for the Court, observed as follows:-           "The interpretation  and scope  of Article 235 has      been the  subject of  several decisions  of this Court.      The position 26      crystalized by these decisions is that the control over      the subordinate  judiciary vested  in  the  High  Court      under Article 235 is exclusive in nature, comprehensive      in extent  and effective in operation. It comprehends a      wide variety of matters. Among others, it includes:      (a)  (i)   Disciplinary  jurisdiction  and  a  complete      control subject  only to  the power  of the Governor in      the  matter   of   appointment,   dismissal,   removal,      reduction in  rank  of  District  Judges,  and  initial      posting and  promotion to the cadre of District Judges.      In the  exercise of  this control,  the High  Court can      hold inquiries  against a  member  of  the  subordinate      judiciary, impose  punishment other  than dismissal  or      removal........      (ii) In  Article 235, the word ’control’ is accompanied      by the  word "vest"  which shows  that the  High  Court      alone is  made the  sole custodian  of the control over      the judiciary.  The control  vested in  the High Court,      being exclusive,  and not  dual, an  inquiry  into  the      conduct of  a member  of judiciary  can be  held by the      High Court alone and no other authority.........      (iii) Suspension  from  service  of  a  member  of  the      judiciary, with a view to hold a disciplinary inquiry."      It is  thus now  settled by  this Court  that the  term ’control’ is  of a  very wide  connotation and amplitude and includes a  large variety  of powers which are incidental or consequential to  achieve the powers vested in the authority concerned. In  the aforesaid  case, suspension  from service pending a disciplinary inquiry has clearly been held to fall within the  ambit of  the word  ’control’. On  a  parity  of reasoning, therefore, the plain language of clause (b) of s. 59 (3),  as  extracted  above,  irresistibly  leads  to  the conclusion  that   the  Municipal   Commissioner  was  fully competent to  suspend the respondents pending a departmental inquiry and hence the order of suspension passed against the respondents by  the Municipal  Commissioner did  not  suffer from any  legal infirmity. The High Court was, therefore, in error in  holding that the order of suspension passed by the Municipal Commissioner  was without  jurisdiction.  In  this

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view of  the matter  the order  of the  High Court cannot be maintained and has to be quashed.      We  might,   however,  mention  that  although  in  the criminal case  charge-sheet was  submitted as  far  back  as September, 1976 we 27 understand that no charges have been framed so far. Criminal cases should  be disposed of as quickly as possible so as to protect  the   accused  from   unnecessary  harassment.   We therefore direct  the Judicial  Magistrate  First  Class  of Nagpur to  dispose of  the Criminal  Case No.  1902 of  1976 pending in  his file  with  the  utmost  expedition  and  if possible within  six months from today. Mr. Sanghi on behalf of the  Municipality, states  that he  will fully  cooperate with the prosecution in producing all the available evidence before the court and bringing the case to a final conclusion within the period mentioned above.      The other  question that  remains is if the respondents are acquitted  in the  criminal  case  whether  or  not  the departmental inquiry  pending against  the respondents would have to continue. This is a matter which is to be decided by the department  after considering the nature of the findings given by  the criminal  court. Normally where the accused is acquitted  honourably   and  completely  exonerated  of  the charges it would not be expedient to continue a departmental inquiry on the very same charges or grounds or evidence, but the fact  remains, however,  that merely because the accused is acquitted,  the  power  of  the  authority  concerned  to continue the  departmental inquiry  is not taken away nor is its direction  in any  way fettered.  However, as quite some time has  elapsed since the departmental inquiry had started the authority  concerned will  taken into consideration this factor in  coming to  the conclusion  if it  is really worth while to  continue the  departmental inquiry in the event of the acquittal of the respondents. If, however, the authority feels that  there is sufficient evidence and good grounds to proceed with  the inquiry,  it can  certainly do so. In case the respondents  are acquitted  we direct  that the order of suspension shall  be revoked  and the  respondents  will  be reinstated and  allowed full  salary thereafter  even though the authority  chooses to  proceed  with  the  inquiry.  Mr. Sanghi states that if it is decided to continue the inquiry, as only  arguments have to be heard and orders to be passed, he will  see that the inquiry is concluded within two months from the  date of the decision of the criminal court. If the respondents are convicted, then the legal consequenses under the rules will automatically follow.      We might  mention that  at the  time when special leave was  granted   by  this  Court,  it  was  ordered  that  the respondents should  be paid  a lump-sum of Rs. 10,000/- each apart from  the 75% allowance. We think that in the interest of justice  the department  may not  insist on the refund of the amount of Rs. 10,000/- until the 28 result of  the departmental  inquiry and if the departmental inquiry concludes in their favour, the amount will be either refunded or adjusted against their dues.      With these observations, the appeal is accepted and the judgment of  the High  Court is  quashed. Parties  will bear their own costs throughout. S.R.                                         Appeal allowed. 29