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PETITIONER: CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY MADRAS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ALLADI KUPPUSWAMY

DATE OF JUDGMENT03/05/1977

BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA BHAGWATI, P.N. UNTWALIA, N.L.

CITATION:  1977 AIR 2069            1977 SCR  (3) 721  1977 SCC  (3) 385

ACT:         Estate  Duty Act, 1953--Sections 7(1) and (2) and  39--Scope         of.             Hindu  Joint   Family--Death  of  coparcener--Nature  of         interest  of widow--Widow not claiming partition during  the         life time--Death of widow--Whether interest in Joint  family         property   passes--Liability  to estate   duty--Estate  Duty         Act, 1953, Ss. 5, 6, 7(1), 39, 40(a) and (b)---Hindu Women’s         Rights to property Act, 1937, Section 3(2).         Construction    of    fiscal    statutes--Duty    of     the         court--Legislative   intent  reflected in the Acts  must  be         given full effect to.

HEADNOTE:             Shri  Alladi was a member of the Hindu coparcenary  con-         sisting  of himself his wife (Smt. Alladi) and  three  sons.         Shri  Alladi who died before the Estate Duty Act  1953  came         into force, during his life time had settled certain proper-         ties  absolutely on his wife and had also  declared  certain         other  properties to form part of the joint  family  proper-         ties.   Smt.  Alladi died on January 5, 1956, a  few  months         before  the passing of the Hindu Succession Act,  1956.  The         Assistant  Controller of Estate Duty valued her estate at  a         total  amount  of  Rs. 7,25,527/- including  a  sum  of  Rs.         2,02,271/-  being the value of her 1/4th share in the  joint         family  properties, on the footing that as Smt.  Alladi  was         a member of the Hindu coparcenary, her interest in the joint         family  properties. passed on her death to the  other  three         sons  and the value Of this interest being 1/4th, the  heirs         would  be  liable  to pay estate duty on the  value  of  the         1/4th,  share.   The respondent filed an appeal  before  the         Central  Board of Revenue and contended that as Smt.  Alladi         died as a Hindu widow she possessed no coparcenary  interest         which  could pass on her death; her interest merged  without         any benefit accruing or arising to the coparceners and hence         section 7 subsection (1) had no application.  This plea  did         not  find favour with the Board. which upheld the  order  of         the  Assistant  Controller of Estate Duty  as  correct.  The         Board further held that the Hindu widow’s. estate created by         s.  3(2) of the Hindu Widows Rights to Property  Act,  1937,         was an interest in property which ceased on the death of the

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       widow  attracting  estate duty.  Thereupon,  the  respondent         moved  the  Board  to make reference to the  High  Court  of         Madras for decision of the questions of law involved in  the         case.  The Board referred three questions to the High  Court         under  section  64(1)  of the Act, but at the  time  of  the         hearing  of  the  reference,  the  respondent  confined  his         arguments  only to the following issue, namely  "Whether  on         the  facts and in the circumstances of the case 1/4th  share         of the deceased in the joint family properties to which  she         was  entitled  under  s. 3 of the  Hindu  Womens  Rights  to         Property Act, 1937, was correctly included in her estate  as         property  deemed  to  pass on her death under s.  7  of  the         Estate  Duty  Act,  1953."  The High Court  relying  on  the         decisions of the Privy Council in Attorney General of Ceylon         v. Arunachalam Chettiar (1957) AC 513 and Gartside v. Inland         Revenue Commissioners 1968 AC 553 held that the interest  of         Smt. Alladi was not a coparcenary interest which could  have         passed under s. 7(1) of the Act and as the said interest was         incapable  of valuation, it was not exigible to estate  duty         and  thus   held against the  Revenue and in favour  of  the         accountable person.         Allowing the appeal by certificate, the Court,             HELD: (1) By virtue of the provisions of the Act of 1937         a  Hindu widow undoubtedly possess a  coparcenary   interest         as   contemplated  by  s. 7(1) of the Act and she is also  a         member  of the Hindu coparcenary as envisaged by s. 7(2)  of         the Act. [734 B]         722         (2)  Prior to the passing of the Act of 1937 a  Hindu  Woman         had  no right interest at all in a Hindu  coparcenary.   The         Act of 1937 bettered the rights a Hindu widow and  conferred         on  her by s. 3 the same interest as possessed her  husband.         [727 A]             (3)  The words "the same interest as he himself had"  in         sub-section (2) of s. 3 of the Act of 1937 clearly  indicate         that the statute gave effect to the well-settled doctrine of         Hindu shastric law that the persons of the husband after his         death continues through his wife who is a surviving half and         the  husband continues to live through the widow so long  as         the  widow is alive. When the Legislature used  the  expres-         sion’  "the same interest as he himself had", it  would  in-         clude  all the rights possessed by the husband  which  could         devolve   on the wife.  Thus, a Hindu widow  was  introduced         for  the  first time into the Hindu coparcenary  having  the         same rights as her husband and became as it were a member of         the  Hindu coparcenary with two qualifications, namely,  (i)         she had only a limited interest and (ii) that she could  not         be  a coparcener because having regard to the nature of  her         entry into the family after marriage with her husband, there         was no question of her getting interest in the  Hindu copar-         cenary by birth which is one of the most important incidents         of a Hindu coparcenary. [727 D-E]             (4) The essence of coparcenary property is the unity  of         ownership  which is vested in the whole body of  coparceners         and the two principal incidents of coparcenary are that  the         interest  of coparceners devolve by survivorship and not  by         inheritance  and  that the male issue of a  coparcenary  ac-         quires   an  interest in the coparcenary property  by  birth         and not as representing his father.                                                        [729 D-E]             (5)  A Hindu coparcenary has six essential  characteris-         tics, namely, (i) that the lineal male descendants upto  the         third  generation acquire an independent right of  ownership         by birth and not as representing their ancestors; (ii)  that         the  members of the coparcenary have the right to  work  out

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       their rights by demanding partition; (iii) that until parti-         tion,  each  member  has got ownership  extending  over  the         entire  property  jointly with the rest and so  long  as  no         partition takes place it is difficult for any coparcener  to         predicate  the share which he might receive; (iv) that as  a         result of such co-ownership the possession and enjoyment  of         the property is common; (v) that there can be no  alienation         of the property without the concurrence of the other  copar-         ceners  unless it be for legal necessity and (vi)  that  the         interest of a deceased member lapses on his death and merges         in  the coparcenary property.  Applying these tests  to  the         interest  of a Hindu widow who has been  introduced  into  a         coparcenary  by virtue of the Act of 1937, it will be  seen,         that  short  of the first condition she  possesses  all  the         necessary indicia of a coparcenary interest.  The fact  that         before the Act of 1956 she had the characteristic of a widow         estate in her interest in the property does not detract  any         the  less  from this position.  Therefore,  though  a  Hindu         widow  cannot be a  coparcener she has  conarcenary interest         and  is  also a member of the coparcenary by virtue  of  the         rights  conferred on her under the Act of 1937.   [731  F-H,         732 A-B-D]           State  Bank of India v. Ghamandi Ram (dead)  through  Shri         Gurbax Rai [1969] 3 SCR 681. 686 applied.             (6) If the widow has not chosen to exercise her right of         partition,  there no severenee of the Hindu coparcenary  and         on her death the interest of the widow merges in the  copar-         cenary property or lapses to the other coparceners.             Parappagari  Parappa  alias Harmmanthappa  and  Anr.  v.         Parappagari  Nagaman  and  Ors. ILR 1954  Madras  183;  S.T.         Sabujpari  and  Anr. v. Satrughan Isser and  Ors.  AIR  1958         Patna  405,  410 and Mst. Khatrant Kuer v.  Smt.  Tapeskwari         Kuer AIR 1964 Pat 261, approved.             (7)  It was not the intent of the legislature which  was         folly  aware of the statutory interest conferred on a  Hindu         widow by virtue of the Act of 1937 and the incidents thereof         that  though a Hindu widow has got the same interest as  her         husband  in the Hindu coparcenary and has also the right  to         demand         723         partition and her interest is a fluctuating one would  lapse         to the other coparceners in case of her death without  seek-         ing partition in the same manner as that of other  coparcen-         ers,  yet  it  should be exempt from estate  duty.   In  the         instant case, Smt. Alladi was a member of the Hindu coparce-         nary,  her interest was undoubtedly a  coparcenary  interest         which  lapsed on her death and merged into the  coparcenary.         It was clearly capable of valuation, it being covered by  s.         39  of the Act.  The High Court was in error in  basing  its         decision  on  the Arunachalam Chettiar’s case  and  also  in         Gartside’s  case  ignoring the decisions of this  Court  and         also the peculiar and special provisions of the Act. [732 F,         733 A-C]             Attorney-General  of  Ceylon  v.  Arunchalam    Chettiar         (1957)   AC  513  34 ITR (E.D.) 20 and  Gattside  v.  Inland         Revenue  Commissioners (1968) AC 553=70 ITR 663 (H.L.)  held         inapplicable.             (8)  It is wrong to contend that the widow could not  be         treated  either as a member of the Hindu coparcenary  or  as         having been conferred coparcenary  interest in the property.         Even  though the widow is not a coparcener in  the  strictly         legal  sense of the term, the interest which she has is  the         same  interest  as her husband and that is  the  coparcenary         interest  with the only limitation placed on her by s.  3(3)         of  the  Act  of 1937, namely, that her  interest  would  be

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       limited  interest, of a Hindu widow.  In the  instant  case,         Smt.  Alladi possessed a coparcenary interest  which  lapsed         on her death and merged into the coparcenary and was clearly         covered  by  the inclusive part of sub-s. (1) of  s.  7  and         under  s. 39, the value of the benefit accruing  or  arising         from the cesser of the coparcenary interest was to be deter-         mined  by  taking the principal value of the share  and  the         joint family property which would have been allotted to  her         had there been partition immediately before her death.   The         present  case  squarely falls within the ambit  of  s.  7(1)         latter  part  and sub-s. (2) of s. 7 of the Act  which   at-         tracts s. 39.  By  reason of the  inclusive part  of  sub-a.         (1) of s. 7 it must be taken to have passed on her death and         was hence exigible to estate duty. [733 D-G]             (9) When the phraseology of a particular section of  the         statute  takes  within its sweep the  transaction  which  is         taxable,  it is not for the court to strain and  stress  the         language  of  the section so as to enable the  tax-payer  to         escape the tax. The legislative intent reflected in the  Act         of 1937 and Estate Duty Act, 1953, must be given full effect         to. [733 H, 734 A]

JUDGMENT:         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2003/71             (From  the  Judgment and Order dated  5-12-1969  of  the         Madras High Court in Tax-Case No. 40 of 1965)             S.T.  Desai,  P.L.  Juneja and R.N.  Sachthey,  for  the         appellant.               G. Venkatarama Sastry, K.R. Ramamani and J. Ramamurthi         for the respondent.         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by             FAZAL  ALI, J.--This appeal by certificate  is  directed         against a Full Bench judgment of the Madras High Court dated         December  5, 1969-Alladi Kuppuswami v. Controller of  Estate         Duty,  Madras(1)--by  which the reference made to  the  High         Court by the Central Board of Revenue was answered in favour         of the accountable person and against the Revenue.  The case         involves  an  interesting and important question of  law  in         respect  of ambit and scope of ss. 7(1) & (2) as also 39  of         the         (1) 76 I.T.R. 500         7--707SCI/77          724         Estate Duty Act, 1953--hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’.         In  order to decide the question of law arising in  the  ap-         peal,  it may be necessary to set out briefly the  facts  of         the   case.    Sri  Alladi  Krishnaswami  Iyer   died   some         time.before  the passing of the Estate Duty Act,  1953,  but         during  his  life  time he had  settled  certain  properties         absolutely  on his wife Smt. Alladi  Venkatakshmamma--to  be         referred in short as ’Smt. Alladi’--and he had also declared         certain  other properties to from part of the  joint  family         properties.   Sri Alladi Krishnaswami Iyer hereafter  to  be         referred  to  as  "Shri Alladi" was a member  of  the  Hindu         coparcenary consisting of himself, his wife and three  sons.         In  the  instant case we are only concerned with  the  joint         family properties left by Shri Alladi.  Smt. Alladi died  on         January 5, 1956 a few months before the passing of the Hindu         Succession Act, 1956 and the Assistant Controller of  Estate         Duty  valued  her estate at a total amount ot  Rs.  7,25,527         including  a sum of Rs. 2,02,271 being the value of her  the         share  in the joint family properties.  The dispute  in  the         present  case centres round the inclusion of  the  aforesaid

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       sum of Rs- 2,02,271/-. The Revenue assessed the estate  duty         on  the footing  that  as  Smt. Alladi was a member  of  the         Hindu  coparcenary her interest in the joint family  proper-         ties  passed  on her death to the other three sons  and  the         value of this interest being 1/4th the heirs would be liable         to pay estate duty on the value of the 1/4th share  assessed         at  Rs. 2,02,271/-.  The accountable persons raised  several         contentions before the Revenue including the question as  to         whether or not the Act would apply to agricultural lands  as         also  whether interest on certain fixed deposits in  Govern-         ment  securities  would  be assessable under  the  Act.   It         appears, however, that before the High Court the  respondent         pressed  only the question relating to the inclusion of  the         value   of  1/4th  share  of  Smt.  Alladi  valued  at   Rs.         2,02,271/-. The respondent filed an appeal before the  Board         and contended that as Smt. Alladi died as a Hindu widow  she         possessed  no coparcenary interest which could pass  on  her         death:  her interest merged without any benefit accruing  or         arising   to  the coparceners and hence s. 7 sub-s. (1)  had         no  application.  The plea taken by the respondent  did  not         find  favour with the Central Board of Revenue which  upheld         the order of the Assistant Controller  of Estate Duty.             Thereupon  the respondent moved the Board of Revenue  to         make a reference to the High Court of Madras for decision of         the  questions of law involved in the case.  The  Board  ac-         cordingly  referred  the  following questions  to  the  High         Court:                             "1.  Whether,  on the facts and  in  the                       circumstances of the case, one-fourth share of                       the  deceased in the joint family  properties,                       to  which she was entitled under section 3  of                       the  Hindu  Women’s Rights  to  Property  Act,                       1937, was correctly included in her estate  as                       property  deemed  to pass on her  death  under                       section 7 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 ?                             2. Whether the Estate Duty Act. 1953, in                       so far as it seeks to levy duty on agricultur-                       al  lands, is ultra vires of  the  legislative                       powers of the Union Legislature ?                       725                             3.  Whether,  on the facts  and  in  the                       circumstances of the case, the accrued  inter-                       est  on fixed deposits and Government  securi-                       ties  up to the date of death of the  deceased                       was  correctly  included in her  estate  under                       section 34(2) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 ?         Although three questions had been referred to the High Court         by  the  Board at the hearing of the appeal  the  respondent         gave  up questions Nos. 2 and 3 and confined  his  arguments         only to question No. 1 which falls for determination in this         case.   The High Court, relying mainly on the  decisions  of         the Privy Council in Attorney-General of Ceylon v. Arunacha-         lam Chettiar;(1) and Gartside v. Inland Revenue’ Commission-         ers(2)  came  to the conclusion that the  interest  of  Smt.         Alladi  was  not  a coparcenary interest  which  could  have         passed  under s. 7 (1) of the Act and as the  said  interest         was incapable of valuation was not exigible to estate  duty.         Thereafter  the  appellant  applied to the  High  Court  for         granting  a certificate of fitness for leave. to  appeal  to         this  Court and the same having been granted the appeal  has         now been placed before us for hearing.             The respondent reiterated his contentions before us  and         submitted that s. 7(1) of the Act had no application to  the         facts of the present case, and therefore, the share of  Smt.         Alladi  was  not exigible to estate  duty.   The  appellant,

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       however,  submitted  that a Hindu widow  had  a  coparcenary         interest  in  the  joint family properties  which  could  be         valued  on the basis of the factors enumerated in s.  39  of         the  Act,  the High Court was in error in holding  that  the         interest  of Smt. Alladi was not capable of  any  valuation.         The appellant, therefore, submitted that the High Court  had         not correctly appreciated the legal nature and character  of         the  interest of the Hindu widow conferred on her by  virtue         of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937.             In our opinion the answer to the problem would naturally         lie in a correct interpretation of ss- 7(1) & (2) of the Act         as  also  on  a true construction of s. 3(2)  of  the  Hindu         Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937 as amended by Act 11 of         1938.  It is true that while this Court has had occasions to         interpret  the provisions of  the  Hindu Women’s  Rights  to         Property  Act,  1937--hereafter referred to as  the  Act  of         1937’---on  several  occasions, yet the  exact  point  which         arises  in  this case has not yet been  determined  by  this         Court.   In  order  to understand the  implications  Of  the         arguments advanced by counsel for the parties. before us, it         may  be necessary to extract the relevant provisions of  the         Act as also of the Act of 1937.  Section 7 sub-ss. (1) & (2)         of the Act run thus:                       "7. Interests ceasing on death,--                              (1)  Subject to the provisions of  this                       section, property in which the deceased or any                       other  person had an interest ceasing  on  the                       death of the deceased shall be deemed to  pass                       on the deceased’s death to the extent to which                       a benefit accrues                       (1957) A.C. 513--34 I.T.R. (E.D.) 20                       (2) (1968) A.C5.53--70 I.T.R. 663 (II. L.)                       726                       or  arises  by the cesser  of  such  interest,                       including, in particular, a coparcenary inter-                       est  in the joint family property of  a  Hindu                       family governed by the Mitakshara, Marumakkat-                       tayam or Aliyasantana law.                               (2) If a member of a Hindu coparcenary                       governed by the Mitakshara school of law dies,                       then the  provisions  of sub-section (1) shall                       apply  with  respect to the  interest  of  the                       deceased in the coparcenary property only :--                            (a)  if  the deceased had  completed  his                       eighteenth year at the time of his death, or                               (b)  where  he had not  completed  his                       eighteenth year  at the time of his death,. if                       his  father or other male as  cendant  in  the                       male  line  was not a coparcener of  the  same                       family at the time of his death."         It  would  be seen that s. 7(1) consist  of  two  parts--the         first  part  refers to the interest of  the  deceased  which         ceases  on his death and according to this part  two  condi-         tions are necessary before there is a passing of the  inter-         est--(1)  that  there must be a cesser of the  interest   by         virtue  of  the  death of the deceased; and (2)  that  as  a         result  of  such cesser a benefit accrues  or  arises.   The         second  part  of sub-s. (1) contains an  inclusive  category         which  brings  within the fold of sub-s. (1)  a  coparcenary         interest  in  the joint family property of  a  Hindu  family         governed by the Mitakshara, Marumakkattayarn or Aliyasantana         law.  In the instant case, we are mainly concerned with  the         Mitakshara  law.  We might dispose of a short  argument  ad-         vanced  by Mr. S.T. Desai in support of the appeal  on  this         question.  It was submitted that the words "governed by  the

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       Matakshara,  Marumakkattayam  or Aliyasan ana  law"  clearly         show that the coparcenary interest  has been used in a  wide         sense  and  cannot be restricted to the  strict  coparcenary         interest  known  to the Mitakshara law alone-  In  the  view         which we take in this case, however, it is not at all neces-         sary to go into this point.  The main question for  determi-         nation  is  as to whether the interest acquired by  a  Hindu         widow under the Act of 1937 can be said to be a  coparcenary         interest in the legal sense of the term.  Once a Hindu widow         is held to have a coparcenary interest, then there would  be         no  difficulty  in  treating her as a member  of  the  Hindu         coparcenary,  in  which case her interest  could  be  easily         valued  according to the relevant provision of s. 39 of  the         Act  which  runs thus:                              "39.  (1)  The  value  of  the  benefit                       accruing  or   arising from the  cesser  of  a                       coparcenary  interest  in  any  joint   family                       property governed by the. Mitakshara school of                       a  Hindu  law which ceases on the death  of  a                       member thereof shall be the principal value of                       the  share in the joint family property  which                       would  have been allotted to the deceased  had                       there been a partition immediately before  his                       death."                       In order to understand the content and charac-                       ter  of the interest which a Hindu widow  gets                       by  virtue  of the statutory  provisions  con-                       tained in                       727                       the  Act  of 1937 there can be no  doubt  that                       prior  to  the passing of the Act  of  1937  a                       Hindu woman had no right or interest at all in                       a Hindu coparcenary.  She was neither a copar-                       cener nor a member of the coparcenary nor  did                       she have any interest in it, except the  right                       to get maintenance.  She also had no right  to                       demand partition of  the coparcenary  property                       after  the death of her husband.  The Act   of                       1937 introduced broad and important changes by                       bettering  the  rights of a  Hindu  widow  and                       conferring  on her the same interest  as  pos-                       sessed  by her husband.  Sub-sections (2)  and                       (3) of s. 3 of the Act of 1937 run thus:                             "(2) When a Hindu governed by any school                       of  Hindu law other than the Dayabhaga  school                       or by customary law dies having at the time of                       his death an interest in a Hindu joint  family                       property,  his  widow shall,  subject  to  the                       provisions  of  sub-section (3), have  in  the                       property   the   same interest as  he  himself                       had."                             "(3)Any  interest devolving on  a  Hindu                       widow   under the provisions of  this  section                       shall be the limited interest known as a Hindu                       Woman’s  estate,  provided  however  that  she                       shall  have the same right of claiming  parti-                       tion as a male owner.         The  words "the same interest as he himself had" in  sub  s.         (2)  of  s. 3 of the Act of 1937 clearly indicate  that  the         statute  gave effect to the well settled doctrine  of  Hindu         Shastric  Law  that the persons of the.  husband  after  his         death  continues through his wife who is the surviving  half         of the husband and the husband continues to live through the         widow so long as the widow is alive.  It was this concept of         the  Hindu Law which was sought to be recognised  and  given

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       effect  to  by  the Act of 1937.   In  these  circumstances,         therefore,  when’ the Legislature used the  expression  "the         same  interest as he himself had" it would include  all  the         bundle  of rights possessed by the husband which  would  de-         volve on the wife and if there were to be any limitations on         those rights they were spelt out by subs. (3) itself,  name-         ly, that while the Hindu widow would have the same right and         interest  as  her husband, her interest would  only  be  the         limited  interest  known as a  Hindu Woman’s  estate.   Sub-         section (2) of s. 3 of the Act of 1937 further conferred  on         the widow the right to demand partition and on partition she         was entitled to get the same share as her husband.  Thus the         position appears to be that a Hindu widow was introduced for         the  first time into the Hindu coparcenary having  the  same         rights as her husband and became as it were a member of  the         Hindu  coparcenary with two qualifications, viz.,  (1)  that         she  had only a limited interest; and (2)that she could  not         be  a coparcener because having regard to the nature of  her         entry into the family after marriage with her husband  there         was no question of her getting interest in the Hindu  copar-         cenary by birth which is one of the most important incidents         of a Hindu coparcenary. All the other rights of a coparcener         were duly conferred on her by the Act of 1937.             Dwelling on the content and import of the nature of  the         interest  of a Hindu widow this Court pointed out in  Jaisri         Sahu v. Rajdewan         728         Dubey  &  Others(1)  that on the death of  her  husband  the         properties vested in the widow and she fully represented the         estate.   In this connection, this Court made the  following         observations:                         "When  a widow succeeds as heir to her  hus-                       band,  the   ownership in the properties, both                       legal  and  beneficial, vests   in  her.   She                       fully  represents the estate, the interest  of                       the    reversioners  therein being  only  spes                       succession’s.  The widow   is entitled to  the                       full  beneficial enjoyment of the  estate  and                       is not accountable to any one. It is true that                       she  cannot alienate the properties unless  it                       be  for  necessity  or for  benefit  to    the                       estate, but  this restriction on her powers is                       not one imposed for the benefit of  reversion-                       ers  but  is an incident of  the    estate  as                       known to Hindu law."                           Similarly in a later case in Potti Lakshmi                       Perumallu   v.  Potti  Krishnavenamma(2)  this                       Court  reiterated that a Hindu widow  was  the                       surviving  half of her husband and so long  as                       she was alive the husband continued to live in                       her.  This ’Court observed as follows:                              "The  decisions  also  recognise   that                       though  the  widow does not, by virtue of  the                       interest given to her by the new law become  a                       coparcener she being entitled to claim  parti-                       tion  of the joint family property is  in  the                       same  position in which her  deceased  husband                       would  have been in the matter of exercise  of                       that  right.   That is to  say,  according  to                       these decisions her interest is a  fluctuating                       one  and  is liable to  increase  or  decrease                       according as there are accretions to or  dimi-                       nutions of the property.  In our opinion these                       decisions lay down the law correctly."         It  may be pertinent to note that in the aforesaid case  the

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       Court  was  considering the nature of the interest  which  a         widow  derived by virtue of the statutory substitution  con-         tained in s.3(2) of the Act of 1937. It was also pointed out         that  like  other  coparceners of a  Hindu  coparcenary  the         interest of a widow until separated by a partition continued         a  fluctuating  one  which was liable to  increase  case  or         decrease with the deaths or additions in the family.                    In Satrughan Isser v. Smt. Subujpari &  Others(3)         this  Court  pointed out that the interest  conferred  on  a         Hindu  widow arose by statutory substitution and the Act  of         1937  introduced  changes  which were go far  alien  to  the         structure  of a Hindu coparcenary.  In this  connection  the         Court observed as follows:                              "The  Act in inventing the widow  of  a                       member  of  a coparcenary  with  the  interest                       which the member had at the time of his  death                       has introduced changes which are alien to the                       (1) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 558, 564-565.                       (2) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 26, 33.                       (3) [1967] 1 S,C.R. 7.                       729                       structure of a coparcenary.  The interest of a                       widow arises not by inheritance nor by  survi-                       vorship, but by statutory substitution:                             A Hindu coparcenary under the Mitakshara                       school  consists of males alone:  it  includes                       only  those  members who acquire by  birth  or                       adoption interest in the coparcenary property.                       The essence of coparcenary property  is  unity                       of ownership which is vested in the whole body                       of  coparceners.  While it remains  joint,  no                       individual  member can predicate of the  undi-                       vided  property that he has a  definite  share                       therein.  The interest of each  coparcener  is                       fluctuating,  capable   of being  enlarged  by                       deaths,  and  liable to be diminished  by  the                       birth  of sons to coparceners: it is  only  on                       partition  that the coparcener can claim  that                       he  has become entitled to a  definite  share.                       The  two  principal incidents  of  coparcenary                       property are: that the interest of coparceners                       devolves  by survivorship and not  by  inheri-                       tance; and that the mate issue of a coparcener                       acquires   an  interest  in  the   coparcenary                       property  by  birth, not as  representing  his                       father  but in his own independent  right  ac-                       quired by birth."                       As  pointed out above the essence of  coparce-                       nary property is the unity of ownership  which                       is vested in the whole body of coparceners and                       the  two  principal incidents  of  coparcenary                       property are that the interest of  coparceners                       devolves  by survivorship and not  by  inheri-                       tance and that the male issue of a  coparcener                       acquires   an  interest  in  the   coparcenary                       property by birth and not as representing  his                       father.  Alter having described the  incidents                       of a Hindu coparcenary, the Court proceeded to                       observe as follows:                             "By the Act (Act of 1937) certain  anti-                       thetical concepts are sought to be reconciled.                       A widow of a coparcener is invested by the Act                       with  the same interest which her husband  had                       at  the time of his death in the  property  of                       the  coparcenary.  She is  thereby  introduced

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                     into the coparcenary, and between the  surviv-                       ing  coparceners of her husband and the  widow                       so  introduced,  there  arises  community   of                       interest  and  unity of possession.   But  the                       widow does not on that account become a copar-                       cener: though invested with the same  interest                       which her husband had in the property she does                       not acquire the right which her husband  could                       have exercised over the interest of the  other                       copareeners.   Because of statutory  substitu-                       tion  of  her  interest  in  the   coparcenary                       property  in place of her husband,  the  right                       which  the  other coparceners  had  under  the                       Hindu  law of the Mitakshara school of  taking                       that  interest  by the  rule  of  survivorship                       remains  suspended  so  long  as  that  estate                       enures.        *         *         *  She  has                       still  power to make her interest definite  by                       making a demand for partition, as a male owner                       may.  If the widow                       730                       after  being introduced into family  to  which                       her  husband belonged does not seek partition,                       on the termination of her estate her  interest                       will merge into the coparcenary property."                       Again  this Court did not approve of  the  as-                       sumption  made by some Courts that  the  fight                       vested  in the widow was liable to revert  to-                       the  coparcenary,  even where, on  demand  for                       partition it became separated from the  copar-                       cenary  property, and in this connection  this                       court observed as follows:                               "The assumption that though the  right                       vested  in the widow by the Act is a right  of                       property  which  may on demand  for  partition                       become separated from the coparcenary property                       it  is still liable to revert to the  coparce-                       nary  on  the  determination  of  the  widow’s                       estate,  does  not  give full  effect  to  the                       statutory  conferment  upon the widow  of  the                       same  right  of claiming partition as  a  mate                       owner".                       Finally this Court approved of certain  obser-                       vations  made  by  the Madras  High  Court  in                       Parappagari  Parappa  alias  Hammanthappa  and                       Another  v. Parappagari Nagamma and  others(1)                       where  Subba  Rao J.as he then was,  made  the                       following observations:                              "She could ask for partition and  sepa-                       rate  possession of her husband’s  share.   In                       case  she asked for partition,  her  husband’s                       interest  ’should be worked out having  regard                       to  the circumstances obtaining in the  family                       on  the  date of partition.   If  she  divided                       herself  from the other members of the  family                       during  her  lifetime,  on  her  demise    the                       succession  would be traced to her husband  on                       the  basis that the property was his  separate                       property.   If  there was  no  severance,   it                       would  devolve  by survivorship to  the  other                       members  of the joint Hindu family :"  It  is,                       therefore,  manifest from the aforesaid  deci-                       sion  that  if  the widow had  not  chosen  to                       exercise  her right of partition, there is  no                       severance of the Hindu coparcenary and on  her

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                     death the interest of the widow merges in  the                       coparcenary  property or lapses to  the  other                       coparceners. As already indicated above,  this                       Court in Satrughan v. Smt. Sabujpari &  others                       (supra)  had taken the same view and had  con-                       firmed  the  Division Bench  decision  of  the                       Patna High Court in Smt. Sabujpari and another                       v.  Satrughan Isser and others(2),  where  the                       Patna High Court after considering the  entire                       law on the subject, observed thus:                            "After  having  considered  the   various                       authorities  and  the various aspects  of  the                       case,  my  conclusions  are  that,  under  the                       Provisions  of the Act a widow of  a  deceased                       coparcener  is placed in same position as  the                       deceased coparcener was, for the reason of the                       fiction  that  half the body of  the  deceased                       husband survived in the widow; that, like  her                       husband, the widow also is entitled to  effect                       severance of the joint status                       (2) A.I.R. 1958 Pat. 405, 410.                       731                       of the family by an unequivocal expression  of                       intention separate;*      *        * that   in                       case the widow does not exercise her right  of                       partition  and  dies  without  expressing  any                       intention  to  separate, the interest  of  the                       husband, which she enjoyed, goes by  survivor-                       ship  to  the  other  members  of  the   joint                       family."                       We  find ourselves in complete agreement  with                       the observations made by the Patna High  Court                       to which one, of us (Untwalia, J., as he  then                       was) was a party.  The view taken by the Patna                       High Court in the aforesaid case was later  on                       approved  by  a Full Bench of the  Patna  High                       Court in Mst. Khatrani Kuer v. Smt. Tapeshwari                       Kuer(1).                           In  State  Bank of India v.  Ghamandi  Ram                       (dead) through Shri Gurbux Rai(2), this Court,                       while  dealing  with the  incidents  of  Hindu                       coparcenary, observed as follows:                          "According  to  the  Mitakshara  School  of                       Hindu Law all   the property of a Hindu  joint                       family  is held in  collective   ownership  by                       all the coparceners in a quasi-corporate capa-                       city.    *       *      *     The incidents of                       coparcenership  under the Mitakshara law  are:                       first, the lineal male descendants of a person                       up to the  third  generation, acquire on birth                       ownership  in  the  ancestral   properties  is                       common;  secondly, that no alienation  of  the                       property.  any time work out their  rights  by                       asking  for  partition;  thirdly,  that   till                       partition  each member has got  ownership  ex-                       tending  over the entire property,  conjointly                       with  the rest; fourthly, that as a result  of                       such co-ownership the possession and enjoyment                       of the properties is common; fifthly, that  no                       alienation of the property is possible  unless                       it  be for necessity, without the  concurrence                       of  the  Coparceners, and  sixthly,  that  the                       interest  of a deceased member lapses  on  his                       death  to the survivors.  A coparcenary  under                       the Mitakshara School is a creature of law and

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                     cannot  arise  by  act of  parties  except  in                       so  far that on adoption the adopted  son  be-                       comes a coparcener with his adoptive father as                       regards  the ancestral properties of the  lat-                       ter."         Thus  analysing the ratio of a aforesaid case regarding  the         incidents  of  a Hindu coparcenary it would  appear  that  a         Hindu coparcenary has six essential characteristics, namely,         (1) that the lineal male descendants up to the third genera-         tion acquire an independent right of ownership by birth  and         not as representing their ancestors; (2) that the members of         the  coparcenary have the right to work out their rights  by         demanding  partition; (3) that until partition, each  member         has  got. ownership extending over the entire property  con-         jointly  with  the. rest and so long as no  partition  takes         place,  it is difficult for any copercener to predicate  the         share  which he might receive; (4) that as a result of  such         co-ownership the possession and enjoyment of the property iS         common; (5) that there can be no alienation of the  property         without           (1) A.I.R. 1964 Pat 261. [19691 3 S.C.R, 681,686.         732         the  concurrence of the other coparceners unless it  be  for         legal  necessity;  and (6) that the interest of  a  deceased         member  lapses  on his death and merges in  the  coparcenary         property.   Applying these tests to the interest of a  Hindu         widow  who has been introduced into a coparcenary by  virtue         of  the Act of 1937, we find that, excepting  condition  No.         (1),  all other conditions are fully satisfied in case of  a         Hindu  widow succeeding to the interest of her husband in  a         Hindu  coparcenary.   In other words,  after  her  husband’s         death  the  Hindu widow under the Act of 1937  has  got  the         right  to demand partition, she cannot predicate  the  exact         share  which she might receive until partition is made,  her         dominion extends to the entire property conjointly with  the         other members of the coparcenary, her possession and  enjoy-         ment  is  common, the property cannot be  alienated  without         concurrence  of  all the members of the family,  except  for         legal  necessity,  and  like other  coparceners  she  has  a         fluctuating interest ’in the property which may be increased         or  decreased by deaths or additions in the family.   It  is         manifest that she cannot fulfil the first condition, because         she enters the coparcenary long after she is born and  after         she  is married to her husband and acquires his interest  on         his death.  Thus, short of the first condition, she possess-         es all the necessary indicia of a coparcenary interest.  The         fact that before the Act of 1956, she had the characteristic         of  a widow-estate in her interest in the property does  not         detract any the less from this position.  It must follow  as         a  logical corollary that though a Hindu widow cannot  be  a         coparcener,  she has coparcenary interest and she is also  a         member of a coparcenary by virtue of the rights conferred on         her under the Act of 1937.             There  is  yet another important aspect  of  the  matter         which  has  to be considered.  At the time when  the  Estate         Duty Act was passed in 1953, the Legislature was fully aware         of the statutory interest conferred on a widow by virtue  of         the Act of 1937 and the incidents thereof. In these  circum-         stances  it is not reasonable to infer that the  Legislature         could  have intended that though a Hindu widow has  got  the         Same  interest as her husband in the Hindu  coparcenary  and         has  also  the right to demand partition  and  her  interest         which is a fluctuating. one would lapse to the other  copar-         ceners in case of her death without seeking partition in the         same  manner as that of other coparceners, yet it should  be

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       exempt from estate duty.             The  sheet-anchor of the argument of the respondent  was         the  Privy Council decision in Arunachalam  Chettiar’s  case         (supra).   In  the first place, the facts of that  case  are         clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present  case.         In  that  case,  the Hindu  undivided  family  consisted  of         father,  son  and  some female members.   According  to  the         Privy   Council,  the  females  were  merely   entitled   to         maintenance.  The females there could not have any  interest         in  the coparcenary nor could any such argument be  advanced         because  there  was no statute similar to the Act  of  1937.         Moreover,  in  the  Estate Duty Ordinance  which  was  being         construed  by  the  Privy  Council  there  was  neither  any         provision  like the inclusive part of sub-s. (1) and  sub-s.         (2)  of s. 7 nor any provision similar to s. 39 of the  Act.         In these circumstances, we do not see how the Privy  Council         decision in Arunachalam Chattiar’s case         733         (supra)  can be called in aid to support the  contention  of         the respondent.  In the instant case, once it is held, as it         must be, that Smt. Alladi was a member of the Hindu coparce-         nary,  her interest was undoubtedly a  coparcenary  interest         which  lapsed on her death and merged into the  coparcenary.         It  was also clearly capable of valuation, unlike the  posi-         tion in Arunachalam Chettiar’s case where the Privy  Council         was  construing  a provision  similar to s. 40 of  the  Act,         which,  in  our opinion, has no application in  the  present         case, it being covered by s. 39 of the Act.  A fortiori  the         same  observations apply to the case of Gertside  v.  Inland         Revenue Commissioners (supra).  That case has no application         here  where  we are concerned with the concept  of  a  Hindu         coparcenary  which is totally alien to the  estates  contem-         plated  under the English Acts.  For these  reasons,  there-         fore,  we  are  clearly of the opinion that  the  two  cases         relied  upon  by the High Court do not appear to be  of  any         assistance  in deciding the points at issue in  the  present         appeal, and the High Court was in error in basing its  deci-         sion  on the aforesaid cases ignoring the decisions of  this         Court  as  also the peculiar and special provisions  of  the         Act.             Finally,  it was vehemently contended by Mr. Sastri  for         the respondent that the right of a Hindu widow under the Act         of 1937 was merely a statutory substitution of a new  status         by  her introduction into the copercenary and she could  not         be  treated  either as a coparcener or a me,  tuber  of  the         copercenary or to possess any kind of coparcenary  interest.         While we agree that the widow after the introduction in  the         coparcenary  could not be held to have become a  coparcener,         because one of the essential characteristics of a  coparcen-         er,  namely,  acquisition of interest by  birth,  is  wholly         wanting  in  her case, yet when the  Legislature  which  was         fully  aware of the status of a Hindu widow under the  Shas-         tric  Law  chose to improve her status by conferring  a  new         right  on  her under the Act of 1937, and with  this  avowed         object clothed her with all the rights and concomitants of a         coparcener’s  interest,  it is futile to  contend  that  the         widow  could not be treated either as a member of the  Hindu         coparcenary or as having been conferred coparcenary interest         in the property.  Even though the widow is not a  coparcener         in the strictly legal sense of the term, the interest  which         she has is the same interest as her husband and that is  the         coparcenary interest with the only limitation placed on  her         by  s.  3(3) of the Act of 1937, namely, that  her  interest         would be the limited interest of a Hindu widow. The  conclu-         sion is therefore inescapable that Smt. Alladi did possess a

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       coparcenary  interest which lapsed on her death  and  merged         into the coparcenary and the case was clearly covered by the         inclusive  part  of sub-s. (1) of s. 7 and under s.  39  the         value of the benefit accruing or arising from the cesser  of         her coparcenary interest was to be determined by taking  the         principal  value of the share in the joint  family  property         which  would  have been allotted to her, had  there  been  a         partition immediately before her death.              The  last plank of the argument of the  respondent  was         that  the Estate Duty Act being a fiscal statute  should  be         construed  strictly so as to give every benefit of doubt  to         the subject.  There can be no quarrel with this  proposition         but  when  the phraseology of a particular  section  of  the         statute takes within its sweep the transaction which is         734         taxable,  it is not for the Court to strain and  stress  the         language  of  the section so as to enable the  tax-payer  to         escape  the tax.  In the view that we take in this case,  it         is manifest that the legislative intent reflected in the Act         of  1937  and the Estate Duy Act, 1953, must be  given  full         effect.         Summarising,  therefore,  the position that  emerges  is  as         follows:             By  virtue of the provisions of the Act of 1937 a  Hindu         widow  undoubtedly possesses a coparcenary interest as  con-         templated  by s. 7( 1 ) of the Act and she is also a  member         of  a Hindu copercenary as envisaged by s. 7(2) of the  Act.         On the death of Smt. Alladi, therefore, there was clearly  a         cesser of her interest and her interest merged in the coper-         cenary property and by reason of the inclusive part of  sub-         s.  (1  ) of s. 7, it must be taken to have  passed  on  her         death  and  was hence exigible to estate  duty.   Since  Smt         Alladi  was  a member of the copercenary, this  interest  of         her’s  which passed on her death was liable to be valued  in         accordance with the method provided by s. 39 of the Act.             The interpretation of s. 40 of the Act is not free  from         difficulty,  but as the present case squarely  falls  within         the ambit of s. 7 (1 ) latter part and sub-s. (2) of s. 7 of         the Act which attracts s. 39, it is not    at all  necessary         for  us  to enter into the complex domain of the  scope  and         ambit of s. 40 of the Act in this case.             The  result is that the appeal is allowed, the  judgment         of the High Court is set aside and the question referred  to         the  High Court is answered in the affirmative.  There  will         be no order as to costs.         S.R.                                                  Appeal         allowed.         735